The Armed Struggle? the Dissidents Analysed

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Colm Bryce

On a gable wall at the top of Westland locked in a political battle with Sinn Féin Street, in the Bogside in Derry, a billboard which prevents them from acknowledging was erected in 2009, shortly after Sinn or analysing why the Provisionals before Féinleader Martin McGuinness denounced them failed to win their military struggle the republicans who had just killed po- against the British. The message also hints lice officer Stephen Carroll in Craigavon at the continued military might of British as ‘traitors to the island of Ireland’. Il- imperialism, now tied into wider US im- lustrated with a photo of an armed British perial ambitions internationally, which will soldier, it reads: not be shifted by an urban guerrilla force which is a pale shadow of the Provisional Those who administer British IRA at their height. rule are traitors They havent Beyond the membership of the armed gone away you know Iraq, groups and their immediate supporters, Afghanistan, Ireland1 there are many in the North who are disenchanted with the outcome of the years The billboard is a stones-throw from of struggle. The economic crisis has ex- Martin McGuinness’s house; deliberately tinguished the vague promise that life so. Its message, its use of republican prin- would improve for working-class commu- ciple against the Sinn Féinleadership and nities. Even the minimal hopes placed in the allusion to the violence of British impe- the Stormont Executive that local politi- rialism in discredited wars abroad, and the cians would be more responsive to peo- fact that it remains there, is an indication ple’s needs than the Westminster govern- of a renewed momentum among armed re- ment are daily crumbling. Sectarian divi- publican groups in Derry, something that sion, far from withering, is in many ways is reproduced elsewhere in the North. more entrenched than ever. And the con- Yet it is also a testimony to their fa- tinual revelations and inquiries into mur- tal weakness. All of the armed republi- ders and collusion, are reminders of the key can groups are splinters from the Provi- role that state violence played in the con- sional IRA and they are marked by the flict, despite the Good Friday Agreement’s failure of the Provos struggle. The Con- attempt to airbrush their role out of his- tinuity IRA (CIRA) broke from the Pro- tory and present the Troubles as being be- visionals in 1986 at the beginning of Sinn tween two communities. Féin’smove to electoralism; the Real IRA (RIRA) was formed in 1997, as the peace Within this, there are many who baulk negotiations reached their conclusion; and at the contortions that Sinn Féinhave un- Oglaigh´ na hEireann´ (ONH) emerged after dergone in the 19 years of the peace pro- 2005, from among former Provisionals dis- cess, who are still opposed to internment of illusioned with the outcome of the Good republican prisoners and police harassment Friday Agreement. The armed republican of active republicans, but who remained groups, since their inception, have been unconvinced that armed struggle is the an- 1The billboard was erected by the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, political wing of the Real IRA

25 swer. The moral condemnation of gun and ples, stretching back, in an unbroken his- bomb attacks by the British government torical thread, through the various defeats rings hollow for these people, as it did dur- and betrayals of previous generations of ing the years of the Provisional IRAs cam- Irish republicans. The appeal to abstract, paign, or the argument that parliamentary almost religious, notions of the Irish nation politics is the antidote, and only alterna- and Irish sovereignty, goes hand in hand tive, to armed struggle. with a reading of Irish history that empha- It is within this wider context that the sises the system of government - British oc- call for a renewed armed struggle is able cupation, partition, the Free State and so to get a hearing. Armed struggle is above on - with little reference to the class forces all a political strategy, linked to hopes of shaping Ireland and beyond. a better society, which suggests that the Modern Irish republicanism has com- most effective way to combat the injustice bined high rhetoric about the ancient of capitalism, and the violence of the state struggle for Irish freedom, the generations that defends it, is to respond in kind. The of martyrs who fought against British rule, appeal from armed republican groups of- with a political blindness to the actual ten, though not always, includes a commit- class relations of Irish society and history. ment, however vague, to a socialist Ireland. But class forces cant be ignored forever, Time and again, however, such strategies and as each wave of republican struggle have failed to make any impression on ei- runs up against its own limitations, it has ther the state or capitalism and have often adapted to these actual class relations and resulted not just in the political destruc- political divisions. A military struggle, tion of the armed groups themselves but which is incapable of changing the form of the demoralisation of the wider movements government, since it does not address it- with which they were associated. self to the source of class rule, repeatedly This article examines the politics and ends up in outright defeat or in a politi- the strategies of the anti-Agreement repub- cal cul-de-sac and successive generations of lican groups in Ireland today, particularly republican leaders, recognising this, have those engaged in armed struggle. It will adapted to bourgeois democracy. also examine how socialists should respond This is as true of the Provisionals as and assert the need for an alternative vi- it was of Michael Collins or Eamon De sion of liberation based on class struggle. Valera or SeánMcBride. The weakness of the southern capitalist class, and its long- Modern Irish republicanism standing economic ties to British capitalism, meant that it was always an unreliable The various anti-Agreement republican force in the struggle for Irish independence groups continue to live in Sinn Féins from Britain; last to join the campaign and shadow, marked by a pre-occupation with first to settle for a deal. The northern cap- what they see as the sell-out that the Pro- italist class, after 1798, based on manu- visionals have engaged in with the Peace facturing and heavy industry and there- Process.2 The hallmark of their politics is fore economically tied to Britain, set its an appeal to traditional republican princi- face against independence and used its po- 2The CIRA, Real IRA and ONH´ are all splinters of the Provisional IRA. The exception is the IRSP and INLA, which emerged from the Official IRA. The INLA declared a ceasefire after the Omagh bomb in 1998 and eventually decommissioned their weapons in 2011. The IRSP says it is now committed to radical politics outside and in opposition to the Agreement.

26 litical power to mobilise Northern Protes- Britain to negotiate with them, as the true tants against it. Since the partition of Ire- representatives of the Irish nation. land in 1922, the capitalist class North and But the two elements are in contin- South have relied on nationalist or union- ual tension. The notion that republicans ist appeals to loyalty and police repression are the true representatives of the nation against those who would challenge their is continually undermined by the isolation rule. that military struggle imposes. Breaking Since partition, the isolation of succes- out of the isolation, in nationalist terms, sive generations of republicans has forced means making compromises with the polit- them to rely on appeals to the founding ical set-up that they are out to overthrow. documents of the republic, the Proclama- It is this contradiction at the heart of re- tion read by Padraig Pearse on the steps of publicanism, which is at the root of the re- the GPO in Dublin in 1916 or the Decla- peated crises and splits in the movement. ration of Independence of the Second Dáil The failure to locate the system of gov- in 1919 as their mandate for continuing ernment and the state, British or Irish or the struggle for Irish freedom. The IRA Northern Irish, as an expression of class Army Council considered itself the legit- rule, means that the republican struggle imate successor of the Second Dáil,and has never sought to challenge capitalism therefore the true government of Ireland. itself or base itself on the organised power In republican terms, the IRA were not of the working class, where it is potentially fighting to establish the republic, they were strongest, at the point of production. In- defending the actually existing republic de- stead of seeing the class struggle as the mo- clared in 1919. tor of history (as Marxists do) the repub- For most of the period between 1922 lican movement has always seen itself and and 1968, republicanism was based on a its own actions, either military or electoral, leadership of intellectuals and the support as the principal driving force. This, along of poorer rural Irish farmers, with lim- with the very nature of armed conspiracy, ited support among workers in cities like is the root of the elitism built into repub- Dublin and Cork. The re-emergence of re- lican strategy. publicanism, as a response to the repres- The re-emergence of republicanism in sion of the mass movement for civil rights the maelstrom of the uprising of Catholic in the North, relied on those older networks areas in 1968 and 1969 had exactly these but for the first time won a substantial same elements. base among working-class Catholics in the For the early leadership of the Provi- northern cities. sionals, mainly IRA veterans from the ‘50s These, in broad outline, are the param- and ‘60s, the commitment to armed strug- eters within which republicanism has oper- gle against British rule was all that was ated in the last century. Faced with an in- needed and they were explicitly conser- ability to defeat the British militarily, un- vative and ‘anti-Communist’ in their pol- able to take control of the major popula- itics.3 In spite of this, the Provision- tion centres, they have adapted to the con- als eventually won the largest support in ditions they find themselves in and fallen Northern Catholic areas as they were seen back on conventional strategies - elections as the most determined fighters against and so on - to prove their political sup- the British Army. The eruption, North port among the Irish people and persuade and South, of mass popular anger follow- 3See Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, (New York) 2003, Ch 2

27 ing Bloody Sunday was the context within bombing campaigns in England, often with which the IRA took the lead in the strug- disastrous results, such as the Birmingham gle. The conclusion that it was both neces- pub bombings of November 1974. A few sary and effective to counter the violence days later, the British Government rushed of the state with violence was drawn by through the notorious Prevention of Ter- large numbers of those involved and was rorism Act, which led to the arrest and supported by much wider numbers of sym- imprisonment of countless Irish people in pathisers.4 Britain, including the Birmingham Six and It was under this pressure that the Guildford Four. British government abolished the discredited Stormont government. But even here, at the height of mass struggle and support, The mid to late ‘70s were years of a war the attempts to militarize the struggle - of attrition, with hundreds of republicans such as the 20 car bombs in Belfast in July imprisoned. The IRA was under added 1972 on Bloody Friday, which killed nine political pressure from the various strate- civilians and wounded 130 - enabled the gies pursued by Britain: the attempts at British government to turn the tide and power-sharing governments in 1974; the mount massive military operations to re- use of loyalist paramilitary organisations take the no-go areas in Derry and Belfast to terrorise Catholic areas; the ‘Ulsterisa- at the end of July.5 tion’ strategy, in which the British Army From 1972 onwards, the IRA was on would take a less prominent role and push the defensive. The enthusiasm and direc- the RUC to the fore; the criminalisation tion of the armed campaign was reaching policy for IRA prisoners; and later the an impasse. During the secret negotiations Anglo-Irish Agreement in the mid-1980s, that were held with the British govern- designed to undermine support for the Pro- ment during ceasefires in 1972 and again in visionals by supporting the moderate na- 1974, the IRA leadership took seriously the tionalists of the SDLP. idea that a British withdrawal was on the cards. When it became obvious that the ceasefires and offers of talks were simply a The Hunger Strikes, and the mass cam- way of weakening and dividing the organ- paign that surrounded them, went way be- isation, the IRA returned to the military yond the Provisionals expectations and led struggle. This eventually led to a readjust- to a resurgence in support and recruitment ment, to the strategy of ‘The Long War’ for the IRA. This meant that the strug- and a complete reorganisation of the IRA gle could be sustained in the 1980s, but all in the North, by a new Northern leader- that was on offer was the same failed strat- ship based around Gerry Adams, Ivor Bell egy and the danger of isolation and de- and Brendan Hughes in Belfast and Mar- feat. The chink of light was the election of tin McGuinness in Derry to withstand the hunger strikers, in particular Bobby Sands, constant pressure of arrests and infiltration but also two TDs in the South, and the by the British and the RUC. votes for those associated with the hunger- The new Northern-based leadership strikers. This, it seemed to the republican continually sought ways to break out of the leadership, offered a way out of the politi- isolation of the Northern ghettoes, such as cal impasse. 4See Eamonn McCann, War and an Irish Town, (London) 1993 5Moloney, pp. 116-117

28 The Continuity IRA culmination of a long internal struggle by the new northern leadership to replace the older, mainly southern leadership of the IRA and Sinn Féin. The old leaders were criticised as being removed from the struggle in the North and responsible for the misjudged ceasefire policy of the early 1970s, which almost brought the movement to its knees. The Adams strategy, of continuing the armed struggle while seeking to broaden the base of republicanism by ‘going po- CIRA Graffiti litical’ through involvement in community and social issues and in electoral work, struck a chord with those closest to the These tensions, between the demands of action in the North. a military campaign and adapting to elec- It was, of course, an adaptation to toralism, also led to splits. In 1984-85 Ivor bourgeois legality but it carried with it the Bell, a key figure in the Belfast leader- notion that popular support could counter ship, privately criticised the damage that the criminalisation of republicanism by the electoral work was having on the armed British government backed by the media. struggle and along with his supporters was At the 1981 Ard Fheis, Danny Morrison forced out of the movement.6 The Conti- had argued for standing in elections: ‘Who nuity IRA and their political wing, Repub- here really believes that we can win the lican Sinn Féin,were born out of an open war through the ballot box? But will any- split in the Provisional IRA in 1986. In one object if, with a ballot paper in this late 1986, the Provisional IRA decided to hand and an Armalite in this hand, we take reverse their previous policy of abstention power in Ireland.’7 for the southern Irish state, meaning that The decision by the 1986 Ard Fheis they would take seats in the Dil. to drop abstention was seen by some in Dropping abstention represented a ma- the IRA as a betrayal of this cornerstone jor break with republican principle. The of the republican tradition. If the legiti- Provisionals, at the time of their split with macy of the southern state was recognised the ‘Official’ IRA in 1969, were traditional- then the whole notion of the ‘actually exists who claimed that the IRA Army Coun- isting republic’ was betrayed. Ruair´ı O´ cil was the sole legitimate inheritor of the Brádaigh,a veteran of the IRA from the Second Dáilof 1919. They even went to 1930s, led a walkout and founded a new the extent of seeking the endorsement of IRA Army Council, known as the Conti- Tom Maguire, the last surviving member nuity IRA, and a new political organisa- of the Second Dáil. Through the difficult tion, Republican Sinn Féin(RSF). They times of the Troubles, this was an impor- too sought and received the endorsement tant source of legitimacy for republican ac- of Tom Maguire. But they took very few tivists. members with them due to the standing of The 1986 Ard Fheis decision, was the the new Northern IRA command, which 6Moloney, pp. 244-245 7Moloney, p. 203

29 had the authority of leading the armed Belfast and Derry and some pockets of sup- campaign. port in rural and border areas such as Fer- In a speech to the Ard Fheis, Mar- managh and Tyrone. It contented itself tin McGuinness, then a key IRA leader, with the notion that it was holding on to promised that the end of abstention would the holy grail of republicanism. Neverthe- not mean the end of the IRA’s campaign. less, like the Provisionals before them, the CIRA and RSF are sustained by the belief I reject any such suggestion that they are the legitimate custodians of and I reject the notion that the Republic. RSF’s programme Eire Nua entering Leinster House would is deeply conservative, economically and mean an end to Sinn Féin’s socially, which goes some way to explain unapologetic support for the its lack of appeal in urban areas. Its main right of Irish people to oppose innovation, when it was first drafted, was in arms the British forces of the notion of a federation of provinces in occupation... Our position is Ireland, as a means of guaranteeing rights clear and it will never, never, for the Protestant minority in a United Ire- never change. The war against land. It outlines a detailed structure of na- British rule must continue until tional, local and regional government bod- freedom is achieved. ies, but it has been unchanged for decades and is a faded blueprint with no reference But we are not at war with the to the means of constructing it.9 government of the 26 Counties A description by RSF of the critical im- - the reality of this fact must portance of abstention shows the superfi- be recognised by us all. And in cial analysis of the nature of modern states. accepting this reality we must also accept that after 65 years The principle of abstention of republican struggle, republi- is derived from a Republican can agitation, republican sacri- view of where the State gets fice, and republican rhetoric we its authority to rule: the peo- have failed to convince a ma- ple. Elected representatives jority in the 26 counties that who participate in the insti- the republican movement has tutions of the State effectively any relevance to them. By ig- accept the authority of that noring reality we remain alone State and its right to volun- and isolated on the high al- tarily rule the people they rep- tar of abstentionism, divorced resent. By withdrawing pop- from the people of the 26 coun- ular support represented on ties and easily dealt with by an official level by withdrawing those who wish to defeat us.8 elected representatives from the State, it becomes impossi- The leadership of RSF and the CIRA ble for the State to function. was essentially southern-based and had lit- By diverting that popular sup- tle support, beyond handfuls of people in port to the parallel apparatus 8Sinn Féin, The Politics of Revolution: The Main Speeches and Debates from the 1986 Sinn FéinArd Fheis (Dublin) 1986 9http://rsf.ie/eirenua.htm 10Republican Sinn Féin, Elections and Abstentionism; Republican Education 3, (Dublin) 2000

30 of the revolutionary State be- breaches of trust - 1922 and ing formed, the existing State 1926, 1946 and 1969, and fi- is democratically replaced.10 nally 1986 - with all the disastrous consequences for the . faithful Irish republicans which But what RSF don’t address is how this flow from them, loom before us might have been achieved, even when the today.11 republican movement was at its strongest during the last 30 years, nor the mecha- The CIRA remained and remains to nism for achieving this situation of dual this day, a marginal force, easily dismissed power. In fact, the reverse is true. The by the leadership of mainstream republi- relative isolation of the republican move- canism as having never killed any British ment in the 1980s, confined mainly to the soldiers. They nevertheless refuse any idea working class Catholic areas of the North, of unity with other republicans, especially was not seen as the crucial issue and RSF those who stayed with the Provisionals have rarely referred to any strategy for after the great betrayal of 1986. The overcoming it. Instead, the guardianship CIRA has been a persistent armed pres- of the true Republic is to be borne with ence, keeping the flame alive, without ever stoic resolve, resisting all attempts to lure inflicting any serious damage. It retains it into compromise. The CIRA and RSF some historical pockets of support in places represent, in their essence, the continua- such as Lurgan, Newry and parts of Fer- tion of the old ‘anti-political’ and conser- managh, especially around some key for- vative IRA position of the Provisionals at mer IRA leaders, but their membership by the their inception, without the context of all reliable accounts is fluid, many having mass upheaval and rebellion, without the defected to other armed groups. Reports armed weight of the early Provisionals and suggest that recent years have been frac- without the attempts to broaden the sup- tious for the CIRA, with a number of de- port base for republicanism that the Pro- fections, splits and expulsions - especially visionals engaged in since the late 1970s. in Belfast and Tyrone - and a turn towards RSF views the trajectory of the Provi- increased militarism, under the pressure of sionals since then as having originated in the other republican military groups. In the key betrayal of 1986: 2009 the CIRA claimed responsibility for the killing of PSNI officer Stephen Car- For the fifth time in 65 years roll in Craigavon. In 2012 it announced an attempt was made to de- that a new leadership had replaced the old part from that basic Repub- with renewed focus on armed struggle in lican and revolutionary posi- the North.12 tion and to accept the British imperialist and colonialist al- Real IRA ternative, the 26-county State, the 6-county statelet and the For the rest of the 1980s and into the overlordship of Westminster it- 1990s, the momentum remained with the self. The years of the great leadership of the Provisionals under Gerry 11 Martyn Frampton, Legion of the Rearguard: Dissident Irish Republicanism, Irish Academic Press, 2011, p.54 12RT News, 26/7/12, ‘CIRA says it has a new leadership in place’http://www.rte.ie/news/2012/ 0726/330721-continuity-ira-says-it-has-new-leadership-in-place/

31 Adams and Martin McGuinness. It was It quickly became clear that the terms they who were running the armed cam- of any peace deal with the British govern- paign in the North, they who would strike ment would be based on a version of the any deal with the British. Electoral sup- power-sharing experiment tried in 1974, port for Sinn Féin grew to roughly 35 per and would mean the IRA giving up its cent of the Northern nationalist vote, be- armed struggle. This caused tensions in hind the SDLP, but remained negligible in the IRA leadership. Adams and McGuin- the South, where Sinn Féinwas viewed ness, fearing a damaging split, engaged in mainly as an IRA support group. a painstaking process of convincing the re- By the early 1990s, the republican lead- publican movement, reassuring Sinn Féin ership recognised that it could not win mil- activists and IRA prisoners and keeping itarily. Faced with another impasse, the other parties on board. Events seemed to leadership circulated an internal discussion have turned in favour of those wanting a document, entitled ‘TUAS’13 which argued return to the military campaign in 1996, for the movement to look to ‘other nation- when the IRA ceasefire was ended with alist constituencies’. a ‘spectacular’ bomb in London’s Canary Wharf. But behind the scenes, the internal ...republicans at this time manoeuvring of the Adams and McGuin- and on their own do not ness leadership eventually won out and the have the strength to achieve ceasefire was re-established. the end goal. The strug- As the final negotiations for the Good gle needs strengthening most Friday Agreement were taking place, the obviously from other nation- seven member IRA Army Council split, alist constituencies led by with IRA Quartermaster Michael McKe- SDLP, Dublin government and vitt and other senior Provisionals - Seamus the emerging Irish-American McGrane and Liam Campbell - breaking lobby, with additional support away to form what became known as the from other parties in EU row- Real IRA in 1997.16 They also formed a ing in behind and accelerating political wing, the 32 County Sovereignty the momentum created.14 Movement. This wasn’t a new departure for the What is often forgotten - particularly Provisionals. It echoed their strategy dur- by the dissidents - are the deep problems ing the Hunger Strikes, when their newspa- with IRA actions in the years immediately per, An Phoblacht/Republican News, de- preceding the peace process. These were clared: ‘Britain can be beaten when the the years of the Shankill bombing, the Free State premier, the SDLP leader and Loughgall disaster in which the East Ty- the Catholic hierarchy are forced to apply rone brigade of the IRA was wiped out in their muscle instead of, as at present, play- an SAS ambush, the Patsy Gillespie bombing at it.’15 But it began the process of se- ing in Derry, in which the IRA had tied a cret, then public, negotiations that would civilian worker from a local army base into lead to the IRA ceasefire in 1994. a van loaded with explosives and ordered 13he title of the document was deliberately ambiguous - the acronym standing for ‘Totally UnArmed Strategy’ or ‘Tactical Use of Armed Struggle’, depending on the audience. 14http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/tuas94.htm 15Quoted in Chris Bambery, Ireland’s Permanent Revolution, (London), 1987, p81 16Moloney, p.479

32 him to drive it to an army checkpoint. In of funding for community organisations, fact IRA actions had become so unpopu- in a deliberate strategy to give republican lar and so disastrous that there have even (and loyalist) activists work and a sense been suggestions that they were deliber- of a stake in the system. Few IRA ac- ately planned that way in order to assist tivists were convinced, despite misgivings, the leadership strategy.17 that restarting the armed struggle would There were large mobilisations by trade get anywhere. The wind was in the sails unions in response to the IRA and loyal- of the Sinn Féinleadership, as the Good ist atrocities. But the political leadership Friday Agreement was completed in April of the trade union movement made no at- 1998. tempt to direct this movement beyond act- The Real IRA and the 32 County ing as a support for the emerging peace Sovereignty Movement represented a rejec- negotiations between the British and Irish tion of the whole ‘political strategy’ pur- governments and the political parties in sued by Adams and McGuinness. The the North. 32CSM concentrated on reasserting the The pressure to end the armed struggle principle of Irish sovereignty, with a con- also came from the focus on elections. Sinn voluted submission to the United Nations Féinwas engaged in a sustained effort to based mainly on an article on Irish his- win over middle-class Catholic voters and tory by former IRA leader-turned UN High voters in the South. The armed struggle Commissioner, Sean McBride; a reprinting was an impediment to that. of the 1916 Proclamation and the Declara- The formation of the Real IRA did not tion of Independence; and various appeals make a significant impact on the Provision- to international law which challenged the als. The numbers who went with McKevitt legitimacy of the referenda on the Good were few. The majority of IRA and Sinn Friday Agreement.18 The submission was, Féinactivists were still prepared to wait of course, ignored by the UN, but it acted and see. Adams repeatedly claimed that as a restatement of republican principle for he needed to move carefully, to bring the the renewal of the armed struggle. republican base with him and McGuinness, The disastrous Omagh bombing a few with his background as an IRA Comman- months later on 15 August 1998, which der, carried considerable weight with IRA killed 33 people, shrunk further the num- activists. bers prepared to join and demoralised The reasons are not difficult to discern. those who had. Omagh was the culmi- Many activists were war-weary, and uncon- nation of a series of car bombings carried vinced that the war would achieve any- out on small, mainly Protestant, market thing - and impressed by the growth in towns by the Real IRA in 1998, includ- popularity in Sinn Féin. And whatever ing Moira, Newtownhamilton and Ban- else the Sinn Féinspeace strategy had de- bridge. The immediate aim was to put livered, it had secured the early release pressure on the Ulster Unionists to pull of hundreds of republican prisoners. The out of the peace negotiations and so col- peace process also enlarged the pool of pro- lapse the process. The effect of Omagh fessional politicians, and their advisors. It was the opposite. It gave added impetus was accompanied by various programmes to the peace negotiations, as all the polit- 17Moloney, Ch 11 18The 32CSM Submission to the United Nations cork32.blogspot.co.uk/p/32csm-submission-to- united-nations.html

33 ical parties united to condemn it. It also the campaign was sporadic and never likely strengthened the hand of the state. Both to succeed in ‘getting past’ the legacy of the British and Irish governments rushed Omagh. Between 2002 and 2006, the Real through draconian new anti-terrorist legis- IRA remained on the defensive, with only lation in September 1998. In the South, fitful attempts at conducting an armed the new Offences Against the State Act campaign. The Stormont administration extended the time suspects could be held also went into repeated crisis between 2000 without charge from 48 hours to 72. It and 2007, especially over the issue of IRA allowed courts to: ‘draw inferences from decommissioning, resulting in less of an im- a suspect’s silence when questioned’ and mediate focus for their campaign. introduced a new charge of: ‘directing an International events also counted unlawful organisation’.19 against the resumption of an armed campaign. The 9/11 attacks on the World The Real IRA announced: ‘a suspen- Trade Centre in 2001 accelerated Sinn sion of all military operations’ in the af- Féinsmove away from armed struggle and termath of Omagh, while it ‘conducted a its distancing itself from an association process of consultation on our future di- with liberation struggles internationally, rection’ and, in September, announced a with the US Envoy invited to that year’s 20 ‘complete cessation of violence’. Reports Ard Fheis. The potential for support from circulated of Real IRA members being vis- Irish-American groups dwindled. ited in their homes by Provisionals warn- The organisation was also heavily infil- ing them to disband. The INLA - who trated and McKevitt was eventually jailed were believed to have co-operated in the on the word of an FBI and MI5 informer. bombing operation, along with the CIRA An indication of the crisis affecting the - also announced a ceasefire, declaring: Real IRA after Omagh is that in 2002 it ‘the conditions for armed struggle do not suffered a major split among Real IRA exist’, but maintaining opposition to the prisoners. A large majority of the prison- Good Friday Agreement. By July 1999, ers, led by McKevitt himself, endorsed a McKevitt had reorganised the Real IRA statement calling on the leadership of the at a meeting in Inishowen, County Done- Real IRA to stand down ‘with ignominy’. gal, which included members of ‘RIRA, They were accused of neglecting the pris- CIRA, INLA, and disaffected members of oners, fraternising with criminals and fail- 21 the Provisionals.’ Their strategy was ing to develop a meaningful strategy.23 to wait for the imminent deal with the This group, which would re-emerge as a Unionists and the IRA decommissioning of discussion group called the ‘New Republi- weapons that would follow, then denounce can Forum’, called on the leadership of the Sinn Féinfor its betrayal and launch a Real IRA to end its armed campaign. new bombing campaign that would ‘over- shadow’ Omagh.22 The bombing cam- ...There is no support for paign was restarted in 2000. The Real IRA armed struggle in Ireland at pulled off a rocket attack on MI5 head- this time. And without pop- quarters in London during this period, but ular support any armed cam- 19Frampton. p. 105 20Frampton, p.106-107 21Frampton, p.109 22Frampton, p. 109 and 117 23Frampton, p.145

34 paign against British rule is between 2003 and 2006, the Real IRA’s doomed to failure. We be- armed campaign hardly existed. lieve it is the moral responsibility of the republican lead- Defeat or betrayal - why did ership to terminate any campaign when it becomes obvious the Provisionals fail? 24 that its continuance is futile. What dominated in republican circles after Omagh, was a period of open criticism, de- The crisis also led to a deep internal debate and reflection. The carefully managed bate among those who remained with the diplomatic stagecraft of the peace process, 32CSM/Real IRA. In 2002, the 32 County the secret deals, the delicately timed an- Sovereignty Movement engaged in an ex- nouncements by the Sinn Féinleadership tensive internal debate, around the ques- during the years of the peace negotiations tion of their ‘single issue’ focus. By allow- were full of double-bluffs, lies, Féints, and ing activists to engage in wider politics, it a continual reassurance to republican ac- was argued, the support base for the strug- tivists that despite the public moves, the gle could be widened. The result was the leadership still held true to republican ide- rewriting of the party’s objectives: als. This is what Adams and McGuinness The objectives of the 32 are praised for in British government min- County Sovereignty Movement isters’ memoirs, but it had a different effect are: on existing republican activists. The dis- (a) The restoration of Irish Na- quiet was evident early in the process, with tional Sovereignty. former republican prisoners like Tommy (b) To seek to achieve unity Gorman, Anthony McIntyre and Tommy among the Irish people on McKearney producing Fourthwrite maga- the issue of restoring National zine. This discussion came into its own Sovereignty and to promote the after Omagh, especially through an online Revolutionary ideals of Repub- magazine, edited by McIntyre and his part- licanism and to this end involve ner Carrie Twomey, called The Blanket. itself in resisting all forms of The Blanket provided a forum and an colonialism and imperialism.25 outlet for open criticism by republicans about the direction of the peace process. The practical effect of this was that the The intention was not to go back to war, 32CSM increasingly took up the question but rather open up debate about where re- of ‘dealing with anti-social behaviour’, po- publicanism had ended up and why. The sitioning themselves to fill the role pre- ethos was one of a celebration of the di- viously carried out by the Provisionals versity of responses and a reluctance to by carrying out punishment beatings and insist on agreement on alternative strate- shootings. gies. Space was given to loyalists, dissi- They also began to comment more dent republicans, mainstream republicans widely on political issues in their news- and socialist writers. Most often there was paper, the Sovereign Nation, and encour- a sense of the lifting of the weight of silence aged members to take part in political imposed on republicans by the conditions campaigns. But for much of the period of war and by the leadership of Sinn Féin. 24Interview with Republican prisoners, Forum Magazine, February 2003 25www.derry32csm.com/p/32csm-policy-documents.html

35 The debate, such as it was, in The Blanket Writing in 2002 McIntyre argued that the oscillated between condemning the Provos IRA had been defeated: ‘They have been for settling for too little and implying that defeated on every issue from the question ‘the war’ had been fought merely for equal- of a British withdrawal, the consent prin- ity for Catholics and nationalists within ciple, decommissioning, the total abolition the existing state. The dominant narra- of Stormont, and policing. Republican- tive was one of sell-out and betrayal by ism has been completely hollowed out to the republican leadership, and suspicions the point where its shell has been filled that were fuelled by revelations of British with core constitutional nationalist rather agents such as Denis Donaldson and Fred- than republican positions...The ‘three Ds’ die Scapaticci operating at the most senior of Provisional republicanism defence, de- level in the Provisionals. Similar debates fiance and dissent now stand for defeat, have continued to surface, including accu- decommissioning and dissolution.’28 How- sations first made by Richard O’Rawe that ever, what the extent of the compromises the IRA leadership deliberately prolonged the Provisionals have made highlights is the 1981 Hunger Strike in order to advance the actual balance of forces ranged against their move towards electoralism.26 the Provisionals and the weakness of their position. It is an indication of how deep the criticism of Sinn Féinreached that The Blanket Winning political legitimacy for the attracted support from such senior former state and its institutions was a key aim of IRA figures as Brendan ‘the Dark’ Hughes. the peace process, which is why the decom- Hughes was an iconic figure, a hero of the missioning of IRA weapons and Sinn Féin gun battles to defend the Lower Falls in recognition of the police were such central the early 1970s, later a key confidant of negotiating issues during the effort to get Gerry Adams and the leader of the first the Stormont Executive established. They Hunger Strike in 1980. Hughes’ contribu- were about forcing republicans to recog- tions to The Blanket reveal a deep disap- nise that the existing state in Northern Ire- pointment with what happened to repub- land was the only one with the right to licanism; a sense of defeat, of how far re- bear arms. Delegitimising armed struggle publicanism had moved from its roots and against the state, as witnessed in the re- in particular, the lived experience of many peated denials by Gerry Adams and Mar- former prisoners like himself, working on tin McGuinness that they were leaders of building sites for pitiful wages, employed the Provisional IRA, was simply another by builders who couldn’t be criticised be- facet of this process. It is hardly a surprise cause they supported Sinn Féin.The most that a key motivation for the armed repub- controversial part of his contribution was licans is to challenge this right, merely by Hughes revealing Adams’ role in the IRA existing. The fact of the armed struggle, in Belfast, a fact which Adams to this day whether it can achieve anything or not, by publicly denies.27 Anthony McIntyre sug- itself is an affront to the idea that the state gested that Adams’ refusal to admit to be- alone should have access to the means of ing a leader of the IRA implied a lack of le- violence. But this challenge to the state’s gitimacy to all republican volunteers, as if hegemony on violence was afflicted by a re- it was something to be embarrassed about. fusal to acknowledge the weakness of the 26Richard O’Rawe, Blanketmen: An Untold Story of the H-block Hunger Strike. (Dublin) 2005 27Ed Moloney (ed) Voices from the Grave (London) 2010 28 A McIntyre, ‘Time Has Run Out for an Armed IRA’, Observer, 20 October 2002

36 IRA campaign. The trajectory of Sinn This tendency is commonly seen Féinsfatal compromise with the establish- throughout the republican discussion that ment is at the heart of their various polit- has taken place since the Good Friday ical analyses and is well rehearsed in their Agreement. Yet the key moments when publications. But there is a glaring ab- the British government was most threat- sence of any assessment of why the armed ened were the periods of mass struggle - struggle failed. the Civil Rights Movement, and especially The main contributors to The Blan- the mass demonstrations north and south ket continued to view the struggle through after Bloody Sunday; and again during the the prism of the IRA campaign and its Hunger Strike. No other event, no bomb- relationship to British military and polit- ing or assassination carried out by the IRA ical strategy. McIntyre summed this up ever came close to threatening the British with his explanation of the peace process: government. ‘The political objective of the Provisonal The failure to develop any coher- IRA was to secure a British declaration ent republican alternative out of such a to withdraw. It failed. The objective of widespread and remarkably open period of the British state was to force the Provi- debate is a testimony to the political con- sional IRA to accept...that it would not fusion and fragmented nature of the repub- leave Ireland until a majority in the north lican opposition to Sinn Féin’sstrategy. consented to such a move. It succeeded.’29 This was to become the hallmark of The What this reflects is the tendency to view Blanket, and having catalogued the vari- history as if the IRA were the key compo- ous betrayals and criticisms of the Provi- nent downplaying the significance of mass sionals, it ended publication in 2008. movements that went beyond the ranks of In his final article, Anthony McIntyre the Provisionals. wrote: ‘The variant of republicanism fo- Leon Trotsky, writing about earlier cussed on in its pages was no more. With terrorist campaigns elsewhere, highlighted the total demise of the Provisional republi- this tendency: can project the symbiotic relationship between it and the writing that described it had been ruptured. The Blanket operated For terrorists, in the entire field within a distinctly republican milieu. We of politics there exist only two are now in a post-republican world where central focuses: the govern- others, such as Eir´ıg´ı,have´ picked up the ment and the Combat Organ- baton and hope to reverse the order of isation... Everything that is things.’31 outside the framework of terror is only the setting for the struggle; at best, an auxiliary Eir´ıg´ı´ means. In the blinding flash of exploding bombs, the contours It was against this background, of open of political parties and the di- dissent against the Sinn Féinleadership, viding lines of the class struggle a reluctance to return to armed strug- disappear without a trace.30 gle (usually characterised as ‘dumb mili- 29 A McIntyre, ‘We, the IRA, have failed’, Guardian, 22 May, 1998 30 L Trotsky, The Bankruptcy of Individual Terrorism, 1909 31A McIntyre, The Blanket, One Last Time, 18 may 2008: indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu:81/AMLB. html

37 tarism’) and a vague commitment to rad- ary form of socialism and trade ical socialist politics as opposed to the unionism. It was by drawing rightward drift of Sinn Féin, that Eir´ıg´ı´ support from all three of these emerged in 2006. Eir´ıg´ıwas´ initially led by trends that the most success- critical republicans who rejected the strat- ful Irish Rebellion to date, and egy of armed struggle ‘at this time’, first in the following five year revolu- Dublin and later in Belfast. They recruited tionary period, occurred.33 Brendan MacCionnaith. Eir´ıg´ı´ identifies with the tradition of left republicanism: However, in their declaration in favour of socialism Eir´ıg´ıhave´ merely bolted so- Eir´ıg´ı´ identifies exclusively cialism and trade unionism onto their un- with a revolutionary current derlying republicanism and nationalism. that has distinguished itself They do not make the working class and historically from the predom- its struggle the point of departure as Marx- inant conservative nationalist ists do. Also while rejecting armed strug- tendency. This current recog- gle ‘at the present time’ they hold open to nises and accepts the essen- the possibility of returning to it in the fu- tial and inseparable relation- ture, without any fundamental critique of ship that exists between the the republican conception and practice of national and social struggles. armed struggle which has always tended to From the Irish Socialist Repub- substitute militarism for the struggle of the lican Party to the Irish Citi- masses. Marxists also recognise the need, zen Army, to the Republican in certain circumstances, for ‘armed strug- Congress and, today, Eir´ıg´ı,´ gle’, but only on the basis of the devel- there have been organised bod- opment of the mass struggle from below ies of people throughout Irish to the point where it comes into physical history that have dedicated conflict with the state in the shape of revo- themselves to the radical trans- lution, insurrection and (if necessary) civil formation of economic, social war, not as a separate military campaign and political relations in Ire- waged by an armed wing of the party, as land.32 in the Republican tradition. The demands of the class struggle in In the building of such a the north require an attempt to forge work- movement inspiration can be ing class unity and the overcoming of the sought, and lessons learned, sectarian divide. Eir´ıg´ıshow´ some aware- from our own history. In ness of this. They write: the period prior to the 1916 Rising Ireland witnessed a We in Eir´ıg´ı´ also wish to see cultural revival encompassing an end to the false divisions the Irish language, music and that Britain has so carefully sports. The same period saw fostered in Ireland and believe the growth of both a sep- that a new political and social aratist movement advocating movement may offer a mecha- Irish freedom and a revolution- nism to do just that. We chal-

32Eir´ıg´ı:´ From Socialism Alone Can the Salvation of Ireland Come, 2010, p 1 www.eirigi.org/pdfs/ socialism.pdf 33Eir´ıg´ı,´ Imperialism Ireland and Britain, 2007 www.eirigi.org/pdfs/imperialism.pdf

38 lenge those who may histori- called ‘Standing Outside the Peace Pro- cally have believed that their cess’, which was mainly a commentary on interests were best served by the failures of Stormont faced with the eco- supporting the British presence nomic crisis. Like Eir´ıg´ıthey´ adopt radical in Ireland to re-examine their language: position in the context of the twenty-first century. We ap- Revolutionary Republicans peal to members of this com- stand by the belief that the munity to join us in a political struggle for National Libera- movement for the creation of a tion and Socialism should be new all-Ireland Republic where practiced hand in hand, that all the people of Ireland will the liberators of Ireland will be be entitled to an equal share of the working class and that it the nation’s wealth and equal will be within a dual struggle access to power regardless of for control of the ‘National ter- class, religion, gender, ethnic- ritory’ and the ‘Means of pro- ity, or other false division.34 duction’ that a worthy freedom will eventually be achieved. But it is clear that this is a merely In conclusion therefore, RNU declaratory, rhetorical, appeal with no real view the so called ‘Peace Pro- strategy as to how this unity could be cess’ as in fact inherently sec- achieved in practice. Particularly revealing tarian, inherently partition- is the last sentence where ‘class’ is cited as ist and inherently capitalist, a ‘false division’ along with ‘religion, gen- promoting ultimately commu- der, ethnicity’. Despite their radical aspi- nal division, a continuation of rations Eir´ıg´ıhave´ not overcome the fun- British rule and the dominance damental weakness in the whole republi- of a greedy capitalist class who can tradition: the elevation of nation over care little for the economic well class. being or welfare of the Irish people north or south. We on Republican Network for Unity the other hand, intend to pro- and the INLA pose a programme of Revolu- tionary Republicanism, the en- A network of Concerned Republicans couragement of the Irish work- emerged in 2006 to challenge Sinn Féins ing class to pursue a Free So- moves to endorse policing. They held cialist Republic, via all avail- a number of well-attended meetings in able means of struggle.35 Belfast, Toome and Derry, to openly debate the issue. The leading figures went on But everything said above about Eir´ıg´ı´ to form the Republican Network for Unity, applies also to the Republican Network which also disavowed a return to armed for Unity, as it does to another republi- struggle, and which has a base in Belfast can splinter, the Irish Republican Socialist and small groups of supporters elsewhere. Party and its armed wing, the Irish Na- It issued a major policy paper in 2012, tional Liberation Army (INLA). 34Eir´ıg´ı,´ Imperialism Ireland and Britain, 2007 35RNU, Standing Outside the Peace Process, 2012

39 Paul Little, speaking on behalf of the Oglaigh´ na hEireann´ Irish Republican Socialist Party, welcom- 37 ing the INLA decision to decommission its weapons in 2010 stated: The second half of the decade also saw the re-emergence of other determined This weeks decision by the armed struggle groups. It was against INLA is not only historic and the background of IRA decommissioning courageous but also a mature and endorsement of the Police Service of political decision that will al- Northern Ireland by Sinn Féin,that an- low the politics of Irish Re- other group of armed struggle republicans publican Socialism to rise to declared itself in 2009. Based mainly in the fore... We do not fear Belfast, Oglaigh´ na hEireann´ was formed the future, we have confidence by experienced Provisional activists, in- that Republican Socialism of- cluding some who had been former leaders fers working-class people a vi- of the Real IRA, but who had split as a able alternative to sectarian result of disputes among RIRA prisoners. politics and we look forward There was considerable confusion about to working with other working- the new group, given that the name had class representatives to ensure been used by various groups in the past, that our rights are not only and for some time it was described as a acknowledged but also that a faction of the Real IRA. However, in inter- real alternative is available to views the leadership insist that they are an the stale and short-sighted pol- independent group. An ONH spokesman itics of division. Our aim described their formation out of disillu- is to build a truly revolution- sioned ex-Provisionals, who thought that ary political party that is not the existing groups were not serious: beholden to any creed; our allegiance is solely with the The organisation began with working class. The IRSP be- nothing more than a number lieve that this weeks announce- of conversations between senior ment by the INLA will allow republicans across Ireland [in that work to continue and ex- 2005]. They had watched how pand, free from the spectre of the anti-agreement republican weapons. It is a truly revolu- military world had the percep- tionary act.36 tion of [being] badly organised, ineffective and perceived [as] It is very much the same mixture of highly infiltrated, and, in some republican and socialist rhetoric, idealist cases, I suppose they were. declarations about rights and verbal com- They decided that after a very mitment to the working class without any lengthy debate to try and sal- real class analysis. vage a group of republicans and 36RSP statement on INLA decommissioning, 10 February, 2010 www.irsp.ie/news/?p=108 37The title Oglaigh´ na hEireann´ (Volunteers of Ireland) has been widely used in the republican movement throughout its history. The Provisionals used it to describe themselves, as do the Real IRA on occassions. A number of short-lived republican splinter groups - especially one in Strabane in the late 2000s, used this name as well. ONH is here used to refer to the mainly Belfast-based organisation which emerged in 2009.

40 form them into an organisa- ‘agreed on the need for the movement to tion. It would have taken a build upon Republicanism’s traditional so- year just to agree to the forma- cialist credentials and to stand up against tion of a group. We had agreed injustice and oppression wherever it ex- the title Oglaigh´ na hEireann´ , ists. This might involve community ac- but hadnt made it public.38 tivism or support for international causes such as Palestine.’40 32CSM suggest that ONH see the instability of the Stor- conditions will return for relaunching the mont Executive: armed struggle. They view themselves as occupying the position of the handfuls of We have no desire to replicate uncompromising republicans who held on or be a morph of the Provi- through the difficult times of the 1950s sional IRA. They failed - so, and 1960s and when mass struggle erupted why would we want to copy again, were there to direct it and restart them? There is a fragile As- the armed campaign. sembly. There is a forging In 2010 the Real IRA planted bombs together of political opposites in two banks in Derry. In an interview that is much easier to under- shortly afterwards they claimed that this mine and defeat than the war was in response to the role of the banks in that the Provisionals had.39 the current economic crisis: ONH do not have a political wing, but We have a track record of at- there is public evidence of close links with tacking high-profile economic the Republican Network for Unity (RNU). targets and financial institu- Both groups officially deny the connection, tions such as the City of Lon- but the RNU co-ordinate support for ONH don. The role of bankers and prisoners. the institutions they serve in fi- nancing Britain’s colonial and Return of the Real IRA capitalist system has not gone unnoticed..41 From 2006, there was a noticeable stepping up of the Real IRA’s campaign, with at- By 2011 the existing republican groups tacks on police officers and bombings. Sinn were highly fragmented. Richard O’Rawe Féin entered government with Ian Pais- wryly commented that there were seven ley’s DUP and eventually endorsed the Po- separate republican Easter commemora- lice Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). tions in Belfast that year. After the Provisional IRA had announced Most, if not all, taking part it was disbanding in 2008, the hindrance in these commemorations were that the threat from the Provisionals rep- convinced that their particular resented was also removed. A 32CSM con- brand of republicanism is the ference in Derry in July 2006, for instance, one, true republicanism, and 38Brian Rowan ‘ONH interview’ Belfast Telegraph 3/11/10 http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/ news/local-national/northern-ireland/diss-14993952.html 39Brian Rowan ‘ONH interview’ Belfast Telegraph 3/11/10 40Sovereign Nation, October/November 2006, p.2. It was shortly after this conference in August that 32CSM members got involved in the occupation of the Raytheon offices in Derry, despite not being involved in the anti-war movement until that point. 41‘Real IRA says it will target UK bankers’, Guardian, 14 September 2010

41 that all others are heretical. Another major problem facing all the There were even some...who various dissident groups is simply that if have convinced themselves the Provisionals, with much greater num- that they are a government- bers, and superior organisation and fire- in-exile, that they are the power, were unable to defeat the forces of sole guarantors and protec- British imperialism, how are the dissidents tors of the Republic which going to be able even to seriously damage was unilaterally declared in them. the 1916 Proclamation, and ratified by the First Dáil in Socialism and Armed Struggle 1919. Some weeks back, the Andersonstown News informed All of the republican groups profess a us that the Real Continu- commitment to a socialist republic. But, ity IRA, which recently broke for republicanism, socialism is, at best, a away from the main Continuity question that is left to the period after IRA, has split into three differ- the achievement of the republic, and at ent factions. That’s four CIRA worst, a cause of division among repub- Army Councils. Then there are licans. Brendan Hughes epitomised both the Army Councils of the Real the feeling that original ideals and princi- IRA, Oglaigh na h-Eireann, ples were being betrayed, and an inability the Provisional IRA, and the or reluctance to define a way forward that Official IRA. That makes eight was typical of a broad layer of republican IRA Army Councils at the last activists who were becoming disenchanted count (I’ve probably forgot- with where Sinn Féinwas taking republi- ten a couple of IRAs here and canism: there).42 In 2012, The Real IRA announced that While I am not pushing for it had linked up with a republican vigilante any military response, our past group in Derry called Republican Action has shown that all is never Against Drugs (RAAD) and other inde- lost... I am not advocating pendent republican groups thought to be dumb militarism or a return based mainly in Tyrone and Armagh to to war. Never in the his- launch a New IRA. The announcement was tory of republicanism was so supposed to indicate a greater capacity to much sacrificed and so little pursue the armed struggle, but it was sim- gained; too many left dead and ply a coming together of existing groups. too few achievements. Let us think most strongly before go- RAAD for instance, a group led by for- 43 mer Provisionals in Derry, had been facing ing down that road again. widespread public protests after they mur- The revolutionary socialist di- dered Andrew Allen, a young man who had rection that I was fighting for been exiled from the city. Their campaign has been dropped. All that of punishment shootings and exiling was Sinn Féin has done, all that becoming deeply unpopular. the IRA has done is become 42Richard O’Rawe How Many Do We Need? www.fourthwrite.ie/?p=162 43A McIntyre, Brendan Hughes http://thepensivequill.am/2011/05/brendan-hughes-life-in- themes.html

42 the SDLP... all the things that As Pat Stack replied at the time: were important to me, that we fought and died for, mainly If Morrison, and the IRA, are the betterment of the work- right then this has very seri- ing class in Ireland, have been ous implications, and not just dropped.44 for Ireland. Take the miners’ strike, for instance. Why Socialism was a personal belief, some- go through seven months of thing to be added on to the republican incredible self sacrifice if one struggle, a definition of its end point. But or two supremely brave acts what was not addressed was the potential can solve the problem? If for republican struggle to run counter to the real enemy is Thatcher the struggle for socialism. and MacGregor [chair of the A clear example of the divergence of British Coal Board], why not these two strategies occurred during one just bump them off? The an- of the fiercest class struggles of the last swer is that capitalism is not 30 years in Britain. Seven months into about one or two individuals, the 1984/85 British miners’ strike, the IRA but about a class in society bombed the Grand Hotel in Brighton dur- that will do whatever is neces- ing the Tory Party conference, narrowly sary to protect its power and missing killing Margaret Thatcher and her privilege. The ruling class is cabinet. Thatcher was bitterly hated by solidly behind Thatcher’s at- millions of people who supported the min- tempt to smash the miners. ers’ struggle to defend their jobs and com- Her death or that of MacGre- munities. She epitomised the determina- gor would do little to alter that tion of the ruling class in Britain to defeat confrontation and humiliate the strongest trade union in the country. But the IRA made no con- 45 nection between the bomb and the struggle Or as Trotsky put it: of the miners. Sinn Féinchairman Danny Morrison claimed: But the smoke from the explo- If that bomb had killed the sion clears away, the panic dis- whole British cabinet, imag- appears, the successor of the ine what would have happened. murdered minister makes his There would have been a re- appearance, life again settles think in British political cir- into the old rut, the wheel of cles and it would probably have capitalist exploitation turns as led to a British withdrawal in before; only police repression a much shorter time,...Today grows more savage and brazen. we were unlucky, but remem- And as a result, in place of the ber we only have to be lucky kindled hopes and artificially once you have to be lucky al- aroused excitement come disil- ways. lusion and apathy.46 44A McIntyre, Brendan Hughes 45Pat Stack, ‘One Great Act or Mass Action?’ Socialist Worker Review, November 1984, p.19 46Trotsky, Terrorism (1911)

43 Reformism is the flip-side of terrorist For independent socialist or- strategies. Both downplay the role of the ganisation masses in winning their own liberation. It would be wrong to overestimate the Trotsky added: ability of the different armed dissident groups to mount a serious military campaign. Nevertheless, some support for republican armed groups is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, fuelled by the disillusion with the Stormont administra- By its very essence terrorist tion, nurtured by ongoing police harass- work demands such concen- ment of republican activists and under- trated energy for ‘the great pinned by the deepening economic crisis. moment’, such an overesti- The moral argument for support for the mation of the significance of ‘age old struggle’ will continue to exert a individual heroism, and fi- pressure on all campaigns that challenge nally, such a ‘hermetic’ con- the state in the North, and be used in turn spiracy, that - if not logically, by the state to discredit radicalism. So- then psychologically - it to- cialists need to do two things at the same tally excludes agitational and time: continue to insist that the source organisational work among the of violence and oppression is the capital- masses. In our eyes, individual ist state - which means being opposed to terror is inadmissible precisely human rights abuses - and challenging the because it belittles the role of dissidents strategy for meeting the needs the masses in their own con- of working class people in the North. sciousness, reconciles them to The dissidents are the continuation of their powerlessness, and turns the political tradition of the Provisionals their eyes and hopes toward and they share many of the debilitating a great avenger and liberator tendencies of ultra-left armed groups else- who some day will come and where. The attempt by figures such as accomplish his mission. The Martin McGuinness to dismiss them sim- anarchist prophets of ‘the pro- ply as ‘gangsters, drug dealers and conflict paganda of the deed’ can ar- junkies’ is inaccurate and covers a shift by gue all they want about the el- Sinn Féinto endorse the structures of the evating and stimulating influ- state. There is a lot of evidence that these ence of terrorist acts on the groups are involved in criminality and ex- masses. Theoretical consider- tortion as well as frequent splits, accusa- ations and political experience tions and expulsions in their own ranks. prove otherwise. The more ‘ef- But this questions rather than explains fective’ the terrorist acts, the their political appeal. greater their impact, the more To the extent that such groups seek they reduce the interest of the to impose their own form of policing on masses in self-organisation and working class communities, socialists also self-education.47 have a duty to resist them openly. And to 47Trotsky, Why Marxists Oppose Individual Terrorism (1911) www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/ 1911/11/tia09.htm

44 the extent that they suggest that they of- of ‘the nation’ - our goal is the rule of the fer a way of resisting capitalism, through working class. such tactics as bombing banks, we have to Equally, socialists have to avoid the po- strongly oppose this as both completely in- litical tendency, common in the history of effective and running counter to the build- the Irish left, to refuse to take part in cam- ing of a genuine mass movement of opposi- paigns against state repression because of tion to the crisis and attacks on the work- fear of association with republicans. If the ing class. In the run-up to the G8 Summit left were to do this, it would mean aban- in Fermanagh this year, for instance, the doning the field of opposing state repres- police and MI5 are already planting sto- sion and defending human rights to the re- ries in the press warning of ‘an attack by publican groups. And it would also ignore dissident republicans’. This will no doubt the way in which such issues are supported be used as an excuse to use repressive tac- by wide numbers of people who openly dis- tics against protestors. agree with the strategy of armed struggle. The relentless slide into economic cri- Above all it is essential that socialists sis since 2007 has blown away the smoke build independent socialist, activist organ- and mirrors involved in the promises of the isations, based on the interests of the work- peace process. Socialists should argue that ing class not the illusion of ‘the nation’ partition distorts the development of class which argues for a fundamentally different politics in Ireland allowing both national- strategy, based on the centrality of workers ist and unionist leaders to profess a com- struggle and a vision of a radical overthrow mon identity with ‘their own’ workers to of capitalism. cover up the exploitation that is the foun- The armed republican groups, no mat- dation of their rule. We need to argue for ter how big they grow, are incapable of in- a different vision for Ireland, in which cap- flicting serious blows on either capitalism italist rule is overthrown and we need to or imperialism in Ireland. Moreover, their do this with workers in the South as well politics and their tactics hinder the devel- as workers in the North. But what sepa- opment of radical movements and the de- rates us from the republican groups is that velopment of class politics that are essen- our end goal is not defined by the illusion tial to undermine the grip of sectarianism.