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Brian A. Jackson, Ph.D.
ISTORY DEMONSTRATES that insurgents armed with conventional Hweapons (the gun, the bomb, the rocket) can sustain violent campaigns against state militaries over long periods of time. Victory against such insur- JHQWVUDUHO\FRPHVIURPGHVWUXFWLRQRIWURRSVRQDEDWWOH¿HOGDQGDVWKH\ W\SLFDOO\EOHQGLQWRWKHSRSXODWLRQWKHHQHP\LVRIWHQPRUHGLI¿FXOWWR¿QG WKDQWRQHXWUDOL]H,QPDQ\UHFHQWFRQÀLFWVUHVLOLHQWDQGDGDSWLYHLQVXUJHQW organizations using hide-and-seek tactics have checked nations and, in some cases, have prevented them from achieving foreign policy goals. After seeing the clearly demonstrated effectiveness of U.S. forces in rapid, decisive operations against conventionally arrayed opponents, future U.S. adversaries will almost certainly apply insurgent-like tactics, whether those adversaries are insurgent groups or state forces simply striving for asymmetric advantage. Therefore, in the current environment, the ability to effectively wage counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare is an important ele- ment of national power. As events in Iraq demonstrate, military organizations that have optimized WKHLUHIIHFWLYHQHVVIRUUDSLGGHFLVLYHRSHUDWLRQVH[SHULHQFHDVLJQL¿FDQW learning curve when engaging in counterinsurgency. Effective COIN opera- tions are, in many ways, the opposite of rapid and decisive: They are slow and deliberate; success may come more from patient use of stabilizing security Dr. Brian A. Jackson is a physical scien- SUHVVXUHWKDQIURPWKHRXWFRPHRIGH¿QHGEDWWOHV DQGGHSULYLQJFRPEDW- tist at RAND Corporation, Santa Moni- ants of their political support and appeal may be a straighter path to victory ca, California, conducting research on than direct engagement. Successful COIN campaigning will often require a such topics as homeland security and terrorism. He holds a doctorate in bioin- VLJQL¿FDQWVKLIWLQSHUVSHFWLYHWRFOHDUO\JUDVSWKHFKDOOHQJHVLQKHUHQWLQWKLV organic chemistry from the California kind of warfare and to select the right tools to overcome those challenges. Institute of Technology, Pasadena. He wishes to acknowledge David Frelinger Where information is needed to identify the enemy, determine how to neutral- and Tom McNaugher, of RAND Corpo- L]HRULVRODWHKLPDQGJXLGHVHFXULW\DFWLRQVDFURVVWKHIXOOVSHFWUXPRIFRQÀLFW ration, for providing input to early drafts intelligence is a central—perhaps the most important—tool for effective COIN. of this manuscript. However, another challenge to traditional military organizations in COIN is that ______WKHQHFHVVDU\DSSURDFKWRLQWHOOLJHQFHGLYHUJHVVLJQL¿FDQWO\IURPFRQYHQWLRQDO PHOTO: A British soldier grabs a modes of operation. Simply applying familiar approaches developed in other Catholic protester during a civil rights march on Sunday, 30 January 1972, contexts can undermine rather than promote mission success. in Londonderry, Northern Ireland. The event became known as “Bloody Sun- Learning from the British day,” because British soldiers killed 13 civil rights marchers and wounded A study of historical cases can sometimes provide new perspectives on cur- several more. (AFP) rent problems and help improve organizational performance. One often cited
74 January-February 2007 z MILITARY REVIEW COIN FOR “THE LONG WAR” case is the British experience in Northern Ireland, successful. Consistent with the nature of COIN SDUWLFXODUO\WKH¿JKWDJDLQVWWKH3URYLVLRQDO,ULVK operations, that success did not translate into 5HSXEOLFDQ$UP\ 3,5$ WKDWEHJDQLQ A traditional measures of military progress, such as number of other terrorist organizations were active discrete battles won or numbers of enemy soldiers LQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGDWWKHWLPHEXW3,5$¶VFDSDELOL- eliminated. Rather, it paid off in increasingly effec- ties posed the most potent threat.23,5$KDVEHHQ tive linkage of security activities into the overall characterized as a sophisticated, intelligence-led SROLWLFDOFRQÀLFWDQGGUDVWLFUHGXFWLRQVLQ3,5$¶V terrorist group because of its capability and opera- freedom of action and effectiveness. In one of the tional precision.3 Only recently, with the reported highest compliments a combatant can pay to the FRPSOHWLRQRIWKHJURXS¶VGHFRPPLVVLRQLQJKDVLWV LQWHOOLJHQFHHIIRUWVRIKLVRSSRQHQWV3,5$PHPEHU armed campaign come to an apparent end. Brendan Hughes said that intelligence efforts had Compared to many nations entering insurgent ³HIIHFWLYHO\>EURXJKW@WKH,5$WRDVWDQGVWLOOZKHUH FRQÀLFWVWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPFDPHWRWKHKRVWLOL- LWFRXOGPRYHYHU\YHU\OLWWOH´ WLHVLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGZLWKVLJQL¿FDQWH[SHULHQFH The totality of the British intelligence experi- in COIN and its modern adjunct, counterterrorism. ence in Northern Ireland, both its successes and 6RPHRIWKH8.¶VSUHYLRXVLQVXUJHQWFRQÀLFWV challenges, is what makes it a valuable example have been held up as examples of effectiveness in from which to draw insight to shape contemporary such wars. In spite of that experience, however, the COIN intelligence operations. Had the practices FRQÀLFWLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGGLGQRWEHJLQZHOORU IURPHDUOLHU%ULWLVKFRQÀLFWVWUDQVIHUUHGVHDPOHVVO\ JRVPRRWKO\3RRULQWHOOLJHQFHRSHUDWLRQVZHUHD DQGÀDZOHVVO\LQWRWKH¿JKWDJDLQVW3,5$WKHYDOXH key source of the problems: as reported by historian of the Northern Ireland experience as a case study Chris Ryder, “the principal weakness, according to would likely be much more limited. Given the the Chief of the General Staff who visited Northern DGDSWDELOLW\RILQVXUJHQWJURXSVDQGWKHVSHFL¿F- ,UHODQG>LQ @ZDVLQLQWHOOLJHQFHJDWKHULQJ´4 ity of local circumstances, effectively implement- In the context of an insurgency, intelligence must ing COIN operations will almost always demand deliver the strategic insight needed to know what learning and adaptability on the part of military and actions will be effective and what levels of com- intelligence organizations. These units must shape mitment are required, the tactical insight to hit the WKHPVHOYHVDSSURSULDWHO\IRUWKH¿JKWDSSO\WKH insurgent target when military action is taken, and right tools to collect and analyze intelligence, and the context needed to understand the broader politi- use the intelligence effectively against the insur- cal and other effects of potential security activities. gency. The British experience provides lessons in $QDO\VHVRIWKH1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGFRQÀLFWIURP all these areas. military and other perspectives highlight problems in each of these areas: Building the Right Ɣ 0LVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVE\SROLWLFDOOHDGHUVDERXW Coordination Structures the root causes of the violence.5 Multiple organizations were involved in the Ɣ 8QUHDOLVWLFH[SHFWDWLRQVDERXWWKHOHQJWKRI LQWHOOLJHQFH¿JKWDJDLQVW3,5$$WWKHEHJLQQLQJ time needed to resolve the situation. the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which might Ɣ 7DFWLFDOLQWHOOLJHQFHVKRUWIDOOVWKDWOHGWR have been expected to spearhead intelligence col- DFWLRQPRUHEHQH¿FLDOWR3,5$WKDQWRDGYDQFLQJ lection to prevent terrorism, was not in a position to WKH¿JKWDJDLQVWLW conduct such activities. This prompted the British Ɣ )DLOXUHWRDSSUHFLDWHKRZFRYHUWRIIHQVLYH Army to intervene in Northern Ireland and forced actions—even successful ones—by special opera- it (and other intelligence organizations) to take the tions or intelligence organizations would play out lead in intelligence activities. in the political arena and other spheres.8 $VWKHFRQÀLFWEHFDPHPRUHLQWHQVHPDQ\GLI- 2YHUWKHFRXUVHRIWKHFRQÀLFWVHFXULW\DQG ferent intelligence units from military, law-enforce- intelligence organizations adapted by studying the ment, and intelligence agencies became involved. overall effects of their actions and learning from /DWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQV 0,DQG0,WKH each engagement. In time, they became extremely Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service,
MILITARY REVIEW z January-February 2007 75 respectively) also initiated operations to collect sources to provide (or sell) the same piece of infor- political intelligence. In an effort to describe the mation to more than one intelligence agency, so organizational landscape of the intelligence activi- that when the agencies did attempt to share data, WLHV¿HOGHGLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG0DUN8UEDQOLVWV multiple reports could be interpreted as independent QHDUO\XQLWVWKDWZHUHIRUPHGRUHYROYHGIURP FRQ¿UPDWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\PXOWLSOHFRQWDFWV RQHDQRWKHUEHWZHHQ DQG Many were with the same source.3UREOHPVLQFRRUGLQDWLRQ added to bring diverse intelligence capabilities to also reportedly resulted in the unintentional com- bear. However, as new agencies and units became promise of sources, hurting the ability of all agen- involved in operations, no focused attempt was cies to collect information.22 made to weave them into a single, coordinated Although they took years to develop and imple- intelligence effort. This is not surprising, given that ment, mechanisms were eventually put in place such coordination activities require time and effort to address intelligence coordination challenges.23 that could not then be directed at the adversary. Changes included centralization of overall com- Also, efforts involving many organizations almost mand and control for security activities, including LQYDULDEO\JHQHUDWHLQWHUDJHQF\FRQÀLFWVWKDWLQKLELW DSSRLQWPHQWRIDQ³LQWHOOLJHQFHVXSUHPR´DQG coordination. coordinating apparatus.24 One key to this shift was The initial lack of coordination had real opera- the development of tasking and coordination groups WLRQDOFRVWV3RRULQWHJUDWLRQPHDQWVSHFLDOL]HG (TCGs) that brought together the tactical activities teams and capabilities were not always used well. of various organizations involved in the intelligence )RUH[DPSOH5\GHUZULWHV³2ZLQJWRDPLVXQ- ¿JKW$FFRUGLQJWR8UEDQ³WKH7&*VDWWDLQHGD derstanding of its role, the SAS [Special Air Ser- FULWLFDOUROHLQZKDWVHFXULW\FKLHIVFDOOHGµH[HFXWLYH YLFH@ZDVPLVXVHGDW¿UVWLWVVSHFLDOVNLOOVZDVWHG DFWLRQ¶²ORFNLQJWRJHWKHULQWHOOLJHQFHIURPLQIRUP- because ordinary infantry commanders did not ers with the surveillance and ambushing activities NQRZKRZWRPDNHEHVWXVHRIWKHP´ )DLOXUHVWR RIXQGHUFRYHUXQLWV´25 share also meant security forces might respond to While such structures are needed to bring together incidents without the information necessary to be information produced in disparate operations staged HIIHFWLYHRUWRSURWHFWWKHPVHOYHV)RULQVWDQFHQRW by different organizations, they also provide critical VKDULQJQHZLQWHOOLJHQFHRQ3,5$ERPEGHVLJQV control. They limit duplication of effort and help ZLWKH[SORVLYHVRUGQDQFHGLVSRVDO (2' RI¿FHUV GHFRQÀLFWWKHDFWLRQVRIYDULRXVRUJDQL]DWLRQVWR who responded to bomb incidents nearly resulted ensure those operations do not interfere with one in EOD casualties. another. Such structures are also needed to concen- 3DUDOOHOLQWHOOLJHQFHHIIRUWVLQVHSDUDWHRUJDQL- trate intelligence forces as effectively as possible. ]DWLRQVDOVRJHQHUDWHGLQHI¿FLHQF\%HFDXVHRI The diverse capabilities that different agencies can VHFXULW\FRQFHUQVDUP\RI¿FHUV stationed in the area on short tours developed their own intel- …parallel streams [parallel intelligence ligence sources rather than rely on the police, who were perma- efforts in separate organizations] also nent residents. Such efforts generated the potential for single sources SURGXFHGVHFXULW\FODVVL¿FDWLRQ to provide (or sell) the same piece of issues that further complicated information to more than one intelligence sharing and coordination. Ryder VD\V³)XUWKHUKRVWLOLW\ZDV agency, so that when the agencies did caused when the army fre- attempt to share data, multiple reports TXHQWO\FODVVL¿HGPDWHULDOµ)RU could be interpreted as independent con- 8.H\HVRQO\¶ZKLFKGHQLHGWKH 58&VLJKWRILW´ ¿UPDWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\PXOWLSOH Such parallel streams also contacts with the same source. generated the potential for single
76 January-February 2007 z MILITARY REVIEW COIN FOR “THE LONG WAR”
EULQJWRD¿JKWDGGYDOXHRQO\LIWKRVHFDSDELOLWLHV groups that operated in Northern Ireland using can be brought to bear when needed. PRUHFHQWUDOL]HGVWUXFWXUHV.HLWK0DJXLUHVD\V “The ability of British security forces to turn any The Right Tools for PHPEHUVRIWKHVH>FHQWUDOL]HG@JURXSVPDGHSRV- Intelligence Collection VLEOHWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIHQWLUHJHRJUDSKLFXQLWV Any intelligence effort must be able to collect In the case of the INLA [Irish National Liberation information. However, the nature of the COIN mis- $UP\@RUWKH5HG+DQG&RPPDQGRRQHGHIHFWLRQ sion challenges traditional ways of thinking about OHGWRWKHLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIWKHHQWLUHOHDGHUVKLSRI intelligence collection, especially against members the organization and perhaps its entire membership of a comparatively small insurgent organization ZLWKLQDIHZPRQWKV´ within a larger civilian population. Where does such low-grade intelligence come from? Intelligence collection is generally thought of as a The primary sources are direct security force observa- GLVWLQFWDFWLYLW\LQZKLFKLQWHOOLJHQFHVSHFL¿FWRROV tion and interaction with members of the public. are used to gather data for analysis and application. Ɣ Every soldier a collector. Direct collection The COIN intelligence mission has elements that of low-grade intelligence by security forces relies ¿WUHDGLO\ZLWKLQWKLVYLHZ)RUH[DPSOHGHYHORS- on the eyes and ears of the entire force, not just LQJDQGH[SORLWLQJLQIRUPHUVRULQ¿OWUDWRUVFOHDUO\ the efforts of intelligence specialists. Because requires the same compartmentalization and protec- insurgents and terrorists blend in with the general tion that is standard intelligence practice. Inform- population, familiarity with what is normal in an HUVZLWKLQ3,5$ZHUHRIFULWLFDOLPSRUWDQFHLQWKH area provides the basis for detecting anomalous COIN effort and played an important part in the behavior that might indicate insurgent activity. Like LQWHOOLJHQFH¿JKW WKHFRPPXQLW\SDWUROOLQJSROLFHRI¿FHUVGRWKLV That said, the British experience in Northern Ire- VWUDWHJ\OHYHUDJHVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\WROHDUQ land demonstrates that COIN intelligence collection what the baseline activity is in his area of respon- efforts must diverge considerably from “classical sibility and then apply his own human processing LQWHOOLJHQFH´PHWKRGV/LPLWVWRWKHDYDLODELOLW\RI power to identify activities of concern.32 clandestine sources mean that other collection tools In Northern Ireland, troops pursued this strategy must be developed and applied. The effectiveness extensively with “constant mobile and foot patrols, of these other tools depends on the relationship ZKLFKDOORZ>HG@WURRSVWRIDPLOLDUL]HWKHPVHOYHV of intelligence specialists with other parts of the with their area and to pick up background informa- security force and even with the general population WLRQ´333ULPLQJSDWUROVWRORRNIRUNH\HOHPHQWV in the area affected by the insurgency. VXFKDVXVLQJ³IDFHERRNV´RILQVXUJHQWVXVSHFWV Tool 1: Collecting low-grade intelligence. :KLOHLQ¿OWUDWRUVRULQIRUPHUVFDQSURYLGHYDOX- DEOHGDWDWKH\PLJKWQRWEHDYDLODEOHLQVXI¿FLHQW numbers for success in a broad COIN effort. The Direct collection of low-grade complement for high-grade intelligence that such intelligence by security sources provide is large amounts of low-grade forces relies on the eyes and information that, added together, can provide a ears of the entire force,… picture of insurgent operations.28 This approach, DWWULEXWHGWR*HQHUDO6LU)UDQN.LWVRQUHTXLUHVDQ this strategy leverages an intelligence collection approach that is a hybrid of individual’s ability to learn military intelligence, law enforcement, and tradi- what the baseline activity is tional intelligence agency approaches. in his area of responsibil- The building up of low-grade intelligence is SDUWLFXODUO\LPSRUWDQWDJDLQVWJURXSVOLNH3,5$ ity and then apply his own that adopt decentralized structures for security human processing power to purposes. British security forces were quite suc- identify activities of concern. cessful in decimating a number of other terrorist
MILITARY REVIEW z January-February 2007 77 AP An armed British soldier patrols a street in Belfast, Northern Ireland, in February 1972. whose positions and activities were of particular and the departure of soldiers at the end of their tours interest) increased the intelligence gathered.34)RU takes them away when they might be operating at this strategy to be truly effective, however, the their highest performance level. various pieces of information obtained must be Early in its activities, the British military took brought together in a way that addresses intelligence few steps to aid knowledge transfer between units needs at all levels, from the need for information rotating into and out of the theater. According to to shape tactical operations to the requirement to Michael Dewar, “During the early years, battal- synthesize data to drive strategic decisions about ions were rushed out at little or no notice as both WKHHQWLUHFRQÀLFW35 The British relied on debrief- the government and the military merely reacted to ings after patrols to collect information and build HYHQWV´38 Over time, to help with knowledge trans- WKHRYHUDOOLQWHOOLJHQFHMLJVDZRIWKHFRQÀLFW In fer, the army developed processes to overlap the The British Army in Ulster, David Barzilay writes, command and intelligence functions of incoming “A patrol never ended up at the main gate [of the battalions with units already operating in theater. PLOLWDU\EDVH@:HZRXOGJHWDTXLFNFXSRIWHD Such processes began to erode the advantage held have a cigarette and in a relaxed atmosphere the by the insurgent, who lived and operated in theater patrol would be discussed and every piece of rel- and, therefore, could maintain and apply a higher evant information written down and passed on to level of local knowledge. WKHFRPSDQ\LQWHOOLJHQFHVHFWLRQ´ Ɣ 7KLQN³SHRSOH¿UVW´(YHQLILWLVSRVVLEOH While individual soldiers or units can be effective to harness the eyes and ears of each soldier in intelligence gatherers, standard military practices of a COIN theater, there will always be areas that compressed tours of duty and frequent troop rota- security forces cannot access. Therefore, the tion can make reliance on this strategy problematic. counterinsurgent must rely on the other eyes and Detailed local knowledge is only built up over time, ears in theater—those of the general population in
78 January-February 2007 z MILITARY REVIEW COIN FOR “THE LONG WAR” which insurgents hide. As members of the public trust can be quickly lost. Interrogation of suspects go about their daily business, they will almost cer- is a good example. While interrogation can provide tainly observe actions or overhear information of a key information stream for intelligence purposes, immeasurable value to security forces. how interrogation practices are perceived publicly In Northern Ireland, the general public provided is important.45 ,IWKHFRXQWHULQVXUJHQW¶VSUDFWLFHV key intelligence at times. Some input came via a are unduly harsh, the insurgent will use them for FRQ¿GHQWLDOWHOHSKRQHV\VWHPSXWLQSODFHE\VHFX- propaganda purposes. This was certainly the case rity forces. However, direct interaction between in Northern Ireland where so-called “interrogation members of the public and security forces was fre- in-depth had revealed a great deal of information quently key to gathering this type of intelligence. in a war where intelligence was at a premium. But At regularized interactions with security forces, success in counterinsurgency operations cannot be such as at checkpoints, individuals sometimes took measured in purely military terms. The interroga- the opportunity to pass on intelligence data.42 In tion issue was a political setback for the security contexts like these, collection depends even more IRUFHVDQGDSURSDJDQGDYLFWRU\IRUWKH,5$´ on individuals outside intelligence organizations The value of information obtained via tough or specialties. The nature of interaction between interrogation methods must be traded against the individual soldiers and members of the public can PHWKRGV¶SRWHQWLDOWRVKXWGRZQYROXQWDU\FRRS- GHWHUPLQHVXFFHVV7RHQVXUHWKDWHYHU\VROGLHU¶V eration from the population. Bad perceptions can actions were consistent with overall goals, soldiers also lead to political reactions that constrain intel- ZHUHWDXJKWWREHFRXUWHRXVEXW¿UP ³6ORZO\LWZDV ligence gathering. Tony Geraghty tells us that “the sinking in that the way a battalion behaved made SROLWLFDOVWRUPUDLVHGE\>WURRSV¶LQWHUQPHQWDQG a big difference to its overall success. Toughness LQWHUURJDWLRQSUDFWLFHV@UHVXOWHGLQRI¿FLDOOLPLWD- ZDVDFFHSWDEOH URXJKQHVVZDVQRW´43 tions on interrogation which gave the IRA a real )RULQWHUDFWLRQDQGLQIRUPDWLRQH[FKDQJHWREH PLOLWDU\SUL]H´48 possible between the public and security forces, Similarly, actions taken by security forces that VROGLHUVKDYHWREHDEOHWRVSHDNWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶V affect the general population must be assessed with ODQJXDJH,Q1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGWKLVZDVQ¶WDSURE- DYLHZWRZDUGWKHLULQÀXHQFHRQSXEOLFRSLQLRQ lem, as it is in Iraq, where security force members While large-scale operations such as cordon-and- who can speak the language are critical assets. If a search might provide ways to collect information member of the public who has critical intelligence RQEURDGSRUWLRQVRIDQDUHD¶VSRSXODWLRQWKH\ approaches a soldier and cannot make himself frequently antagonize the public and inhibit coop- XQGHUVWRRGKHPLJKWQRWSHUVHYHUHWR¿QGDQRWKHU eration. Limiting broad operations and using other person who can understand his language. intelligence-gathering methods can pay dividends Ɣ Public opinion drives collection. In COIN, in effectiveness and public image. LPDJHPDWWHUV7KHSRSXODWLRQ¶VSRWHQWLDOWRSURYLGH Tool 2: Specialized operations and units. valuable information means that perceptions—the While broad efforts to collect intelligence data can public image of security forces and their activi- provide much information useful for COIN, other ties—have operational consequences. If, for exam- needs require more specialized tools. Some focused ple, citizens believe they will not be protected from retributive violence, their willingness to participate with authorities will be understandably reduced.44 Where insurgents or terrorists take actions that are If…citizens believe they will perceived as particularly brutal or inexcusable by the not be protected from general population, citizens may pass on information retributive violence, their in spite of such fear. However, relying solely on the willingness to participate DGYHUVDU\¶VWDFWLFDOPLVWDNHVWRVSXUWKHÀRZRILQWHO- OLJHQFHLVQRWVXI¿FLHQWIRUDUREXVW&2,1HIIRUW with authorities will be Actions matter too. When the actions of security understandably reduced. forces are seen as inappropriate or repressive, public
MILITARY REVIEW z January-February 2007 79 intelligence operations applied in Northern Ireland intelligence through the use of challenge-response ZHUHTXLWHVLPSOHLQFRQFHSW)RUH[DPSOHVHFX- type operations, in which overt actions by security rity checkpoints (particularly rapidly implemented forces were combined with close observation to ³VQDS´FKHFNSRLQWV ZHUHXVHGWRFROOHFWLQIRUPD- FDSWXUHDQ\3,5$DFWLYLWLHVRUGHIHQVLYHDFWLRQV tion on the movement of individuals and vehicles. ³ÀXVKHGRXW´E\WKHRYHUWHOHPHQW Similarly (and despite the risk of creating ill will Tool 3: Flexible technical means. While British in the population), stop-and-search operations of security services deployed a range of intelligence individuals in areas of security concern helped col- efforts that relied on direct observation and infor- lect certain types of information. Other operations mation collected by individuals, such operations were more complex and required specialized units DOZD\VKDGLQKHUHQWDQGIUHTXHQWO\VLJQL¿FDQW and capabilities to carry them out. risks. Therefore, technical tools were needed to 2EVHUYDWLRQSRVWV 23V ZHUHDPDMRUSDUWRIWKH provide alternative and complementary ways to LQWHOOLJHQFH¿JKW6RPH23VZHUHRYHUWVXFKDV gather information. Such tools were also important WKHRQHRQWRSRI'LYLV)ODWVLQ:HVW%HOIDVWZKHUH IRUFHPXOWLSOLHUVEHFDXVHWKHUHIUHTXHQWO\ZHUHQ¶W observers continuously scanned the streets using high- enough specialized surveillance operatives to sat- powered binoculars and, at night, infrared sights.52 isfy the demand for their services. Covert surveillance posts (complemented by Strategies applied in Northern Ireland included soldiers patrolling undercover) were also used in such traditional means as airborne sensors with live- problem areas to enable long-term monitoring.53 feed television, sophisticated photographic devices, $WVXFKSRVWVFRQWLQXLW\LQVWDI¿QJKHOSHGEXLOG and infrared detection systems.58 Listening devices, up baseline local knowledge, making it easier for phone taps, hidden cameras, motion detectors, and an observer to detect anomalies that might suggest technologies that intercepted communications traf- 3,5$DFWLYLW\$FFRUGLQJWR%DU]LOD\³(DFKWLPH ¿FDOVRSOD\HGFULWLFDOUROHV Reportedly, a variety WKH23VFKDQJHGWKHVDPHPDULQHVZHQWWRWKHVDPH of devices were deployed in areas of particular SRVLWLRQVDQGWRRNRYHUWKHVDPHZDWFKHV>VRWKH\@ LQWHUHVWIURP]RQHVZKHUH3,5$RSHUDWLYHVPRYHG could get used to the routines of the day, such as across the border between Northern Ireland and the WKHPLONÀRDWRQLWVURXQGVWKHGXVWPDQFDOOLQJWKH Republic of Ireland to underground tunnels where paperboy on his rounds, and the pubs opening and terrorist operations were suspected. closing. In this way each marine became familiar Technical surveillance efforts were also specially with the personalities and locality and was able to adapted for COIN. Technologies were molded to the VSRWDFKDQJHRIURXWLQHZKHQLWRFFXUUHG´54 mission, not vice versa; they augmented the collection Overt observation was challenging. In close-knit effort instead of determining how it would be done. As QHLJKERUKRRGVVWUDQJHUVFRXOGEHUHDGLO\LGHQWL¿HG a case in point, the critical task of identifying and track- DQGZHUHUDSLGO\FKDOOHQJHGPDNLQJLWGLI¿FXOWWR LQJ3,5$DFWLYLWLHVPHDQWWKDWSKRWRJUDSKLFVXUYHLO- carry out overt and static surveillance activities. lance approaches were applied in ways more akin to This necessitated development and application of how they would be used by law-enforcement agencies a wide range of specialized teams with training in than in traditional military intelligence gathering. close observation of individuals and other methods 3KRWRJUDSKLQJWHUURULVWVXVSHFWVDQGXVLQJSKRWRV of focused intelligence gathering. Groups such as of them to identify their associates was key to build- WKHWK,QWHOOLJHQFH&RPSDQ\VSHFLDOFORVHREVHU- ing dossiers and identifying people who might be vation platoons, the E4A unit in the police depart- recruited as agents.:KHQVHFXULW\IRUFHVLGHQWL¿HG ment, and the SAS all played these roles in different sites (such as arms caches, residences, or commercial SDUWVRIWKHLQWHOOLJHQFH¿JKWLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG buildings) that terrorist group members used, security Some military intelligence teams operated for forces frequently chose to monitor the sites with audio extended tours (compared to the shorter rotations and video surveillance for extended periods in an of other units) to provide continuity and to allow effort to identify unknown terrorists or supporters. them to build up local knowledge and expertise.55 Another intelligence tool particularly suited to Having units that could monitor areas and indi- WUDFNLQJ3,5$RSHUDWLRQDOSUDFWLFHVZDVWKHWUDFN- viduals covertly made it possible to gain additional ing transmitter, which helped security forces map
80 January-February 2007 z MILITARY REVIEW COIN FOR “THE LONG WAR”
small, around the normal wartime establishment of VL[PHQ¶´ Effective interpretation and dissemina- :KHQVHFXULW\IRUFHVLGHQWL¿HGVLWHV tion of the large volumes of data produced required …that terrorist group members much more, with the effort eventually growing into used, [they] frequently chose to D³ODUJHRUJDQL]DWLRQ>WRXWLOL]H@WKHLQIRUPDWLRQ monitor the sites with audio and EURXJKWLQE\WKHWURRSVLQWKH¿HOG´ While the effective use of intelligence requires video surveillance…to identify VXI¿FLHQWDQDO\WLFDOFDSDELOLW\WHFKQRORJ\ GDWD- unknown terrorists or supporters. bases and computational power) also plays an LPSRUWDQWUROHLQZHDYLQJWKH³SRLQWV´RIORZJUDGH intelligence data together into a coherent picture. the movement of particular vehicles or materials Initially, data management included the use of banks through the terrorist infrastructure. Transmission RIFDUG¿OHVDQGOLVWVRISKRWRJUDSKVRISRWHQWLDO devices in vehicles made it possible to track the 3,5$PHPEHUVRUV\PSDWKL]HUV As the coun- SRVLWLRQRIDQLQIRUPHURUDVXVSHFW¶VYHKLFOHDV terinsurgency continued, these tools evolved into it called on various locations in Northern Ireland. complex databases and computerized information Mapping such travels helped identify sites that management systems. Descriptions of intelligence might merit follow-up investigation. In the middle efforts indicate that there were individual systems WRODWH VLPSURYHPHQWVLQWHFKQRORJ\PDGH for data on vehicles (code named Vengeful) and it possible to surreptitiously place similar tracking individuals (code named Crucible). devices in weapons and explosives discovered in Critically, data was collated from across the col- 3,5$DUPVFDFKHV The practice, known as jarking, lection spectrum. Law-enforcement organizations, PDGHLWSRVVLEOHWRWUDFHWKHPDUNHGDUPV¶SURJUHVV IRULQVWDQFHIHGWKHLULQWHOOLJHQFHLQWRDXQL¿HG WKURXJKWKHJURXS¶VORJLVWLFDOV\VWHP:KHQGHYLFHV criminal intelligence system: “Monitoring of terror- were produced that could capture audio, they were ist suspects and their supporters was also carried out also used by security to listen to conversations and the details forwarded to an intelligence-collat- occurring around the weapon. ing facility. . . . These details would be entered into a computer system, where an easy and retrievable The Right Capabilities reference could be made and a composite printout for Analysis of the date, time, and place of the sighting of the The many collection modes deployed against SDUWLFXODUYHKLFOHYHKLFOHVFRXOGEHDFFHVVHG´ 3,5$DQVZHUHG.LWVRQ¶VUHTXLUHPHQWIRUPDVVHV Ryder tells us, “Every single piece of information of low-grade information on the insurgency and reaching the RUC from any source was . . . system- its activities. However, without robust analytical atically collated. The ballistic and forensic reports capabilities to make sense of the information, a on every incident were married with even the most COIN effort can drown in data rather than gain LQFRQVHTXHQWLDOVFUDSVRILQWHOOLJHQFH´ greater knowledge of the situation on the ground. Such systems were constructed and populated 'HVPRQG+DPLOOVD\V³>:@KDWZDVQHHGHGWKHQ through systematic gathering of framework data was for it all to be brought together and meshed (geographic, census, and other descriptive informa- LQWRDFRQVWUXFWLYHDQGXVHIXOSDWWHUQ´ tion about the theater and its inhabitants) to provide Correlating the snippets of information collected context for collected intelligence information. by COIN intelligence efforts into a coherent picture Committing the time and resources necessary to requires a commitment of manpower and capabil- construct and feed such systems requires up-front ity. Early on the British military reportedly did not LQYHVWPHQWEXWLQDORQJWHUP¿JKWDJDLQVWDQ commit the manpower needed to do the job. Accord- insurgent group such investment makes sense. The LQJWR%UXFH+RIIPDQDQG-HQQLIHU7DZ³,Q WKH V\VWHPV¶UHWXUQDFFUXHVRYHUWLPHDVWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ QXPEHURIPLOLWDU\LQWHOOLJHQFHVSHFLDOLVWVµLQYROYHG they hold increases and their capabilities expand. in collating and assembling this information were left Additional knowledge-based features were to each unit, but the numbers were comparatively reportedly added to the data-collation systems to
MILITARY REVIEW z January-February 2007 81 improve analysis of data and pattern recognition, counterinsurgency sometimes enables successful which made it possible to apply such techniques as operations in which terrorist-insurgent plans are WUDI¿FDQDO\VLVDQGQHWZRUNDQDO\VHVRIJURXSVDQG disrupted; adversaries are shot, killed, or captured; WRGHWHFWHYHQVPDOOFKDQJHVLQVXVSHFWV¶EHKDYLRU cells are rolled up and prosecuted in the courts; or )RUH[DPSOHLIWKHV\VWHPVORVWWUDFNRIVSHFL¿F logistical bases are captured and supply lines broken. 3,5$VXVSHFWVDWWHQWLRQZDVWKHQIRFXVHGRQORFDW- Examples of such operations can be found throughout ing those individuals to determine the reasons for the history of the violence in Northern Ireland. In a the change in behavior. ORQJWHUP¿JKWKRZHYHUVXFKDFWLRQVPLJKWEHWKH 7KHFRPSXWHUV\VWHPV¶UDSLGUHWULHYDOFDSDELOLWLHV H[FHSWLRQUDWKHUWKDQWKHQRUP+LJKSUR¿OHYLFWRULHV also provided soldiers on the ground with quick are not the most common—or even always the most access to intelligence to guide action. Barzilay desirable—outcomes of COIN intelligence efforts. writes, “Soldiers on foot and vehicle patrol [would In Northern Ireland, applying intelligence imme- ORRN@IRUSDUWLFXODUPHQDQGYHKLFOHV:KHQWKH diately and actively was risky, not only for military WDUJHW>ZDV@VSRWWHGDIXOOUHSRUW>ZDV@UDGLRHGWR or police personnel, but for intelligence sources the battalion headquarters and then passed on to the whose identities and activities might be discovered LQWHOOLJHQFHRI¿FHUZKRSDVV>HG@WKDWLQIRUPDWLRQ DV3,5$FDUULHGRXWLWVRZQSRVWPRUWHPLQYHVWLJD- to the computer, if necessary in a matter of seconds. tion of security force success. A balance had to be $WPDQ\EDVHVWKURXJKRXW8OVWHUWKHUH>ZDV@D struck between acting immediately on actionable direct terminal link to the computers. That link also information, thereby gaining a local victory, and HQDEOH>G@WKHLQWHOOLJHQFHRI¿FHURURSHUDWRUWRVHH ³FRQWLQXLQJWRZDWFK´LQDQHIIRUWWREXLOGXSDVXI- ZKDW>ZDV@RQµ¿OH¶DERXWWKHSDUWLFXODUWDUJHWDQG ¿FLHQWO\GHWDLOHGSLFWXUHRIWKHLQVXUJHQWV¶DFWLYLWLHV pass this information back to the man on the ground. plans, and order of battle to enable more effective It could be a simple piece of information that a man action at a later time. This balance necessitates is often seen in the area where he has been spotted, or different strategies for acting on intelligence in a it may refer to the fact that he should be approached COIN environment. with caution because he is known to have been Because of the risk of revealing sources and LQYROYHGLQWHUURULVWDFWLYLW\DQGDUPHG´ methods, intelligence in Northern Ireland was )HHGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQEDFNWRVROGLHUVRQWKH often used to frustrate rather than to strike directly ground generated more and better data collection. DW3,5$%DVHGRQNQRZOHGJHRIDSODQQHGWHUURU- Barzilay continues, “Those who mount vehicle ist attack, for example, security forces shaped the checkpoints, whether Royal Military policemen or HQYLURQPHQWVR3,5$ZRXOGFKRRVHWRDERUWWKH RUGLQDU\VROGLHUV>ZHUH@JLYHQDGDLO\EULH¿QJRQ operation. Urban tells us that “an IRA team sent to what to look out for. That information might have DVVDVVLQDWHD>PHPEHURIWKHVHFXULW\IRUFHV@ZLOO come as a tip-off, from police criminal intelligence not press home its attack if there are several uni- or Special Branch, or it might have come from other formed police, perhaps stopping vehicles to check information which had previously been fed into the their tax discs, outside his or her house. The police FRPSXWHU>LQWHOOLJHQFHV\VWHPV@´ Getting such or soldiers involved will almost always be ignorant LQIRUPDWLRQPDGHWKHVROGLHUVVHHWKHV\VWHP¶VWDQ- RIWKHFRYHUWUHDVRQIRUWKHLUSUHVHQFH´ JLEOHEHQH¿WV,WJDYHWKHPLQFHQWLYHWRFRQWULEXWH Such disruption operations did not even have to information to the systems. involve overt action by security forces. Urban con- WLQXHV³$QLQWHOOLJHQFHRI¿FHUUHODWHVRQHLQFLGHQW Applying Intelligence where it was known that an IRA team was to travel in a Long Fight along a particular route on its way to an attack. They In military intelligence activities, the focus is >WKHVHFXULW\IRUFHV@DUUDQJHGIRUDFDUµDFFLGHQW¶ usually on moving as quickly as possible from col- WRWDNHSODFHRQWKHURDGµ7KHUHZDVQ¶WDXQLIRUP lecting information to acting on it—transitioning LQVLJKW¶KHUHFDOOVµEXWLWZDVDVVXPHGWKDWWKH\ from sensor to shooter, as the U.S. Army calls it—in >WKHLQVXUJHQWV@ZRXOGJHWXQQHUYHGVLWWLQJLQWKH an effort to capitalize effectively on all available WDLOEDFNWKLQNLQJWKHSROLFHZHUHDERXWWRDUULYH¶ information. Intelligence in counterterrorism and 7KHSOR\VXFFHHGHG´82
82 January-February 2007 z MILITARY REVIEW COIN FOR “THE LONG WAR”
Changing the Vocabulary for COIN The U.S. Department of Defense UHFHQWO\DGRSWHG³WKHORQJZDU´DVD descriptive term for the current struggle against the insurgency in Iraq and the PRUHJHQHUDO¿JKWDJDLQVWJOREDOWHU- rorism. Such a change in vocabulary is significant, given that much of contemporary U.S. military planning has focused on how to win a short war by bringing together force, precision, agility, and speed to make quick vic- tory possible. However, waging war effectively requires more than acknowl- edging that wars are fought and won on different time scales. As the British experience in Northern Ireland shows, it is not enough merely to adopt the long-war terminology; rather, the U.S. military will have to make a broad set
AP of changes if it wants to build orga- Members or the Royal Ulster Constabulary remove a Catholic demon- strator from the city walls of Londonderry, Northern Ireland, before the QL]DWLRQVWKDWFDQZLQVXFKFRQÀLFWV start of the Protestant Apprentice Boy Parade on 12 August 1995. Winning a long war is not the same as winning many short wars in succession. Other strategies included simply depriving the Rather, winning a long war requires applying an terrorists of their targets. If word of a planned entirely different, sometimes antithetical set of tools ambush on a security-force patrol came in from than those optimized for achieving victory through intelligence sources, the area could simply be put rapid, decisive action. RXWRIERXQGVIRUSDWUROVPHDQLQJWKDWWKH3,5$ 3HUKDSVQRWVXUSULVLQJO\1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGSUR- attack team would sit in position waiting for a target vides many examples of organizations making the that never appeared.83 More subtle deployments of transition from seeking quick victory to waging security forces were used to divert terrorist teams long-term operations. When it deployed, the Brit- GRZQSDUWLFXODUURXWHVDQGWRLQÀXHQFHKRZWHU- LVK$UP\GLGQRWH[SHFWWREHLQYROYHGLQDFRQÀLFW URULVWORRNRXWV ³GLFNHUV´ ZRXOGUHSRUWWKHULVNRI for decades, and its early actions were not designed staging operations around particular security-force ZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIDORQJWHUP¿JKWLQPLQG85 bases or sites.84 According to Graham Ellison, the police organiza- This approach to applying intelligence, where WLRQVLQYROYHGLQWKHFRQÀLFWDGRSWHGWKH$UP\¶V VHFXULW\IRUFHVHVVHQWLDOO\³SOD\IRUDWLH´ DQGQR viewpoint, believing that strong action in the short- direct damage is done against either side, but the term could tighten the noose on the terrorists and WHUURULVWV¶SODQQHGRSHUDWLRQLVWKZDUWHG WDNHVD ZLQWKH¿JKW ORQJWHUPYLHZRIWKHFRQÀLFW,WDFNQRZOHGJHV 7KHVDPHZDVWUXHIRU3,5$(DUO\RQ3,5$ that there is value in frustrating operations while DSSURDFKHGLWV¿JKWIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHWKDW³MXVW preserving intelligence sources, rather than going RQHPRUHKHDYH´ZRXOGSXVKWKH%ULWLVKIURP1RUWK- for a tactical win immediately. While “playing for ern Ireland. The organization only transitioned away DWLH´GRHVQRWGLUHFWO\DWWULWLQVXUJHQWZHDSRQVRU from that view much later, to an approach focused SHUVRQQHOLWFRQVWUDLQVWKHLQVXUJHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V on maintaining its survivability over the long-term freedom of action and costs it the time and effort and integrating its violent action with a more explicit invested in the disrupted plans. political strategy. Both sides made these changes
MILITARY REVIEW z January-February 2007 83 because strategies based on winning quickly, and primarily through military means, produced results that were unsat- isfactory at best and frequently quite damaging to their interests. )RUVHFXULW\RUJDQL]DWLRQVWUXO\ adopting a long-war approach entails a shift from decisive to patient operations; it means understanding how security efforts contribute to or detract from political and other efforts against an insurgency. It is important to consider the overall impact of security actions because many COIN intelligence activi- ties do not produce clear military results that can be measured in adversary casu- alties or materiel destroyed. Collecting extensive data on individuals in an area AP $\RXQJVWHUZDONVSDVW5HDO,ULVK5HSXEOLFDQ$UP\JUDI¿WLRQZDOOVLQ RIUHVSRQVLELOLW\DQGGHEULH¿QJVROGLHUV West Belfast, Northern Ireland, 4 March 2001. UHWXUQLQJIURPSDWURORQWKH³IHHO´RI neighborhoods might seem unsoldierly to military to assess the outputs of COIN intelligence in purely intelligence traditionalists, but it works. PLOLWDU\WHUPV)RUH[DPSOHZKHQWKHRXWFRPHRI Similarly, larger considerations might dictate lim- an extensive intelligence operation is a standoff ited action, perhaps only quietly disrupting insur- or draw, the military utility of the activity might JHQWV¶SODQVRUHYHQIRUHJRLQJWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WR seem limited at best; however, in the context of an VWULNHDQLGHQWL¿HGWDUJHWLQRUGHUWRFROOHFWQHHGHG integrated political and military effort, there might information. Because military intelligence typically be a great deal of utility in such an approach. When strives to move actionable information into target \RXQHXWUDOL]HWKHHQHP\¶VDELOLW\WRFDXVHKDUP IROGHUVDQGRQWRVWULNHOLVWVLWPLJKWEHGLI¿FXOWWR you create opportunities for other action along other pass up an attractive, valuable target, whatever the lines of operation. potential payoff in future intelligence opportunity. Because insurgencies are usually ended by politi- 3DWLHQFHDQGGLVFLSOLQHKRZHYHUQRWVFDWWHUHG cal means, the mission of security forces might not tactical victories, overcome insurgencies. be to destroy the insurgent organization and its The vagaries of COIN make collecting, analyz- membership. Instead, it might simply be to pre- ing, and applying intelligence quite different from vent the insurgency from shaping its environment traditional military intelligence operations, which through violence. Once security forces have effec- are optimized for rapid, decisive action. The long tively rendered the insurgency impotent, broader collection-and-analysis cycles involved and the action on political and other fronts can catch up VRPHWLPHVVXEWOHXVHVRIGDWDDOVRPDNHLWGLI¿FXOW and render it irrelevant. MR
NOTES
1. See, for example, Conor O’Niell, “Terrorism, Insurgency and the Military 'DYLG%DU]LOD\The British Army in Ulster, YRO %HOIDVW8. &HQWXU\%RRNV Response from South Armagh to Falluja,” RUSI (2004): 22-25, online at
84 January-February 2007 z MILITARY REVIEW COIN FOR “THE LONG WAR”
%UHQGDQ +XJKHV TXRWHG LQ 3HWHU7D\ORU Brits: The War Against the IRA RYHUODSSLQJSURFHVVHVUHTXLUHGLQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPVDQGSUDFWLFHVDGHSWDWDVVHVV- /RQGRQ %ORRPVEXU\ LQJDQGYDOLGDWLQJOLNHO\³LPSHUIHFW´LQWHOOLJHQFHGDWD7KHRYHUODSPLJKWQHFHVVLWDWH $ZHDOWKRILQIRUPDWLRQLVDYDLODEOHLQWKHRSHQOLWHUDWXUHLQFOXGLQJ¿UVWSHUVRQ DGGLWLRQDOUHVHDUFKDQGVXUYHLOODQFHRSHUDWLRQV 6HH%DUNHU QDUUDWLYHVRILQGLYLGXDOVRQERWKVLGHVPDNLQJLWSRVVLEOHWRH[SORUHWKHVHLVVXHVLQ %DU]LOD\YRO PRUHGHWDLOWKDQLQPDQ\RWKHUFDPSDLJQV$YDLODEOHVRXUFHVLQFOXGHPHPRLUVE\ ,ELGYRO LQGLYLGXDOVLQPLOLWDU\LQWHOOLJHQFHDQGVSHFLDORSHUDWLRQVRUJDQL]DWLRQVODZHQIRUFH- 43. Hamill, 141. PHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQV%ULWLVK$UP\XQLWVRSHUDWLQJLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGDQGQRQ$UP\ 44. Maguire, 152. (2'XQLWV DQGE\LQ¿OWUDWRUVDQGLQIRUPHUVLQWKHSDUDPLOLWDU\WHUURULVWJURXSV$OVR (OOLVRQDQG6P\WK7KHYDOXHRILQWHUURJDWLRQDVDVRXUFHRIDUDQJHRILQWHO- YDOXDEOHDUHZRUNVORRNLQJDWLQGLYLGXDOVHUYLFHVRUFRQWDLQLQJDQDO\VHVFXWWLQJDFURVV ligence reinforces the importance of security forces being able to communicate in WKHDFWLYLWLHVRILQWHOOLJHQFHDQGVHFXULW\IRUFHVRSHUDWLRQVLQWKHFRQÀLFW WKHORFDOODQJXDJH(IIHFWLYHLQWHUURJDWLRQIUHTXHQWO\UHTXLUHVFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWK 'DYLG$&KDUWHUV³,QWHOOLJHQFHDQG3V\FKRORJLFDO2SHUDWLRQVLQ1RUWKHUQ LQGLYLGXDOV RYHU H[WHQGHG SHULRGV RI WLPH 6KRUWDJHV RI VHFXULW\ IRUFH PHPEHUV Ireland,” RUSI (1997): 22-27 (originally published in Journal of the Royal Services (especially those trained in interrogation processes) who can communicate directly Institute for Defence Studies 122); Hoffman and Taw, 87. ZLWKSULVRQHUVFDQPDNHHIIHFWLYHLQWHUURJDWLRQGLI¿FXOWSDUWLFXODUO\LIQXPEHUVRI .HLWK0DJXLUH³7KH,QWHOOLJHQFH:DULQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG´International Journal GHWDLQHHV EHJLQ WR VLJQL¿FDQWO\ H[FHHG WKH QXPEHU RI WUDLQHG DQG OLQJXLVWLFDOO\ of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, YRO VNLOOHGLQWHUURJDWRUV7KHSUHVVXUHWR³VSHDNZLWKHYHU\RQH´FDQOHDGWRDEEUHYLDWHG 8UEDQ7KHYDULRXVUROHVDQGDJHQFLHVDUHDOVRGLVFXVVHGLQ7RQ\*HU- LQWHUURJDWLRQSURFHVVHVWKDWJUHDWO\UHGXFHWKHSRWHQWLDOWDNHRILQIRUPDWLRQIURP aghty, 7KH,ULVK:DU 7KH+LGGHQ&RQÀLFW%HWZHHQWKH,5$DQG%ULWLVK,QWHOOLJHQFH any single detainee. %DOWLPRUH0' 7KH-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV -DPHV5HQQLH 46. Charters; Hamill, 60-61. The Operators: On the Street with Britain’s Most Secret Service 6RXWK
MILITARY REVIEW z January-February 2007 85