Infighting in Northern Ireland's Republican
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REBEL FRATRICIDE IN STRONG STATES: INFIGHTING IN NORTHERN IRELAND’S REPUBLICAN INSURGENCY AND THE KURDISH REBELLION IN TURKEY By Tyler Evans Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In International Relations Chair: Boaz Atzili, Ph.D. Kursad Turan, Ph.D. Joseph K. Young, Ph.D. Dean of the School of International Service Date 2019 American University Washington, D.C. 20016 © COPYRIGHT by Tyler Evans 2019 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED To Ruth REBEL FRATRICIDE IN STRONG STATES: INFIGHTING IN NORTHERN IRELAND’S REPUBLICAN INSURGENCY AND THE KURDISH REBELLION IN TURKEY BY Tyler Evans ABSTRACT Why do rebels sometimes go to war with each other, weakening their position against their common enemy, the state? This dissertation compares two cases of intra-rebel war that pose an especially difficult puzzle for existing theories of intra-rebel war: the fighting between the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA in Belfast (1969-1980) and war among Kurdish revolutionaries in Turkey (1974-1980). These two cases are puzzling because both occurred in areas where the state was strong, and therefore able to capitalize operationally and politically on rebel fratricide. By comparing these two cases, this dissertation argues that broadly similar causal mechanisms can help to explain these intra-rebel wars. In both cases, rebel organizations were shaped by their involvement in defensive violence in response to repression from the state and state-aligned attackers. Learning to counteract this violence changed the operational and cultural character of these organizations, with downstream effects on how these organizations strategically appraised the costs and benefits of using violence against rivals. Furthermore, these organizational changes led to an increased frequency of violence that was non-strategic; that is, it was not performed as the result of a considered and thorough decision-making process. In combination, these mechanisms promoted repeated spirals of fratricidal ii violence that progressively altered threat perceptions, and thereby encouraged riskier, more concerted applications of violence against rivals. This dissertation fashions this comparative explanation into a generalizable argument about the causes of intra-rebel war in strong states, and provides initial testing of the arguments with two shadow cases, taken from the Algerian independence movement in France and the Sinhalese leftist insurgency in Sri Lanka. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Throughout my dissertation work, I have been amazed by the generosity and openness of the academic community around the world. This dissertation has only been possible thanks to help from a list of researchers and scholars that is too lengthy to fit into these brief acknowledgements. I also owe a great debt to my committee. Joe Young encouraged me to think harder about my concepts and to enjoy the exploration and discovery of dissertation writing. My conversations with Kursad Turan added focus to my project, and taught me much about the study of political violence. Boaz Atzili gave more of his time and intellectual energy to my dissertation than I ever could have expected. Working patiently with me over many twists and turns, he showed an unwavering dedication to my growth as a researcher. And of course, I am grateful to my wife, Ruth, not least for the Sunday afternoons that she spent reading over my literature reviews, instead of restaurant reviews. The mistakes and omissions that remain are mine alone. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: THE PUZZLE OF REBEL FRATRICIDE IN STRONG STATES ...........1 1.1. Introduction and main concepts ...........................................................................1 1.1.1. Research question and argument .......................................................................3 1.1.2. Key definitions ...................................................................................................5 1.1.3. Defining and operationalizing intra-rebel war ................................................16 1.2. Wars within: comparing the Republican movement and Kurdish revolutionaries .............................................................................................................18 1.2.1. Intra-rebel war in strong states .........................................................................24 1.2.2. Possible explanations .......................................................................................29 1.2.3. The plan and approach of the dissertation .......................................................38 CHAPTER 2: MOBILIZATION, COUNTER-MOBILIZATION, AND VIOLENCE ....43 2.1. Northern Ireland: from civil rights to civil war ................................................45 2.1.1. Political opportunity and early risers ...............................................................47 2.1.2. Counter-mobilization (1966-1969) ..................................................................49 2.1.3. Transgressive protest and violent backlash: an escalating cycle .....................51 2.1.4. Inter-communal strife .......................................................................................55 2.1.5. Belfast in flames ..............................................................................................59 2.1.6. The British Army in Northern Ireland: from peacekeeping to COIN ..............61 2.1.7. Loyalist violence: a continuing danger (1970-1980) .......................................64 2.1.8. The politics of community threat .....................................................................66 2.2. Turkey’s twin insurgencies .................................................................................67 2.2.1. Political opportunity structure and the pro-Kurdish movement in Turkey (1960-1971) ...............................................................................................69 2.2.2. The rise of the left in western Turkey (1960-1971) .........................................71 2.2.3. Grassroots counter-mobilization ......................................................................72 2.2.4. A new decade and new heights of conflict ......................................................76 2.2.5. Defying the dangers of total repression in eastern Turkey ..............................80 2.2.6. New heights of violence and military intervention ..........................................85 2.2.7. The new politics of violence in eastern Turkey ...............................................86 2.3. Theorizing repressive environments .................................................................87 2.3.1. Contentious politics and disorderly violent repression ....................................89 2.3.2. Disorderly violent repression: an antecedent condition for intra-rebel war ..103 CHAPTER 3: VIOLENCE AND INSURGENT CHANGE ...........................................104 3.1. Continuity and change in the Irish Republican movement ...........................105 3.1.1. The Officials ..................................................................................................106 v 3.1.2. The Provisional IRA: organizing anew ..........................................................115 3.2. Changing patterns of repression and organizing violence in Turkey ...........119 3.2.1. The Kurdish incumbency: born in the shadow of total repression ................120 3.2.2. The TKDP/KUK: fighting tradition ...............................................................128 3.2.3. The PKK: a violent newcomer .......................................................................134 3.3. Theorizing violence and dissident transformation .........................................146 3.3.1. Changes in the local culture of the dissident community ..............................147 3.3.2. Shaping organizations within the dissident movement ..................................157 3.3.3. Imprints from disorderly violent repression ..................................................160 3.3.4. Rudimentary violence as politics ...................................................................163 3.3.5. The hazards of routines of rudimentary violence ..........................................168 3.3.6. Implications for interaction ............................................................................171 CHAPTER 4: ENTERING THE PATH TO WAR ........................................................173 4.1. The Republican movement after 1969: early antagonisms, lasting animosity ....................................................................................................................174 4.1.1. Physical competition ......................................................................................181 4.1.2. Taking non-lethal violence to the limit ..........................................................184 4.1.3. Community defense and intensifying competition ........................................186 4.1.4. The Cracked Cup and the Burning Embers ...................................................190 4.1.5. Competition and containing the feud .............................................................198 4.1.6. The British military closes in .........................................................................203 4.1.7. Strategy vs. organizational routines ...............................................................205 4.1.8. Fighting in the vicinity of the British military ...............................................208