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'THE AFFIRMATION OF BEHAN?'
AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICISATION PROCESS OF THE
PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT THROUGH AN ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SPLITS FROM 1969 TO 1997
John F. Morrison
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the
University of St Andrews
2010
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‘The Affirmation of Behan?’
An Understanding of the Politicisation Process of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement
Through an Organisational Analysis of
Splits from 1969 to 1997.
John F. Morrison
School of International Relations
Ph.D. 2010
SUBMISSION OF PHD AND MPHIL THESES REQUIRED DECLARATIONS 1. Candidate’s declarations:
I, John F. Morrison, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 82,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.
I was admitted as a research student in September 2005 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. in May, 2007; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2005 and 2010. Date 25-Aug-10 Signature of candidate
2. Supervisor’s declaration:
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Ph.D. in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree. Date 25-Aug-10 Signature of supervisor
3. Permission for electronic publication: (to be signed by both candidate and supervisor)
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. We also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. We have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below. The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic publication of this thesis:
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- Date 25-Aug-10 Signature of candidate
- Signature of supervisor
Table of Contents
List of Tables vii List of Figures ix
Abstract x
Acknowledgements xi
Introduction P.1
Chapter 1: Function of an Organisation
1.1 Introduction P.7
1.2 The Organisation p.8
1.3 The Terrorist Group as a Political Organisation: Public Goods and Externalities P.10
1.4 Survival and Maintenance P.14
1.5 Support P.19 1.6 Loyalty P.26
1.7 External Factors P.28
1.8 Chapter Summary P.29
Chapter 2: Intra-Organisational Conflict
2.1 Introduction P.30
2.2 Reasoning for Intra-Organisational Conflict P.31
2.3 Alternative Hypotheses p.33
2.3.2 March and Simon Model of Organisational Conflict P.33
2.3.2 The Pondy Model P.35
23.3 Weinberg and Richardson Model P.36
2.4 Intra-Organisational Conflict in Terrorist Organisations P. 38
2.5 Chapter Summary P.41
Chapter 3: Exit, Voice and Entry
3.1 Introduction P.42
3.2 Voice P.43
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3.3 Exit P.48
3.4 Entry P.53
3.5 Chapter Summary P.57
Chapter 4: Theory of Splits
4.1 Introduction P.58
4.2 Organisational Splits P.59
4.3 Process Model of Split P.63
4.3.1 Dyck and Starke Process Model of Breakaway Group Formation P.63
4.4 Splits in the Terrorism Literature P.67
4.4.1 Application of the Hirschman Model P.70
4.4.2 Application of the Irvin Model P.73
4.4.3 Application of the Miller Model P.74
4.5 Splits: How Terrorism Ends? P.75
4.4 Post-Split Competition P.79
4.5 Hypothesised Process Model P.83
4.6 Chapter Summary P.84
Chapter 5: Aims of the Present Study and Hypotheses
5.1 Introduction P.86
5.2 Organisational Aims and Hypotheses P.87
5.3 Individual Hypotheses and Aims P.92
5.4 The Functionality of Splits as a Process P.93
5.5 Chapter Summary P.94
Chapter 6: Methodology
6.1 Introduction to Methodology P.95
6.2 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis P.96
6.3 Interviewing P.98
6.3.1 Sampling Procedure P.99
6.3.2 Participants P.101
6.3.3 Interview Methodology P.103
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5.4 Interpretative Data Analysis P.105
5.6 Validity P.106
5.7 Chapter Summary P.108
Chapter 7: Introduction to Interview Analysis: The Macro-Process of Irish
Republican Involvement in the ‘Troubles’
7.1 Introduction P.110
7.2 Splits in the Irish Republican Movement P.112
7.3 Splits as a Process P.115 7.4 Chapter Summary P.117
Chapter 8(a): 1969/70 The Origin of the Macro-Process
8a.1 Introduction P.118
8a.2 Stage 1: The Origins of 1969/70 P.120
8a.2.1 Public Support: Weakened P.121
8a.2.2 Membership: Exit, Weakening and Disillusionment P.123
8a.2.3 The Origins of Factionalism P.125
8a.3 Stage 2: Factional Development P.130
8a.3.1 Policy Changes: Too Much Too Soon? P.134
8a.3.1.1 Armed to Political P.136
8a.3.1.2 Politically Left-Wing P.138
8a.3.1.3 Abstentionism P.141
8a.3.1.4 National Leadership P.143
8a.4 Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split P.145
8a.4.1Preparation for Split P.147
8a.4.2 Republican Expectations and Leadership Disconnect P.150
8a.4.2 External Influence: Fianna Fail P.157
8a.5 Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation P.158
8a.5.1 The Split P.159
8a.5.2 Competition for Support P.161
8a.5.3 Personality Clashes and Trust P.164
8a.5.4 Overview of Split P.166
iv
8a.6 Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation P.167
8a.6.1 Competition P.169
8a.6.1.1 Competition for Membership and Support P.170
8a.6.1.2 New Enemy: Violent Feuds P.172
Chapter 8(b) 1986: The Beginning of the End
8b.1 Introduction P.176
8b.2 Stage 2: Factional Development P.178
8b.2.1 Voice: Questioning of Strategy P.183
8b.2.2 IRA Restructuring and Northern Prominence P.189
8b.3 Successful Application of Voice: Transition of Power: One Step at a Time P.192
8b.3.1 Strengthening in Alternative Support: Benefits of Circumstance P.194
8b.3.2 Control of Voice P.196
8b.3.3 Strategy Change: One Step at a Time: Armed to Armed and Political P.198
8b.3.4 Leadership Change P.203
8b.4 Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation P.207
8b.4.1 Change in Political Strategy: Abstentionism P.211
8b.4.2 Preparation for Split P.215
8b.5 Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split P.219
Chapter 8(c) 1997: The Steps into Peace
8c.1 Introduction P.226
8c.2 Historical Analysis of 1997 Split P.229
8c.3 Change in Strategy: Armed and Political to Political P.238
8c.4 Factionalism P.240
8c.5 Gradualism: One Step at a Time P.244 8c.6: Preparation for Change: Support P.249
Chapter 9 Discussion and Conclusions
9.1 Introduction P.256
9.2 Present Study Findings P.257
v
9.2.1 Testing of Stage-Based Process Models P.258
9.2.1.1 1969/70 P.259
9.2.1.2 1974 P.260 9.2.1.3 1986 P.260 9.2.1.4 1997 P.261
9.2.2 Organisational Perspective P.261
9.2.3 Individual Perspective P.266
9.3 Contribution P.268
9.4 Future Research P.270
9.5 Conclusions P.272
Bibliography P.273
Appendix A Table of Interview P.287
Appendix B Complete Interview Schedule P.291 Appendix C Ethical Issues in the Research P.298
Appendix D Consent Form P.302
Appendix E The Stage-Based Data Analysis Process P.303
Appendix F 1974: The Officials Divide Again P.311 Appendix G Why Do People Become Dissidents? P.335
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List of Tables
Table 6.1: Participants involved at the time of the 1969/70 split P.102 Table 6.2: Participants involved at the time of the 1974 split P.102 Table 6.3: Participants involved at the time of the 1986 split P.102 Table 6.4: Participants involved at the time of the 1997 split. P.102 Table 6.5: Participants who exited the Movement at a time other than a split. P.103 Table 8a.1: Participants who discussed 1969/70 split P.119 Table 8a.2: Factionalism due to Armed Strategy P.131 Table 8a.3: Factionalism due to Political Strategy P.132 Table 8a.4: Factionalism due to Political Strategy P.132 Table 8a.5: Factionalism due to Left-Wing Political Strategy P.132 Table 8a.6: Factionalism due to Abstentionism P.133 Table 8a.7: Factionalism in National Leadership P.133 Table 8a.8: Intra-organisational conflicts between Left-Wing Politicisers and Religious Old-Guard p.134 Table 8a.9: Membership Expectations: Weapons P.152 Table 8a.10: Membership Expectations: Defence P.152 Table 8a.11: Public Expectations: Defence P.153 Table 8a.12: Disconnect between membership expectations and Leadership strategy P.153 Table 8a.13: Leadership Unprepared P.153 Table 8a.14: Influence of Fianna Fail in developing the Provisionals P.157 Table 8a.15: Significance of Personality Clashes P.165 Table 8a.16: Influential Individuals: Old-Guard P.165 Table 8a.17: Influential Individuals: Local Leadership P.166 Table 8a.18: Violent Feuds P.172 Table 8b.1: Participants who discussed 1986 split P.177 Table 8b.2: 1974/5 ceasefire beginning of 1986 process P.179 Table 8b.3: The importance of debates within the Prisons P.184 Table 8b.4: North/South Factionalism P.191 Table 8b.5: Old Guard/New Guard Factionalism P.191
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Table 8b.6: National Leadership Factionalism P.192 Table 8b.7: Strengthened Public Support P.196
Table 8b.8: Merger of papers P.197 Table 8b.9: Leadership Distancing P.199 Table 8b.10: Change from Armed to Armed and Political Strategy P.202 Table 8b.11: Change of Abstentionist Policy to Dail Eireann P.212 Table 8b.12: Adams/McGuinness Leadership Preparation for Change P.216 Table 8b.13: Pre-Change Securing of Support P.216 Table 8b.14: Old-Guard Influential Individuals P.218 Table 8b.15: Lessons learned P.223 Table 8c.1: Participants who discussed the 1997 split. P.228 Table 8c.2: Change in Strategy from Armed and Political to Armed P.238 Table 8c.3: Factionalism: Armed/Political P.240 Table 8c.4: Factionalism: North/South Divide P.241 Table 8c.5: Gradualism: One Step at a Time P.245 Table 8c.6: Preparation for Change P.249 Table 8c.7: The Importance of Internal Support P.250 Table 8c.8: The Importance of Timing P.250 Table 8c.9: The Application of Leadership Distancing. P.250 Table 8c.10: Usage of ‘internal methods’ in 1996 Army Convention. P.254 Table F.1: Participants who discussed the 1974 split P.312 Table F.2: Change of Armed Strategy P.314 Table F.3: Centrality of Seamus Costello to the 1974 Split P.320 Table F.4: Post Split Violent Feuds P.330
viii
List of Figures
Figure C.2: Row from the Stage 3 ‘Group’ analysis results table of ‘Denis’ P.307 Figure C.3: Extract from the super-ordinate table for the theme of Voice. P.309
ix
Abstract
One of the foremost reasons for the success of the Northern Irish Peace Process has been the ability of the national leadership of the Provisional Republican Movement to bring the majority of their membership away from the armed campaign and towards the acceptance of peaceful politics. This dissertation analyses how they were able to achieve this. This is carried out by considering the processes of the four major splits in modern day Irish republicanism from 1969 to 1997. Each split was analysed so as to derive why the split took place and why one side was more successful than the other in the aftermath. The cases were used to test a stage-based process model of split designed by the author. The data from thirty-eight semi-structured interviews were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). This analysis treated the three Provisional splits as three micro-processes within the macro-process of Provisional Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles’, as it did the two Official splits with respect to the Official macroprocess of involvement. The results of the analysis showed that the success of the later Provisional leadership was significantly tied to their method of changing strategies, tactics and policies one step at a time rather than by attempting to implement a variety of substantial changes within a short space of time as the leadership of the 1960s endeavoured to. This research outlines how the acceptance of peaceful politics for a terrorist organisation is a gradual stage-based process and that in order to be successful that the significant changes must be implemented in a patient manner.
x
Acknowledgements
The process of this PhD has been long, and at times arduous. There was no way that I would have been able to make it through it without the help, friendship and support of so many amazing people. I would first of all like to thank Dr. John Horgan for encouraging me to move over to St. Andrews to do this PhD, and for his constant support when things weren’t running so smoothly at the beginning. Similarly I would like to give the warmest thanks to Dr. Michael Boyle for his insightful, thorough, and often times witty supervision. I have the utmost respect for any man who can calmly tackle what was initially a 150 page first chapter on organisations and split, and come out the either side laughing and joking while still pointing me in the right direction. Without either of these men I would never have been able to finish this.
I would similarly like to thank all those who were not officially affiliated with this dissertation but gave me academic guidance and support through. I would especially like to thank all the staff within the School of International Relations, St. Andrews and the librarians at the Northern Irish Political Collection in the Linen Hall Library, Belfast.
To my friends and colleagues in St. Andrews, Edinburgh, Sligo, Dublin, Belfast and all around the globe. I am very lucky to have met each and every one of you. You are now free to comfortably ask me “when are you going to be finished that ‘essay’?” without fear of a backlash. It’s done at last! I thank you all for your friendship, support, humour and interest in my work. Two people deserve a particular mention. Faye Donnelly I will never forget how you calmed me down all those years ago when I was about to drop out of this whole PhD. Thank you. Alison Careless and everyone in 5 Union St. you went out of your way to welcome me into you home in the last stressful few weeks of this work. It made it so much easier. Thank you.
Throughout my four and a bit years doing this work I have lived with a variety of amazing people. I would love to thank them all personally. However, there are three people who deserve special thanks in this regard. David Miles for making my move from
xi
Ireland to Scotland so easy and Ricky and Janette my comrades in ‘Team Channing’ my time in Belfast with you guys was one of the best years I have ever had.
To everyone who agreed to give up their time to meet or be interviewed by me I will forever be grateful. There would be no PhD without you. Similarly I am forever indebted to all those who helped arrange interviews and meetings for me. In this regard I would especially like to thank Tommie Gorman of RTE for both welcoming me to Belfast and allowing me to ‘use his name’ in my attempts to meet with numerous people. This opened so many doors for me, doors which would have stayed shut without you.
I have the most amazing family, both immediate and extended, and they have excelled themselves in support and love throughout these years. This is especially true of my three siblings Una, Kevin and Brendan. You are more than my brothers and sister, you are my best friends. Also to Grandma, Ita Stephens, you have always shown nothing but love and support to me in this and all of my endeavours down through the years. Gra Mor. However, above all others who have been mentioned in these acknowledgements I don’t know how to thank my amazing parents Barbara and Peter Morrison enough. You have gone beyond the call of parenting in your support of me throughout these years. I love you both so much, and will never forget what you have done for me.
I would finally like to acknowledge the pain and suffering which so many people in Northern Ireland, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland have endured throughout the years, be it at the hands of paramilitaries, security forces or governments. Nothing is worth the death, injury and permanent trauma which has been endured. It is up to us all to make sure that we never return to those days.
John F. Morrison June 10th, 2010 University of St. Andrews, Scotland.
xii
Introduction
The Northern Irish peace process is internationally recognised as having brought an end to the conflict commonly referred to as ‘The Troubles.’1 The involvement of the British and Irish governments as well as their American allies is rightly credited as playing a major role in achieving a lasting peace. However, without the positive actions and compromises of the Northern Irish actors, both those violent and peaceful actors, the achievement of peace would have been impossible. Central to this was the movement of the Irish Republican Movement, in particular the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), from the employment of terrorism2 as a tactic towards the exclusive adoption of peaceful politics. 3 Without this action and their continued commitment to peaceful politics any progress in the peaceful development of the six counties of Northern Ireland would have been extremely difficult.4
The continued success of the peace process is reliant on the commitment of the leaders of the various Northern Irish organisations, both violent and non-violent, to the utilisation
1 While this is the case there have been significant failures of the process and consequently there are those who are highly critical of the process. See Dingley, J. (2002). Peace in Our Time? The Stresses and Strains on the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25(6), pp.357-382 2For the purpose of this work there will not be an extensive discussion outlining the ins and outs of the debate. For the purpose of this dissertation any use of the word ‘terrorism’ refers to the employment of violence or the threat of repeated violence by the individual or group intent on bringing about a social or political effect. The aim of this action is to bring about a state of fear in a wider audience than the direct physical victims of the initial act or threat of violence. A terrorist incident should be defined by the use of violence or the threat of violence to bring about social or political change, not by the specific motive of the perpetrators. Therefore terrorism is a tactic which can be employed by any individual or group, whether they be state or non-state actors. See for example, Schmid, A. & Jongman (2005). Political Terrorism: A
New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature. (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction), pp.1-38; Richardson, L. (2007). What Terrorists Want. (London: John Murray), pp.19-39; Horgan, J. (2005). The Psychology of Terrorism. (London: Routledge), pp. 1-47; Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 1-41; Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. & HirschHoefler, S. (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(4), pp. 777-794; Silke, A. (1996). Terrorism and the Blind Man’s Elephant, Terrorism and Political Violence, 8(3), pp. 12-28; English, R. (2009). Terrorism How to Respond. (New York: Oxford University Press). Pp.1-26. 3 This belief that the Republican change in strategy was a dominant factor in the success of the peace process is supportive of the position taken in Hayes, M. (1998). The Evolution of Republican Strategy and the ‘Peace Process’ in Ireland. In Race & Class, 39(3), pp.21-39 4 The same is true for those other Republican groups as well as the Loyalist paramilitaries who renounced violence.
1and promotion of peaceful politics.5 However, what is more important is that the majority of their organisational membership similarly ascribe to the power of politics as opposed to the employment of the gun and the bomb. A leadership promoting peaceful politics is only constructive if they convince their internal membership and support of its benefits. It has been the ability of the leadership of the modern day Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein to successfully convince the majority of its membership of the benefits of peaceful politics which has ensured their continued involvement in the continuing peace process.