Modern Civilization

A History of the Last Fjve Centuries, Second Edition

Brinton, Christopher. and Wolff

@ Copyigbt 1957, j96l by prentice Hal1,Inc.,

Engleuood Clifs, Neu Jerselt

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ma1 be reproduced in any forn, b1t mimeograph 0r dnl 0tber ruean:.

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Library of Congrus Catalog Card Number 67_13122

Printed in tbe LJ nited State, of Anrica

Maps b1 Vincent Kotscbar

Pictare Editor; Gabriele lVunderlicb

De:ign fu lValter Behnke

C

Current Printing (last digit): lt t4 13 12 11 10 981654321 853

enofmous a8r0g0r0ds or agricultufal towns, see had been purged for alleged Titoism in 1911. \Warsaw p.832, which had indeed failed) were actually Not even the presence in of Khrush- Khrushchev's errors, for which Malenkov now chev himself and other members of the Soviet had to take responsibility. Yet, though Presidium prevented the rise of Gomulka to Khrushchev was certainly very powerful, his power, although at one moment the Russians fellow-members on the Politburo had great seem to have contemplated using their army influence, and showed no outward signs of to impose their will by force. Yet because the fearing him as all had feared Stalin. On the new government in Poland was, after all, a whole, it appeared that the transfer of power communist government, they allowed it to had actually gone quite smoothly in the remain in power. U.S.S.R. and that among the rulers, in the In Hungary, however, the movement went happy phrase from George Orwell's Animal farther. Starting, like the Polish uprising, as a Farm "all were equal, but some were more movement within the Communist party, and equal than others." spurred by the outspoken writinp of many communists who loathed the restraints of Stalinism, the Hungarian movement brought --e Denunciation of Stalin Imre Nagy, a communist like Gomulka, into its Consequences office as Premier. But then the popular hatred '-C for communism and for the Russians got out At a Party Congress, held early in 1956, of hand, and heroic young men and women Khrushchev made a speech in which he not flew to arms in Budapest in the hope of oust- only carried the attack on the "cult of person- ing the communists and of taking Hungary ality" to new heights, but openly denounced altogether out of the Soviet sphere. They even Stalin by name, emotionally detailing the denounced the \Tarsaw Pact, the Russian alli- ghastly acts of personal cruelty to which the ance of eastern European satellites set up by psychopathically suspicious nature of the late Moscow to oppose NATO. It was then that dictator had given rise. Khrushchev thus Khrushchev ordered full-fledged military ac- echoed what western observers of the U.S.S.R. tion. In November, 1956, Soviet tanks and had been saying for years. As the details of the troops, violating an armistice, swept back into speech were leaked out to the Soviet public, Budapest and put down the revolution in ihere was of course some distress at the blood and fire. A puppet government led by smashing of the idol they had worshiped so a good many of them no doubt had -ong but The Hungarian Revolt: head of the statue :.11 along suspected that Stalin was something of Stalin toppled in downtown Budapest. -ess than god-like. So the widespread disor- fers that some observers were predicting :.:i1ed to materialize. But outside the U.S.S.R., the sudden defla- :lon of Stalin and the admission of so many :ast injustices proved far too strong a brew for :he citizens of some of the European satellites :o swallow. Anti-communist riots by work- :fs- supposedly the pillars of any communist i:are- in Poznan, Poland, in June, 1956, were ::,llowed by severe strikes, demonstrations, -d upheavals in the rest of Poland a few ::onths later. Polish national sentiment was :=claring itself, but the uprising remained ,,'rthin the grip of one wing of the Communist -,rt\,, that led by \Wladislaw Gomulka, who 861 hold all these threats in balance, and the veloping socialism are exclusively matters for choices he eventually was forced to make led the people of the country concerned," which to a major split in the communist world. seemed to echo Tito's own views. Relations In the years immediately following Stalin's between Tito and Moscow were temporarily death, Soviet foreign policy continued along improved, although the Yugoslavs never Stalinist lines. The Russians moved into the abandoned their ties to the $7est. Khrushchev Middle East with new vigor. Here they had even went so far as to declare that many the advantage of being able to deal with prominent victims of the "Titoist" purges had Gamal Abdel Nasser, the new ruler of Egypt been executed wrongly, and absolished the and an inveterate enemy of the \West, which Cominform, the body that ostensibly had he associated not only with past colonialism started the qurrel with Tito. But in making but with support for Israel. Czechoslovak aod these admissions and healing the quarrel Russian arms flowed to Egypt, and Russian Stalin had started, Khrushchev had opened the technicians followed. Perhaps the high point door to the Polish and Hungarian troubles of Soviet influence was reached during the that soon began; Soviet military intervention Suez affair in 1956 (Section IV). \X/hen the in Hungary showed Tito and the rest of the United States joined the U.S.S.R. in denounc- world how limited was Khrushchev's willing- ing the British and French artack, however, it ness and ability to permit free choices to became impossible for Nasser to lump all the other communist states. Tito denounced the western powers together. Soon Nasser began Soviet intervention against Nagy, though he to learn that Russian influence usually fol- was frightened by the wholly anti-communisr lowed Russian favors. He experienced some character that the Hungarian revolt subse- disillusion during the summer of 1958, when quently took on, and failed ro oppose the de- revolution broke out in Iraq, where Soviet' cisive Soviet operations that put an end to the sponsored communists were opposing Nasser's uprising. own pan-Arab aims. Prompt American inter- For a second time, relations between Mos- vention in Lebanon and British inrerven- cow and Tito were strained. They were tion inJordan in 1958 may have temporarily patched up again in the summer of l95l; the countered the threat of the spread of Soviet Soviets once more hoped that Tito would influence beyond Iraq. It was the Russians agaio accept Moscow's leadership of the world n,ho provided the aid that made possibie communist movement. But when in Novem- rhe high dam at Aswan and much armarnent ber the Russians invited representatives of all for the Egyptian armies, but Nasser remained the world's Communist parties to Moscow to unaligned with either major bloc. In the Mid- celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Rus- lle East and in other "undeveloped" areas, sian Revolution, and produced a declaration notably Africa, the U.S.S.R. had begun to of twelve Communist parties denouncing "re- challenge the I(est as rhe supplier of eco- visionism"-as Tito's views had come to be nomic and technolo gical aid. A new chapter in known*Tito flatly refused to sign. Indeed he rhe Cold \Var had opened. published his own counter-program declaring In eastern Europe, Soviet influence coo- that each communist nation should make its rinued stable until Khrushchev's policies of own decisions freely. The old quarrel was re- le-Stalinization at home touched off the Pol- newed for the third time. Tito would not re- ish and Hungarian uprisings (see p. 853). But enter a world communist union led by Russia. :ven before this, Khrushchev had departed Khrushchev's efforts had failed. Moreover, rhe :rom Stalinism by making a great effort to Poles signed the declaration with obvious re- reai the breach with Tito. In May, 1955, he luctance, and Gomulka continued to insist on \\'ent in person to Belgrade, and not only pub- autonomy for his government in internal and iicly apologized for the quarrel, taking the party affairs. rlame upon the U.S.S.R., but openly agreed The harshness of the onslaught against re- :hat "differences in the concrete forms of de- visionism and Khrushchev's acceptance of de-