Research Notes From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation, Villa Medicea “La Ferdinanda” (Artimino, Italy) 27-29 April 2006 by Duccio Basosi, Matteo Gerlini, and Angela Romano From 27 to 29 April, 2006, the Medicean villa of Artimino, near Florence (Italy), was the seat of the international conference “From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985: The Globalization of the Bipolar Confrontation.” The event was organized by the Italian inter-university Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA), with CWIHP as a co-sponsor. The proceedings of the conference are currently under review for publication. The goal of the scientific committee of the conference was “to gain a greater understanding of the fundamental shift occurred during the 1975-85 period, from the bipolar US-Soviet confron- tation to a truly global one, as well as the interconnections of this process with the new industrial-technological revolution and the return of the United States to a position of global economic lead- Leopoldo Nuti (Roma Tre), Samuel F. Wells (Woodrow Wilson Center), Ennio Di Nolfo (Florence) and Christian Ostermann (CWIHP) at the ership.” Forty-four speakers, grouped into ten panels, presented April 2006 Artimino Conference papers which were first commented upon by their discussants and then debated with the floor. The ten panels covered the entire the conference. spectrum of international relations in the period concerned, from The first group of panels depicted a complex picture of the both a thematic and a geographic perspective, by addressing many facets of the crisis of détente after 1975. The first panel, issues such as: the aftermath and impact of Helsinki’s Conference entitled “After Helsinki,” dealt with the long-term effects of the on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975, the CSCE in undermining the Soviet Union’s hold on the Eastern Euromissile crisis of 1978-83, the Polish Crisis of 1980-81, the European countries, with particular reference to the issues con- Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of 1983, European integration, nected to the Third Basket on “human rights.” Patrick Vaughan Eurocommunism, and the multiplication of conflicts involving (Jagellonian University of Krakow, Poland) highlighted the the superpowers in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. approach to CSCE in the Carter administration, particularly the view taken by Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew After the opening remarks by Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo (CIMA Brzezinski, who largely drove the US towards viewing Helsinki as Chairman, University of Florence, Italy), the proceedings began a resource rather than as a retreat vis-à-vis the USSR. According with a roundtable aimed at introducing the general subject of the to Vaughan, whose paper was based mainly on Brzezinski’s per- years 1975-1985, through the presentation of the critical oral his- sonal archive and on several interviews with Brzezinski himself, tory work by James Blight (Brown University, USA) and Janet the national security adviser was one of the few “hardliners” in the Lang (Brown University, USA): “When Empathy Failed: Why United States who did not interpret Helsinki as a Yalta II, thereby US-Soviet Détente Collapsed in the Carter-Brezhnev Years.” avoiding the wholesale condemnation of the Final Act that many Commented upon by Christian Ostermann, director of CWIHP, expected in the United States from President Ford in 1975. The this contribution verged mainly on the concept of “empathy, possibilities opened in the following years to US foreign policy “which the authors adopted both as a methodological resource by the CSCE’s “Third Basket”, were addressed in particular by and as an explicative category for the events of the late 1970s. As Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive), who analyzed a methodological resource, historians seek to empathize with the the KGB and the Soviet government’s response to the emergence protagonists of the events they describe: hence, Blight and Lang of an organized human rights movement after the Soviet Union examined the Carter-Reagan-Brezhnev years using the critical signed the Helsinki Final Act. Her paper discussed Soviet inter- oral history method, which combines historiographical findings ests and expectations in the CSCE negotiations, as well as the and primary sources with oral interviews of former policymak- differences within the Politburo regarding the inclusion of the ers. But, according to Blight and Lang, empathy should also be human rights provisions. Savranskaya presented new evidence the “next big thing” in the study of war, peace and conflict. In from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, substance, they claimed, no period in the history of the Cold War from the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, as well exceeded the late 1970s in the figurative “distance” between as from the personal diaries and memoirs of Soviet politicians the stated objectives of the leaders of the United States and the and diplomats. The paper emphasized the efforts of Soviet dis- Soviet Union, and the actual outcome of their efforts. The ero- sidents to use the Final Act to put pressure on the repressive state sion of empathy and the collapse of détente in the second half of apparatus and highlight human rights abuses in the Soviet Union the 1970s were in fact the subject of the many contributions to and the authorities’ response to the new wave of dissent at home 528 Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16 overall context of the transatlantic strategic debate in the early 1970s, the inter-alliance debates on NATO policies, détente and arms control in the mid-1970s, and some of the different Western national rationales for the choices of 1979. From this standpoint, NATO’s Euromissiles decision was a very difficult and unpopular choice, at a time when a large part of the public opinion of the West had become accustomed to seeing détente as a more or less permanent feature of the international system. Nuti’s most interesting conclusion was that Soviet foreign pol- icy paradoxically ended up facilitating the implementation of a NATO policy, as the deployment of the SS-20s and the emotional impulse generated by the appearance of the new Soviet weapons systems provided the West with the necessary leverage to imple- ment a project of weapons modernization which might as well Kristina Spohr-Readman (LSE), Malcolm Byrne (National Security have remained in a limbo. Helga Haftendorn (Free University Archive), Saki Dockrill (King’s College London) and and Enrico Fardella (CIMA) at the April 2006 Artimino Conference of Berlin) explored the causes of how and why the ambivalent consensus within NATO on the 1967 Harmel Report broke and its foreign support. Andrzej Paczkowski (Polish Academy apart. Using Cold War International History Project sources, US of Science, Poland) considered the “Helsinki effect” in his Congressional documents, British and German parliamentary paper on the authorities and the opposition in Poland between records and the rich body of memoirs and newspapers articles 1976 and 1986, based on several Polish archives, including the of the time, she showed how the consensus did not survive the Archive of the Institute for National Remembrance. According contravening domestic pressures on both sides of the Atlantic to Paczkowski, the belief that the Helsinki agreements could which questioned the wisdom of détente. The signature of the discourage the authorities from deploying repression became Helsinki Final Act was overshadowed by the heavy criticism of increasingly popular among the opposition movements since the SALT and ABM agreements by both defense conservatives 1976. As a symptom of this perception, his paper recalled, for in the US and Europeans weary of American-Soviet bilateralism. example, that, shortly after Helsinki, Polish party leader Gierek In Haftendorn’s analysis, the division was not so much between took care to limit the number of prisoners who could be regard- Europeans and Americans, but rather between détente-minded ed as political and proclaimed an “act of pardon,” releasing the liberals who emphasized cooperation, and anti-communist con- majority of internees detained after earlier disturbances. While servatives who gave priority to containment and confrontation, the objective influence played by the Helsinki agreements in in a crucial period in which détente turned sour and a “small undermining Soviet control in Eastern Europe was recognized ice age” in East-West relations occurred. The attitude taken on by all speakers, Sarah Snyder (Georgetown University) focused Euromissiles by selected groupings of countries was analyzed on the “subjective” intentions of those that dealt with the post- thoroughly in the following three papers in the panel. In particu- Helsinki phase. In particular, she questioned the “crudely drawn lar, the Harmel Report was also considered by Vincent Dujardin dichotomy” that drew a sharp distinction between US President (Catholic University of Louvain), although in a different fashion Jimmy Carter’s forceful support for human rights and Ronald and on the basis of primary sources from French and Belgian Reagan’s scepticism about, criticism of, and supposed shift away state archives. In fact, while the Harmel Report had marked the from Carter’s human rights policy. Based on records from the high point for the international position of a small country such Reagan Library, Snyder argued that Reagan came to support the as Belgium within NATO structures, the Euromissiles story told CSCE as a meaningful forum for East-West relations, and his a different truth: the role played by the small European countries, “unexpected” commitment to human rights facilitated change in namely Belgium, in the unfolding of the Euromissile crisis was the communist bloc, particularly after Gorbachev’s rise to power termed by Dujardin as nothing less than “insignificant.” Gerhard in 1984. Wettig (Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, Cologne) focused on the Soviet attitude towards the The second panel addressed the first dramatic confronta- “dual-track decision” (i.e.