Robert B. Rakove. Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 315 pp. $31.99, paper, ISBN 978-1-107-44938-1.

Reviewed by Simon Stevens

Published on H-1960s (August, 2014)

Commissioned by Zachary J. Lechner (Centenary College of Louisiana)

The central historical problem that Robert B. of a policy of “engagement” of the “nonaligned Rakove sets out to solve in Kennedy, Johnson, and world.” The subsequent souring of relations was a the Nonaligned World is how to explain the re‐ consequence of the abandonment of that ap‐ markable transformation in the relationship be‐ proach under Lyndon Johnson. Central to tween the and much of the postcolo‐ Rakove’s argument is the distinction between nial world over the course of the 1960s. The assas‐ Kennedy’s approach to states in the sination of John F. Kennedy in 1963 was met with that were “aligned” in the Cold and those that genuine grief in many postcolonial states, refect‐ were “non-aligned.” Common historiographic ing the positive and hopeful light in which the characterizations of Kennedy’s policy toward the United States under Kennedy had been widely Third World as aggressive and interventionist viewed. And yet by the second half of the decade, have failed to appreciate the signifcance of this the United States “had come to be seen not as an distinction, Rakove suggests. In the cases of states ally to Third World aspirations but as a malevo‐ that the U.S. perceived to be already lent foe. Polarizing accusatory rhetoric unusual in aligned with the West, especially in the early 1960s became unremarkable by the and Southeast Asia, the Kennedy administration decade’s end, emerging as a lasting feature of was intolerant of changes that might endanger world politics, a recognizable precursor to con‐ that alignment, and pursued forceful interven‐ temporary denunciations of the United States” (p. tionist policies—including sponsoring coups and xviii). other forms of covert action—to avert that possi‐ This shift, Rakove argues, was a consequence bility. But with regard to non-aligned states, of changes in U.S. government policy. Positive per‐ Kennedy pursued “an ambitious program of out‐ ceptions of the United States in the early 1960s re‐ reach” that, though the administration never gave sulted from the Kennedy administration’s pursuit H-Net Reviews it an ofcial name, Rakove characterizes as a poli‐ the transition from Kennedy to Johnson played a cy of “engagement” (pp. xx-xxi).[1] primary role in driving events?”—Rakove an‐ Engagement, Rakove argues, had three pil‐ swers with a resounding afrmative: “the failure lars. First, Kennedy was an avid and adept practi‐ of engagement came as a direct consequence of tioner of presidential diplomacy: he met personal‐ the transition between Kennedy and Johnson” ly with the leaders of many non-aligned states (pp. 256-257). Johnson, Rakove argues, lacked during his short period in ofce, and in many cas‐ Kennedy’s “interest in the third world and his es succeeded in developing a friendly rapport. comprehension of nonalignment” (p. xxv). LBJ’s Secondly, the Kennedy administration signifcant‐ background as a leading legislator left him with ly expanded to non-aligned states, which—it little patience for those who refused to choose claimed publicly at least—was ofered without po‐ sides and with a preference for rewarding loyal litical strings. Thirdly, the Kennedy administra‐ allies, predispositions that were further en‐ tion made adjustments to U.S. foreign policy, espe‐ trenched in the context of the war in Vietnam. cially on conficts involving colonial powers, in Thus, though several non-aligned leaders ex‐ order to improve U.S. standing among non- pressed hopes of meeting Kennedy’s successor, aligned states. Drawing primarily on extensive re‐ Johnson showed little interest in establishing per‐ search in the Kennedy and Johnson presidential sonal relationships with them, tending to treat libraries and in the records of the Department of meetings instead “as a kind of diplomatic curren‐ State at the U.S. National Archives, Rakove weaves cy, to be tendered to friends and withheld from together analyses of American policy toward a uncooperative states” (p. 218). The Johnson ad‐ range of early 1960s conficts across Africa and ministration used aid similarly, granting it with Asia. Some, such as the , are already “increasingly overt strings” attached (p. 177). the subjects of substantial scholarly literatures; The great strength of Kennedy, Johnson, and others, like the West New Guinea confict, are the Nonaligned World is in its analysis of decision probably only familiar to regional specialists. In making within the executive branch of the U.S. the latter case, for instance, Rakove convincingly government. Rakove devotes a full chapter to ana‐ argues that the Kennedy administration was pre‐ lyzing the “outlooks and personalities” of policy‐ pared to go “surprisingly far” in challenging an makers within the Kennedy and Johnson adminis‐ ally, the , on behalf of a leading non- trations. Leading members of the two administra‐ aligned state, (pp. 112). tions responsible for the day-to-day management How, then, do we explain the ultimate failure of U.S. relations with non-aligned states are cate‐ of the policy of engagement? In terms of the gorized as “liberals” (such as Kennedy’s frst un‐ perennial “level of analysis problem” for students dersecretary of state Chester Bowles and assistant of foreign policy, Rakove positions his study of en‐ secretary of state for Africa G. Mennen Williams), gagement and its ultimate failure at the level of who advocated engaging non-aligned states out of executive decision making. As discussed below, a sense of American mission; “pragmatists” this does mean that he pays less attention to two (above all, Robert Komer of the National Security other levels also of signifcance to the historical Council Staf), who promoted such engagement— problem that he sets out to solve: American do‐ especially with the largest and most powerful mestic politics and the international environment. non-aligned states, such as Egypt, , and In‐ donesia—as a geopolitical necessity in the context To his own question—“was this a case where of the changing balance of power; and “skeptics” individuals mattered, wherein the changing bal‐ (primarily the secretary of state Dean Rusk and ance of infuence within the executive branch and Bowles’s successor as undersecretary of state

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George Ball), who saw fewer advantages to en‐ should be focused on changing attitudes in the ex‐ gagement with the non-aligned and were wary of ecutive branch. the potential damage to American relations with At times, however, Kennedy clearly did buck‐ established allies. The pursuit of engagement, le before congressional or public opposition to his Rakove argues, depended on the shifting balance pursuit of engagement. Despite Kennedy’s com‐ of power of these groups within the executive mitment to personal diplomacy with non-aligned branch, as well as on the personality and prefer‐ leaders, for instance, Rakove notes that the reason ences of the two presidents. The signifcance of that he never met Gamal Nasser of Egypt (one of Johnson’s succession of Kennedy to U.S. relations non-alignment’s “Big Three” along with Josip Broz with non-aligned states was thus not only that Tito of Yugoslavia and Jawaharlal Nehru of India) LBJ’s own inclinations predisposed him against was that the domestic political costs were judged the pillars of Kennedy’s engagement policy, but to be too high (pp. 85, 153). But Rakove’s focus on also that Johnson’s closeness to Rusk shifted the executive decision makers means that American balance of infuence within the administration to‐ public conceptions of non-alignment and its rela‐ ward the “skeptics” of engagement. tionship to the , or of particular non- Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World aligned states or leaders such as Nasser, receive convincingly synthesizes into an overarching in‐ only cursory attention. How those conceptions did terpretation the diferences in Kennedy’s and or did not change over time, and which specifc Johnson’s approaches that have frequently events, individuals, media, or propaganda ‐ emerged from bilateral studies of U.S. relations tions played particularly signifcant roles in shap‐ with particular states.[2] Nevertheless, Rakove’s ing American public opinion on non-aligned focus on the level of executive decision making states remain topics for further research. Rakove means that at least two other levels of analysis re‐ does devote a full chapter to the question of for‐ ceive less attention in his explanation of the fail‐ eign aid to non-aligned states and the intense bat‐ ure of engagement. The frst is the level of domes‐ tles with Congress that this engendered. But the tic politics.[3] Rakove concludes his introduction outlooks, personalities, and interests of the lead‐ with the observation that “engagement came un‐ ing Democratic senators who participated in the done because it was fundamentally incompatible congressional assault on aid to non-aligned states, with long-standing popular views” of the Cold such as Ernest Gruening, William Proxmire, and War, but, surprisingly, he does not pursue this in‐ Stuart Symington (each of whom left extensive sight further (p. xxviii). This relative lack of analy‐ personal papers now open to researchers), never sis of public and congressional opposition to en‐ receive the same sustained analysis devoted to de‐ gagement is presumably justifed for Rakove on cision makers in the executive branch. the grounds that Kennedy was more willing than The second level of analysis that is relatively Johnson to pursue engagement despite the domes‐ neglected in Rakove’s account is that of the inter‐ tic political costs. (Rakove points out that both national environment in which American policy Kennedy’s last press conference and the remarks toward “the nonaligned world” was being formu‐ he planned to give in Dallas on November 22, lated. At the outset, Rakove explains his focus on 1963, included extended defenses of foreign aid “the American side of the story”: “It is my belief against congressional attacks.) In this reading, that sustained attention to the personalities, since domestic politics only infuenced policy to views, and debates of these two administrations is the extent that the executive branch was pre‐ needed to understand the profound shifts in U.S.- pared to allow it to do so, analytical attention nonaligned relations over the course of the 1960s.

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In key ways, the challenges presented by non‐ cline of relations between the United States and aligned states in 1965 were not substantially dif‐ the non-aligned through American eyes and ferent in character from what they had been in based almost entirely on American sources.[6] (In‐ the 1950s. What had changed over the preceding deed, Rakove’s prose often refects the perspective years were the ways in which they were per‐ of the American policymakers who are the main ceived within the White House” (pp. xxvi-xxvii, protagonists in his account: the rapid spread of emphasis added).[4] Rakove’s substantive chap‐ unfavorable perceptions of the United States is ters ofer a considerably more nuanced account “dismaying,” a speech by of than this and some of the other similarly stark is “unsatisfactory,” conficts in Africa are claims in the introduction and conclusion might “bafing,” the United States and its allies consti‐ suggest. In particular, Rakove devotes consider‐ tute the “free” world, and so on [pp. xviii, 140, able attention to how the emergence or escalation 144, 172].) As with the American congressional op‐ after 1962 of “regional conficts” (that is, conficts ponents of engagement, for example, the out‐ between postcolonial states, as distinct from looks, personalities, and interests of non-aligned “colonial conficts” involving one or more colonial leaders, such as Nasser, Nehru, Tito, Nkrumah, powers) contributed to the deterioration of rela‐ and Sukarno of Indonesia, never receive the sus‐ tions between the United States and the non- tained analysis devoted to policymakers in the aligned. Regional conficts that pitted leading non- White House and the State Department. How did aligned states against American allies, such those decision makers and other constituencies in non- between Ghana and African states including Nige‐ aligned states perceive the United States and its ria and Cote d’Ivoire, between Indonesia and engagement policy in the era of Kennedy and , between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in Johnson? To what extent were their attitudes and , and between India and , ultimate‐ approaches toward the United States shaped by ly “added an insupportable burden to U.S.-non‐ factors other than shifts in American policy? aligned relations,” as U.S. support for American To take the example of just one leading non- allies strengthened the image of the United States aligned state, Rakove acknowledges that “the in non-aligned states as a “friend of reaction and forces that doomed Washington’s [engagement] ” (p. 136). Even in these cases, policy toward Ghana had been set in motion long however, Rakove links this development back to before Johnson took ofce,” though the implica‐ the transition from Kennedy to Johnson, arguing tions of this idea for the book’s overarching argu‐ that though regional conficts seriously strained ment are not explored further (p. 144). W. Scott U.S.-non-aligned relations in the fnal year of Thompson’s unsurpassed 1969 study, Ghana’s For‐ Kennedy’s life, the critical damage occurred after eign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and Johnson’s succession and the American “shift the New State, provides considerable further evi‐ back toward allies” as a consequence of Johnson’s dence for this perspective, however. Like Rakove, very diferent approach to diplomacy (p. 173). Thompson emphasizes the “emotional warmth” Rakove is surely correct in characterizing with which Nkrumah viewed Kennedy and the U.S.-non-aligned relations after 1962 as being role that this played in slowing Ghana’s alienation caught in a “vicious cycle of mutual alienation,” from the United States. But many of the factors but his focus on the “American side” of that cycle Thompson identifes in his explanation of Ghana’s leaves his argument that “the failure of engage‐ progressive turn after 1960 away from the West ment came as a direct consequence of the transi‐ and toward the and of Nkrumah’s in‐ tion between Kennedy and Johnson” difcult to creasing identifcation of the United States as a assess.[5] Rakove tells the story of the rise and de‐ neocolonial force have little to do with who hap‐

4 H-Net Reviews pened to occupy the Oval Ofce. Those factors in‐ turn” to focus on movements, projects, and net‐ clude the growing bureaucratic strength among works that operated outside or beyond the bound‐ Nkrumah’s advisers of the “radical wing” of the aries of individual nation-states, historians are ruling Convention People’s Party (CPP), the failure now just beginning to rediscover the signifcance of Nkrumah’s plans to achieve a United States of of the non-aligned and -Asian movements in Africa and the role that more conservative newly postwar international history.[9] Rakove explicitly independent African states played in this, the disavows the task of “chronicling the evolution of greater openness of the Soviet Union to radical [the] vast diverse grouping” of states that came to “bourgeois nationalist” regimes in the postcolo‐ be known as the non-aligned movement. Never‐ nial world in the early 1960s, the assassination at‐ theless, his “(tentative) examination of non‐ tempts against Nkrumah in August 1962 and Janu‐ aligned politics” raises important questions (p. ary 1964, and the growth of Nkrumah’s obsessive xxvii). Most fundamentally, what did it mean to be fear that the CIA was behind eforts to overthrow non-aligned? Strikingly, though he argues that the him. (We now know from Christopher Andrew distinction between “aligned and uncommitted and Vasili Mitrokhin that this suspicion of the CIA states ... was cardinal to the Kennedy administra‐ was a result of a remarkably successful black pro‐ tion,” Rakove never explains how he defnes the paganda operation by the KGB.)[7] “nonaligned world” of his title nor how the Can such factors—and others, from the im‐ Kennedy and Johnson administrations did (p. pact of the Sino-Soviet split to the global intellec‐ xxii). The U.S. government’s conception evidently tual history of the concept of “neocolonialism”— difered from that of participants in the frst and be incorporated more fully into the story of rela‐ second conferences of non-aligned countries in tions between non-aligned states and the United 1961 and 1964. Revealingly, Rakove notes that in States in the 1960s? In some signifcant cases, in‐ approving U.S. assistance for the Volta River Dam cluding Egypt and Indonesia, governmental ar‐ project in 1961, Kennedy sought a commitment chives relating to this period remain inaccessible. from Nkrumah to “true” non-alignment (p. 179). But in others, including Algeria, Ghana, Yu‐ Thomas Noer concludes from his 1984 analysis of goslavia, and Zambia, scholars have recently been this episode (which Rakove cites but does not di‐ able to draw on state archives to analyze the for‐ rectly engage with) that “to most in the [Kennedy] eign policies of these in this period. administration there was an ‘acceptable’ form of [8] In almost all cases, there is, in addition, a Third World neutralism. This did not, however, wealth of contemporaneous newspaper coverage include Nkrumah’s outspoken and sustained criti‐ and memoirs, among other sources. The shift cism of American foreign policy or his firtations Rakove identifes in relations between the United with and the Soviet Union.”[10] Clearly, States and the postcolonial world during the Kennedy was more tolerant of some forms of non- 1960s is a striking and signifcant one. His own alignment than others, yet the lack of a defnition U.S.-centric explanation for that transition pro‐ of the “nonaligned world” makes this point some‐ vides an important framework for other scholars what difcult to discern in Rakove’s account. now to situate (and evaluate) his account, as he Asked to defne “non-alignment” in the recent suggests, “in a broader international history of H-Diplo roundtable on his book, Rakove suggests the 1960s” (p. xxvii). linking it “to formal membership in the Non- One central feature of such future interna‐ Aligned Movement (NAM) and an avowedly un‐ tional histories will be the very concept of non- committed stance in the Cold War.” Given the sec‐ alignment. Prompted by the recent “international ond qualifcation, Rakove notes that despite ’s “sincere” embrace of the NAM, he has a

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“hard time classifying as truly non‐ ideological agreement at the conference. Some aligned.”[11] This is presumably why American participants, including Sukarno, Nehru, and policy toward Cuba—a participant in both the Norodom Sihanouk of , did advance 1961 and 1964 non-aligned conferences and, one forms of what would come to be known as non- might imagine, a limit case for the argument that alignment. But eforts to include commitment to Kennedy’s policy toward the “nonaligned world” “” in the ten principles adopt‐ was characterized by tolerance and engagement ed by the conference were unsuccessful. The prin‐ rather than intervention—is omitted altogether ciples ultimately included both “respect for the from Rakove’s account. Like that of the American right of each nation to defend itself singly or col‐ ofcials he studies, then, Rakove’s approach is in‐ lectively” (at the insistence of states including formed by a belief in the idea of a “true” non- Pakistan, a member of the South East Asia Treaty alignment that can be distinguished from the self- Organization [SEATO] and the , and identifed non-aligned status of the participants in Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Or‐ the 1961 and 1964 conferences. This is a very dif‐ ganization [NATO] and the Baghdad Pact) and “ab‐ ferent approach from that adopted by Peter Wil‐ stention from the use of arrangements of collec‐ lets in his 1978 study, The Non-Aligned Movement: tive defence to serve the particular interests of “it is not appropriate for observers from outside any of the big powers” (at the insistence of Nass‐ to set their own defnitions. Non-alignment is the er). Subsequent statements by participants made ideology put forward by the states that call them‐ clear that there was no agreement on how the selves Non-Aligned. Cuba and Saudi Arabia are contradiction was to be reconciled.[14] Non-Aligned because they joined in forming the When Nasser and Tito decided in 1961 to call ideology, chose to attend conferences, and were the frst conference of non-aligned states at Bel‐ accepted as members of the Movement by the oth‐ grade, they intended in part to head of Sukarno’s er members.”[12] eforts to call a second Asian-African conference. “Non-alignment” was a moving target in the Indonesian attempts to organize “Bandung II” late 1950s and early 1960s, in terms of both mean‐ continued after 1961, strongly backed by ing and membership. Though Rakove suggests and Pakistan (neither of which had been invited that the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, In‐ to ). Indeed, drawing on American and donesia, in 1955 marked the emergence of the British embassy reporting, Rakove provides one “phenomenon of organized nonalignment” (p. 7, of the frst archive-based accounts of the rivalry see also pp. xx, 63), this widely heard claim has between the parallel eforts in 1964 to organize been repeatedly challenged by scholars over the “Belgrade II” (a second conference of non-aligned past fve decades, most recently by Robert Vitalis states, ultimately held in in ) in a spectacular myth-busting article. As Vitalis and “Bandung II” (a second Asian-African confer‐ demonstrates, “the 1961 meeting of Non-Aligned ence, eventually planned for Algiers in 1965, but States and Heads of Governments [sic] was not a ultimately never held). Although Sukarno’s deter‐ follow-up to Bandung or its extension. It was its mination to promote Afro-Asian solidarity as an rival.”[13] As Rakove does note, the twenty-nine alternative to non-aligned solidarity was thus de‐ states represented at Bandung (all of the then-in‐ feated, he nevertheless had some success at Bel‐ dependent states in Asia and Africa, plus soon-to- grade in his eforts to redefne non-alignment as be-independent Sudan and Ghana, but excluding primarily concerned with the battle against colo‐ Israel, the two , South Africa, the Soviet nialism and neocolonialism. Union, and Taiwan) included several states that were outspokenly aligned, and there was little

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Long after the frst non-aligned conference in provision for regular future conferences (which is Belgrade in 1961, then, the meaning of non-align‐ why there was a three-year gap between the frst ment remained contested and shifting. Much fur‐ and second non-aligned conferences and then a ther research remains to be done on this issue, six-year gap until the third). Indeed, though but what is clear is that none of the leading advo‐ Nkrumah and others advocated the creation of an cates of non-alignment understood it as simply organized third bloc in the early 1960s, this was the passive abstention from participation in Cold rejected by other non-aligned leaders, most no‐ War alliances. Rather, their conceptions involved, tably Nehru, who believed that blocs were the with varying degrees of emphasis, such elements problem, not the solution. as activist promotion of international peace and This, combined with the strikingly diferent mediation of Cold War tensions; support for disar‐ composition of the participants in the 1961 and mament; opposition to and, later, neo‐ 1964 conferences, makes it complicated to refer, colonialism; and concern about unequal econom‐ as Rakove frequently does, even to a lower-case ic development. It was this fact that non-align‐ “nonaligned movement” in the early 1960s. The ment always involved more than the word’s liter‐ number of full participants in the non-aligned al meaning that led Willetts to predict correctly in conferences increased from twenty-fve at Bel‐ 1978 that the end of the Cold War would not mean grade to forty-six at Cairo. This was not only be‐ the end of non-alignment. U.S. Secretary of State cause more states had won in the Condoleezza Rice’s comment at the time of the intervening three years. In 1961, the postcolonial 2006 Non-Aligned summit—she had “never quite world was deeply divided, especially by the Congo understood what it is they would be nonaligned crisis. The fnal list of participants at Belgrade pri‐ against at this point. I mean, you know, the move‐ marily refected the wishes of Nasser and Tito, ment came out of the Cold War”—was, as Rakove and excluded a signifcant number of non-bloc has noted elsewhere, “a classic misreading of non‐ states in Africa and Asia. Within Africa, all of the alignment.”[15] more radical Casablanca Group of states attended, Moreover, Rakove correctly points out that but none of the more conservative “only with hindsight can we say that the 1961 Bel‐ Group. Two Arab states, Jordan and Libya, were grade Conference marked the emergence of the excluded.[17] By 1964, however, the divisions of NAM” (p. xiii), a point that is often missed, even 1961 had been, to some degree, overcome, espe‐ by the recent critics of the “Bandung-to-Belgrade” cially as a consequence of the foundation of the origin myth. (Vitalis, for instance, claims that an Organisation of African Unity in May 1963 and the “actually existing international organization, the frst Conference of Arab Heads of State in Cairo in Non-Aligned Movement (or NAM), [was] founded January 1964. Membership of either of these in Belgrade in 1961.”[16]) The term “Non-Aligned groupings was treated as an automatic qualifca‐ Movement” appears nowhere in the ofcial docu‐ tion for participation at the Cairo Conference. ments adopted by the 1961 Belgrade Conference Did American policy toward Cameroon, the or the 1964 Cairo Conference; the term gained Central African Republic, , Congo (Brazzav‐ common currency only in the 1970s. And it was ille), Dahomey, Jordan, , Libya, Mauritania, only from the third non-aligned conference in , , , or (all inde‐ Lusaka in 1970 that eforts began to institutional‐ pendent by 1961) change in any signifcant way ize the incipient “movement.” The 1961 and 1964 because they participated in the Cairo Conference conferences, in contrast, had created no organiza‐ of non-aligned states in 1964, despite not having tional structure—no executive, spokesman, or participated in the Belgrade Conference three permanent secretariat—and they did not make

7 H-Net Reviews years earlier? Presumably not. Indeed, Rakove solidarity); the Casablanca, Brazzaville, and Mon‐ suggests, intriguingly, that after the 1961 Belgrade rovia conferences of rival groupings of African Conference there was “a gradual cessation of [U.S. states in 1960-61; the founding meetings in government] eforts to comprehend nonalign‐ Bangkok of the Association of Southeast Asia in ment as an international phenomenon” and a 1961 and the Association of Southeast Asian Na‐ “shift to bilateral approaches” (pp. 63-64, 83). This tions in 1967; the founding conference of the Or‐ leaves open the question, however, of to what ex‐ ganisation of African Unity in Addis Ababa in tent bilateral American policy toward each of 1963; the Conference of Arab Heads of State in these states was infuenced by their participation 1964; and the various eforts to form an “Islamic (or not) in non-aligned conferences, and to what Pact” that culminated in the founding of the Or‐ extent it was shaped by the interactions in each ganisation of the Islamic Conference in Rabat in case of a range of other factors.[18] Those other 1969. The story becomes even more complex factors might include, for instance, American when we consider in addition the various non- ideas about “neutralism” (the term, Rakove notes governmental convocations and groupings in the on H-Diplo, that American policymakers persisted same period, such as the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Soli‐ in using), in its “true” and other variants; about darity Organisation, founded in Cairo in 1957; the race (the signifcance of which in American policy All-African People’s Conferences of 1958, 1960, in this period toward Africa has been explored by and 1961; and the Tricontinental Conference in Thomas Borstelmann, toward India by Andrew J. Havana in 1966. Rotter, and toward the by The writing of the history of most of these in‐ Matthew Jones);[19] about postcolonial national‐ ternational and transnational projects is in its in‐ ism (not an issue, of course, in the case of one of fancy. The nature of the various projects, how the leading non-aligned states, Yugoslavia); about they related to each other, to the Cold War, and to political and economic systems (both issues, Noer the United States and other great powers; why shows, raised in the U.S. negotiations with some did not survive and others did; and how Nkrumah on the Volta River Dam project); and those that did survive changed over time, are all about the range of other political geographies and subjects for research by future scholars. Such re‐ solidarities that characterized this fuid moment search will enhance our understanding of the na‐ in international history. ture of what Frederick Cooper has called the “pos‐ As former rapidly gained their inde‐ sibility and constraint” of the era of decoloniza‐ pendence between the 1940s and the 1960s, the tion and, ultimately, of how we arrived at our con‐ leaders of the new states were engaged in what temporary world order.[21] Kennedy, Johnson, Vitalis calls “a multifront war of position” to es‐ and the Nonaligned World is a detailed study of tablish which particular geographies and solidari‐ one aspect of that vast and complex history. The ties would defne the postcolonial era. The Asian- questions it raises will inform future eforts to tell African Conference at Bandung and the non- other components of the story. aligned conferences of 1961 and 1964 were only Notes three of the series of “sometimes rival, sometimes [1]. Unlike Rakove, in this review I use the hy‐ simply orthogonal convocations” that character‐ phenated forms for “non-aligned” and “non-align‐ ized this competition.[20] Others included the frst ment” since these were the forms that were most Conference of Independent African States in Ac‐ widely used in the 1960s, including in the ofcial cra in 1958 (conceived by Nkrumah and his advis‐ documents of the frst two conferences of non- er George Padmore as a means of asserting pan- aligned countries in 1961 and 1964. African solidarity as an alternative to Afro-Asian

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[2]. For one such example, see Andy DeRoche, and the Soviet Challenge (: I. B. Tauris, “Dreams and Disappointments: Kenneth Kaunda 2012); Svetozar Rajak, “No Bargaining Chips, No and the United States, 1960-1964,” Safundi 9, no. 4 Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold (October 2008): 369-394; and Andy DeRoche, War Non-Alignment,” Journal of Cold War Studies “Non-alignment on the Racial Frontier: Zambia 16, no. 1 (Winter 2014), 146-179; DeRoche, and the USA, 1964–68,” Cold War History 7, no. 2 “Dreams and Disappointments”; and DeRoche (May 2007): 227-250. “Non-alignment on the Racial Frontier.” [3]. See also the comments in Matthew Jones, [9]. Recent scholarship has focused especially review of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned on the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, In‐ World, by Robert B. Rakove, Journal of American donesia, in 1955. See, for example, Cary Fraser, History 100, no. 2 (September 2013): 598. ‘‘An American Dilemma: Race and in [4]. For Rakove’s further gloss on this specifc the American Response to the Bandung Confer‐ claim after another reviewer took issue with it, ence, 1955,’’ in Window on Freedom: Race, Civil see Robert B. Rakove, “Author’s Response,” H-Dip‐ Rights, and Foreign Afairs, 1945-1988, ed. Brenda lo Roundtable Reviews 14, no. 39 (July 8, 2013): 27, Plummer (Chapel Hill: University of North Caroli‐ http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/ na Press, 2003), 115-140; Jamie Mackie, Bandung Roundtable-XIV-39.pdf. 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005); “Ban‐ [5]. Ibid., 28. See also Rakove, Kennedy, John‐ dung/Third Worldism,” ed. Hee-Yeon Cho and son, and the Nonaligned World, 134. Kuan-Hsing Chen, special issue, Inter-Asia Cultur‐ [6]. In addition to his extensive research in al Studies 6, no. 4 (December 2005); Matthew American archives, Rakove also draws on some Jones, “A ‘Segregated’ Asia? Race, the Bandung European sources, primarily materials in the U.K. Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American National Archives, but also—though less frequent‐ Thought and Policy, 1954-1955,” Diplomatic Histo‐ ly—on materials from the French and East Ger‐ ry 29, no. 5 (November 2005): 841-868; Antoinette man foreign ministry archives. On “sources left Burton, Augusto Espiritu, and Fanon Che Wilkins, un-consulted,” see also Rakove, “Author’s Re‐ “Forum: The Fate of in the Age of sponse,” 29-30. Bandung,” Radical History Review 95 (Spring [7]. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 2006): 145-210; Roland Burke, “‘The Compelling The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Dialogue of Freedom’: Human Rights at the Ban‐ Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic dung Conference,” Human Rights Quarterly 28, Books, 2005), 435, 582n22. no. 4 (November 2006): 947-965; Jason Parker, [8]. See, for example, Jefrey J. Byrne, “Algiers “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the between Bandung and Belgrade: Guerilla Diplo‐ Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of macy and the Evolution of the Third World Move‐ the Postwar Era,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 5 ment, 1954-1962,” in The Middle East and the Cold (November 2006): 867-892; Kweku Ampiah, The War, ed. Massimiliano Trentin (Newcastle upon Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), Conference of 1955: The Reactions of the US, UK 11-28; Jefrey S. Ahlman, “Road to Ghana: and (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007); Shu Nkrumah, and the Eclipse of a Guang Zhang, “Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexis‐ Decolonizing Africa,” Kronos 37 (November 2011): tence’: China’s Diplomacy toward the Geneva and 23-40; Rinna Kullaa, Non-Alignment and Its Ori‐ Bandung Conferences, 1954–55,” Cold War Histo‐ gins in Cold War : Yugoslavia, Finland, ry 7, no. 4 (November 2007): 509-528; See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited:

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The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference Routledge, 2014) was forthcoming at the time this for International Order (Singapore: National Uni‐ review was written. versity of Singapore Press, 2008); Christopher J. [10]. Thomas J. Noer, “The New Frontier and Lee, ed., Making a World after Empire: The Ban‐ African Neutralism: Kennedy, Nkrumah, and the dung Moment and Its Political Afterlives (Athens: Volta River Project,” Diplomatic History 8, no. 1 Ohio University Press, 2010); Antonia Finnane (January 1984): 78. and Derek McDougall, eds., Bandung 1955: Little [11]. Rakove, “Author’s Response,” 28. See also Histories (Victoria: Monash University Press, Rakove’s reference to “truly uncommitted states,” 2010); and Quinn Slobodian, “Bandung in Divided in Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned : Managing Non-Aligned Politics in East World, 34. and West, 1955–63,” Journal of Imperial and Com‐ monwealth History 41, no. 4 (2013): 644-662. Non- [12]. Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Move‐ alignment has so far received relatively less re‐ ment: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (Lon‐ cent attention and the best works remain those don: Frances Pinter, 1978), 44. produced by journalists and political scientists [13]. Robert Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of from the 1960s to the 1980s (see note 13 below). Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung Recent studies include: Ann Lane, “Third World (Ban-doong),” Humanity: An International Jour‐ Neutralism and British Cold War Strategy, nal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and De‐ 1960-62,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 14, no. 3 (Sep‐ velopment 4, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 277. Other ac‐ tember 2003): 151-174; Vijay Prashad, The Darker counts that in various ways challenge or compli‐ Nations: A People’s History of the Third World cate the Bandung-to-Belgrade narrative include: (New York: New Press, 2007), esp. 95-104, 207-223; Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester: Leicester Uni‐ James G. Hershberg, “‘High-Spirited Confusion’: versity Press, 1963), 47-48; G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia , the 1961 Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference, and Non-Alignment (London: Faber and Faber, and the Limits of an ‘Independent’ Foreign Policy 1966), esp. 223, 280; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yu‐ during the High Cold War,” Cold War History 7, goslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton: no. 3 (August 2007): 373-388; Itty Abraham, “From Princeton University Press, 1970), 62-64; David Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian For‐ Kimche, The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and eign Policy, 1947–65,” Commonwealth & Compara‐ Foreign Policy of the Third World (Jerusalem: Is‐ tive Politics 46, no. 2 (April 2008): 195-219; Kullaa, rael Universities Press, 1973), esp. 73, 89-91, 96-97; Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Eu‐ Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement, esp. 3-14; B. rope; Byrne, “Algiers between Bandung and Bel‐ D. Arora, Indian-Indonesian Relations (1961-1980) grade”; Mark Atwood Lawrence, “The Rise and (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1981), Fall of Nonalignment,” in The Cold War in the esp. 53-90, 151-166; Robert A. Mortimer, The Third Third World, ed. Robert J. McMahon (New York: World Coalition in International Politics, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2013); John R. Lampe, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 6-22; John W. “Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy in Balkan Perspec‐ Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in tive: Tracking between the Superpowers and Non- the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Alignment,” East Central Europe 40, no. 1-2 Washington Press, 2001), 118-128; Abraham, (2013): 97-113; and Rajak, “No Bargaining Chips, “From Bandung to NAM”; Kullaa, Non-Alignment No Spheres of Interest.” Nataša Mišković, Harald and Its Origins in Cold War Europe, esp. xiv, 3, 16, Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boškovska, eds., The Non- 177; and Lawrence, “The Rise and Fall of Non‐ Aligned Movement and the Cold War (Abingdon: alignment,” 143-144. For an account that notes that “there has been some debate as to whether or

10 H-Net Reviews not Bandung was a prelude to the Belgrade meet‐ in American History 41, no. 4 (December 2013): ing” but nevertheless concludes (implausibly) that 749-750. it was “in Bandung that the concept of the Non- [19]. Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The aligned Movement was conceived,” see A. W. Sing‐ United States and India, 1947–1964 (Ithaca: Cor‐ ham and Shirley Hune, Non-alignment in an Age nell University Press, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, of Alignments (Westport: Lawrence Hill & Co., The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race 1986), 67-68. Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Har‐ [14]. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, vard University Press, 2001); and Jones, “A ‘Segre‐ 214-215, 221-222; and Kimche, Afro-Asian Move‐ gated’ Asia?” ment, 72-73. [20]. Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of Kwame [15]. Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement, Nkrumah,” 262, 267. 233; and Rob Rakove, “Taking Nonalignment Seri‐ [21]. Frederick Cooper, “Possibility and Con‐ ously,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2012, http:// straint: African Independence in Historical Per‐ www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/27/ spective,” Journal of African History 49, no. 2 iran_non_alignment. (July 2008): 167-196. [16]. Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah,” 261-262. See also, for example, Kullaa, Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Eu‐ rope, 177; and Lawrence, “The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment,” 144. [17]. The exception was Libya, which was not invited. Libya had attended the Casablanca Con‐ ference, but had subsequently distanced itself from the Casablanca Group, and had attended the Monrovia Conference, from which the other members of the Casablanca Group stayed away. [18]. I am drawing here on Ryan Irwin’s ques‐ tion in his own review, “whether [American] poli‐ cymakers actually had a worldview on nonalign‐ ment or interlocking opinions about race, devel‐ opment, and neutrality that interacted as the world changed around them during the early 1960s.” See Ryan Irwin, review of Kennedy, John‐ son, and the Nonaligned World, by Robert B. Rakove, H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews 14, no. 39 (July 8, 2013): 6, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XIV-39.pdf. See also Hannah Gurman, “In Search of a Postcolonial U.S. World Order,” review of Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, by Robert B. Rakove and Gordian Knot: and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order, by Ryan M. Irwin, Reviews

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