Imbalance of Power the Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1961
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
IanImbdaollanceo of Power Imbalance of Power The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1961 ✣ Alessandro Iandolo Introduction The Congo crisis of 1960–1961 was one of the ªrst times the United States and the Soviet Union vied for inºuence in the Third World. Moscow and Washington backed different parties in an internal conºict in Congo and re- sorted to force to support them. Despite the importance of the Congo crisis in the context of the Cold War, surprisingly little has been written about it, despite the availability of primary sources from Russia as well as the West. The ªrst international history of the crisis, which takes into account the points of view of the superpowers, the United Nations (UN), and the local ac- tors, appeared only recently.1 In recent years, several analyses of speciªc issues connected to the crisis have also been published.2 Moreover, inºuential works with a broader scope, such as Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War and the recent three-volume Cambridge History of the Cold War, have high- lighted the Congo crisis as a key event for the Cold War in the Third World.3 1. Lise Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–65 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 2013). For useful background information, see M. Crawford Young, “Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi,” in The Cambridge History of Africa, ed. Michael Crowder (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 717–722; Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence: January 1960–December 1961 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1965); Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables. The Cold War in Africa—from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982); and Ste- phen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975). 2. On the tragic conclusion of the crisis and the role of Western business interests in it, see Ludo De Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba (London: Verso, 2002). On U.S. policy, see David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 3. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 136–143; and Michael E. Latham, “The Cold Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 2014, pp. 32–55, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00449 © 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 32 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00449 by guest on 27 September 2021 Imbalance of Power However, so far only one work based on primary sources directly addresses the role the Soviet Union played in the Congo crisis.4 Using declassiªed Soviet, Western, and Ghanaian documents, this article aims to broaden the debate on Soviet policy during the Congo crisis. Its main purpose is not to present a detailed reconstruction of the crisis but to focus on Moscow’s actions and link them to overall Soviet policy toward the Third World. In particular the article highlights how the USSR’s relative inferiority in power-projection capabilities caused the Soviet strategy in Congo to fail. Moscow’s repeated threats to intervene in the conºict on the side of its local allies were nothing but a bluff and could not hide the real imbalance of power between the Soviet Union and the West in Africa. This had important repercus- sions in Congo as well as for Soviet policy in general. The ªrst consequence was that Congo turned from a potential Soviet ally into a ªrmly pro-Western re- gime, ending a phase of Soviet expansion in the Third World. Prior to this Moscow had managed to establish cooperative relations with several newly in- dependent countries largely thanks to offers of economic aid. However, after the “loss” of Congo, Soviet leaders began to realize that developing appropriate military and logistical capabilities to project power was an unavoidable necessity if the USSR hoped to challenge the West in the Third World. The Congo crisis, therefore, contributed to turning the Cold War in the Third World into a more militarized competition between the superpowers. The Soviet Union and the Third World Following Iosif Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union assumed a more ac- tive role in the Third World. Moscow abandoned Stalin’s restrictive interpre- tation of the “two camps theory,” which prescribed that alliances with non- Marxist nationalist elites were impossible, and instead jumped at the chance to make new friends in Asia, Africa, and Latin America at a time when more and more countries in these regions were becoming independent.5 Whereas Stalin believed that post-independence leaders were “lackeys” of the imperial- ists, Nikita Khrushchev, the new First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), was convinced that the newly independent coun- War in the Third World, 1963–1975,” in Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Lefºer, eds., The Cam- bridge History of the Cold War, 3 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Vol. 2, pp. 265– 266. 4. Sergey Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 77–129. 5. Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 57–72. 33 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00449 by guest on 27 September 2021 Iandolo tries represented a great opportunity for the Soviet Union.6 Khrushchev hoped “to use post-colonialist momentum, break into the soft underbelly of imperialism and win sympathies of the millions of people who woke up to the new life.”7 Soviet policy for the Third World was based on economic aid. In particu- lar, Khrushchev thought that the superiority of socialism as an economic sys- tem would convince the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia to choose a non-capitalist path to development. In 1955 he embarked on a series of trips to key countries in Asia, visiting India, Indonesia, Burma, and Af- ghanistan, offering aid and technical cooperation. Khrushchev also pushed to establish strong links between the Soviet Union and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, including shipping weapons to Cairo through Czechoslovakia in 1955.8 It was precisely over Egypt that the USSR clashed with the West for the ªrst time in the Third World. In 1956, follow- ing Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, Britain, France, and Israel launched a coordinated attack against Egypt. Moscow issued an ultimatum threatening to intervene in the conºict on Cairo’s side and to attack Britain and France with long-range “nuclear missiles, which the Soviet Union did not [yet] possess.”9 British and French actions ceased shortly thereafter—but as a result of the U.S. threat to impose economic sanctions rather than because of the Soviet ultimatum. Nevertheless, Khrushchev saw his tough talk during the Suez crisis as a success. He had always regarded the Franco-British-Israeli attack on Egypt as a coordinated Western move that the U.S. government must have at least known about in advance. Khrushchev believed his ultima- tum had scared the Americans to the point that they had to restrain their allies.10 After Suez, Khrushchev became convinced that by talking belligerently and threatening intervention he could bully the West into making conces- 6. A good discussion of the differences between Stalin and Khrushchev in thinking about the Third World is in Ted Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945–1958 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 131–133, 235–242. 7. Georgii Mirskii, quoted in Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). p. 139. 8. For more information on the arms deal with Egypt, see Guy Laron, “Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Egyptian Quest for Arms and the Czechoslovak Arms Deal,” CWIHP Working Paper 55, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, 2007. For a complete overview of the Suez crisis, see Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 9. Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953–1962,” in Westad and Lefºer, eds., Cambridge His- tory of the Cold War, Vol. 1, p. 321. 10. See “Transcript of a CC CPSU Plenum, Evening 28 June 1957,” in Cold War International His- tory Project Digital Archive, Collection: “Cold War in the Middle East,” http://www.wilsoncenter .org/digital-archive. 34 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00449 by guest on 27 September 2021 Imbalance of Power sions, even if the USSR did not actually have the capability to make good on the threats. This kind of bluff became a trademark of Khrushchev’s approach to foreign policy.11 As I discuss below, Moscow followed the same policy in Congo. The Soviet Union and Africa The Soviet Union was already active in Africa before Congo became inde- pendent. From 1957 to 1960 the USSR had established diplomatic relations and ambitious programs of economic and technical cooperation with newly independent Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Khrushchev hoped to lure more newly independent African countries to the socialist camp by granting Soviet aid under favorable conditions. Therefore, once the possibility of establishing relations with Congo arose, Moscow was quick to move. Independent Congo was the ideal candidate to enter into an alliance with the USSR and receive economic aid. The country was much larger than all of Moscow’s existing Af- rican partners combined.