Imbalance of Power the Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1961

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Imbalance of Power The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1961

✣ Alessandro Iandolo

Introduction

The Congo crisis of 1960–1961 was one of the ªrst times the United States and the Soviet Union vied for inºuence in the Third World. Moscow and Washington backed different parties in an internal conºict in Congo and re- sorted to force to support them. Despite the importance of the Congo crisis in the context of the Cold War, surprisingly little has been written about it, despite the availability of primary sources from Russia as well as the West. The ªrst international history of the crisis, which takes into account the points of view of the superpowers, the United Nations (UN), and the local ac- tors, appeared only recently.1 In recent years, several analyses of speciªc issues connected to the crisis have also been published.2 Moreover, inºuential works with a broader scope, such as Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War and the recent three-volume Cambridge History of the Cold War, have highlighted the Congo crisis as a key event for the Cold War in the Third World.3

1. Lise Namikas, Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960–65 (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni- versity Press, 2013). For useful background information, see M. Crawford Young, “Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi,” in The Cambridge History of Africa, ed. Michael Crowder (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 717–722; Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence: January 1960–December 1961 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1965); Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables. The Cold War in Africa—from Eisenhower to Kennedy (New York: Macmillan, 1982); and Ste- phen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975). 2. On the tragic conclusion of the crisis and the role of Western business interests in it, see Ludo De Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba (London: Verso, 2002). On U.S. policy, see David N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 3. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 136–143; and Michael E. Latham, “The Cold

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However, so far only one work based on primary sources directly addresses the role the Soviet Union played in the Congo crisis.4 Using declassiªed Soviet, Western, and Ghanaian documents, this article aims to broaden the debate on Soviet policy during the Congo crisis. Its main purpose is not to present a detailed reconstruction of the crisis but to focus on Moscow’s actions and link them to overall Soviet policy toward the Third World. In particular the article highlights how the USSR’s relative inferiority in power-projection capabilities caused the Soviet strategy in Congo to fail. Moscow’s repeated threats to intervene in the conºict on the side of its local allies were nothing but a bluff and could not hide the real imbalance of power between the Soviet Union and the West in Africa. This had important repercus- sions in Congo as well as for Soviet policy in general. The ªrst consequence was that Congo turned from a potential Soviet ally into a ªrmly pro-Western regime, ending a phase of Soviet expansion in the Third World. Prior to this Moscow had managed to establish cooperative relations with several newly independent countries largely thanks to offers of economic aid. However, after the “loss” of Congo, Soviet leaders began to realize that developing appropriate military and logistical capabilities to project power was an unavoidable necessity if the USSR hoped to challenge the West in the Third World. The Congo crisis, therefore, contributed to turning the Cold War in the Third World into a more militarized competition between the superpowers.

The Soviet Union and the Third World

Following Iosif Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union assumed a more active role in the Third World. Moscow abandoned Stalin’s restrictive interpretation of the “two camps theory,” which prescribed that alliances with non- Marxist nationalist elites were impossible, and instead jumped at the chance to make new friends in Asia, Africa, and Latin America at a time when more and more countries in these regions were becoming independent.5 Whereas Stalin believed that post-independence leaders were “lackeys” of the imperial- ists, Nikita Khrushchev, the new First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), was convinced that the newly independent coun-

War in the Third World, 1963–1975,” in Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Lefºer, eds., The Cam- bridge History of the Cold War, 3 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Vol. 2, pp. 265– 266. 4. Sergey Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 77–129. 5. Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 57–72.

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tries represented a great opportunity for the Soviet Union.6 Khrushchev hoped “to use post-colonialist momentum, break into the soft underbelly of imperialism and win sympathies of the millions of people who woke up to the new life.”7 Soviet policy for the Third World was based on economic aid. In particular, Khrushchev thought that the superiority of socialism as an economic sys- tem would convince the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia to choose a non-capitalist path to development. In 1955 he embarked on a series of trips to key countries in Asia, visiting India, Indonesia, Burma, and Af- ghanistan, offering aid and technical cooperation. Khrushchev also pushed to establish strong links between the Soviet Union and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, including shipping weapons to Cairo through Czechoslovakia in 1955.8 It was precisely over Egypt that the USSR clashed with the West for the ªrst time in the Third World. In 1956, following Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, Britain, France, and Israel launched a coordinated attack against Egypt. Moscow issued an ultimatum threatening to intervene in the conºict on Cairo’s side and to attack Britain and France with long-range “nuclear missiles, which the Soviet Union did not [yet] possess.”9 British and French actions ceased shortly thereafter—but as a result of the U.S. threat to impose economic sanctions rather than because of the Soviet ultimatum. Nevertheless, Khrushchev saw his tough talk during the Suez crisis as a success. He had always regarded the Franco-British-Israeli attack on Egypt as a coordinated Western move that the U.S. government must have at least known about in advance. Khrushchev believed his ultimatum had scared the Americans to the point that they had to restrain their allies.10 After Suez, Khrushchev became convinced that by talking belligerently and threatening intervention he could bully the West into making conces-

6. A good discussion of the differences between Stalin and Khrushchev in thinking about the Third World is in Ted Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945–1958 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 131–133, 235–242. 7. Georgii Mirskii, quoted in Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). p. 139. 8. For more information on the arms deal with Egypt, see Guy Laron, “Cutting the Gordian Knot: The Egyptian Quest for Arms and the Czechoslovak Arms Deal,” CWIHP Working Paper 55, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, 2007. For a complete overview of the Suez crisis, see Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 9. Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953–1962,” in Westad and Lefºer, eds., Cambridge His- tory of the Cold War, Vol. 1, p. 321. 10. See “Transcript of a CC CPSU Plenum, Evening 28 June 1957,” in Cold War International His- tory Project Digital Archive, Collection: “Cold War in the Middle East,” http://www.wilsoncenter .org/digital-archive.

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sions, even if the USSR did not actually have the capability to make good on the threats. This kind of bluff became a trademark of Khrushchev’s approach to foreign policy.11 As I discuss below, Moscow followed the same policy in Congo.

The Soviet Union and Africa

The Soviet Union was already active in Africa before Congo became independent. From 1957 to 1960 the USSR had established diplomatic relations and ambitious programs of economic and technical cooperation with newly independent Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Khrushchev hoped to lure more newly independent African countries to the socialist camp by granting Soviet aid under favorable conditions. Therefore, once the possibility of establishing relations with Congo arose, Moscow was quick to move. Independent Congo was the ideal candidate to enter into an alliance with the USSR and receive economic aid. The country was much larger than all of Moscow’s existing Af- rican partners combined. Moreover, Congo had emerged from a notorious colonial history of exploitation and discrimination against its population. The Soviet Union, by extending its programs of economic assistance and technical cooperation to Congo, would not only become a major player in Africa but would also show to other Third World countries the contrast between the “neo-colonialist” ambitions of the West and the USSR’s “freedom-loving” approach to newly independent countries.12 Congo thus became a priority for Soviet policy. However, despite growing interest in the Third World, the Soviet Union showed no particular willingness to sustain national liberation struggles in Af- rica or Asia. Instead Moscow was interested in creating new bonds in the Third World only after former colonies had received independence. Khrush- chev and other Soviet leaders frequently scolded the colonial powers over their policies, and the Soviet representatives at the UN Security Council often ad- vocated a harsher condemnation of imperialism from the UN. However, Moscow refrained from providing direct support for national liberation movements that were waging an armed struggle for independence, as in the

11. For a discussion of Khrushchev’s foreign policy in this period, see Mastny, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953–1962,” pp. 312–33. 12. Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War. For a discussion of Soviet economic aid, see Elizabeth K. Valkenier, The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind (New York: Praeger, 1983). See also Alessandro Iandolo, “The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Model of Development in West Africa, 1957–64,” Cold War History, Vol. 12, No. 4 (November 2012), pp. 683–704.

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case of the Front de Libération Nationale during the Algerian War of Inde- pendence.13 Moreover, the USSR had always shown great hesitation even to support Communists involved in violent conºicts. Stalin agreed to help Kim Il-Sung during the Korean War, but he was careful to minimize Soviet involvement on the ground.14 Even after Stalin’s death, the new Soviet leader did not alter this policy. In Indochina, Moscow stuck to the same approach toward Ho Chi Minh. The USSR did not provide more decisive support to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam until the second half of the 1960s—especially after 1968, when the plight facing the United States became too obvious to ignore.15 The USSR’s unwillingness to support liberation movements and local wars had roots in Moscow’s awareness of the risks of military confrontation with the West in the Third World. Soviet leaders saw no point in becoming involved in local conºicts that would result in the birth not of socialist states but only of “national-bourgeois” regimes. Moreover, Soviet military engage- ment in the Third World would most likely have resulted in Western intervention in retaliation, with signiªcant risks of escalation to an all-out conºict. Soviet military doctrine reºected these views, and therefore local wars were ofªcially dubbed “unjust” and to be avoided.16 The events of the Congo crisis were to alter this policy of non-intervention. The Soviet Union did become entangled, albeit brieºy, in a local conºict in open competition with the United States. The outcome of the crisis demonstrated to Moscow the limits of its extant inºuence in the Third World.

13. The Soviet Union’s role in the Algerian war has yet to be explored by historians following the declassiªcation of at least some documents from the Russian archives. Moscow’s relative lack of support for the Algerian guerrillas was inºuenced by the position of the French Communist Party, which was initially against the idea of an independent Algeria. For an international history of the conºict, including some discussion of Soviet policy, see Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post–Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a more general discussion of Soviet policy toward North Africa, see Yahia Zoubir, “U.S. and Soviet Policies towards France’s Struggle with Anticolonial Nationalism in North Africa,” Cana- dian Journal of History, Vol. 30, No. 3 (December 1995), pp. 440–466. 14. William Stueck, “The Korean War,” in Lefºer and Westad, eds., Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1, pp. 266–287. 15. Ilya Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conºict, 1954–1963 (Stan- ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996); and Fredrik Logevall, “The Indochina Wars and the Cold War, 1945– 1975,” in Lefºer and Westad, eds., Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 2, pp. 281–304. 16. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of Soviet military thought concerning the Third World, see Mark N. Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought (London: Croom Helm, 1982).

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Congo’s Independence

Following prolonged turmoil in Congo throughout 1959, the Belgian government agreed to grant independence to its largest African colony on 30 June 1960.17 Patrice Lumumba, a young radical activist, was one of the most important leaders of the Congolese independence movements and became Congo’s ªrst prime minister. The Soviet Union had already established con- tacts with Lumumba in April 1959, when Pavel Gerasimov—at the time So- viet ambassador to Guinea—met him in Conakry when Lumumba was at- tending the Conference of the Peoples of Africa in his capacity as leader of the Congolese National Movement (Mouvement National Congolais, MNC). Lumumba told Gerasimov that “as soon as we attain power we will immediately exchange diplomatic representatives with the USSR.” Moreover, he ex- pressed his willingness to visit the Soviet Union and asked Gerasimov about possible Soviet help for his independence movement.18 Lumumba was not a Marxist and certainly not a Communist, but his views were deªnitely radical.19 Because of his leftist convictions, U.S. ofªcials had been worrying about possible Communist inªltration in Congo well before the country’s independence.20 Lumumba was on friendly terms with both Guinea’s Ahmed Sékou Touré and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, with whom he shared pan-Africanist convictions. Guinea at the time was the closest Soviet ally in Africa, and Ghana had recently begun to move closer to the USSR. Moreover, the Belgian Communist Party regarded Lumumba positively, and he made no secret of his interest in cultivating relations with the Soviet bloc. Accordingly, the leaders of the CPSU decided to invite him to the Soviet Union, but only unofªcially (as Lumumba had requested), to prevent the Bel- gian authorities from learning of the visit. The Soviet embassy in Conakry was entrusted with organizing the trip.21

17. Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, pp. 8–11. 18. “Posol SSSR v Gvineiskoi Respublike P. I. Gerasimov—MID, 28 aprelya 1959 g. Zapis’ besedy s predsedatelem Natsional’nogo dvizheniya Kongo Patrisom Lumumboi o perspektivakh sovetsko- kongolezskikh otnoshenii, 18 aprelya 1959 g.,” in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Ar- chive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, AVPRF), Fond (F.) 590, Opis’ (Op.) 1, Papka (Pa.) 1, Delo (D.) 1, Listy (Ll.) 4–5, published in Apollon Davidson and Sergey Mazov, eds., Rossiya i Afrika: Dokumenty i Materialy, XVIII v.–1960 g., Vol. 2 (Moscow: IVI RAN, 1999), pp. 251–252. 19. Jean Van Lierde, ed., Lumumba Speaks: The Speeches and Writings of Patrice Lumumba, 1958–1961 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); and Patrice Lumumba, Congo: My Country (New York: Praeger, 1962). 20. “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana,” 28 April 1960, in U.S. De- partment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vol. 14, p. 271 (henceforth cited as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers); and “Telegram from the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State,” 1 May 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 272–274. 21. “Zapiska v TsK KPSS zamestitelya zaveduyushchego Mezhdunarodnym otdelom TsK V. Teresh-

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Lumumba was not the only member of a Congolese independence movement to look for support from the USSR. In late 1959, a few representatives of movements other than the MNC got in touch with the Soviet embassy in Conakry to ªnd out about the possibility of receiving material aid (such as money and perhaps weapons) from the Soviet Union for their independence struggle. Those demands were quickly rebuffed by the embassy, a factor that makes Moscow’s interest in Lumumba all the more important. Even though Soviet leaders made clear that they had no intention of getting involved in the Congolese liberation struggle beyond providing “moral support,” Lumumba was clearly seen as the best possible interlocutor for Moscow.22 Although Lumumba was unable to visit the Soviet Union (he was ar- rested by the Belgians in October 1959 and released only in late January 1960), relations between the USSR and newly independent Congo began very positively. National elections were held in Congo in May 1960. Lu- mumba’s strongly anti-colonial MNC-L did well, and the country became fully independent in June.23 Lumumba became prime minister, and the more conservative Joseph Kasavubu was elected president.24 Following the elections, analysts in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs praised the MNC-L, even though it was a “bourgeois” (rather than socialist) party. What made Lu- mumba and his party stand out in Moscow’s eyes was his willingness to achieve full independence for Congo, including no economic dependence on the West and an effort to curtail the interests of “foreign monopolies.”25 The day before the ofªcial proclamation of independence on 29 June,

kina i zaveduyushego cektorom Mezhdunarodnogo otdelom TsK G. Shumeiko,” 23 April 1959, in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, RGANI), F. 11, Op. 1, D. 372, L. 32, cited in Apollon B. Davidson, Sergey Mazov, and Georgiy Tsypkin, eds., SSSR i Afrika, 1918–1960: Dokumentirovannaia istoriia vzaimootnoshenii (Moscow: IVI RAN, 2002), p. 258; and “O priglashenii v Sovetskii Soyuz Patrisa Lumumby—obshchestvennogo deyatelya Kongo,” 30 April 1959, in RGANI, F. 11, Op. 1, D. 372, Ll. 30–31, cited in Davidson, Mazov, and Tsypkin, eds., SSSR i Afrika, pp. 258–259. 22. “Zapis besedy s Mulel Perom, Kingotolo Antuanom i Kinki Rafaelem,” 28 December 1959, in AVPRF, F. 0575, Op. 2, Pa. 1, D. 2, Ll. 105–107, published in Davidson and Mazov, eds., Rossiya i Afrika, Vol. 2, pp. 236–238. 23. The Congolese National Movement split into two parts in July 1959. The main part, headed by Lumumba (MNC-L), was for a united Congo. The other, under Albert Kalonji’s leadership (MNC- K), was instead federalist and was based in the Kasai province. See J. Gerard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen, Congo 1960, 2 vols., Vol. 1, Les Dossiers du C.R.I.S.P. (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politique, 1961), pp. 17–18; and Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, p. 29. In the May elections, Lumumba’s party won 33 seats out of 137, and eight more went to its direct allies. With a total of 41 seats, the MNC-L was the single largest party. Lumumba was the party leader who received the most preferential votes. See Libois and Verhaegen, Congo 1960, Vol. I, pp. 262–265; and Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, pp. 72–73. 24. Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, pp. 75–77. 25. “Partiya Kongolezskoe Natsionalnoe Dvizhenie (MNK)—Spravka,” 4 June 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 3, D. 21, Ll. 25–30; and “Rezultaty Vyborov n Obrazovanie Tsentralnykh Organov Vlasti v Kongo—Spravka,” 13 July 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 3, D. 20, Ll. 145–156.

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Khrushchev sent Lumumba a telegram, congratulating him and signaling the USSR’s readiness to establish diplomatic relations. The Congolese prime minister replied warmly a few days later.26 A Soviet delegation headed by Mirzo Rakhmatov of the Tajik Soviet Republic’s Supreme Soviet attended the ofªcial celebrations for Congolese independence. An analysis of the preparations made beforehand shows that the Soviet Union intended to approach newly independent Congo in the same way it had approached Ghana and Guinea: by highlighting the USSR’s achievements in economic development and scientiªc progress and by offering aid with favorable conditions.27 On 7 July the delegation met with Lumumba and reached an agreement on the establishment of ofªcial diplomatic relations between the two countries.28 Newly independent Congo thus seemed destined to become not just a new Soviet ally in Africa but also the most important one, given Congo’s size, its symbolic importance in the struggle against European colonialism, and its natural resources.

The Outbreak of the Crisis

However, after independence Congo was far from stable. Only a few days after the ofªcial declaration of independence, the country’s armed forces— whose ofªcer corps was entirely Belgian—began to mutiny over poor pay and the lack of career opportunities for the Congolese. The principal targets of the revolt were the Europeans left in the country. This gave Belgium, which had kept two battalions of its troops in Congo following independence, a reason to send more troops to Congo with the task of protecting its citizens there.29 By mid-July, “Belgian paratroopers had intervened in twenty-three different places in the Congo.”30 Khrushchev publicly condemned this Belgian intervention, speaking of a “bandit policy” and neocolonialist aggression to preserve Belgium’s economic interests in Congo.31 The Soviet leader’s statement was followed the next day

26. N. Khrushchev to P. Lumumba, 29 June 1960, in V. A. Brykin, ed., SSSR i strany Afriki, 1946– 1962 gg.: Dokumenty i materialy, Vol. 1: 1946 g.–Sentyabr 1960 g. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1963), pp. 549–550. 27. “Materialy k Press-Konferentsii Sovetskoi Delegatsii na Torzhestvakh po Sluchaiu Provozgasheniya Nezavisimosti Kongo,” 23 June 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 2, D. 9, Ll. 23–30. 28. “Soobshchenie ob ustanovlenii diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii mezhdu SSSR i Kongo,” 8 July 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, p. 552. 29. Gerard-Libois and Verhaegen, Congo 1960, Vol. 1, pp. 336, 371–460. 30. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 404. 31. “Iz otvetov Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N.S. Khrushcheva na voprosi sovetskikh i

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by an ofªcial declaration that blamed Belgium together with the whole of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the chaos in Congo and called for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops.32 The situation in Congo deteriorated rapidly. On 11 July, the southern province of Katanga—rich in mineral resources, including uranium— declared independence. The leader of the Katangan separatists was Moise Tshombe, the provincial president, whom many suspected of having strong links with Belgium, especially with the mining companies that operated in Katanga and that feared the new Congolese government would hinder their activities. Tshombe could count on the help of several thousand Belgian troops and European mercenaries who joined the separatists in Katanga.33 The central government, however, could rely only on the Congolese regular armed forces. However, the government had only limited control over the army because of the ongoing mutiny and the fact that most (Belgian) ofªcers had ºed as a consequence of it. Lumumba and Kasavubu ªrst decided to ask the United States for help, but U.S. ofªcials informed them that no assistance would be provide without ofªcial UN authorization.34 The Congolese government then ofªcially appealed to the UN Security Council in order to obtain UN military support against the secessionists. The disorder in Congo thus became an international crisis. The USSR strongly supported Congo’s central government. The Soviet representative at the UN Security Council, Arkadii Sobolev, spoke in favor of Lumumba’s request that the UN assist Congolese forces in removing Belgian troops from the country and urged the Security Council to act against what he deªned as the illegitimate aggression against a sovereign state.35 The decisive date was 14 July. The UN Security Council approved an ambiguous resolution, which on one side granted UN military assistance to Lumumba’s government but on the other did not make clear whether the UN troops were authorized to use force against the separatists, leaving this to the interpretation of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.36 A UN opera-

inostrannykh zhurnalistov na press-konferentsii v Kremle,” 12 July 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, p. 553. 32. “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo pravitel’stva v svyazi s imperialisticheskoi interventsei v otnoshenii nazavisimoi Respubliki Kongo,” 13 July 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 554– 558. 33. J. Gerard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen, Congo 1960, 2 vols., Les Dossiers du C.R.I.S.P. (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politique, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 715–734. 34. Urquhart, Hammarskjold, pp. 393, 395; and “Telegram from the Department of State to the Em- bassy in Congo,” 12 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 298–299. 35. “Vystuplenie predstavitelya SSSR A.A. Soboleva v Sovete Bezopasnosti OON po voprosu o polozhenii v Kongo,” 13 July 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 558–560. 36. Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold: The Congo Crisis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 1976), p. 7; and Urquhart, Hammarskjold, pp. 403–404. The Security Council rejected a

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tion (Operation de Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC) was quickly set up under the direction of Ralph Bunche, a top UN ofªcer and 1950 Nobel Prize winner who had been in Congo since May 1960 as UN special representative. Rajeshwar Dayal, an Indian diplomat who had headed the UN operation in Lebanon in 1958 replaced Bunche in early August 1960.37 The ªrst UN troops began to arrive in Leopoldville on 15 July.38 The USSR was involved in ONUC from the very start. The Soviet government provided food supplies and vehicles, including aircraft to transport African troops under UN command to Congo.39 Soviet participation was nonetheless relatively limited. Rather than helping Lumumba directly, Mos- cow’s logistical contribution was always conveyed through the UN, and the Soviet logistical support and operational management were far inferior to what the United States was doing. Even though no U.S. troops participated in ONUC, the United States was still providing the lion’s share of transportation and supplies. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had no say in the management of ONUC on the ground or in decisions taken at UN headquarters in New York. UN staffers from the Soviet bloc were often left out of key meetings on Congo and were generally mistrusted among the UN’s highest echelons.40 The United States, by contrast, enjoyed a direct channel of communication with UN Secretary General Hammarskjold in New York.41

Khrushchev’s “Bluff”

Following the UN resolution, both the central Congolese government in Leopoldville and Tshombe in Katanga wrote to Moscow to explain their posi-

Soviet draft resolution demanding ofªcial UN condemnation for Belgian actions. See “Obsuzhdenie voprosa o polozhenii v Kongo v Organizatsii Obedinennykh Natsii c iyulya 1960 g. po aprel 1961 g. (spravka),” 25 April 1961, in AVPRF, F. 590, Op. 4, P.6, D. 16, L. 10, cited in Davidson, Mazov, and Tsypkin, eds., SSSR i Afrika, p. 269. 37. Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold, pp. 7–11. 38. Urquhart, Hammarskjold, p. 401. 39. From N. Khrushchev (First Secretary, CPSU) to P. Lumumba (Prime Minister, Congo), 16 July 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i strany Afriki, Vol. 1, p. 563; and From A. Shvedov (African department, MID) to Ya. Malik (Deputy Foreign Minister), 24 October 1960, in AVPRF, F. 590, Op. 2, Pa. 2, D. 17, Ll. 5–6, cited in Davidson, Mazov, and Tsypkin, eds., SSSR i Afrika, p. 271. 40. Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. 21. 41. Hammarskjold regularly kept in touch with Eisenhower, Herter, and the U.S. mission to the UN, to the point that UN and U.S. policy on Congo were coordinated to a large extent. See, for example, “Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations,” 11 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 292–293; “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Sec- retary of State Herter and Secretary-General Hammarskjold,” 12 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 296–298; “Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission at the United Na- tions,” 13 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 303–304; “Telegram from the Department

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tions. Katanga’s leader ofªcially wrote to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announcing that his province had seceded from the rest of the country to es- cape the “chaos and anarchy” that followed Congo’s independence from Bel- gium.42 Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu jointly signed a message addressed to Khrushchev describing the situation as a case of aggression by the “Western camp”—rather than just Belgium—and pleading for Soviet support.43 Whereas Tshombe’s message remained unanswered and the USSR did not recognize Katanga, Khrushchev issued an ofªcial declaration on 15 July that echoed Lumumba’s and Kasavubu’s views, criticizing Western responsi- bility for the “aggression” against Congo. He argued that Belgian troops and mercenaries in Katanga served not only Brussels’s interests but also Washing- ton’s, London’s, and Bonn’s insofar as their “monopolies” all exploited Congo’s natural resources. The Soviet leader went to great lengths in his ofªcial declaration to support the Leopoldville government. “If the aggression continues,” Khrushchev wrote,

in spite of this [UN] resolution, the Soviet government declares that there is the need to take more decisive measures than according to the UN line, in accor- dance with the line of sympathy for the situation of Congo of the peace-loving countries. If the states that are ingeniously carrying out an imperialist aggression against the Republic of Congo and that are supporting it continue their criminal actions, then the Soviet Union will not refrain from decisive measures to stop the aggression. The government of Congo can be sure that the Soviet government will offer to the Republic of Congo the necessary help that can be required for the tri- umph of your just cause.44

of State to the Mission at the United Nations,” 14 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, p. 305; “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Herter and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge),” 14 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 306–307; “Tele- gram form the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,” 7 August 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 395–399; “Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations,” 3 September 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 455–457; “Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Herter and Secretary-General Hammarskjold,” 26 Sep- tember 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 506–508; “Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,” 11 October 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 524–525; and “Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,” 25 November 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 595–598. 42. From M. Tshombe (Katanga government representative) to A. Gromyko (Foreign Minister), 14 July 1960, in AVPRF, F. 590, Op. 2, Pa. 2, D. 9, L. 34, published in Davidson and Mazov, eds., Rossiya i Afrika, Vol. 2, pp. 258–259. 43. From J. Kasavubu (President, Congo) and P. Lumumba (Prime Minister, Congo) to N. Khrush- chev (First Secretary, CPSU), 14 July 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 562–563. 44. From N. Khrushchev (Frist Secretary, CPSU) to J. Kasavubu (President, Congo) and P.Lumumba (Prime Minister, Congo), 15 July 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i strany Afriki, Vol. 1, p. 562.

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The message Khrushchev wanted to convey was clear: The Soviet Union was ready to support Lumumba’s government directly if foreign intervention did not immediately cease. Because the situation in Congo was by then an open conºict between the central government and the Katanga secessionists, Khrushchev’s declaration seemed to imply that Moscow’s support for Lumumba could come in the form of military action. The Congolese prime minister took Khrushchev’s words seriously. After the rapid dispatch of a UN force to Congo, Lumumba became increasingly unhappy with the UN mission. Although he wanted the UN troops to engage the secessionists in Katanga, Hammarskjold viewed the secession as an internal conºict in which the UN should take no part. Lumumba soon quarreled with Bunche about the nature of the UN mandate in Congo.45 Initially, Lumumba mentioned the possibility of asking Moscow for direct help— something that according to Gromyko, caused a “shock” in Washington— largely to convince the UN and the United States to provide more effective support. However, by the end of July the Congolese prime minister had become utterly frustrated with the UN and with U.S. policy, which he regarded as obstructing his efforts to reunite the country.46 On 31 July, after he concluded that neither the UN nor any Western country seemed willing to satisfy his requests Lumumba turned to the USSR for logistical and military help.47 Yet, despite the strong wording of Khrushchev’s recent telegram, the So- viet Union was in fact unable to help Lumumba in any signiªcant way. Mos- cow had recently made important advances in the ªeld of missile technology and nuclear warfare, but its capacity to project conventional military force remained very limited. The Soviet Union could not count on any base outside Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Soviet navy was still far from fully operational on the high seas, and airlifting troops some 7,000 kilometers away from the USSR was a considerable challenge for the Soviet air force, making a large- scale operation in Congo impossible.48 Western analysts were quick to realize the ostentatious nature of the So- viet threats. On 21 July, following Khrushchev’s tough words and Lumumba’s ªrst signals that he might look to the USSR, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in London decided to “consider the importance” of Khrushchev’s “threat” and to “examine the capability of the Russians to intervene in the

45. Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold, p. 8. 46. From A. Sobolev (Soviet Permanent Representative to UN, New York) to MID, Moscow, 18 July 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 2, D. 15, Ll. 78–79. 47. From A. Gromyko (Foreign Minister) to N. Khrushchev (First Secretary, CPSU), 21 July 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 2, D. 15, Ll. 88–89; and Kalb, The Congo Cables, pp. 40–41. 48. Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conºicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 19–20, 36–59.

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Congo.”49 The JIC set out to analyze the crucial tactical questions of how Moscow could provide direct help to Lumumba’s forces. Would the USSR be able to “move a military element to the Congo by air”? Could it manage to provide the necessary logistical support—water, power and fuel—for a possible intervention in Congo? How long would it take instead to move troops by sea?50 Less than 24 hours after the drafting of a preliminary version, the JIC determined that a report on “Russian capability to intervene in the Congo” was no longer necessary.51 Western intelligence services were well aware of the limited capabilities of Moscow’s armed forces and concluded that

Soviet military intervention in the Congo poses great practical difªculties for the Soviets. Essentially, they are limited to airlifting forces into the area or sealifting them. The former is the most expeditious means but the latter is the most feasi- ble. There are general measures that the United States can undertake to aggra- vate the Soviet problem and consequences of their action as well as certain spe- ciªc measures which tend to forestall the possible success of either an airlift or a sealift. Moreover, there are measures that the United States should take in the event of a Soviet attempt to intervene or if actual intervention by then becomes a fact.52

The United States was even ready to organize a blockade to prevent any Soviet encroachments in Congo. Secretary of State Christian Herter told the Belgian ambassador to Washington that a Soviet intervention “would be a difªcult and lengthy move by air and that if the Soviets were to move by sea, the U.S. carrier would be off the Congo coast before the Soviets could be there.”53 Moscow’s threats were empty, and Lumumba’s hopes of relying on the USSR were misplaced. As the Western analysts had concluded, an airlift of Soviet troops and equipment was impossible because of logistical limitations, whereas a sealift would be slow and easy to disrupt. Khrushchev was trying to bluff, by hinting that the Soviet Union was ready to help Lumumba militarily, without in fact having the capability to do it. His strongly worded telegram in support of the Leopoldville government echoed the ultimatum during the Suez crisis of 1956, when Khrushchev had threatened a Soviet attack against Britain and France if they did not cease their aggression against Egypt. Simi-

49. Joint Intelligence Committee Meeting, 21 July 1960, in The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNAUK), CAB159/34, JIC(60)38. 50. Joint Intelligence Committee Meeting, 22 July 1960, in TNAUK, CAB159/34, JIC(60)55. 51. Ibid. 52. “Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates,” 22 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, p. 347. 53. “Memorandum of a Conversation” (Secretary of State and Ambassador Louis Scheyven of Bel- gium), 15 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 315–16.

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larly to 1956, however, the Soviet Union did not have the means to intervene in Congo. As during the Suez crisis, Khrushchev hoped that Soviet threats of intervention coupled with a UN resolution would in the end convince the United States to deny any support to its European allies (in this case Belgium) for a neocolonial adventure. Belgium would have then been forced to give up Katanga, thus allowing the Soviet Union not only to present itself as a de- fender of Third World interests, but also to boost Lumumba’s power and prestige in Congo. Since the USSR had showed that it believed in the possibility of building stronger ties to Congo as long as Lumumba was in power, this prospect had an obvious appeal for Moscow.

Soviet Support for Congo

Because Lumumba had requested Soviet help, Moscow had to respond. Khrushchev’s only option was to grant token assistance to the Congolese government and again issue threatening statements, in the hope that the situation would take a favorable turn. In reply to Lumumba’s request for military help, Moscow issued an ofªcial statement in which the Soviet government announced that the Soviet transport trucks that were originally intended for the UN mission would be offered directly to the Lumumba government.54 More- over, on 5 August, Khrushchev wrote to Lumumba informing him that Mikhail Yakovlev—the foreign minister of the Russian Soviet Republic— had been appointed Soviet ambassador to Congo, presumably to signal Mos- cow’s interest and attention. Khrushchev assured Lumumba that the Soviet Union ªrmly supported his positions and condemned the imperialist aggression against the young Congolese republic. On 6 August, the Soviet government issued a statement that again accused the UN and the West of conniving with Belgium and the Katanga secessionists and hinted at a more serious threat:

If any country’s troops sent to Congo in agreement with the Security Council resolution will not for any reason be able to guarantee the withdrawal of the troops that intervened [i.e. the Belgians] from the territory of the independent Congolese state, then [it is necessary] to send to the Republic of Congo troops from those countries who will be ready to take part in the realization of this rightful act.55

54. “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo pravitelstva ob imperialisticheskoi agressii protiv Respubliki Kongo,” 31 July 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 576–577. 55. “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Pravitel’stva v Svyazi s Polozheniem v Respublike Kongo,” 6 August 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 2, D. 9, L. 9.

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Similar allusions to the availability of direct Soviet help for Lumumba were made by the Soviet representative at the UN, Anatolii Sobolev. However, Sobolev still voted for a more moderate resolution that was eventually approved by the Security Council on 9 August—another sign that Moscow’s bark was worse than its bite.56 Khrushchev also promised Lumumba signiªcant economic and technical assistance from the Soviet side in order to help Congo exploit its natural wealth, which had traditionally been in the hands of the Western imperial- ists.57 A few days later, Moscow sent food supplies to Congo, and a Soviet diplomat from the embassy in Leopoldville met Congolese Minister for Eco- nomic Affairs Alphonse Nguvulu, agreeing on the importance of Soviet economic help for the country.58 Soviet support for the Leopoldville government nonetheless remained of little practical use. Lumumba needed decisive military aid rather than food- stuffs and guarantees of future economic cooperation. When on 9 August South Kasai—another mineral-rich province—followed Katanga’s example and detached itself from the central government, Lumumba was desperate for help.59 He again appealed to Moscow, asking for military assistance in order to enable his army to ªght the secessionists in both regions. The Soviet Union, faced with the need to provide more decisive help, offered what it could. Some airplanes that were meant for the UN mission were instead turned over to Lumumba’s forces. From late July through early September, approximately 30 Soviet aircraft were assigned to airlift Congolese soldiers for deployment against the rebels. This enabled the central government to begin a bloody re- pressive operation in South Kasai.60

Soviet Support for Ghana

Lumumba was not the only African leader to request Soviet assistance during the Congo crisis. Ghanaian President Nkrumah, whose relations with Mos- cow had been growing since Ghana’s independence in 1957, also appealed to

56. Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. 44. 57. From N. Khrushchev (First Secretary, CPSU) to P. Lumumba (Prime Minister, Congo), 5 August 1960, in AVPRF, F. 590, Op. 36, Pa. 4, D. 1, L. 40, published in Davidson and Mazov, eds., Rossiya i Afrika, Vol. 2, pp. 261–264. 58. From A. Shvedov (African department, MID) to Ya. Malik (Deputy Foreign Minister), 24 Octo- ber 1960, in AVPRF, F. 590, Op. 2, Pa. 2, D. 17, L. 6, cited in Davidson, Mazov, and Tsypkin, eds., SSSR i Afrika, pp. 280–281; and “Zapis besedy s ministrom po ekonomicheskim delam A. Nguvulu o sovetskoi pomoshi Kongo,” 10 August 1960, in AVPRF, F. 590, Op. 3, Pa. 1, D. 6, Ll. 81–83, published in Davidson and Mazov, eds., Rossiya i Afrika, Vol. 2, pp. 264–265. 59. Gerard-Libois and Verhaegen, Congo 1960, Vol. 2, pp. 798–811. 60. Spravka MID SSSR o postavkakh sovetskikh samoletov v strany Afriki v svyazi s okazaniem

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Khrushchev for military and logistical support. Nkrumah had been one of Lumumba’s ªrmest allies since the early days of Congo’s independence. Nkrumah viewed Lumumba as an ideal partner with whom to build a strong political bond, ideally leading to Congo’s entry into the recently established Ghana-Guinea union.61 Lumumba and Nkrumah shared an antipathy to Eu- ropean colonialism and believed in the need to overcome Africa’s ethnic and political divisions in favor of some form of unity. Furthermore, they were rad- icals in their approach to economic affairs: both men sought rapid development and both admired the economic success of the Soviet Union, showing interest in the idea of applying the same model to their countries. When war erupted in Congo, Nkrumah immediately understood that by carving out an important role for itself in the UN operation, Ghana could considerably boost its prestige in the eyes of other independent governments on the continent, contributing to Nkrumah’s wish to make Ghana the leading force of independent Africa. During the early discussions at the UN, Ghana supported the position that the operation in Congo be led by African countries, which in his view should also contribute the bulk of the troops.62 What Nkrumah had in mind was to send a relatively large Ghanaian contingent to Congo and then try to have the chief of staff of Ghana’s armed forces— British General Henry T. Alexander—appointed as military head of the UN mission.63 However, sending troops to Congo was a logistical challenge for the Ghanaian government, which at the time did not even have an air force. Clearly, Ghana would have to depend on foreign assistance to move its contingent to the crisis area as rapidly as possible. Nkrumah asked Moscow for help, and in late July Khrushchev agreed to use some Soviet Ilyushin IL-18 planes to transport troops to Congo.64 Despite a formal protest from the UN, ªve Soviet IL-18s were eventually used for this purpose.65

pomoshchi Respublike Kongo, n.d., in AVPRF, F. 601, Op. 1, Pa. 1, D. 6, L. 1, published in Davidson and Mazov, eds., Rossiya i Afrika, Vol. 2, pp. 266. 61. Bureau of African Affairs, Intelligence Unit, Report, February 1960, in Public Records and Ar- chive Administration Department, Accra (PRAAD), SC/BAA/282. Although the Ghana-Guinea “union” was little more than symbolic, Nkrumah showed great interest in extending it to Congo in the near future. According to Nkrumah, Lumumba signed an agreement establishing a Ghana-Congo union in August 1960. See Jean-Claude Willame, Patrice Lumumba: La crise Congolaise revisitée (Paris: Karthala, 1990), p. 353; and W. Scott Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957–1966: Diplomacy, Ide- ology, and the New State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 125–126. 62. See Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo: A Case Study of Foreign Pressures in an Independent State (New York: Independent Publishers, 1967). For a broader discussion of Ghana’s foreign policy during the Congo crisis, see Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, pp. 119–170. 63. Cabinet meeting, 28 July 1960, in PRAAD, ADM/13/1/29. 64. From N. Khrushchev (First Secretary, CPSU) to K. Nkrumah (President of Ghana), 30 July 1960, in PRAAD, SC/BAA/149; and From N. Khrushchev (First Secretary, CPSU) to K. Nkrumah (Presi- dent of Ghana), 4 August 1960, in PRAAD, SC/BAA/149. 65. Spravka MID SSSR (see note 60 supra), p. 266; and D. Hammarskjold (United Nations Secretary

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Nkrumah quickly came to regard Moscow as the only source of assistance compatible with his plans. On 9 August he consulted with the Soviet embassy in Accra about setting up a joint command between the Ghanaian and the Congolese governments to oversee military operations, and he again asked for Soviet military help. Khrushchev replied that the USSR was ready to help the legitimate struggle of the Congolese people for full independence and that “the Soviet government expresses the readiness, if the necessity arises, to ren- der the government of Ghana the necessary help, for example, by sending weapons to the government of Ghana.”66 However, developments in Congo made Khrushchev’s offer to Nkrumah impossible to realize. Despite the success of the Soviet airlift of Congolese and Ghanaian troops, a brief comparison with the American effort reveals that the real bal- ance of forces was still unfavorable to the USSR. From the start of the crisis, the United States had used 50 aircraft to airlift troops and transport supplies. The ªrst provisions and equipment brought by the U.S. aircraft reached Congo 24 hours after the UN resolution, and the ªrst troops transported by the United States arrived less than 48 hours later. Moreover, an American aircraft carrier—the USSR did not even have that kind of vessel at the time— was stationed at the mouth of the River Congo. Both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter repeatedly praised the U.S. Air Force for having set up the Congo operation so quickly and efªciently.67 The Soviet airlift, on the other hand, was technically challenging because of the difªculty of ºying from the USSR to Congo. Soviet aircraft ºew from Moscow to Leopoldville, stopping ªrst in Rome, then in Rabat, and then in Accra. This was the best possible route given the fuel economy of the IL-18 with full payload and the fact that some countries, such as Sudan, denied the Soviet aircraft permission to make a refueling stop or even to ºy over their territory.68 Each ºight thus took ªfteen hours.69 Given the circumstances, the ºights were no small

General) to N. Khrushchev (First Secretary, CPSU), 24 July 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 2, D. 15, L. 1. 66. Proekt ukazanii vremennomu poverennomu v delakh SSSR v Gane o sovetskoi pomoshchi etoi strane dlya zashity nezavisimosti Kongo, 9 August 1960, in AVPRF, F. 0573, Op. 4, Pa. 2, D. 9, Ll. 1–3, published in Davidson and Mazov, eds., Rossiya i Afrika, Vol. 2, pp. 196–197. 67. “Memorandum of a Discussion at the 451st Meeting of the National Security Council,” 15 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, p. 311; and “Memorandum of a Discussion at the 452nd Meeting of the National Security Council,” 21 July 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 339– 340. 68. For information on the technical speciªcations of the Ilyushin IL-18, see D. E. G. Kommissarov, Ilyushin IL-18/-20/-22: A Versatile Turboprop Transport (Hinckley, UK: Aerofax, 2004); and D. E. G. Kommissarov and S. Kommissarov, OKB Ilyushin: A History of the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft (Leicester, UK: Midland, 2004). On the issue of ºying over Sudan, see “Zapis besedy s pomoshch- nikom Postoyannogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Makhdzhubom Mekkabi, 5 sentyabrya 1960,” in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 1, D. 5, Ll. 27–29. 69. G. Protsenko, “Samolety idut v Kongo,” Pravda, 20 July 1960, p. 6.

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achievement. The U.S. operation was considerably easier to manage because of the extensive network of U.S. military bases in Western Europe. Moreover, French and British bases in Africa made a potential escalation of the Western presence in Congo technically possible, as Soviet leaders were well aware.70 In 1960, the United States was a consolidated global military power; the USSR was not.

Mobutu’s Coup and the End of Soviet Hopes

Despite its limitations, the Soviet airlift of troops to Congo annoyed Wash- ington deeply. Since Congo’s independence, the United States had been ex- tremely suspicious of Lumumba’s radicalism. As a result of the Congolese prime minister’s decision to seek help from Moscow, the Eisenhower administration lost any desire to come to terms with him. The director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Allen Dulles, derogated Lumumba as “a Castro or worse,” meaning that in his view he was “in the pay of the Sovi- ets.”71 The conclusion was straightforward, Dulles explained to the CIA oper- atives in Leopoldville: Lumumba represented Moscow’s main leverage in Congo, and thus”his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action.” Hammarskjold agreed with the necessity to get Lumumba “out of the way,” and the U.S. government exercised pressure on the UN to put an end to the Soviet airlift.72 On 5 September Congolese President Kasavubu, with the U.S. government’s blessing, announced that he was removing Lumumba from power.73 Lumumba, however, was able to broadcast several messages over the radio ral- lying his supporters, and subsequently he obtained a favorable vote in the par- liament.74 At this point, the UN forces in Congo took control of the radio in Leopoldville, preventing Lumumba from using it, and closed down all of the

70. M. Menshikov (Soviet Ambassador to United States) to A. Dobrynin (American Department, MID), 3 August 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 2, D. 10, Ll. 1–3. 71. “Memorandum of a Discussion at the 452nd Meeting of the National Security Council,” p. 338. 72. “CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Ofªcer, 8/26/60,” 26 August 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, p. 443; “Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,” 26 August 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 444–446; and “Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations,” 3 September 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 455–457. 73. Kalb, The Congo Cables, pp. 63–67. 74. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 458th meeting of the National Security Council,” 7 Septem- ber 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, pp. 460–462; and Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, pp. 199–206.

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Congolese airports, making any further transport of troops or equipment impossible for Moscow.75 U.S. ofªcials were pleased that it took a mere eighteen hours to put the plan into action and block the Soviet airlift.76 The Soviet operation in Congo ceased less than one month after it began. The standoff between Lumumba and Kasavubu in Leopoldville ended on 14 September, when Colonel Joseph Mobutu—allegedly with direct CIA assistance inasmuch as U.S. ofªcials were fed up with Kasavubu’s inability to re- move Lumumba from power once and for all—ousted both men, taking control of the Congolese government and arresting Lumumba.77 The United States immediately recognized the new government. Lumumba was put under the “protection” of UN troops, who prevented him from leaving his house in Leopoldville, but this also prevented Mobutu’s soldiers from capturing him. Lumumba was still able to issue occasional communiqués denouncing the developments in Congo, which angered Mobutu.78 After the blockade of the airports and Kasavubu’s ªrst coup, Moscow kept protesting vigorously about what was happening in Congo, especially the behavior of the UN forces, which the Soviet Union accused of having become an instrument of the Western powers’ imperialist policy.79 Moscow even tried to attack Hammarskjold’s position as Secretary General during the XV Session of the UN General Assembly, which began in September 1960. Khrushchev suggested that Hammarskjold step down and that an executive “troika,” consisting of one representative each of the Western, Eastern, and neutral blocs, replace the position of Secretary General. Khrushchev hoped that the Afro-Asian grouping of states would back his proposal. However, the UN General Assembly, including the majority of Afro-Asian countries, voted against it.80 Other than protesting at the UN, the Soviet Union could do nothing

75. “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Pravitelstva o Polozhenii v Kongo ot 9.IX.1960,” in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3d, Pa. 4, D. 1, Ll. 99–103. 76. “Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,” 7 September 1960, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, p. 465. 77. Kalb, The Congo Cables, pp. 86–101. 78. Young, “Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi,” p. 421; and Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, pp. 210–217. 79. From N. Khrushchev (First Secretary, CPSU) to K. Nkrumah (President of Ghana), 9 September 1960, in AVPRF, F. 573, Op. 4, Pa. 2, D. 9, Ll. 20–22, published in Davidson and Mazov, eds., Rossiya i Afrika, Vol. 2, pp. 247–248; and “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo pravitel’stva o polozhenii v Kongo,” 9 September 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 631–635. 80. “Vystuplenie predstavitelya SSSR V.A. Zorina v Sovete Bezopasnosti OON po voprosu o polozhenii v Kongo,” 14 September 1960, in Brykin, ed., ed. SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 639– 655; “Proekt rezoliutsii po voprosu o polozhenii v Kongo, vnesennyi delegatsiei SSSR v Sovete Bezopasnosti OON,” 15 September 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, p. 656; V. Zorin (Soviet Permanent Representative to UN) to D. Hammarskjold (Secretary-General, UN), 16 Septem- ber 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 656–658; and “Vystuplenie predstavitelya

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concrete to change the course of events in Congo. Mobutu’s ªrst act as the new head of state in Leopoldville was to sever diplomatic relations with the USSR and expel all Soviet personnel from Congo. The Soviet embassy closed down, and diplomats and advisors had to leave the country in a hurry.81 In Moscow’s view the West had overthrown a Soviet-friendly government in Africa with impunity, and the Soviet Union was forced to accept the situation. Analyses of the crisis produced by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, often based on articles published by the left-wing press in the West, highlighted the United States as the real culprit behind Congo’s descent into chaos. Belgium, which had a strong interest in maintaining its business privileges in Katanga, in fact did not have the resources to conduct a colonial war in Congo.82 It was the The United States, with the collaboration of other NATO countries, that was pulling the strings in order to defend the strong investments it had made in Katanga—investments that would have been endangered if a radical like Lumumba had remained in power.83 From the Soviet perspective, the U.S. government had organized a coup in Leopoldville without even having to send their troops there, insofar as the UN forces in Congo were, in Moscow’s view, acting as proxy for the United States. The Soviet permanent representative at the UN, Valerian Zorin, often complained about the behavior of the UN contingent in Congo, which he claimed had become a “tool of the impe- rialists,” and about the degree of inºuence the United States had on ONUC. What especially annoyed Moscow was that a large part of the UN personnel who worked on Congo, both in the Secretary-General’s staff in New York and on the ground in Africa, were either Americans or citizens of other NATO countries.84 Formal protests at the UN, however, had few consequences. The problem was that the Soviet Union had already lost whatever inºuence it had built in Congo since independence, and it was also about to lose Lumumba, who was its only hope to regain at least some leverage in Leopoldville.

SSSR V.A. Zorina na IV Chrezvychainoi spetsialnoi sessii Generalnoi Assamblei OON po voprosu o polozhenii v Kongo,” 17 September 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i Strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 658–672. 81. “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo pravitel’stva o vremennom otozvanii sostava posol’stva SSSR iz Kongo,” 17 September 1960, in Brykin, ed., SSSR i strany Afriki, Vol. 1, pp. 672–673. The ofªcial communi- qué was worded in such a way to give the impression that leaving Congo was a Soviet decision. 82. “Polozhenie v Kongo,” in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 3, D. 20, Ll. 26–39; and “Obzor Sobytii v Kongo i Politiki Belgiskogo Pravitelstva v Otnoshenii Kongo,” 15 October 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 2, D. 14, Ll. 32–60. 83. “K Voprosu o Politike SShA v Otnoshenii Kongo—Obzor Pechati,” 28 October 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3, Pa. 2, D. 14, Ll. 99–111; and “Fakty Vmeshatelstva Zapadnykh Derzhav v Dela Kongo—Kratkaya Spravka,” 3 March 1961, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 4, Pa. 5, D. 12, Ll. 13–19. 84. “Zayavlenie Delegatsii SSSR na Pyatnadtsatoi Sessii Generalnoi Assamblei OON,” 21 October 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3a, P. 3, D. 1, Ll. 9–12; and “Vystuplenie Glavy Delegatsii SSSR V.A. Zorina na Zasedanii Soveta Bezopasnosti,” 13 December 1960, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 3a, Pa. 3, D. 1, Ll. 115–130.

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The Last Stage in the Congo Crisis

Although the ªghting in Congo was to continue for a long time, direct Soviet involvement became negligible after 1961. As Mobutu’s regime gradually established its power throughout the country, Lumumba’s supporters tried to organize an effective armed opposition movement. However, they never managed to obtain signiªcant support from the Soviet Union, which was unable to intervene effectively and seemed increasingly determined to cut its links to Congo. Moscow’s deªnitive loss of hope for Congo came about with the assassination of Lumumba. In late 1960, he was captured by Mobutu’s troops while trying to ºee Leopoldville, hoping to join his supporters, who had set up a provisional government in Stanleyville in northeast Congo. Lumumba was initially held captive in military barracks in Thysville in western Congo. In January 1961, Mobutu, who still feared that Lumumba might rally popular support against him, decided to turn the deposed prime minister over to Tshombe’s forces in Katanga.85 As soon as he reached Katanga, Lumumba was brutally murdered under the supervision of Belgian ofªcers, thus realizing President Eisenhower’s wish that the former Congolese prime minister “would fall into a river full of crocodiles.”86 Lumumba’s death ended any real- istic possibility that a government favorable to the USSR might soon come back to power in Leopoldville. News of Lumumba’s death was ªrst released in February 1961, about a month after the actual date of his assassination. The murder was initially pre- sented as an accident that happened while Lumumba was being transferred to Elisabethville in Katanga. The Soviet government did not accept the ofªcial version and in a special statement accused the Belgians of having murdered Congo’s legitimate prime minister. Moreover, Khrushchev held the UN, and Hammarskjold personally, responsible for the death of Lumumba.87 The tough rhetoric proved of little avail, however. Soviet support for the Congolese cause remained limited to statements and symbolic gestures such as renaming the recently established Moscow’s “Peoples’ Friendship Univer- sity” as “Lumumba University.” Although some countries such as Guinea and the United Arab Republic withdrew their troops from ONUC in protest

85. Willame, Patrice Lumumba, pp. 438–467. 86. D. Eisenhower in conversation with Lord Home (British Foreign Secretary), cited in “Editorial Note,” in FRUS, 1958–1960, p. 495. The circumstances of Lumumba’s murder and Belgium’s respon- sibilities have been thoroughly investigated in De Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba. 87. “Zayavlenie Sovetskogo pravitel’stva v svyazi c ubiistvom Patrisa Lumumby,” 14 February 1961, in V. A. Brykin, ed., SSSR i strany Afriki, 1946–1962 gg: Dokumenty i materialy, Vol. 2, Sentyabr 1960 g.– 1962 g. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1963), pp. 194–198.

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against Lumumba’s assassination, Soviet hopes of delegitimzing the UN mission and thus obtain Hammarskjold’s resignation was frustrated by the decision of the other formally neutral countries that participated in the mission to keep their soldiers in Congo.88 Moreover, despite the repeated pleas for help that came from Antoine Gizenga—the former Congolese deputy prime minister who headed the rebel government in Stanleyville—the Soviet Union was unable to provide sig- niªcant military or logistical help to the pro-Lumumba government. Follow- ing a short-lived coalition government in late 1961, in which the Stanleyville government participated, Gizenga was eventually defeated and imprisoned by Mobutu in early 1962.89 Besides the USSR’s lack of capabilities, other factors led Moscow to regard the rebel government as a lost cause. First, Gizenga’s government might have been the only legitimate one, but—as Nehru reminded Khrushchev in February 1961—very few countries recognized it, even among the “neutral” bloc of Third World states.90 Furthermore, Gizenga’s strategic position appeared hopeless to the Soviet analysts. The Stanleyville government controlled about half the territory of Congo and about half the population, but it could count on only 5,000–7,000 poorly equipped soldiers scattered across a large area. On the other hand, Mobutu had 15,000 soldiers commanded by Bel- gian ofªcers, plus several thousand well-trained “volunteers” from French- speaking African colonies. Tshombe in Katanga was also in a better position, with 7,000 soldiers and 400 Belgian ofªcers, in addition to 300 mercenaries.91 With these odds, even limited Soviet support for Gizenga was out of the ques- tion. Thus, by early 1961 the Soviet authorities had given up on Congo. Khrushchev’s bid for inºuence had failed. Lumumba and his allies had been defeated, and forces loyal to the West had taken power in Congo, ending any hope for Moscow to establish friendly relations with Africa’s second-largest independent country. Khrushchev’s bluff of military support for Lumumba had been called and resulted in a painful Soviet defeat. The United States was able

88. A. Sekou Touré to N. Khrushchev, 17 February 1961, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 4, Pa. 5, D. 11, L. 28; and “Reaktsiya politicheskikh i obshchestvennykh krugov Respubliki Mali na ubiistvo Patrisa Lumumby: Spravka,” 17 February 1961, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 4, Pa. 5, D. 11, Ll. 30–33. The Soviet government received similar letters of solidarity from Argentina, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Leba- non, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. 89. For a complete overview of Moscow’s policy toward the rebel government in Stanleyville, see Sergey Mazov, “Soviet Aid to the Gizenga Movement in the Former Belgian Congo (1960–61) as Reºected in Russian Archives,” Cold War History, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July 2007), pp. 425–437. 90. “Ob otvetakh na poslanie Khrushcheva ot 22 Fevralya 1961 g.,” in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 4, Pa. 5, D. 11, Ll. 61–74. 91. “K voprosu o vnutripoliticheskom Polozhenii v Kongo (Kratkaya Spravka),” 25 February 1961, in AVPRF, F. 628, Op. 4, Pa. 6, D. 19, Ll. 8–10.

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to organize the removal of an unfriendly government in Leopoldville, and the Soviet Union was unable to prevent it. Allen Dulles was even “surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced out of the Congo.”92 From this setback in Congo, Soviet leaders realized that military involvement was still what mattered to build inºuence in the Third World, especially when the West was involved too. When the Western presence was more limited, as in the early stages of the Yemeni Civil War in 1962–1963, a policy of military assistance for local allies was more successful.93 This proved to be decisive for the future of Soviet policy.

Conclusions

Following the relative success the Soviet Union had enjoyed in establishing cooperative relations with newly independent states in West Africa, leaders in Moscow had become interested in Congo because of Lumumba’s radical ideas. Establishing friendly relations with Congo would have signiªcantly in- creased the prestige and credibility of the Soviet Union in Africa. As in West Africa, the Soviet authorities offered Congo economic aid under favorable conditions to facilitate a non-capitalist path to economic and social development. However, Western intervention made Soviet plans impossible to im- plement. To support Lumumba, Khrushchev decided to resort to the same approach he thought had been successful during the Suez crisis. He threatened Soviet intervention in Congo despite not having the capability for it. However, the Western powers were aware of the USSR’s limitations and were therefore not deterred by Khrushchev’s tough talk. This was a lesson to leaders in Moscow that the expectation to increase Soviet inºuence in Africa by extending offers of economic aid and technical cooperation to newly independent countries was unrealistic. As soon as the Soviet Union had entered negotiations with a resource-rich, strategically rele- vant country such as Congo—unlike small, resource-free Ghana, Guinea, and Mali—the West had reacted by employing force and effectively driving the USSR out. Because the Soviet Union at the time was unable to respond to

92. A. Dulles at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, cited in “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIV, p. 497. 93. Following the republican coup in Sana’a in September 1962, Nasser requested Soviet assistance to enable his troops to ªght alongside the republicans against the royalists in Yemen. Khrushchev authorized the use of Soviet aircraft to transport Egyptian troops to Yemen, and later he even authorized So- viet pilots to conduct bombing missions. Soviet leaders expected the conºict to be short and successful, without Western involvement. Although the Soviet airlift was successful, the war ended in failure for Egypt. See Jesse Ferris, “Soviet Support for Egypt’s Intervention in Yemen, 1962–1963,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 2008), pp. 5–36.

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the West using the same means, the level of Soviet resources destined for Africa decreased over the next few years. The Congo crisis ended the phase of Soviet expansion in the Third World that had begun after Khrushchev’s pioneering trips abroad in 1955 and inaugurated a new season of Western interventionism after a brief lull in the second half of the 1950s. Through coups, interventions (not always successful), and local wars, the United States tried to stem the advance of poten- tially Soviet-friendly, strongly anti-colonial, revolutionary-national regimes in Cuba (1961), Laos (1962), Vietnam (1963), Yemen (1962–1964), Indone- sia (1965), Ghana (1966), and Mali (1968). This trend was not reversed until the 1970s and the unexpected—especially in Moscow—U.S. defeat in Vietnam. The experience of Congo also showed Khrushchev the futility of trying to intimidate the Western powers without having the means to fulªll his threats. Already in 1961, Khrushchev seemed aware that conventional weapons were especially important to exercise inºuence in the Third World.94 He also realized the usefulness of a blue-water navy to project power far from the USSR.95 His successors moved much further in using these instruments in the 1970s. The Congo crisis was thus a crucial event for Soviet foreign policy. Before the crisis, the USSR could still hope to win inºuence in Africa and Asia through the competitive provision of economic aid and technical cooperation alone. After the events in Congo, Moscow could no longer overlook the role played by conventional military power in the Third World.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank David Anderson, Anne Deighton, Alex Pravda, and Odd Arne Westad for their help and support during the writing of this article.

94. “Vyskazyvaniya N. S. Khrushcheva v khode zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS po voprosu ob obmene ‘mneniyami k vstreche tov. Khrushcheva N.S. c Kennedi v Vene,’” 26 May 1961, in Aleksandr A. Fursenko, ed., Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964: Chernovye protokol’nye zapisi zasedanii—Stenogrammy—Postanovleniya, 3 vols., (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), Vol. 1, p. 505. Talking to the CPSU Presidium about his meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, Khrushchev mentioned that conventional weapons were important for places like Congo, Laos, and Cuba. However, he also believed that the USSR had an advantage in conventional weapons that was recognized by the West. 95. N. S. Simonov, Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950-e gody: Tempy ekonomicheskogo rosta, struktura, organizatsiya proizvodstva i upravlenie (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996), p. 299. See also Donald Chipman, “Admiral Gorshkov and the Soviet Navy,” Air University Review, Vol. 33, No. 5 (July August 1982), pp. 28–47.

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