UNITED NATIONS LEADERSHIP in the SUEZ CRISIS of 1956 and ITS RAMIFICATIONS in WORLD AFFAIRS Matthew Alw Ker University of Nebraska - Lincoln

University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research, History, Department of Department of History 11-2010 THE LOST ART OF INTERDEPENDENCY: UNITED NATIONS LEADERSHIP IN THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS Matthew alW ker University of Nebraska - Lincoln Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historydiss Part of the History Commons Walker, Matthew, "THE LOST ART OF INTERDEPENDENCY: UNITED NATIONS LEADERSHIP IN THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS" (2010). Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research, Department of History. 33. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historydiss/33 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research, Department of History by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. THE LOST ART OF INTERDEPENDENCY: UNITED NATIONS LEADERSHIP IN THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS By Matthew Walker A DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Major: History Under the Supervision of Professor Thomas Borstelmann Lincoln, Nebraska December, 2010 THE LOST ART OF INTERDEPENDENCY: UNITED NATIONS LEADERSHIP IN THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS Matthew Walker, Ph.D. University of Nebraska, 2010 Advisor: Thomas Borstelmann The following study examines the relationship between competing national interests and the implementation of multilateral diplomacy as characterized by the United Nations. Although primary attention focuses on the events Suez Crisis of 1956, the scope of work analyzes this dichotomy from the Suez Canal’s construction to the post-Suez era of the 1960s. Adopting a more comprehensive approach to understanding the crisis and its impact on international diplomacy provides adds a new and timely perspective to scope of the crisis and the complexities of conflict resolution. In many respects, the diplomatic maneuvering of the nineteenth century remained a constant in diplomatic exchange leading up to the Suez crisis. As the canal’s architect, Ferdinand de Lesseps marginalized international differences in order to win support for the fulfillment his own ambitions. De Lesseps’s tactics gained in popularity throughout the remainder of the century as British politicians and early Zionists presented their particular interests as broader, universal goals. This became the operational model for many twentieth century leaders and diplomats. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, President Eisenhower, and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles used similar methods to in order to enlist support for their Cold War agenda. Egyptian Prime Minster Gamal Abdel Nasser and other nationalists usurped pluralistic initiatives to serve state interests. Virtually all of these efforts heightened international tensions within and between blocs of interests. Concomitant with these developments, some members of the international community engaged in more genuine multilateral diplomatic pursuits. International civil servants inside the United Nations, including UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, advanced ideas that placed the international interest above the agenda of any single country. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, and the Congo Crisis of 1960, this diplomatic alternative helped defused tensions. Rather than encourage independent multilateralism, national leaders established closer relations with non-government organizations through which they could continue to exercise influence without sacrificing control. After the Suez crisis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the European Economic Community (EEC) all sought greater conformity. The sense of interdependency was lost. A multitude of masters is no good thing; let there be one master, one king . --Agamemnon from The Iliad For Friends and Family Acknowledgements What follows may be the work of a single author, however all of the credit cannot be awarded to me alone. Professor Thomas “Tim” Borstelmann’s time, advice, criticism, and historiographic approach have been extremely valuable. These investments strengthened my intellect and allowed me to form and argue my own interpretations. Professor Lloyd Ambrosius and Professor Parks Coble also contributed to my development as a scholar. Their critiques have improved the final product. I thank the archivists, such as Tom Branigar, and assistants at the Eisenhower Library and the National Archives. Assistants at the Library of Congress, New York Public Library, and George Mason University also deserve my thanks. Their help made researching the Suez crisis enjoyable. My wife Michelle, my son Ryan, and my family as a whole have been indispensable in their guidance, love, and support. Finally, to my friends I thank you for your honesty and compassion. Jason, Matt, Colin, Dave and the other members of the “Goon Squad”—as well as honorary member Allen and Anna—and many others have weathered my stress-reliving wit and contested my assumptions. You have helped to keep me honest to myself and given me much to contemplate. For that, I thank you one and all. Table of Contents Introduction 1 1. Disingenuous Consensus: the Subjugation of Multilateral Diplomacy from the 1850s to the 1950s and Its Impact on the Suez Crisis of 1956 39 2. Unilateralism and the United Nations: International Affairs and the Rise of Dag Hammarskjöld as UN Secretary General, April 1951 to July 1956 95 3. The Mismanagement of Multilateral Diplomacy: National Leadership and Its Short-Sighted Policies, February to October 1956 160 4. The Midnight Hour: The Suez War and Diplomatic Efforts to Halt Its Expansion, October to November 1956 212 5. The Image of Inclusiveness: Responses to Multilateral Diplomacy and its Effects on International Relations, 1956 to the 1960s 270 Conclusion 326 Bibliography 333 1 Introduction At various stages throughout international history, competing interests have exerted themselves to influence a larger whole. World leaders during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and many historians since then have examined the event as a competition between various spheres of influence or conflicting perspectives within like-minded blocs. While insightful, these arguments often overshadow the United Nations and the pivotal role it has played in quarantining crisis. The following study probes this relationship by investigating the effects of intolerant interests throughout the history of the Suez Canal, how the United Nations reversed these effects ever so briefly during the height of the Suez crisis in 1956, and the return to the status quo ante bellum as national leaders created new institutions supplanting the UN‘s success. Understanding the Suez crisis from this perspective demonstrates the successful interaction of viewpoints inside the United Nations that recognized the need for more inclusive diplomacy, how multilateral dialogue resolved this particular conflict more effectively than traditional methods, and the various lengths to which national leaders attempted to monopolize multilateral diplomacy. As United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld dedicated himself to transforming the United Nations into an independent institution responsible for providing an internationalist alternative in the mediation of crises. He stressed the monumental discipline international civil servants required in order to maintain their objective integrity. During a lecture at Oxford University in 1961, Hammarskjöld remarked that the international civil servant must remain cognizant of his or her ―sympathies‖ and must 2 prevent them from influencing the individual‘s actions. Should conflict arise from up- holding this perspective, Hammarskjöld argued, then it would be the result of adhering to neutrality rather than deviating from it.1 The organization‘s success lay in the ability of its member states to abide by similar principles. When he became UN Secretary General in 1953, Hammarskjöld called for member states to subordinate national interests to broader international interests.2 Operating from this premise required that vigilant attention be paid to policing one‘s own interests and segregating them from influencing the interests of the international community. Instead of embracing this viable alternative, national leaders sponsored initiatives portraying national interests as emblematic of a broader, multilateral agenda. As historian A.G. Hopkins proclaims, ―Where international themes are recognized, they are often treated as spare parts that have to be bolted on to the national story.‖ This leads to ―nationalizing internationalism, by treating the wider world as an extension of narrower national interests.‖3 Many policy-makers from around the globe operated from this presupposition. As John Ikenberry contends in his book, After Victory, America‘s post- World War II policy-makers imbued multilateralism with an understanding of ―the American experience and a thoroughgoing understanding of history, economics, and the sources of political order.‖4 1 Taken from W.H. Auden, ―Forward,‖ in Dag Hammarskjöld, Markings, trans. Leif Sjöberg and W.H.Auden (New York:

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