Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd i 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iiii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East Louise Kettle 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iiiiii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © Louise Kettle, 2018 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road, 12(2f) Jackson’s Entry, Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 11/1 3 Adobe Sabon by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd, and printed and bound in Great Britain. A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 3795 0 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 3797 4 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 3798 1 (epub) The right of Louise Kettle to be identifi ed as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498). 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iivv 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Contents Acknowledgements vii 1. Learning from History 1 Learning from History in Whitehall 3 Politicians Learning from History 8 Learning from the History of Military Interventions 9 How Do We Learn? 13 What is Learning from History? 15 Who Learns from History? 16 The Learning Process 18 Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East 21 2. No End of a Lesson – Suez 1956 24 Planning the Intervention 26 During the Intervention 35 After the Intervention 43 Musketeer Learning 55 3. More like Korea – Jordan 1958 60 Planning the Intervention 63 During the Intervention 70 After the Intervention 80 Fortitude Learning 86 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd v 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East 4. Suez in Reverse – Kuwait 1961 90 Planning the Intervention 92 During the Intervention 103 After the Intervention 113 Vantage Learning 123 5. A Re-Run of Port Stanley – The Gulf 1990–1 129 Planning the Intervention 131 During the Intervention 146 After the Intervention 158 Granby Learning 165 6. Afghanistan Part Two – Iraq 2003–9 169 Planning the Intervention 171 During the Intervention 182 After the Intervention 194 Telic Learning 205 7. Failing History or Lessons Learned? 209 Learning from History since Iraq 218 Conclusion 227 Notes 229 Index 279 vi 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd vvii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Acknowledgements There are too many people who have helped me with this project to thank each individually. However, I am particularly grateful to Dr Andrew Mumford who has provided enthusiasm, invaluable insight and support throughout the research and writing of this book. I would also like to thank Professor Alex Danchev who offered inspiration and sage advice from the outset; he is sorely missed. I am also indebted to: Professor John Young, Professor Richard Aldrich, Professor Wyn Rees, Professor Michael Goodman, Dr Rory Cormac, Dr Geoffrey Sloan, Sir Alan Munro, Sir Jeremy Green- stock, Lord Williams of Baglan, Major General Tim Cross, Michael Herman, John Stubbington, Patrick Salmon, Richard Smith, Bob Evans, Lieutenant Colonel Judith Dando, lessons teams across the Ministry of Defence and all of the obliging archivists I have been fortunate to encounter. Each has taken the time and trouble to help in different ways and for this I am extremely grateful. I am thankful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council, Economic and Social Research Council and Royal Historical Soci- ety, as well as the University of Nottingham’s School of Politics and International Relations, Centre for British Politics and Centre for Confl ict, Security and Terrorism, for funding my research. In addition, I am grateful for permissions granted by the following: the RAF Historical Society; Air Power Review; The Naval Review; The Guardian; © Telegraph Media Group Limited 2012/2013; the Trustees of the Harold Macmillan Book Trust in relation to the diaries of Harold Macmillan – housed at Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford; former diplomats (where individual copyright was retained) and the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge for reproduction of transcripts from the British Diplomatic Oral History vii 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd vviiii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East Programme; and the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives with respect to extracts from the Liddell Hart archive and the Suez Oral History Project at King’s College, London. I would like to thank my wonderful family and friends who have been patient and understanding throughout this process. I am especially thankful to Suzanne and Christopher Sullivan, for keep- ing me smiling, checking in on me and always being supportive; I am extremely lucky to have them. I am also grateful to John Sullivan for providing my pedant tendencies and the education to get me here, as well as Robert and Margery Kettle who have shown me kindness and generosity in innumerable ways. Finally, I owe more than I can possibly express to David Kettle – whose love, faith and encouragement have made all of this possible – and to William, whose impending arrival kept me focused and who has already brought so much joy to our lives. It is to David and William that this book is dedicated. viii 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd vviiiiii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM 1 Learning from History If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us! But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experi- ence gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us. (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1831)1 In 2003, shortly after the beginning of the Iraq War, British Prime Minister Tony Blair arrived at the United States Congress to raptur- ous applause. At the end of a standing ovation he began a speech in which he announced that the use of history in developing for- eign policy was defunct. For him, at the beginning of what would become the most controversial and criticised war of a generation, there had never been a time when ‘a study of history provides so little instruction for our present day’.2 It was not long after this speech that Iraq descended into post- war chaos and accusations of blame for the disastrous events emerged. Historians and commentators quickly asked how, given Britain had so much experience in Iraq, had policy-makers got post-war planning so wrong? Britain had been responsible for the founding of the state of Iraq in 1919 and established its Hashemite monarchy. It had governed the country under a League of Nations mandate until 1932 and maintained close links throughout the twentieth century: intervening against a coup in 1941, maintaining military occupation until 1947, keeping the country as a satellite state until 1958 and intervening again in 1991. How then, with all of the lessons of history at its disposal, had the government failed to understand the complexities of governing the Iraqi nation? The accusation was soon made that British policy-makers had failed to learn the lessons of history. 1 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd 1 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Learning from British Interventions in the Middle East Despite Tony Blair’s statement to Congress, the government quickly searched for ways to counteract the allegations that it had not learned from the past. A fl urry of reports were produced to demonstrate to the public that lessons were at least being identi- fi ed from the Iraq operation. As the 20th Armoured Brigade low- ered the mission fl ag in Basra, Whitehall discussed culminating their efforts with a public inquiry. By the summer of 2009 the Iraq Inquiry had been announced under the Chairmanship of Sir John Chilcot. The inquiry was given the specifi c objective of determin- ing lessons for the future: Our terms of reference are very broad . to establish, as accurately as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that can be learned. Those lessons will help ensure that, if we face similar situa- tions in future, the government of the day is best equipped to respond to those situations in the most effective manner in the best interests of the country.3 Initially, the inquiry seemed promising, with the pledge of full gov- ernment cooperation and the power to call the highest echelons of Whitehall to the witness stand. Even the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made an appearance for public questioning; attending the inquiry in January 2010 and again a year later. These appear- ances were highly anticipated with widespread media coverage and over-demand for seats in the hearing room leading to alloca- tion via public ballot. They were also controversial: surrounded by large protests and punctuated by intermittent heckling and booing from the audience. Over time, expectation dissipated. The inquiry progressed at a painfully slow pace, its duration being longer than that of the war it was investigating. It was also plagued with diffi culties. In particular there was continual wrangling between the inquiry and the Cabinet Offi ce over what information could be released to the public, with the inquiry succumbing to Cabinet Offi ce demands to restrict the release of letters between Tony Blair and the American President George W.