Notes

Foreword

1 Dan Jenkins, “The Other Side of the Hill: Combat Intelligence in the Canadian Corps, 1914–1918”, Canadian Military History, Vol.10 No.2, (Spring 2001); Albert Palazzo, “The British Army’s Counter-Battery Staff Office and Control of the Enemy in World War 1”, The Journal of Military History, Vol.63 No.1, (1999), 55–74. 2 James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform Between the Wars, (Lawrence, Ks., 1992); Robert Citino, “Beyond Fire and Movement: Command, Control and information in the German Blitzkrieg”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.27 No.2, (June 2004), 324–44. 3 John Ferris, “The British Army, Signals and Security In the Desert Campaign, 1940–42” in John Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, Selected Essays, (London: Routledge, 2005). 4 John Ferris, “Catching the Wave: The RAF Pursues an RMA, 1918–1945” in Monica Tufts and Imlay, Talbot, The Fog of Peace, (London: Routledge, 2006). 5 David French, Raising Churchill’s Army, The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919–1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Introduction

1 Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., MacArthur’s Airman: General George C. Kenney and the War in the Southwest Pacific, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), Gary Null, Weapon of Denial: Air Power and the Battle for New Guinea, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1995), Herman Plocher, The German Air Force versus Russia, 1942, (New York: Arno Press, 1968), James Sterret, “Learning is Winning: Soviet Air Power Doctrine, 1953–41”, Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray (eds), Air Power History: turning points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, (London: Routledge, 2002), Air Historical Branch Monograph. Close Air Support, (London: HMSO, 1955), Richard Hallion, Strike from the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack 1911–1945, (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1989), Richard Hallion, “Battlefield Air Support – A Retrospective Assessment”, Air Power Journal. Vol.4 No.1 (1990), B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1990), Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern For Joint Operations, (Washington: Office of Air Force History), and Daniel Mortensen, Air Power and Ground Armies, (Air University Press, 1998), Arthur Coningham, “The Development of Tactical Air Forces”, Royal United Services Institute Journal Vol.91 (1946), Lt. Col. C. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1943”, Royal United Services Institution Journal Vol.114 (1971), W.A. Jacobs, “Air

192 Notes 193

Support for the British Army, 1939–1943”, Military Affairs Vol.46 (1982), D. Hall, “The Birth of the Tactical Air Force”, D. Phil. thesis Oxford University, 1996, David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43” in Cooling, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront, (London: Frank Cass, 1998), Thomas Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941, (Manhattan Kan.: Aerospace Historian, 1955), J. Heither, The Development of Tactical Doctrine at AAFSAT and AAFTAC, (Manhattan Kansas: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian, 1944), Hughes, T.H. Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II, (New York: The Free Press, 1995), Williamson Murray, “The Luftwaffe Experience, 1939–1941”, B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939”, B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. 2 James S. Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918–41”, Journal of Military History, 59 (1995), 1, James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe’s Way of War, (Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1998), James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating The Operational Air War, 1918–1940, (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1997). 3 There are few historians who treat issues like C3I as a system combining technology, thought, and action. Characteristically, these issues have been treated separately, while they are in fact interrelated. Apart from the author, one of the few who has acknowledged this is Professor John Ferris. For examples, see “Ferris, John, “Achieving Air Ascendancy: Challenge and Response in British Strategic Air Defence”, Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray (eds.), Air Power History: turning points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo, (London: Routledge, 2002); Ferris, John, “Airbandit: C3I and Strategic Air Defence during the First Battle of Britain, 1915–18”. Strategy and Intelligence: British Policy During the First World War. Michael Dockrill and David French, eds., London: The Hambledon Press, 1995; Ferris, John, “Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917–1934”, Journal of Military History, Vol.63, No.4, October, 1999; Ferris, John, “The British Army, Signals and Security”, Intelligence and Military Operations. Michael I. Handel, (ed.) London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1990; Ferris, John, “The British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940–42”, Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays, John Ferris, ed., London: Routledge, 2005. 4 David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), passim. 5 Public Record Office (PRO) WO 169/6638 War Diary of No.2 AASC, 18 May 1942. 6 PRO WO 106/2270, Military Intelligence Service, War Office, Notes and Lessons on Operations in the Middle East, January 30 1943, 14; Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, (New York: Morrow, 1946), 137–8. 7 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, the Western Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 20. 8 PRO WO 169/647 Operation ‘Grapeshot’, 2 November 1942. 9 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), Papers of Major-General McNeill 1/2 A2, 1. 194 Notes

10 David R. Mets, “A Glider in the Propwash of the Royal Air Force?”, Daniel Mortensen (ed.), Airpower and Ground Armies, (Maxwell AFB Alabama: Air University Press, 1998), 48. 11 For a discussion of ‘OODA’ or Boyd Loops, see Frans P.B. Osinga, Science, Stra- tegy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, (London: Routledge, 2006); Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training, and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 13; Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, (London: Harvard University Press, 1985), introduction; J. Wallace, “Manoeuvre Theory in Operations Other Than War”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.19 No. 4, 1996, 209; “The Information Advan- tage”, The Economist, June 10–16, 1995, 5. 12 Martin Samuels, Command or Control?, 3. 13 Ibid., 7. 14 Ibid., 4. 15 Air Chief Marshal Sir Kenneth ‘Bing’ Cross with Prof. V. Orange, Straight and Level, (London: Bugg Street, 1993), 157. 16 War Office, Field Service Regulations, Vol.II, Operations – General, (London: HMSO, 1935), pp. 26–7. 17 Ibid., 27. 18 Ibid., 28. 19 U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations 1939, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), 56. 20 U.S. Army Field Manual 100–5, Field Service Regulations, Operations 1941, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), 29. 21 Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers Vol.II, 1940–1945, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 194–6. 22 Ibid., 196. 23 Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey, CAB 146/27 Evaluation of the British and American Commands and Troops in North Africa, Appreciation by Freemde Heere West, 18 May 1943. 24 PRO AIR 23/1299, Air Power in the Land Battle (Air Ministry, 1943). 25 PRO AIR 39/129 Memorandum by GHQ Home Forces, Organization and Sys- tem of Control of Air Forces in Support of Overseas Operations, 6 November 1942. 26 Ibid., Questionnaire submitted to Air Headquarters Western Desert. 27 James S. Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941”, Journal of Military History, Vol.59, No.1 (1995), 70. 28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (eds) Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 117. 29 John Ferris, “Airbandit: C3I and Strategic Air Defence during the First Battle of Britain, 1915–18”, in Michael Dockrill and David French (eds), Strategy and Intelligence: British Policy During the First World War, (London: The Hambledon Press, 1995), 26. 30 WO 208/1559 Weekly Review of the Military Situation, 24 November 1941. 31 PRO AIR 41/25 The Enemy Supply System in Libya, Appendix Z, 10 Novem- ber, 1941. 32 Ibid. 33 PRO AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns Vol.IV Operations in Libya, the Western Desert and Tunisia July 1942–May 1943, 26. Notes 195

34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 PRO AIR 26/402 Operations Record Book No.285 Wing, R.A.F. M.E., 26 August, 1942. 38 LHCMA Papers of Major General McNeill 1/1 A1 Military Situation, Period 1st–29th August ’42. 39 AHB, Air Support, 52. 40 LHCMA General Sir Richard O’Connor’s papers 4/3/1, An Account of Various Events Written by General Sir R.N. O’Connor whilst a prisoner of war in Italy May 1941; PRO CAB 106/685 Letter Regarding Difficulties Encountered While Commanding 13 Corps 1940/41. 41 Neil Orpen, South African Forces in World War II, Vol.III War in the Desert, (Cape Town: Purnell, 1971), 268. 42 Losses during close air support and interdiction missions could be quite high, which affected Allied morale, but no evidence suggests that pilots were unwilling to press home their attacks because of the risk. In a conversation on 10 June 1999, Squadron Leader Milt Jowsie, formerly of 93 Squadron RAF, indicated that the efficiency of a squadron’s commanding officer largely determined the effect of losses on morale depended largely on the efficiency of the squadron’s commanding officer. Where the commanding officer was effec- tive and enforced discipline, the effect of losses was minimized. 43 PRO AIR 19/92 Minutes of Meeting in CAS’s room, 26 July 1923, John Ferris, “Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917–1934”, Journal of Military History, Vol.63, No.4, (October, 1999), 850. 44 John Ferris, “Fighter Defence before Fighter Command: The Rise of Strategic Air Defence in Great Britain, 1917–1934”, 853. 45 Ibid.

Chapter 1

1 Group Captain Andrew Vallance, Air Power: Collected Essays on Doctrine, (London: HMSO, 1990), VII. 2 Captain Mc A. Hogg, RE, “Aeroplanes in Future Warfare”, Army Quarterly, Vol.IX, No.1, October 1924, 104. 3 Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939”, in B.F. Cooling, (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 51. 4 For an analysis of the ten-year rule and its effect on strategic policy, as well as the dialectic relationship between British diplomacy and its military policies, see John Robert Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919–1926, (Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1988). 5 General William Mitchell, Provisional Manual of Operations, in Maurer, U.S. Army Aviation, 1919–1939, (Washington D.C., Office of Air Force History, 1988), 286. 6 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917–1941, (Manhattan Kan.: Aerospace Historian, 1955), 128. 196 Notes

7 Bolling Air Force Base, Washington D.C., United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (USAFHRA) Ira Eaker interview, K239.0512-829, 103. 8 Library of Congress, Washington D.C., (hereafter cited as LC) Manuscript Division, Papers of Benjamin Foulois, Box 26, Letter by John J. Pershing to General Menoher 20 January 1926. 9 LC, Papers of Benjamin D. Foulois, Box 37, Address by Major G