DOCSLIB.ORG

Andrew Buchanan on the Mediterranean Air War: Airpower

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Andrew Buchanan on the Mediterranean Air War: Airpower Robert S. Ehlers Jr.. The Mediterranean Air War: Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015. 536 pp. $39.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-2075-3. Reviewed by Andrew N. Buchanan Published on H-Diplo (August, 2015) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) The core of Robert S. Ehlers Jr.’s fne account glas Porch’s campaign to assert the pivotal charac‐ of the air war in the Mediterranean during World ter of the Mediterranean theater, and he endorses War II is an operational-level study focused on the Porch’s judgment that victory there was “a re‐ integration of airpower into the overall conduct of quirement for Allied success” (p. 4). To a card-car‐ military activity, or the lack of it. Ehlers’s central rying Mediterraneanist such as myself, this argu‐ contention in The Mediterranean Air War: Air‐ ment seems to be right on the money. power and Allied Victory in World War II is that During the course of the war in the Mediter‐ the Allies’ increasingly competent and binational ranean, the air assets available to the Allies rose integration of land, sea, and air assets stands in from the meager 370 Royal Air Force machines in sharp contrast to the profound disfunctionality Egypt and East Africa under the command of Air that marked similar eforts by the Axis powers. He Chief Marshal Arthur Longmore in May 1940, to argues convincingly that it was possible for the the fve thousand-plus modern combat aircraft Axis to win in the Mediterranean if they had ap‐ available to American lieutenant general Ira Eak‐ proached the theater with a clear strategy, cen‐ er’s Mediterranean Allied Air Force in 1944 (p. tralized leadership, and operational practices 397). This massive air armada enjoyed complete based on the careful allocation of available assets. air supremacy, enabling Allied aircraft both to This, he contends, would have been possible with‐ dominate within the Mediterranean itself and to out committing substantial additional resources range deeply into central Europe. Yet these simple to the theater; the “better use of the ones they had statistics at least partially obscure the fact that could well have done the trick” (p. 9). The war in this was not a process of incremental growth. the Mediterranean, in other words, was not won Rather, from the frst battles with the Italians in by superior numbers--although the Allies increas‐ the summer and fall of 1940 through to the evic‐ ingly benefited from the big battalions--but by the tion of the Axis from the North African littoral side that learned best how to deploy its available with the victory in Tunisia in May, 1943, the issue forces. While this operational question is Ehlers’s was closely contested, with the Axis coming close central focus, he does not stint on discussing both to victory during the great German-led offensives the strategic context and the tactical details of the in North Africa in 1941 and 1942. In this light, application of airpower. In relation to big-picture Ehlers focuses a great deal of attention on the strategy, Ehlers very much follows historian Dou‐ struggle for Malta, arguing—correctly in my view H-Net Reviews —that the repeated suspension and eventual can‐ in June 1941, Tedder quickly recognized that the cellation of Operation Hercules, the Axis plan to air force’s primary initial mission was to secure capture the troublesome island, was “one of the and maintain air superiority, a task that required pivotal blunders of the war” (p. 199). the consistent deployment of air assets against en‐ What comes across most clearly here is, to emy airfields and lines of supply on both land and use a term not commonly used by military histori‐ sea. Ironically, as Winston Churchill noted after a ans, a question of agency. Within a given set of critical meeting with theater commanders and the circumstances, it matters who makes decisions, chiefs of staff in London in July 1941, the struggle how those decisions are made, and above all, how for air superiority would mean that ground units they are executed. From this point of view, would see fewer friendly aircraft overhead. The Ehlers’s account of the individual personalities “mischievous practice” of “keeping standing pa‐ and command structures helps to build a sophisti‐ trols over moving columns” had to be abandoned, cated account of Allied air forces that were gen‐ the prime minister insisted, in favor of round-the- uine learning organizations, fexible enough to clock attacks on the “rearward services of the ene‐ permit experimentation and innovation, yet suffi‐ my” (p. 153). This key lesson in the deployment of ciently centralized to ensure both the organized airpower eluded the Axis forces, with Rommel in‐ generalization of lessons learned and the rational sisting that Luftwaffe assets be used primarily to overall disposition of resources. A high degree of provide close support for fast-moving tank col‐ centralization was initially forced upon the umns. Given the high quality of German pilots British by the necessity of marshaling extremely and equipment, this approach could yield devas‐ scarce resources to the best advantage, not least tating results at the point of contact. It could not, because the latest aircraft types were being held however, counter an Allied air effort whose con‐ for the defense of the British Isles. Having estab‐ certed attacks on the “rearward services” were lished the habits of centralization in extremis, in‐ continually eating into Axis resources (p. 153). cluding the practice of collocating headquarters to Ehlers insists that by misusing their air assets, ensure maximum interservice collaboration, they Axis commanders, and Rommel in particular, became ingrained in British, and later Anglo- threw away the opportunity to leverage their su‐ American, practice in ways that continually maxi‐ perior equipment and well-trained crews to se‐ mized both the use of available assets and the dis‐ cure a decisive advantage in North Africa. semination of doctrinal developments. American As British airpower was deployed with in‐ air units, arriving in the theater in large numbers creasing effect against Axis shipping, and as following the Torch landing in November 1942, British commanders learned to integrate air and were thus able to assimilate the hard-won lessons naval resources in this effort, the Axis forces in of their British allies without having to go through North Africa entered an accelerating “logistical their own protracted learning experience. As death spiral” (p. 239). Ironically, by extending his Ehlers makes clear, the Axis experience was, in advance to El Alamein without having secure air contrast, marked by a chronic lack of centraliza‐ superiority, Rommel succeeded only in placing his tion, constant breakdowns in communication be‐ head very frmly in the noose. At this point, it tween ground and air forces, and by profound di‐ seems, the significance of a concentrated effort to visions between the Axis partners. secure air superiority fnally dawned on him; it The central fgure in all of this was Chief Air was, to say the least, a little late in the day. If Axis Marshal Arthur Tedder, and Ehlers rightly high‐ logistics were catastrophically shambolic, Ehlers lights his leadership. Taking over from Longmore does a fne job of discussing the increasingly com‐ petent logistical and support effort that facilitated 2 H-Net Reviews Allied air operations. In particular, he highlights north across the Mediterranean; it is striking that the remarkable work performed by Air Vice-Mar‐ the Desert War occupies nearly three hundred shal Graham Dawson, Tedder’s chief maintenance pages of text, while the Italian and French cam‐ officer. Under Dawson, recovery teams scoured paigns, despite the larger forces involved, cover the desert for damaged aircraft that were then re‐ barely one hundred. furbished with parts manufactured in new plants By the time the Allies moved north into Sicily set up in Egypt; again, the contrast with the Luft‐ and Italy, they were well on the way to achieving waffe, which frequently abandoned aircraft for air supremacy; indeed, with the exception of lim‐ want of spares, is striking. ited attacks on Allied invasion forces by aircraft Over the course of the war in the North equipped with guided bombs, the Luftwaffe virtu‐ African desert, the Royal Air Force (RAF) perfect‐ ally disappears from the story. Despite this advan‐ ed the integration of airpower into fast-moving tage, however, complex terrain, slow-moving bat‐ ground battle. RAF squadrons became adept at tlefronts, tenacious German defenses, and poor “leapfrogging” to new airfields as ground forces flying weather negated the application of many of advanced or retreated; at one point RAF airfields the close support techniques developed in North were operating under German artillery fre in ad‐ Africa. Instead, in early 1944 Allied tactical air‐ vance of forward Eighth Army ground units! As power was concentrated on an effort to force Ger‐ this integration progressed, airpower came to be man ground forces to retreat by cutting off their viewed less as a “support” for ground and naval supplies. Operation Strangle thus saw airpower units, and more as a key component of a genuine‐ concentrated on railroads (there was a heated dis‐ ly “combined” bi- or trilateral effort. cussion about the relative efficacy of bombing As British aircraft secured air superiority, bridges or marshaling yards) and truck convoys they were able to pay increasing attention to the in a concerted effort to starve out well-entrenched provision of tactical support for their ground German troops. There was, Ehlers suggests, some forces. Here, too, the Desert Air Force was work‐ “excessive enthusiasm” in the planning process, ing out in practice the complexities of targeting, with Eaker arguing that the Germans could be dis‐ resource allocation, and the avoidance of “friend‐ lodged by airpower alone (p.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The War Years
    1941 - 1945 George Northsea: The War Years by Steven Northsea April 28, 2015 George Northsea - The War Years 1941-42 George is listed in the 1941 East High Yearbook as Class of 1941 and his picture and the "senior" comments about him are below: We do know that he was living with his parents at 1223 15th Ave in Rockford, Illinois in 1941. The Rockford, Illinois city directory for 1941 lists him there and his occupation as a laborer. The Rockford City Directory of 1942 lists George at the same address and his occupation is now "Electrician." George says in a journal written in 1990, "I completed high school in January of 1942 (actually 1941), but graduation ceremony wasn't until June. In the meantime I went to Los Angeles, California. I tried a couple of times getting a job as I was only 17 years old. I finally went to work for Van De Camp restaurant and drive-in as a bus boy. 6 days a week, $20.00 a week and two meals a day. The waitresses pitched in each week from their tips for the bus boys. That was another 3 or 4 dollars a week. I was fortunate to find a garage apartment a few blocks from work - $3 a week. I spent about $1.00 on laundry and $2.00 on cigarettes. I saved money." (italics mine) "The first part of May, I quit my job to go back to Rockford (Illinois) for graduation. I hitch hiked 2000 miles in 4 days. I arrived at my family's house at 4:00 AM one morning.
    [Show full text]
  • (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies A Stepping Stone to Success: Operation Battleaxe (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine Mike Bechthold On 16 February 1943 a meeting was held in Tripoli attended by senior American and British officers to discuss the various lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The focus of the meeting was a presentation by General Bernard Montgomery. This "gospel according to Montgomery," as it was referred to by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, set out very clearly Monty's beliefs on how air power should be used to support the army.1 Among the tenets Montgomery articulated was his conviction of the importance of air power: "Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain principles regarding the use of air power." Montgomery also believed that flexibility was the greatest asset of air power. This allowed it to be applied as a "battle-winning factor of the first importance." As well, he fully endorsed the air force view of centralized control: "Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resource into small packets placed under the control of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces." Montgomery concluded his discussion by stating that it was of prime importance for the army and air 1 Arthur Tedder, With Prejudice: The war memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder (London: Cassell, 1966), p.
    [Show full text]
  • Eib Information
    EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BAN ¡998 1958 Φ+ilô EIB INFORMATION DEN EUROPÆISKE INVESTERINGSBANK BANQUE EUROPEENNE D'INVESTISSEMENT EUROPÄISCHE INVESTITIONSBANK BANCA EUROPEA PER GII INVESTIMENTI EUROPESE INVESTERINGSBANK ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ΕΠΕΝΔΥΣΕΩΝ BANCO EUROPEU DE INVESTIMENTO 1 ­ 1998·Ν°96 EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK EUROOPAN INVESTOINTIPANKKI ISSN 0250­3891 BANCO EUROPEO DE INVERSIONES EUROPEISKA INVESTERINGSBANKEN 1997: European Investment Bank aunches ¡ob-support action plan and strengthens its commitment to EMU In 1997, the European Investment Bank intensified its support for economic and social cohesion in Europe in the run up to Economic and Monetary Union. The Bank launched a special action programme to encourage job-creating investment to underpin the European Union's growth and employment policies, and expanded its financing for investment in key areas sucri as regional development and Trans-European Networks. Total lending in the year increased by 13%, to ECU 26.2 billion (of which ECU 23 billion was in the Member States of the Union) and the Bank borrowed ECU 23 billion on the international capital markets, making it the world's largest non-sovereign borrower. "Our two top priorities during 1997 have been to step up our activities to help the European Union move successfully towards Economic and Monetary Union and the single currency and to prepare the way for the Union's enlargement. We responded rapidly and in a practical way to the Resolution on Growth and Employment of the June Amsterdam Summit by launching our Amsterdam Special Action Programme (ASAP). This is now well under way with substantial financing operations already con­ cluded in the areas of health and education and through a "special window" for venture capital, in the high-growth, technology oriented, small and medium-sized enterprise sector.
    [Show full text]
  • Coastal Command in the Second World War
    AIR POWER REVIEW VOL 21 NO 1 COASTAL COMMAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR By Professor John Buckley Biography: John Buckley is Professor of Military History at the University of Wolverhampton, UK. His books include The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945 (1995), Air Power in the Age of Total War (1999) and Monty’s Men: The British Army 1944-5 (2013). His history of the RAF (co-authored with Paul Beaver) will be published by Oxford University Press in 2018. Abstract: From 1939 to 1945 RAF Coastal Command played a crucial role in maintaining Britain’s maritime communications, thus securing the United Kingdom’s ability to wage war against the Axis powers in Europe. Its primary role was in confronting the German U-boat menace, particularly in the 1940-41 period when Britain came closest to losing the Battle of the Atlantic and with it the war. The importance of air power in the war against the U-boat was amply demonstrated when the closing of the Mid-Atlantic Air Gap in 1943 by Coastal Command aircraft effectively brought victory in the Atlantic campaign. Coastal Command also played a vital role in combating the German surface navy and, in the later stages of the war, in attacking Germany’s maritime links with Scandinavia. Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors concerned, not necessarily the MOD. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form without prior permission in writing from the Editor. 178 COASTAL COMMAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR introduction n March 2004, almost sixty years after the end of the Second World War, RAF ICoastal Command finally received its first national monument which was unveiled at Westminster Abbey as a tribute to the many casualties endured by the Command during the War.
    [Show full text]
  • Air-To-Ground Battle for Italy
    Air-to-Ground Battle for Italy MICHAEL C. MCCARTHY Brigadier General, USAF, Retired Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama August 2004 Air University Library Cataloging Data McCarthy, Michael C. Air-to-ground battle for Italy / Michael C. McCarthy. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58566-128-7 1. World War, 1939–1945 — Aerial operations, American. 2. World War, 1939– 1945 — Campaigns — Italy. 3. United States — Army Air Forces — Fighter Group, 57th. I. Title. 940.544973—dc22 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. Air University Press 131 West Shumacher Avenue Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6615 http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . vii PREFACE . ix INTRODUCTION . xi Notes . xiv 1 GREAT ADVENTURE BEGINS . 1 2 THREE MUSKETEERS TIMES TWO . 11 3 AIR-TO-GROUND BATTLE FOR ITALY . 45 4 OPERATION STRANGLE . 65 INDEX . 97 Photographs follow page 28 iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Foreword The events in this story are based on the memory of the author, backed up by official personnel records. All survivors are now well into their eighties. Those involved in reconstructing the period, the emotional rollercoaster that was part of every day and each combat mission, ask for understanding and tolerance for fallible memories. Bruce Abercrombie, our dedicated photo guy, took most of the pictures.
    [Show full text]
  • The British Defence of Egypt 1935–1940
    The British Defence of Egypt 1935–1940 This book offers a comprehensive and challenging analysis of the British defence of Egypt, primarily against fascist Italy, in the critical lead-up period to the Second World War. The security of Egypt, a constant of British imperial strategy, is a curiously neglected dimension of the still burning appeasement debate. Yet it was a factor which demanded constant consider- ation by British policy-makers and figured in the crises of the period over Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Poland. By giving equal weight to the perspectives and assessments of the men on the spot, Steven Morewood adds to the originality of his interpretation by suggesting the old view should be reinstated: that Mussolini should and could have been stopped in his empire-building at the Abyssinian hurdle. Thereafter, as Nazi Germany tore the Versailles peace settlement to shreds, the drift to war accelerated as British resolve and credibility were brought into question. The fascist dictators in Rome and Berlin held no respect for weakness and Mussolini became the conduit through which Hitler could apply pressure to a sensitive British interest through reinforcing Libya at critical moments. Steven Morewood is lecturer in International History in the School of Historical Studies at the University of Birmingham. Cass series: Military history and policy Edited by John Gooch and Brian Holden Reid This series will publish studies on historical and contemporary aspects of land power, spanning the period from the eighteenth century to the present day, and will include national, international and comparative studies. From time to time, the series will publish edited collections of essays and ‘classics’.
    [Show full text]
  • Jabberwock Jabberwock
    JJABBERWOCKABBERWOCK The Journal of the Society of Friends of the Fleet Air Arm Museum IN THIS EDITION: • The FNHT Sea Vixen • The Formation of the RNAS • The Double Sunrise Service • Tu 144 Concordski • SOFFAAM Visit to the RAF Museum • SOFFAAM Christmas lunch • Tailpiece PLUS .... All the usual features, news from the Museum, letters to the Editor, snippets from Council meetings, monthly talks programme, latest membership numbers. No. 77 November 2014 Published by The Society of Friends of the Fleet Air Arm Museum Jabberwock No 77 November 2014 Patron: Rear Admiral A R Rawbone CB, AFC, RN President: D S Moxley JP FLEET AIR ARM MUSEUM RNAS Yeovilton Somerset BA22 8HT Telephone: 01935 840565 SOFFAAM email: [email protected] SOFFAAM website: fleetairarmfriends.org.uk Registered Charity No. 280725 1 Jabberwock No 77 November 2014 The Society of Friends of the Fleet Air Arm Museum Vice Presidents Captain K A Leppard CBE, RN Rear Admiral A R Rawbone CB, AFC, RN F C Ott DSC BSc (Econ) Lt Cdr Philip (Jan) Stuart RN Squadron Leader Maurice Biggs RAF David Kinloch Chairman Richard Hufton [email protected] Admission Vice Chairman Members are admitted to the Mike Strang Museum free of charge, on [email protected] production of a valid member- ship card. Members may be Secretary accompanied by up to three Malcolm Smith guests (one guest only for junior [email protected] members) on any one visit, each at a reduced entrance fee, cur- Treasurer rently 50% of the standard price. Gordon Johnson Members are also allowed a 10% [email protected] discount on goods purchased from the shop.
    [Show full text]
  • The Second World War 1939-45
    CHAPTER 3 THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45 MAP MODIFIED FROM ATLAS OF WARFARE: NATKIEL & PIMLOTT In the First World War, the aeroplane was in its infancy and, for all the strides made in development, it remained an ancillary of land and sea operations. The Second World War, however, brought air power to its maturity; the aeroplane became a decisive weapon and the outcome of both land and sea battles depended upon air superiority. 91 THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45 Between 1939-45 the RAF was in the forefront of the exercise of air power; it prevented an invasion of Britain; it supported British Armies in North Africa, Italy, NW Europe and the Far East; it fought continuously over the seas around Britain, over the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean and over the Indian Ocean; and it played a major role (together with the US Army Air Force) in the strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Of the major air forces of the Second World War, the German, Italian, Japanese and Russian were organized and equipped primarily to support their respective armies on the ground; only the RAF and US Army Air Force had well-developed plans for the independent use of air power in maritime and strategic bombing offensive roles. THE LUFTWAFFE From the first to the last day of the war in Europe, the major opponent of the RAF was the German Luftwaffe. Since the RAF and the Luftwaffe were locked in combat for so long, it is worth looking briefly at their plans for an air war at the start of the Second World War.
    [Show full text]
  • November 1943
    12th Air Force, 57th Bombardment Wing 321st Bombardment Group History: November 1943 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For my dad, Colonel John “Jack” Fitzgerald, U.S. Army (deceased) “Lil Butch” John T. Fitzgerald, SMSgt, U.S. Air Force (retired) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12th Air Force, 57th Bombardment Wing 321st Bombardment Group History: November 1943 The following is a compilation of the 321st Bomb Group’s Headquarters and individual Squadron War Diaries. They have been transcribed word for word, from the Squadron Histories provided by the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama. At the end of each Squadron’s daily entry, the individuals cited in the entry are identified by full name, rank and duty, in alphabetical order. The day’s entry begins with the Tactical Operations Statement, from the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) Chronology, for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO). The history also includes mission reports, mission crew rosters, Missing Air Crew Reports (MACR), personal mission logs, journals, and diaries made available by various sources. Invitation Anyone who has documentation pertaining to the 321st Bomb Group or its members, and would like to have it included in this history, is welcome to participate. Copies of: photos (official or personal); orders (promotion, decoration, travel, etc.); Mission Reports; Missing Air Crew Reports; personal diaries, logs, journals, etc; other documentation; or information that will help identify hi-lited individuals will be greatly appreciated, as one of my goals is to correctly identify every man and plane assigned to the 321st Bomb Group. My only interest in this project is to honor those who served by perpetuating their story, and making it available for future generations, particularly the families and friends of our Great Heroes.
    [Show full text]
  • Africa to the Alps the Army Air Forces in the Mediterranean Theater
    The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II Africa to the Alps The Army Air Forces in the Mediterranean Theater Edward T. Russell and Robert M. Johnson AIR FORCE HISTORY AND MUSEUMS PROGRAM 1999 Africa to the Alps The Army Air Forces in the Mediterranean Theater By the time the United States declared war on Germany and Italy on December 11, 1941, most of Europe had fallen under the domination of Adolf Hitler, dictator of Germany’s Third Reich. In the west, only Great Britain, her armies expelled from the European continent, re- mained defiant; in the east, Hitler faced an implacable foe—the Sovi- et Union.While the Soviets tried to stave off a relentless German at- tack that had reached Moscow, Britain and her Commonwealth allies fought a series of crucial battles with Axis forces in North Africa. Initially, America’s entry into the war changed nothing. The Unit- ed States continued to supply the Allies with the tools of war, as it had since the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. U.S. military forces, however, had to be expanded, trained, equipped, and deployed, all of which would take time. With the United States in the war, the Allies faced the question of where American forces could best be used. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston S. Churchill had al- ready agreed that defeating first Germany and then Japan would be their policy, but that decision raised further questions. Roosevelt wanted U.S. troops in combat against German troops as soon as possible.
    [Show full text]
  • Trenchard's Doctrine: Organisational Culture, the 'Air Force Spirit' and The
    TRENCHARD’S DOCTRINE Trenchard’s Doctrine: Organisational Culture, the ‘Air Force spirit’ and the Foundation of the Royal Air Force in the Interwar Years ROSS MAHONEY Independent Scholar Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT While the Royal Air Force was born in war, it was created in peace. In his 1919 memorandum on the Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force, Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard outlined his vision for the development of the Service. In this strategy, Trenchard developed the idea of generating an ‘Air Force spirit’ that provided the basis of the RAF’s development in the years after the First World War. The basis for this process was the creation of specific institutions and structures that helped generate a culture that allowed the RAF to establish itself as it dealt with challenges from its sister services. This article explores the character of that culture and ethos and in analysing the early years of the RAF through a cultural lens, suggests that Trenchard’s so-called ‘doctrine’ was focussed more on organisational developments rather than air power thinking as has often been suggested. In 1917, during the First World War and in direct response to the challenge of the aerial bombing of Great Britain, the British government decided to create an independent air service to manage the requirements of aerial warfare. With the formation of the Royal Air Force (RAF) on 1 April 1918, the Service’s senior leaders had to deal with the challenge of developing a new culture for the organisation that was consistent with the aims of the Air Force and delivered a sense of identity to its personnel.
    [Show full text]
  • Bombing the European Axis Powers a Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive 1939–1945
    Inside frontcover 6/1/06 11:19 AM Page 1 Bombing the European Axis Powers A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive 1939–1945 Air University Press Team Chief Editor Carole Arbush Copy Editor Sherry C. Terrell Cover Art and Book Design Daniel M. Armstrong Composition and Prepress Production Mary P. Ferguson Quality Review Mary J. Moore Print Preparation Joan Hickey Distribution Diane Clark NewFrontmatter 5/31/06 1:42 PM Page i Bombing the European Axis Powers A Historical Digest of the Combined Bomber Offensive 1939–1945 RICHARD G. DAVIS Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 2006 NewFrontmatter 5/31/06 1:42 PM Page ii Air University Library Cataloging Data Davis, Richard G. Bombing the European Axis powers : a historical digest of the combined bomber offensive, 1939-1945 / Richard G. Davis. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58566-148-1 1. World War, 1939-1945––Aerial operations. 2. World War, 1939-1945––Aerial operations––Statistics. 3. United States. Army Air Forces––History––World War, 1939- 1945. 4. Great Britain. Royal Air Force––History––World War, 1939-1945. 5. Bombing, Aerial––Europe––History. I. Title. 940.544––dc22 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Book and CD-ROM cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. Air University Press 131 West Shumacher Avenue Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6615 http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil ii NewFrontmatter 5/31/06 1:42 PM Page iii Contents Page DISCLAIMER .
    [Show full text]