How do transnational actors cluster regionally? Regional ventures and coalitions beyond and behind the state level Ž‡••ƒ†”ƒ—••‘ǡƒ–ǯƒ Š‘‘Ž‘ˆ†˜ƒ ‡†–—†‹‡•1 Alessia Chiriatti, University for Foreigners of Perugia

Introduction

A new account of the role of transnational actors in the literature of International Relations and Security Studies has emerged in the last decades in order to study how and why they are able to challenge the central foreign policy organs of government and provide an alternative to the state structures, authorities and institutions of governance. –ƒ–‡•Šƒ˜‡–‘ƒ•™‡”ˆ‘”–Š‹•Dzunstructured potentialdzƒ†‹‰Š–•‡‹œ‡–Š‡‘’’‘”–—‹–› created by this context in order to initiate cooperative arrangements or reframe the cooperative frameworks in which they are involved. However, the exclusive ‘’‡–‡ ›„›–Š‡•–ƒ–‡‹Dz‰‘‹‰”‡‰‹‘ƒŽdzȋƒ•™‡ŽŽƒ•Dz‰‘‹‰‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽdzȌhas been diffusely questioned by the idea that state is no longer the sole actor in the international order. Black-Caspian Seas Region is a significant example in order to understand how state and non Ȃ state actors are interrelated within their respective Regional Security Complex. Few cases will be evaluated, with particular reference to the Caucasian sub- region and the Turkish-Georgian dyad.

DzŠƒ‰‡•‹•–ƒ–‡Š‘‘†dzǣ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•„‡–™‡‡‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ”‡Žƒ–‹‘•ƒ††‘‡•–‹ ƒˆˆƒ‹”•

In the analysis of how transnational actors cluster in a regional dimension, the position and the function of the state as a monolithic element of international system occur as primary step. Concepts such as state, sovereignty and territory are central, by definition, in the study of International Relations. However, there has been a significant Dz†‹•’‡”•‹‘dz in the location of authority during the recent decades: the state is no longer the principal and predominant site of power on a growing number of issues, as its agency, prerogatives and capabilities are challenged by the emergent claims from non-

1 The co-author has had the opportunity to work on some parts of the present paper in the framework of a Visiting Fellowship at the Center for Social Sciences, Tbilisi, Georgia. She therefore offers her heartfelt thanks to the CSS members and staff, namely Marine Chitashvili, Neil MacFarlane, Mako Mikaberidze, Diana Lezhava, Irina Osepashvili, Salome Minesashvili and all the other people who made my stay in Tbilisi so rich.

1 state actors, i.e. firms, individuals, non-governmental or private organizations, markets. –Š‹•’‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡ǡ‹–‹‰Š–Šƒ’’‡ȋƒ†‹–‹ ”‡ƒ•‹‰Ž›‘ —”•Ȍ–Šƒ–Dz‘-state actors fill or exploit the gaps left by the (in)voluntary loss or evaporation or sovereignty attending the transformation of the state, while others are purposeful repositories for •‘˜‡”‡‹‰–› ‡†‡†ǡŽ‡–ǡ’‘‘Ž‡†‘”ˆ‘”ˆ‡‹–‡†dz2. According to a Dz–”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽdzȋ‡•–’ŠƒŽ‹ƒȌ interpretation of sovereignty, the standard distinction between the domestic and the ‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ”‡ƒŽ‹•Dz‡„‘†‹‡†dz„›–Š‡•‘˜‡”‡‹‰„‘”†‡”3; this definition is based on the assumption that states are entities endowed with a delimited territory, a stable population and a government. In other words, Dzsovereignty means constitutional independence, that is, independent, centralized authority over a specific territory and population. Jurisdiction thus creates a domestic and an international space. In substantial terms, domestic is what goes on inside that jurisdiction; international is ™Šƒ– ‰‘‡• ‘ ‘—–•‹†‡ ‘ˆ ‹–dzǤ4Nevertheless, changes in sovereign statehood have to be appreciated in order to recognise actual differences of power among states: the understanding of these asymmetries requires a closer examination of the domestic- international connection, since this latter might either weaken or strengthen the state. The different degrees of exposure of the state to the so-called Dz‹–‡rnational †‡–‡”‹ƒ–•dzǡ •— Š ƒ• ‡š–‡”ƒŽ •‘—” ‡• ‘ˆ ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ hanges and policy externalities, ‹‰Š–„‡ ‘•‹†‡”‡†ƒ•ƒ•‹‰‘ˆDz Šƒ‰‹‰•–ƒ–‡Š‘‘†dz, intended as the varying capacity of the state both to maintain a monopoly of the use of force and to function as effective gate-keeper between internal and external flows; so that states differ along four †‹‡•‹‘•ǣ Dz–Š‡ †‡‰”‡‡ ‘ˆ ’‡‡–”ƒ–‹‘ „› •–ƒ–‡• ƒ† ‘-state actors and the consequences of that penetration for national authorities; the nature and extent of the securitization process; the level of sovereign control, de facto and de jure; and the referent for calculating security inte”‡•–•dz5. On the other side, the strategies to underpin the attributes of statehood have often led –‘–Š‡ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘‘ˆŠ›„”‹†’‘Ž‹–‹‡•™Š‡”‡‹Dz„‹ƒ”›—†‡”•–ƒ†‹‰•‘ˆ•–ƒ–‡•‘˜‡”‡‹‰–› ȏǥȐƒ”‡”‡’Žƒ ‡†„›‘–‹‘• ‘ˆǮ•‘˜‡”‡‹‰ˆ”‘–‹‡”•ǯȏǥȐ‹™Š‹ Š„‘—†ƒ”‹‡• „‡–™‡‡

2 J. Sperling, State Attributes and System Properties, in D. Bourantonis, K. Ifantis, P. Panagiotes and I. Tsakonas (eds.), Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization, Routledge, 2008, p. 102. 3 G. SØrensen, Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International Relations, Palgrave, 2001, p. 12. 4 Ibidem. 5 J. Sperling, National Security Cultures, Technologies of Public Good Supply and Security Governance, in E.J. Kirchner and J. Sperling (eds.), National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance, Routledge, 2010, p. 4.

2

™Šƒ–‹••—’’‘•‡†Ž›Ǯ‹–‡”ƒŽǯ‘”†‘‡•–‹ ƒ†™Šƒ–‹•Ǯ‡š–‡”ƒŽǯ‘”‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ„‡ ‘‡ blurred. New hybrid forms based on complex linkages emerge, constituting a new Ǯ‹–‡”‡•–‹ •’Š‡”‡ǯ‘ˆ’”‘ ‡••‡•dz6. The challenges to the traditionally conceived sovereignty and the emergence of a new Dz‹–‡”‡•–‹ dzŽ‡˜‡Ž‘ˆ‹–‡”’Žƒ›Šƒ˜‡ led to the coming out of a new scholarship whose interpretation of the internal-external divide is blurred. In other words, the struggle „‡–™‡‡–Š‡Dz‘—–•‹†‡Ȃ ‹dzƒ†Dz‹•‹†‡‘—–dzƒ’’”‘ƒ Š‡•‹‰Št be intended in nuanced terms and even complicated by the juxtaposition oˆƒ‡™DzŽƒ›‡”dz–‘„‡ƒƒŽ›•‡†ǡ–Šƒ–‹• the regional oneǣDz‹n the post Ȃ Cold War world the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for • Š‘Žƒ”••‡‡‹‰–‘‡š’Ž‘”‡ ‘–‡’‘”ƒ”›•‡ —”‹–›ƒˆˆƒ‹”•dz7.While regionalism certainly ’”‡†ƒ–‡•–Š‡‡†‘ˆ–Š‡‘Ž†ƒ”ǡ–Š‡ƒ™ƒ”‡‡••‘ˆ–Š‡•ƒŽ‹‡ ‡‘ˆ–Š‡Dz”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ•dzŠƒ• gradually emerged over the last twenty years; at the same time, international ‹•–”—‡–•ǡƒ””ƒ‰‡‡–•ǡ‹‹–‹ƒ–‹˜‡•™Š‹ Šƒ”‡Dz”‡‰‹‘ƒŽdz‹–Š‡‹”• ‘’‡‘”‡”‡Ž›‹ their label have been set, renamed, reformed and/or reframed. After the collapse of Soviet Union, the formation of sub-regional blocks mainly aimed at integrating the Dz’‘•–-‘˜‹‡–dzˆ”ƒ‰‡–•‹–Š‡‰Ž‘„ƒŽ‘”†‡”ǡ™Š‹Ž‡ƒ••‘ ‹ƒ–‹‰–Š‡–‘ ‘ŽŽ‡ –‹˜‡•‡ —”‹–› mechanism.

Regional Studies and Transnational Actors: key concepts and definitions

We could assume the end of the Cold War as a turning point in the emerging regional security: with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, fifteen new states were born, and with them, new Regional Security Complexes and new polarities have come out. Therefore, a growth of interest for Regional Studies has been one of the major developments in International Relations in recent years. The study of regional orders and regional complexes should take into consideration that the exclusive competency „›–Š‡•–ƒ–‡‹Dz‰‘‹‰”‡‰‹‘ƒŽdzŠƒ•„‡‡†‹ˆˆ—•‡Ž›„”‘—‰Š–‹–‘“—‡•–‹‘•„›ƒ”‡Ž‡˜ƒ– number of comparative regionalism scholars; consistently, the object of their inquiry currently deals with regional interactions and interconnections occurring among non-

6C. Solioz and P. Stubbs, Emergent regional co-operation in South East Euro’‡ǣ–‘™ƒ”†•Ǯ‘’‡”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•ǯǫ, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2009, p. 3. 7 B. Buzan and O. Waever, Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 10.

3 state actors. Few preliminary and basic definitions might be helpful in order to set some conceptual boundaries around intertwined variables and topics: in spite of partial imbrications in the literature and deceptive liminality, it is important to distinguish between two ƒ’’ƒ”‡–Ž› ‘˜‡”Žƒ’’‹‰ ƒ––”‹„—–‡•ǣ Dz–”ƒ•ƒ–‹‘ƒŽdz ƒ† Dz‘-•–ƒ–‡dzǤ Š‡ fundamental difference seems to be that the former identifies a mode of interaction, while the latter refers to the agent of interaction; from the other side, one of the most well-kno™†‡ˆ‹‹–‹‘•‘ˆDz–”ƒ•ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹–‡”ƒ –‹‘dz‘—–Ž‹‡•‹–ƒ ‘”†‹‰–‘–Š”‡‡ƒ‹ features: 1) regularity of the transactions/connections; 2) cross-„‘”†‡”‡•• ȋDzƒ ”‘•• ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ „‘—†ƒ”‹‡•dz8); 3) polylateralism9 ȋDzƒ– Ž‡ƒ•– ‘‡ ƒ –‘” ‹• ƒ ‘-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘dz10). According to another operational definition (outlined by the National –‡ŽŽ‹‰‡ ‡‘— ‹Ž‘ˆ–Š‡‹–‡†–ƒ–‡•Ȍǡ‘Ǧ•–ƒ–‡ ƒ –‘”•ƒ”‡Dz‘Ǧ•‘˜‡”‡‹‰‡–‹–‹‡• that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national ƒ†ƒ–‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽŽ‡˜‡Ž•dz11. The consensus on the actual members of this category is rather vague, and diverse players are often included without providing any sound analytical criteria: they can range from unions and associations built according to shared economic interests or societal identities, to religious and ethnic groupings, from epistemic communities to include NGOs and advocacy networks; along with non-state security providers, brokers and/or Dzjeopardizersdzsuch as Private Military Companies as ™‡ŽŽ ƒ• Dz‹ŽŽ‹ ‹– ’‘™‡” •–”— –—”‡•dz ȋ‹Ž‹–‹ƒ•ǡ ‡š–”‡‹•–Ȁ–‡””‘”‹•–Ȁ•‡’ƒ”ƒ–‹•– ‰”‘—’• ƒ† movements, insurgents, rogue intelligence networks, criminal enterprises and outlaw organisations). In order to organize this assortment of actors, it might be considered –Šƒ– ‘Ž› •‘‡ ‘ˆ –Š‡ Šƒ˜‡ ƒ Dz’—„Ž‹  ’—”’‘•‡dz ƒ† ’‡”ˆ‘” ˆ— –‹‘• ™Š‹ Š ƒ”‡ typically associated with national governments; and that they can be variously related –‘ƒ•—’’‘•‡††‹•’Žƒ ‡‡–‘ˆ–Š‡•–ƒ–‡ƒ†’”‘†— –‹‘‘ˆƒDz‡š’ƒ†‹‰ƒ” Š‹’‡Žƒ‰‘‘ˆ ’”‹˜ƒ–‡ ‰‘˜‡”‡–•dz ‘” Dz‘†ƒŽ •‡ —”‹–›dz12. As a matter of fact, non-state actors can

8 T. Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction, in Id. (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 3. 9G. Wiseman, Ǯ‘Ž›Žƒ–‡”ƒŽ‹•ǯƒ†‡™‘†‡•‘ˆ Ž‘„ƒŽ ‹ƒŽ‘‰—‡, in C. Jönsson and R. Langorne (eds.) Diplomacyǡ˜‘ŽǤ ǡƒ‰‡ǡʹͲͲͶǡ’’Ǥ͵͸Ǧͷ͹Ǥ 10 T. Risse-Kappen, ivi. This definition encompasses both trans-societal and trans-governmental interactions. 11 National Intelligence Council, Non-state Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States, Conference Report, 2007, p. 2. 12K. Stenson and J. Lea, Security, Sovereignty and non-state governance 'From Below', The Canadian Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 22, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 9-28.

4 work both with the state and against the state: in the first case, they ƒ”‡DzŽ‹ ‡•‡†„›‹– ƒ† ‘’‡•ƒ–‡ ˆ‘” ‹–• ™‡ƒ‡••‡•dz13 (Dzalter-state actorsdz); in the second case, they might engage in constitutive and configurative conflicts with the state14 (Dzƒ–‹-state ƒ –‘”•dz). Furthermore, these latter might either aim ƒ––Š‡Dz†‡ˆ‡nce and/or liberation of ’ƒ”–‹ —Žƒ”’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘•ƒ†–‡””‹–‘”‹‡•ˆ”‘’‡” ‡‹˜‡†‡š–‡”ƒŽ‘ —’ƒ–‹‘ƒ† ‘–”‘Ždz ȋDz–‡””‹–‘”‹ƒŽ ”—Ž‡”•dz) or be involved in smuggling and trafficking activities ȋDz‡–™‘”‡”•dzȌ15. Non-state actors might aim at detouring the central foreign policy organs of government and providing an alternative to the state structures, authorities and institutions of governance. In doing so, they might resort to different instruments (armed or not) and envision different ultimate goals: these latter might be the expression of a political project or instance, or not (in the Schmittian sense)16. Warlords, militias, insurgents, rebels, bandits, criminal organisations and gangs can be all defined as irregular forces which employ violent means outside any framework of state-derived legitimacy; but while some of them challenge the state inasmuch they make profit out of its weaknesses, others challenge the state by contesting its political rules of the game and pursuing a major change in the status quo: they can demand a different government, a different political system, a different territorial configuration. Furthermore, it is ‹’‘”–ƒ––‘‘–‹ ‡–Šƒ–Dz‹ƒ› ƒ•‡•–Š‡•‡‰”‘—’•ƒ”‡ ŠƒŽŽ‡‰‹‰–Š‡•–ƒ–‡Ǣ‹‘–Š‡”• they are cooperating and colluding with state structures; in some, the state is a passive by-stander while they fight one another. In several instances they are both fighting one another and confronting state structures that seek either to destroy them or to bring –Š‡—†‡” ‘–”‘Ždz17. In their possible challenging the state, non-state actors defy state capacity of grabbing multiple declensions of sovereignty: not only as control of territories but also as control of movement; and beside it, they indirectly question the way states establish and organised collective security systems and cooperative

13K. Stenson and J. Lea, cit. 14J. G. Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, International Organization, Vol. 47, Issue 1, 1993, pp. 139-174. 15K. Stenson and J. Lea, cit. 16L. Bozzo, ‡””‘”‹•–‹ǡ‹•‘”–‹‘’ƒ”–‹‰‹ƒ‹ǫ‡ƒ’‘”‹‡Ž‹‰—‹•–‹ Š‡†‡ŽŽƒDz‰—‡””ƒƒŽ–‡””‘”‹•‘dz, Quaderni di RelazioniInternazionali, n. 14, May 2011, pp. 86-94. 17 P. Williams, Violent Non-state Actors and National and International Security, International Relations and Security Network, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, 2008, p. 4. Another significant dimension deals with the functions they fulfill for members and supporting ‘•–‹–—‡ ‹‡• ƒ† –Š‡ ‡š–‡– –‘ ™Š‹ Š –Š‡› „‡ ‘‡ Dzƒ ƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡ ˆ‘” ‘ˆ ‰‘˜‡”ƒ ‡ ƒ† ˆ—Žˆ‹ŽŽ• functions normally the responsibility of the state [...] what kinds of capacity gaps and functional holes are filled [..ǤȐǤ –Š‹•’‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡Dzˆ‹ŽŽ‹‰ˆ— –‹‘ƒŽ•’ƒ ‡•‹•‘ˆ–‡‡˜‡‘”‡‹’‘”–ƒ––Šƒˆ‹ŽŽ‹‰–‡””‹–‘”‹ƒŽ •’ƒ ‡•dzǤIvi, p. 8.

5 arrangements. Security is thereby one of the principal elements that could clarify the linkage between state and non-state actors, as the latter might threaten the integrity of the former, rather than trigger rooms for inter-state cooperation18. In order to cope with the abovementioned multiplicity and hybridity, the new approaches to comparative regionalism and the new scholarship dealing with region- building aim at combining disciplinary area studies19 and transnational area studies. Nevertheless, the shift from interstate cooperation to transnational cooperation has been intended according to few specific meanings: 1) the opening of international institutions to the participation of transnational actors (the so- ƒŽŽ‡† Dz–”ƒ•ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ turn in multilat‡”ƒŽ‹•dzȌǢ ʹȌ –Š‡ emergence of cross-border/trans-boundary/trans- frontier regions; 3) processes of regional cartelization of national elites20; 4)the establishment of projects which are regional in scope and are realized though para- diplomatic activities of sub-national administrative units. These cooperative ventures pave the way to the study of non-state regionalism; however, a definitional differentiation between regionalism and regionalization could still be retained while the co-existence of alternative ƒ –‘”•™Š‹ ŠDz‰‘”‡‰‹‘ƒŽdz†‘‘– ŠƒŽŽ‡‰‡–Š‡ƒ‰‡ ›‘ˆ–Š‡ state as a member in international institutions.

The puzzle

Slightly differently, the abovementioned transnational actors might be willing and/or able to coagulate in regional networks and partnerships, possibly detouring the central foreign policy organs of government and providing an alternative to the state structures, authorities and institutions of governance. The tentative answers to these research questions might cast a new light not only to the studies about regions in the International Relations but also to the ongoing re-conceptualization of a Dz„”‘ƒ†‡‡† ƒ† ™‹†‡‡†dz •‡ —”‹–›ǡ ™Š‹ Š Šƒ• „‡‡ †‡˜‡Ž‘’‡† ‘–‡š–—ƒŽŽ› –‘ –Š‡ ”‡‰ionalist awakening/revival. As a matter of fact, in the last twenty years, parallel to the emergence of the studies about regional security orders, governance, organizations,

18H. Muller, Security Cooperation, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse-Kappen, B. A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, Sage, 2002, pp. 369 Ȃ 391. 19 A. Acharya, International Relations and Area Studies: Towards a New Synthesis?, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006. 20 In this perspective, see also the coalitional approach developed by E. Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, Princeton University Press, 1998.

6 institutions, the state-centric assumptions of security studies have been softened; even the most reticent scholar admitted the role of non-state actors, specifically if they are strategic users of force in the international system and reveal themselves as agents which might be able to define practices and policies connected to the definition of threats, risks and survival of their own respective political communities. Despite similar †ƒ‰‡”• ‘ˆ Dz ‘ ‡’–—ƒŽ ‘˜‡”•–”‡– Šdzǡ –Š‡ Ž‹–‡”ƒ–—”‡ ƒ„‘—– ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹• Šƒ• ‡˜‘Ž˜‡† –Š”‘—‰Š‘—–ƒ—„‡”‘ˆDz™ƒ˜‡•dzǡ‹‘”†‡”–‘‹ Ž—†‡‹–‡”-regional, multi-regional and trans-regional configurations; still, one of the criticalities issued by the debates about Dz‡™ ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•dz Šƒ• –‘ †‘ ™‹–Š –Š‡ ƒ‹–‡ƒ ‡ „› –Š‡ •–ƒ–‡ ‘ˆ ƒ ”‘Ž‡ ‘ˆ Dz”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•ǯ•Ǯ‰ƒ–‡‡‡’‡”ǯƒ†ƒ••— Š–Š‡‘•–˜‹–ƒŽƒ†‡†—”‹‰”‡ˆ‡”‡ce point in –Š‡ ’”ƒ –‹ ‡ ƒ† ”‡‰—Žƒ–‹‘ ‘ˆ ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•dz21. Nevertheless, the involvement of non- state actors has been associated with regional interactions induced by economic and societal agents, i.e. multinational corporations and civil society and developed through multi-dimensional and decentralized channel and non-governmental vectors such as the market, private sector, human flows of migrants and refugees as well as diasporic interactions: that is the reason why this slippery declension of region-building is often conceptualized in terms of networks and mosaics, without referring to any intentional and purposive policy or project established by identifiable hubs. A relatively recent Ž‹–‡”ƒ–—”‡ ƒ„‘—– Dz•Šƒ†‘™ ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•dz ƒ† Dz–”ƒ•-•–ƒ–‡ ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•dz Šƒ• gradually brought the attention not only on non-state-centric instances of regionalism, but also on –Š‡ˆƒ ––Šƒ––Š‡•‡Žƒ––‡”Dzƒ›˜‡”›™‡ŽŽ‡‡”‰‡ƒ•ƒƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡‘”‹‘’’‘•‹–‹‘–‘–Š‡ challenged state, and sometimes also in competition with states-Ž‡†”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•dz22, as state-led regionalism may in turn serve the purpose of reproduction, consolidation and legitimization of the state itself23. Shadow regionalism and trans-state regionalism have been conceptualized with an empirical reference to African case studies, in order to explain the existence of parallel structures of power pursuing and managing different patterns and processes of regional interactions; these informal activities often aim at

21 L. Fawcett, The History and Concept of Regionalism, UNU-CRIS Working Papers W-2013/5, Bruges, 2013, p. 5-6. Soft, de facto, informal regionalisms acknowledge the pursuit of regionalised patterns of activities by non-state actors operating beyond and behind state-led institutional frameworks and establishing connections on a regional scale from below. P. De Lombaerde, F. Soderbaum, L. Van Langenhove and F. Baert, Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism, in F. Laursen (ed.), Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Ashgate, 2010, p. 23. 22 B. Hettne, ‡›‘†–Š‡Ǯ‡™ǯ‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, Issue 4, 2005, p. 557. 23B. Hettne, cit, pp. 543-571.

7 undermining the regulatory capacity of the state24,challenging its territorial control25 and its ability to govern resilient hybrid political orders26: exactly because they take advantage of the porous borders, dividends of insecurity and weakness of state institutions27. •–Š‡ ‘ ‡’–‘ˆDz•Šƒ†‘™”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•dz”‡Ž‹‡•‘–Š‡’”‡˜‹‘—•‘–‹‘‘ˆDz•Šƒ†‘™•–ƒ–‡dzǡ a similar parallelism ƒ „‡ †”ƒ™ „‡–™‡‡ Dz†‹ˆˆ—•‡ •–ƒ–‡Š‘‘†dz ƒ† Dz†‹ˆˆ—•‡ ”‡‰‹‘Š‘‘†dz, in order to describe the presence of alternative providers of regionhood; this latter is consistent after all with context where diverse and competing claims to power co-exist, overlap and intertwine, and the state has to share authority, legitimacy and capacity with other structures28ǤDz‹ˆˆ—•‡•–ƒ–‡Š‘‘†dz‹•‹–‡†‡†ƒ•–Š‡Dz‘—–•‘—” ing ‘ˆ•–ƒ–‡ˆ— –‹‘•ȏǥȐ–‘ƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡ƒ‰‡–•ȏǥȐǤ—–•‘—” ‹‰‘ —”•‹ˆ–Š‡”‡‹•ƒŽƒ ‘ˆ resources and the state has little capacity to fulfil its functions all by itself. The next step that might follow outsourcing is capture, in which an actor other than the state ‘’Ž‡–‡Ž› –ƒ‡• ‘˜‡” ƒ –‡””‹–‘”› ‘” ƒ ˆ— –‹‘ƒŽ •‡ –‘” ‘ˆ –Š‡ •–ƒ–‡ ȏǥȐǤ Š‡ ”‡˜‡”•‡ process is re-capture, in which the state takes over a function that had previously been outsourced to a particular agent. A state that is not capable of re-capturing its core ˆ— –‹‘• ƒ„‡†‡ˆ‹‡†ƒ•™‡ƒdz29Ǥ –Š‹•’‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡ǡDz†‹ˆˆ—•‡”‡‰‹‘Š‘‘†dz ƒ„‡ƒ useful category in order to explain that the central state does not hold the sole agency ˆ‘” –Š‡ ’”‡”‘‰ƒ–‹˜‡• ‘ˆ ”‡‰‹‘‡••Ǥ Š‹Ž‡ Dz†‹ˆˆ—•‡ ”‡‰‹‘Š‘‘†dz per se is not a sign to explain the performance of regional outcomes, this mode of regional governance is likely to affect not only the patterns of region-building but also the contents of state-led regionalist projects and the posture of the states as they act as members of regional institutions: these latter might be oriented, for example, towards the reinforcement of

24F. Soderbaum, Whose regionalism in Africa?, GREAT Insights, Vol. 1, No. 9, 2012. 25 D. Bach, New Regionalism as an Alias: Regionalisation through Trans-State Networks, in A. Grant and F. Soderbaum (eds.), New Regionalism in Africa, Ashgate, 2003, pp. 21-30. 26 These latter are characterized by diverse and competing claims to power and logics of order which co- exist, overlap ƒ† ‹–‡”–™‹‡ǡ •‘ –Šƒ– Dz–Š‡ •–ƒ–‡ †‘‡• ‘– Šƒ˜‡ ƒ ’”‹˜‹Ž‡‰‡† ’‘•‹–‹‘ ƒ• –Š‡ ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ framework that provides security, welfare and representation; it has to share authority, legitimacy and ƒ’ƒ ‹–›™‹–Š‘–Š‡”•–”— –—”‡•dzǤ‘‡‰‡Ǥǡ”‘™ǤǡŽ‡‡–•Ǥ, Nolan A., On Hybrid Political Orders and ‡”‰‹‰–ƒ–‡•ǣ–ƒ–‡ ‘”ƒ–‹‘‹–Š‡‘–‡š–‘ˆǮ ”ƒ‰‹Ž‹–›ǯ, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 2008, p. 10. 27D. Bach, cit. 28Boege V. et alii, cit. 29 G. Wiegmann, Local Alliances Providing Local Governance in Tajikistan?ǡ ‡•‡ƒ” Š ”‘Œ‡ – Dz ‘—–‹‰ for State-Building, Stability & Violent Conflict: The Institutional Framework of Caucasian and Central •‹ƒ”ƒ•‹–‹‘ƒŽ‘ ‹‡–‹‡•dzǡ ”‡‡‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ‡”Ž‹ǡʹͲͲͷǡ’Ǥ͹Ǥ

8 state prerogatives, establishment of policies of border securing, deployment of a law- and-order discourse30. In other words, two sets of research questions could be spelled out. Firstly, how do transnational actors cluster regionally? Are there regional coalitions beyond and behind the state level? And secondly, which impact (if any) do the non-state regional ventures have on the state-led regional institutions? Are these latter weakened by the incapacity to deal with transnational issues? Or rather, do they respond through regional policies and countermeasures?

Regional Security Complex and Non-State Actors in the Black-Caspian Seas Region

According to the Regional Security Complex Theory, Dz•‡ —”‹–› ‹–‡”†‡’‡†‡ ‡ ‹• ‘”ƒŽŽ›’ƒ––‡”‡†‹–‘”‡‰‹‘ƒŽŽ›„ƒ•‡† Ž—•–‡”•ǣ•‡ —”‹–› ‘’Ž‡š‡•dz31. In their early formulation, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever defined a security constellation according to four interrelated levels of analysis: the states of the region, particularly their domestically-generated vulnerabilities; state Ȃ to Ȃ •–ƒ–‡ ”‡Žƒ–‹‘•Ǣ –Š‡ ”‡‰‹‘ǯ• interaction with neighbouring regions; and finally the role of global powers in the region. –Š‹•’‡”•’‡ –‹˜‡ǡƒ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ•‡ —”‹–› ‘’Ž‡šŠƒ†„‡‡ƒ–ˆ‹”•–†‡ˆ‹‡†ƒ•Dza group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one anothe”dzǤŠ‡ state- ‡–”‹  †‹‡•‹‘ Šƒ• „‡‡ Dz†‘™‰”ƒ†‡†dz Žƒ–‡” ‘ǡ –Š‡”‡ˆ‘”‡ ”‡-defining a ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ •‡ —”‹–› ‘’Ž‡š ƒ• Dzƒ •‡– ‘ˆ —‹–• ™Š‘•‡ ƒŒ‘” ’”‘ ‡••‡• ‘ˆ •‡ —”‹–‹œƒ–‹‘ǡ desecuritization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one anotherdzǤ As most of the regional spaces, also the definition of the Black Sea Region is subjected to ƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡ƒ† ‘–‡•–‡†‹–‡”’”‡–ƒ–‹‘•ǣ‹–‡‡”‰‡†‹–Š‡‡ƒ”Ž›‹‡–‹‡•ƒ•ƒDz—”‹•Š ‘•–”— –‹‘dzƒ† ƒ‡ „ƒ –‘ –Š‡ ˆ‘”‡ ‹–Š‡ •‡ ‘†ŠƒŽˆ‘ˆ–Š‡ ™‘-Thousands, in ‘”†‡”–‘‹†‡–‹ˆ›–Š‡—”‘’‡ǯ••‘—–Š‡”ƒ†south-eastern „‘”†‡”Žƒ†•ǣDz–Š‡•‡ ‘†‡”ƒ ˆ‘”–Š‡Žƒ ‡ƒƒ•ƒ‰‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ‡–‹–›Šƒ•‹–•‘”‹‰‹•‹–Š‡—”‘’‡ƒ‹‘ǯ•ʹͲͲ͹ enlargement. With the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in the European Union,

30 L. K. Cheliotis and S. Xenakis, Crime, Fear of Crime and Punitiveness in Contemporary Greece, in Id. (eds.), Crime and Punishment in Contemporary Greece: International Comparative Perspectives, Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 1-43. 31 B. Buzan and O. Waever, cit., p. 4.

9

Dz—”‘’‡dz ‘™ ”‡ƒ Š‡† –Š‡ Žƒ  ‡ƒ •Š‘”‡• ˆ‘” –Š‡ ˆ‹”•– –‹‡ ‡˜‡”Ǥ • –Š‡  ‘˜‡† eastward, the Black Sea moved westward, and became regarded as an integral part of –Š‡ —”‘’‡ƒ ’”‘Œ‡ –dz32. Nevertheless, the Black Sea Region cannot be artificially disconnected by its neighbourhoodsǡ•‘–Šƒ–Dz–”ƒ•-r‡‰‹‘ƒŽ ‘ ‡’–•dz„‡ ƒ‡‘™ǡ leading to definitional, geopolitical and institutional overstretching and overlapping: along with the ones ‘ˆ DzŽƒ -‡†‹–‡””ƒ‡ƒ ‡ƒ• ‡‰‹‘dz ƒ† DzƒŽ–‹ -Black Seas Regi‘dzǡ–Š‡†‡ˆ‹‹–‹‘‘ˆDzŽƒ -Caspian Seas Region is particularly interesting for the interconnectedness of the actors and the way they are embedded in this security complex. Apart from that, the strategic significance of the Black Sea Region lies in at leƒ•––Š”‡‡”‡ƒ•‘•ǣͳǤDz‹–•Š‹–‡”Žƒ†•ƒ”‡ƒ‹’‘”–ƒ–’ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡—”‘’‡ƒ•‡ —”‹–› ‡˜‹”‘‡–dzǢʹǤ‹–Šƒ•ƒDz”‘Ž‡ƒ•ƒ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽƒ†Ž‘‰‹•–‹ ƒŽŠ—„ˆ‘”’‘™‡”’”‘–‡ –‹‘–‘ crisis-’”‘‡ƒ”‡ƒ•„‡›‘†–Š‡Žƒ ‡ƒ„ƒ•‹dzǢƒ†‹–‹•Dzƒ’Žƒ ‡‘ˆ•–”ƒ–‡‰‹ significance in its own right, with multiple crises on, or near, its shores, and numerous flashpoints ˆ‘””‡‰‹‘ƒŽ ‘ˆŽ‹ –•dz33. The Black-Caspian Seas Region has been selected as a case study in order to identify different instances of regional interactions, led by non-state actors on a transnational basis, with the purpose of analysing whether this poses a challenge to the tentative regionalisation(s) in progress which the states are trying to pursue, in spite of the fact that many of them struggle with weak institutional capacity, corruption, fragile rule-of- law, ungoverned territories, territorial and inter-ethnical disputes and conflicts. In the middle of Black Sea, Middle East and Caucasus regions, the prismatic and multidimensional role of Turkey has to be particularly introduced, not only for the virtue of its location, but also for the interlinked relationships that Ankara has established with the countries of every different regional block. Turkey can be identified at the intersection of a so-called Dz‡”—†ƒ–”‹ƒ‰Ž‡dz34, between the conflict regions of the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East. Turkey could be also defined as a pivotal state, in particular for its geographic and strategic position, and as Dz‹•—Žƒ–‘”dzǡƒ•’—–„›ƒ””› Buzan, since Dz‹–‹•‘–ƒ„Ž‡–‘„”‹‰–Š‡†‹ˆˆ‡”‡– ‘’Ž‡š‡•–‘‰‡–Š‡”‹to one coherent

32 P. Manoli, Reinvigorating Black Sea Cooperation: A Policy Discussion, Policy Report III, Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, 2010, p. 8. 33 I. O. Lesser, Global Trends, Regional Consequences: Wider Strategic Influences on the Black Sea, Paper, No. 4, ICBSS, Athens, November 2007, pp. 5-7. 34 B. Buzan and O. Waever, p. 394.

10 strategic arenadz35. Focusing on Turkish neighbourhood, Caucasus could be divided into two different sub-complexes: the Northern part - an ethnic mosaic with fringes of religious radicalism, and the Southern sector, which is characterized by complicate inside-out and outside-in interplays and issues of controversial alignments with adjacent countries and extra-regional actors.

The Black-Caspian Seas Region: challenges by non-state actors

One of the most relevant features of the region are the secessionist/separatist pressures which originate from both scattered minorities, enclaves, de facto independent polities ƒ† Dz‘-recognised •–ƒ–‡Ž‡–•dzǡ ƒ‡Ž› Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. These latter, in particular, are engaged in mimicking the activities of ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ‰‘˜‡”‡–•ǡ „‡‹‰ ‹˜‘Ž˜‡† ‹ Dz’ƒ”ƒ-diplomatic activitiesdzǡ †‹•’ƒ– Š‹‰ representatives abroad and trying to develop their status in the international context by means of collective legitimation. From the one side, Abkhazia and South Ossetia applied for membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)36, considering those affiliations as a sign of recognition of statehood; from the other side, and perhaps most interestingly, the four statelets grouped together in the so-called Commonwealth of Unrecognized States (CUS)37. The agreement to create the grouping was reached in 2001 in Stepanakert, –Š‡–Š‡ȋƒŽ•‘‘™•ƒDzCommunity for Democracy and Rights of Nationsdzƒ†Dz - ʹdzȌ ™ƒ• ‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡† ‹ ʹͲͲ͸ ‹ —Š—‹Ǥ  ʹͲͲ͹ –Š‡  •‹‰‡† ‹ ‹”ƒ•’‘Ž ƒ ‘‹– Declaration on principles of peaceful and fair settlement of the conflicts in which they are involved with the respective states; while in 2009 three of its members agreed on the abolition of visa regimes for their citizens. More recently, in 2012, the CUS Inter- Parliamentary Assembly appealed the Interstate Council of the Eurasian Economic

35 DzIf actors from the different complexes can act strategically together, the boundary of the complexes has growth thin, and the general conceptualisation is challenged. If a much strengthened Turkey actually becomes the regional great power it claims it is, it could trigger such a coalescence of its neighbours; it would then increasingly have to be analysed as a pole in some RSC, not only as insulator between RSCs. But for the foreseeable future Turkey will remain an insulator, but one that tries to handle its complicated •‹–—ƒ–‹‘ –Š”‘—‰Š ƒ ‘”‡ ƒ –‹˜‡ ’‘Ž‹ › –Šƒ –Šƒ– –”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽŽ› ƒ†‘’–‡† „› ‹•—Žƒ–‘”•dzǤ B. Buzan and O. Waever, cit., p. 395. 36This declaration was released in September 2008 during a joint press conference in Moscow, by Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity. 37Similarly, during the Nineties Abkhazia established relations with two other unrecognized states: Serbian Krajina in Croatia and the Respublika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11

Community, in order to express their willingness to participate in the process on regional integration. ’ƒ”–ˆ”‘–Š‡ƒ„‘˜‡‡–‹‘‡†Dz‹•–‹–—–‹‘ƒŽ‹•‡†‡š’‡”‹‡–dzǡ–Š‡”‡ƒ”‡•‡˜‡”ƒŽ‘–Š‡” transnational interactions among non-state actors in the region; of course, the ‘‡ –‹‘„‡–™‡‡‘”–Šƒ†‘—–Šƒ— ƒ•—•Šƒ•„‡‡ ‘•‹†‡”‡†–Š‡‘•–Dzƒ–—”ƒŽdz one, not only by virtue of various connecting routes Ȃ along the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea coasts, through the Darial Pass and the Roki tunnel Ȃ but also because of a –”ƒ†‹–‹‘ƒŽ ‹†‡ƒ ‘ˆ Dzƒ— ƒ•‹ƒ ‘ˆ‡†‡”ƒ–‹˜‡ —‹–›dzǤ Š‹• Žƒ––‡” ™ƒ• ‡„‘†‹‡† ‹ –Š‡ "Gorskaya Respublika" (Mountain Peoples' Republic), established in 1917, and was ƒŽŽ‡‰‡†Ž› ™‡ƒ‡‡† „› –Š‡ Dz‹•‘Žƒ–‹‘ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‘—–Š ƒ— ƒ•—• ˆ”‘ –Š‡ ‘”–Š ƒ— ƒ•—• ƒ† –Š‡ ”‡ƒ–‹‘ ‘ˆ –Š‡ Ǯ•‘- ƒŽŽ‡† ”ƒ• ƒ— ƒ•‹ƒ ‡†‡”ƒ–‹‘ǯ̶38. In the Post-Soviet period, the North and the South Caucasus are still tied together: the members of some ethnic groups such as the Ossetians, the Lezghis, or the Adyghe-Abkhaz live in different political-administrative units on both sides of the Caucasus mountain range39; and, more relevantly, the circulation of the combatants has enhanced the political and military linkages between the fighters of the Confederation of Caucasus People and the militias of the breakaway territories40. Nevertheless, the relations among the Caucasian minorities and armed non-state actors were jeopardised and the different fringes of indipendentism and irredentism remained fragmented, in other words they did not ‘˜‡”‰‡‹ƒDz•‘Ž‹†ƒ”‹–›ˆ”‘–dzǣŠ‡ Š‡ƒ††›‰Š‡ȋ‹” ƒ••‹ƒȌŽ‡ƒ†‡”•™‡”‡‹•’‹”‡† by competing national ambitio•Ǣ ˆ—”–Š‡”‘”‡ǡ Dz™Š‡”‡ƒ• ƒ ƒ–‹-Georgian feeling characterised the Confederation, which supported Abkhaz and Ossetian struggles for secession, Ingush representatives maintained a distance, and opposed the ‘ˆ‡†‡”ƒ–‹‘ǯ••‘Ž‹†ƒ”‹–›˜‹•-à-vis the Ossetian•dz41.

38 S. Lakoba, Abkhazia, Georgia and the Caucasus Confederation, in B. Coppieters, G. Nodia and I. D. Anchabadze (eds.), Georgians and Abkhazians: the search for a peace settlement, Sonderveröffentlichung des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, Vol. 3, Issues 2-3 of Caucasian regional studies, 1998. 39 A. Merlin, Relations between the North and South Caucasus: Divergent Paths?, Caucasus Analytical Digest Newsletter, No. 27, May 27, 2011. 40 Chechnyƒǯ•”‡•‹†‡–ƒœƒƒ†›”‘˜ƒ†–Š‡Ž‡ƒ†‡”•‘ˆ–Š‡‘–Š‡”‘”–Šƒ— ƒ•—•”‡’—„Ž‹ • immediately voiced their support for the decision to recognize Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, while welcoming their refugees. Furthermore, in August 2008, a Chechen battalion (the Yamadaev-led Dz‘•–‘dzȌ’ƒ”–‹ ‹’ƒ–‡†‹–Š‡‘’‡”ƒ–‹‘•‹‘—–Š••‡–‹ƒǤǤ‡”Ž‹ǡ ‹–ǤǢǤƒƒ”‡‹•Š˜‹Ž‹ǡThe north Caucasus: Bone of Contention or a Basis for RussianȂGeorgian Cooperation?, Caucasus Analytical Digest Newsletter, No. 27, May 27, 2011. 41 A. Merlin, cit.

12

The presence of an Azerbaijani minority in Dagestan, and Lezgin and Avar minorities in Azerbaijan throws another piece into the puzzle, especially because of the separatist claims coming from the Lezgin minority, which was supported by a few circles of the Lezgin intelligentsia based in Dagestan42. The Lezgin National Movement, "Sadval" (Unity) demanded for the unification of the Lezgin people (in Azerbaijan and Dagestan) in the Republic of Lezgistan; freely operating from the territory of Russia, it carried out a terrorist attack in the Baku subway in 1994. The antagonism between Azerbaijan and Dagestan existed with the connivance of the Russian central government whose intent was to exert a leverage on all the Post-Soviet countries; beside it, while Azerbaijani government officially supported Russian campaigns in the North Caucasus, Azerbaijani NGOs and CSOs sympathized with the Chechen rebels: several charitable structures and hospitals provided humanitarian assistance to the fighters and received the refugees crossing the borders, among which some followers of the Salafi Islam. More recently, ’‡”•‹•–‡– ‘‘’‡”ƒ–‹˜‡ Ž‹ƒ‰‡• ‡‡”‰‡† „‡–™‡‡ –Š‡ œ‡”„ƒ‹Œƒ‹ ƒƒƒ– ȋDz ‘”‡•– BrothersdzȌƒ†‘”–Šƒ— ƒ•‹ƒ ƒƒƒ–ȋDzƒ— ƒ•—•‹”ƒ–‡dzȌ43. Moving from the Caucasus to a broader geopolitical area, one interesting transnational vector to be analysed is the Abkhazian attempt to develop different sources of leverage for their independence from Georgia, looking at all the Circassian world including Turkey. As in the Azeri-Russian case, in spite of the Turkish official support to the Georgian side, the Circassian community living in Turkey succeeded in wielding some influence on the government led by Süleyman Demirel44: in 1992 Turks of Abkhazian descent founded the CaucasianȂAbkhazian Solidarity Committee (KafkasȂAbkhaz Dayanisma Komitesi) to coordinate the assistance given to Abkhazia and organise demonstrations against the Georgian invasion of Abkhazia, contesting at the same time the posture held by the government in Ankara; moreover, some of these Turks of Abkhazian descent volunteered to fight in the breakaway republic. Beside that informal solidarity towards Sukhumi in its campaign to achieve independence from Tbilisi, and in spite of the repeated reaffirmation by Ankara of its support to Georgian territorial

42 A. Valiyev, Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus: A Pragmatic relationship, Caucasus Analytical Digest Newsletter, No. 27, May 27, 2011. 43 M. Vatchagaev, Azerbaijani Jamaat Cooperates with Caucasus Emirate, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9, Issue: 73, April 12, 2012. 44 ǤŠ‡—Š‘˜ǡ‡ ‘‰‹–‹‘‹–Š‘—– †‡’‡†‡ ‡ǣ„Šƒœ‹ƒǯ• –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‘–‡š–ǡ—”ƒ•‹ƒ Policy Memo No. 24, September 5, 2012.

13 integrity, in 2001 the Turkish company Kara-Elmas signed an agreement with the Abkhazian government to exploit a coal mine in the breakaway republic. The context of protracted violence in the breakaway territories of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova has been particularly conducive for the emergence of criminal networks, as these statelets became Dz‰”‡›œ‘‡•dzby denying the access not only to the authorities of the respective national governments but also to international monitoring missions ƒ†ƒ –‘”•ǣDz–Š‡•‡—”‡•‘Ž˜‡†ˆ”ƒ‰‡–•‘ˆ–Š‡ ‘˜‹‡–’‹”‡‘™•‡”˜‡ ƒ• •Š‹’‡– points for weapons, narcotics, and victims of trafficking and as breeding grounds for transnational organiœ‡† ”‹‡dz45. At the same time, it would be deceptive to consider this scourge confined to the secessionist enclaves: in Georgia, for example, contraband and smuggling routes pass through not only Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region but also the Red Bridge, Lagodekhi and Jandara (border with Azerbaijan); the Sarpi checkpoint in Adjaria and Akhaltsikhe (at Turkish border), Kazbegi (border with Russia); and Ninotsminda (border with Armenia)46Ǣƒ†‡˜‡‘”‡‹–‡”‡•–‹‰Ž›ǡDz–Š‡•‡ [smuggling] groups collaborate with each other regardless of their ethnic origins and ’‘Ž‹–‹ ƒŽ‘”‹‡–ƒ–‹‘dz47, adjusting their modus operandi according to a more pragmatic stance: for example, during the Nineties, the Chechen groups recruited in their criminal syndicates Armenians, Georgians, Russians, and Ukrainians48. As a matter of fact, the ongoing process of establishing effective law enforcement agencies and solving the problem of corruption of border authorities in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and the crucial position of the Cau ƒ•—•„‡–™‡‡–Š‡Dz•‘—” ‡•dzƒ†–Š‡Dz†‡•–‹ƒ–‹‘•dz‘ˆ–Š‡ illicit good and services, make this region a major criminal corridor; illegal transits have ‘•–Ž›‘ —””‡†ƒ†•–‹ŽŽ‘ —”–Š”‘—‰Š–Š‡Dz ”ƒ-œ‡”„ƒ‹ŒƒdzǡDzƒ‰‘”‘ƒ”ƒ„ƒŠ-Iran- œ‡”„ƒ‹Œƒdzǡ Dz ”ƒ-Azerbaijan-Russia- ƒ’ƒdzǡ Dz ”ƒ-Azerbaijan-Georgia-—”‘’‡dz ”‘—–‡•Ǣ beside it, shuttle trade (i.e. between Georgia and Turkey and Ukraine and Turkey) has paved the way to trafficking of diverse illegal commodities. An out-and-‘—–DzŽƒ ‡ƒ ‘—–‡dzȋ™Š‹ ŠŠƒ•Œ‘‹‡†ƒ––Š‡ Š‹’–Š‡DzƒŽƒ‘—–‡ƒ†–Š‡Dz‘”–Š‡”‘—–‡dzȌ˜‹ƒ

45 R. D. Asmus and B. P. Jackson, The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom, Policy Review, No. 125, June/July 2004, p. 7. 46 A. Kukhianidze, A. Kupatadze and R. Gotsiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region of Georgiaǡ‡”‹ ƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›ǯ•”ƒ•ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ”‹‡and Corruption Center (TraCCC) - Georgia Office, Tbilisi, 2004, p. 7 and 11. 47 A. Kukhianidze, A. Kupatadze and R. Gotsiridze, cit., p. 21. 48 G. E. Curtis, Involvement of Russian Organised Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Chechnya, Library of Congress - Federal Research Division, Washington, October 2002, p. 24.

14

Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine to Romania and the Baltic and Nordic countries, has been developed, through the exploitation of the Black Sea ports including Poti, Batumi, Odessa, Constanta and Varna (beside Sukhumi and Gudauta in Abkhazia) as transit-points even from Latin America, and Moldovan territory as an important location for storage and further processing49.

The Black Sea States: regional (non)responses

The existence of the above-mentioned challenges to the states of Black Sea Region does not necessarily mean per se that their expected behaviours ‹•‘‡‘ˆDz•‡Žˆ-”‡–”‡ƒ–dzƒ† inward-lookingness; state consolidation, rather, might be pursued also through the involvement in process of regional institutionalization. As the state has to face an internal threat, it might decide to undertake an omni-balancing strategy that is balancing the internal threat by bandwagoning, through the alliance or merely the association with an external actor50. This latter is normally identified with a regional hegemonic power, but could be otherwise intended as a regional organization functioning as a mechanism of institutional entrapment or taming. Put in other terms, regional arrangements of governance would be expected in the Black Sea Region, since it includes a number of countries dealing with internal threats from non-state actors, which operate at the transnational level. Moreover, those regional arrangements would be oriented toward the reinforcement of state prerogatives and infrastructures. The most relevant try of regional institutionalisation in the Black Sea Region is considered the Organization of Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC), whose establishment as an accomplished regional organisation dates back to the end of the Nineties, even though it was conceived already in 1992 in Istanbul51. In 1995 the BSEC ‘‹––‡†–‘Dz ‘ ‡”–‡†actions through bilateral agreements with a view of combating organized crime, drug dealing, illicit traffic of weapons and radioactive materials, all

49 Leo S. Lin, Transnational Organized Crime in the Black Sea Region and Its Impact on the European Union, http://www.athens-securityforum.org/ 50 David S., Explaining Third World Alignments, World Politics, Vol., 43, Issue 2, 1991, pp. 233-256. 51 As is stipulated in the Istanbul Summit Declaration of 25 June 1992, the basic objective of the BSEC is to turn the Black Sea region into an area of peace, stability and prosperity, through the promotion of friendly and good-neighbourly relations among the participating nations.

15 acts of –‡””‘”‹•ƒ†‹ŽŽ‡‰ƒŽ„‘”†‡” ”‘••‹‰•dz52; furthermore, the BSEC member states signed an agreement and two later additional protocols dealing with cooperation in combating crime53, and established a special working group and a Network of Liaison Officers. Cooperation for the containment of the terrorist threat as well as the fight against corruption merged in the counter - crime sector, although the whole process of coordination and collaboration has been rather limited to the declaratory level. Beside BSEC, Black Sea Littoral States started to cooperate in the field of maritime security through the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (Blackseafor) and the naval operation Black Sea Harmony: both of these initiatives were respectively launched and initiated by Turkey, although their endurance has been hindered by the actual regional fragmentation and by the current impossibility to heal two mains cleavages: from the one side, between Turkey and Armenia, from the other side between Georgia and Russia. The emergence of a grouping constituted by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) has been perceived exactly as a way for moving away from the Russian sphere ‘ˆ‹ˆŽ—‡ ‡ǡ‹ˆ‘–‡˜‡ƒDzƒ–‹-—••‹ƒ–‘‘Ždztout court; by the way, in 2002 GUAM (at that time including also Uzbekistan, therefore GUUAM) •‹‰‡† ƒ ƒ‰”‡‡‡– Dz‹ –Š‡ Field of Combat Against Terrorism, Organized Crime and Other Dangerous Types of ”‹‡•dz ƒ† ‡•–ƒ„Ž‹•Š‡† ƒ –‡”•–ƒ–‡ ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ ƒƒ‰‡‡– ›•–‡ ™Š‹ Š was conceived as a coordination mechanism under the strict surveillance and control of the states. In spite of the structural heterogeneity of the states allegedly belonging to the Black Sea Region, the regional initiatives and projects have proliferated. The Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard Cooperation Forum was established as a further cooperative arrangement to prevent smuggling, illegal migration and as well as strengthen the safety and security of navigation in the Black Sea; its mission is complemented by the activities of the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre. Moreover, other platforms have been created, often making the region multiply- crossed by overlapping alignments, cooperative devices and endeavours, such as the Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea, Border Defence Initiative/Black Sea Border Security Initiative and Black Sea Forum. Admittedly, this redundancy of instruments is leading to ineffectiveness, all the more so as they do

52 Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Statement of the High Level meeting of the BSEC Participating States, Bucharest, June 30, 1995. 53 The agreement was signed in 1998 in Corfu, the protocols respectively in 2002 in Kyiv and in 2004 in Athens.

16 not carry any operational provision to tackle terrorist and criminal activities, interactions between insurgents and armed groups, illicit flows of people and commodities. The process of region - building, which would have been encouraged by the Black Sea ‘—–”‹‡•ǯ ‘‘•‡ —”‹–› ‘ ‡”•ǡŠƒ•„‡‡”‡†— ‡†–‘ƒ‹•–ƒ ‡‘ˆ Dz•—‹–”›”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•dzǤ

A multi-dyadic approach to the Black Sea Region: the Turkish Ȃ Georgian case

In spite of the attempts of regional institutionalization mentioned above, it is difficult to consider the collection of Black Sea littoral states and their close neighbours ƒDzƒ–—”ƒŽdz ‘” ƒ Dz‘„Œ‡ –‹˜‡dz ”‡‰‹‘ǣ Dz Šƒ”ƒ terised by cultural, historical and geographical Š‡–‡”‘‰‡‡‹–›ǡ –Š‡ ”‡‰‹‘ǯ• „‘—†ƒ”‹‡• Šƒ˜‡ •Š‹ˆ–‡† ‘–‹—‘—•Ž›ǡ ƒ• Black Sea regionalism may be described as an expression of multifaceted networks. Indeed, many of –Š‡”‡‰‹‘ǯ• littoral states (i.e., Bulgaria, Georgia Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine) and adjacent states (i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova) belong to other regions ƒ• ™‡ŽŽ ȋ‹Ǥ‡Ǥǡ ‘—–Š‡ƒ•– —”‘’‡ǡ –Š‡ ƒ— ƒ•—•ǡ ‡–”ƒŽ •‹ƒǡ ‡†‹–‡””ƒ‡ƒȌdz54. The review of some of the main non-state actors operating in the Black-Caspian Seas Region and the account of the most evident trans-state interactions there underline the fact that although these agents aim at challenging the state structures, detouring the central ˆ‘”‡‹‰’‘Ž‹ ›‘”‰ƒ•‘ˆ‰‘˜‡”‡–‘”‡”‡Ž›‡š’Ž‘‹–‹‰–Š‡Dz•‡ —”‹–›Š‘Ž‡•dzǡ–Š‡›†‘ not really act as an alternative source of region-building, except from the eccentric experiment represented by the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations. In other words, changing the order of the operands might not change the result: that is the reason why a multi-dyadic approach to the Black Sea Region seems to be more suitable to describe both inter-state relations and trans-state interactions, and they respective preference for bilateral linkages. An emblematical example of the prevalence of a multi-dyadic pattern might be provided by the positive course of relationships between Turkey and Georgia since 1992: in the first half of the Nineties, a Treaty on friendship, cooperation and good neighbourly relations was signed between the two countries, while Ankara sup’‘”–‡† ‡‘”‰‹ƒǯ• admission as a member to the BSEC in 1992 and limitedly acted as a counterbalance to Russian overlay in the South Caucasus. In 1997, the two countries signed a military

54 P. Manoli, cit., p. 9.

17 cooperation agreement, while in 1999 Turkey agreed to grant financial and technical aid to the Georgian armed forces over a 5-years period and assistance for the modernization of Georgian military training facilities. In the development of his relations with Demirel, Shevardnadze has yet to deal with the restraints posed by Georgian commitments vis-à-vis Russia, including the acceptance to enter the Commonwealth of Independent States and the concession of basing rights to Moscow55. Generally, Georgia was contended by —••‹ƒǡ ™Š‹ Š †‹†ǯ– ƒ ‡’– ‹–• independence in foreign policy and its possibility to deal with Black Sea Region, and Turkish influence. However, bilateral relations between Turkey and Georgia seamlessly stepped up during the following years, as Erdogan reaffirmed its commitment to Georgian sovereignty, while promoting economic and political cooperation between the two countries56. Bilateral ties are mutually important: from a Georgian perspective, Turkey seems to be instrumental to any attempts of moving away from Russian sphere of influence, while from a Turkish perspective, Georgia would act as a gateway to Eurasia and Middle EastǣDz—”‡›ǯ••—’’‘”– ‘ˆ„‹Ž‹•‹ ‹• ƒ‹‡† ƒ– ‡Šƒ ‹‰ ‡‘”‰‹ƒ ‹†‡’‡†‡ ‡ƒ†’”‘–‡ –‹‰–Š‡ƒ”‡ƒ•™Š‹ Š–Š‡’‹’‡Ž‹‡‹•’”‘Œ‡ –‡†–‘’ƒ••dz57. There are few infrastructural projects which the two countries are developing58: they ”‡’”‡•‡–‘–‘Ž›ƒ•‹‰‹ˆ‹ ƒ–ˆƒ –‘”‹–Š‡’”‘ ‡••‘ˆ‘—–Šƒ— ƒ•—• ‘—–”‹‡•ǯ‰Ž‘„ƒŽ integration but also a tool to establish new vectors and connectors between Europe and Asia, namely between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Central Asia. In spite of this positive relationship, there are two elements that raise issues to bilateral relations between Georgia and Turkey: from the one side, the independence claims made by ethnic minorities, and from the other side, the tensions for the control of pipelines. In these two cases we could notice the intervention of non-state actors in the structural system: in this process, we could assume that transnational and regional actors playing in the TurkishȂGeorgian relationship constitute a threat both to regional integration and bilateral inter-state cooperation.

55 L. Fuller, Turkey: the tussle for influence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, Transition, June 14, 1996, p. 14. 56 Turkish Foreign Minister Visits Georgia, RFE/RL Newsline, 18 September 2003; Georgian Ȃ European Policy and Legal Advice Centre, Georgian Economic Trends 2003, Tbilisi, 2002, p. 34; E. Karagiannis, The Turkish Ȃ Georgian Partnership and the pipeline factor, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2004, p. 15; Library of Congress, Georgia Ȃ A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Washington DC, 1994. 57E. Karagiannis, cit., p. 10. 58 The most relevant ones are the Kars Ȃ Tblisi Railway, connecting Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and the Rize Ȃ PotiFiber Optic Cable Line.

18 a. Ethnic minorities

Georgia is a conglomerate of people and ethnic groups. The most important and the dominant is the Kartvelian, composed by Georgian, Mingrelian, Svan and Adjar subgroups, each with its own religion and language. This type of ethnic strife could have negatively affected TurkishȂGeorgian relationship, as the ties between Turkey and Abkhazia have caused some concerns to Tbilisi. For example, in 2001, Turkish company Kara Ȃ Elmas signed an agreement with the Abkhazian government to exploit a coal mine in the breakaway republic. Adjaria also looks to Ankara in its demands for greater autonomy, namely Adjars living on the Turkish side as well. It depends in particular on religious Muslim faith of Adjars: the others Georgians view these latters with suspicion, and also their loyalty is questioned as they allegedly have too proȂTurkish sympathies59. A further cause of tension depends on the issue of repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks, a mixed group including people of Turk descent as well as Turkicized and Islamicizied Georgians. During the Forties, they were deported to Central Asia, mostly to Uzbekistan, on the pretext that the military security of the TurkishȂSoviet border needed to be strengthened. Many Georgians claim that the Meskhetian Turks have lost their links to Georgia and hence have no rights that would justify the largeȂ scale upheaval resettlement would cause. ‘–Š‡”Dz‘•ƒ‹ –‹Ž‡dz‹• ”‡’”‡•‡–‡†„›–Š‡ Turkic minority of Azerbaijanis living in the south-east areas of Georgia. This minority still complains about the lack of political representation and being subjected to diverse discriminatory conditions60. Although an ethnical dimension is present in of the relationship between Ankara and Tbilisi, the former Georgian governments have considered its bilateral relations with Turkey too important to be spoiled by those issues. On the other side, Turkish government is perfectly aware both of the increasing importance of Georgia as an energy transit country and the impossibility of bypassing Russian influence. While the

59 It is important to remind that Adjaria was part of Ottoman Empire until 1878, when it was incorporated into the Russian Empire. Then it received the status of an autonomous republic in 1923. 60 Furthermore, there is a Georgia-related subgroup which is located on the Laz, on the eastern Black Sea coast, and several hundred thousand Islamicized Georgians in the north-eastern inland of Turkey. However they have shown no interest in being reunited with Georgia, which has not controlled the region since the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, Georgian nationaŽ‹•–• ƒ› •‡‡ –‘ ”‡˜‹˜‡ ‹ –Š‡ ˆ—–—”‡ ƒ Dz ”‡ƒ–‡” ‡‘”‰‹ƒdzǡ „› ƒ‹‰ ‹””‡†‡–‹•– Žƒ‹• ‘ —”‹•Š •‘‹ŽǤ L. Fuller, ‡‘”‰‹ƒǯ• œ‡”„ƒ‹Œƒ‹ ‹‘”‹–› ƒ‹”• grievances, RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Vol. 5, Issue 12, 2002; G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser, —”‡›ǯ•‡™ Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, Westview Press, 1993, p. 25; O. Hoiris and S. M. Yurukel, Contrasts and Solutions in the Caucasus, Aarhus University Press, 1998, p. 444.

19 potential for GeorgianȂTurkish disputes over ethnic minorities certainly exists, the two countries have been scrupulously respectful of one a‘–Š‡”ǯ•–‡””‹–‘”‹ƒŽ‹–‡‰”‹–›Ǥ c. Pipeline issues

The considerable amount of gas and oil resources in the Caspian and Caucasus regions constitutes the most accessible alternative energy supplies not only for Europe but also for Turkey; energy issues are exactly the other aspect that strictly links Turkey and Georgia and in presence of transnational and regional actors this could exacerbate tensions or otherwise strengthen economic integration. The infrastructural project of the Baku Ȃ Tbilisi Ȃ Ceyhan pipeline emerged in the Nineties, through a cooperative endeavour among Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia61. The BCT was warmly supported by the United States, which viewed in this conduit a route for exporting Azeri oil: therefore it was crucial to bypass Russian power in South Caucasus for the transport oil through Europe. Turkish integration to Euro-Atlantic structures, its support to Georgian and Azeri military forces and its backing of the Chechen cause deteriorated the relationship between Moscow and Ankara, at least until the inauguration of a more balanced policy towards the neighbours initiated by Erdogan62. This new deal included the formation of Blue Stream pipeline, which carries natural gas from Russia to Turkey. As a result the development of pipelines constitutes one of the main factors of the relationship between Georgia and Turkey, as both of them have been elaborating their ˆ‘”‡‹‰ ’‘Ž‹ › ‹ –‡”• ‘ˆ „‡‹‰ ƒ DzŠ—„dzǡ Dz‰ƒ–‡™ƒ›dzǡ Dz–”ƒ•‹– ‘—–”›dzǡ ‹ ‘–Š‡” ™‘”†• capitalising on their positional potential: Dz’ipelines across the Transcaucasus to the Black Sea and through Turkey to the Mediterranean are the least costly way to get œ‡”„ƒ‹Œƒǯ• ‘‹Ž –‘ –Š‡ ‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ƒ”‡–dz63. This common strategic interest has increasingly encouraged the strengthening of bilateral relations between Georgia and Turkey, to the point that Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit once affirmed that Dz ‡‘”‰‹ƒǯ•

61 In Turkey, BOTA, the nationalised pipeline company, is responsible for the construction of BTC, under a Lump-Sum Turnkey Agreement. The route chosen is one of the most expensive possible for Caspian oil ‡š’‘”–•Ǣ ƒ ‘”†‹‰ –‘ –Š‡ Šƒ‹” ‘ˆ ǡ –Š‡ ’”‘Œ‡ –ǯ• ’”‘ˆ‹–ƒ„‹Ž‹–› ‹• †‡’‡†‡– ‘ Dzˆ”‡‡ ’—„Ž‹  ‘‡›dz becoming available, principally loans from publicly-funded financial institutions. 62 Š‡†‘ –”‹‡‘ˆDzœ‡”‘’”‘„Ž‡•™‹–Š‡‹‰Š„‘—”•dzƒ†–Š‡‹†‡ƒ‘ˆDz‡ƒ ‡ƒ–Š‘‡ǡ‡ƒ ‡‹–Š‡‘”Ž†dzǡ suggested by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, could clarify the last approach ˆ”‘ƒ”ƒǯ•‰‘˜‡”‡–Ǥ 63 E. Karagiannis, cit., p. 15.

20

’”‘„Ž‡• ƒ”‡ ‘—” ’”‘„Ž‡•Ǥ ‡‘”‰‹ƒǯ• •‡ —”‹–› ‹• ‘—” •‡ —”‹–›dz64. From his own side, ”‡•‹†‡– Š‡˜ƒ”†ƒ†œ‡ †‡• ”‹„‡† ‡‘”‰‹ƒ Dz‘– ƒ• –Š‡ •‘—–Š‡” ˆŽƒ ‘ˆ —••‹ƒǯ• strategic zone, but rather the northern flank Ȃ extending from Israel to Central Asia Ȃ of Turkey ƒ†ǯ••–”ƒ–‡‰‹ ‹–‡”‡•–•dz65. The Government of Georgia applied to several large banks for the financing needed construct a new 315 km high voltage transmission Ž‹‡ˆ”‘ ƒ”†ƒ„ƒ‹–‘‡•–ƒ’‘‹ƒ†ƒǮ„ƒ -to-„ƒ ǯ substation at the Turkish border - EnergoTrans Ltd implements the project.66

Final remarks and venues for future research

Our preliminary research proposal has been motivated by the interest in exploring a •—’’‘•‡† Dz–”ƒ•ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ –—”dz ‹ ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ •–—†‹‡• ƒ† –‘ ™Šƒ– ‡š–‡– •–ƒ–‡• ƒ† ‘- state actors converge or rather diverge in their patterns or regional interactions. In the background there is a question about the maintenance by the state of a role of Dz”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•ǯ• ‰ƒ–‡‡‡’‡”dzǤ Š‡ ‡‡”‰‹‰ Ž‹–‡”ƒ–—”‡ ƒ„‘—– •Šƒ†‘™ ”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹• ƒ† trans-state regionalism, along with and the tentative introduction of the concept of Dz†‹ˆˆ—•‡ ”‡‰‹‘Š‘‘†dz Šƒ˜‡ „‡‡ ‡’Ž‘›‡† –‘ •’‡ŽŽ ‘—– –™‘ ƒ‹ •‡–• ‘ˆ ”‡•‡ƒ” Š questions. Throughout the paper, our try has been the tracing of instance of regional interactions, led by non-state actors on a transnational basis, in other words we sampled examples of trans-state regionalism in the Black-Caspian Seas Region. Although the respective non-state actors actually aim at challenging the state structures, detouring the central foreign policy organs of government or merely exploiting the Dz•‡ —”‹–›Š‘Ž‡•dzǡ–Š‡›†‘‘–”‡ƒŽŽ›ƒ –ƒ•ƒƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡•‘—” ‡‘ˆ”‡‰‹‘-building. The

64E. Karagiannis, cit., p. 24. 65 A. M. Koknar, Turkey and the Caucasus: security and military challenges, in M. Radu (ed.), Dangerous ‡‹‰Š„‘”Š‘‘†ǣ‘–‡’‘”ƒ”› ••—‡•‹—”‡›ǯ• ‘”‡‹‰‡Žƒ–‹‘•, The Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, 2003, p. 98. 66 Black Sea Energy Transmission System, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, March 21, 2011, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/workingwithus/procurement/notices/project/110224a.shtml. In June 2012 Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a deal to build a $7 billion Trans-Anatolian natural-gas pipeline (TANAP); the project would carry Azerbaijani natural gas to European markets without passing through Russia or Iran. Another attempt to lessen European dependence on Russian energy is Nabucco pipeline (Turkey - Austria gas pipeline), which has been planned to transit from Erzurum to Baumgartner with the goal of diversifying natural gas suppliers and delivery routes to Europe. Nabucco will also connect oil from Tbilisi and Baku. The project is backed by several European Union states and the United States and is considered a rival project to the Gazprom-led South Stream one. At the same time, there are some doubts concerning the viability of supplies. The main supplier is expected to be Azerbaijan in cooperation with Turkmenistan, Iraq and Egypt. Companies and partner involved are BOTAS Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD, GDF SUEZ Company, MOL Group, OMV Group and Transgaz.

21 odd exception seems to be represented by the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations, wherein four breakaway territories belonging to the same regional space grouped together in a pseudo-regional organisation: this latter might be intended as a means of collective legitimation and a strategy to mimic the attributes of statehood. While we cannot exclude tout court the tendency of non-state actors to cluster on a regional basis, we can affirm that a multi-dyadic approach to the Black Sea Region seems to be more suitable to describe both inter-state relations and trans-state interactions, and they respective preference for bilateral linkages. The last part of the paper actually serves the purpose of demonstrating that trans-state interactions could not produce major changes in the inter-state relations between Georgia and Turkey, at least over the last twenty years. The intervention of non-state actors in the structural system might constitute a threat both to regional integration and bilateral cooperation, but they have not spoiled the development of a positive course between Ankara and Tbilisi. As we stated above, this is to be considered a tentative and introductory study; our intention is to improve the methodological structure and to broaden the terms of comparison, possibly including an analysis of trans-state regionalism in the Central Asian Region. In order to establish a defined pattern of trans Ȃ state relations and to complement our analysis with other case studies, namely located in Eurasian region, our venues for future research are oriented to apply a critical approach, developed on three different levels of analysis: firstly analysing the existing perceptions within the respective states, –Š”‘—‰Š •‘‡ Dz ivil society Ž‡•‡•dz, thanks the analysis of media and documents; secondly interviewing on the field few experts and advisors; thirdly carrying out a document analysis and a content analysis of primary sources such as statements and declarations issues by members of the respective governments, in order to identify possible perceived challenges to statehood.

22

References

Acharya A., International Relations and Area Studies: Towards a New Synthesis?, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2006;

Asmus R. D. and Jackson B. P., The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom, Policy Review, No. 125, June/July 2004;

Bach D., New Regionalism as an Alias: Regionalisation through Trans-State Networks, in A. Grant and F. Soderbaum (eds.), New Regionalism in Africa, Ashgate, 2003;

Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Statement of the High Level meeting of the BSEC Participating States, Bucharest, June 30, 1995; Black Sea Energy Transmission System, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, March 21, 2011, www.ebrd.com/pages/workingwithus/procurement/notices/project/110224a.shtml;

Boege V., Brown A., Clements K., Nolan A., On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging –ƒ–‡•ǣ –ƒ–‡ ‘”ƒ–‹‘ ‹ –Š‡ ‘–‡š– ‘ˆ Ǯ ”ƒ‰‹Ž‹–›ǯ, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 2008;

Bozzo L., Terroristi, insorti o partigiani? Le apori‡ Ž‹‰—‹•–‹ Š‡ †‡ŽŽƒ Dz‰—‡””ƒ ƒŽ –‡””‘”‹•‘dz, Quaderni di Relazioni Internazionali, n. 14, May 2011, pp. 86-94;

Buzan B. and Waever O., Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Cheliotis L. K. and Xenakis S., Crime, Fear of Crime and Punitiveness in Contemporary Greece, in Id. (eds.), Crime and Punishment in Contemporary Greece: International Comparative Perspectives, Peter Lang, 2011; Curtis G. E., Involvement of Russian Organised Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Chechnya, Library of Congress - Federal Research Division, Washington, October 2002;

David S., Explaining Third World Alignments, World Politics, Vol., 43, Issue 2, 1991, pp. 233-256;

De Lombaerde P., Soderbaum F., Van Langenhove L. and Baert F., Problems and Divides in Comparative Regionalism, in F. Laursen (ed.), Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Ashgate, 2010;

Fawcett L., The History and Concept of Regionalism, UNU-CRIS Working Papers W- 2013/5, Bruges, 2013;

Fuller G. E. and Lesser I. O., —”‡›ǯ•‡™ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹ •ǣ ”‘–Š‡ƒŽƒ•–‘‡•–‡”Š‹ƒ, Westview Press, 1993;

23

Fuller L., ‡‘”‰‹ƒǯ•œ‡”„ƒ‹Œƒ‹ minority airs grievances, RFE/RL Caucasus Report, Vol. 5, Issue 12, 2002;

Fuller L., Turkey: the tussle for influence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, Transition, 14 June 1996;

Georgian Ȃ European Policy and Legal Advice Centre, Georgian Economic Trends 2003, Tbilisi, 2002; Hettne B., ‡›‘†–Š‡Ǯ‡™ǯ‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, Issue 4, 2005, pp. 543-571;

Hoiris O. and Yurukel S. M., Contrasts and Solutions in the Caucasus, Aarhus University Press, 1998;

Karagiannis E., The Turkish Ȃ Georgian Partnership and the pipeline factor, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2004, pp. 13-26;

Koknar A. M., Turkey and the Caucasus: security and military challenges, in Radu M. (ed.), Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemp‘”ƒ”› ••—‡• ‹ —”‡›ǯ• ‘”‡‹‰ ‡Žƒ–‹‘•, The Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, 2003;

Kukhianidze A., Kupatadze A. and Gotsiridze R., Smuggling through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region of Georgia, ‡”‹ ƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›ǯ•”ƒ•ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ”‹‡ƒd Corruption Center (TraCCC) - Georgia Office, Tbilisi, 2004;

Lakoba S., Abkhazia, Georgia and the Caucasus Confederation, in B. Coppieters, G. Nodia and I. D. Anchabadze (eds.), Georgians and Abkhazians: the search for a peace settlement, Sonderveröffentlichung des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, Vol. 3, Issues 2-3 of Caucasian regional studies, 1998; Lesser I. O., Global Trends, Regional Consequences: Wider Strategic Influences on the Black Sea, Paper, No. 4, ICBSS, Athens, November 2007;

Library of Congress, Georgia Ȃ A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Washington DC, 1994;

Lin L. S., Transnational Organized Crime in the Black Sea Region and Its Impact on the European Union, http://www.athens-securityforum.org/;

Manoli P., Reinvigorating Black Sea Cooperation: A Policy Discussion, Policy Report III, Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, 2010; Merlin A., Relations between the North and South Caucasus: Divergent Paths?, Caucasus Analytical Digest Newsletter, No. 27, May 27, 2011; Muller H., Security Cooperation, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse-Kappen, B. A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, Sage, 2002, pp. 369 Ȃ 391.

National Intelligence Council, Non-state Actors: Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States, Conference Report, 2007;

24

Risse-Kappen T., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction, in Id. (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge University Press, 1995;

Ruggie J. G., Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, International Organization, Vol. 47, Issue 1, 1993, pp. 139-174;

Soderbaum F., Whose regionalism in Africa?, GREAT Insights, Vol. 1, No. 9, 2012; Solingen E., Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy, Princeton University Press, 1998;

Solioz C. and Stubbs P., Emergent regional co-operation in South East Europe: towards Ǯ‘’‡”‡‰‹‘ƒŽ‹•ǯǫ, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 1-16; SØrensen G., Changes in Statehood: The Transformation of International Relations, Palgrave, 2001; Sperling J., National Security Cultures, Technologies of Public Good Supply and Security Governance, in E. J. Kirchner and J. Sperling (eds.), National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance, Routledge, 2010: Sperling J., State Attributes and System Properties, in D. Bourantonis, K. Ifantis, P. Panagiotes and I. Tsakonas (eds.), Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization, Routledge, 2008; Stenson K. and Lea J., Security, sovereignty and non-state governance 'From Below', The Canadian Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 22, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 9-28;

Turkish Foreign Minister Visits Georgia, RFE/RL Newsline, 18 September 2003;

Valiyev A., Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus: A Pragmatic relationship, Caucasus Analytical Digest Newsletter, No. 27, May 27, 2011; Vatchagaev M., Azerbaijani Jamaat Cooperates with Caucasus Emirate, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9, Issue: 73, April 12, 2012; Wiegmann G., Local Alliances Providing Local Governance in Tajikistan?, Research ”‘Œ‡ – Dz ‘—–‹‰ ˆ‘” –ƒ–‡-Building, Stability & Violent Conflict: The Institutional ”ƒ‡™‘” ‘ˆ ƒ— ƒ•‹ƒ ƒ† ‡–”ƒŽ •‹ƒ ”ƒ•‹–‹‘ƒŽ ‘ ‹‡–‹‡•dzǡ ”‡‡ ‹˜‡”•‹–› ‘ˆ Berlin, 2005; Williams P., Violent Non-state Actors and National and International Security, International Relations and Security Network, Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, 2008; Wiseman G., Ǯ‘Ž›Žƒ–‡”ƒŽ‹•ǯ ƒ† ‡™ ‘†‡• ‘ˆ Ž‘„ƒŽ ‹ƒŽ‘‰—‡, in C. Jönsson and R. Langorne (eds.), Diplomacy, vol. III, Sage, 2004;

Zakareishvili P., The north Caucasus: Bone of Contention or a Basis for RussianȂGeorgian Cooperation?, Caucasus Analytical Digest Newsletter, No. 27, May 27, 2011;

25

Zhemukhov S., ‡ ‘‰‹–‹‘ ™‹–Š‘—– †‡’‡†‡ ‡ǣ „Šƒœ‹ƒǯ• –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ‘–‡š–, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 24, September 5, 2012.

26