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The Sources of Conflicting Relations with Russia in Armenia and Georgia University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal College of Arts and Sciences 4-6-2020 Diverging Neighbors in the Near Abroad: The Sources of Conflicting Relations With Russia in Armenia and Georgia Jake H. Fallek University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Fallek, Jake H., "Diverging Neighbors in the Near Abroad: The Sources of Conflicting Relations With Russia in Armenia and Georgia" 06 April 2020. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/251. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/251 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Diverging Neighbors in the Near Abroad: The Sources of Conflicting Relations With Russia in Armenia and Georgia Abstract When Armenia and Georgia exited the Soviet Union in 1991, massive popular majorities in both countries voted for independence in nationwide referenda. Over thirty-years later, Armenia and Georgia have chartered two radically distinctive pathways for their states within the near abroad. Tbilisi has become a reliable opponent of Russia within the post-Soviet space as it pursues integration into NATO and the European Union. Yerevan, by contrast, is closely associated with Russia, and has joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. This thesis employs a comparative framework to evaluate the sources behind this divergence. The research identifies three determining variables behind this divergence. The first is shared elite geo-political visions for the state (“constructed realities”), informed by historical and post- Soviet developments, that shape the national trajectories either towards close association with Russia or defection to the West. The second is the extent of economic dependence between the subject country and Russia and the reaction of national elites to that linkage. Finally, the two variables are mutually reinforcing and serve to confirm the overall trajectory of relations. Keywords russia, armenia, georgia, ter-petrossian, elites, identity, post-soviet space, near abroad, nato, saakashvili, putin, russia-georgia relations, russia-armenia relations, russia-west relations, economic interdependence, Political Science, Social Sciences, Rudra Sil, Sil, Rudra Disciplines Comparative Politics | International Relations | Political Science This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/251 Diverging Neighbors in the Near Abroad: The sources of conflicting relations with Russia in Armenia and Georgia By Jake Fallek Advisor: Rudra Sil This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of Bachelor of Arts Degree Department of Political Science with Distinction College of Arts and Sciences University of Pennsylvania 2020 Table of Contents Acknowledgements 1 Abstract 2 Introduction 3 Section 1: Overview of Relations with Russia and the West 22 Section 2: Constructed Realities 40 Section 3: Economic Dependence 68 Discussion: Constructed Realities and Economic Dependence 105 Conclusion 111 Bibliography 115 Acknowledgements When I began researching for this thesis, I foolishly neglected to anticipate the apocalypse. Even if providence had gifted me a special prescience, I would have still failed to imagine vacant Western cities and Russian military transports delivering vital medical supplies to the United States. But perhaps because of the severity of the current crisis, and the distancing measures that obstruct normal intimacy between friends and family, my appreciation for those that guided me throughout this challenging process has only been amplified. I would first extend all my gratitude to both Professor Sil and Professor Doherty-Sil for their constant encouragement, superb feedback, and genuine interest in my topic. In addition, my fellow PSCI classmates, who reviewed my material and offered constant feedback, deserve special acclaim for their perspicacity and diligence. I should be sure not to neglect my family—Steve, Susan, and Molly—who are and have always been my strongest supporters. At times when this research appeared as if it were a monumental enterprise, they were a crutch and a comfort. Nor can I forget that while this research was completed in trying times, it was written in the excellent company of the fine gentlemen of 239. I would also like to express my sincerest bon-voyage to the librarians of Van-Pelt, who must surely be sick of me. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my late grandparents: Barbara Fallek, Joseph Fallek, and Robert Saltzstein. 1 Abstract Abstract: When Armenia and Georgia exited the Soviet Union in 1991, massive popular majorities in both countries voted for independence in nationwide referenda. Over thirty-years later, Armenia and Georgia have chartered two radically distinctive pathways for their states within the near abroad. Tbilisi has become a reliable opponent of Russia within the post-Soviet space as it pursues integration into NATO and the European Union. Yerevan, by contrast, is closely associated with Russia, and has joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. This thesis employs a comparative framework to evaluate the sources behind this divergence. The research identifies three determining variables behind this divergence. The first is shared elite geo-political visions for the state (“constructed realities”), informed by historical and post-Soviet developments, that shape the national trajectories either towards close association with Russia or defection to the West. The second is the extent of economic dependence between the subject country and Russia and the reaction of national elites to that linkage. Finally, the two variables are mutually reinforcing and serve to confirm the overall trajectory of relations. 2 Introduction In March 1991, the semi-autonomous Republic of Armenia and Republic of Georgia boycotted Mikhail Gorbachev’s “All-Union'' referendum to reform the Soviet Union and convert it into the “Union of Sovereign States.” Over the following six months, national authorities in both republics organized popular referenda on the issue of independence. The results were near unanimous. With majorities that surpassed ninety-nine percent, the polls demonstrated a clear repudiation of a continued association with the Soviet Union and preceded formal independence that same December. But for Tbilisi and Yerevan, independence was not just a rejection of the Soviet Union; it was a rejection of Russia. Since independence, however, national perspectives and policies on Russia in the two republics have diverged dramatically. In Georgia, the anti- Russian sentiment evident in the 1991 independence movement has intensified, exemplified by Georgia’s geopolitical alignment with the West. By contrast, Armenia has deepened its ties with Russia, even going so far as to join Russia in the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite cyclical electoral and revolutionary changes in the status of elite Caucasian politics, the trajectory of bilateral relations with Russia has remained consistent in Armenia and Georgia. The causes of this divergence in Russian relations constitute the subject of this investigation: why do post- Soviet states (Armenia and Georgia) embrace different foreign policy trajectories vis-a-vis Russia? This paper argues that the closeness and contentiousness of Russian relations in Georgia and Armenia—tracked by engagement with Russian or Western economic and security institutions—is principally determined by three variables: economic dependency, shared geo- political visions for the state (‘constructed realities’) among elite actors, and the interaction between the two. 3 This research employs a comparison of Armenian and Georgian post-independence engagement in Russian-led or Western-led international institutions and bilateral agreements as an indicator of the status of relations with Moscow. The three variables are analyzed as motivating causes of a ‘deepening’ or ‘defection’ from Russia as expressed in the direction of institutional engagement, resulting in a definitive ‘Russia decision’ for each country. The structure of the thesis is therefore organized into three sections. The first section provides an outline of the trajectory of Georgian and Armenian relations with Russia and the West from independence to the present. The second section features a constructivist foreign policy analysis to argue that national trajectories were determined by shared elite visions for the state within the post-Soviet space. The third section evaluates the extent of economic dependency, the reaction of elites to this dependence, and subsequent engagement or defection from Russian international economic institutions and bi-lateral agreements. A brief discussion of how these two variables interacted and a review of the key points of comparison then follows before the conclusion. The subsequent introduction features a contextual review of Russia and the near abroad, the selection of cases and controls, the discussion of the dependent variable, and the research design and framework. Russia and the Near Abroad Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western alliances and institutions have pressed ever closer to the Russian perimeter. Two NATO members in the Baltic, Estonia and Latvia, already share a frontier with Russia, and further
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