ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 3, pp 509± 525, 1997

Onthe front lines in the near abroad: theCIS andthe OSCE inGeorgia’ s civil wars

SNEILMACFARLANE

As ispointedout by Muthiah Alagappa’ s frameworkanalysis in this issue, that regionalorganisations 1 mightrelieve some oftheburden on the United Nations (UN)inthe area ofcon¯ ict management gained new currency after the Cold War.As BoutrosBoutros-Ghali pointed out, the goal of such task-sharing was notonly to distributemanagement burdens more effectively by taking advantage ofhitherto under-utilised regional capacities, but also to democratise inter- nationalrelations through the of power to regional entities. 2 In addition,some wouldargue that regional organisations are betterprepared than globalones to address speci®cally regional problems. 3 However,regional organisations face anumberof structural de® ciencies, and theymay be less capableof impartiality in addressing problems among and withinregional states. 4 Notably,power asymmetries at the regional level raise theprospect that regional multilateral organisations may be used by locally dominantstates toachieve their own self-interested objectives. There is an elementof irony here in that hegemony 5 bysome accountslays the basis for effectivecooperationÐ in that the hegemon is bothwilling and able to provide thepublic good of orderÐ but by its very nature is likelyto turn the pursuit of orderto the hegemon’ s ownadvantage. Therecord of activity and effectiveness (or inactivity and ineffectiveness) of regionalorganisations in the post-cold war era incases suchas theGulf, Somalia,the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda suggests that much of the initial enthusiasmabout regionalism in the security realm was misplaced.This might welllead to a re-emphasison the exclusive role of global organisations (and notablythe UN); butgiven the latter’ s dif®culties, this seems unpromising. Alternatively,it raises thepossibility of creativecombinations of sub-regional, regionaland global organisational activities that maximise the advantages and minimisethe disadvantages at each institutional level through a synergistic approachto localproblems. Notably, might it notbe possible to rely on regional structures,including hegemonic ones, to provideorder in theface ofrisinglevels oflocal con¯ ict and the reluctance of extra-regional actors to commit them- selves,and yet to involve broader multilateral mechanisms in an effort to enhancetransparency and to situate the hegemon’ s activitiesin a shared normativestructure, and in so doingto temper the hegemonic agenda?

SNeil MacFarlaneis atStAnne’ s College,Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6HS, UK.

0143-6597/97/030509-17$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 509 SNEIL MACFARLANE

Thecase athand, the of , is agoodone with which to test thispossibility. It involves efforts by a regionalpower with hegemonic aspira- tions() tomanageÐ directly in the case ofSouth , and indirectly viaa sub-regionalorganisationÐ two civil con¯ icts. A broaderregional organis- ation,the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ( OSCE), is active inefforts to temper Russian intervention in the South Osset case. TheUN is attemptingto play a similarrole with respect to . TheUN faces adilemmain task-sharing in Georgia, as elsewherein the formerSoviet space. On the one hand, it is loatheto become directly involved inregional con¯ icts because no consensus on such action is presentamong the permanentmembers oftheSecurity Council. Moreover, doing so wouldonly add furtherburdens to an already stretched peace-building apparatus in the UN system.On theother hand, the organisation and its members perceivean interest inenhancingpeace and stability in theformer Soviet space. The combination of thesetwo factors leads to a search fortask-sharing with regional organisations. However,the principal regional organisation thus far willingand able to undertakesuch tasks happensto be dominated by a regionalhegemon, Russia, whichdisplays little reluctance to manipulate con¯ ict management in pursuit of aself-interestedagenda of in¯ uence-building and control. 6 Unquali®ed reliance onthe organisation consequently jeopardises another basic norm of the UNÐ respectfor the of its members. Life is fullof sloppy compromises. Inthis instance, UN task-sharingmust ® ndmiddle ground between these inconsistentimperatives. Inthis paper, I examineexternal efforts at con¯ ict management in Georgiain aneffortto assess theextent to which synergy has beenachieved. First, to what extenthas thisblend of external activities been effective in keeping the peace andin producing durable settlements to the con¯ icts in question? Second, to whatextent have the roles of the OSCE andthe UN operatedto mitigate the impactof the Russian presence? Third, to what extent did the broader inter- nationalcontext in which UN task-sharingproceeded affect the nature and effectivenessof task-sharing?UN deliberationson the Abkhaz question occurred moreor less simultaneouslywith decisions on task-sharing in Haitiand Rwanda. Arguably,this concatenation of crises mayhave affected UN effortsto dealwith each one. Iarguethat the combination of regional and global efforts evident in the case has beeneffective in keepingthe peace in a strictsense. Moreover,the presence ofinternational observers has enhancedtransparency and to some extenthas acculturatedRussian forces tointernationalnorms regarding peacekeeping. This has resultedin gradual improvement in the performance of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS) andRussian forces inthe ® eld.However, the Georgianmix has beenunsuccessful in producing progress towards political settlementsin the two con¯ icts. Moreover, international efforts have had little restrainingeffect at a strategiclevel on Russian efforts to manipulate these con¯icts in order to induce Georgian acquiescence in the broader regional agendaof Russia inthe Transcaucasus. Thisarticle begins with a shortdiscussion of task-sharingin the former Soviet regionand is followedby a backgroundsection dealing with the con¯ icts. Then 510 THE CIS AND THE OSCE INGEORGIA’ SCIVIL WARS

Igoon to look at the mandates of the OSCE,theCIS andthe UN Observer Missionin Georgia ( UNOMIG)inthe con¯ icts and their effectiveness in ful® lling them.This leads to a discussionof the efforts of the various organisations to promotea durablepeace in Georgia. The next section deals with the extent to whichthe regional power has pursueda unilateralagenda by multilateralmeans andthe tension between this agenda and the objectives of the international communityin the . The conclusion discusses whatthe Georgian case tells usaboutthe effectiveness of `superviseddevolution’ of responsibilityfor con¯ ict managementand resolution.

Subcontractingand the formerSoviet Union Theterm ` subcontracting’is notreally appropriate for peace-related operations of the OSCE andthe CIS inthe former Soviet space ingeneral or Georgia in particular.The concept implies a decisionon the part of one organisation to devolvea de®ned set ofresponsibilities upon another on the basis ofmutual gain.In the case ofthe former Soviet Union, such activities generally occur on thebasis ofnational (Russia) orregional ( OSCE,orCIS) decision. Thatsaid, the regional players do recogniseto varyingdegrees the purview of theUnited Nations and its Charter over their actions. The OSCE haddeclared itselfto be a ChapterVIII organisation and therefore presumably accepts the limitationson its behaviour contained in this section of the Charter. 7 The delineationof responsibility over con¯ icts in Georgia (with the UN takingthe internationallead on Abkhazia and the OSCE onSouth Ossetia) is basedon an agreementbetween the two organisations. Russia has soughtUN approvalfor CIS actionsin Georgia, not least out of a desireto secure external® nancefor force deployment, and the Commonwealth ofIndependent States Peacekeeping Force ( CISPKF)inAbkhazia operates withthe approval of the United Nations Security Council, as established byResolution 937 of 21 July 1994. There are, however, numerous instances inwhich such approval has notbeen sought (for example, the Russian peacekeepingoperation in ) or has notbeen granted. And in anyevent, rather than initiating action, the UN ®ndsitself in the delicate situationof facingrequests for international legitimisation of decisionstaken by others. Froma UNperspective,there are speci®c advantagesin relying on regional organisationsfor the management of con¯ ict in the former Soviet space. Notably,it is clearthat Russian makers are uncomfortablewith the idea ofa prominentrole being granted to external actors in dealing with con¯ ict in theformer Soviet space. 8 Morerecently, this has beenextended speci® cally to theactivities of internationalorganisations in themanagement of con¯ict. As one groupof in¯uential Russian foreign policy commentators and policy makers put itin May 1996, ` itis de®nitely not in Russia’ s interestto see outsidemediation andpeacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union’ . 9 Inthese circumstances, it is dif®cult to conceive of substantial UN con¯ict managementactivities in the former Soviet space, since they are likelyto be opposedby Russia,one of the® vepermanentmembers oftheSecurity Council. 511 SNEIL MACFARLANE

Otherkey players, and notably the US, are reluctantto contemplate such operations,not only given the cost, but also in view of the importance of maintaininggood relations with Russia. In consequence, it makes sense forthe organisationto let others take the lead.

Background Georgiais acountryof some 5.4million people in theTranscaucasian region of theformer Soviet Union. Although the Georgian majority constitutes over 70% ofthe total population, there are numerousethnically de® ned and territorially compactminorities in the country. Two of these minorities, the Ossets and theAbkhaz, have been involved in civil con¯ icts with the central andthe Georgian majority since the early 1990s; key events are summarisedin Table 1.10

Thecon¯ ict in South Ossetia Thecon¯ ict with South Ossetia began during Georgia’ s transitionto indepen- dencein 1989±90. The leadership of theSouth Ossetian Autonomous Oblast’ of theRepublic of Georgia, threatened by the overt chauvinism of rising political forces amongthe Georgian majority declared, its fromGeorgia and desireto unite with the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic of the then RussianSoviet Federated Socialist Republic. The Georgian Supreme Soviet annulledthis declaration and abrogated the oblast’sautonomousstatus in a climateof growing intimidation and violence in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia’ s capital.In the face ofrisingviolence, Soviet Interior Ministry forces intervened, butdid not succeed in curbing the con¯ ict. They were withdrawn as theSoviet Unioncollapsed. And the war continued until June 1992, when a durable cease® re agreementwas obtainedthrough the mediation of Russian President BorisYeltsin. Estimates of casualties from the war vary, although most agree onaround 1000 dead. The war also produced some 110000 refugees, from bothSouth Ossetia and the rest ofGeorgia, whence many Ossets were evicted. Thecease® re agreementon South Ossetia envisaged the deployment of a mixedRussian± Georgian± Osset forceto police the line of contact. Initially, the forcecomprised one regiment of Russian forces, and one battalion from each of theparties. By 1995 the Russian complement had shrunk to one battalion, matchingthe other two. The initiative was Russian; noapproval from inter- nationalorganisations (including the CIS) was sought. InDecember 1992 an OSCE Missionto Georgia was establishedin at theinvitation of President in order to ` promotenegotia- tionson a peacefulpolitical settlement of the con¯ ict’ . 11 Thecease® rehas been stablesince June 1992. A degreeof freedom of movementhas beenestablished insideSouth Ossetia and between it and the rest ofGeorgia. Visits with Osset unitsof the peacekeeping force suggest low levels of readiness and little sense ofthreat.Their principal preoccupation seemed tobetheprevention of theftsof ® rewood.12 Alowlevel of economic exchange between Georgian and Osset 512 THE CIS AND THE OSCE INGEORGIA’ SCIVIL WARS

TABLE 1 Keyevents in the Osset andAbkhaz con¯icts

SouthOssetia January1989 Foundingof Osset Popularfront ( AdemonNykhas ) November1989 Armed confrontationin Tskhinvalibegins March 1990 Georgiadeclares sovereignty October1990 ZviadGamsakhurdia elected chairman ofGeorgian Parliament November1990 South Osset regionSoviet attempts toupgraderegion’ s statusto autonomous republic. Decisionannulled by Georgian government December 1990Georgia annuls autonomy of South Ossetia. State ofemergency declared January1991 Gorbachevcalls forGeorgian withdrawal from South Ossetia December 1991USSR dissolved December 1991± January1992 Gamsakhurdiadriven out of Tbilisi.Military Council takes power March 1992 Shevardnadzereturns to Georgia as Chairof MilitaryCouncil June 1992 Renewed Georgianoffensive in South Ossetia. Russian±Georgian agreement on regulationof con¯ict inSouth Ossetia July 1992 Deploymentof mixed Georgian± Osset± Russian peacekeeping force inSouth Ossetia December 1992Deployment of OSCE long-termmission to Georgia

Abkhazia July 1989 Anti-governmentriots in May 1990 MountainPeoples Congress in Sukhumi demands exit of Abkhaziafrom Georgia August 1990 Abkhazgovernment declares sovereignty July 1992 Abkhazgovernment annuls current constitution, restores 1925constitution, and states intentionto secede fromGeorgia. Decision annulled by GeorgianSupreme Soviet August 1992 Georgianforces enter Abkhazia.Hostilities begin September1992 Russia mediates cease® re October1992 Abkhazoffensive against . Georgianrequest for UN peacekeepingforce. (Repeats requestin January1993) May 1993 SpecialRepresentative oftheSecretary General forGeorgia appointed. Second cease® re agreement, whichfails immediately July 1993 ThirdRussian-mediated cease® re agreement August 1993 SecurityCouncil authorises deployment of advance50-person observer force for Abkhaziato observe cease® re compliance September1993 Cease® re collapses.Georgian forces andpopulation driven from Abkhazia. Deployment of UNOMIG suspended December 1993Memorandum of Understandingbetween Abkhaziaand Georgia on cessation of hostilities.Security Council authorises deployment of full observer force February1994 Shevardnadze and Yeltsin request UN peacekeepingforce April 1994 MoscowAgreement onformalisationof cease® re andinitiation of politicaltalks. Requestfor peacekeeping force withRussian contingent. Quadripartite (Abkhaz±Georgian± Russian± UNHCR)agreement onrefugee return(never implemented) May 1994 Abkhaz±Georgian agreement onpeacekeepingoperation June 1994 CISagrees toprovide peacekeeping force July 1994 Formaldeployment of CISPKF.UNSecurityCouncil Resolution 937 recognises CISPKF decision,expands UNOMIG,andextends its mandate settlementsin SouthOssetia and between South Ossetia and the rest ofGeorgia has alsore-emerged. OSCE monitorsin thespring of 1996judged the situation to becalm and did not anticipate any change. 13 Incontrast, there has beenlittle movementtowards a settlementof the dispute, despite agreement between the partieson a securitymemorandum in May 1996. 513 SNEIL MACFARLANE

Thecon¯ ict in Abkhazia

Theconclusion of the phase of active hostilities in South Ossetia was closely followedby the beginning of war in Abkhazia in August 1992. After the overthrowof in a prolonged® re® ghtin central Tbilisi in November1991± January 1992, Gamsakhurdia returned to his home region of Mingreliain westernGeorgia and mounted a rebellionthere. In consequence,the GeorgianNational Guard and associated paramilitary forces enteredMingrelia to pursuea counter-insurgency.Supporters of Gamsakhurdiawere using Abkhazia asasanctuaryfrom which to resist Georgianforces andalso to hide kidnapped Georgianof® cials, including Deputy Prime Minister Sandro Kavsadze. As a result,the newly arrived Eduard Shevardnadze sought and obtained the approval ofthegovernment of theAbkhaz Autonomous Republic for a limitedhot pursuit operationinto eastern Abkhazia in the . 14 WhenGeorgian forces enteredAbkhazia, they found the road open to the capital,Sukhumi, and moved on in violation of the informal agreement with Abkhazauthorities. As theyarrived in Sukhumi, the Abkhaz Parliament was in theprocess ofdeciding to bring Abkhazia’ s 1925constitution back into force. Thisconstituted a declarationof sovereignty. Georgian forces respondedby attackingthe parliament and driving the Abkhaz government out of the city in September.The Abkhaz re-consolidated their position in the northern part of the regionand began a counter-offensive,taking Gagra in October 1992, and then advancingto Sukhumi by mid-1993. Atthisstage, Russia brokereda cease® re,agreeing to actas itsguarantor and deployingmonitors to ensure that its disarmament and encampment provisions wererespected by the parties. The United Nations responded to Georgian appealsby deploying a smallobserver group, UNOMIG,toAbkhazia in the late summer of1993.The cease® re failedbefore the UN missionwas fullydeployed, andthe Abkhaz, bene® ting from Russian and North Caucasian assistance, retook thecapital in September 1993, and ejected Georgian forces fromAbkhazia. Abkhazforces alsodrove out the region’ s Georgianpopulation of some 250000 people(46% of Abkhazia’ s population). Thelast days of the campaign in Abkhazia also witnessed a revivalof the Zviadistrebellion behind Georgian lines in Mingrelia, threatening the complete collapseof the Georgian state. At this stage (in October 1993), Shevardnadze ¯ewto Moscow and agreed that Georgia would join the Commonwealth of IndependentStates. Russian forces intervenedin the con¯ ict in Mingrelia and suppressedit. They also deployed along the Abkhaz± Georgian line of contact in late1993 to separate the warring parties. In June 1994, the Commonwealth of IndependentStates, acting on the basis ofan agreement between the parties in May,legitimised this deployment as aregionalpeacekeeping operation based on theconsent of the parties. The Security Council in turnaccepted this decision in July1994. Resolution 937 also provided for an expansion of UNOMIG from 40 to 136observers. Thecease® re has heldsince the end of 1993, with the exception of limited exchangesof ® re inthe ValleyÐ the only part of Abkhazia that had not beenfully evacuated by Georgian forcesÐ in late 1993 and 1994. Violence, 514 THE CIS AND THE OSCE INGEORGIA’ SCIVIL WARS however,did not disappear altogether. Limited spontaneous return of refugeesto theGali District in 1995 and in greater number in 1996 was accompaniedby repeatedinstances of terrorism targeting local Abkhaz of® cials, and by substan- tialviolations of human rights in the security zone established by peacekeepers. Inthe meantime, little progress has beenmade towards a politicalsettlement allowingrefugee return and the restoration of Georgianjurisdiction in Abkhazia Althoughthe Abkhaz side appears to have abandoned the objective of full ,their insistence on a confederalrelationship with the Republic of Georgiaremains a substantialdistance from the Georgian advocacy of afederal structurefor the country.

Mandatesand performance Inthese two con¯ icts, primary responsibility for management was devolvedto onesub-regional organisation (the CIS inAbkhazia) and to one state (Russia in SouthOssetia). In each instance, the activities of the primary actor were supplementedby an international multilateral presenceÐ the UN inAbkhazia through UNOMIG,theactivities of the Special Representative of the UN Sec- retary-General( SRSG,EdwardBrunner), and the role of the UN HighCommis- sionerfor Refugees ( UNHCR)inthe negotiation of returnfor internally displaced persons (IDPs); and the OSCE inSouth Ossetia in the form of the OSCE mission. Theiractivities in relation to con¯ ict management and political settlement were embeddedin broader roles in Georgia. Inorder to assess theeffectiveness of these actors, greater precision with regardto their mandates is desirable.The mandate of thepeacekeeping force in SouthOssetia is themost conservative of thevarious actors in con¯ ict manage- mentin Georgia, involving the suppression of hostilities and then interposition toprevent their resumption. 15 Thereare noexplicit humanitarian or other functionsin themandate, although the activities of thepeacekeeping force were accompaniedby theestablishment of aJointControl Commission (Russia, South Ossetia,Georgia) to deal with modalities of the cease® re andby Russian diplomaticefforts to mediate a settlement. Themandate of the OSCE Missionin Georgia involves the conduct of negotiationswith both sides inthe con¯ ict in the hope of removing sources of tensionin their relationship; maintaining contacts with both of® cials and the populationin thecon¯ ict zone, cooperation with local military forces insupport ofthe cease® re; thegathering of information on the military situation and the investigationof incidents; and cooperation in the creation of the political bases forthe achievement of lasting peace. 16 Tothese ends, the mission has mountedregular trips by military and civilian personnelto the line of contact to visit peacekeeping units, to monitor their weaponsand personnel levels, and to consult with government personnel in SouthOssetia and neighbouring of Georgia.In addition, members ofthe missionact as mediatorsin instances of local disputes that carry some riskof disturbingthe cease® re.The mission also facilitates humanitarian assistance and deliverssmall amounts of such assistance itself. 515 SNEIL MACFARLANE

Theobjectives of the mission are toenhance transparency, transfer inter- nationalnorms to the peacekeepers, maintain an early-warning capability throughfact-® nding, and build con® dence among local inhabitants and military andparamilitary forces. With the passage oftime, the OSCE mission’s roleand, indeed,the role of the organisation as awhole,expanded. The outbreak of hostilitiesin Abkhazia led to dual OSCE andUN effortsto mediate a settlement, withthe UN Secretary-Generaldesignating a specialrepresentative for Georgia, AmbassadorEdward Brunner, and the OSCE doinglikewise (Ambassador Gyarmati).17 Thetwo organisations coordinated their efforts through much of 1993,and eventually agreed that the United Nations should be the lead organisationon the matter of Abkhazia,the OSCE retainingstatus as aparticipant inthe negotiations on political settlement. The OSCE has alsotaken up a human rightsrole in cooperation with the United Nations in that region. The OSCEÐ at theinvitation of the Georgian governmentÐ has alsoassumed humanrights monitoringresponsibilities with respect to minority populations in the rest of Georgia,observed both the 1992 and 1995 , and provided technical assistance totheGeorgian government in theareas ofconstitutionaland judicial reform. The OSCE missionin Georgia has byand large ful® lled expectations, at least as regardsthe monitoring of the peacekeeping force in South Ossetia, con®dence-building between the parties at the local level, and the promotion of dialoguebetween the parties at both of® cial and unof® cial levels. By Georgian account,the mission’ s broaderactivities have also contributed signi® cantly to thepromotion of a stableand democratic transition in the country as awhole. OSCE humanrights activities have greatly enhanced transparency in thisarea and, as such,have probably contributed to an improvement in the position of minorities,as wellas inthe treatment of peopleimprisoned for acts ofopposition (some wouldsay terrorism)to the current government. They have produced signi®cant progress towards a politicalsettlement of the Osset± Georgian ques- tion.Little progress is evidentin the negotiations. This cannot, however, be takenas evidencethat task-sharing does not work. There is noreasonto believe that,had it assumed adirectrole, the UN wouldhave done any better, for reasons thatare furtherdiscussed below. Therelationship between the United Nations and the OSCE inGeorgia has been relativelyuntroubled, although in speci® c instancesthere have been the prob- lems thatone might expect in inter-organisational cooperation. The lack of progresson the Abkhaz front led to an increase in OSCE activitywith respect to thatcon¯ ict in 1995±96, particularly in the area ofhumanrights monitoring. The organisationoriginally intended to opena humanrights of® ce inAbkhazia on its own,but after a certainamount of exchangewith the UN, itwas agreedthat such anof®ce beopened by both organisations, with the UN inthe lead and the OSCE playinga supportingrole. Jealousy over turf has beensupplemented by organi- sationalincompatibility in thisjoint effort. The OSCE isaratherunstructured and ad hoc organisation.The UN is not.The result is thatit has takenmore than a yearto negotiate the parameters of a jointrepresentation that will probably numberfewer than ® vepeople. 18 Relationsbetween the missions in the ® eld havealso been somewhat strained because the OSCE has receivedmore favour- 516 THE CIS AND THE OSCE INGEORGIA’ SCIVIL WARS abletreatment in the press andis generallyperceived in Georgia to be doing a reasonablygood job. Turningto Abkhazia, the original mandate of CISPKF,whichhas survivedmore orless intactsince, is attachedas aprotocolto the Moscow Agreement of 14 May1994 between Georgia and Abkhazia on the cease® re andseparation of forces.The two sides agreedto establish a securityzone along the line of contact,in which there would be no armed forces fromthe two sides. Adjacent tothiszone on bothsides was arestrictedweapons zone, in whichartillery, most mortars,tanks and armoured personnel carriers wereprohibited. Heavy military equipmentoriginating in the zone was tobestoredin designatedareas. Georgian forces wereto withdraw from the Kodori Valley. Volunteer formations from outsideAbkhazia assisting Abkhaz forces wereto be disbanded and removed. CISPKF unitswere to bedeployedto the security zone. The parties agreed that the PKF’sprincipalfunction was to`exertits best efforts to maintain the cease® re andto see thatit is scrupulouslyobserved’ . 19 Itwas tosupervise the implemen- tationof the agreement with regard to the security zone and the restricted weaponszone. Moreover, in contrast to the South Ossetian case, the CISPKF presencewas to` promotethe safe returnof refugees and displaced persons, especiallyto the Gali District’ . Rulesof engagement were unspeci® ed in the documentsestablishing the force. 20 TheSecurity Council’ s recognitionof the CISPKF inJuly 1994 brought an expansionin the mandate of UNOMIG.Theforce was expandedin order to `monitorand verify the implementation by theparties’ of theMay agreement, ` to observethe operation of the CISPKF’,toverify the removal of troops and heavy equipmentof the parties from the security zone, to monitor storage areas for heavyequipment withdrawn from the security and restricted weapons zones, to monitorthe withdrawal of Georgian troops from the Kodori Valley, to patrol the KodoriValley, to investigate alleged violations of the May agreement and to assist inthe resolution of such incidents, to report to the UN Secretary-General ontheimplementation of itsmandate and related developments, and to `contrib- uteto conditions conducive to the safe andorderly return of refugees and displacedpersons’ . 21 Again,there are atleast two dimensions to effectiveness. The ® rst focuses directlyon how well the players ful® lled the mandates that guided their action. Thesecond focuses onthe extent to which the separate or joint actions of the respectiveorganisations fostered movement towards a politicalsettlement, and addressedother recognised needs deriving from the con¯ ict. With regard to the ®rst,one might well argue that the principal objective of theinternational actors istopreventrenewal of con¯ict. Con¯ ict has notbeen renewed. Therefore, they haveessentially ful® lled their mandates. In the Abkhaz case, likethat of South Ossetia,the interposition of peacekeepers has stabilisedcease® res andhas preventedany renewal of con¯ ict. Moreover,as inSouth Ossetia, relations between international observers and Russianpeacekeepers have on the whole been good. With the exception of UNOMIG dif®culties in obtaining access tothe coastal areas ofthe security zone inlate1994, there has beenno obvious CISPKF effortto hinder UNOMIG activities. Thetwo bodies often patrol jointly. They consult on mine and other hazards. 517 SNEIL MACFARLANE

CISPKF has agreedto provide evacuation assistance to UNOMIG inthe event that itis needed. Theproblem in assessing therole of CISPKF and UNOMIG instabilising the cease® re is thatone cannot know the counterfactual. In the case ofAbkhazia,the ejectionof the resulted in the establishment of a geographically de®ned and defensible front line. Georgia was inno position in 1993 and 1994 (andarguably even now) to contestthe outcome. In this respect, one might well arguethat the cease® re wouldhave held in any case. Suchan inference is supportedby the experience of Nagorno Karabakh, next door in Azerbaijan, wherea cease® re has heldsince May 1994 in the absence of any peacekeeping force. Therewas atleastone organised effort to breakthe cease® re andto `liberate’ Abkhaziafrom the Abkhaz. In 1995, former Defence Minister Tengiz Kitovani andseveral hundred armed followers moved by bus from Central Georgia towardsthe cease® re line,having announced their intention to take Abkhazia back.This was perhapsthe most dangerous organised effort to breach the May 1994agreement. However, he was stopped,not by peacekeeping forces, but by interiorministry personnel of theRepublic of Georgia.Kitovani now sits injail. Itis easy toconceive of how spontaneous incidents along the line of contact couldhave produced inadvertent escalation in Abkhazia, as inSouth Ossetia. Internationalpersonnel interposed between the parties do reducethe incidence of suchproblems and, particularly in the case ofthe OSCE inSouth Ossetia, follow upon themto seek aresolutionof the question causing the problem. Moreover, theUN rightlypoints to evidence that UNOMIG and CISPKF remonstrationswith localmilitary authorities have minimised the reintroduction of heavy weapons intothe weapons restricted zone. 22 Thematter gets much stickier when one moves to issues ofprotection. This isamoresigni® cant problem in Abkhazia,where large-scale spontaneous return of IDPstothe Gali District began in 1995 and met with substantial opposition fromAbkhaz authorities. 23 Underthe terms ofthe May 1994 agreement, local lawstill applies in the security and restricted weapons zones, the local authorities retainresponsibility for civil administration including law enforcement, and peacekeepersare notempowered to override local of® cials in the discharge of theirresponsibilities in these areas. Theproblem is thatthe Abkhaz administra- tionis structurallyhostile to Georgian returnees. In addition to the lingering acrimonyof thecivil war, there is thefurther problem that, if asubstantialreturn ofrefugees occurs before a settlementon the political status of Abkhazia, decisionson status will be determined in largemeasure byreturning Georgians. TheAbkhaz constituted less than20% of the population of theregion while the Georgiansmade up more than 45%. In such circumstances, returnees are likely tobe targets of intimidation. Thishas beena chronicproblem in the area. 24 InMarch 1995, for example, overone hundred Abkhaz with police identity cards enteredthe security zone, andarrested some 200returnees. Twenty, mostly male and of militaryage, were murdered.Some executions took place in theopen and were reportedly observed by CISPKF and UNOMIG personnel.Civilians seeking protection from CIS peace- keeperswere unevenly treated. Some received protection; some wereturned 518 THE CIS AND THE OSCE INGEORGIA’ SCIVIL WARS away;some wereturned over to Abkhaz police. This re¯ ected a verynarrow interpretationof the humanitarian clause in the mandate cited above. CISPKF personnelresponded to questioning on theseevents by arguingthat there was no humanitarianor protection component in their mandate, and that the agreement obligedthem to allow properly documented local of® cials to carry out their responsibilitiesin the security zone. 25 UNOMIG personnelmade no effort to interfereeither, although they did provide medical assistance tothoseinjured in theaction. Those UNOMIG personnelwho assisted civiliansduring this incident reportedlydid so inviolationof instructionsfrom UNOMIG commandin Sukhumi. Althoughthe basic functions of peacekeeping in a traditionalsense were ful®lled, broader aspects ofthemandate, including protection, were not. UNOMIG, composedof unarmed observers, was notin a positionto take on the issue of protectionseriously. 26 CISPKF was,but did not. The problem from the perspective oftheUNÐ leavingaside the ethical problems of standingaside to watchpeople beslaughteredÐ is thatthe failure to address protectiondamaged the world organisation’s credibility.UN credibilitywas inthis instance the hostage of the regionalorganisation with whom it was task-sharing.When the CISPKF did not deliver,much of theegg stuck to UNOMIG’ s and UNHCR’sfaces, thetwo agencies beingthe only high pro® le international presences inthe area. The result of the UN’sassociationwith a peacekeepingventure that leaves the population at risk has beena seriousloss offace inthe area concerned. 27 Moreover,to the extent thatabuse of the population carries some riskof renewal of con¯ ict as wellas furtherembittering the parties, the failure of CISPKF and UNOMIG todeliver on protectionmay have further complicated efforts to achieve a settlement. Ona morepositive note, however, there is some evidenceto suggest that encouragementfrom UNOMIG,coupledwith the Russians’ own embarrassment, didslowly improve CISPKF performancein 1995± 96. Subsequent to the events justdescribed, CISPKF unitsbegan shadowing Abkhaz patrols in the region more closely,perhaps reducing intimidation and violation of local human rights. In thissense, onemight argue that the interweaving of UN andregional activity did resultin a degreeof transfer of international norms. Moregenerally, Russian performance in the early days of both the Osset and Abkhazoperations was handicappedby alackof units trained for peacekeeping. Inthe Abkhaz case, earlyunits were drawn in considerable measure from formationsalready stationed in Georgia. Their connections to the local popu- lationcompromised their impartiality. The Russian military has sincemade considerableefforts to train units for such missions, can draw upon a more substantialcomplement of experienced personnel 28 andis deployingunits from outsidethe region. The level of professionalismamong Russian forces deployed tothe region has thusincreased. Greater UN andother international support of Russiantraining efforts might well accelerate this process. Therewere several other perils associated with the devolution of peacekeeping functionsto CIS andRussian peacekeepers in Georgia. Notably, when it went intoSouth Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Russian military did not share international standardsconcerning rules of engagement, and comportment with regard to the civilianpopulation and civilian property. Matters were made worse by the state oflogisticsin the Russian army. Shipments of suppliesto units in the® eldwere 519 SNEIL MACFARLANE erraticand insuf® cient. The ® nancialcrisis inthe Russian military resulted in longperiods when peacekeepers were not paid. These factors led to problemsof corruption.Instances ranged from the small scale (forexample, the extortion of moneyfrom Georgians seeking to cross intoAbkhazia from Georgia via the mainbridge across theInguri controlled by CISPKF29)tothe grandiose. 30 Evidence ofcorruptionwas alsoevident in the Osset case, where,for example, peacekeep- ers wereextorting protection money from vendors in the Tskhinvali markets. 31 Suchactivities highlight the practical dif® culties of relying on poorly paid and equippedregional forces toimplementpeacekeeping tasks. However, corruption was inpart the result of the disastrous ® nancialand logistical condition of the Russianarmed forces. It is, consequently, an open question whether UN willingnessto ® nanceRussian peacekeeping might have mitigated the problem. Withregard to thesecond dimension of effectiveness,the extent to which the playerscontributed to creatingthe conditions for a politicalsettlement, the OSCE andthe Russians havebeen somewhat effective in establishing and sustaining a dialoguebetween the parties in South Ossetia. The OSCE has alsohad some success inre-establishingunof® cial contacts between the two sides throughtrack twodialogue. The stabilisation of thesituation on the ground has allowedsome revivalof economic links across theline of contact. However, other than a memorandumagreed between the two on con® dence-building measures in1996, therehas beenlittle obvious movement towards a comprehensivesolution. In the meantime,there has beenlittle success inefforts to return displaced Georgians andOssets totheir homes. Likewise,in Abkhazia, there is littleevidence of progress on the political front. The SRSG forthe Abkhaz con¯ ict is widelycriticised in the region for what is perceivedto be a dilatoryapproach to the settlement process. Likewise, the CISandRussia havehad little success inpushing the parties towards an agreement,and, indeed, many in the region believe that Russia has madelittle realeffort in thisregard, since Georgian dependence on Russia rests inlargepart onthe failure to normalise the Abkhaz situation. Finally, the UNHCR has failed todeliver in its role as leaderof the quadripartite commission on return of IDPs toAbkhazia. Its onesubstantial effort in this regard (the April 1994 agreement onreturn) was widelycriticised for its failure to address theissue ofprotection ofreturnees, and ultimately failed in the face ofAbkhaz obstructionism. 32

Hegemonyand con¯ ict management Underlyingthese speci® c dimensionsof cooperative peace-building in theregion isthebroader political question raised at the outset of thispaper: to what extent doesreliance on regional actors jeopardise impartiality and serve particularstate interestsat the expense of thoseof thetarget state or the international system as awhole?It is worthrecalling the nature of the trade-off that the UN faces in task-sharingin suchcircumstances. On theone hand, reliance on aregionalactor reducespressure onthe universal organisation and, moreover, increases the likelihoodthat a substantialeffort will be made in the area ofcon¯ ict manage- ment.It is fairto say that,in the Georgian case, hadit not been Russia that intervenedto stabilise the situation, no one else wouldhave. On theother hand, 520 THE CIS AND THE OSCE INGEORGIA’ SCIVIL WARS relianceon a regionalorganisation may further the hegemonic aspirations of dominantpowers within that organisation. Moreover, regional players may have tiesto particular actors in a con¯ict that make it dif® cult to dissociate regional institutionalresponses fromthe of the con¯ ict itself. Russia has clearhegemonic aspirations in the former Soviet space. Although awidearray of opinions is expressedon Russian policy in the newly indepen- dentstates inthe media and in parliament,a dominantconsensus appears to have emergedamong foreign policy in¯ uentials on the need for active presence and in¯uence in the area. 33 Suchviews have been widely expressed in of® cial statements, 34 in¯uential statements by independent policy groups, 35 and by advisersto the president, 36 in¯uential political ® gures, 37 andthe president himself.The hegemonic component of Russian policy in the ` nearabroad’ is evidentin its efforts to restore Russian control over the external borders of the formerSoviet Union, to reassume controlover the Soviet air defence network, toobtainagreements on basingRussian forces inthenon-Russian , and byits obvious sensitivity to external military presences (includingmultilateral ones)on the soil of the former Soviet Union. To judge from Russian policy on CaspianSea andCentral Asian energy development, it extends beyond the political/securityrealm and into the economic one. Its sources are diverse,and includethe Russian imperial hangover, but more practically the fate of the Russiandiaspora, the lack of developed defences along the borders of theRussian Federation proper, concern over Islam, and discomfort with the spill-overeffects ofinstability in the other republics. Thecapacity of a dominantpower to manipulate a regionalorganisation dependspartially on the latter’ s institutionalstrength. The more substantial and embeddedthe organisation, the less likelyit is tobe a creatureof particular dominantstates withinthe region. This case is unpromising.We have seen alreadyhow one instance of peacekeeping in Georgia (South Ossetia) ignored theregional organisation altogether. It was aRussianresponse on thebasis ofan agreementmediated between the parties by Russia. There was nopretence of multilateralism.In the case ofAbkhazia, on paper the CIS respondedon a regionalmultilateral basis. However, for reasons amplyanalysed elsewhere, 38 the CISwas (andis) neithermultilateral nor an organisation. To the extent that itserves anypurpose, it is as aninstrument of Russian foreign policy in the formerSoviet space. The Georgian example is illustrative.In the Abkhaz case, Russianpeacekeepers were deployed late in 1993 by decision of the Russiangovernment and without the imprimatur of theCIS, which caught up in June1994 by authorising the deployment of a regionalpeacekeeping force. However,not a singlesoldier from a CISstateother than Russia has ever appeared.Nor have the other states inthe CIS contributed® nanciallyto the force.In short, the CIS mandateis atransparent® gleaffor Russian action in a neighbouringstate. Russia’s ®rst activitiesin these con¯ icts in Georgia were not peacekeeping operations.Russia andRussians havebeen involved in various capacities in thesecon¯ icts since their eruption. It is hardto say whetherthis involvement has alwaysre¯ ected a consciousand coordinated policy, given the chaotic nature of policymaking in Moscow from 1990 to 1994. However, the involvement of 521 SNEIL MACFARLANE

Russia (includingpeacekeeping) has servedto render Georgia dependent on the RussianFederation, and this dependence has ledto Georgian concessions that are entirelyconsistent with the evolving hegemonic consensus in Russia on relationswith the other former Soviet states. Totakethe case ofSouth Ossetia, the insurgency in theregion was fundedout ofRussia,and many of those® ghtingwere Russian citizens from North Ossetia. Althoughit is morethan likely that these people participated for their own reasons,most of them related to ethnic loyalty, Russia madeno attempt to interferewith the passage ofvolunteers and of mate Ârielacross thefrontier into Georgia.It alsodid not pressure theNorth Ossetian Autonomous Republic of the RussianFederation to limit its involvement. Support of or tolerance for Osset initiativesis consistentwith pattern of North Caucasian politics, in which the Ossets havebeen one of the most reliable allies of Russia ina verydif® cult region.Another example of this point is therole of Russian federal forces in defendingthe Osset claimto the Prigorodnyi Raion in 1991± 92 against Ingush effortsto reclaim the area forIngushetia. 39 Inthe Abkhaz case, insurgentsused Russian military equipment, presumably obtainedfrom Russian bases inAbkhazia, in order to push the Georgians back. WhenRussia brokereda cease® re inmid-1993, it took on responsibilities to monitorcompliance and guarantee the agreement. The Georgians (albeit slowly) didremove heavy equipment restricted under the agreement from Abkhazia. The implementationof the disarmament was, by contrast, ineffective with respect to theAbkhaz. This created the regional military imbalance that permitted Abkhazia’s rapidpush to victory in September 1993. The asymmetrical quality ofRussian monitoring of the Sochi Accord appears to be a clearexample of Russiangovernment partiality in the period leading up tothe deployment of the Russianpeacekeeping force in late 1993. Large numbers of Russian citizens participatedon theAbkhaz side in the® naloffensive. There was noeffortto stop themfrom entering Abkhazia even though their purpose was known. Theconsequence for Georgia was dramatic.Georgian forces wereejected fromAbkhazia and faced a seriousrebellion in Mingreliathat was beingassisted bytheAbkhaz. The state was indangerof totalcollapse. It was atthis stage that Shevardnadzewent to Moscowto pleadfor Russian help and caved in onseveral majorcomponents of Russia’ s agendain is relationswith Georgia. Notably, Georgiasigned the CIS Accord and agreed in principle to amilitarycooperation agreementthat would render more or less permanentthe Russian military presencein Georgia, as wellas guaranteeingsubstantial Russian in¯ uence in Georgia’s military.It was onlywhen these objectives were attained that Russia interposedits peacekeepers and provided the military assistance necessary to quellthe rebellion in Mingrelia. The® nalpoint to make concerns the role of Russia innegotiations for a politicalsettlement of the two con¯ icts. Although the reviews of Russian mediationin both the Osset andAbkhaz cases are mixed,Russia has not mountedthe kind of pressure onthe insurgent parties necessary topush them towardsa compromise.Abkhazia is supposedto beunderblockade, for example, butRussia has madelittle effort to enforce it. In both instances, enough gets throughto sustain the insurgencies. One is leftwith the impression that Russia 522 THE CIS AND THE OSCE INGEORGIA’ SCIVIL WARS isnotlooking for a settlement,since a durablesolution to thewars wouldreduce Georgiandependence on Russia.

Conclusion Inthe case consideredhere, task-sharing has produceda greaterdegree of stabilitythan would otherwise have been the case. Russia has takenon peace- relatedoperations that no-one else (includingthe UN) was willingto tackle. Its presencemakes aconsiderablecontribution to ensuring that there is noacciden- talresumption of hostilities. This has alloweda degreeof normalisation in Georgia.In this sense, theexperience of UN task-sharingis positive. However,judgement is complicatedin considerable measure becauseRussia was tosome degreeinstrumental in causing these con¯ icts and has usedthem toenhanceits control of theaffairs ofGeorgiaand the Transcaucasus. Although theactivities of boththe UN andthe OSCE tomitigatethe impact of theRussian presencein Georgia and to promote international norms have had some effect,they have done little to alterthis basic fact. From the Russian perspective, task-sharingis ameans ofreasserting control while bene® ting from the legitimisingeffects ofinvolvement of international organisations. Froma policyperspective, this begs the question of whether a different approachto task-sharingmight not have had more effective results in furthering theobjectives of the UN. Itis certainlynot dif® cult to identify areas inwhich improvementscould have been made. The deployment of larger numbers of Russian-speakingobservers in UNOMIG,andthe construction of atighterstructure ofrelationsbetween UNOMIG and CISPKF mightwell have enhanced the perform- anceof bothorganisations while assisting the spread of international practice to Russianforces inthe ® eld.Greater attention by UN observersto the issue of protectionmight have produced a betterperformance of CIS peacekeepersin this area oftheirmandate. A willingnessto ® nance CISPKF operationsin whole or in partcould have been used as leverageto secure greater CISPKF compliancewith internationalnorms. The Russians wereclearly interested in such support. None was forthcoming.Finally, greater international assistance inthe training ofRussian peacekeepers might well have accelerated their adaptation to internationalstandards. Inshort, although this particular case illustrateseloquently the pitfalls of relianceon regional organisations and actors to provide the public good of security,there are methodsavailable to mitigate the negative consequences of suchtask-sharing and to enhance prospects for realising its positive effects. Althoughthey were not adequately explored in the Georgian case, thelatter experienceprovides a numberof useful lessons totake into account when contemplatingfuture devolutions of tasks relatedto regional security.

Notes 1 Followingthe approach by Muthiah Alagappa, I de®ne regionalism and regional organisation to be `cooperationamong or non-governmental organisations in three ormore geographically 523 SNEIL MACFARLANE

proximateand interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue-areas’ .Given thefocus of this paper, the discussion is limitedto inter-governmental organisations and the issue-area of security. 2 BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, AnAgenda for Peace ,reprintedin AnAgenda for Peace 1995 ,New York:United Nations,1995, paras 63±64. 3 Fora summary ofsucharguments, see SNMacFarlane &TGWeiss, `Regionalorganizations and regional security’ , SecurityStudies ,Vol2, No 1, 1992, pp 10± 11. 4 Ibid, p 11. 5 Asituationin which ` asinglepowerful state controlsor dominates the lesser states inthe system’ .See R Gilpin, Warand Change in World Politics ,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1981,p 29. 6 Infact, onemight argue that the post-Soviet experience has addeda noveldimension to the general concept ofcon¯ ict management, since ina numberof cases, theactivity is notlimited to con¯ ict prevention, containmentand resolution, but also to con¯ ict generation. 7 Notablythose contained in Article 53tothe effect that` noenforcement actionshall be takenunder regional arrangements orbyregionalagencies withoutthe authorisation of the Security Council’ , inArticle 54to the effect that` theSecurity Council shall at all times bekeptfully informed of the activities undertakenor in contemplationunder regional arrangements orby regional agencies forthe maintenance ofinternational peace andsecurity’ . Article 53is notrelevant to OSCE orCIS activities inthe former Sovietspace, since theydo not include enforcement, but lie more inthe realm ofChapter VI. 8 See the` Foreignpolicy concept’ and the ` Draft conceptof military doctrine’ . See alsoS NMacFarlane, `Russianconceptions of Europe’ , Post-SovietAffairs ,Vol10, No 3, 1994, pp 234± 269, for a general overviewof evolving Russian views onexternal involvement in the former SovietUnion. 9 `Vozroditsyali Soyuz? Tezisy Sovetapo Vneshnei i OboronnoiPolitike’ (Will the Union be reborn?Theses ofthe Council on Foreign and Defence Policy), NezavisimayaGazeta ,23May 1996. 10 Formore substantialbackground on these con¯icts, see SNMacFarlane, LMinear& SShen®eld, Armed Con¯ict inGeorgia: A Case Studyin Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping ,Occasional Paper#27, Providence,RI: Watson Institute, 1995; S Goldenberg, Prideof Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-SovietDisorder ,London:Zed, 1994, pp 81± 114; and S Hunter, TheTranscaucasus in Transition: Nation-Buildingand Con¯ ict ,Washington,DC: CSIS,1994,pp 100± 141. 11 OSCE Handbook1996 , Vienna: OSCE, 1996, p 21. 12 Interviewsnear Gori,June 1996. 13 Interviewsin Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, June 1996. 14 Onthis point, see SMChervonnaya, Abkhazia-1992:Postkommunisticheskaya Vandeya , Moscow: Mosgorpechat’, 1993. 15 Accordingto Russian military sources, Russian troops deploying to the line of contact initially faced some hostile® re. Thiswas suppressedthrough the use ofsuperior ® repower,a process facilitated bythe force’ s rather broadrules of engagement.One Russianmilitary of® cer characterised thelatter inthe following form: anyviolation of the cease® re wouldbe ` immediately andseverely punished’. See PBaev,` Russia’ s peacekeepingin the Caucasus’ ,adiscussionpaper for the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs/ Western EuropeanUnion Conference on ` Peacekeepingin Europe: Assessing UNandRegional Perspec- tives’, Oslo,17± 18 November 1994, mimeograph, p 14.For more generaldiscussion of Russianpeacekeep- ing,see ARaevsky& INVorob’ev, RussianApproaches to Peacekeeping Operations ,Research PaperNo 28,New York: UNIDIR,1994;M Shashenkov,` Russianpeacekeeping in the ª Near Abroadº’ , Survival, Vol 36,No 3, 1994, pp 46± 69; and S NMacFarlane &ASchnabel,` Russia’ sapproachto peacekeeping’ , InternationalJournal ,Vol50, No 2, 1995, pp 294± 324. 16 `SBSE:Missia vGruzii’, mimeograph,Tbilisi: OSCE, 1994. 17 Onthis point, see OSCE,`ThirdMeeting of the Council: Summary of Conclusions’, Stockholm: OSCE, 1992, p 12. 18 As one OSCE Tbilisimission member putit in somewhat frustratedterms inMay 1996, ` It’s soeasy toget twopeople into a car andup to Sukhumi to do some humanrights monitoring. But to get the same two peopleassigned there bytwo different takes months’. Interviewsin Tbilisi, May 1996. 19 `Protocolto the Agreement ona Cease-Fire andSeparation of Forces’ ,mimeograph. 20 At aseminar inMoscow in June1995, I askedwhat the rules of engagementfor the force mightbe. Russian of®cers presentevinced a degree ofconfusion on this point, suggesting a degree ofunfamiliarity with the concept.Perhaps the best indicator of the Russian view on this subject was providedby a seniorof® cer in theMinistry of Defence whoearlier inthe seminar haddismissed the de® nitional travails of Western scholarsattempting to address thedistinction between peace-building,peacekeeping, peace-making, and so onwith the curt comment thatit was all `localwar’ . 21 Thisdiscussion focuses onpeacekeeping. In the overall context of task-sharing between universaland regionalorganisations, it is worthnoting that a UNagency( UNHCR)retainedprimary responsibility in anotherkey sphereÐ the status and return of internally displaced persons in Georgia. For an extended discussionof UNHCR’srolehere, see MacFarlane et al, Armed Con¯ict inGeorgia , pp 38±42. 524 THE CIS AND THE OSCE INGEORGIA’ SCIVIL WARS

22 `Reportof theSecretary General concerningthe Situation in Abkhazia,Georgia’ , S/1995/181,6 March1995. 23 Interestingly,the problem lay not so much with the local administration in Gali, whichrecognised the inevitabilityof return and was seekingmeans toregularise it. The problem lay with incursions by Abkhaz `police’from neighbouring districts of Abkhazia, acting presumably on the suspicion of the Abkhaz governmentthat the locals were toosoft on the returnees. Interviews in Gali, March 1995. 24 Thisis notedin much UN documentationon the con¯ ict. See, forexample, `Reportof the Secretary General’ ,6March1995. 25 Interviewswith CISPKF staff of®cers, March1995. 26 TheSecretary-General’ sreportof 6March1995 notes quite rightly, if rather lamely, that` neither UNOMIG’ s mandate norits strength enable [sic] itto prevent violations of the Agreement orto deter armed groupsfrom enteringthe security zone. However, UNOMIG’sprotests,together with the action taken by the CISPKF, help reduce thenumber and duration of suchviolations’ . Itis ofcourseimpossible empirically to determine the validityof such a claim. Its timing,however, was unfortunate,since itpreceded by one week themost seriousincursion of this type. 27 After theincidents of March1995, both UNOMIG and UNHCR representatives inthe Gali District commented onthe serious loss of UNprestigeresulting from their inaction, and expressed concern about the possibility ofcivilian attack onUN personnel.Interviews in Gali, March1995. 28 Totake oneexample, aseniorstaff of®cer we interviewedin Gali hadserved on peacekeeping missions in Moldova,South Ossetia andTajikistan before his placement inAbkhazia. 29 Thishad unfortunate humanitarian consequences. Georgian civilians attempting to bypass the tolls had to pass throughmine-infested zones, with some fatalities. 30 Aninternational aid of® cial ineastern Abkhaziatold of an instance where adeparting CISPKF unit commander hadremoved all thefurniture from a localschool, loaded it into a netsuspended from a helicopterand ¯ ownit all offwith him. Interviews in Gali, March1995. 31 TheUN Of® ce was in1995 contemplating support of market developmentin Tskhinvali as ameans of buildingcon® dence between theGeorgian and Osset communities,but an informal feasibility study recommended againstproceeding for this reason. 32 Theagreement includedprovision for screening of potential returnees bythe Abkhaz authorities. This process was extremely slow.By thetime theprocess was abandonedat theend of 1994, approximately 310 outof a projected40 000displaced persons had returned to the Gali District.Many of these subsequently left theirhomes again as aresultof the security situation. 33 See MacFarlane, `Russianconceptions of Europe’ , pp234± 269. 34 See `Foreignpolicy concept of the Russian Federation’ , FBIS-USR-93-037,25 March 1993. 35 `Vozroditsyali Soyuz’ , passim. 36 AMigranyan,` RossiiaI BlizhneeZarubezh’ e’ ;Russianand the Near Abroad, NezavisimayaGazeta , 12 January1994, pp 1, 4. 37 VPLukin,` Oursecurity predicament’ , ForeignPolicy ,Vol88, 1992, pp 57± 75. 38 See, forexample, SNeil MacFarlane, `LaCEIet la seÂcuriteÂregionale’, EtudesInternationales , Vol XXVI, No4, Decembre 1995,pp 785± 797; Andrei Zagorsky, ` Die Gemeinschaft UnabhaÈngigerStaaten: Entwick- lungenund Perspektiven’ , Berichte des Bundesinstitutsfu ÈrOstwissenschaftlicheund Internationale Studien , 50, 1992. 39 Theregion in question had been transferred fromIngushetia to North Ossetia whenthe Ingush were deported toCentral Asia duringWorld War II.They were allowedto return in the 1950s, but did not get their original bordersback. In 1991± 92, the Ingush population of the area was `cleansed’ bythe Ossets. Federal forces intervenedin November1992 and declared astate ofemergency inorder to restore order.Since the removal ofthe Ingush had already been completed, Russian forces essentiallyserved to protect the Osset victory.On thisincident, see SuzanneGoldenberg, Prideof Small Nations ,London:Zed, 1994, pp 200± 201.

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