THE ÅLAND OFFICE in BRUSSELS an Analysis of Its Channels of Influence
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES (CES) THE ÅLAND OFFICE IN BRUSSELS An analysis of its channels of influence Gustav Blomberg Master thesis: 15 credits Programme: Executive Master’s Programme in European Studies Level: Second Cycle Semester year: Spring 2020 Supervisor: Linda Berg Abstract Bachelor thesis: 15 credits Programme: Executive Master’s Programme in European Studies Level: Second Cycle Semester year: Spring 2020 Supervisor: Linda Berg Regions, regional offices in Brussels, channels of influence, Åland Keywords: Islands Word count: 15365 This thesis is a case study of the Åland office in Brussels that sets out to analyse its extra-state and intra-state channels of influence in use in order to influence European policy- and decision- making and at the same time try to shed light on how the Åland office circumvent and, on the other hand, work in tandem with the central government of Finland. In this respect, the bypass- theory of the multi-level governance approach will be used to understand and analyse these regional paradiplomatic activities both without the state and in tandem with the state. This approach will offer elaborate insights into how the Åland office use various channels of influence, including lobbying and interregional organisations and networks. In the end this study will find that the Åland office is able to bypass the central government by: lobbying and creating influence in the European Parliament; forwarding the positions of the Åland Government to relevant political players and EU-institutions, organizing or taking part as speaker in seminars or conferences; forming direct (both formal and informal) contacts and dialogue with officials at the Commission; creating and using ad-hoc groups/networks/alliances with cooperating partners; organizing and setting up official meetings with high-profile officials and politicians; promoting certain important political goals, values and activities of the Åland Government and the Åland community at the wider EU-arena; informal advocacy work at an early stage; trying to get access to new important forums at the EU-level; cooperating with specific industry interest organisations; and membership and engagement in European networks. On the other hand, the Åland office work in tandem with the central government by: cooperating with Finnish MEPs and actors supporting the positions of the national government; accreditation to the Council, with all its informal and formal advantages; presenting positions and taking part and engaging in meetings in the Council and other EU-institutions (the latter if in cooperation with officials from national authorities); cooperation between Åland and Finnish officials at the EU-level; and influencing the national political agenda in the Council. Finally, the thesis concludes that the extra-state channels in use of the Åland office in Brussels - being less-institutionalized, more policy-specific cooperation – rather complements formal intra-state mechanisms of cooperation and interest representation than the other way around. Table of content 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 1.2. Aim and research questions .................................................................................................. 2 2. Theory and previous research ......................................................................................... 4 2.1. Theory .................................................................................................................................... 4 Regional blindness – a ‘pessimistic’ view of regional influence in the EU .................................... 4 The multi-level governance approach ............................................................................................. 5 Bypassing of and working in tandem with the state ........................................................................ 6 Arguing for the use of the multi-level governance and the bypass-theory of regionalism .............. 7 2.2. Previous research .................................................................................................................. 8 Regions’ ability to influence policy- and decision-making in the EU ............................................ 8 Previous research about the Åland Islands and the EU – a short introduction .............................. 10 Channels of influence regions use ................................................................................................. 10 Sub-national mobilisation through the establishment of regional offices ..................................... 13 The activities and channels of influence of regional offices in Brussels ....................................... 14 3. Method and material ...................................................................................................... 16 3.2. Analysing the Åland regional office in Brussels – building an analytical framework .. 16 3.3. Method .................................................................................................................................. 17 3.4. Material ................................................................................................................................ 18 4. Result ................................................................................................................................ 20 5.1. Bypassing the central government ..................................................................................... 21 5.2. In tandem with the central government ............................................................................ 24 5. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 27 References ............................................................................................................................... 29 1. Introduction Regional representations are nowadays a mainstay in the plenitude of actors that have set up offices in Brussels with an objective to foster a closer relationship with the European Union (EU). A large, and increasing, number of sub-state actors make their presence felt in Brussels in order to exert their influence on matters related with the EU, European integration and the increasing competencies of the EU (Rowe 2011, p. 1; Huysseune & Jans 2008; Hutchinson 2020). The representative offices of regions in Brussels provide a significant connection link between regional interests and EU institutions as well as with cooperation partners and like-minded actors. These regional offices are a functional element within EU’s multi-level governance structure (Rowe 2011, p. 3). Questions that arises are how a regional representation office in Brussels, operating in an environment with an abundance of interest organisations, work and which different types of channels it uses when it with or without the state (Tatham 2010) tries to affect policy- and decision-making? These rhetorical questions address European integration, the mobilisation of regions towards Brussels and the multi-level governance structure within the EU. According to research about regions' and regional representation offices' channels of influence, the existing intra-state influence-creating channels that are in use when a regional office try to influence EU-matters with interaction with its member state ('with the state') are the most important compared to the extra-state channels that are in use when trying to influence EU-matters without its member state ('without the state') (see Keating et al. 2015; Tatham 2010). However, some research also proposes that extra-state channels (the Brussels route) and channels of lobbying and paradiplomacy not in tandem with the central government – thus bypassing the state – might be as important as intra-state channels (Trobbiani 2019). This research puzzle will be at the heart of this thesis. Perhaps a paradox the evolution and the substantial increase of regional representations in Brussels is the notion that the EU suffers from ‘regional blindness’ (Stephan 2010; Rowe 2011, p. 199; Cygan 2014, p. 266; Weatherill 2005, p. 3). However, EU’s blindness towards regions and the member states’ internal arrangements might be a rather deceptive assumption (Palermo & Kössler 2017, pp. 24). In contrast to the concept of the ‘regional blindness’ in understanding the regions’ role in the governance structure of the EU, the multi-governance approach view the EU as a single, multi-level polity that allows regions to systematically engage in the European policy processes in the different levels of governance, and as a consequence sub-state regions have the ability to bypass the state and the central government when trying to influence EU-matters (Marks 1993, p 392; Marks et al 1996, p. 169; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Olsson 2010, pp. 119, 125). The academic discussion whether or not regional governments actually engage in and successfully use this process of continuous negotiation and represent their interests at the EU arena (Högenauer 2014, pp. 451-452) is still very much active. In this regard, when studying regional representation offices and multi-level governance in the EU, legislative regions1 are particularly interesting cases (Högenauer 2014, pp. 452). This can be motivated by; a) these regions can be expected to have more impact at the European level 1 For the purposes of this study a