AN ASSESSMENT OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS,

SINCE 1947 UPTO 2001

BEING A THESIS PRESENTED

BY

ABDUL MANAN BAZAI

TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

UNIVERSITY OF BALOCHISTAN

QUETTA, PAKISTAN.

IN APPLICATION FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

2008

DECLARATION BY THE APPLICANT

I, Abdul Manan Bazai, do solemnly declare that the

Research Work under the Title “An Assessment of Pak-Afghan

Relations, Since 1947 Up to 2001” is hereby submitted for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and has not been submitted elsewhere for any Degree. The said research work was carried out by the undersigned under the guidance of Supervisor appointed by the University of Balochistan, Quetta, Pakistan.

Abdul Manan Bazai a

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Mr. Abdul Manan Bazai has

worked under my supervision for the Degree of Doctor of

Philosophy. His research work is original. He fulfills all the

requirements to submit the accompanying thesis for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi Research Supervisor & Dean of Languages University of Balochistan Quetta, Pakistan.

Prof. Dr. Seemi Naghmana Tahir Dean Faculty of State Sciences University of Balochistan Quetta, Pakistan.

b

DEDICATED

TO

THOSE AFGHANS, WHO BECAME THE VICTIMS OF UNDECLEARED WAR ON AFGHANISTAN

The continent of Asia is made of water and clay is but one body in that body the heart is the Afghan Nation the destruction of that nation will bring about the prosperity of Asia as long as the heart remains free, the body will be free otherwise it will become like a straw on the path of the wind : (Allama Iqbal)

It is not difficult to conquer Afghanistan it is difficult to keep it (Amir Abdur Rehman) c

Acknowledgments

First of all, I own my deep gratitude to Allah Almighty for holding me strength to complete this task. In the course of my last four years now and when I was registered as doctoral candidate, I have incurred a considerable number of debts of warm gratitude. Indeed I am grateful to more people that I can count. I take pride in expressing my deep appreciation and gratitude to my supervisor, Professor, Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi, -Dean faculty of languages and ex- Chairman Department of International Relations University of Balochistan Quetta for his constant guidance,interest and suggestion in the complation of this dissertation. No appropriate words of thanks can express my feeling to him. He has been an unfailing source of encouragement and aspiration to me at every stage of this study. He was keen to know the progress of my research throught this period.His valuble suggestions helped me to formulate my hypothesis. No appropriate world of thinks can express my feeling to him. I express my special Thanks and gratituded to Prof Dr Ibrahim Shah Bukari Ex V.C of Jamshoro UOS, who encouraged me at every step in this laborious work.I deserve my greatest regard and respect for his valuable suggestion and guidance. His gentleness, magnaimity and affection have always impressed me. I am also thankful to DR.Azmat Hayat khan, Vice Chancellor (U.O.P) University of Pashawer, a renewed scholar and writer who provdid me different types of books, magazine, journals, and other related information which proved very useful in furnishing me fruitful information. In the course of my research various scholars and organizations helped me to the extent without which this research would not have not been possible.I wish to acknowledge the immense benefits I derived my fruitful discussion with some of my univirsity colleges and friends, especially, Kaleemullah Breach Assistant professor department of history, university of Balochistan, Quetta, who guided and assisted me through suggestion, criticism. and advice in preparing this research work. I am very thankful to him for his assistance whenever I required and asked for it his professionalism and deep source of courtesy help me to complete my research work I would like to express my deep d

appreciation to professor Dr, Zulfiqar Ali, ex Chairman department of International Relations University of Balochistan, Quetta, his company gave me an unstinting help for my research work.I am also thanks to the Chairperson Dr,Mussaret Jabeen Department of International Relations, who always force me for the completion of my thesis. I wish to offer my thanks to the library staff of the main library, University of Balochistan, staff, and Command College Quetta, and Area Study Center of Peshawar University, for eventually allowing me to the valuable library sources. I am greatful for interviewes to that professor,s docrors, scholars, polatitions and foreigners who enlightened me with usful informations. I also express my warm sense of obligation to my family members, especially my brothers and sisters, who always been a tower of strength and sport to me,And a large number of my friends especially Muhammed Sharif kaker, M.Hussan A. Raziq and A. Manan .k, which always encouraged me to fulfill my objectives. . My God Almighty helps them all. I must thank to my wife, who remained a continuous source of encouragement throughout my studies.Her love, patience and devotion were invaluable in completing this study. I express my deep appreciation to my sons and doughters who remained aperennial source of motivation throughout my studies. At last, the pains taken by Mohamme Yousf for undertaking the typing job without pleading pleasure of time is also acknowledged.

e

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ACBL Afghan Campaign to LAN dminesan ACF Action Contra IA Faim ACB Asian Development Bank AIG Afghan Interim Government AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission AIP Afghan Islamic Press AKDN Agha Khan Development Network AMOPH Afghan Ministry of Public Health ANDA Afghan National Defense Islamic Front ANF Afghan Narcotics Force ANLF Afghan National Liberation Front ASF Afghan Students ‘Federation ASO Afghan Students’Organization BBC British Broacasting Corporationd BEMOP Bamyan Emergency Operation CBR Central Board of Revenue CID Crime Investigation Department DP’s Displaced Person DPS Demand for peace & Security EC European Community ECOSOC Economic and Social Conncil EPC Eastern Provincial Council HII Harkate Inqilabe Islami ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross f

ILO International Labor Organization ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISI Inter-Services Intelligence IUAM Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahedeen JI Jamaat-e-Islami JMC Joint Minstrel Commission MUC Muttahida Ulema of Pakistan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDS National Directorate NIF National Islamic Front NSC National Security Council OIC Organization of Islamic Conference OSCA Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe PDPA People’s Democratic Party Afghanistan PTI Press Trust of India PTV Pakistan Television RAWA Revolutionary Association of war in Afghanistan SAIS School of Advanced International Studies SCCI Shared Chamber of Commerce and Industry UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Program UNGOMAP United Nations Good Officer Mission for Pakistan and Afghanistan UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNODC United Nations office on drugs and Crime WIC World Islamic Council WFP World Food Program

g

ABSTRACT

It’s make the most important issue after Soviet Union’s invasion on Afghanistan in 1979, and event of 9/11/2001, Brought forth an entirely new situation not only for Pakistan, s domestic and external policies but for all the regional countries and world. Its impact on relations between the two historical, traditional friends and neighboring Muslim countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The main purpose of the research is to explore and examine the key aspects and interactions between the two countries by focusing attention on the political, economical and other policies of the two countries. The study begins from the time of indepdence of Pakistan in 1947 to 2001. The central point of the study focuses upon the hypothesis that ‘’since 1978 Pak- Afghan diplomacy have remained very successful in achieving their foreign policy objectives.’’ The study analyses the different geo-strategic perceptions and conflicting interests on the regional and global issue, which ultimately made these tradional friends and immediate neighbors’ avirtualrivals and strong competitors. The purpose is to make a good attempt to study the various aspects of Pak-Afghan relations in the context of rapidly geo-strategic environment, and to explore the potentional areas that could provide new avenues for improvement in the bilateral relations between these two brotherly neighboring countries. The study will also help to understand the concerns of the two countries under study vis –a-vis various bilateral as well as multilateral issues that the figure in the overall context of regional peace and stability. The impact of these relations would be analyzed through the local, regional, and International dynamic. Moreover, various turns and twists that Pak-Afghan relations have taken during the five-decad have been elaborate h

upon Different theories, approaches and methods have been used in order to examine, analyze, and to access the depth and the nature of relationship between the two countries.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE a

DEDICATED b

ACKNOLEDGMENTS d

LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS f

ABSRTRACT h

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

CHAPTER- O1:-

INTRODUCTION 1‐9

Introductions of thesis 1

Significance of the study 3

Objective of study 4

Hypothesis 4

Research procedure 4

Organization of chapters 5

References 9

CHAPTER-O2:-

Historical Perspective of Pak-Afghan relations since 1947- 10‐49 1979 Durand Line 11

Historical Perspective of Durand Line 11

Border Demarcation conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan 17

The pashtunistan issue 20

j

Afghanistan claims and Pakistan counter claim over 23 Pashtunistan issue

Pak-Afghan Relation in the context of Pastunistan issue 1947- 24 1979-

Pashtunistan issue in new dimension 33

Daud’s visit to Pakistan...Further improved 34

Bhutto third visit to Afghanistan and its effects on Pak –Afghan 36 relations

References 39‐49

CHAPTER-3:-

Saur Revolution and its impacts on Pak- Afghan Relations 50‐93

Background of leftist movement in Afghanistan up to PDPA. 51

Young Afghan 51

Wesh Zalmiyan 53

Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 54

Manifesto/Program 54

Constitution 55

Split in PDPA 57

KHALQ 57

PACHUM 57

Unification of PDPA 58

Role o f Soviet Unionin1979 Revolution 59

The Coup 61

Aims and Objectives of Saur Revolution 62 k

Major Reforms of Saur Revolution 65

Changing of National Flag 66

Banning of Private Loan Dealing 66

State Control of Marriage and Abolishing of vulvers 68

Land and Agrarian Reforms 70

Centralization of Tribes 72

Modernization of Afghan women 73

Establishing National Father Land Front 75

Official policy of PDPA in 1979 76

Impact of Saur Revolution on Pakistan 76

Political 77

Economical 79

Social 81

Weapons 83

Strategic 83

References 87‐92

CHAPTER 4:- International involvement in Afghanistan and the ROLE of 93‐119 Pakistan

Role of Pakistan 94

Policy options for Pakistan 97

The front line State policy and the US, Assistance 98

Pakistan’s Diplomatic Efforts 101 l

Role of Non Aligned Movement (NAM) 102

Role of Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) 102

Role of United Nations 103

The Geneva Accords 105

First Round 106

Second Round 106

Major Mujahedeen Groups 109

Hizb-Islami (Hi km atyar) 109

Hizb-Islami (Khalis group) 110

Jamiat-e-Islami 111

Attehad-e-Islami 111

Mahaz-e-Milli Islami Afghanistan 112

Harakit-e-Inqilabi 113

Jabha-e-Nejat Milli Afghanistan 113

Iran Based Parties 114

References 117‐119

CHAPTER- 5:-

The withdrawal of soviet troops and Pakistan's Contribution 120‐145 in Peace Accords.

Peshawar Accord 127

Islamabad Accord 133

Rabbani Government 136

m

Tension in Relations 138

References 143‐145

CHAPTER- 6:-

Emergence of Taliban and their Rule (1994-2001). 146‐166

Pre-Taliban Afghanistan 146

Emergence of Taliban 147

Shape and Scope of Taliban Administration 152

Imposing of Islamic Penal Code 154

Present one Party Political Situation 155

Implacable role of Taliban 155

Power struggle and Civil war 156

Foreign Policy of Taliban Administration 157

Pakistan’s Strategic interests 158

The Changing Relations with Taliban Government 162

International Community’s Attitude 164

References 165‐166

CHAPTER-07:-

The event of 9/11 war against terrorism and it impacts on 167‐192 Pak-Afghan Relation.

Post 9/11 Phase and Pakistan 172

References 189‐192

CHAPTER- 8:-

CONCLUTIONS 193‐202 n

Future Suggestions 197

BIBLIOGRAPHY 203

Constitutions 208

Article and Journals 208

Articles in Newspapers 211

Newspapers 212

Magazines 212

Journals And Periodicals 212

Papers and Lectures 213

Personal Interviews 213

News Media 214

Reports 217

Maps 217

The Political Map of Pakistan.

The Political Map of Afghanistan.

CHAPTER: - 01

INTRODUCTION

1

Cordial and brotherly relations with all the Muslim countries have always been one of the integral parts of Pakistan’s foreign policy. This policy did not change besides all sorts of government changes. However Pakistan’s relations with its North-western neighbor Afghanistan have constituted a problematic area in its foreign policy since its inception in 1947. The foreign relations with Afghanistan are as complex as its population. The geopolitical environment of the country is quite complex. Afghanistan has been subjected to foreign political and military intrusions since long. Undoubtedly, internal conflicts depending on their severity and connection of the internal political parties with foreign actors, earn the attention of the outside powers 1 Historically, the county played an important role as a ‘Buffer State’ between British India and the Czarist Empire.2 Great Britain for long exercised influence over the external relations of Afghanistan (1879-1919) with the objective of preventing Kabul from developing any strategic linkage with the former Soviet Empire.3 The exit of Britain from the sub-continent in 1947 and its declines as a global power altered the traditional geopolitical balance in the region. Kabul’s disputes with the newly born Pakistan over Durand Line and Pashtunistan issues added to its urgency to look for political and material support from the Soviet Union. While Pakistan opted to is the ally of USA and joined SEATO and CENTO to get military support to combat with her neighboring states.4 Indeed, for all practical purposes the people of Afghanistan bore no ill will whatsoever towards Pakistan. And neither did the Pakistan’s people harbor any hostility against Afghanistan and its people. The emergence of Pashtoonistan issue was crushed by Pakistan which further deteriorated the relations between both the states. When Sardar Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah in July 1973. Observing the situation, their started a struggle between progressive elements led by PDPA and Islamist to revolt against Daud’s regime. Pakistan provided support to Islamist for bringing change in Afghanistan. However, PDPA under the leadership of Noor Muhammad Taraki remained successful in Afghanistan while Pakistan carried its support to Islamists and Pakistan rendered hospitality to more than 3.5 millions refugees for more than two decades, despite its crumbling economy and the consequences of involvement in conflict 2

with former USSR. Pakistan supported the Afghan cause at all levels and forums (UN, OIC, NAM, EEC, etc). This commitment was partly because of the religious and geographical affinity, which Pakistan has with Afghans and partly because of its national, geographical and geopolitical interests. Due to big threat Pakistan had refused to recognize the Soviet- backed Communist regime which followed the “Sour revolution” and extended active support of all sorts to different Afghan Mujahedeen groups who had refused to accept the increasing Soviet influence in their internal affairs. Pakistan’s close collaboration with the Afghan guerrilla leadership continued to exist till the withdrawal of Soviet troops. However the post withdrawal period is marked with an increased hostility between the Afghan groups as the scramble for Kabul began. Thus as a consequence, Pakistan’s relations with certain Afghan groups were strained, particularly with the ruling coalition under Burhanudin Rabbani. Later on the Islamic movement of Taliban emerged in the South-western Afghanistan and gradually captured almost the entire Pushtoon majority areas of Afghanistan.5 the Rabbani administration had blamed Pakistan for supporting Taliban which has resulted in the deterioration of relations. It was widely believed that Pakistan continued to extend all kind of support to Taliban and, as a result they captured Kabul in September 1996, 6 Hence a Pakistan friendly government replaced the hostile Rabbani administration in Kabul which has even attacked the Pakistan’s Embassy in Kabul. The prospects of peace, at least in the perception of decision makers in Islamabad, became brighter than even before.7 However the struggle continued in the Northern part of Afghanistan where the ethnic minorities live and which have been averse to the idea of Pushtoon dominated government in Kabul 8. Although peace has been restored in more than two third of Afghanistan that is under the effective control of Taliban yet they are facing stringent opposition in northern Afghanistan.9 Despite the fact that Afghanistan is relatively more peaceful in that time, Pakistan is being strongly criticized not only by the opposition groups within Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also by Iran, Central Asian Republics (CARs), India and Russia for its alleged sponsoring of the extremist taliban. 10 3

Pakistan’s Afghan relation ever since the Soviet intervention and even after the fall of Taliban has been subjected to widespread criticism both at home and regionally. Critics of the policy have been contending the Pakistan’s Afghan policy is a hostage to outside interests and shortsighted. It does not reflect the best national interest of Pakistan. They argue that Pakistan’s policy is made either in Washington or Saudi Arabia and is implemented by Pakistan. Thus Pakistan’s policy regarding Afghanistan carries foreign interests. As a result of this policy, Pakistan is being isolated in the region. This scholarly work, however argues and demonstrates that Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, has always remained complex as their always a conflict of interest between western and other global powers with Pakistan. The USA and USSR using the land of Pakistan but once they defeated USA, they left the region ignoring the destroyed Afghanistan and did not settle the Issues related with Afghanistan. The post Russian withdrawal era in Afghanistan was mostly managed by Pakistan, which is considered suspicious by the rest of the world. Significance of the Study The main purpose of this study program is to analyze the two countries' relations between 1978-2001.As the period from 1978 up till 2001 is one of the crucial ones not only for Pakistan but also for the whole world. It was a period during which the whole world remained divided into two blocs. Pakistan had retained its foreign relations towards Afghanistan since 1978 under such parameter. 1. It is descriptive study based upon the evidence. A sleeping lion, a vital country Afghanistan, had been part of the Central Asia and some time ruled by the Mughal emperor enlarged to some parts of the Afghanistan. Historically Afghanistan is gateway towards the South regional countries. 2. Modern history of Afghanistan as an independent state started with rise of declared it as a buffer state i.e. a land between Russia and South Asia. 3. in 1979 white bear of North Pole once again extended their limbs with a great dream, the access to hot water; it is yawning readjustment of the geo-Political status of Afghanistan. This action posed a great threat to the security of world as well as to the region. 4

4. Pakistan as neighboring country of Afghanistan was the first, which affected its geo- Political security and integrity. North West borders of Pakistan are interconnected with Afghanistan. The political situation in Afghanistan has direct reaction on the people and government of Pakistan, because people on both sides of the border have common Historical, Cultural, Social inter relations. British in Subcontinent, they realized the importance of Afghanistan. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY The main objective of this study is to carry out an evaluation of Pakistan's Afghan policy and to find its strength and weaknesses, its problems, achievements and to make suggestion for improvements. HYPOTHESES The main hypotheses of the study are: 1. “From 1978-2001, Pakistan-Afghanistan diplomacy have remained very successful in Achieving their foreign policy objectives” 2. “Pakistan has been failed in achieving her foreign policy objectives since 2001, vis-à- vis frontline states Afghanistan.” METHODOLOGY The methods of inductive/qualitative patterns of research are proposed to be adopted for this study. The relevant materials are expected to be found from the published or unpublished sources. The interviews of the Scholor, Professor, s politicians and other personalities will also be included and relied upon in the study. Method of Research The nature of research work is qualitative. It is based on the critical analysis of the data gathered from the following sources. 1. In the theoretical discussion of the Pakistan foreign policy, I have drown extensively from the core literature on the subject such as by Agha Shai, Shabzada Yaqoob Khan, Star, Burk, Felix Gross, Hannan Kate, Charles Tilly, Walter Leuqur etc. 2. As for as the data on the Pakistan foreign Policy is concerned, I have collected many information from the following sources. 5

3. The books which focused on the historical analysis on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Such as by S.M Bark, Star, Louis Dupree, Ludwic Adamec, Dorn Bernard, Hassan M Kaker,Musa Khan Jalalzai 4. The literature Published after the soviet invasion of Afghanistan and after the withdrawal of soviet troops from Afghanistan, which discussed the Afghan situation, and Pakistan role in Afghanistan in detail. They include a long list of writing Published during the period. Such as of Tahir Amin, Rasool Box Rais, Kamal Mutuddin, George Arney, Salig Harrison, Fred Halliday, Thomas T, Richard etc. 5. A large numbers of articles dealing with the situation war also studied they included those written by eminent writers, and published in the journals of international reports. 6. A regular source of the world events was greatly helpful to me in the pursuit of my research Kessing’s Contemporary Archives, Published by Kessing’s publications 7. I also counted upon newspapers and Magazines, Particularly the time, News week. Dawn 8. Interviews with scholars, politician’s, policy makers, of both countries Afghanistan and Pakistan. 9 Use of Internet. Organization of Chapters

This thesis is consisted of Eight Chapters. Chapter 01:- Introduction of Thesis Significance of the Study Objective of the study Hypotheses Research Procdure

6

Chapter 02 The roots of Pak-Afghan Relations in Historical prospective. The chapter will trace the historical roots of Pak-Afghan relations from 1947 to 1978. Because the newly established country like Pakistan found its self in the shadows of inherited problems left unresolved in the relationship between the British India and Afghanistan. Pakistan was to find a way that could resolve the issue through peaceful manners. The chapter is to focus on the period from the 1947 till 1978 as its inclusion was necessary to understand the relationship under research. A lengthy reference to be made to the restructuring of Pakistan's relationship, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with Afghanistan under President Dawood 1975-78 with Iran playing the role of mediator. President Dawood agreed to establish good relations with Pakistan by burying hatches over Pashtunistan in return for massive development aid from Iran for its Helmand Vally and other developments. Chapter 03 Sour Revolution and its impacts on Pak-Afghan Relations. The Afghan sour revolution of 27th April, 1978 led by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan under Taraki created a new kind of atmosphere not only in the regional politics but it also had a great impact on the international politics. As it was basically a socialist revolution so, naturally USSR's strong support was behind it. While on the other side the Islamists who were against the revolution were projected and supported by U.S.A led coalition. Pakistan being the next door neighbor of Afghanistan had to be affected by the changes occurred in Afghanistan. Due to war, around 3 million Afghans migrated to Pakistan although refugees’ camps were established in different places in the two provinces namely NWFP and Balochistan but majority of them settled in different cities of Pakistan which naturally had impacts on the social and economic life of the country. The cities of Peshawar and Quetta became the centers for the so-called Mujahedeen who were fighting with the support of USA led coalition against the sour revolution in Afghanistan.

7

Chapter 04. International involvement in Afghanistan and the Role of Pakistan. The soil of Afghanistan became a battlefield for the biggest powers and their companions to show their military and economic strength. The cold war was turned into the hot war on the soil of Afghanistan. USA provided a huge amount of fund to the Islamists and an undeclared war (Jihad) was started. The direct involvement of the USA and USSR in the region let Pakistan, the close neighbor of Afghanistan most affected from the situation. Pakistan was supposed to play an important role as Frontline State. Chapter 05 The withdrawal of Soviet troops and Pakistan’s contribution in Peace Accords The tussle between USA and USSR in Afghanistan ended by the withdrawal of Russian troops from Afghanistan. The role of Pakistan in the peace Accords is most important one. The Geneva Accords signed between involved parties in Afghanistan let the Russian Army go out from Afghanistan. The same Accord might not have been implemented properly if Pakistan would not have supported. Later on, during the ruling period of Mujahedeen, Pakistan again facilitated to provide opportunities to the different Afghan Mujahedeen groups to sign agreement in Islamabad and Peshawar and to form a unanimous Government in Afghanistan after the resignation of Dr. .Najeebuallah's regime. Chapter 06 Emergence of Taliban and their rule (1994-2001). The short period of Mujahedeen Government did not prove well because their weak performance opened a way for civil war bringing a lot of destruction to Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan and the neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan became fed up and lethargic from such situation. The people of Afghanistan and state of Pakistan facilitated the way for the emergence of Taliban. Taliban emerged on the Afghan scene in 1994 after they captured their stronghold in Kandahar and by September,1997 they had controlled more than 75% of Afghanistan but their traditional 8

and rigid approach in the formation of Government isolated them from rest of the world. The chapter will cover in depth the study of the emergence and the downfall of Taliban. Chapter 07 The event of 9/11, war against terrorism and Pakistan. The major challenge of Pakistan after 9/11 was the predicament of war against terrorism. In the medium term after the military operation the US agenda became more complicated bringing new challenges. Pakistan should spin on its head, discard the Taliban, discard Islamic Jihad, discard Islamic fundamentalists, and became an accomplice in American military intervention in Afghanistan or else face the consequences. President Bush had made it clear that those who failed to join hands with them against terrorism were then against them. The chapter will deal in detail the aftermath of September 9, 2001 in Afghanistan and its impact on the relations of Pakistan. Chapter-8 Deals with the Conclusion .of thesis and future suggestion and recommendations.

9

REFERENCES 1. Www/embassy of Pakistan.org/facts and figure.Php. 2. Thomas Barfield, the Afghan Morass’’, Current Affairs, July 1996. 3. Kamal Matim-u-Dins. Power Struggle in the Hindukush, Lahore: Wajid Ali Publisher, 1991, p.38. 4. Tahir Amin, Afghan Crises: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan. Islamabad: Institute of Studies, 1980.pp75-78. 5. Kamal Matim-u-Din, opcit. p.71. 6. Rais, War without Winners, London: Oxford University Press, 1994.p58. 7. B.Hilal’ Afghanistan, A Multi- Ethnic Society’’, Journals of Central Asian Studies, (Area Study Center, Peshawar University) 1995. 8. Rais, opcit. p.51 9. TahirAmin, opcit. p.45 10. Ibid.p.46. 11. bid

CHAPTER NO:- II

HISTORICAL PRESPECTIVE OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS SINCE 1947-1979. 10

Before we attempt to study Pak-Afghan relations, it is necessary to acquaint ourselves of the historical background of Pak-Afghan relations. Therefore, the present chapter explains the historical perspective of Durand line and “Pashtunistan” issue.’ While discussing the Durand line, the circumstances leading to signing of the Durand agreement, the Afghan ruler’s reservation of the Durand line agreement as well as the main objections raised by the Afghan rulers have been discussed. Similarly, while discussing the Pashtunistan issue, various versions of the Pashtunistan raised government and the repudiation of the Afghan claim by the Pakistani authorities also been discussed. Movers ever, the Pak-Afghan relation in the context of Pashtunistan issue from 1947 to 1978 have also been elaborated. There have been ups and down in Pak Afghan relations since 1947. During this period the relations remained fluctuating from tense to peaceful at different occasion. At few occasion the relation had deteriorated to the extent of closing borders and stopping of Afghan trade through Pakistan territory. The Pak Afghan issue has two dimensions. The first point of difference is over the Durand line their common border, and the second point of difference is the Pashtunistan identity inside Pakistan the Afghan argue that the Durand line being the product of the British forward policy was imposed upon them under the Frontier forward policy of divide and rule.. Since the Durand line, was the product of little thought as to the topography of the area, it cut the Pashtun tribes into two further more, the question of the Pashtun territory had always remained “disputed” between Afghanistan and great Britain. The Afghan agreed that the boundary demarcation agreement (Durand line 1893) concluded between Afghanistan and great British were applicable only for the duration of the British rule. There fore the boundary question should be reopened between Pak and Afghanistan solution as to settle the boundary conflict according to the desires of the people. On the question of the Pashtuns identity in Pakistan, the Afghans contended that due to their continuous agitation on the matter, the British had conceded Afghanistan's interest in the welfare of the Pashtuns across the border in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921, Signed between British India and Amir Amanullah Khan, Afghanistan, therefore, wanted the right of self-determination for Pashtuns right up to the Indus. The Afghans 11

declared the referendum of 1947 as "sham and a trick" as the people were not given the choice to remain independent or to merge into Afghanistan.1 DURAND LINE Pakistan and Afghanistan have a common frontier of about 1, 200 miles known as the Durand Line named after Mortimer Durand the Indian secretary of State. Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan and Mortimer Durand, on behalf of the British India, demarcated this frontier between British India and Afghanistan on November 12, I893. 2 Though initially both the sides expressed satisfaction, the later developments showed that the Durand Agreement did not solve the frontier problems. The later Afghan rulers also resented the Durand Agreement. The British could not persuade the Afghans to recognize the legitimacy of the Durand Line and transferred the disputed area to Pakistan in August 1947. 3 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE DURAND LINE Before 1747, Afghanistan was part of various successive empires in different historical phases. History of the early empires is obscure. However, under Darius the great (500 B.C.), it formed part of Achacmenian Umpire. In 329 B.C. Alexander crossed the country, then successively Morays (250 B.C.), Yuehchih (1, 75 B.C.), and Kushans (100 A.D.) ruled it. White Huns (400A. D.) and the Sassanid (600 A. D.) made Afghanistan part of their empires. The Muslims came- to Afghanistan by the middle of seventh century and various dynasties; Ghazanavids, Seljuk’s, Ghorids, Turks, Mongols, Timurids and Mughal ruled this country.4 Although various scholars disagree over the origin of the Pashtuns, who are the main inhabitants of Afghanistan. However, it is said that when Alexander armies passed through (his area to invade India in the 4th century B.C. the Pashtuns had inhabited the Eastern Highlands and mountains of modern Afghanistan. The long standing of the Pashtun's residence in this area enabled them to command the principal passes of strategic importance lying between central Asia and the rich plains in India. It gave them control over military and trade routes.5

12

As a political entity, Afghanistan came into prominence with the decline of the two great empires, the Safavids in the West and the Mughals in the East, 6 The decline of both the empires created an opportunity,7 of which Ahmad Shah Abdali (1747-1773) took advantage to establish the first Afghan kingdom. In 1747, Afghanistan became fully independent under Ahmed Shah Abdali of Sadozai clan. His empire stretched as far as Kashmir, Delhi, little-Tibet and the Arabian Sea, while Persian Khurasan to the west became a tributary state. His regime resembled a convention of tribes.8 Modern Afghanistan is the remains of the empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali. After the decline of his empire Russian expansion in Central Asia southwards and British expansion northwards started resulting in the creation of the present state of Afghanistan about the middle of nineteenth century between the Oxus and the Durand Line.9 Afghanistan, though a landlocked country, occupies a strategic position between the Middle East. Central Asia and South Asia. It is bounded to the north by the Central Asia, to the west by Iran, to the East and South by Pakistan and to extreme North-East by China. Its geographical position has exerted decisive influence on its political history, composition and population.10 Afghanistan is watered by four major rivers-the Amu Darya (Oxus) in the north, which rises from Lake Victoria (discovered by Captain Wood in I83 8 ) and flows into the Aral Sea. The Hari Rud lies in the west, the Helmand in the south and (the Kabul in the east. 11 Afghanistan has been rightly familiarized as a "highway of conquest" for migrant peoples and expanding empires, a confluence of civilizations and religions, and a "roundabout" for numerous trade routes connecting Europe with Far East and the Indian Subcontinent,.12 Numerous factors had led to the external intervention in Afghanistan. The most important were its landlocked character, its large and powerful neighbors and its undefined and undefended borders. Afghanistan'; geographical position has also made it insecure to raids from both Central Asia and the West. Insides it the strategic goals, political interests and the ideological imperatives of its neighboring .Stales were also of equal importance for consideration.13 Afghanistan's pivotal place in the strategies of world powers is not a recent development. For more than a century and a quarter, it was a sort of "No Man's Land' on the periphery of two Great empires- The landlocked stale was like a bridge spanning central and southern Asia, It was a gateway, which opened on both 13

sides. 14 The Russian had coveted the warm water port in the Indian Ocean since Peter the Great's reign (1628-1725). This ambition brought it into conflict with British imperial positions in Persia and India in the 19th century. The two great powers hovered over Afghanistan for nearly two centuries, fighting for position and the general outline of its history is pertinent to the current controversy.15 To pursue their ambitions, the two European powers in Asia, British and Russia, came face to face with each other in early 19th century. The desire to expand, led Russia to absorb Kirghiz and Turkmen and reduce Khiva and Bukhara to the status of mere vassal states. While the British Empire in India contended for the time being with the annexation of the Punjab, Sind and established its supremacy in Kashmir, Chitral and Kalat. It also manifested its desire to control the approaches to India located in Afghanistan. The Russian expansion to the South and British expansion to the North were looked upon with mutual suspicion by the two empires. To the British, any Russian advance in Central Asia was considered a potential threat to India, whereas to the Russians, any British attempt to establish itself north of the Hindu Kush was a clear signal to dislodge the former from its Central Asian possessions. The mutual efforts to frustrate the real or perceived designs of the other came to be known as the "Great Game.16 The rivalry between British in India and Russians in Central Asia started to manifest itself in the soil of Afghanistan since 1815. Ensuring its own security was the major concern of each power. Afghanistan was the focus of both the super powers for their defense against another. The British policy towards Afghanistan alternated between ‘Close Door Policy' and 'Forward Policy' depending on the perceptions of the British decision-makers regarding Russian designs over India.17 The 'Close Border Policy' meant direct British rule only in the settled areas of the frontier region and leaving the tribes to administer their own affairs. It also meant non-interference in Afghan affairs. The British believed that stability in Afghanistan would obstruct Russian expansion. Therefore, during 1890s the 'Close Border Policy' was replaced by 'Forward Policy.' Under the new policy, the British look" the responsibility of administering certain areas and sent strong military force into the other parts of the region.18 When the British reached the Pashtun areas in the north-west, they had to stop at the "scientific frontiers" following the line that 14

ran between the cities of Kabul and Kandahar. Such a frontier would have brought the entire Pashtun population under British control, but the Pashtuns were not in favor of such a solution to British expansionism.19 However, the Russian expansion in central Asia and its progress towards Afghanistan made the British worried who looked upon the Russian threat as a real danger. Therefore the defense of India had to be planned and this could be achieved by the occupation of the "scientific frontier" based on Kabul-Ghaziu- Kandahar Line.20 Continued British intervention in Afghanistan compelled Amir Sher Ali to take the Russian help. Sher Ali's acceptance of the Russian envoy and refusal to the British mission resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80).21 As a result of the Second Anglo-Afghan war the British not only had to control the Afghan foreign affairs but also stationed the British agents in Afghanistan in return for the British support against foreign aggression (Persian, Russian, or Bokharan intrusion).22 The war also led to the removal of Sher Ali leaving the country to Sher Ali's son Yakub Khan who concluded the Treaty of Gandamak with the British on May 26, 1879. The treaty granted internal autonomy to Afghanistan but in foreign relations it was bound to follow British advice. A false promise of non-interference in Afghan home affairs was also made. The British also agreed to pay annual tributes to the Amir. Amir Abdur Rahman, (1880-1901) a cousin of Amir Sher Ali Khan followed Amir Yakub Khan as Amir.23 However, the unruly nature of the Afghans, and the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-1842), (1878-1880) convinced the British that "what was possible and practical were considerably less than what was scientific and desirable." Constant British pressure on Amir, on the one hand, and Amir's own reluctance to start war with the British on the other, led to the signing of the Durand Line agreement between Afghanistan's Amir Abdur Rahman and Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of India on November 12, 1893.24 Two treaties were signed between the Amir and Durand, one about territory north and south of Oxus and the other about those to the south and east of Afghanistan 25 The Kabul Convention or the Durand Line ran a hundred miles south of Kabul-Kandahar divide. This line cut the Pashtun population into two: "Afghan" and the other "tribal" with the latter only "marginally integrated" to British India.26 the main provisions of the second agreement known as the Durand Agreement are as follows: 15

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side or India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the government of India are desirous or settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and fixing the limit of their respective spheres or influence so that in future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied governments. Il is hereby agreed as follows: 1. The government of India will at no time exercise interference in thes lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyong this line on th side of India. 2. The British government thus agreed to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will not interfere in swat. Bajaur of Chitral, Including the Arnwai or Bashgal valley. 3. The British tract, who agrees to leave to his Highness the Birmal tract, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of Waziristan coutnry and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to chagh 4. The Frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, whereas this may be Practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan commissioners.27 The Afghans contended that while negotiating the Durand Line Agreement, Amir Abdur Rahman was faced with many problems from various corners. They claimed that it was obtained through duress, because at that time the British had the control of the foreign affairs of Afghanistan, The Russians were also snapping away at Afghanistan's western border. Internecine wars and rebellions were also going on in Afghanistan at full vigour.28 Furthermore, the British having monopoly over commercial trade and arms trade from India to Afghanistan had imposed arms embargo on Afghanistan. They were also building a network of roads and railroads in the tribal areas leading to Afghanistan in prosecution of their 'Forward Policy.29 It was also claimed that the British bribed the Amir by payment of 18 lakh of rupees annually as "subsidy" for “signing” the agreement, which corrupted the very nature of the agreement. 30 In addition, the Viceroy of India also sent a letter to the Amir stating that "the Indian Government cannot wait for your indefinite promises of uncertain dates and, therefore, after such and such a time, will draw its own conclusions," He asked the Amir to conclude a demarcation agreement. The Amir took the letter as warning and ultimatum. In fact, the British wanted the 16

demarcation and for that purpose they used every means to pressurize the Amir.31 Thus, according to Afghanistan's sources. Amir Abdur Rahman was pressurized politically, militarily and economically to accept the agreement. 32 Amir Abdur Rahman has described the Durand Line issue in his memoirs. According to him a map concerning the Afghan frontier was sent to him by the Viceroy in which certain areas inhabited by the fronted tribesmen were called as “Yaghistan” (the land of the unruly) were shown as belonging to India. In the map sent to the Amir all the countries of Yaghistan namely the New Chaman including the railway station there, Chaghe, Bulund Khel Waziri, the whole of Mohmand, Asmar, Chitral, Bajaur, Swat Buner, Dir, and Chilas were shown as belonging to India. The Amir wrote back to the Viceroy asking him to let the people of theses areas stay with him. Because being of the same faith, he would make the people of the areas fight against the enemy of the British “in the name of Jihad”. If the areas were detached neither it would be of any use to the British north the Amir. He further argued that the detachment of the areas [from Afghanistan] would minimize his prestige in the eyes of the people, which in turn would make him weak. He warned that his weakens would be dangerous to the British government. 33 But the British did not accept his viewpoint and the boundary line were concluded. The boundary line extended from Chitral and Baroghil pass to Peshawar and thence up to Kohl Malik Siyah in this way that Wakhan, Kafiristan, Asmar, Mohmand of Lalpura, and one portion of Waziristan were left to the Amir software Jurisdiction. The Amir gave up claims to the railway station of new Chaman, Chaghe, and part of Waziri Bulund Khel, Kuram, Afridi, Bajaur, Swat, Buner, Dir, Chilas and Chitral as a result of the Durand Line Agreement. 34 The next important matter was the subsequent ratification and renunciation of the agreement by the succeeding Afghan rulers. The relevant documents in favor of ratification are the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905, the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919, and the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921. These three documents show that the Durand Line treaty had been ratified or at least accepted. 35 In addition, the letters exchanged between the British Government and Afghanistan on May 6, 1930; June 30, 1950; and on 1s1 March 1956 also confirmed the Durand Line.36 Although Amir Habibullah in 1905, Amir Amanullah in 1921 and King Nadir Shah in 1930 ratified the agreement. King Zahir 17

Shah did not accept it after the British withdrawal from India, 37

BORDER DEMARCATION CONFLICT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN The Afghans questioned the Durand Line when the partition plan of the Indian Subcontinent was announced on June 3, 1947. The Afghan Government claimed all the areas of Indian Subcontinent inhabited by the Pashtuns, but the Indian Government rejected the claim.38 According to the authorities in Afghanistan, in the past, NWFP was part of Afghanistan. Therefore, they demanded that after the departure of the British from the Sub-continent, they should be allowed to join their kith and kin in Afghanistan. The Afghans further hoped that the Pashtuns in NWFP would be given the option either to join Afghanistan or to remain independent,39 Having this in mind, the Government of Afghanistan approached the British to negotiate for regaining the areas inhabited by the Pashtuns, which were now part of Pakistan after the British withdrawal.40 They tried to persuade the British to return NWFP, Balochistan and the tribal areas on the grounds that they were initially part of Afghanistan, and they be allowed to unite with Afghanistan to form one Afghan state or to form independent Pashtunistan. However, the British did not accept the Afghan claims.41 They rather insisted that the Pashtuns join either India or Pakistan through referendum.42 Between 6 and 17 July 1947, a referendum was held under the control of the army to find out whether the people of Frontier want to join India or Pakistan. The Frontier Congressmen did not take part in the referendum. Consequently, the Muslim League was victorious in the referendum. The Frontier congressmen were told to give up their alliance with Patel and Ghandi and join hands with the Muslim League in the reconstruction of the country. Nevertheless, the Congressmen refused and termed the referendum as 'sham' and 'one-sided' affair.43 However, the Pashtuns decided in favor of joining Pakistan.44 Afghanistan rejected the referendum results on the ground that the Pashtuns having the same links with British India, as with other princely states, should have been given The third option of remaining independent,45 An official press communiqué was issued in Kabul in 1947, declaring that:....

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In spite of the boycott of a great majority of the Afghans, the forced referendum was enforced and carried out in Afghan Balochistan and the NWFP. Both were given to Pakistan. But our claim stands as it was. And Afghanistan has already announced that Afghanistan will not acknowledge the results of the above mentioned obligatory and unjust referendum. 46 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Khudai Khidmatgar Organization who led the freedom struggle in NWFP, while delivering a speech on the eve of observing 'Pashtunistan Day' on 1" September 1967, in Kabul, objected the referendum of July 1947 in the following words: The force of Referendum was staged by the British government first, on the issues we are not interested in; second, based on limited franchise,; third, with no supervision and control of the ballots; fourth, rigging of votes and fifth, non-participation by majority of Pashtuns.47 Even after the referendum of 1947, Afghanistan continued to challenge the Durand line 48 on three basic grounds. 1. The Durand Line had been concluded under duress therefore Pakistan couldn't inherit a territory, which had never belonged rightfully to British. 2. That the majority of the Pashtuns had not voted in the referendum of July 1947 and that they had not been given the option of remaining autonomous. 3. The Durand Line had divided the Pashtuns into two, The Afghan contended that the Pashtuns should be given the right of self-determination to decide whether they want to stay in Pakistan join Afghanistan or become independent.49 Having denounced the Durand Line, the Afghanistan Government made the following demands from Pakistan: 1. Pashtunistan should be the name of the Frontier province along with certain areas of Balochistan. 2. The tribal areas of Pakistan's side of the Durand Line should be declared the sovereign state of Pashtunistan with the Frontier province and Balochistan being incorporated in this new state.50 Thus, between 1947 and 1979, various Afghan Governments objected the Durand Line on the grounds that it was a treaty between two unequal powers i.e. British Empire and 19

Afghanistan. They suggested the demarcation of new boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan so as to resolve the problem of Pashtun's ethnic purity. Such a frontier would have completed the ethnic purity of Afghanistan by the re-union of the vast majority of the Pashtuns. Afghanistan also presented another option of creating a self- governing province of Pashtunistan or an independent country for the whole Pushtuns.51 Thus, Afghan claims can be summarized into three categories Historically, Afghanistan argued that all the disputed areas had been controlled by Afghanistan but were usurped by the British. Legally, Afghanistan argued that the Durand Line treaty had been obtained by coercion and Pakistan cannot inherit the areas from an extinguished ruler, namely British rule in India. Ethnically, the Afghans argued the Pashtuns are single ethnic unit but had been divided by the Durand Line.52 Pakistan refused to accept the demands of Afghanistan. It contended that the Pashtuns had never formed a single ethnic nation in history. Far from maintaining any unity there had been continuous inter-tribal feuds. It further argued that Afghanistan only talks about the inclusion of all Pashtuns across the border in Pashtunistan but denied the inclusion of Pashtuns on its side. By so doing the Pashtuns would continue to remain divided into two sovereign stales. Pakistan even rejected the Afghan argument of Pashtuns being a racial group with common traditions, culture and language and added further that the Pashtuns on eastern border have developed their own culture and connected themselves economically and politically more with Peshawar than Kabul.53 It pointed out, that Afghanistan's emotional attachment with the Pashtuns and its domestic and geo-.strategic compulsions were responsible for its refusal to negotiate on the issue.54 Therefore, Pakistan considered the Durand Line as an internationally recognized frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite its geographical and ethnic flaws, Because Amir Abdur Rahman and all the subsequent rulers of Afghanistan had accepted the Durand Line as obligatory upon them. Pakistan being the inheritor of British had assumed the rights and obligation by virtue of various treaties concluded between Afghanistan and the British Government. "The Durand Line has thus become the international Boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan.55

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2 PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE The colonies created by the Europeans in Asia and Africa during their rule have left legacies of bitterness and often of war for the independent nations that emerged from colonial rule- Afghanistan, though never colonized in a proper sense, was no exception.56 The Pashtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the legacy of the British colonialism. The origin of the Pashtunistan issue dates back to the Treaty of Gandamak concluded on May 26, 1878, and the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 between Afghanistan and British India. The Durand Line rather than solving problems created more complications for Afghanistan in the shape of division of the Pashtun tribes living between Afghanistan and British India.57 Although at the time of partition, the Afghan Government tried to persuade the British to give the Pashtuns two supplementary options either lo merge with Afghanistan or to form an independent Pashtunistan, but the British refused to entertain any of these demands.58 AFGHANISTAN'S CLAIMS AND PAKISTAN'S COUNTER CLAIMS OVER PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE The Afghan Government definition of Pashtunistan has been changing from time to time. Afghanistan at one time wanted without reservation, the incorporation of large territories from Khyber to Dera Gliazi Khan and from Giigit and Chitral to the Arabian Sea. Yet at another time Afghanistan recommended the establishment of an autonomous Pashtunistan. Though, Afghanistan was quiet on the incorporation of any of Pashtun and Pashto speaking areas situated in Afghanistan.59 According to Afghan official sources, Pashtunistan comprised of NWFP and Balochistan. In other words, it stretches from Balochistan in the South to Chitral and Gilgit in the north. Abdur Rahman Pazhwak, an Afghan ambassadorial representative has also written that Pashtunistan includes Chitral, Hazara, Kohistan, Swat, Dir, Buner, Peshawar, Tirah, Bajaur, Kohat, Pezu, Goirial, and Bolan. And Malacad. According to the 'nationalist' Pakistani Pashtun leaders including Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan, Pashtunistan meant only the renaming of the NWFP conceding it autonomy within Pakistan.60 According to Arif Hussain 'Pashtunistan', as visualized by Afghanistan, would be comprised of the tribal territory with its two million population, the former territory of

21

NWFP, with two million inhabitants, and a part of old Balochistan total amounting to about seven million people. However, Afghanistan claim was a little larger and included Balochistan and a few other states as well.61 Since the word Pashtunistan is used for the area inhabited by a majority of the Pashto speaking people, 62 consequently the Pashtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan basically concerns the social and legal position and condition of several million Pashtuns living east and south of the Durand Line. These people are called Pashtuns because their main language is Pashto or Pakhto, Although the Pashtuns are divided into several complex tribes and sub tribes but they have a common language, culture, custom and history.63 The principal argument for creating Pashtunistan' was ethnological. The Afghans argued that the Pashtuns are different from the rest of the people and should be given a separate homeland of their own.64 The Pashtun areas in Pakistan were looked upon as belonging to the Pashtuns by a shared history, race, language and culture.65 Accordingly, the original Afghan propaganda was based on two themes: first, the Pashtunistan state should be formed comprising only Pashtun areas across the border, totally independent from Pakistan and secondly, the new 'Pashtunistan State' should be integrated with Afghanistan due to ethnic, linguistic and other affinities. The major argument was that "since there is no difference between us, there is no sense in our being disunited. 66 Strategic and economic reasons were also some of the factors for furthering Pashtunistan claim. Afghanistan wished to acquire some territory to reach the Indian Ocean and put an end to Afghanistan's landlocked status. Amir Abdur Rahman had revealed this desire in unequivocal manner at the end of nineteenth century in these words: If Afghanistan had access to the ocean, there is no doubt that the country would soon grow rich and prosperous ... if no favorable opportunity occurs in my life to bring about this purpose my sons and successors must always keep their eyes on this corner, i.e. Balochistan. 67 Security factor was also one of the main considerations of Afghanistan in supporting Pashtunistan claim. Pashtunistan's importance for Afghanistan was apparent for it lay on the Afghan border. Afghanistan could not remain unaffected by the unrest in the Pashtun 22

areas, as it would be politically, economically, administratively and strategically. It was more likely because Afghanistan is depended on its neighbors for trade with the outside world. 68 Another major argument of Afghan Government was that the disputed territory was neither composed on state-like basis nor absorbed with the rest of British India on the eve of the departure of the British from India. Some areas were administered territories while others remained as independent tribal areas but none of this formed part of any state. According to Azmat Hayat, an authority on Durand Line, in international law, alteration of such an area into a political body by the Pakistani authorities was an innovation, formed by irregular means. 69 Afghanistan, therefore, considered it its duty to support and protect the right of self- determination of the Pashtuns living on Pakistani side.70 It has always shown its concern whenever they felt any danger to the Pashtun identity and culture. They made it clear to the Pakistani Government that the future status of the tribal areas and the Pashtuns should be divided in accordance with the desires of the Pashtuns. They threatened that any thing decided against the wishes of the Pashtuns would not be acceptable to the Afghanistan's Grand National Assembly.71 The incompatible nature of the Afghan claims often confuses modern researchers on this distressing controversy. This confusion is the result of the failure to distinguish between the official Afghan government position and the demands put forward by the "unofficial propagandists, extreme nationalists, and political advocates of a Greater Afghanistan." Governmental control or influence over the communication in Afghanistan had made it difficult to decide, "When a certain claim is official, officially inspired, or merely the opinion of the writer." But when we examine exactly only the official pronouncement of the Afghan Government, three basic themes are repeated with outstanding coherence. These are: 1. A demand for the Pashtuns living East of the Durand Line; 2. Insistent denial that Afghanistan desires any territorial expansion, and. 3. Repeated assurances that Afghanistan wants the dispute solved only by peaceful means and that negotiations should take place between Pakistan and the leaders of Pashtuns themselves.72 23

Pakistan has rejected Afghanistan's demand for the right of self-determination of the Pashtuns on the ground that before 1747, there was no such state and the territories of Pashtuns remained divided between the Safavi Empire and the Mughal Empire. Moreover, the North West India remained part of Afghanistan for only Fifty years. After it, it was taken by the Sikhs and from them it passed on to the British in 1849. It further argued that if a territorial claim for such a short period nearly 150 years ago was to be accepted for territorial change, "the world map would be liable to dramatic change," Thus Pakistan rejected Afghanistan's claim on the basis that the trans-lndus tracts had been surrendered to Nadir Shah. After Nadir-Shah's death, Ahmad Shah captured it by force and the area remained as part of Afghanistan for a short period.73 Pakistan further argued that the question of self-determination has already been dosed by the referendum lied in NWFP in which the majority of the Pashtuns had decided in favor of joining Pakistan.74 Manzoor Qadir, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, even suggested the holding of a referendum for the Pashtuns inside Afghanistan.75 The argument was advanced on the ground that the Pashtuns are in majority in Pakistan than Afghanistan. There are seven million Pashtuns in Pakistan while in Afghanistan their strength is not more than four million. If the Afghan historical kinship is kept in view then the Afghan claim could be rebounded on them by asking Afghanistan to hold referendum among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan to find out whether they want to Join Pakistan or remain in Afghanistan.76 In this way, Pashtunistan demand could have been dangerous for Afghanistan if Pakistan would have recourse to active propaganda The very propaganda that the Afghans themselves are not unified group could have created problems for them. According to Arif Hussain, "it is no great trick to bring down a government in Kabul, it never has been. 77 After some border raids, the Government of Pakistan in a White Paper issued on September 3, 1961, pointed out: If the frontier of a country has to be determined on linguistic and ethnic bases as claimed by the Afghans. It will result in the disintegration of Afghanistan. There are twelve million people in Afghanistan. Of these only 3.5 million speak Pashto and the rest speak Persian. Turkish. Tadzhik and Uzbek. All these non-Pashto speaking parts of Afghanistan should on this basis be integrated with neighboring counties. 78 24

Thus Pakistan opposed Afghanistan's hostile policy on Pashtunistan which it pursued with backing from Russian and India. Indian involvement in the matter was because of its policy to encircle Pakistan "which India had about to do by reasons of combination other own frontier marching with that of West Pakistan, her occupation of Kashmir and the maintenance of close relations with Afghanistan." Russia's interest in the matter was to punish Pakistan for joining the Western Alliances.79 PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTESXT OF PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE: 1947-78 The Pashtunistan issue had been the main cause of often-tense relations between the two countries since Pakistan's creation.80 The dispute took various forms of propaganda warfare, border fighting, closure of consulates and interference with Afghan transit arrangement for trade via Karachi.81 The Pak-Afghan discord surfaced with Afghanistan's casting negative vote on Pakistan's admission into the United Nations on September 30, 1947 82 The Afghan representatives, Hosyan Aziz, defended the decision in the United Nations, Genera! Assembly in the following words: We cannot recognize the North West Frontier as part of Pakistan solution as long as people of North West Frontier have not been give an opportunity free from any kind of influence and I repeat, free from any kind of influence to determine for themselves whether they wish to be independent or to become part of Paksitan.83 Since then, the Afghan government demanded a plebiscite to be held in Pakistani side of the Durand Line.84 Pakistan was not recognized as a complete state "with defined, acceptable frontiers." In order to be accepted by international community, according the Afghan accusations, Pakistan had to re-demarcate its border with its neighboring country. 85 The Kabul radio and press frequently instigated the tribes on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line to create an independent Pashtunistan. 86 In November 1947, the meeting’ between the special envoy of King Zahir Shah and Pakistani statesmen in Karachi, to negotiate friendship treaty remained vague. But despite mutual suspicion and skirmishes, diplomatic relations established between the two countries in 1948.87 In February 1948, Afghanistan and Pakistan showed some

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conciliatory signs including Afghanistan's withdrawal of its negative UN vote in the United Nations and the exchange of ambassadors.88 The appointment of the first Afghan Ambassador, Marshal Shah Wali Khan, the uncle of King Zahir Shah was regarded as a gesture of goodwill. On May 8, 1948, Shah Wali Khan Chazi, the first Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan presented his credentials to Quaid-i-Azam. The Quaid said on this occasion: Your Royal Highness has rightly referred to the natural bonds of friendship and affection, which bind the people of our two countries. It could hardly be otherwise as these bonds are based on ties of faith and culture. With such powerful bonds in our favor we cannot. I feel, fail to bring the people of our two countries closure than they were before the birth of Pakistan. 89 In 1948, the Pashtunistan propaganda was going on in full swing in Kabul. On May 26, 1948, King Zahir Shah in his inaugural speech in Shin-a-i-Milli referred to the Pashtunistan issue in the following words: … The Afghan nation welcomed and viewed with utmost gratification the establishment of the dominion of Pakistan and India and the Afghan government did not fail in exerting their best efforts to take up the matter of our Afghan brethren living in the government of Great Britain and the newly set up government of Pakistan. Whilst we have openly declared our desire to set up an embassy of Afghanistan in Karachi, with a view to cementing the relations of friendship and “Bon Voisinage” with Pakistan. We earnestly hope that assurances in this regard will be dully implemented.90 I In June 1948, the Loyai Jirga (the Afghan National Assembly) rejected all treaties, conventions and agreements signed between Afghanistan and the British Government before 1947. It even challenged the Durand Line as an internationally recognized frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan.91 The Loya Jirga announced "it recognized neither the imaginary Durand nor any similar Line" and declared all agreements as null and void. An attempt was made to set up an independent Pashtunistan, which had secret Afghan support, 92 The Loya Jirga also mentioned the separation of NWFP and other areas from Chitral to Balochistan from the Pakistani government and promised help to the Afghan Government in the achievement of freedom for the people of this areas.93

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In March 1949, Afghanistan's activities of mobilizing its troops on the Pakistani side of the border failed due to Pakistan's closure of its border in 1950, for three months, By 1950, the situation had aggravated to the extent of opening of Pashtunistan fund.94 and Pashtunistan Assembly or first Pashtun Provisional Parliament, with a branch in Tirah under the leadership of the Afridi clan and another branch at Gorweikht in Waziristan of which the Faqir of 1pi Mirza Ali khan, the legendary freedom fighter became the first President. A general assembly of all the Pashtun clans had declared their allegiance to it- Its meetings were organized at different places in Afghanistan, which no doubt, had secret Afghan support.95 In January 1950, Liaqat Ali Khan, then Prime Minister of Pakistan asked the British Government to declare the Durand Line as an international boundary and encroachment upon it as a violation of the Commonwealth border. On January 12, 1950, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Philip Noel Baker, told a conference in Karachi that under international law, Pakistan was the lawful-inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Indian Government of the regions on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line". Later the British Parliament confirmed it on June 30, 1950. It declared, "The Durand Line is the international frontier. 96 In early 1950, tribal uprising started against the Pakistani Government on the Question of granting autonomy to the Pashtun territory. The uprising took a serious turn when the Government of Pakistan sent off troops for repressing the subversive elements. From March 17, 1950, to October 22, 1950 the Pakistan Air Force bombed some Pashtun villages, killing men, women and children.97 in one of such bombing raids in June 1950, the Pakistani Air Force plane bombarded a village across the frontier to put down the tribal uprising. It produced feeling of resentment in Afghanistan.98 the Afghan Government alleged that a Pakistani aero plane had bombed a village within its territory. Though, Pakistan accepted the responsibility of the accidental bombing of the Pakistan Air Force plane, and offered full payment, yet, the settlement of the issue could not help lessen the Afghan propaganda. 99 A periodical journal Pashtunistan was published in 1951, in Delhi and distributed internationally. The celebration of Pashtunistan Day' on August 31, became an annual feature or rather a political ritual mixed with funfair at Kabul, Delhi and London. A 27

square in Kabul was renamed as 'Pashtunistan Square'. In September 1951, the semi- official journal, Arif (Kabul) published a map showing the geographical boundaries of Pashtunistan; it included Chitral, the NWFP and the Pashtun areas of Balochistan extending from the Durand Line to the Indus. 100 The assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan on October 16, 1951 by an Afghan citizen syed Akbar, living in exile in Pakistan, was another nuisance, Pak- Afghan relations. However, Pakistani government accepted Afghanistan's refusal of any involvement on its part.101 On March 27, 1955, large-scale demonstrations were staged in Kabul and other cities of Afghanistan in response to the proclamation of emergency and creating 'One Unit.' Kabul thought that the One Unit is an attempt to destroy the demand of the Pashtuns for autonomy, thereby, jeopardizing the very idea of Pashtunistan. On March 30, 1955, not only a strong note was sent to the Pakistani Government but the Afghan demonstrators also attacked the Pakistani embassy building in Kabul and torn the Pakistani flag. In retaliation, demonstrations also took place in Karachi and other cities, There were protests and counter protests. On April 2, 1955, fighting erupted on the border. Pakistan argued that it was the result of Afghan attack on Pakistani territory but Afghanistan took it as fighting between Pashtuns and Pakistani forces.102 On May 2, 1955, Pakistan ordered the closure of Afghan consulates and trade agencies in Peshawar, Quetta, Peshawar and Chaman and banishment of Afghan staff from there as a "first step against the Afghan government." On May 6, 1955, a Foreign Office spokesman in Karachi warned of bitter consequences like severing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, closing the border and call for economic sanctions, if Afghanistan failed to provide protection against attack on Pakistani consulate by May 15. The Afghan Government, quite contrary to expectations, ordered the mobilization of its troops for its country's defense, which in turn aroused strong counter-response in Pakistan. However, tension was released when both the countries accepted the mediation offer from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey.103 In September 1957, diplomatic relations were resumed, Zahir Shah visited Pakistan in February 1958, and an agreement on the improvement of transit facilities through Pakistan was signed in May 1958. During 1959, relations once again 28

deteriorated. In July 1960, the USA and UK embassies in Kabul excused keeping Pakistanis any more in their staff due to Afghanistan's government refusal to renew their visas.104 In 1955, when One Unit was promulgated, the ruler of Dir refused to surrender. He apprehended about his own state, as the activities for One Unit were more visible now.105 In order to support the Nawab of Dir, Afghanistan concentrated its troops on the border, West of Bajaur. In retaliation, Pakistan also airlifted some scout platoon to Dir. Border clashes started between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which continued; from 1961 to 1963.106 both countries accused each other of creating trouble. According to Pakistani intelligence sources, several hundred Afghan militias dressed as tribesmen entered Pakistan, south of the Durand Line. Afghanistan denied the claims by saying that rather Pakistani agents were creating trouble in the Pashtun areas. The Afghan Government also accused Pakistan of following undemocratic and repressive policy towards the Pashtuns, But the Pakistani press alleged that the Afghan Government, in order to conceal the Afghan Lashkar’s failure to capture Pakistani territory, was propounding such groundless propaganda.107 The Soviet media criticized Pakistan for using American weapons against the Pashtuns in order to suppress their 'liberation movement.108 By May 1961, Pakistan and Afghan troops were fighting in Bajaur area. Eventually the Pakistani Government ordered Afghanistan to close its consulates and trading agencies in Pakistan by September 6, while announcing the closure of its own consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad.109 In August 1961, Pakistan informed the Afghan government that due to abnormal circumstances on the border, normal diplomatic relations couldn't be continued. Pakistan, therefore, closed its consulates in Afghanistan, and requested Afghanistan to follow suit. The Afghan government quite contrary to expectation declared that Pakistan should withdraw this policy within one week or Afghanistan would severe diplomatic relations.110 The Afghan Government presented the following condition for the resumption of diplomatic relations: a) Pakistan should guarantee the right of self-determination of the Pashtun tribes, b) Pakistani troops should withdraw from the tribal area east of the Durand Line;

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c) Release of all the detained Pashtun leaders; d) Afghan consulates and trade agencies should be reopened in Pakistan. Pakistan rejected the above mentioned terms of the Afghan Government. 111 On September 6, 1961, Afghanistan severed relations with Pakistan and closed border. This, in turn, led to restrictions on the seasonal movement of the Afghan nomads into Pakistan, Traffic between the two countries slopped. Two of Afghan major export crops were also ready for shipment to India. The Soviet Union stepped in and offered to buy the crops and airlift them from Afghanistan to India. Afghanistan Arianna Airline.1; airlifted the remaining crops to India.112 Being a landlocked country, Afghanistan's foreign trade is dependent on transit rights through neighboring countries. It has the shortest route to the sea through Pakistan to the port of Karachi.113 But the closure of Pak-Afghan border in 1960 compelled Afghanistan to seek different routes to the sea. One of these was through Iran to the port of Khorramshehr on the Persian Gulf. The other was across Russia to the Baltic Sea. After the re-opening of the Pak-Afghan border the shorter and less costly route through Pakistan was brought back into use.114 Due to Afghanistan's provocation on the Pashtunistan issue, Pakistan had imposed three times trade embargo on Afghan good115 in 1950, 1955 and 1961-63.116 but the embargoes were soon lifted on the Shah of Iran's mediation.117 In 1961, the American spy U-2 plane used the Badaber base, near Peshawar, for carrying out observation over the Soviet Union, Afghanistan protested against the over flight of the plane. President Ayub Khan rather then dealing properly with the issue, blamed Daud, then Prime Minister of Afghanistan for interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs.118 During 1961-62, the Durand Line and Pashtunistan issues were again renewed so as to put pressure on Pakistan not to take advantage of India's difficulties during the Sine-Indian border dispute of 1961-62.119 In 1962, Ayub Khan suggested a convention between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran but Afghanistan did not give due importance to the offer.120 The Shah of Iran's offer of mediation in July 1962, to settle the disputed issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was rejected due to Daud's emotional commitment to

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Pashtunistan.121 But the Shah continued his efforts and eventually succeeded in his efforts. A meeting of the representatives of the two countries was held in Tehran and thus Tehran Accord was signed in May 28, 1963.l22 A joint communiqué regarding the Tehran Accord was issued simultaneously from Tehran, Rawalpindi and Kabul on May 30 1963. Its salient features include:

Pak-Afghan consulates in each other's capital would be reopened as soon as possible. A. The Afghan consulates at Peshawar and Quetta would be re-opened as soon as possible. But at the same time Pakistan reserved the right to establishing the consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad if necessary. B. Afghan trade agencies would be established temporarily at Peshawar arid Chaman until the projected railway from Chaman to Landikotal had been extended into Afghanistan. Should more trade agencies be needed, this would be discussed between the two governments. C. Transit and trade arrangements would be regularized under the 1958 transit agreement into account. D. Both parties agreed that the duties and conduct of the representatives would be in accordance with the recognized principles of international Law, usage and practice and would be confined to the discharge of the official functions. E. The two governments agreed to endeavor to create atmosphere of goodwill, friendship and mutually expressed their deepest gratitude to the Shah, for his good office had made the re-establishment of relations possible.123 F. The Afghan consulates at Peshawar and Quetta would be re-opened as soon as possible. But at the same time Pakistan reserved the right to establishing the consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad if necessary. G. Afghan trade agencies would be established temporarily at Peshawar arid Chaman until the projected railway from Chaman to Landikotal had been extended into Afghanistan. Should more trade agencies be needed, this would be discussed between the two governments. H. Transit and trade arrangements would be regularized under the 1958 transit agreement into account. 31

I. Both parties agreed that the duties and conduct of the representatives would be in accordance with the recognized principles of international Law, usage and practice and would be confined to the discharge of the official functions. G. The two governments agreed to endeavor to create atmosphere of goodwill, friendship and mutually expressed their deepest gratitude to the Shah, for his good office had made the re-establishment of relations possible.123 Relations were again normalized and borders were reopened in May 28, 1963. The reopening of the border solved the economic problems of Afghanistan to some extent.124 the seasonal migration of 200,000 Afghan powindahs was restored by September 1963. The Dir issue, which was supported by Afghanistan to highlight the Pashtunistan issue internationally, was solved by the integration of Dir with West Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Minister, who represented Pakistan in the negotiations, declared the Pashtunistan issue, 'a completely closed and a dead issue.125 In 1963, the Afghan Government announced that the Pashtunistan dispute was "the only point of difference with Pakistan and would be settled peacefully. 126 In March 1965, a five-year transit trade agreement was signed. Then in mid 1966, talks between the two countries began on measures to establish rail links between them, 127 despite its differences with Pakistan on Pashtunistan issue, Afghanistan remained sympathetic towards Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war in 1965. It resisted the Russian pressure to exploit the situation. Ayub visited Kabul in January 1966, and King Zahir Shah visited Pakistan in spring of 1967. However, there was no progress in resolving the remaining "point of difference.128 During 1969-71, Pak-Afghan relations remained normal. In May 1970, Pakistan's Finance Minister Nawab Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash visited Kabul. An agreement was signed to utilize the possibilities of increased economic co-operation between the two countries.129 The economic co-operation visualized multiple fields, ranging from the use of Afghanistan's iron or deposits of Haji Gak, to investment of Pakistani assets in industrial projects in Afghanistan.130 Afghanistan also accepted the Pakistani offer of technical assistance, in the form of training facilities in medicine, engineering, irrigation.131 Afghanistan's foreign policy under Zahir Shah was less hostile towards Pakistan 32

despite having good relations with Russia. However, the issue of Pashtunistan was not abandoned; Zahir Shah had moderate views on international issues. While referring to Dir issue (1960-63) and border clashes between the troops of both countries, he said that "we were partly to blame for the incidents, but the Pakistanis were not without guilt and that Pakistan with rapidly expanding army equipped with American arms, posed a threat to Afghanistan.132 Afghanistan remained neutral in the Indo-Pak war of December 1971. On December 30, 1971, the Afghan Foreign Ministry spokesman extended its message of goodwill, non-interference and support to the territorial integrity, to the Pakistani Government during the Indian aggression on Pakistan.133 To sum up, the Durand Line was concluded between the British India and Afghanistan under duress. After the partition of India, the Afghans refused to accept the validity of the Durand Line and raised the Pashtunistan issue. However, they were not unanimous in (heir demand for Pashtunistan. Some time they contended that the Pashtuns of the North West Frontier should be given the right of self-determination to join Afghanistan. At other time they demanded an autonomous Pashtunistan separable from Pakistan, but united with Afghanistan. The Pakistani government refused to accept the Afghan demands on the plea that the right of self determination had been given to the Pashtuns in the referendum of 1947 and the majority of the people had decided in favor of Joining Pakistan. However, from 1947-71, Pak-Afghan relations remained hostile due to Pashtunistan issue. PASHTUNISTAN ISSUE: NEW DIMENSION Pakistan's two important nascent decisions, firstly, the acceptance that a dispute exists between Pakistan and Afghanistan and secondly, recognition of Afghanistan's right to be concerned about the fate of the Pashtuns living east and south of the Durand Line opened the door to the kind of negotiations that Afghanistan had wanted. Now, Afghanistan could discuss the accomplishment of their aspirations with the Pakistani government134 Daud wished to settle the Pashtun dispute that had for so long ruined the relations between the two countries.135 One of the reasons of Daud's changing his stance on quarter-century old Pashtunistan cause, in addition to Iranian and other foreign insistence was an obvious cooling of the Soviet altitude. The cooling had begun in the

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middle of 1960s when the Soviet Union decided to soften its attitude towards Pakistan in order to contend the new Chinese influence in Pakistan.136 Presdient Daud warned that the deterioration of the situation could be detrimental to the security and well being of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He said that there were countries, without precisely naming them "but clearly referring to the USSR" that did not want Pakistan Afghanistan rapprochement. He said that now the main concern of Afghanistan government was the improvement of economic conditions, for without economic prosperity the very existence of Afghanistan as an independent entity would be in danger. He further said that economic progress needs peace and tranquility in the region.137 During Bhutto's second visit to Afghanistan, Daud raised the point that Afghanistan can never drop its interest in the well being and protection of the rights and identity of Pashtuns. At this point Bhutto interrupted Daud and said, "The government of Pakistan recognizes as legitimate the interest of Afghanistan in the welfare and preservation of the rights of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan." He then smilingly supplemented, "we want you to be interested in the welfare of all the peoples of Pakistan, not only in that of Pashtuns," To this Daud replied without break, "please let me first be concerned about the welfare of our kith and kin. The turn of other Pakistani nationalities will come later.138 During the same visit Daud also raised the issue of the NAP leaders who had been accused of secessionist designs. He said, "While nobody can know what is in a man's heart, to us none of the ones with whom we have spoken, including Wali Khan, said that they wished to separate from Pakistan." Daud told Bhutto that Pashtuns and Baluch's acceptance of the Pakistani Constitution and participation in the national elections is a demonstration of their desire to achieve their rights within the setting of Pakistan. He went on to say that the victory of Pashtun and Baluch leaders in the provincial elections is the indication that they enjoy the support and confidence of their people.139 President Daud stated that, Afghanistan had no intention of seeing Pakistan destroyed or weakened. The existence of strong Pakistan was in Afghanistan's favor. The informed Bhutto that "when you assumed presidency of Pakistan and visited Kabul in January 1972, you yourself conveyed to the King, Pakistan's appreciation for Afghanistan

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restraint in 1965, and 1970, and informed him of your commitment of the establishment of cordial relations between our countries." Daud objected that Pakistanis had never made any serious effort to comprehend the Afghan claim, which had always been slipped out of hand as harmful to Pakistan's integrity. New areas of agreement between the two governments could have been found, provided an effort had been made. He said that a bold and novel approach was required for the abdication of the nationalistic near sightedness and Bhutto at last succeeded in overcoming it.140 By 1975, however, the enthusiasm for the Pashtunistan issue had subsided and in 1976, Afghanistan did not celebrate "Pashtunistan Day.141 Due to improved relations the traditional occasion for "hostile anti-Pakistan campaigning and misinformation" passed in Kabul almost without public notice.142 DAUD'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: RELATIONS FURTHER IMPROVED At the invitation of the President of Pakistan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Sardar Daud, Prime Minister of the Republic of Afghanistan, paid a four day official visit to Pakistan from August 20, to 24, 1976.143 Daud along-with his delegation arrived Pakistan on August 20, 1976. The first round of talks started between the delegates of the two countries in Rawalpindi. They started the discussion by linking it up with Kabul discussion’s.144 Further talks were held between the two leaders (Bhutto and Daud) and their delegates in Islamabad, Lahore and Murree in a "friendly atmosphere.145 After the first round, the delegates were asked to finalize a formula for the simultaneously package agreement. From Rawalpindi, the two leaders went to Lahore. Daud was given a warm reception at Shalimar Gardens. Thousands of Lahore citizens had gathered there to honor him. Daud addressed the Shalimar gathering. He said: .... The wish of the government of Afghanistan and my person is that our political difference is rushed, and our relations are brotherly and friendly, and permanently based on good will. The government of Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan have the means or resolving this difference at then disposal. For the realization of this we have no way but understanding and serious and direct negotiations through peaceful means. I am certain that on this path the grace of God will be with us. One cannot solve all difficulties

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in one or several talks even negotiations with good will and seriousness can be expected to take us one step closer to our objective.146 Eventually, the delegates reached a formula. It necessitated for Afghanistan the recognition of the Durand Line as the international frontier in return for Pakistan's acceptance of the release of the NAP leaders and declaring of a general amnesty, Aziz Ahmad, then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, brought the written formula to the Governor House of Lahore for Bhutto's ratification. Bhutto studied the formula and said, "I am satisfied" and so was President Daud, 147 For the normalization of relations with Afghanistan, Bhutto at this stage also emphasized on reaching an agreement with the Baluch’s and Pashtuns, He said that though Daud has left the matter of agreement, to the Pakistani government and Pashtun and Baluch leaders, his government would be happy to involve the Afghan government in the agreement. Daud responded by saying that Afghanistan wants the will-being of all the parties involved in the discussion. He said that Afghanistan would publicly announce the ratification of the agreement once the Pashtun and Baluch give their willingness and approval for the agreement. He even offered to join the tripartite declaration of the approval provided that parties involved wish so.148 Daud's visit for the normalization of Pak-Afghan relations was fruitful- On the one hand, it stopped the Afghan mass media propaganda against Pakistan. On the other hand, in 1977, he was about to reach an under landing with Bhutto for the expulsion of the Pashtun and Baluch leaders who had taken refuge in Afghanistan and were involved in subversive activities in Pakistan.149 On the whole the visits of heads of the two countries brought visible improvement in Pak-Afghan relations.150 Transit trade started flowing smoothly. Overland transportation of India's surplus wheat was allowed from India to Afghanistan. On March 2, 1977, Afghanistan and Pakistan resumed air service, which had been stopped since early 1974.151 Along with the easing of restrictions on Pakistani tourists visiting Afghanistan no more anti Pakistan propaganda was broadcasted from Radio Kabul, Besides it, Afghanistan representation from the past two years had been through a charged affair, but now Afghanistan ambassador was ported at Islamabad, 152 Pakistan also stopped propaganda against Kabul. After bitter relations of thirty years, Pakistan- 36

Afghanistan relations never appeared friendly than in 1977.153

BHUTTO’S THIRD VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN AND ITS -EFFECTS ON PAK- AFGHAN RELATIONS Daud and Bhutto had decided in Lahore that a formal ceremony for signing the draft agreement of August 1976 would be held in Kabul.154 According to the terms of the draft agreement, both sides had agreed that Bhutto would visit Kabul in October or November 1976, to conclude the formal agreement with the Afghan President.155 On January 6, 1977, it was decided that Bhutto would visit Kabul at the end of March 1977, a week or two after the general elections in Pakistan, However, due to subsequent changes in the political scenario of Pakistan the visit to Kabul could not materialize.156 Bhutto visited Afghanistan for the third time on June 9, 1977. While returning from Tehran, Bhutto stopped at Kabul during the night to see Daud. Due to the rigging of 1977 national election, Bhutto was in deep trouble but despite to that he had meeting with Daud during dinner. Bhutto tried to reduce the impact of turmoil that had surfaced in Pakistan as a response to his rigging of the elections. He apologized for the appearance of abnormal situation in Pakistan due to which he had not yet succeeded in releasing the political prisoners. Daud listened to him carefully and at the end advised him not to stall on liberating the Pashtun and Baluch leaders. Bhutto replied that he had not forgotten this most important issue and that he would cope with it on a right of way basis once the confused situation returned to normal.157 the moment Bhutto found a chance to restore normalcy. General Zia-ul-Haq removed him in a coup, on July 5, 1977, and martial law was imposed in the country.158 Bhutto's further talks with Afghanistan stopped with the imposition of martial law.159 Daud hoped that after Bhutto's removal. General Zia-ul-Haq, the new President would settle Afghanistan's dispute with Pakistan in just and honorable manner, Zia-ul-Haq visited Kabul in October 1977. During the discussion, Daud affirmed that the divergence between the two countries would be abridged and finally do away with through mutual efforts.160 on his return from Kabul. Zia freed the NAP leaders from Hyderabad jail.161 About Zia's visit to Afghanistan, Bhutto slates that, Zia was more of a beginner in

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the art of statecraft and foreign affairs when he went to Kabul than he is today. The experts stood to one side and let him to talk to crafty Afghan diplomat (Daud). It was not a surprising end.162 He further added that Pak-Afghan relations are back to beginning. This is very sad, as the period of strained relations was about to be finished.163 In March 1978, Daud visited Pakistan. In one of his speeches, Daud pointed out that the "political problem" with Pakistan had still to be resolved. There was no joint communiqué when Daud visited Pakistan. Possibly there was a fresh secret agreement on the quid pro quo, which was finalized when Zia went to Kabul or when Daud came to Pakistan in March 1978. Perhaps this was such a big achievement that joint communiqués were not dispensed with, 164 However, they described the talks useful and productive on bilateral issues, particularly on "political differences" that had fogged up the relations with distrust and uncertainties for thirty years. The developments during those two years showed that the very old differences over the future of the Pashtuns and Baluch tribesmen had ceased to be the main issue. However, it did not cease, forever as the Afghan leaders repeated the necessity of resolving it.165 There after, on April 27, 1978, radical changes took place in Afghanistan, Daud regime was overthrown and he along with most of his family members was killed- The new Afghan leaders declared that the Pashtun and Baluch problem stay alive and that they want the problem with Pakistan to be solved by peaceful means.166 To conclude, Bhutto wanted to solve the Pak-Afghan problem. With this end in view he undertook three visits to Afghanistan. His first visit was a good will visit aiming at thanking Zahir Shah for his being netural in Indo-Pak war of 1971. In his second visit he succeeded in concluding draft agreement according to which, Afghanistan would accept the Durand Line in return of the release of NAP prisoners by Pakistan, His third visit to Afghanistan took place in very abnormal circumstances because of PNA agitation in Pakistan after 1977 general election. Due to it, he could not implement the draft agreement. However, the coup of July 5, 1977 dashed all the hopes of the implementation of the agreement to the ground. Yet, about the draft agreement Bhutto has written that it was the most important achievement of his career. As a result exchange of visits between Daud and Bhutto took place. Bhutto agreed to release the National Awami Party (NAP) leaders, assumed supporting the Pushtunistan 38

demand while the Daud agreed to recognize the Durand line as the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, before the agreement could be signed Bhutto was overthrown in the July 1977 coup. A similar agreement was reached between Gen Zia-ul- Haq and Daud during the latter’s visit to Islamabad in March 1978. But before this agreement could be finalized Daud was murdered in a coup by promarxi revolutionaries and soviet influence in Afghanistan increased further. 167 39

REFERENCES 1. ‘Sangat Sigh, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy; An Appraisal (London: Asia Publishing House, 1970), pp 27-28. 2. Mujtabad Razvi, The Frontier of Pakistan: A study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971), P. 143. 3. Kulwant Kaure, “Pak-Afghan Relations”, in Surrender Chopra, ed., Perspective on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev university, 1983), P. 312. 4. W.K. Fraser Tytler, Afghanistan: A study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 17-22. 5. Leon B. Poullands, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan”, in Ainsilie T. Embree, ed., Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, The Transportation of a Political Order (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977), pp. 129-130. Popular tradition attributes the Pashtuns to Jewish origin, the Beni Israel, come down through Qais from Saul, King of Israel whose off spring’s were carried into custody and re=settled in Khurasan, Kabul and Ghazni. They embraced Islam when Afghan Qaiswas invited by Khalid Bin Walid to visit Mecca. He later returned to Afghanistan to propagate the new faith. But except certain facial resemblance, a number of biblical names and some other minor characteristics Aramaic language. Tyler, Afghanistan, pp. 48-49. Scientific study of their physics characteristic shows the Pashtuns to be, of Turko-Iranian type with a substantial mixture of Indian blood among the eastern tribes. This study couples with the fact the Pashto, the language of the Pashtuns belongs to the Aryan par to the Indo-European group of languages, suggests the possibility that the Pashtuns are of Aryan origin, but have mix together with is now the Indo- Afghan border. Syed Weqar Ali Shah Ka Ka Khel, “Origin of the Afghans” in Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat and Syed Weqar Ali Shah, Afghanistan and the Frontier (Peshawar: Embay Book International, 1993), pp. 155-156. The word Pashto in Tajik Persian stands for the back of a mountain range. Solution according to Revert the Pashtuns copied their name from the fact that they were people who lived at the back of the edges of the Suleiman Range. Tytler, Afghanistan, p. 49. 40

According to H. W. Bellew the term Pakhtun, its plural Pukhtana means “Highlander, and Pakhto or Pashto “the language of the Higher Landers.” H.W.Bellew, Afghanistan and the Afghans (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1979), p. 216. 6. M. Hasan Kakar, Afghanistan: A study in International Political Developments 1880-1896 (Kabul: n.p. 1971), p.5. 7. Vartan Gregorian, the Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946 (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 44. 8. Kakar, Afghanistan, p. 5. The Ghilzais and the Abdalis were the most important divisions of the Afghans in Afghanistan. These two powerful tribes had been taking advantage of the weakening power of the Empires of Persia and India to presume practical autonomy at the end of seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Among the Abdalis the important divisions were the populazais, of which the most important families were the descendants of Sado and Mohammad. The Sadozais were the first to assume power for in Ahmad Shah the Afghans found a leader. Soon after his arrival to Kandahar he was elected as first King o f the Afghans. He assumed the name of Dur-i-Durran, or ‘Pearl of Pearls’, that’s why the Abdali tribe became usually known as the Durrani. Tytler, Afghanistan, pp. 61-62. 9. M. M. Juniad, the Resurgence of Pakistan (Rawalpindi: National Book Foundation, n.d.), p. 115. 10. Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), p. 26. 11. Gregorian, the Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, p 12. 12. Ibid. p. 11. 13. Rasual Bakhsh Rais, War Without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition after the Cold War (Karachi: Oxford University press, 1994), p.9. 14. Mushtaq Ahmed, Pakistan at the Crossroads (Karachi: Royal Book company, 1985), p.353. 15. Leon B. Poullanda, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with 41

Pakistan”, in Ainslie T. embree, ed. Pakistan’ s Western Borderlands, p.130 16. Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An international Law Perspective (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), pp. 49-50. 17. Amin, Afghanistan Crisis, pp. 27-28. The main feature of the policy was to protect the border closely with a view to keep attack and consequent reprisal by military expedients to the slightest. The recognized objects of this policy were non-aggression and non-interference in the tribal affairs, Lal Baha, N.W.F.P. Administration under British Rule: 1901-1919 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p.5. 18. Kalim Bahadur, “Pakistan Policy towards Afghanistan”, in K.P. Misra, ed. Afghanistan in Crisis (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981), p. 84. 19. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: The continuing Search for nationhood (Oxford: West view Press, 1991), p. 196. 20. Lal Baha, N.W.F.P. Administration under British Rule, p.6. 21. Bellew, Afghanistan and the Afghans, pp. 175-176. 22. Kakar, Afghanistan, p. 12. 23. G.No. Moles worth, Afghanistan 1919: An Account of Operation in the Third Afghan War (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962), p. 15; Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass and the Focus of the New State of Pashtunistan, An Important Political Development in Central Asia, (n.p. n.d.). p. 72.. 24. Gregorian, the Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, P. 158. 25. Kakar, Afghanistan, P. 111 26. Gregorian, the Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, P. 158. 27. Kakar, Afghanistan, pp. 286-287. 28. Leon B. Poullanda, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan”, in Ainslie T. Embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderland, p. 136. 29. Mir Munsi Sultan Mahomed Khan, Ed. The life of Abdur Rahman Amir of Afghanistan, Vol. 11 Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 136-137). 30. Ibid. p. 161. 31. Ibid. p. 156 32. Ibid. p. 136. 42

33. Ibid. p. 157-158. 34. Ibid. p. 161. 35. Leon B. Poullanda, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan”, in Ainslie T. embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderlands, p 139. 36. Fazal Haque Kazi, Law and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Royal book Company, 1976), p. 192. 37. Burki, Pakistan: The Continuing search for Nationhood, P. 196. 38. Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58: An Historical Review (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1992), p. 190. 39. Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan: The communist Coup. The soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Colorado: West view Press, 1984), p. 24. 40. Raja Anwar, the Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account (London: Verso, 1988), P. 31. 41. Ibid. PP. 30-31 42. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan, p. 24 43. Syed Weqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 226. 44. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan, p. 24. For further details on referendum see Shah Ethnicity, Islam and nationalism, pp. 226-227. 45. Sally Ann Baynard, “”Historical Setting”, in Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, eds. Afghanistan: a Country Study (Foreign Area Studies: The American University, 1986). P. 54. 46. Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, an Important Political Development in Central Asia, P. 117. 47. Azmat Hayat Khan, the Durand Line: It’s Geostrategic (University of Peshawar: Area Study Centre, 2000), p 186. 48. Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhry, Pakistan and World Security (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1987), p. 101. 49. Mehrunnisa Ali, “The Attitude of the New Afghan Regime Towards its Neighbors”, in Kemal A. Faruki, ed. Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXVII, No. 30, third 43

quarter, 1974, pp. 47-48. 50. W. Howard Wriggins, “The Balancing Process in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” in Lawrence Ziring et al. eds. Pakistan: The Long View (Durhan: Duke University Press, 1977) p. 297. 51. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the making (London: West view Press, 1986), pp. 185-186. 52. Kulwant Kaur, “Pak-Afghan Relations”, in Surendra Chopra, ed. Perspective on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp. 315-316. 53. Khan, the Durand Line, p. 203. 54. Ibid. p. 207. 55. Kalim Bahadur, “Pakistan Policy towards Afghanistan” in K. P. Misra, Ed. Afghanistan in Crisis, P. 89. 56. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting”, in Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seeking, Eds, Afghanistan: a Country Study, P.51. 57. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, The Evolution and growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917-79): An Appraisal (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1997), pp. 269-270. 58. Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 186. 59. Razvi, The Frontier of Pakistan, P. 147; Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Master: A Political Autobiography (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), P. 175. 60. Kulwant Kaur, “Pak-Afghan Relations” in Surrender Chopra, ed. Perspective on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, PP. 45-46. 61. Arif Hussain, Pakistan: its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London: Frank Cass and Concentration. 1966), P. 114. 62. Ibid. p. 114. 63. Leon b. Poullada, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan”, in Ainslie t. Embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderlands. P. 126. 64. Razvi, The Frontier of Pakistan, P. 148. 65. Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet domination: 1964-83 (London: The 44

Macmillan Press, 1984), P. 45. 66. Zulfiqar Khalid, Pakistan in the Pamir Knot: Gestrategic Imperatives (Lahore; Vanguard Books Ltd. 1987). P. 114. 67. Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed Khan, Ed. The Life of Abdur Rahman, P. 212. 68. Kulwant Kaure, Pak-Afghanistan Relations (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication, 1985), P. 50. 69. Khan, the Durand Line, PP. 190-191. The British divided the area which they had acquired from the Afghanistan into British Administrative Border into two main parts. The region between the River Indus and the Administrative Border, Which was later combined with Punjab for a short period of time, was known as the North West Frontier Province, while the land between the Administrative Border and the Durand Line was given the name of “Independent Tribal Territory”. The British administration was limited to administrative Border and the tribal territory remained an independent zone between Afghanistan and British India. Thus as a result of the Durand Agreement one part of the territory separated from Afghanistan came under the political influence of the British government. Some writers declared the independent tribal territory as “Yaghistan” which means “the land of those who could not accept any yoke”. The status of this territory, according to British historians, was that of a British protectorate. Pashtunistan. The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan. An important Political Development in Central Asia, pp. 101-102. For further details on administration of N.W.F.P. See Lal Baha, N.W.F.P. Administration under British Rule, chapter 2 and 3. 70. Kulwant Kaur, “Pak-Afghan Relations”, in Surendra Chopra, ed. Perspective on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, P. 316. 71. Khan, the Durand Line. P. 189. 72. Leon B. Poullada, “Pashtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan”, in Ainslie T. embree, ed. Pakistan’s Western Borderlands. P. 127. 73. Kaur, Pak-Afghanistan Relations, pp. 60-61. 74. Khan, the Durand Line, p. 198. 75. Syed Salalhuddin Ahmed, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Critical Study (Karachi: 45

Comprehensive Book Service, 1996). P. 88. 76. Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and foreign Policy, P. 116. 77. Ibid. 78. Razvi, the Frontier of Pakistan, P. 148. 79. A Group study, “The fundamentals of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” in Hamid A.K. Rai, ed. Reading in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Vol. 1 (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, n.d.)p. 36. 80. Salahuddin Ahmed, Foreign Policy of Pakistan. P.88. 81. Hyman, Afghanistan Under soviet Domination. 1964-83. P. 46. 82. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, Eds. Afghanistan: A country Study. P.55. 83. Ahsen Chaudhry, Pakistan and World Security, P. 101. Pashtunistan: The Khyber pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, An important Political Development in Central Asia, P. 118: Khan, The Durand Line. P. 187. 84. Ibid. 85. Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in The making, P. 186. 86. Richard Symonds, the Making of Pakistan (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1976), P. 171. 87. Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58, P. 191. 88. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan: a country study. P.55. 89. Government of Pakistan, “Presentation of credentials to the Quaid-e-Azam by Sardar Najibullah Khan, Special Representative of His Majesty the Afghan King. F. 125 (11)-GG/47. 90. Marwat, the Evolution and Growth of Communism, PP. 277-278. 91. Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58, p. 191. 92. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan: A country study. P. 55. 93. Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58, P. 191. 94. Kazi, Law and Politics in Pakistan, P. 193. 95. Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, 46

An Important Political Development in Central Asia, pp. 123-124. 96. Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58. P. 192. 97. Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, an Important Political Development in Central Asia, PP. 119-120. 98. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan: a Country Study. P. 55. 99. Symonds, the Making of Pakistan, p. 171. 100. Kazi, Law and Politics in Pakistan. P. 194. 101. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting” in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan: a Country Study. P. 55. 102. Kulwant Kaur, “Pak-Afghan Relations”, In Surendra Chopra, ed. Perspective on Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, PP. 319-320. 103. Ibid. 104. Arif Hussain, Pakistan: Its Ideology and foreign Policy, P. 120. 105. Dir’s feudal ruler, the Nawab refused to merge his state with the unified West Pakistan. He also did not send his representative to the National Assembly established under the constitution of 1956. Hafeez Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics. 1947-92 (London: The Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 125. The Nawab of Dir remained the central government of its earlier assertion that “he North West Frontier Province states will not be merged into the proposed West Pakistan unit since they are being treated as ‘special areas. However, Dir State was merged with unified West Pakistan as a “special area’ that the executive authority of West Pakistan was empowered to act in the area subject to the president’s concurrence. “Kaur, Pak-Afghanistan Relations, P. 106. However, the Nawab was removed from his position in September 1960. Afghanistan involved itself in the conflict of Dir state that lasted from 1960-63. Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post –Soviet Dynamics. P. 125. 106. Ibid. 107. Kaur, Pak-Afghanistan Relations, P. 109. 108. Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relation Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics. P.125. 47

109. Ibid. 110. Anees Jillani, “Pak-Afghan Relations, 1958-1988” in Mehrunnisa Ali, ed. Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy, 1971-1998 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.377. 111. Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, p. 126. 112. Sally Ann Baynard, “Historical Setting”, in Nyrop and Seekins, eds. Afghanistan: a Country Study, p. 16. 113. During the British rule in India, the Afghan goods transit through the British Indian Territory took place on the basis of 1921 Treaty and the 1923 Anglo-Afghan Trade Convention. The two treaties did not deal exclusively with the question of transit. After the creation of Pakistan these two treaties continued to govern trade relations between the two countries till May 29, 1958, when the new transit agreement was signed between Pakistan-Afghanistan for transit facilities across each other’s territories. Later on additional trade agreements were also signed. Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, P. 154. 114. Syed Abdul Quddus, Afghanistan and Pakistan: a Geopolitical Study (Lahore: Ferozsons, Ltd. 1982) p. 57. 115. Salahuddin Ahmed, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Critical Study, p. 88. 116. Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 155. 117. Kamal Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush: Afghanistan (1978-1991) (Lahore: Wajidalis Pvt. Ltd. 1991). P. 21. 118. Anwar, the Tragedy of Afghanistan, p. 36. 119. Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush, p. 25. 120. Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet dynamics, pp. 128-129. 121. Government of Pakistan, Background Information and Analysis: Pak- Afghan Relations (A General Survey) 1947-73 (Islamabad Bureau of National Research and Reference, n.d.) p. 4. 122. Ibid. p.8. 123. Ibid. p.4 124. Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, P. 130. 125. Harvey H. Smith et Al. Area Handbook for Afghanistan (Foreign Area 48

Studies: The American Universities, 1973), p. 223. 126. Ibid. 127. Ibid. 128. The New Times, 17 May 1970. 129. The Pakistan times, 21 May 1970. 130. The New Times, 29 May 1970. 131. Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, pp. 129-130. 132. Government of Pakistan, Background Information and Analysis: Pak- Afghan Relations (A General Survey) 1947-73, p.19. 133. Ghaus, the fall of Afghanistan, p. 134. 134. Ibid.,- 127, 135. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 63. 136. Ghaus. The Pall of Afghanistan, p. 127. 137. Ibid. 128. 138. Ibid, p. 129.. 139. Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two-party communism: Purchum and Khalq (California: Hoover institution Press, 1983), p. 45. 140. Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, pp. 63-64. 141. Government of Pakistan, Joint Communiqués, 1947-1976 (Islamabad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), p, 416. 142. Bhutto, "If I am assassinated . . .” p. 128. 143. At the talks, the Afghan delegation included Wahid Abdullah, Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdul Samad Ghaus, Director General, Afghan Foreign Ministry, Rahim Sherzoy, Afghan Charged' Affairs in Pakistan, Mohammad Gul Jahangiri, Director Afghan Foreign Ministry and Abdul Ahad Nasir Ziayee, Deputy Chief of the Foreign Minister's office. The Pakistan delegation was comprised of Aziz Ahmed. Minister of State for defense and Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary, S. Shah Nawaz, Additional Foreign Secretary, Ali Arshad, Pak-Afghan Ambassador in Afghanistan and A.A Farooq, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Government of Pakistan, Joint Communiqués, 1947-1976, p. 416. 144. Ghaus, the fall of Afghanistan, v. 135. 49

145. Bhutto, "if I am assassinate. . . “p. 129 146. Ghaus, the fall of Afghanistan, p. 136. 147. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics,’ Economics and Society: Revolution, Resistance, Intervention (Colorado: Lyimc Rienner Publishers inc., 1986), p. 23. 148. Government of Pakistan, Wada our Efai Wada, Pakistan Peoples Party ke 1970 intakhabi manshor par amal dar amad ke report, (Urdu) (Islamabad: Directorate of film and Publications, 1977). p. 17S- 149. Ghaus, the fall of’ Afghanistan, p. 140. 150. Government of Pakistan, Wada our Efai Wada, Pakistan People’s Party ke 1970 ke intakhabi manshor par amal dar amad ke report, p. 178. 151. Burke and Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy,p.126 152. Bhutto, My Dearest Daughter: A Letter from the Death Cell, p.31. 153. Ibid. 154. Ghaus, the fall of Afghanistan, p. 140. 155. Bhutto, My Dearest Daughter: A Letter from the Death Cell, p. 32. 156. Mahmood, Pakistan Political Roots, p. 221. 157. Kulwant Kaur, Pak-Afghanistan Relations (Mew Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1985), pp. 52-53. 158. Bhutto, My Dearest Daughter. A Letter from the Death Cell, p. 35. 159. Bhutto, if I am assassinated…….p. 120.

CHAPTER NO:_III Saur revolution in Afghanistan And it’s impacts on Pakistan. 50

The Saur Revolution in Afghanistan in 1978 by a group of military and air force officers was the ultimate result of the underground struggle by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against the Daud government. The PDPA was led by a group of progressive leaders who believed in the control of power for rapid socio-political changes in the Afghan state and social structure. Afghanistan had been traditionally a tribal society with a nomadic trend amongst its people. The state of Afghanistan being controlled by the central government through a provincial government under a Wali (Governor) in fact experienced little interference by the central government. The control of the central government was not beyond Kabul and the provincial capitals. The existence of a centuries old monarchial setup might have apparently bred the crisis of participation and representation; nonetheless, there were no signs of dissatisfaction against the government. The unruly nature of the state of affair has in Afghan society had posed no threat internally or to the regional peace. Afghanistan enjoyed a peaceful policy of co-existence with its neighbors. The only neighbor state with which it had enveloped a strained relationship was Pakistan over “Pashtunistan” (a border dispute) issue; however, it never resulted in a hot war. Afghanistan’s growing relationship with the Soviet Union had made it more dependable on the former for military, economic, and political support make it one. Zahir Shah, the last monarch of Afghanistan, had been in power for almost 40 years. He allowed a number of political activities in the last decade of his rule by permitting a number of political groups to carry their political activities. The PDPA was established in 1965, whose members were young, and school/college students. A larger number of them came from the educated class of Kabul, and other major cities in Afghanistan. . The storm, which eventually broke over Kabul on the morning of 27 April 1978, leaving behind the dead bodies of President Daud and his family, brought with it a socio-economic system, which was alien to the deeply conservative Afghan society. A small group of devoted Marxists took upon themselves to turn Afghanistan from an illiterate, poverty stricken and tribal ridden religious society into a modern socialist state.

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BACKGROUND OF LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN UP TO PDPA The origin of leftist goes back to the times of the Bolshevik revolutions of 1917 1 It was then that the seeds of socialism were brought back by some members of an Afghan delegation, headed by Mohammad Wali Badakshi, who went to Moscow in 1919 to attend the October celebrations. Abdul Rehman, a young Afghan, full of progressive and radical ideas propagated them amongst his group members on his return 2. Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1931), an adviser and mentor of King Amanullah, was also convinced that the Muslims must ‘modernize or perish’ 3. He advocated the two themes of ‘anti- colonialism’ and ‘modernization’ through his bi-weekly paper ‘Seraj ul Akbar’ 4 His writings influenced the youth of his country who began to demand a change in the existing tradition bound Afghan society. He also influenced King Amanullah who had introduced a number of radical social reforms for which his country was not prepared. The Russians also took advantage of King Amanullah’s anti-British stance and encouraged him to establish closer relations with Moscow. V. I. Lenin wrote a letter to the Afghan monarch expressing appreciation for the desire of the Afghan people to follow the Russian example which had given them strength and independence 5 The Soviet Union agreed to grant Afghanistan monetary assistance annually, construct the Kuska, (on the Soviet border) - Herat – Qandahar – Kabul telegraph line and to provide technical experts. When Nadir Shah banned the activities of the anti-establishment Afghan Youth Organization it went underground and continued to participate in debates and discussions on the socio-economic problems of its country. YOUNG AFGHAN: The origin of the PDPA peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan can be traced back to Young Afghan, movement in 1930, started by a group of young progressive intellectuals namely. Mohammed Beg Tarzi, Mohammed Nabi Charkhi and others. There is little known about the social and political policies of the Members of the Young Afghan movement. However, the fact remains that many of its membership were recruited from the middle and lower middle classes and were the faithful supporters of Amanullah Khan Reforms. 52

To understand the circumstances that led to the emergence of the PDPA, it will be pertinent to probe the past. Despite the monarchist and authoritarian regimes that ruled Afghanistan, Wider of progressive thought and liberalism did blow occasionally to ease the suffocation. Reformist rulers like Amir Sher Ali and Amanullah, and scholars like Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani stood out for their pioneering efforts to usher in reforms and modernize the country's medieval society. Organized progressive political activity, however, took long to materialize, owing to official constraints and absence of ideal conditions. But once the start was made, such activity picked up fast. Even before occupying the Kabul throne, Amanullah under the inspiration of his enlightened father in - law, Muhammad Beg Tarzi, was active along with other young Afghans in a secret Mashruta (constitutional) group that sought ways and means of modernizing Afghanistan. 6. Called the "young Afghans”, this was Afghanistan's first underground political grouping. Though the party disappeared after Amanullah seized power, it had blazed a trail that attracted many adventurous young Afghans in later years. In the early 1930s, an organization prone to violence claimed itself to be a direct heir to the earlier group of the same name that had been nurtured by Amanullah. It called itself the "Young Afghans" and aimed at "subversion of the existing government and it if basis, the Islamic code", justifying its revolutionary position on an alleged secret British manipulation of the Afghan government of Nadir Shah. 7. The violence was directed both against the British and the royal family, the motivation being a blend of local politics and personal revenge. The assassinations, which also claimed the life of Nadir Shah, ushered in a brief era of politics of violence. The execution of Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, the faithful supporter of Amanullah. The assassin in each case was either a student or a former student of the German School (Nejat) in Kabul, set up by Amanullah. Thus it was clear that Amanullah's shadow still loomed large over the Afghan horizon. The term "Young Afghans" carried so much romanticism it was heard once more when in a bloodless palace coup, Sardar Dauod and his brother, Sardar Naeem, climbed up the power ladder to replace their hitherto dominant but aging

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uncles, it was labeled, somewhat oddly, as the "Young Afghan" revolt. 8. WEESH ZALMIYAN Progressive and liberal Afghan elements finally cam into their own with the advent of the "Weesh Zalmiyan" (Awakened Youth) movement in 1947. The founder of Weesh Zalmiyan is reported to be Mohammed Rasul Pashtun; while its active members included Abdul Hadi Dawi, Gul Bacha Ulfat (President and vice- president, respectively, of the Seventh National Assembly), Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar, Dr. Abdur Rehman Mahmudi, Khial Mohammad Khaistan, Abdul Awal Qureshi, Kabir Ghorbandi, Karim Nazihi, Nazar Mohammad Nawa, Abdul Haye Habibi; Noor Alam, Abdul Rauf Benawa, Syed Mohamad Dehqan, Sarwar Goya, Faiz Mohammad Angar, Ghulam Hasan Safi, Gul Shah Safi, Taj Mohammad Paghmani, Mir Ali Asghar Shua, Mohammad Alam Basarkay, Baraat Ali Taaj, Mohammad Ibrahim Khwakhugay, etc. Two familiar names of recent origin- Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal- have also been described as Weesh Zalmiyan activists 9. Though having a Pashto name (in the soft Kandahari dialect, which was proclaimed later as Afghanistan's national language in preference to the hard Pashto dialect) and despite the fact that its headquarter was in the Pashtun city of Kandahar and its founder was himself a Pashtun, the movement’s appeal transcended religious, ethnic, regional and language barriers, it particularly, aroused the Imagination of the intelligentsia. While the movement's adherents in parliament for the first time in Afghanistan raised issues concerning the common man, the Weesh Zalmiyan activists outside were busy lending voice to the muted aspirations of the masses through the fledgling press. During its brief survival until 1952, when the government decided to crush the movement prior to the next parliamentary elections by closing down all non-government news papers and arresting about 25 of the " liberal" leaders, Weesh Zalmiyan was able to sow the seeds of dissent. Most of the outspoken latter-day Afghan newspapers and political parties owed their origin to the members of Weesh Zalmiyan. However, the abrupt termination of the experiment in liberalism was an important factor in the radicalization of the men who later established the PDPA. 10 The revolutionary movement in Afghanistan had its roots in the Weesh Zalmiyan period. As 54

outspoken political movements, notably the PDPA. Earlier, the Weesh Zalmiyan had itself become a successor organization to the Young Afghan. But with the progress of time and increase in repression of the opposition, the progressive force became more radicalized, culminating eventually in the founding of left and ultra-left political parties, among them the PDPA. THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA) Taking advantage of the provision of the new constitution, which came into effect on 1 October 1964, permitting, at least in theory, the formation of political parties, a number of unofficial groupings began to emerge. The most important was the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a party that was later to play a crucial role in the history of contemporary Afghanistan. Even before the new constitution came into being Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and a few other like-minded revolutionaries began to organize discussion groups among the literate Afghans in Kabul 11 As their numbers grew more practical steps to achieve their objective began to be planned. The PDPA was, however, formally formed at Nur Mohammad Taraki’s residence on 1 January 1965. Thirty young men gathered at his house and unanimously elected him as a member of the Central Committee and the Secretary General of the Party 12 MANIFESTO / PROGRAM As secretary general of the PDPA, Taraki was primarily responsible for drafting the party manifesto. The draft was first adopted by a committee set up for the purpose by the central committee and subsequently by an unspecified party conference. 13 The party charter was then published in the first two (joint) issues of Khalq in April 1966. The PDPA's Maraam (manifesto) in its preamble lamented the disgusting socio - economic situation prevailing in 20th century Afghanistan despite the 'liberation' of the country in 1919. It vowed that PDPA would fight for the snatched rights of the Afghans and fulfill the aspirations that had been aroused following complete independence 47 years ago. 14 The preamble said Afghanistan's woes had resulted from its feudal economy,

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exploitation by the ruling classes and the bureaucracy, and the designs of the imperialists. It criticized the poor performance of Loya Jirgah for failing to achieve its targets since being convened in 1955. The preamble, citing the considerable politico- economic changes and the collapse of colonial system that had occurred since World War II, argued that socialism was the answer to Afghanistan’s misery and backwardness. It felt the circumstances warranted the emergence of a Jabha (party) which would bring together the farmers, laborers, workers and progressive writers. The manifesto divided its objectives under different sub-headings. The nine-point political objectives of the PDPA aimed at (i) bringing social and economic equality; (ii) providing for people's sovereignty; (iii) laying down democratic organization of the state through universal adult franchise; establishing the rule of law; (iv) guaranteeing liberty of though; eradicating ethnic differences; (v) finding legal and democratic solution to linguistic, cultural and economic issues; (vi) derecognizing the Durand Line; and (vii) Following a policy of neutrality and forging links to fight imperialism. 15 (viii) CONSTITUTION The Assasnamah (constitution) of the party was framed in early 1967, cyclostyled and distributed amongst the members. It was spread over 10 chapters and 52 articles. Article 1 of the constitution proclaimed that the PDPA was founded on the philosophy and concepts of Marxism and Leninism. Membership was open to all who agreed with the party's line except those "who had harmed the national liberation movement". The party hoped to extend its branches all over the country and to enroll members at the Hoza (village unit) level; each membership was required to be endorsed by two existing members with at least one- year stay in the party, and new members had to spend a probation period of a year. The central committee could take decisions by majority vote and was also authorized to make nominations in certain cases. The Kangra-e-Hizb (congress) was the highest 56

advisory body of the party, composed of the provincial delegates, and required to meet every four years. The central committee, which was next to the congress, performed its functions through sub-committees of workers, cooperatives, lower grade clerks, students, youth, culture clubs, and sports and arts clubs. The plenum of the central committee, required to meet thrice annually, was composed of the members of central, standing and enquiry committees. The provincial branches of the party were expected to hold a conference every two years while those in the cities and districts once every year. The Hoza as the basic tier of the party, with at least three members in each, was directed to hold a meeting every fortnight. The Hoza served as a link between the party secretariat and the public, with authority to collect subscriptions and enlist new members. Membership fee, to be determined by the central committee, and donations and income from the PPA publications constituted the visible income of the party. The members were to be issued party cards by the central committee, which was also authorized to select candidates for elections and issue them with party tickets. 16 Newspapers have been the precursors to all political movements in Afghanistan. The parties in most cases owed their names to the newspapers published by them; but it can also be said that these newspapers were actually named after the political parties whose cause they espoused. Though newspapers could conceivably have little effect on a nation with a literacy rate of less than 10 per cent, their political impact was expected to be significant on the increasing urban literate population, particularly on the impressionable students. In principle, the 1964 constitution had provided for freedom of the press, but the press law, with its eight chapters and fifty-five articles, became effective after its promulgation in July 1965.17 Six private journals sprang into existence after the promulgation of the press law, as if they had been waiting in the wings. Wahdat, Payam-I-Emroz, Afghan Melat, Khalq, Mardum and Masawat, all weeklies, appeared in that order in the first half of 1966. Khalq ("The Masses") was the organ of the pro-Moscow PDPA SPLIT IN PDPA As happens with most political parties in third world countries differences between their leaders arise soon after they begin enunciating their ideas of how they 57

intend to achieve the objectives earlier agreed upon. Same it was with the party divided into two groups. KHALQ (The people) PARCHAM (The flag) KHALQ The Khalq lead by Noor Mohammad Taraki and Amin were more radical then the parchamites. They wanted to bring about, political, economic, and social changes even if it meant throwing out the present system lock, stock and barrel.18 The first major issue dividing the party was the stand to be adopted towards the Zahir Shah monarchy, but the actual split came over the proper response to the Government action of banning Khalq. Subsequent disagreement related to the interpretation of the party Program as it applied to the formation of a" national united front". Taraki, far- sighted man believed in peaceful means to achieve the final end but, under the influence of Amin, he was impelled to take host steps, which led to their eventual failure inthe long run. PARCHAM The Parchamities headed by Babrak Karmal believed in gradual changes in the face mounting challengenes , There was sharp division among them along ethnic lines also . The Khalqs were die-hard Pushtuns, committed to the uplift of the Pushtuns, cause and come from the lower middle class, and were less educated. The Parcahamities mainly consisted of non –pushtoon draw from the upper strata of society and urbanities. So that s why there existed a wide chasm between them, which caused a split among them. there is no doubt, that the spilt in the PDPA was personality oriented also, as Bebrak Karmal refused to recognize the leadership of Taraki and Amin,s but latter on these differences assumed an ethnic and religious dimension also there is no doubt that both factions were committed to pursue the Marxist lenist ideology but the khalq were committed to take an independent decision, while Karmal was amenable towards Moscow But Moscow did not approve of the growing rift between the two factions of PDPA. At least, the Soviets succeeded in bringing a transitory unity between them, thus 58

clearing the ground for a decisive coup against the strongly entrenched government of Sardar Daud Khan20 The armed forces were under the influence of the communists as large number of Khalq s and Parchamities were holding important position. The notable Khalqis officer were Major Aslam watanjor and air force Lieutenat syed Muhammad Gulabzai.While the parchimities officer Nur Ahmed, Muhammed Rafi and Lieutenat Colonel Abdul Qader. The Parcham faction, were instrumental in bringing Sardar Daud to power in 1973. This taking advantage of their close link with Sardar Daud, the perchamities, further increased their influence in the military and bureaucracy. The incising influence of the communists alarmed Sardar Daud, though Daud Khan perceived the growing influence of the communists with great concern but it was too late and the communists were successful in over throwing Daud in oct.1978. UNIFICATION OF PDPA: Daoud’s domestic and Foreign policies greatly led the unification of the PDPA. Although it is often argued that the Soviet Union played a central rule in bringing about a rapprochement between Khalq and Parcham in 1977, the domestic political scene is conveniently ignored. Given their wide contacts the Soviet might have exercised their influence over the Afghan Marxist to forge unity, The Communist party of India consulted Parcham and Khalq to patch their differences and close their ranks. This did help the initiation of a dialogue between them.21 but in the final analysis, it was their commons fear that Daud with the support of Iran by Turning to oligarchic elite was preparing for a final move to destroy the leftist movement. The hostile political environment forced Parcham to return to the fold, and PDPA was reunited in July 1977 after a decade of split. 22 Like an erring child, the Parchamis were presently accommodated in a spirit of forgive and forget. But having betrayed one another’s trust in the past, Khalq and Parcham could never again rise above fictional considerations. Various intermediaries are credited with patching up the Khalq Parcham differences. They include Ajmal Khattak of Pakistan, the communist party of India and the Soviets.23 However, this much is sure that the sympathies of all 59

three conciliators mentioned above were closer to the well-dense to the view that it was Babrak Karmal who had initiated the unity proposal through these friends in neighboring countries. But it must be kept in mind that important considerations which must have speeded up unity were due to threats/fears from Dauod. According to Taraki’s biography, unity was achieved without taking into consideration the party strengths, popularity and organizational experience. Civilian and military organizations of both factions were to be dealt separately. On the civilian side unity was to be achieved on a strictly equal, power-sharing basis, while on the military side the merger was to be delayed 24. Because the Khalqist felt they outnumbered the Parchamis, hence unity on an equal footing was not possible. From the very outset, the unity looked fragile, even artificial, the mistrust remained and the Khalqi’s later blamed Parcham for keeping both their civilian and military organizations intact even after the merger. They even charged that unlike the Khalqi military officers who were moving to wrest power from Dauod, the Parchami officers were still willing to defend the Dauod regime. 25 But without being influenced by the Khalqi accusations, it seems that each faction kept its won separate organization intact though professing unity in the same breath. Once PDPA emerged as a single entity, its old central committee was replaced by a politburo of eleven with Taraki retaining the secretary - general ship. The remaining ten positions were equally shared by Khalqi and parch, which meant that together with Taraki the Khalqi still had a numerical majority, it was a pointer to the fact that Parcham had eventually conceded the ore-eminence of Khalqi PDPA called itself "National Democratic" its communist character could not be hidden. ROLE OF SOVIET UNION IN 1978 REVOLUTION. Unlike the 1973, the Soviet Union was actively involved in 1978 coup-data. The rampant of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan through direct and indirect means such as moral and political support for the PDPA; the presence of a larger number of the Soviet personnel and a huge military and economics and did give the Kremlin a position to cripple the administration in Kabul. The Soviet Union which had supported Dauod in his power struggle against the Zahir Shah during his days of Prime Minister Ship and after, and had backed his policy of Pashtunistan as a bonafide right of Afghanistan 60

believed in making his regime totally biddable to Moscow. The changing polices of Dauod in the last two years of his rule where he attempted to curb the activities of the leftists in order to legitimize his rule and reduce it regime dependence on the Soviet Union were embarrassing for the Soviets. Dauod stretched his hand of friendship to other Muslim States; Saudi. Arabia, Pakistan, Iran etc. They all assured him to provide economic assistance. The Shah of Iran, having secured a lion's share of the petrodollars by quadrupling the oil prices in 1973, promised Dauod a grant US$ 10 billion aid for the development of Afghanistan’s economy. The Shah in return was believed to have received commitment from Dauod to limit its relations with the Soviet Union and bury belches with Pakistan by withdrawing it claim over-Pushtunistan. The Moscow perceived Shah's ambitious schemes in Afghanistan a threat to the Soviet influence in the area, as shah was a strong ally of America, for furthering the US interests in the area 26 The Soviet Union being alert on the Dauod's independent policy of Moscow condemned it as a imperialist and aberrant. In April 1977, CPSU, Communist party of Soviet Union General, Leioned Brezhnev " apparently gave him a Tongue- Lashing over his exclusion of leftists from his Government and his eagerness to find non-Soviet sources of economic and military aid.27 In response, Daoud ignoring any future repercussions of his defying the soviet union claimed that Afghanistan would go for own policy as it was an independent country and not a satellite like the Eastern European States. The drift in the Daud’s policies trying for an independent policy of Moscow and the purging of the Pro-Soviet Factions in Afghanistan antagonized Kremlin. The Soviet Sought the replacement of Daud as early as it was possible. The Soviet concentrated in patching the differences between the two factions of the PDPA for the future strategy of toppling Daud. Ralph. H. Magnus in his article quoting Karmal's interview which an Indian correspondent, claim that once after the PDPA united, the Soviets "wanted that there should be revolution". 28 The April coup was pre-planned and Moscow knew about it. The PDPA infiltration into defense forces during the past years by gaining the loyalties of the top ranks backed by the Soviet Union had made them in a position to lead a successful coup 61

against Dauod no matter at the cost of how much causality. According to the post revolutionary news Media, once Khalqi and Parcham appeared to patch up their differences, they were more confident of their networks in the military and their capability to launch a coup. Each week Amin gave oral progress reports to the Central Committee which included list of reliable officers in the PDPA. 29 The PDPA underground cells in the month of April remained busy in planning the coup as Daud appeared more repressive towards its leaders. At the time of coup, many top leader including Amin and Taraki were under detention and house-arrest. The coup was launched on April 26, 1978 by colonel Abdul Qadir (acting Brigadier and deputy Commander in the Chief of the Air Force) Abdul Qadir was also among the leading figures who played an active role in the 1973coup. The action entailed two divisions an armored brigade involving near about 600 officers. The final raid on the place resulted in many causalities as the place's Security showed armed resistance the place guard, however, being cut off from the out side and being surrounded were unable to convey signal, for any out side help. They soon seemed succumbing to the insurgents. The coup was successful. President along with many of his family members and place entourage was killed in action. A revolution was made and powers were handed over to. PDPA in 27 April 1978. THE COUP On 17 April 1978, Mir Akbar Khyber, co-editor of the Daily Parcham, and a prominent communist ideologue, rated higher than even Babrak Karmal, was assassinated. Drew an unexpected angry crowd of 10,000 to 15,000 raising anti-imperialist and anti-government slogans. A numbers of well-known PDPA personalities addressed the gathering inciting them to take revenge. Daud was surprised and shocked to learn that the PDPA, which he had been able to organize such a large procession united against him. 30 27 April was a Saturday, the first working day in many Muslim countries. At the peak hour in Kabul when the streets were crowded with buses, cars and pedestrians, forty to fifty tanks led by major Aslam Watanyar, who was at that time the deputy

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commander of the 4th Armored Brigade stationed outside Kabul, moved out of their barracks. Their presence on the streets was not considered very unusual. The traffic policemen are reported to have motioned the tanks to pull over to curb so as to let the vehicles flow smoothly. By 11 a.m. the tanks had reached the Minister of Defense. Watanyar then took nine tanks and proceeded towards the Arg (presidential palace), a complex within Darulaman, and ten kilometers southwest of Kabul and isolated from the rest of the city. A cabinet meeting under Daud was in progress. Lieutenant General Ghulam Haider Rasuli, the Minister of Defense, left the cabinet meeting and went out to try and stop the rebels from moving any further but could not rally enough loyal troops around him. He never returned as he met with an accident and was immobilized. According to some reports he was caught by the communists on 29 April and executed 31 The storm, which eventually broke over Kabul on the morning of 27 April 1978, leaving behind the dead bodies of President Daud and his family, brought with it a socio- economic system, which was alien to the deeply conservative Afghan society. A small group of devoted Marxists took upon themselves to turn Afghanistan from an illiterate, poverty stricken and tribal ridden religious society into a modern socialist state. AIMS AND OBJECTIVIES OF SAUR REVOLUTION Revolution follows a complete overthrow of an established political order of a country by a class or a group of a people (revolutionaries) who previously being subject to it were against its very existence and believed its replacement by a new one. 32 In many cases, the post-revolutionary period is followed by a rapid policy of reforms in social, economic and political structures of state/society. The direction of changes in these components of state system affirms a long held two-fold belief of revolutionaries. First, men are capable of altering the conditions of society and can replace one regime with another. Second, revolutionary’s zest for a future ideal society with a time of more happiness and prosperity for everyone a millennium movement. This sense of disentanglement with the old system and future remedy by bringing rapid changes leads the incumbent revolutionary regime to adapt an abrupt policy of reforms for the transformation of state and social systems. Thus revolutionaries believe that a true revolution is one which not only bring changes in the political structure of society, but 63

also involves changes in social, economic and cultural values of a society. In Leiden and Schmitt’s definition.

“A prominent feature of the post-revolutionary trouble is the tendency to embrace all sorts of programs or adventures as achievement of revolution and after sour revelators and his reforms and decrees aspects of revolutionary goals. This may result in implementation of innocuous reforms or others Meddling. They now own a government and opportunity to do the many things long dreamed or have at hand, and it would be remarkable indeed if revolutionary leaders did not engage in plethora of Experimentation (after revolution.)” 33 The similar situation happened in Afghanistan after the Saur revolution where the Revolutionaries once having stepped into power were found experiencing a number of reforms to bring Economic and socio-political changes in the country. They, from the first day of the revolution, perceived the replacement of old order with a new one. The succeeding of April revolution was hailed as a major Landmark and a victory of toiling people of Afghanistan against a tyrant regime towards the setting up of a just society and its glorification.34 Making the first announcement of the triumph of revolution by the revolutionary Command on radio, they proclaimed:

For the first time in the history of Afghanistan the last remnants of monarchy, tyranny, Despotism and power of the dynasty of the tyrant Nader Khan has ended and all powers of state are in the hands of the people of Afghanistan. The power of state fully rests with the Revolutionary Council. 35

Few hours later in another announcement, they said: Dear Compatriots, your popular state which is in the hands of the Council of the Revolution (Revolutionary Council) informs you that every Anti-revolutionary element who would venture to defy instructions and rulings of the Council of revolution shall be submitted immediately to the revolutionary military centers for severe punishment. 36

The armed revolutionary council existed for few days after the revolution. After it ceded power to the PDPA controlled revolutionary council of the Democratic Republic of 64

Afghanistan. The revolutionary council consisted of 35 members. It included the leading members of the PDPA, defense forces, and civil bureaucracy. The membership on the revolutionary council was later raised to 53. The revolutionary council was presided over by Noor Muhammad Taraki. A decree was issued by the revolutionary council stating: Afghanistan from the viewpoint of the state is the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and that the government business regarding the future planning for state and society would be conducted through decrees and regulations of the Revolutionary Council. The PDPA leadership being adamant to its belief for mobilizing changes in all leading sectors of Afghan society announced issuing of a long radical program known as the Basic Line of revolutionary Duties of the Government of Afghanistan”. The program was regarded as a charter containing essential principles of the state’s policy to infuse new zeal among strata in society towards the future ramification of Afghan state. The important provisions of the Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties Were: a) Democratic land reforms would be implemented in the interests of the oiling farmers. Land reclamation program would be instituted. A program of irrigation and solution of the grazing problem will be made. Abolition of old feudal and pre- feudal relations. Adoption of measures of ensure that domestic and foreign trade be conducted in the interest of the people. b) Strengthening of the public sector of the economy with scientific planning and other measures and democratization of social life in the machinery. c) Rejection of imperialism and those related to it in various spheres and democratic solution of national issues. d) Weeding out from the state machinery anti-revolutionary, anti-democratic elements. e) Strengthening and building of the national-liberation and heroic army of the democratic republic and Afghanistan which defends the revolution and its results; ensuring of full and just rights to patriotic officers and soldiers in particular, defend the right of wide participation, without any discrimination and privilege, shoulder with all patriots, in the life and political activities of the country. 65

f) Guaranteeing democratic rights for all, including workers, peasants, officers and soldiers, patriotic clergy, toiling nomads, small and medium classes and (other) strata. g) Promulgation and acquisition of all democratic laws and abrogation of all previous laws and regulations and disbanding of all institutions which contradict the aspiration and the principles of the revolution of Sour revolution. h) Ensuring the equality of rights of women with men in all social economic, political, cultural and civil aspects. i) Democratic solution of the nomad issue. j) Protection of domestic industries against foreign competition of products, encouragement, protection, control and guidance private investments in industries, and small medium-sized enterprises. k) Expansion of relations and cooperation with friendly countries. l) Ensuring universal, compulsory, free education to all children of school age creation of all essential provisions for effective struggle against illiteracy. m) Establishment of relations of good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with all neighbors of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, consolidation, widening and all round expansion of friendly relations with our great northern neighbor: the Soviet Union, expansion of friendly relations with India, and ensuring friendly relations with Iran, Pakistan and China. N) Solution of the national issue of Pashtun and Baluch people on the basis of their own will and on the basis of historical background, solution of this issue through understanding and peaceful political talks between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 37

MAJOR REFORMS OF SAUR ROLUTION The following changes-cum-reforms, delineating the PDPA’s aims of revolutionary lines, were adapted after the revolution

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CHANGING OF NATIONAL FLAGE. The first major change occurring just after the revolution symbolizing the spirit of revolutionary fervor was the government decision to change the national flag of Afghanistan. The previous traditional tricolor flag was replaced with a solid red colored flag, with an emblem of wheat sheaves, a star and the letters “Khalqi” inside. The new flag was designed to embody the revolutionary red color by rectifying the symptoms of conservation represented by the old flag. The red color flag waved on flagpoles in all areas of Afghanistan for the first two years of revolution after it was abandoned in favor of another tricolor flag (tricolor were same as in old traditional flag with an inclusion of an industrial wheel, having sheaves of corn around it.) The change in flag by Babrak Karmal was mainly due to growing opposition to the PDPA government over implementing its revolutionary policies by people in large. The policy of recharging the flag by Babrak was a mediating effort to allay the persisting trouble among Afghan people over rapid enforcement of revolutionary steps by the PDPA government. The Afghan population feared the future socialization of Afghan society; the existence of a red flag testified it. In his speech, on the occasion of flag recharging, Babrak Karmal appealed to Afghan people to strengthen their unity and support Saur revolution under the new tricolor flag: Let us declare with confidence and confection that the national and state flag and emblem of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will soon turn into a symbol of unity and solidarity for defense of the glorious revolution of Sour and their revolutionary achievements more than ever under the flag of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which we hoist today. 38 BANNING OF PRIVATE LOAN DEALING In July 1978, the revolutionary council announced decree six, which banned all private loan dealing as well as the practice of mortgages (Garau) in Afghanistan. According to the decree, all mortgages debts of agricultural laborers, tenants and small landowners (possessing less than two hectares of land) prior to 1973 to April 1978. The system of private loan-dealing like in many underdeveloped countries where

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system of bank-loans is not facilitated for a common man and practice of private loaning is rampant, was in practice in Afghanistan since the advent of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century. The Afghan society having an entrenched rural set up, divided approximately into 15,000 villages with a population of 13.3 million (85% of the total Afghan population) 39, conveniently or inconveniently was adapted to the methods of private loan-dealing. There were three major kinds of private loan dealings in Afghanistan: cash seeds and livestock loans the cash loan takings absorbed largest portion of private loan business practice. The cash loan taking there were three major kinds of private loan dealings in Afghanistan: cash seeds and livestock loans. The cash loan takings absorbed largest portion of private loan business practice. The cash loan taking was not only limited to the rural area, but also existed in the urban area. The method of cash loaning was easy to follow. In case of cash loan, the borrower had to pay a fixed amount of money (surplus to the original money), which in many cases was to be decided by the lender. The interest rates on money lending varied from case to case involving personal relations. There were no fixed rules regulating interest rates on borrowed money, except found necessity of the borrower and the personal interests of lender. The repaying of loans was burdensome in a situation where a higher demand on interest rate was initiated by the lender. In case of personal relationship, the proposed conditions for repaying loan could be lenient. Traditionally, in many of the areas, the lender expected future support by the borrower; he did not expect the return of his money rather the borrower agreed to support the lender (who usually was notable of the area) in the local election and disputes 40 In case of the seed loans, the borrower had to pay a fixed quantity of crop to the lender along with the value of seeds borrowed. The practice of seed loans was frequent in rural areas with the agricultural sectors where residents were engaged in cultivation of land and orchards. The principal implied in repaying the seed loans was that it could only be made through crop with a possible concession in time period. In case of the flood or drought, causing damage to the borrower’s crop, the repayment had to be reconsidered/rescheduled the livestock loan system existed in Afghanistan since very long. Loaning on livestock was common in the far-flanged rural areas. The repayment on 68

livestock loan, more or less, required the same method as of seed loans. The borrower had to return a fixed number of livestock as decided at the time the lending was made. For example, if person A borrowed 10 sheep from person B at the rate of two sheep per year, at the end of two years, person A had to return the person B 14 sheep. The ratio of livestock loan taking was higher in areas with nomad population. The nomad people, which major source of livelihood was by growing cattle, were apt to borrow livestock in cold areas with scarcity of grazing land during winter. They would then migrate to the warm areas where plenty of pasture was found. The system could benefit the poor, hard- working rural cattle-raisers, especially the nomad people. Similarly, under the “Gerau” system, which was also the target of decree six, a person would accept a loan at the value of his immovable property such as land, house, orchard etc. for a specific period with fixed interest rate/conditions. Again, the conditions decided for repayment varied in each case. In case of mortgage on land, orchard, the interest rate was in shape of the yield of two-third or three-forth of the land until the original debt was paid back. Other than crop producing items, the interest on mortgage could possibly be in form of cash/physical support. A person failing to return the payment under the system would get his property forfeited under mortgage. After the proclamation of decree six, the revolutionary government appointed “Woluswali” (regulating) committees at the districts level in all the provinces of Afghanistan to deal with the cases arising out of the breach of decree 6. The Woluswali committee appointed sub-committees at smaller levels and exercised control over them. They all worked collectively as a team of state-appointed agents. A good number of them were spread all over the areas to report secretly in case there was any violation of decree 6. They were empowered to report to police against anyone found suspicious of violating the decree. Violators could be arrested and penalized.41 STATE CONTROL OF MARRIAGE AND ABOLISHING OF VULVERS One of the major social changes made by the PDPA government, pertaining to its aims of social engineering in Afghanistan, pertaining to its aims of social engineering in Afghanistan, was the implementation of marriage reforms. The marriage reforms were designed to regulate marriages and abolish Vulvars (bride-price), and fix the amount of 69

(Jahiz) dowry. The reforms were one of the leading principles of the Revolutionary Lines, whose stated purpose was to ensure “equal rights of women with men by removing the unjust patriarchal feudalistic relations between husband and wife for the consolidation of sincere family ties”42. The proclamation of decree regulating the marriage and dowry affairs specified six principles: A No one shall engage a girl or give her in marriage in exchange for cash or commodities. B No one shall compel the bridegroom or his guardians (parents) to give presents to the girl or her family. C The girl or her guardians shall not take cash or commodities in name of dowry in excess of ten-dirham (Arabic coinage equal to 500 Afghanis). D Engagements or marriages shall take place with full consent of parties involved: E No one shall force marriage and f No one shall prevent the free marriage (with the consent of both: bride and groom) because of family relations or patriarchal ties. g Engagements and marriages for women under sixteen and men fewer than eighteen are not permissible. H Violators shall be liable to imprisonment from six month to three years: Cash or commodities accepted in violation of the provision of this decree will be confiscated.43 The marriage reforms were similar to the reforms introduced by late King Amanullah of Afghanistan in 1928. The reforms were to make firm state control over family affairs by facilitating both: male and female to choose their own mates without any patriarchal interference. The revolutionary regime, from the very beginning, finding fault with the marriage affairs denounced them as unethical and immoral, hindering the future of a happy family order in Afghan society. The existing system of bride price, as the revolutionary government proclaimed, was un Islamic and burden some for the majority of men: “Because of high bride-prices, men must work for five to ten years in order to earn sufficient economic resources to obtain a bride”.44 The situation could be rather worst in case of low-income men from whom a handsome amount of vulvar was 70

demanded. For them marriage making at cost of vulvar appeared a hard nut to crack. On the contrary, a man affording to pay vulvar to bride’s guardians, irrespective of his age and match, could go for more than one marriage. The PDPA regime believed in complete annihilation of traditional marriage system involving complications of bride price and dowry. The government announced immediate penalization, to arrest and possible confiscate property of all those violating marriage rules. LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORMS Land reforms are regarded one of the major changes taking place in the wake of many of the leftist revolutions. No socialist revolution in an agrarian society, demanding socioeconomic changes in society, is deemed complete without any major land reforms. It (land reforms) involves changes in the political, social and economic Power positions of several groups within a society. Land reform has an essential core meaning which concerns significant and purposeful changes in land tenure – changes in ownership and control of land and water resources. Specific measures may include: expropriation of large estates and the distribution of land among the tillers, either an individual ownership and operation or for collective use; abolition or improvement in tenancy conditions by converting tenants into owners or by reducing rental payments; issuance of land titles to the tillers to provide them with greater security; and transformation of tribal and other traditional forms of tenure in the interests of cultivators of the land. Land reform is often viewed as an instrument primarily for the achievement of greater equity and social justice. Land reforms in a feudal state, if shrewdly planned, play a role in setting down economic imbalances.45 The PDPA revolutionary council declared that its policy of land reforms is a cornerstone of its overall planning of bringing changes in economic and social strata of society. The peasant-landlord relationship, the PDPA perceived, was to be restructured by bringing massive land reforms. This would help fixing the landownership and taking away the land in excess --- essential to the elimination of big land lordship in Afghanistan. The government also announced the settlement of water distribution: They announced: Measures for abolition of feudal and pre feudal relations through democratic and just 71

solution of land and water matters in favor of hard working peasants, is the major essence of the democratic revolution, and is one of the main and urgent revolutionary tasks propounded by the PDPA. Within the framework of national democratic revolution and relying on the knowledge and nature of this historical movement, the progressive land policy of the PDPA is aimed towards abolition of the backward feudal and pre- feudal relations, growth of agricultural productive forces, application on agricultural mechanization and establishment of mechanized agriculture centers, provision of land and water for the peasants, rehabilitation of the irrigated systems for the benefit of the toiling peasants.46 In November 1982, the government issued decree 8 for the implementation of land and agrarian reforms. The decree 8 entailed many provisions defining the land distribution. It modified the earlier settlement on land distribution, in 1975 by President Daud, by reducing the ownership of all irrigated land from 20 hectares (one hector equivalent to five jaribs) to only six hectares. The limit on the holdings of less irrigated or rain- irrigated land, however, remained higher, between 35 to 40 hectares. The land exceeding the limit of ownership was to be confiscated by the government without any compensation. Unlike the 1975 land reforms by the Daud regime making compensation to those from whom land was confiscated in excess, no compensation was allowed by the PDPA. The land confiscated in excess was to be distributed among the landless. 47 An order of priority for the distribution of land was made. According to the priority order, the first were landless peasants, farmers and sharecroppers already working on the land. The neighboring farmers with two or less hectors of land were given second priority. Nomads and cattle-raisers with no land were given third priority, provided they assured the Land Reforms Committee of their readiness to utilize the land. Allotters were eligible for loans from the district and local agricultural banks to buy seeds and other required equipments necessary for the cultivation of land.48 Regarding the settlement of water distribution, the government announced the nationalization of all canal and Karaz (underground natural irrigation network existing in Afghanistan and Pakistani Balochistan) system in the country, 49 and put it under the provincial irrigation departments. The management of irrigation network and distribution 72

of water supply for cultivation purpose was now the responsibility of each provincial government regulating through district offices. Previously, taking care of these affairs was bifurcated between the district government and tribal committee/Jirga. The members of the tribal committee were nominated by the tribal people in consent with the district administration. In case of a breach or mishap, the matter was to be resolved jointly. However, in case of a financial need, the major contribution was made by the government. Following the announcement of the decree 8, the government appointed committees all over Afghanistan. The members of committees, majority of them being the PDPA members, were to report the district administration and the departments concerned about the violation of land reform rules. The principal violation of the rules was to defy the rules/decrees of the revolutionary government i.e., not leaving the land confiscated in excess by the government, or conspiring against the government by supporting the elements that resisted the government policy of land reforms. 50 Committees undertaking to supervise the affairs of new landowners (those allotted out of confiscated land) were appointed to ensure the above authorities that the Allotter is utilizing land and loan effectively, and is not allowing the land go out of cultivation. Violators war subject to penalization varying from case to case, including the loss of allotted landownership. According to the government report, a total of 373,000 hectares of land was taken by the government in excess after the 1978 land reforms. Later on, the land was distributed among 300,000 landless peasant families. 51 CENTRALIZATION OF TRIBES another leading change resulting after the Sour revolution was the government decision of regulating the affairs of tribes in Afghanistan by bringing them under a centralized system. The Afghan society was primarily a tribal society divided into hundreds of tribes. Afghanistan had not experienced a centralized system of government. The jurisdiction of central government was mostly limited to the urban areas, and the areas with military bases. The tribal areas in Afghanistan, unlike many developing countries, like Pakistan and Turkey where they are federally administered or controlled by the provincial government, disclaimed the control of state jurisdiction. The tribes in 73

Afghanistan enjoyed a complete autonomy.52 Entrenching the area of state jurisdiction all over the country, important to succeed the government policy for the centralization of tribes, major changes in the government structure were made by the revolutionary regime. Afghanistan was divided into 29 provinces (Wilayats). The provinces were further divided into districts (Wuluswalis), and districts into sub districts (Alaqadaris). Governors were appointed for each province. A governor was the chief executive of a province. He was appointed by the PDPA revolutionary council. He was responsible for the smooth, efficient administration in the province. The PDPA Government, needing the support of defense forces to break down any armed resistance from tribal people to the implementation of its tribal policy, decided to divide Afghanistan into seven military districts.53 each military district was under the supervision of PDPA Political Officer acting on behalf of the central government. A Political Officer was not necessarily to be a military man, albeit many of them were. After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet officers were also appointed in those districts to monitor the resistance movements against the government. They worked in collaboration with the Political Officers providing them guidelines for future action. In pursuance of centralizing the tribal structure, the government nullified all tribal codes and privileges. Many tribal norms, regulating the day-to-day conduct of a tribe and defining its relations with other tribes, were canceled. They were declared contrary to the revolutionary spirit and process of national integration. The offices of tribal chiefs were abolished and all privileges, states, and allowances enjoyed by them thus ceased to exists. MODERNIZATION OF AFGHAN WOMEN The PDPA, following the footprints of its predecessor reformist: King Amanullah Khan necessitated the importance of the modernization of females in Afghanistan. The policy of female modernization, the PDPA believed, was essential to revolutionary aims of social changes. Soon after the revolution, Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW) was established. The main object of the DOAW was to encourage Afghan female participating in public and working side by side with men. On the eve of the 74

inauguration of the DOAW, Taraki, highlighting the importance of female participation in Afghan public affairs, said “without the participation of toiling women no great movement relating to toiling classes has achieved victory, because women constitute half of the (Afghan) society”.54 The DOAW was a huge organization working under the leadership of its central committee. The members of the committee were elected. Offices of the DOAW were opened in all major cities of Afghanistan by claiming more than ten thousands permanent members; and many more as supporters. An official notification regarding the membership of the DWOA said: The Democratic Women’s Organization of Afghanistan, under the leadership of its central council, has mobilized 14,000 permanent members in its 29 provincial and district councils, and 450 primary precincts. The pioneer’s organization, under the leadership of its central council has mobilized 40,000 pioneers in its 7 Pioneer places, 513 Pioneer Units, 3,500 Pioneer Groups, and has convened 12 Pioneer camps. The characteristics of the current revolutionary process (DWOA) are aimed to bring harmony in mass organization and integration of their activities with party and state organizations. 55 The attainment of primary education was made compulsory for girls above the age of five in all areas of Afghanistan. The attendance of schools was declared compulsory, and inspection teams belonging to the DWOA were appointed to report on the progress of female attendance. The DWOA teams worked in collaboration with the Education Departments, and reported the matters relating the female education to higher authorities. The PDPA, in one of the pamphlets, imbibing the teachings of Jamal-uddin Afghani, a great Afghan scholar and philosopher, described the necessity of achieving female education thus: A society can hardly progress where the attainment of knowledge is limited to men only, and female population is deprived of it. The first cradle of learning for a child is his association with mother. If mother is without knowledge or learning, how can children learn? The deficiencies will remain with them through out their lives an irreparable loss. It cans society to darkness and chaos. 56 In November 1980, an All-Afghanistan Women’s Conference was held in Kabul. The 75

conference lasted for one week. It was participated by 2,000 Afghan female delegates representing all spheres of life. Beside them, many guest female delegates from 19 countries also participated in the conference. The major purpose behind organizing this conference was to highlight the revolutionary endeavors for the promotion of female welfare in Afghanistan; the female population which long had been deprived of their right of participation in national deployment. ESTABLISHING NATIONAL FATHER LAND FRONT Relevant to the (PDPA) policy of mobilizing a collective massive support to achieve the revolutionary spirit in favor of glorious Afghanistan, Afghan National Fatherland Front (NFF) was established. The formation of the NFF, a directive of Fundamental Revolutionary Policies, represented “widest possible strata of national life in the building of the country” 57 And “propagate an explain on a broad scale the policy of the PDPA, the Revolutionary Council and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” 58 The inaugurating session of NFF was participated by 900 representatives of all leading sections of Afghan society. The membership of the NFF included representatives from the PDPA, trade unions, unions of agricultural cooperatives, the DOAW, unions of Poets and writers, union of journalists, union of artists, peace solidarity and friendship organizations, Economic Consultative Council (ECC), and Democratic Organization of Afghan Youth (DOAY) and Afghan clergy. The Government declaration on the formation of the NFF stated: The National Fatherland Front has a vast social organization acceptable to all the toilers of Afghanistan and has expanded its activities countrywide in its 24 Provincial Councils, 13 City Councils, 8 Country Councils, 15 mass social organizations and large number of national and patriotic elements with a total figure of more than half a million people are mobilized in the National Fatherland Front such level of mobilization is realized first time in the country. As a whole during the years of the revolution and specifically after the new and revolutionary sovereignty in compliance with national democratic essence of the revolution is systematized. 59 Although, the existing status of the NFF, as the PDPA defined, was of free-front line independent of any government control. The fact, however, remained that its activities 76

and funds were under the direct control of the PDPA revolutionary council, including the publication if its newspapers. OFFICIAL POLICY OF PDPA in- 1978. The objectives of the PDPA were to build a socialist society founded on the voluntary union of the progressive people of Afghanistan. The declared policy of the PDPA was based on, I. The Sacred Religion of Islam. II. Ensuring democracy III. Active and Positive neutrality. IV. Good Neighborliness. V. Peaceful Coexistence and respect for the U.N Charter. 60 , The main Features of the PDPA at the time of the April 1978 coup were following 1. Introduction of democratic land reforms which involved taking away land from the wealthy land owners and distributing it amongst the landless without giving compensation. 2. Abolishing the existing feudal-tenant relationship. 3. Censuring Women's equality in Afghan society, 4. Salving the nationalities problem by giving them greater autonomy in the use of their local languages. 5. Strengthening the public sector, increasing investment in industry: a. Enlarging education and public health sector: b. Expanding relation with the Soviet Union: c. Supporting national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America and opposing establishment of military bases 61 IMPACTS OF SAUR REVOLUTION ON PAKISTAN The impact on Pakistan of the Saur revolution in Afghanistan was direct, ranging and far reaching. It had both negative and positive repercussion. Afghanistan crisis, in general, and the large concentration of refugees on Pakistani soil in particular, have

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given birth too many complex problems linkage; economical, political, social, strategic, and, weapons. . ECONOMICAL. According to one source the cost of maintaining the registered refugees is little over a million dollars a day. This, of course, is the minimum version of the cost entailed as this does not take into account the new-comes and the unregistered refugees. However, most sources agree that almost half the cost involved in the maintenance of Afghan refugees is borne by Pakistan and the other half is met by many donor states, agencies and international organization. 62 While it may be true that almost 50% of the cost is borne by the donors but when invisible expenditures are added it would seem reasonable to assume that Pakistan is sharing the major burden of the cost involved. Another dimension of the economic problem was the issue of providing fodder to the animals and cattle that came along with their masters. The provision of grazing grounds and water for the Afghani livestock caused consistent headaches for the Pakistani officials. In both provinces of NWFP and Balochistan, the grazing lands are somewhat limited. In NWFP most of it belongs to private land-owners but in Balochistan part of the green pastureland belongs to the Government. Obviously the private owners guard their land with all the care they could muster while the government land is not sufficient enough to cater for all the cattle. Consequently the pressure on land compelled the Pakistani authorities to disperse them to other provinces; a necessity not particularly favored by the Government as such dispersal would make the eventual repatriation of refugees rather difficult. The large concentration of refugees in certain areas also caused ecological problems. Many forests suffered because most of the refugees used the wood for cooking and heating purpose. 63 Most of these refugees are poor and not familiar with the use of modern cooking and heating gadgets that were provided to them and in consequence not only opted but preferred the traditional methods of using wood. Recognizing the inadvertent damage being done to environmental and ecological resources particularly in NWFP and Balochistan, the Government took many remedial measures including portable water supplies, digging of tube-wells and open surface wells, mono pump and hand pump, etc. in order to alleviate the situation. 64 More 78

affluent and wealthier Afghan refugees, after their arrival, began to invest their wealth in varied types of commercial pursuits including the real estate and transport business. The purchase of immovable property caused a boom in real estate business especially in and around the areas of refugee concentrations. Realizing the dangerous implications of such a trend the Government expressed its determination to curb this development 65 Although the Afghan refugees were not allowed to purchase the immovable properties, the shrewd Afghans continued to manage to evade the operative rules and regulations either through employment of unfair means. 66 They found ways to get around the law restricting their right to purchase property by obtaining National Identity Cards, Domicile Certificates, and at time even Passports through agents who charged handsome fees for such procurements.67 these developments not only raised the property prices but also encouraged corruption. In addition, the house rents have also soared in cities mainly because city dweller Afghans were willing to pay higher rent which, in turn, pushed the rent ceiling beyond the capacity of the local lower middle and lower classes. 68 A small number of refugees also started to participate in transportation system of NWFP and Balochistan gradually took over part of the transport business. The Afghan transporters not only offered relatively less rates in order to secure a portion of this business but also operated without immunity. It is also alleged that since the Pakistani treated them more like guests and they were given facilities that were not available to the local transporters, the Afghanis were able to soon establish a foothold in this business. 69 Besides, the presence of a large number of refugees also increased the unemployment problems. 70 Not only the refugee concentration areas had already their own unemployment problems, the arrival of many young refugees looking for jobs and willing to work for lesser payment escalated the local unemployment problem. Many Afghanis managed to secure unemployment in agriculture and construction industry, which implied that those opportunities would have been available to the locals in the absence of the refugees. In addition, the Afghanis have also secured a reasonable position of odd jobs in urban centers. Since the Afghanis were and still are willing to work for lower wages and an employer is likely to give preference to the Afghanis over the locals, the friction became somewhat inevitable 79

POLITICAL The presence of a large number of Afghan refugees has also caused many political problems in Pakistan. Pushtoon tradition of ‘Panah’ and Pakistanis know hospitality is now confronted with a dilemma. Two factors seemed to have taxed their patience, the number and the time. The number of refugees has patience, the number and the time. The number of refugees has swollen to four million and the time span has already covered 28 years. The dilemma is how to continue offering them the best of our traditional hospitality and cope with the already surfaced dangerous implications effectively. The political problems that are in some way directly connected with the refugees and need to be highlighted are the growth of terrorism, and a sharp cleavage among the political parties regarding the Afghan refugees and their eventual return. Until the advent of the 80’s, organized terrorism was virtually never experienced by the Pakistanis. Acts of terrorism are varied and many. The NWFP has been particularly at the receiving end of terrorism. The Kabul regime has managed to penetrate into the great reservoirs of resistance; namely the refugee camps. In fact, it is commonly believed in Pakistan that many Afghan saboteurs have come into Pakistan in the guise of refugees with the object of spying and creating tension between the refugees and the locals. Two factors seemed to have contributed considerably towards the increasing terrorism. First, the agents of Afghani intelligence service have been extremely active in creating not only the potential for riots in refugee villages and generating antagonism between the refugees and the locals but have also been responsible for periodic bomb blasts in areas of civilian concentration as well as attempts to destroy targets of tactical importance. Both Pakistan Government and Mujahideen sources firmly place the blame on the KHAD Agents for causing various successful acts of terrorism. 71 Perhaps that’s time KHAD had been promoted for its good performance and elevated to cabinet level as the Ministry of State Security. 72 In fact, KHAD has grown as large as the Afghan army and works in close collaboration with KGB 73 second the internal feuds between various resistance groups and factions have also manifested in the forms of irresponsible terrorist acts. 74 Perhaps that was one of the major considerations to influence the Government’s decision to order, 80

in August 1984, all Peshawar-based resistance groups to move out Peshawar. 75 Perhaps the most serious political problem arising from the continuing presence of a large number of refugees in Pakistan is the impact on domestic politics. Normally most external crises tend to have a unifying effect on domestic politics but in case of Pakistan, the impact of Afghanistan crisis has sharply divided political opinion about the refugees and the eventual settlement of the crisis. It all started when one of the political parties gained access to the refugee camps mainly through the Peshawar-based Afghan resistance groups. 76 The humanitarian work of that particular party created goodwill among the ‘cultivated refugees’ which, in turn, generated apprehensions among the other political parties and they began to wonder what would happen if the refugees did not leave and formed a large vote bank for the privileged political party.77 Besides, it is not all that difficult, as stated above, to obtain Nation Identity Cards, or Domicile Certificates, enabling the cultivated refugees to form a strong political base for the involved party. This simmering fear surfaced in 1986 when the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) passed a resolution alleging the growing involvement of the Afghan refugees in the politics of Pakistan. In addition, it was also alleged that the refugees were being made an instrument to create dissension and disorder in academic institutions to serve the political objectives of a particular section.78 indeed these were very serious charges. Some political parties also disagreed with Government’s approach towards the Afghan crisis and insisted that direct talks with the Kabul regime should be initiated. 79 Another sensitive political problem relates to the augured ethnic imbalance in Balochistan that may result provided the Afghan crisis continues to persist and the flow of refugees into Pakistan does not stop. Assuming that no change takes place in the operative rate of refugee’s influx and the conflict remains unresolved for a few more years, the concentration of the refugees could gravely disrupt the socio-economic life in provinces bordering Afghanistan. Not only the refugees have increased the population of those areas by 10 to 15% but in case of Boluchistan the inflow of Pusthoon refugees could begin to erode the Boluchi predominance. Many Baluch leaders have already expressed fears that the continuous inflow of the refugees could up-set the existing 81

delicate balance between the Boluchis and the Pashtoons, and might even cause a situation in which the Boluchis may find themselves in a minority in their own Province 80 Politically the Bolochistan situation could be quite easily exploited by the Soviets if they so decide. Not only Balochistan had remained a troubled province especially during the last regime which resulted in the flight of many dissidents who took refuge in Afghanistan, but the Boluch minority problem is extremely sensitive and capable of being exploited. The Soviets have many compelling reasons to play the Baluch card in order to coerce, if not undermine, the Pakistani Government. Among the reasons that seemed to have annoyed the Soviets are Islamabad’s linkage with the U.S. and China, the use of Pakistani territory for sanctuary purposes by the Afghan resistance groups, the supply of men and material for the resistance force from and via Pakistan, Pakistan’s repeated refusal to talk directly to Kabul regime, and most recently no-response Russian initiative. 81 In fact, according to an American writer, the Soviets have already carefully and actively cultivated support among the Boluchis to increase their leverage against the regime in Islamabad.82 Finally among the political circles many questions are repeated debated. Would all the refugees go back if the Geneva process is able to produce a settlement? What would be the status of those refugees who did not to go back to Afghanistan? Will they be allowed to become Pakistani citizens if no settlement is agreed upon in the near future, would the aid be stopped? What would happen if the refugees refused to accept the settlement? Would Pakistan force them out? Would there be a war within the bordering provinces between the refugees and the Pakistanis? Such questions not only reflect the apprehensions of those who are directly affected by the presence of the refugees but also at national level, indirectly, communicate fears for future harmony, stability and peace for Pakistani society SOCIAL Many economic issues are, in many ways, linked with the social problems and have contributed enormously towards the existing tension. For example, transport, grazing land, property purchase, deforestation, and unemployment have all contributed considerably towards the initial birth and later increasing of the tension between the 82

natives and the foreigners. In urban centers not only the increased rent ceilings caused frictions but also the ‘privileged position’ of the refugees for whom the refuges administration systematically provided all sorts of facilities raised many questions among the local population. 83 Since many poor Pakistanis do not enjoy most of the facilities that had been extended to Afghan refugees and government is unable to provide similar facilities to all the Pakistanis, tension becomes a natural outcome of such situations. In some areas the refugee’s settlements have upset the existing sectarian balance. The increasing tension in Kurram Agency is, in some ways, a byproduct of the altered sectarian balance. 84 Another significant social problem that was, hitherto, nonexistent in Pakistan, is the drugs problem. Until the advent of the 80’s drug addiction was relatively unknown to most Pakistanis. Although poppy was never cultivated on a very large scale in Pakistan and General Zia’s concerted efforts further reduced Pakistan’s opium harvest from a 1979 high 800 tons to a low of 45 tons in 1948, yet in Afghanistan even after the advent of civil war, poppy remained the most attractive cash crop. 85 Before the Khomeini revolution in Iran, most of the poppy crop was exported to Iran but with the advent of the new regime export to Iran altogether stopped. With the virtual vanishing of Iranian market, the growers began to set up labs in both Afghanistan and Pakistan with the objective of the making more profitable heroin for export to the western countries.86 With Pakistan welcoming the Afghan refugees and Iran depriving the poppy growers of its market, the obvious route to west became through Pakistan. One dangerous by product of heroin smuggling through Pakistan was that a massive increase of heroin consumption among the Pakistanis was noticed within a short span of time. In 1986 it was reported that out of 1.3 million addicts in Pakistan, roughly about 100,000 were heroin-hooked and in 1996 the number of heroin addicts exceeded 450,000.87 Since the advent of the crisis, the number has been steadily on the rise despite government’s earnest efforts to curb its consumption and to retrieve the hooked persons. However, it must be asserted here that addiction to such a dangerous drug cannot be solely assigned to the Afghans. Perhaps the increased consumption could also be attributed to the shifting centers of heroin activities and its easy availability in local markets. 83

WEAPONS Another social problem confronting the Pakistanis is the enormously increased crime rate during the last many years. It is alleged that the easy availability of smuggled and unauthorized large quantities of weapons and ammunitions has contributed substantively towards the increased rate of crimes. 88 Three factors seemed to have caused tremendous increase in weapons inside the country. First, the Afghan rulers have continuously supplied arms to certain tribes in Pakistani territory with a view to establishing a sympathetic tribal militia that would act as a restraint on resistance activities in and around the tribal belt. 89 Second, since both Pakistani territory and the Afghan political leaders are serving as a conduit for weapon supplies to resistance field commanders, it is alleged that Pakistani official are involved and Afghan political leaders are peddling weapons for personal profit. 90 Third, in a crisis situation, it is inevitable that local arms manufacturer would inevitably increase its production in order to generate sufficient profit. Conscious of increased smuggling of arms that flooded the market, the indigenous producer was left with limited options; either to employ the economy of scales principles or indulge in smuggling. A combination of these factors has not only increased the availability of weapons but has also reduced the prices. Thus cheap weapons are now easily available which, in turns. STRATEGIC Strategically threats emanating from the Afghanistan crisis did not acquire threatening proportions until the Soviets introduction of its own combat troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion has dramatically complicated the security situation on the western border. Afghanistan, on its own, has never been able to pose much of a problem, as Pakistan’s military strength was regarded more than sufficient to cope with Afghan threats. It is the Soviet-backed and protected Afghanistan which has adversely affected the security scenario for Pakistan. For Pakistan, the invasion has introduced many disturbing elements, in its security environment. The danger, of course, is manifold. First, the invasion has generated fears and apprehensions among many Pakistanis that their country would be the next target. Many Pakistanis believe that after having 84

consolidated its position in Afghanistan, Moscow will then try to extend its influence beyond Afghan borders.91 The argument that the Soviets are likely to use Afghanistan as a spring-board to destabilize Pakistan in order to gain much-desired access to warm waters of the Indian Ocean, is still held valid by a sizable section of Pakistanis. Sandwiched between Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and Soviets ally, India, such anxieties do not seem too far-fetched, especially if viewed within the context of past Soviet attitudes towards Pakistan. Second, because of the presence of a large number of Afghan refugees on the Pakistani soil and the continuing Afghan Civil War, it can not be overruled that Pakistan may be drawn into Afghanistan cauldron will nilly. Given the nature if the Afghan resistance’s disunity and the on-going Civil War, it is difficult to say that it would be a short war. Assuming that the civil war persists and the Soviet casualty rate registers a dramatic increase over time, there may come a point where the Soviets might seriously contemplate active hot pursuits and sanctuary busting operations. Once this happens, Pakistan perforce would be dragged into the Afghan crisis. Such eventualities look real when one realizes that the Soviet leaders and officials already regard Pakistan in a state of undeclared war with the Soviet Union.92 Undoubtedly the Pakistanis are involved in the Afghan crisis but not the way the Soviets are interpreting it. The day Pakistan decided to accommodate large numbers of refugees on compassionate grounds; it became involved, though this involvement is of a very different nature. What the Soviets appear to have, so far, failed to recognize, is the fact that the massive refugees influx has presented the Government of Pakistan with an irreconcilable dilemma. If it organizes help and provides the bare minimum facilities to these refugees on humanitarian grounds, then Moscow begins to accuse Pakistan of aiding, abetting and encouraging what it terms as counter-revolutionary elements. If it does not look after them, then the danger of refugee’s camps becoming the hot beds of intrigues appears even more threatening. Third, the Soviets may be tempted to exploit the internal problems arising from the activities of the dissident elements in the provinces of Balochistan and N.W.F.P. More than once the substantial internal security capacity of Pakistan’s military has been tested 85

in these turbulent provinces. It has been often reported that the Baluchi feel ‘they never had a fair deal and are still not getting one.’93 Punjabi-dominated army and bureaucracy is unable to understand the gravity of Baluchi problems. Similar kind of feelings also exists in other smaller provinces. The problems of NWFP and Balochistan have been further compounded by the influx of the Afghan refugees. The dangers of a possible fall- out of Afghanistan’s political instability and re-emergence of subversion by the dissident elements cannot be under-rated. There exists sufficient evidence to support the contention that in the past, the subversive activities were actively encouraged and materially supported by the Afghans as well as by the Soviets. The situation as it exists today is much more prone to Soviet-inspired subversion primarily because of the presence of a massive number of refugees in these provinces and the on-going civil war in Afghanistan than what was the case in the past. The final major source of threat to the security of Pakistan primarily emanates from the internal situation but has been exacerbated by continuing Afghan crisis and the age-old unfriendly state of relationship with India. When there threats on borders, the internal threats often assume alarming proportions. Because of Soviet involvement in the Afghan crisis and its extremely friendly and stable relationship with India, the emergence of a dangerous Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis could not just be brushed aside. Even if they decide not to directly invade Pakistan individually or collectively, the exploitation of internal problems could sufficiently weaken Pakistan. Among the host of domestic problems that seem to have haunted the minds of scholars and leaders alike, are the continued search for a viable political system, lack of national cohesion and the operative inequalities and disparities among the federating units that from Pakistan. The continued inability of the Pakistanis to evolve a viable political system in which the political legitimacy is ultimately sought by a reference to the people of Pakistan, have not only consistently impeded the development of nation-building institutions, but have also generated a number of complex problems. Excessive political experimentations at various periods of Pakistan’s history by different leaders have not yet conclusively provided a panacea for the political problems of Pakistan. Equally potent problem is the lack of national cohesiveness. While the cultural and linguistic 86

heterogeneity of federating units of Pakistan is frequently referred to by many outsiders, the two main motivational and referred to by many outsiders, the two main motivational and binding forces that hold Pakistan together are often relegated to secondary level: namely the religion of Islam and the common aspiration for a future. Many Indian scholars have often argued that Islam does not have any binding appeal and in this connection they often quote the example of separation of East Pakistan and insist that the two-nation theory that produced Pakistan died with the birth of Bangladesh. 94 The two- nation theory stipulated that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations of the subcontinent. The emergence of an independent Bangladesh has in no way invalidated this theory, as Bangladesh is a separate independent Muslim entity. As far as the creation of Bangladesh is concerned, it needs to be mentioned here that it was the product of a peculiar set of circumstances in which not only the above-mentioned major internal problems contributed their share but the effective exploitation of geographical remoteness of the eastern wing of Pakistan coupled with active India and Soviet involvement did the trick. However, this does not mean that heterogeneity does not exit and is not taking the toll. The third and perhaps the most important source of tension is the presence of economic disparities. Because of the ill-advised and badly planned Harvard Group’s developmental strategies, the economic disparities were allowed to grow unnecessarily. These disparities were much more visible in the regional distribution of industrialization programmes over the years.95 despite the rectification processes undertaken in recent years, the effective removal of these social inequalities and economic disparities are likely to take some time to fade into oblivion. The current regime’s five-point programme certainly seems to be a timely and useful step in the right direction. 87

REFERENCES 1. Ghaus, A.S the fall of Afghanistan, Pergamon Brassy, International Defense 2. Publisher, Washington DC.1988.p.194... 3. Taizi, S.Z Saur Revolution, an unpublished Ph.D., thesis at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan 1989, p. 10: Other instances of Afghans attending communist meetings were: Afghans representatives attend the Eastern Communist Central Committee Meeting at Berlin in 1991; Two Afghans attended a Congress in Baku in 1920; between 1920 and 1933 a number of Afghan socialist visited USSR. 4. Hyman, A. Afghanistan under Soviet Domination-1964-1981, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, UK, 1982, p. 24. 5. Ibid. 6. Amstutz, J.B. Afghanistan – The First Five years of Soviet Occupation, National Defense University, Washington DC, USA, 1986, p.11. 7. In Dari (modified Persian) the PDPA is called Janiat-e-Democratiqi – Khalq-e- Afghanistan. 8. Arnold, A. Afghanistan’s Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalqi, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA, USA, 1983, p. 25. 9. Hyman, P. 55; Also see Arnold, P. 25 or details Five members were elected to the Central Committee of the newly found PDPA. Four became alternate members. Other full members were Taher Badekshi, Sultan Ali Kheshtmand, Ghulam Dastgir Panjsheri Shahpur and Dr. Saleh M. Zeary. 10. Ibid, p. 19. 11. Amstutz, P. 34. 12. Interviewed by the author at Peshawar, 7 May 1990. 13. Bradsher, H.S. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Duke University Press, Durham, USA, 1985, P. 41. 14. Ibid, P. 41. 15. Ibid. p. 43 16. Ibid, P. 45. 17. Ibid, Appendix B, PP.149, 150. 88

18. Interviewed by the author at Peshawar, 7 May 1990. 19. Keesings Contemporary Archives, Volume XXV, P. 29641, 1 June 1979. 20. New Times, Moscow, 21-28 May 1978, PP. 8, 9. 21. Babrak karmal mentioned the help of international supporters and brothers, world Marxist review (Prague) vol, 23.No4 April, 1980, p 35. 22. Current Digest of the Soviet press (CDSP) vol, 28 No 08, 25 February 1976, p 13Arnold. . 23. Nayar, K. Report on Afghanistan, Allied Publishers Pvt, Limited, New Delhi, India, 1981, P. 19. Also see Ghaus, P. 200. 24. A short information about PDPA op-cit delaits provided in Tariq-ul-Shaab - articles and the Dari documents about the establishment of the Marxist -Leninist party in Afghanistan. 25. Louis duprce op cit 34 26. Ibid. Also in Beverly male. Op. cit. p.46. 27. Dr. Anwer "the third Afghan constitution (part VII) central Asia, winter 1982, op- cit, p.1. 28. Ibid. 29. Louis duprce, op- cit. pp. – 115, 18. 30. From the original issues "Parcham". 31. Lous Dupree, Op-cit p608. 32. Afghanistan, “Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1934. pp. 131-34. 33. Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World, Cliffs, N.J Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 68. 34. The Kabul Times, April 29, 1978. 35. Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Annual, 1979 published in Kuldip Nayar’s Report on Afghanistan, New Delhi: Allied Publisher, 1980, p. 19. 36. Ukherjee, Afghanistan: From Tragedy to Triumph, Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1984, p. 85. 37. Kuldip Nayar, op.cit. p. 20. 38. “Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 89

“published in S. Muherjee’s op.cit. pp. 160-62. 39. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), South Asian Service (SAS), April 22, 1980, de/10. 40. Alexander Dastarac and M. Levant, “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan, “Merip Report, No. 89, 1980, p. 12. 41. Louis Depree, “Red Flag over Hindu Bush: Leftist Movements in Afghanistan,” American Flag Staff Reports, No. 44, 1979, P.5. 42. Ibid. p.7. 43. Nazif M. Sharani and Robert L. Canfield, ed. Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 332. 44. Ibid, P. 33. 45. Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekings, Afghanistan: A Country Study, ed. Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1986, p. 122. 46. Peter Dorner, Land Reform and Economic Development, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1972. 47. Afghanistan: Multifaceted Revolutionary Process, Kabul: Government Printing Press, 1980, p. 11. 48. Louis Dupree, “Red Flag over Hindu Kush: Rhetoric Reforms or Promises, Promises, “American Field Staff Reports, No. 46, 1980, p. 8. 49. The Kabul times, January 2, 1979. 50. George Arney, Afghanistan: The Definite Account of a country at Crossroads, London: Cax & Wyman Ltd. 1989, p. 92. 51. See John Fullerton, “Too Much at Stake to quit”, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1982, pp 101. 52. Mukherjee, op.cit. p. 180. 53. Antony Hyman, “Afghanistan’s Unpopular Revolution: Reforms Zeal Fails to enthuse the People, “The Round Table, 27, 1979, p. 223. 54. Richard F. Nyrop, op.cit. p. 266. 55. Louis Dupree, 1980, op.cit. p. 17. 90

56. Afghanistan Multifaceted Revolutionary Process, op.cit. p. 65. 57. Appeared in one of the pamphlets defining the revolutionary aims. The idea was actually derived from: Jamal ud Din Afghani: A Political Biography, by Nikkie, R. Kiddie, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 160-62. 58. S. Mukeerjee, op.cit. p. 160. 59. See “Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,” by David B. Edwards in George E. Delury. Ed. Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties, Vol. 1, New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986, p. 3. 60. Afghanistan: Multifaceted Revolutionary process, op.cit. p. 67. 61. Richard F. Nyrop, op.cit. p. 268. 230 62. The administrative cost of 2.4 million registered refugees was put around a million dollars a day in 1985. Neither the flow of refugees has stopped nor have the unregistered refugees been taken into consideration when the above mentioned figure was quoted. It is quite safe to assume that the cost of maintaining those refugees is more than a million dollars a day. See along Afghanistan’s War-Torn Frontier by Debra Denker in National Geographic, June 1985 p. 788. 63. Ibid. Among the donors, most external sources, UNHCE, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, FAO are the prominent international organizations. The other group of external donors is individual states that have been giving aid for the refugees. See Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications by Hasan- Askari Rizvi in Pakistan Horizon Vol. XXXVII, NO. 1, 1st Quarter 1984, pp. 40-61. Also see Malik, op. cit., pp. 41-43. Also see Arabic: The Islamic World Review, Ap. 1982. An official summary of financial outlay for upkeep of 3 million refugees during the year 1984-85 was as follows: 64. SOURCES AMOUNT PERCENTAGE Government of Pakistan $ 205 million 49% External Sources $ 209 million 51%

91

See Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan a publication of the Chief Commission erate for Afghan Refugees, Government of Pakistan, July 1984, p. 17.

65. See ‘The Afghan Refugee: The Human Aspect’ by Zafar Samdani in Pakistan and Gulf Economist Oct. 9-15, 1982, pp. 24-25. 66. Malik, op. cit., p. 46 67. See South Oct. 1982, p. 24. 68. Rive op. cit., p. 54. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid, p. 52. 71. See ‘A Tiger by the Tail: Pakistan and the Afghan Refugees’ by Beverly Male in Refugees; Four Political case studies. By Milton Osborne, Beverly Male, Gardon Lawrie, and W.J.O’ Malley (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1981) p.39. 72. Malik op. cit., p. 46. 73. Rizvi, op. cit., p. 53. 74. Denker, op. cit., p. 788. 75. Ibid. Also see The Newsweek, Oct. 6, 1986. 76. The Muslim, March 1982. Also see ‘Pakistan’s Heroin Problem’ by Yameen Mitha in The Muslim, Aug. 14, 1986. 77. See Inspector General’s (Punjab Police) statement in Jang (Urdu Daily), Nov. 7, 1986. 78. O’Ballance, op. cit., p. 80. 79. Time, Dec. 9, 1985. 80. Denker, op. cit., p.785. Also see ‘Hazards of the Afghan Crisis’ by Khalid Akhtar, The Muslim, July 20, 1986. 81. See ‘The war in Afghanistan by Craig M. Karp in Foreign Affairs, summer 1986, pp. 1026-47. 82. Ibid. 83. Denker, op. cit., p. 785. 92

84. Ibid. Rizvi, op. cit., pp. 56-57. 85. Ibid. It was also reported that large number of refugees already managed to enlist themselves as regular voters of Pakistan’s electoral roll. See Jang (Urdu Daily), June 28, 1986. 86. See The Muslim, Feb. 4, 1986. 87. Ibid. 88. Both Wali Khan and Asghar Khan had been supporting this view. See The Muslim May 7, 1985. 89. See South, op. cit., p. 24. 90. See ‘In Afghanistan’s Shadow’ by Arthur Ross in The Washington Quarterly, autumn 1982. Also see Soviet Ambassador Smirnov’s speech to the Press Club in Karachi on 18th Nov. 1984, The Muslim 19th Nov. 1984. Also see Times of India Ap. 13, 1984. 91. Ibid, Ross. 92. See ‘Pakistan: Nation on Tightrope’ by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in Reader’s Digest Oct. 1982, pp. 22-25. 93. See Selig S. Harrison In Afghanistan Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981). 94. See Pakistan and the Islamic World’ by O.N. Mehrotra in Strategic Analysis (Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi), Vol. V., No. 1-2, April- May 1981, pp.32-33. See also other articles in the same issue. 95. See Khalid Bin Sayeed Politics in Pakistan: Nature and Direction of The Change (New York: Praeger, 1980) pp. 113-36.

Chapter IV External Involvement in Afghanistan And the Role of Pakistan 93

Afghanistan a landlocked country with its tragic history has never been let in peace and prosperity. The country with its strategically important location has usually been under the influence and attack of regional and global power. The past history of Afghanistan shows that in early 19th century when the British completed the occupation of India sub-continent turned their eyes towards Afghanistan as they were afraid of Russian influence on Afghanistan and their approached to the warm water of Arabian Sea. Since then their started a kind of cold war between the British and Russian. In order to be away from each other and to have no direct link to each other they declared Afghanistan a buffer zone. The British empire at that time wanted to install a friendly government in Afghanistan and for this purpose it had three wars with the Afghanistan by the end of each war they had occupied the land of Afghanistan as in the first Anglo Afghan war of 1838-40 they occupied Peshawar and the surrounding areas which used to be the capital of Afghanistan in the Second Afghan Anglo War of 1878-80 the British were successful in occupying the Quetta and surrounding areas of Afghanistan declaring it as British Balochistan and in 1893 divided the Afghanistan in half by marking the Durand line in the heart of Afghanistan. In this entire episode the British remained successful in getting the support of so called religious leaders and the war lords to oppose and resist the patriotic Afghan leaders and to fight for the cause of British Empire. With the end of Second World War (1939-1945) there emerged two big super powers one headed by USA and the other by the USSR. Both powers were in cold war rivals. Pakistan and Afghanistan the two close neighboring Muslim have mixed bilateral relationship which in large have been unfriendly. Afghanistan was the first country to oppose Pakistan’s membership in UN in 1947. Pakistan after achieving independence in 1947 tried her best to develop good relations with Afghanistan over the past colonial problems particularly the Durand Line, and it adjacent Pashtunistan issue. The turning phase in relations of both the states came to the fore when there came a coup led by the (PDPA)in Afghanistan provide an opportunity to both super power to start a hot war on the soil of Afghanistan. The soil of Afghanistan became a battlefield for the biggest powers and their companions 94

to show their military and economic strength. The cold war was turned into the hot war on the soil of Afghanistan. USA provided a huge amount of fund to the Islamists and an undeclared war (Jihad) was started. The direct involvement of the USA and USSR in the region let Pakistan, the close neighbor of Afghanistan most affected from the situation. Pakistan was supposed to play an important role in the conflict. Afghanistan soon became a Pawn on the chessboard of superpowers rivalry in which Pakistan became a frontline state whose supportive role was in dire need of the U.S led Western Powers to make Soviet struck in Afghanistan. The invitation to USSR’s Army to Afghanistan by Babrak Kormal the then the President of Afghanistan to defend himself and his government was a pretext to USA to start a tragic and sever war in Afghanistan. The USA in order to combat the USSR projected the so called religious leaders by announcing a JIHAD against the USSR. The USA had also taken the immediate neighbors in confidence and provided a huge amount of money and ammunitions to the JIHADi group through Pakistan as the country used to be the base camp. ROLE OF PAKISTAN Pakistan didn’t want a confrontation with the regime of the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan. (PDPA) after it sized power in Kabul. No doubt it disappointed Pakistan because Daud, realizing that the Soviet embrace had turned into a ‘bear-hug’, had decided to improve relations with Pakistan, Iran and other Islamic countries. But at that juncture Pakistan was itself in disarray. The country’s economy was bled white by the prolonged agitation against ZulfiqarAli.Bhutto following the 1977 election, and Gen. Zia ul Haq’s military government was unpopular for reneging on his promise to hold election within 90 days after Bhutto was toppled. Making the best of a bad situation, President Zia-ul-haq went Kabul to meet President Tarakai in the hope of securing mutual accommodate. The government of Tarakai strengthened Afghan relations with the former USSR, which was alarming for Pakistan. The Soviet-Afghan 20 years “Friend-Ship Treaty” was concluded in early December 1979 during Tarakai visit to Moscow, bringing the two sides closer to each other. The change in the political set up in Afghanistan was taken 95

with surprise in Pakistan. The “Detente” achieved with Dauod was no more. The Tarakai government revived with more tenacity the issue of “Pushtoon and Baluch” rights. The massive refugee’s exodus from Afghanistan to Pakistan added more bitterness to Islamabad. Kabul accused Pakistan of helping the government rebels. However, a way of hope appeared at Havana Non-Aligned summit conference (September 1979) when President Zia-ul-Haq and President Tarakai met each other. But the government of Tarakai was toppled and Hafizullah Amin seized the power. He showed his interest to solve the outstanding issues with Pakistan. He offered to remove his country’s misunderstanding with Pakistan in friendly negotiations. He renewed invitations to Pakistani leaders to visit Kabul. It was felt that Pakistan’s concentrated efforts during the last three decades have brought the two countries near to the goal friendly neighbors during Amin’s era in Afghanistan. But Soviet leaders regarded the leadership style and nationalist orientation of Amin’s Communism as serious obstacles in their efforts to guide and direct the domestic reforms policies of Afghanistan. But Amin had become totally weak by Oct. 1979 due to inner fighting in the PDPA government and the question was, ‘who would replace him’; the Mujahideen or the Soviets. The Mujahideen lacked proper organization, unity and acceptable leadership and did not present a real alternative to the fast deteriorating Amin government. This situation compelled the USSR to intervene. When Amin became aware of Soviet plans of intervention, he made attempts to seek help from Pakistan. He had been trying since long to revive contacts with Pakistan and eliminate misunderstandings. Pakistan did agree to help Amin but it was too late. In December 1979, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal as President of Afghanistan. As a result, a large majority of population rose up against the intervention of Soviet Union. The persecution and resistance that followed led the mass migration of men, women and children to the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran. The Soviet invasion of a defenseless country was not shocking only for Pakistan or this regions but for international community through out the World. The intervention provoked a deep sense of alarm in Pakistan. The ‘buffer’ was disappeared, and if the Soviet rule was consolidated in Afghanistan, they could use it as ‘spring board’ for a leap 96

down the Bolan and Khyber passed to fulfill their historical ambition for access to the warm waters of the Arabian. China perceived the invasion of Afghanistan towards its enercirclement by a rival Communist power. Pakistan thus decided a middle course avoiding confrontation by raising a low-pitched voice of concern and protest. The “Induction of foreign Troops” was described as a “Serious violation” of norms of peaceful Co-existence and the principles of the UN Charter1 rather defensively, the statement explained, Pakistan’s “gravest concern” in the context of its links of Islam, Geography and non-aligned policy with Afghanistan. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought forth an entirely new situation not only to Pakistan, but for all the region's countries. The invasion was the culmination of two and a half years of intra-People Democratic Party conflicts, distrust, three successive coups and political anarchy. Babrak Karmal took over as the president Eager not to appear an atheist he began his speeches with name of Allah. But at the same time the color, form and emblem of the Afghan flag were changed and "the red star", the symbol of communism, added. Civilians were given a major share in the central committee of the PDPA. Only 7 out of 36 members were from the army.2 In the presence of factionalism, corruption, indiscipline and the narrow base of the Marxist Regime, the Soviet realized that violence would not salvage the situation. They, therefore, attempted to promote an integrative political strategy, combining restructuring coercion and co- option, and urged the new regime to go beyond rhetoric and take practical action. In order to appease the inflamed population the Soviets advised Karmal to backtrack on the issue of reforms and religion, and project a non-Marxist image. As a consequence he began stressing that his party's goal was to develop society, not socialism. He induced non-party technocrats and influential Afghans to join his regime. He announced changes in the land reform laws. Attempts were made to gain the backing of the ulema. A new constitution was promised that would respect and adhere to the sacred religion of Islam, guarantee private ownership and political, economic and social rights of the people. To give a humane face to his regime a large number of political prisoners was also released.3 Unification, organization and strengthening of the PDPA and the regime, however, were 97

the inherent objectives. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan on the one hand created opportunities for Pakistan. It could redress its security concerns by neutralizing the previous bitter experiences with Afghanistan. But on the other it created challenges: to tactically face and engage an ideologically hostile super power standing right on its doorstep. This was a testing time for Pakistan to demonstrate and increase its strategic salience and indispensability at the height of the cold war, as well as not let any other party directly intervene and exploit the situation for its own advantage. According to Mr. Abdul Sattar, the ex Foreign Minister, “the Soviet military intervention provoked a deep sense of alarm in Pakistan. Suddenly the status of buffer disappeared and if the Soviet rulers consolidated their control in Afghanistan they could use it as spring board to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Pakistan could neither afford to acquiesce in the Soviet intervention,, nor it could it afford a confrontation with a super power. Islamabad therefore decided on the middle course, avoiding confrontation but raising a low pitched voice concern and protest.4 Policy Options for Pakistan Pakistan had three immediate options in December 1979 to deal with the Afghan issue : 1. It could acquiesce and accept the fait accompli. 2 It could, if it was a big power like India, provide all-out military support to the freedom fighters and achieve its objective of eliminating an adversary by force of arms. 3 It could bring political pressure to bear on the Soviet Union along with covert assistance to the Mujahideen. 5 Considering the first option, Pakistan would never have been comfortable with Russian soldiers deployed along the Pak-Afghan border; even if it was assured that they would not attack Pakistan. Indirectly it could still become a target country of the KGB, which could instigate an insurgency within Pakistan easily by using dissident elements and exiled politicians to raise ethnic issues and territorial connotations. With the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 in its hand India could use Soviet controlled Afghanistan to stir up trouble on Pakistan's western borders thereby forcing it to weaken its eastern frontier defenses. Regarding the option of military involvement Pakistan and certain limitations. These 98

included 1 Soviet troop was well within Afghanistan and military confrontation could have threatened the security of Pakistan. 2 There was no guarantee of security/protection from big powers like USA or China. 3 Pakistan itself was dependent on foreign assistance to be able to sustain even a low intensity conflict for a long period. 4 Internal disunity meant that a military adventure might not have had the support of the entire Pakistani nation.

The Front line State Policy and the US Assistance

The only viable option left, which was adopted, was to use all possible diplomatic pressure to build up world opinion against the soviet union for having violated the principles of the UN charter, and thereby force it to leave Afghanistan. At the same time Pakistan would provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees and the freedom fighters.6

The following can be considered as the main reasons for Pakistan's decision to become immediately involved in the issue.

A Defend the integrity of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. B Mitigate the severity of the soviet military and political thread to Pakistan. C Enhance access to the political, military and economic benefits offered by alliance with the west. 7 The other determinants of this policy were Islamic brotherhood neighborhood and humanitarian concern, the desire to crush Pushtoon nationalism, modernize its own army with western assistance, divert public opinion from domestic problems and ensure/prolong at the Zia regime. Pakistan played a critical role by not only mobilizing international support but also in equipping and training its own forces. Givens the complex economic, political and security problems confronted by Pakistan this role was not an ordinary foreign policy response to a crisis in the region8 According 99

to Gen. Kamal Matinuddin, the positive aspect of the Soviet invasion was the renewed interest of the US in befriending Pakistan. Pakistan was the only country which could serve the US interests. Gen. Zia was well aware of the situation when the told the Americans in March 1980 that " you take Pakistan out of this region and you will find that you have not one inch of soil where American can have influence". He made use of the new situation on his border to strengthen his armed forces and in the process to ensure his own survival. Pakistan therefore once again became ready to act as a pawn in the supper power rivalry in the south Asian region, albeit for its own national interest .The American forgot their previous allegation of human rights volitions Pakistan and put the non-proliferation issue on the back burner. Their earlier title towards the largest democracy in the world, India, was now balanced by giving equal importance to Pakistan security. The US arms embargo was lifted. The 1959 Karachi Agreement was reaffirmed binding the US to come to Pakistan's aid if the USSR moved further southwards. A debt of 85.1 billion was also rescheduled. Considering Pakistan's precarious situation since Soviet invasion in Afghanistan China also declared its full support for Pakistan. So too did Saudi Arabia, Egypt and some other Muslim countries. UN relief agencies and several NGOs began relief operations for the Afghan refugees to lessen Pakistan's burden9 In 1982 President Regan believed that President Carter was wrong in not giving full support to Pakistan and signaled his desire to make amends a $ 3.2 billion aid to Pakistan was provided for five years (1982-86). Zia got what he want-F-16s from the USA, Kalashnikovs from Egypt, and hand-held surface-to-air missiles from China. Blowpipes from the UK, and money from Saudi.10 Under the leadership of Gen.Akhtar Abdul Rehman support for the Jihad was gradually stepped up. By the mid 80s tens of thousands of arms and ammunition were being distributed by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Afghan Mujahideen via their party warehouses. It is no secret that tens of thousands of Afghan guerrillas with their commanders came to Pakistan for training. From 1980 until 1987 Pakistan Army teams from the ISI went to Afghanistan to advise and assist the Mujahideen in their operations. All resistance commanders in inside Afghanistan were required to join one 100

of the seven Peshawar-based parties (Hizbs) as it was only through these parties that arms were distributed. There was no arms supply to individuals. Among the seven recognized parties, some were close to the Pakistani establishment than others. About 70 percent of the logistical support was given to the fundamentalist parties but no single party got more than 20 percent.

The Saudis matched every US dollar given to the CIA's arms buying fund with their own. In total hundreds of millions of dollars were given by Saudi Arabia. Tarki -al- Faisal (the then official representative of the Saudi Government for Afghan Jihad) paid secret visits to Pakistan to accelerate the Afghan resistance. It was generous Saudi assistance that kept the Afghan warlords in field. 11

The role of the ISI increased between 1983-86, leading to marked improvement in the performance of the Afghan resistance. The ISI was operating the supply line, which was moving large quantities of arms and ammunition to the resistance groups. The most significant role the ISI played was in the establishment of the seven-party alliance in Peshawar in 1984. This considerably reduced the disunity and chaos in the guerrilla operations inside Afghanistan.

Many crities of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy claim that the CIA was in control of the strategic aspect of Islamabad's foreign policy. This is a very simplistic view. In fact it was the ISI which was in the forefront while the CIA usually played the role of a junior partner. The CIA's involvement did not assume prominence until 1984 when its Director visited Pakistan and after meeting the DG ISI, doubled the military budget for the Afghan war in 1985-86. The CIA and US government officials were constantly trying to take control of the war and insisted on being involved in strategic planning and decision making. But the ISI continued to be in control of the operation. The CIA usually relied on the ISI and based its information on ISI intelligence units; it also allowed ISI to play a big role in policy formulation12

Gen Zia-ul-Haq reconstituted the Afghan Cell in 1978. Its initial purpose was to collect current information and keep the government updated and to help it formulate 101

policies about Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion the scope of the Cell was magnified and all the top civil and military personnel were included: VCOAS, the Foreign Minister, the MLAs of NWFP and Balochistan. Secretaries SAFRON, Information, Finance and Interior, Director Ml and DG ISI. There were two power structures (the formal and the real) in operation during the Zia era. The formal power structure included the civil bureaucracy and the Cabinet while the real power structure was limited to key Lt. Generals including governors, Corps Commanders, DG ISI and VCOAS. The only civilian members were the finance Minister and later the President (Ghulam Ishaq Khan) and the Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. During Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo's government, there was no change in the Foreign policy of Pakistan. The martial law regime's policy was pursued and the same decision- makers continued to call the shots on the Afghan crisis.

PAKISTAN'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS At the same time Pakistan continued its diplomatic efforts to get the conflict resolved. It called upon the UN, SC, to condemn the Soviet invasion but the resolution was vetoed by the USSR. This resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly in January 1980 by 104 votes. Pakistan realized that the world community was overwhelmingly against the Soviet invasion. From then on in became a test of Pakistan's informational credibility to keep the number of votes at each session. The number of vote rose to 123 in 1987.13 Mr. Agha Shahi requested the UN Secretary General to appoint his special representative as mediator. Pakistan proposed that Iran should be involved in the negotiations and Iran in turn insisted that unless the Mujahideen were included it would not participate. Finally the format of the talks was evolved and Mr. Kurt Waldheim appointed Mr. Perez de Cuellar as the special representative to act as a mediator between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Islamabad refused to recognize the post- invasion Afghan regime and did not want to negotiate directly since that would imply recognition and confer legitimacy on it. The basis of negotiations was the four principles drawn up by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in May 1980. These were: 1 Preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political Independence and non- alleged character of Afghanistan. 102

2 The right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of Government and choose freely their own political, economic and social system. 3. Immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. 4 Creation of the necessary conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in honor and safety.14 ROLE OF NON ALIGNED MOVMENT (NAM) In the Non Aligned Movement's meeting in New Delhi on 9-13 February 1981, reiterated the points included in the UN resolution. The Indian and some pro-Soviet countries tried to play down the Afghan crisis during this meeting while, Pakistan and its friends succeeded in making the NAM express grave concern for the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan. Agha Shahi insisted on the insertion of a call for the withdrawal of Soviet forces in the text of this final declaration of the conference. Countries out of the 96 present supported Pakistan. 15

Role of organization of Islamic countries (O.I.C)

The first extraordinary session of foreign minister of organization of Islamic countries meeting was held in Islamabad soon after one month of the invasion on 22 May 1980. Mr. Habib Chatty, the Secretary General of the organization urged all members to up to an end to the soviet intervention. The conference condemned the invasion on the basis of following principles. First, in pursuance of the principles and objectives of the organization of the Islamic conference emphasizing the common objectives and destiny of the people of the Islamic nation. Second, recalling, the particular the basic principles of the Non Aligned Movement of which Afghanistan is a founding member. Few months later in May 1980. The Levant Islamic conference of foreign ministers meeting in Islamabad was held. The meeting unanimously expressed its conviction for solidarity with Afghan nation attacked by a foreign aggressor. The statement stated that: termination of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and respect for the political independence, sovereignty and non-aligned status of

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Afghanistan and for the inalienable nation right of the Afghan people to choose their own political and social economic system and form of government without outside interference of coercion. Are imperative for bringing about Conditions of peace and stability in the region and for defusing current international tension .The conference resolutions seriously condemned the sufferings of the Afghan people and at the continuing influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Iran. Reaffirmed the determination of the Islamic states to pursue a policy of non-alignment and to oppose superpower interference in the affairs of Islamic countries. The conference which expressed deep concern at the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan urged all the independent nation-states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Afghanistan as well as the non - aligned status of that country and its Islamic identity.

A wide opposition was shown to the invasion from Islamic countries. Among the Islamic nations only south Yemen condoned the soviet action describing it a countermove to CIA supported counterrevolution in Afghanistan, every Islamic country condemned the aggression. The Saudi Arabia became the first country which on January 6, 1980 announced to boycott the Olympic Games. The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al Faisal, said on January 10 in a statement in the talks that the international community had an obligation to respond to the soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but the states of the region did not want foreign troops in the area, no matter what are the reasons. 16 Egypt reacted to the situation by from over 50 persons to only seven, and a handout issued by the foreign ministry said that severance of relations with Moscow would-be considered in near future. It’s asked a number of soviet experts to leave the country. The public reaction to invasion was won in Turkey where the Soviet consulate in Istanbul was attacked on January 19 by a group of youth who protested against the invasion. A number of people were killed by Turkish grads. A Similar incident took place in Sudan after 5,000 students marched on the Soviet embassy in Khartoum.

ROLE OF UNITED NATION As the Security Council resolution was passed on January 5, 1980 condemning 104

the Soviet military intervention. More than 50 the UN the Security Council to Examine the situation in Afghanistan and its consequences for peace and international security, It included ten Islamic countries, Bahrain, Bangle, Dash, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, The Security council met on January 5 and after two days of debate voted on January 7 to adapt a resolution which was sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia, Deeply deplored the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of soviet forces, Following a debate in which Afghanistan and Vietnam expressed support for the Soviet position. The resolution was approved by 13 Security Council members. They included four of the permanent members of the Security Council: United States, France, China, and United Kingdom. Although, the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union, nonetheless, it tabled a discussion against the invasion.17 The Resolution was followed by another resolution in the Security Council. The Resolution was approved by 12 votes to two of Soviet Union and East Germany, Zambia being absent. The resolution had demanded the moving of Afghanistan question in the General Assembly.18 The Resolution 462 Calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly, concerned at the aggressive actions taken in Afghanistan, The resolution was mindful of the purpose and principles of the Charter and of the responsibility of the general Assembly under the relevant provisions of the charter and of Assembly resolution 377 A(V) of November 3, 1950 which focuses on the four major principles for the promotion of world peace against such a naked aggression resulted in Afghanistan.

In this session the Security Council unanimously issued this statement.

1 Reaffirms that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state is a fundamental principle of the charter o the United Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and purposes, 2 Strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle, 105

3 Appeals to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in his internal affairs of threat country,

4 Calls for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic political and social systems free from outside.

5 Intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever.

Urges all parity concerned to assist in bringing about speedily and in accordance with the purpose and principles of the charter. Conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees to their homes,

6 Appeals to all states and National and international organization to extend humanitarian replied assistance with view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees in co-ordination with the United Nations High commissioner for Refugee,

7 Requests the Secretary General to keep member states and the Security Council promptly and concurrently informed on the progress towards the implementation of the present resolution,

8 Calls upon the Security Council to consider ways and means which could assist in the implementation of the present resolution.19

During the debate, Dr. Abdul Hakim Tabibi, he Afghan deputy permanent representative to the UN resigned in protest against the Soviet invasion by saying, the violation of the sovereignty and independence of my country by our close neighbor, the soviet Union leaves me with the only choice of doing it 20

THE GENEVACCORDS.

After nearly six years of indirect negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan an 106

agreement was signed in Geneva on 14 April 1988, for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan under the following points.

1 Unconditional withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan.

2 International guarantees by the USA and USSR.

3 Non interference and non intervention in each other, of Pakistan and Afghanistan. 21

4 Return of Afghan. Refugees to their home

5 The accords also provided for the monitoring of the implementation of the agreement by the United Nation.

The Agreement (Which came in to force on 15 May, 1988) were signed by Mr. Abdul Wakil, the Afghan foreign minister and Mr. Zain Noorani the Pakistan Minister of state for foreign affairs, signing the documents as guarantors were Mr.-Georg Shultz the US secretary of state, and Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign Minster

THE FIRST ROUND:-The first round of the Geneva Talks was held during June 16-24, 1982, where an understanding was reached on the scope and content of a comprehensive settlement, interrelationships between withdrawal and non-interference and non- intervention, return of refugees and international guarantees.

SECOND ROUND The second round was held during April 11-22 and June 12-24, 1983 where it was acknowledged that the final settlement would be an integrated package and would only, be completed when all four elements had agreed upon it. The final settlement was to include the consultation of refugees and endorsement of the international guarantors was also to be obtained. The third round was held during August 24-31, 1984 where the

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format changed from indirect to proximity talks, The Agenda underwent a change. Kabul had disapproved of the settlement which was being negotiated as a single document, Pakistan agreed and the four separate instruments, The Provisions concerning non- intervention and non-interference were given the form of a bilateral agreement. 22

The fourth, fifth and sixth round were held during June 22-25, August 27-30 and December 16-19, 1985, In the fourth round the two instrument relating to non- intervention / non-interference and return of the refugees were finalized. The instrument of international guarantees was prepared and sent to the USSR and the US. Then the problem of format was raised by Kabul which insisted on direct talks in order to discuss the fourth and final instrument of withdrawal and the interrelationship between the instruments. In the fifth round indirect talks were resumed and both the US and USSR agreed to act as guarantors. The time-table for withdrawal to be given by Kabul was held up because it insisted on direct talks; the sixth round was inconclusive due to the deadlock cover the change in format. The seventh round of talks continued for two years and was held during May 05-23 and July 31- August 8, 1986 and Feb. 25- March 9 and September, 7-10, 1987. All these four sets of talk were related to the issue of withdrawal and a definite time-table to be given by Moscow and Kabul. In the first set Kabul resumed the indirect format but there was disagreement over the time-table (Kabul proposed four years which Pakistan put forth four months). In the third set the differences over time-table were reduced Kabul offered 18 months and Pakistan Proposed 7 Months. In the fourth set the time-table gap was reduced Kabul Proposed 16 months and Pakistan offered 8 month.23

The year 1988 witnessed many stops and starts as each side wanted more concessions from the other mostly the US and Pakistan pressing the USSR and Kabul for a hard bargain. Pakistan had maintained that the four negotiated instruments including that on withdrawal should be signed even if the agreement of an interim government remained unsettled. It was the Soviet Union which had linked withdrawal to an afghan consensus on the transitional government, Moscow dropped its insistence on an interim government and de-linked the withdrawal from it while Pakistan reversed its position and 108

insisted on a nexus. Moscow came forth with another concession that it would withdraw its forces within 10 Months of the date of the signing of the Geneva Accords, and that the withdrawal would be front-end loaded i.e. greater portion of forces to be removed in the first phase24

The last and final round to talks was held on March 2, 1988 where a nine month time- table was agreed on and the withdrawal was to be front-end loaded (50% troops were to be pulled out by August 15th 1988). The negotiations were stymied? By Pakistan insistence on an interim regime and the US demand of symmetrical cessation of arms supplies by the US and the USSR to their respective Afghan allies. By April, the US and the USSR had agreed to positive symmetry in which the US and the USSR retained the right to arm their respective allies as long as the other side continued to do so. Finally on April 14th, 1988 the Geneva Accords were signed. Pakistan and Kabul signed there instruments non-intervention / non-interference, return of refugees, withdrawal of troops and the US and USSR signed one instrument as international guarantors. This was the only time that Pakistani delegates met face-to-face with their Afghan counterparts at Geneva. Islamabad claimed that this fulfilled the Afghan demand for direct negotiations which had been raised by Kabul since the fourth round of Geneva Talks. 25 The Accords left unresolved difference about the nature of a future Afghanistan Government.

The Geneva Accords have aroused considerable controversy and there were an equal number of proponents and opponents claiming that it was a victory and a sellout. According to W.Harrsion who represents the proponents of the Accords, says that the agreement to withdraw resulted from a combination of military pressure and seven years of farseeing and determined UN diplomacy, the Geneva Accords offered a face-saving escape to the USSR from the growing costs of a (Politic0-military) dead-lock.26. On the other hand the opponents of the Accords were of the view that the accords were rushed to completion and signed in a few-weeks, after six years of glacial progress and stalemate. The Afghan refugees who had been excluded from the negotiations were against the Geneva process, right from their onset in 1982. 109

MAJOR MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS.

The Major Mujahideen groups based in Pakistan, later on were joined under a seven-party alliance based in Peshawar and Quetta, of them in Peshawar. They were (1) Hizb-e-Islami of Hikmatyar, (2) Hizb-e-Islami of Younis, (3) Jamiat-e-Islami of Rabbani, (4) Ittehad-e-Islami of Sayyaf, (5) Harakat-e-Inqilabi of Nabi, (6) Maha-e-Milli by Gilani, and (7) Jabha-e-Milli by Mojadded. Both of groups of Hizb-e-Islami, and Ittehad- e-Islami were fundamentalists. The remaining three, Harakat-e-Inqilabi, Mahaze-e-Milli, and Jabha-e-Milli were moderates. 1 HIZB-E-ISLAMI (HIKMATYAR) It was led by Gulbadin Kikmatyar. The Hizb was a strongest resistance group and was traditionally rooted in Pashto speaking provinces of Paktia, Konarha, Badakhshan, Nangarhar, and Baghlan. The major areas where this organization was operated were in Kabul, Bamiyan, Konduz, Balkh, Paktika, Farah, Helmand, Qandahar, and Uruzgan. Gulbadin Hikmatyar, a Pashto speaking karoot from the province of Kunduz, had been active in Kabul politics as a student leader of Kabul University, and formed an Islamic movement called the Muslim Youth Organization. In 1972 he was alleged of murdering a student of which he was not directly accountable he was arrested and was released in 1973. After release he started opposing president Daoud’s policies more fiercely. Before he could be purged by the Dauod Government for his anti-government policies he fled to Pakistan. He lived in Pakistan from 1973 to 1975. He established contacts with Jamat-e- Islami in Pakistan during the period. The fall of Daoud in 1978, and the resistance movement to the PDPA regime in aftermath provide him ideal opportunity for establishing his leadership. He exploited the situation in his favor amongst Pashto speaking population; a larger number of them were living as refugee in Pakistan. He recruited fighters for this Hizb-e-Islami from these people. Hikmatyar is a fundamentalist whose largest support came from Saudi Arabia and western world. He is the most rigid leader of all fundamentalists, and believed in the formation of a pure Islamic government without any coalition with any party with leftist orientation. He opposed grant of vote for any one with the PDPA affiliation in any such planning for the future settlement of

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Afghanistan where elections were held and refused to treat the Afghan Shies as a separate political entity.27 The Hikmatyar’s Hizb found support from a strong religious party Jamat Islami of Pakistan after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Hikmatyar while seeing all against the Soviet Union, showed least inclination towards the United States and blamed the United States for not fully cooperative with the Islamist causes. The United States because of his attitude was less than willing to support his party for a major role in events after the Soviet withdrawal. The biggest disappointment for the American Government was Hikmatyar’s refusal to see president Regain during his visit to America 2 HIZB-E-ISLAMI (KHALIS GROUP)

The Hizb-e-Islami was indeed an offspring of Hizb-e-Islami under Hikmatyar. Because of the rigid attitude of Hikmatyar and his intolerance to other parties, from the very beginning of resistance, Maulvi Yunis decided to form his own group instead. Maulvi Yunis is himself a fundamentalist, and was not prepared to compromise on the two basic objectives of the Islamic struggle. All destruction of PDPA, and the establishment of an Islamic state in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah. Under the context of his ideology, his differences with Hikmatyar were less ideological and more conceptual about how to achieve an Islamic state. Also, they differed on strategic policies they had adapted from struggle against the Soviet Policies. Maulvi Yunis is a Pashtoon from Qazian village in the province of Nangarhar He remained a student of a religious institution in Peshawar in 1939. He opposed the rule of Zahir Shah and Dauod in Afghanistan. Because of purges against his group president Dauod forces, he was forced to seek asylum in Pakistan until 1978. The Saur revolution, like many other, provided him an opportunity to establish his leadership in exile. Yonis Khalis was appointed as interior Minister in the Afghan Interim Government under Mojadde. Hizb- e-Islami was / is mainly composed of Pashto speaking people from eastern and northeastern Afghanistan. The Majority of those who joined the organization were those who resisted against the PDPA regime, and their relatives had taken refugee in Pakistan. Hizb-e-Islami was considered the most effective resistant group from the very beginning because those who joined it were traditionally trained in warfare. The Hizb was stronger 111

in important cities such as Kabul, Qandahar, and Jalalabad. Later on, because of specific training which the resistance groups received at the hands of inter Services intelligence (ISI) and Pakistan armed forces made them more forceful in attacks against their targets. 3 JAMIAT-ISLAM

The Jamiat was active in waging a guerrilla was against the Kabul regime even before the Saur revolution. The party was founded n 1967. In 1974, it carried a number of operations in Panjsher valley against the government. The party leader Burhanuddin Rabbani is a Tajik. Born in Raizabad of Badakshan province, he received his early education in a religious institution. He graduated from college of Theology at the Kabul University. He studied at Al Azhar and worked on his doctoral thesis on the life of Afghan mystic Abdul Rehman Jami he worked as a lecturer in the college of Theology where his lecturers attracted adherents to his organization. He is a strong advocate of the Islamic principle the politics and religion are strongly mixed. He was elected the party leader in 1972. He opposed the policies of Dauod as dictatorial and anti-Islamic. Because of his continual opposition to Dauod his party came under purges by the government. He fled to Pakistan and lived in exile for a number of years. He is a fundamentalist, but less rigid than others. Because of his less orthodox views, his comparatively less rigid attitude and a more humane approach to the members of his group he was able to attract a large number of defectors from other parties. 29 Rabbani emerged as an important leader soon after the Saur Revolution. He reactivated his party offices, which had already existed, in Iran and Pakistan a Rabbani and Hikmatyar had closer relationship and both strong individual following for “Akhwanul Muslimeen” His differences with Hikmatyar developed during the Dauod period over the strategy and intensity of resistance to his government.

4 ITTEHAD-E-ISLAMI

The party was conservative Islamic party led by Abdu Rib Resool Soyaf is a piston leader from Panhuman near Kabul. He, like Rabbani also studied at Theology Institute of Kabul University in 1967, and Later on taught there for two years. He 112

received his Master’s in “Ilm-ul-Hadis” (sayings and traditions of Holy prophet PBUH) from Egypt. He for his anti-government activities was arrested by president Dauod in 1973 spending six years in prison until 1979, including one year under the PDPA regime. After he was released from position he left for Pakistan for only. It was there he organized his party with the support of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia supported Sayyaf in large. Unlike the first three resistant groups his party us not very well organized.30 His political party had not showed any considerable guerrilla resistance to Soviet forces although Sayyaf was believed to have been supported by 20.000 fighters. He is a fundamentalist and believed in struggle against a unislamic government in Afghanistan of PDPA. He was elected as Prime Minister in the Interim government in 1989. His party was militarily stronger in Zabul, Baghlan, and Lowgar provinces. The famous character of Afghan resistance, Mulla Salam Khan, Known as Mulla Rockety, belonged to his party.

5 MAHAZ-E-MILLI I ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN

The party was strongest in Paktia, Ghazni, and heart with around 20,000 men under the command of Amin wardak. The party leader, Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani was a descendant of a well known religious family of Afghanistan, he had served as an adviser to king Zahir shah. His relationships with the president Dauod were always marked with differences. Pir Gailani was very rich persons because of his wide - spread business around the world; His is a graduate of Kabul University Theology institute in 1964. Pir Gailani Supported the Saur revolution in the beginning, but soon because of its rapid reform policies, Dis-alignment with the PDPA regime, and life Kabul for Pakistan. He organized a resistance movement from outside by establishing a National Islamic Front with its headquarters in Peshawar. National Islamic front was not a very successful military alliance, and it received very little military and financial help from the west, no matter its leader Pir Gailani widely traveled in the west and had face to face contacts with many heads of governments.

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6 HARAKAT-E-INQILABI

It, like the National Islamic Front, is a moderate party with its head office in Peshawar. The party was actually funded in Quetta in 1978 by Maulvi Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi. He was a pashtoon from Logar Province near Kabul. He was a theologian and had early education in religious madrasa; however he denied exclusion of traditional ideas from modern. He established his “madrasa” (academy) in Helmand in 1973 to propagate Islam based on combination of conservative and modern ideas. He enjoyed popularity both among traditional and educated people, and was elected to Afghan parliament in 1969 under the King Zahir Shah. Maulvi Nabi was also purged by Dauod forces because of his opposition to his government. He was arrested in 1973 but was released after few moths for his modern ideas. He fled to Pakistan soon after Saur revolution when the PDPA government started a crack down on clergy. The party was strong in Heart, Ghazni and Kabul provinces. The party had an approximately of 20,000 fighting force which continued a guerrilla warfare under their commanders in Quetta and Peshawar in Pakistan. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Maulvi Nabi forwarded the idea of a common cooperation among resistance groups to oust Najibullah, but did not insist on a military conflict. He has opposed to conflicts among resistance groups after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

7 JABHA-E-Nejat MILLI AFGHANISTAN

The party was the brainchild of Sibghatullah Mojeddidi, an Afghan leader who was jailed in 1953 by President Dauod for taking an active part in political activities against his government. Born in 1926 in Kabul, Mojeddidi completed his religious education from Al Azhar in Cario. He was a professor of political science at the Kabul University. Upon his release from prison, he went to Beirut and then to Saudi Arabia where he served in the Rabeta-e-Islami. From there he flew to Denmark where he opened an Islamic Center. He founded the party eight months after the Saur revolution in December 1978.

The Jabha-e-Milli Afghanistan was not very organized and regular in guerrilla 114

fighting; nonetheless, it considerable commands around Qandahar and the northern provinces of Farah and Baghian Provinces. Estimate strength of the party was not more than 20,000.

Mojeddidi is considered to be independent of other fundamentalist in an establishment in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet forces and collapse of the PDPA regime. He was against the formation of seven different Afghan poetical parties in Peshawar, and advocated one party instead. He showed differences with President Zia-ul-Haq and his lieutenants involved in the Afghan war.

IRAN BASED PARTIES A number of resistant groups, in all nine, were based in Iran. These included (1) Shura-e-Ittefaq-Islami, (2) Dawat-e-eIttehad-Islami: (3) Sazman Nayroye-Islami (4) Nuzhat-e-Islami, (5) Harakat-e-Islami: Javed: (6) Hizb-Ullah, and jabbha-e-Muttah (7) Muttahid-e-Islami. The most important among them who showed fighting spirit to Soviet forces during the resistance were Shura, Saman-e-Nasr, and Harkat Islami. They received support from Shia Population in the central part of Afghanistan, known as Hazarajat. The resistance of Mujahideen to the revolution was highly supported and patronized from the beginning. As a part of the great game to be revisited, a huge military and financial aid from the west soon assured for their for its support after they knew Zia was supporting the resistance a part of Pakistan’s forward defense against the Soviets 31 Zia in return needed the US support for legitimizing his own rule against a popular support by hanging the ex-Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, banning Political parties, and putting a large number of political dissidents into prisons. The major support for the resistance groups was channelized through Pakistan by the ISI. A special bureau was established in the ISI to control and monitor the overall activities of Mujahideen. The support for them started Soon after the Soviet invasion, nonetheless it was I 1984 when they were put into a seven party Alliance based in Pakistan. It was through the joint decision of president Zia-ul-Haq and his trusted general Akhtar Abdur Rehman General Akhtar was personally chosen by the president soon after the Afghan resistance began in 1979 to head the organization as its Director General. It was a need of time that an alliance of the resistance groups is 115

formed. The decision was important in many ways for the successful monitoring and controlling the operations of Mujahideen. First, the number of Mujahideen leader existed after huge funds and arms poured into their hands number of incidents of corruption was reported to the ISI where leaders and officers were involved in the System could not have run successfully with the multiplicity of small groups where opportunities for corruption for each were many. Third, there were growing rivalries among the Mujahideen leaders which could undermine the support and unities among them for each were many. Third, there were growing rivalries among the Mujahideen leaders which could undermine the support and unity among themselves for holy struggle. And fourth, without bringing them into an alliance, the role of ISI was less effective in supervising and monitoring their activities regarding military, logistic and tactical operations. 32 The task of brining them together was not easy. Because of the growing differences the Mujahideen had showed to each other, it was necessary to unite them together under an alliance. The task of brining the, together was Not easy. Each Mujahideen group had reservations about joining an alliance. The fundamentalists. A number of leaders supporting their cause, such as prince Turkie, the head of the Saudi Arabian intelligence services, which backed full support to the Mujahideen, struggle were called / as head to settle the differences among them for a united cause. 33 Before the efforts failed to bear a fruitful result, President Zia-ul-Haq interfered by using his directive that they al must unite under the alliance. To him, a party falling to join the alliance will not be provided any military and the financial aid. The policy worked because of the affect no party could have survived without the protection and help they enjoyed from Pakistan to carry its activities successfully.

Each resistance group in the alliance was headed by its leader, had a number of Mujahideen commanders who commanded in the field. The field commanders were the backbone of the movement. They received regular instructions from their leader, most of them came from the ISI Afghan bureau military committee specifically designed to monitor and guide the guerrilla activities. The money and arms to the guerrilla fighters reached through the commanders, actually provided by their leaders and ISI. 34 The Success of the Mujahideen movement against the Soviet forces depended on the quality and quantity of arms, and the training and tactics to be used more effectively. They 116

Mujahideen were provided training and Tactics Afghan bureau wing of the ISI. The army men, from a rank of non-junior commissioned officer to an officer, were posted from all branches, particularly from infantry, to the bureau for training and tactics purpose to Mujahideen in two of the camps established inside Pakistan for the purpose. The process of training t the Mujahideen accelerated as the war inside Afghanistan intensified. The number of trainees could exceed to 1,000 a week few years after the invasion. The number of training camps had reached seven, five in Peshawar and two in Quetta. By the time Soviet Withdrew from Afghanistan. 35 The first stock of the weapon, supplied in huge quantity to Mujahideen, was supplied through Pakistan from the US. They were actually taken from Egypt, supplied to them by he USSR during the heyday of the friendship between the two countries under Nassar later on, a larger quantity of the weapon was imported from China. Similarly, al large quantity of “Kalakov” a semi- automatic weapon was available to Mujahideen.

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REFERENCES

1. Agha Shahi, Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy, Progressive Publisher, Lahore, 1988. pp. 6-10.

2. Kamal Maitiuddin. Power Struggle in Hindu Kush (1978-1991, Wajidalis Lahore, 1991, p.18.

3. President Zia in NCB-TV "Face the Nation" Interview with Walter Cronkite. Documents-ed. Arif, 18 May 1980. p.394.

4. Kessing’s contemporary Archives, volume 32-1980. P. 51. .

5. Rasual Bakhsh Rais, War without Winners, Oxford University press, 1994.pp.140141 6. Abdus Sattar, Afghanistan; Past, Presentand Future. From jihad to civil War. The Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 1997, pp.462-63Z

7. Kamal, op.cit. p121. 8 ibid,

8. Salahuddin Ahmed, Foreign Policy of Pakistan. P.88.

9. Dr.Fazal Rahim Marwat, ‘’Pakistan s Strategic Role in the Afghan Crisis’’, in journal of Pakistan Study Center, University of peshwer.Vol.Spring autumn 1993, No27-28, p.37.

10. Rasual Bakhsh Rais, op.cit. p.236.

11. Kamal, op.cit. pp.120-1. , .

12. Abdul Stattar, op.cit. Pp.415-17

13. Marwat, op.cit. 37

14. Ibid. 118

15. Ibid...

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Kamal, op.cit. p.192

19. Marwat, op.cit. p.47

20. Kamal op.cit. Pp207-8.

21. Kamalop.cit.pp215-16...

22. Rasual Bakhsh Rais, op.cit. Pp.119-21.

23. Hyman, Afghanistan Under soviet Domination, 1964-81, Macmillan Press Ltd, London. P. 101.

24. Guardian, 31March, 1979.

25. Urban, pp.31-32.

26. Amstutz, p.46.

27. Roy, A.Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, p.20.

28. New yorkTimes, 13March, 1990.

29. Amstutz, p.

30. Mohammed Yousif and Mark Adkin, the Dear Trap Afghanistan Untold Story, Lahore Jung Publisher 5th Edition, 1983, P.37 . 31. Kamal Maitiuddin. Power Struggle in Hindu Kush (1978-1991, Wajidalis Lahore, 1991,p.18. 119

32. Ibid.

33. Guardian,31March,1979.New Times,Vol.17,No,80,April,1980,p.23.

34. New yorkTimes, 15March, 1991.

35. Ibid.

Chapter. V The withdrawal of soviet troops From Afghanistan: Pakistan contribution in peace accords 120

The completion of the Soviet withdrawal was not a new dran for the Afghan people. The Soviet withdrawal was the first step of implementation of the Geneva Accord. This resided the hope that the other three instruments of the policy; enhancement of security return of the Afghan refugees; and formulation of a friendly Afghan government would also be achieved once the Soviet Union completed the withdrawal of its troops. The Afghan Mujahideen had declared in Jan. 1989 that the moment the last Soviet left Afghanistan, it would be a matter of weeks to topple the PDPA regime and to fulfill their cherished dream of offering prayers in Kabul. But these expectations were not easy to be achieved. During this period, it had become very clear that no single group could gain outright victory in Afghanistan. If the regime of Najibullah was too weak to eliminate the Mujahideen, the collective forces of the Mujahideen too were not capable of ousting Najib’s government. When the stigma of Soviet intervention was removed, Najibullah took initiative to promote national reconciliation. His efforts began to earn credibility. He demonstrated flexibility and struck deals with some Tribal chiefs and certain internal commanders. He also showed some inclination to change the basic character of his regime and his party. 1 He changed the name of the country back to republic Afghanistan, changed the name of the party (PDPA) to the Witan (Homeland) Party. For the first time in Afghanistan, he declared Islam as a state religion. By renouncing Marxism he abolished single party rule and opted for Pluralism and market economy. 2 Najibullah made an effective control over the major cities and access to the main roads. To counter the Mujahideen onslaughts, he delegated more power to the local commanders. He also established local militia, the largest and most important among them was an Uzbek Juzjani, led by Rashid Dostum. This militia was guarding the road, linking Afghanistan with Soviet Union in the Northern part of Afghanistan. The KGB (Intelligence Agency of Soviet Union) has trained the Juzjani militia in the guerilla warfare in the tough terrain of the Siberia. 3 Local commander Ghulam Muhammad laid the foundation of this militia in his quest to take revenge from the Mujahideen for the massacre of his family during the Jihad days. While the USSR was employing various tactics to prop up the dwindling Kabul regime, the ‘Western Powers’ were losing interest 121

in Afghanistan. The most glaring example was the fall in the supply of Stinger Missiles to the Mujahideen, which undermined the operations against the urban centers. Many quarters believed that the fall of Kabul to the Mujahideen would result in utter chaos in the absence of a well-organized Mujahideen Council or Shoora capable of administering the affairs of the country. 4 So the Mujahideen leaders in active consultations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia decided to evolve a mechanism of government through a Shoora or Council. The Iran based Shia Mujahideen groups boycotted the proceedings as their demands for 100 out of 519 Shoora seats were rejected by the Peshawar based Mujahideen Parties who were prepared to give only 70 seats to them. Each of the seven parties of the Peshawar based Mujahideen were given 60 seats each. The offices were divided among them according to the votes; they could secure from the Shoora. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi emerged with the highest votes, followed by Sayyaf Mohammadi, Hekmatyar, Khalis, Rabbain and Gillani. As a result, Mujaddedi was named head of the State, Sayyaf as Prime Minister, Mohammadi as Defense Minister, Hikmatyar as Foreign Minister, Rabbani as of Reconstruction and Gillani as Chief Justice. 5 Contrary to the expectations, Najib government continued to survive against the onslaughts for the Mujahideen. Pakistan was still facing the problem of returning the Afghan refugees. However, the return of the refugees was not possible in isolation of two very important and inter- related factors, which were, the cession of hostilities, and the formation of a truly representative government in Kabul. Pakistan had accepted the terms and conditions of the Geneva Accord contrary to its desire that the issue of an in term government should be resolved first. Pakistan could not resist the pressure to sign the accord. Had the Afghan Mujahideen been included in the Geneva talks, the situation would have been different. 6

Anticipating weak position of the Najibullah government, Pakistan embarked upon the ‘military option’s to win war on the battlefield. But this policy failed miserably. Despite Soviets withdrawal, Najib’s government survived as he succeeded in presenting his regime as ‘defender of Afghanistan’s integrity. There were certain factors responsible for the Mujahideen failure;

 The massive Soviet military and economic aid to the Kabul regime;

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 The failure of the western countries improvising such aid to the Mujahideen; 7  The Kabul regime played ethnic an sectarian card very effectively;  The establishment of local militias by the Kabul regime, greatly lead to the neutralization of Mujahideen military powers; and  The attempts of regional powers to boost the position of their ‘favorites’ elements in the Mujahideen. 8 In order to deal with post Soviet withdrawal situation, the Mujahideen, after a great deal of wrangling had finally succeeded in forming an Afghan ‘Interim Government’ (AIG). The AIG was recognized as the sole representative of Afghanistan by the OIC Foreign Ministers meeting held on March 16, 1989 and elevated to a ‘government in exile’ by giving them the vacant seat of Afghanistan in the OIC. Saudi Arabia and Sudan recognized the AIG. Malaysia followed later. The United States did not recognize the Mujahideen government, as the USA was of the view that:

 The AIG did not have the ability to go into international agreements;  It did not control any territory;  It did not govern the people it controlled; and  It was not a functioning government. 9 The Pakistan government, which was instrumental in formation of the AIG, did not accord formal recognition because of its fragile nature. The recognition by Pakistan would have meant interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, which was avoided due to the guarantee given in Geneva Accord. Pakistan fully supported the Mujahideen against the struggle the Najib’s regime. But they failed to topple Kabul regime. 10 These failure were the result of some hard factors:

 Internal conflicts among the Afghan Mujahideen groups. The rivalry of Iran and Saudi Arabia weakened the strength of the resistance as they fought for their own influence in the area by playing with their favorites;  Absence of the Iranian based Shia parties;  Dissatisfaction of some of the commanders in the battlefield;  Low representation of the various tribes; 123

 Mujahideen were trained for guerrilla warfare and they had no experience of the regular army operations;  Pakistan’s influence over the Mujahideen groups had decreased after the death of Zia;  Decrease in arms supply by USA also limited Mujahideen s capability; and  India was now also in active support of the Najib government and provided diplomatic and material support to the regime. 11 The United States, a major weapon supplier to the Mujahideen,/ emphasized on Pakistan to stop military aid to Mujahideen. 12 The American authorities made it clear that their aid to Pakistan would be stopped it there were no progress towards a political settlements. In September 1991, both the superpowers concluded a mutual aid cut-off agreement to Afghan groups from June 1992 and stressed for a political settlement. 13 The ‘Islamist group’ of Afghanistan during the Gulf War had supported Iraq against USA and Arabs which alienated Saudi Arabia from the Mujahideen cause.

Internal pressure form some political circles in the country, ANP an ally of the Nawaz Sharif Government and Benazir Bhutto as the opposition leader, advocated a halt to the military aid to the Afghan resistance. In Jan 1992, Pakistan finally went along the contrary lines by declaring its intention to end military support for the Mujahideen. Pakistan pressed openly for the acceptance of the UN peace plan and declared that peace would not be held hostage. But On March 18, 1991 Najib dramatically had announced that he would step down once an understanding was reached through the UN for establishment of an interim government. He pledged to transfer all powers and executive authority to interim government from the first day of the transition period. 14

With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the main supporter of the Kabul regime was no more on the international scene. On the other hand, the United States who was backing most of the Mujahideen factions showed lack of interest due to her own compulsions. The external supporters of the respective Afghan factions seemed to be seriously working for a political settlement of the Afghan crisis. The two sides decided to cut off all military assistance to their respective allies from January 1, 1992 marking the end of the superpower competing role in Afghanistan. Pakistan also agreed to accelerate efforts 124

for a peaceful political settlement of the Afghan problem.

The UN Secretary General outlined a peace plan to derive as the basis for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan issue. He also called on Afghan leaders to resolve their difference through political dialogue. The plan envisaged composition of a grand assembly of more than 100 leaders of all-political shades and interests and creation of an interim government to supervise elections in the country. The United Nations peace plan had received the support of all the regional powers and majority of the Mujahideen which outlined five points as the basis for settlement. These points came into effect in May 1992. They were:

 The necessity of restoring territorial integrity, political independence and non- aligned and Islamic character of Afghanistan;  The recognition of rights of the Afghan people to determine their future;  The need for credibility and important transitional mechanism to be worked outs and agreed upon through intra-Afghan dialogue. Political arrangements in the transition period would lead to a broad-based government and an end to hostiles;  A halt to arms supplies to all Afghan sides by all; and  Reconstruction of the war-ravaged country and a rehabilitation of Afghan refugees. 15 Just when the United Nations plan was supposed to go into effect for evolving a power sharing mechanism for the transfer of power, the dissolution of the Soviet Union at that critical stage utterly transformed the regional and international significance of Afghanistan. With dissolution of the USSR, one super power has disappeared, the other had to disengage and thus co-operation between them became moot. In the absence of a hegemonic power, security dilemmas emerged both for regional states and for the ethnic coalitions with Afghanistan. 16

The Personal representative of the UN Secretary General, Benon Sevon, met with the various leaders of the Mujahideen group, but without an encouraging response. Pakistan and the United State were putting intense pressure on Sevon to force Najibullah to leave. They claimed that an explicit public commitment by Najibullah to resign would allow them to pressurize the ‘rejections’ in the Mujahideen. After several long sessions with 125

Sevon in Kabul, Najibullah presented his list and agreed to announce his intention to resign. On March 18, 1992, Najibullah addressed the nation on Television and Radio, and announced his resignation, which he said, would take effect once the United Nations had established an ‘interim government. 17

The hard line factions out-rightly rejected the proposed plan. One of the leaders, Gulbadin Hikmatyar, claimed that the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) was planned by the Americans in agreement with Moscow and a major part of this Jirga would be picked up by the US and Pakistan, leaving very little for the Afghan Mujahideen. Pakistani officials tried their best to find a reasonable solution of the conflict but it also turned fruitless. However, before there could be any progress on the UN plan, Najib’s hold on power rapidly decreased. The cut-off aid, the dissolution of Soviet Union and his own announcement that the ‘would leave’ before the establishment of an alternative government to replace him, reacted a ‘vacuum of power’ in Kabul in to which the regional and ethnic coalition rushed. 18

Najibullah agreed to resign once the interim government was formed. Seeing the departure of Najib, many of his army officers began to negotiate their defection with the resistance groups Najibullah while recognizing the dangerous course of events, moved to assert his authority over Northern command, located around the largely ethnically Uzbek city of Mazar Sharif by putting Pukhtoons Officers who were loyal to him, at key posts and particularly replacing General Momin, the leading Tajik officer in the region. This conflict led to the dissidence of non-Pukhtoon officers headed by Gen. Rahsid Dostum and Gen. Momin.

The overthrow Najib’s regime, they concluded an alliance with the Mujahideen groups; Jamiat-I-Islami, Hizb-I-Wahdat and other Northern resistance groups notably with Ahmed Shah Masud, ethnically a Tajik. While in cities, the military defection occurred against and background of division in supplies of food and fuel. The crisis was so acute that Pakistan, the US and others had to ship wheat to Kabul, intended on one side to stave off hunger and on other hand to maintain the regime long enough to administer an orderly transition of power. However, when the Mujahideen closed on and Najib was observed trying to flee in a UN plane, government forces across the country gave up0 the 126

fight and the regime collapsed. 19

After Najibullah’s sudden departure, an ill-defined group of the former President claimed power in Kabul. They immediately began to seek allies among the Mujahideen and dispatched foreign Minster Abdul Walkil to meet Ahmad Shah Masud. By last week of April, 1992Masud forces had captured government’s main-air base of Bagram, some 35 miles outside Kabul. Meanwhile, forces loyal to Masud’s fieriest rival Gulbadin Hekmatyar closed in on the capital’s South side. 20

After the collapse of Najibullah, four principal armed groups fought for power in Kabul. These groups had different ethnic compositions and different sources of foreign support, according to the regions in which they were based. Each group, to some extent also enjoyed income form local taxes or customs, as well as from the drug trafficking and other enterprises. Abdul Rashid Dostum, former commander of the Afghanistan Army’s Jauzjani division, led a largely Uzbek group of former government militias that also included member of Parcham, including Babrak Karmal, Joined him in Mazar-I-Sharif. He received support form the Karimov government in Uzbekistan and perhaps forms Russia. Masud and Rabbani led mainly Tajiks, with members of some other Northwestern ethnic groups; they were allied to one small but well-organized Shia party. Hikmatyar led a main Pukhtun group that consisted of Hezb recruits from the refugee camps and Eastern Afghanistan, and former government militias. Finally Hizb-I-Wahdat, which had a base in the Hazarajat, organized the Shia of Kabul city that was armed by the Iranians and Parchamis during Najib fall.

The ethnic structure of the conflict changed over time as the domestic and international balance of power shifted. Suggesting that the conflict was fundamentally a struggle for power rather than an ethnic war fueled by “ancient hatreds”. At first, Masud Dostum, and Hizb-Khalq coalition. This conflict seemed to pit resurgent non-pukhtoons against Pushtuns, who had long dominated the Afghan state. It was also a clash between coalition backed by Iran, on the one hand, and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on the other. But by the end of 1992 the ethnic alignment had shifted. By the start of 1994, Hikmatyar’s Hizb, Mujaddidi’s Afghanistan National Liberation Front (ANLF), the Shia Hizb-I-Wahdat, and Dostum’s Junbish, allied in a Co-ordination council. 127

The predominance of Masud and Rabbani in Kabul alienated first Hizb-I-Wahdat and then Dostum. Furthermore, the political situation in the newly independent states of Central Asia set formerly allied Uzbeks and Tajiks of Northern Afghanistan against each other. Dostum’s backer, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, worked with Russia to restore to power in Tajikistan a coalition of former communists and other including Uzbeks. Masud, meanwhile, gave refuge to the supporters of the opposition, which included Islamists. Tajik nationalists and democrats. Karimov apparently wanted Dostum to block Masud’s access to the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. 23

With the Peshawar leaders still unable to reach to an agreement, the forces of Masud and Dostum, all ready in control of the airport, entered the city to pre-empt a coup by Hekmatyar. The non-Pukhtoon Parchamis, assisted by the Iranian embassy, had also armed the Shia of Kabul city. Hekmatyar portrayed his strategy as a “defense against a coup by the Northern Alliance”. After several days of hard fighting, the forces of Masud Dostum forces and the Shia expelled the Hizb-Khalqi forces. As the time came for the Mujahideen forces to take power in Kabul, Islamabad was losing grip on the Peshawar based Afghan leaders. Intense round of talks started at Peshawar to arrange a transitional government for the peaceful transfer of power. Saudi Prince, Turki-al-Faisal, who was deeply involved in these talks, joined Pakistan’s efforts.

At the same time, Mir Hamad Musavi, a former Iranian ambassador to Pakistan, was sent to assure that the deal to form a new government incorporated Iranian interests. After hectic efforts by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the Peshawar based leaders agreed to formula, manly out of fear that if they delayed any further, the field commanders like Ahmad Shah Masud would take the matter into their own hands. Thus, they concluded an accord on April 24, 1992 at Peshawar, called Peshawar Accord.

THE PESHAWAR ACCORD

The transitional Mujahedeen Council was formed in Peshawar on April 26, 1992. The majority of Mujahedeen’s heads formed a 50 members Council with unspecified responsibilities, made up of 30 field commanders, party and religious leaders. This was a complicated arrangement for the transfer of power and the promise of national elections.. 128

It should be remembered that Hekmatyar refused to take part in the proceedings of the accord. His argument was that as the Mujahideen had already controlled the Capital thus the accord holds no importance. According to the accord, Sibghatullah Mujaddedi was made head of the 50 member ruling council to supervise the transition arrangements. After two months, Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani was to become head of the state for four months and responsible for holding general elections.

Gulbadin Hekmatyar was given the charge of Prime minister who instead of himself, nominated Ustad Farid as Prime Minster. The portfolio of Defense Minster was given to Ahamed Shah Masud. The United Nation Secretary General’s special envoy on Afghanistan, Benon Sevon, played a very vital role in persuading Najib to agree to resign. This caretaker set-up was a part of a five-point peace plan presented earlier by the UN. Pakistan, Iran had already welcomed the peace plan and agreed to coordinate their efforts to seek an end to the bloodshed, ensure territorial integrity and secure peaceful transition of power in Afghanistan.

Pakistan extended full diplomatic and political recognition to the transitional Mujahideen Council and pledged to provide all possible cooperation for undertaking him gigantic tasks of national reconstruction’. When the leaders of the interim government were taken to Afghanistan, an armed Pakistan escort assured their security on April 29, 1992. Prime Minster of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif flew to Kabul together with Asif Nawaz; Pakistan’s Army Chief of Staff, ISI chief Gen. Nasir and the Saudi Prince to demonstrate Pakistan’s backing for the interim government. Nawaz Sharif, after having recognized the 51-member interim council, confirmed Islamabad’s official recognition of the new Islamic interim government in Afghanistan. He was the first and the last ahead of government who visited Afghanistan since the Mujahideen formally took over power. During the visit, he presented a cheque of $10 millions to the Afghan interim government for reconstruction of the war-torn country.24

Hekmatyar had refused to accept the Peshawar Accord. It not only created problems for the new interim government, but also for peace in the region. A Pakistani food convoy of 130 trucks, each carrying about 12 tons of food supplies was blocked by the Hezb-I- Islami forces in order to show their resentment for any settlement imposed form outside. 129

25 Gulbadin major demand was that Dostum must be pulled out from Kabul as he was the remnant of the Communists. On the other hand, it was hard for the ‘Interim government’ to lose an ally which had played a very significant role in the ouster of Najib government 26 However Gulbadin refused to accept his allegiance to the Mujahideen as he had fought the Afghan Mujahideen for over a decade as mercenaries of the Soviet installed government. Among the three most powerful factions; Hekmatyar, Dostum, and Masud, the later was the weakest one. So Ahmed Shah Masud needed the help of Dostum to stay in contention of Power. To that end he has forged a desperate coalition, which included some of the die-hard of the Najibullah government, most of whom were of Uzbek and Tajik origin.

The interim President Mujaddedi paid at two-day official visit to Pakistan in May 1992. It was his first visit to Pakistan since the assumption of office as interim President of Afghanistan. Addressing a press conference in Islamabad, Mujaddedi supported the sight of self-determination of the people of Kashmir and stressed that the Kashmir problem should be resolved according to the UN resolutions. He also showed his willingness to join Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) along with Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and the other Central Asian states. 27 but soon on 26 April sever fighting erupted between the forces of Hekmatyar and Masud who was the Defense Minister in Mujaddedi government. By controlling Kabul with the help of Uzbek and Tajik Generals of the former regime, Masud had over maneuvered Hekmatyar.

The rivalry between the two warlords was not new. They had always been each other foes and suspicious of each other since the breakup of the Islamic movement of Afghanistan in 1978. Even during jihad against the Soviet, the forces of the two had many clashes. They were opposed to each other on a member of ideological and ethnic lines. The allied forces of Masud and Rashid Dostum drove out forces of Hekmatyar out from the city of Kabul. The reason of Hekmatyar hostiles towards Masud was that the latter did not take into confidence any of the Peshawar-based parties, perhaps not even his own party leader, Rabbani, before entering into alliance with Dostum and other Communist commanders of the Afghan Army. 28 Hekmatyar was not willing to share any power with the former communists and asked to remove the forces of Dostum form 130

Kabul.

Immediately Pakistan appealed for the cease-fire. During his visit to Kabul on April 29, 1992 Nawaz Sharif tried touring about a rapprochement between them. On May 25 Masud and Hikmatyar met in the presence of Saudi Prince Najaf and Pakistani Federal Minister Ejaz ul Haq. The two rivals put their signature on a cease-fire accord and an agreement, which called for the election within six months. But as usual, the accord was not honored and soon fighting erupted again after a few weeks. It was because of these reasons that Ustad Farid, a nominee of Hekmatyar of Premier was not allowed to assume his office. Moreover, Hekmatyar did not like the continued presence of Dostum in Kabul and also objected to the portfolio he was holding (Chief of Afghan Army).

After two months of stay in power, Mujaddedi handed over the office to Burhan-ud-Din Rabbanbi. According to his mandate as per Peshawar Accord, Rabbani’s immediate action included the setup of a commission for holding election: by convening the widest possible representation of Afghan commanders, Ulema and other people with representative status. He appointed Syed Noorullah Emin of his own party (Jamait-I- Islami) as its chairman. There could be no further progress with regard to delegates for Shoora. The Rabbanbi tenure came to an end on Oct. 28, 1992. On this occasion Leadership Council held an extra-ordinary meeting in Kabul on Oct, 31, 1992 and reluctantly approved 45 days extension in Rabbani’s tenure. The reason was that the continued fighting with Hekmatyar made it impossible for him to summon the Shoora in the time designed. Rabbanbi was to convene the proposed Shoora by December 15, 1992 after which the leadership council was to elect the new president for the following eighteen months.

However, Rabbani’s performance in the extended tenure of 45 days remained precarious as well. There were growing differences over the shape of Shoora. Fighting between Hekmatyar and Masud forces continued during the period. The period also saw the crystallization of a new force under the leadership of Gen. Rashid Dostum, ethnically an Uzbek. He formed his own party, the Janbish-e-Milli-Islami Afghanistan, which was broad-based consisting of political and military representatives of the Northern areas, mostly Uzbeks making 12 per cent of the total Afghan population. Dostum demanded a 131

seat for himself in the ‘leadership council’ and adequate representation in the ‘Jehad Council’. This period also saw the growth of ethnic alignments in Afghanistan.29

Jamiat-I-Islami was representing mainly the Tajiks, while Dostum represented the Uzbek, Hezb-e-Wahdat represented the Shia’s while Hizb-I-Islami of Hekmatyar and Khalis represented the Pushtoons. Ethnic factor now played a greater role in the politics of Afghanistan. Pushtoon nationalist (ANP) on the Pakistani side of border, who never concealed their sympathy for the Marxists regime objected to the composition of the Mujahideen government, alleging that Pushtoons were being denied their legitimate share of power. 30

Unlike Mujaddedi, Rabbanbi refused to resign power own his term expired. Fighting again broke out. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran joined to promote another accord among the Afghan leaders. In December 1992, the Peshawar Accord finally ended starting a new phase of rivalries. Just One day before the end so his tenure, President Rabbanbi issued a statement that he would transfer power only to a Council of Nationally elected representatives.

His opponents demanded that he should step down immediately and hand over power to the Vice President Maulvi Nabi Muhammadi to avoid a showdown. Rabbanbi managed to hold the Shoora on December 1992 comprising 1335 delegates which re-elected him as President of the ‘transitional government’ for a period of two years. The representative character of the Shoora was questioned by many. Five groups of Mujahedeen’s including Hezb-I-Islami and Hezb-I-Wahdat did not support the newly elected Shoora thus initiating a fresh round of fighting around Kabul. 31

The crux of the problem was the lack of agreement between the two major resistance parties; Gulbadin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I-Islami and Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-I- Islami on basic power-sharing formula. 32 The Najibullah regime’s remnants, to save their skins, have accentuated the hitherto dormant ethnic rivalries within the Afghan resistance. 33 The first interim Afghan President Sibghatullah Mujaddedi’s regime, appointed for two months under the Peshawar agreement, quickly realized the capability of Dostum militia to make or break any regime. He appointed Dostum as chief of Afghan 132

Army, thus further aggravating the differences between the two major parties.

Rabbani took over as President in June, 1992, and agreed to disband the Uzbek militia from Kabul, which was the major point of contention between him and Hekmatyar. However, after a brief period of uneasy truce with the Hizb-I-Islami, during which Hekmatyar’s Tajik representative, Ustad Farid served as the Prime Minister, Rabbani like his predecessor, preferred to rely on the support of Dostum’s Uzbek militia to maintain his fragile regime. Rabbani extended his tenure of President ship through a hand-picked Shoora Hal-o-Aqad (council of wise mend) in December, 1992, further alienating Hekmatyar’s group. 34

The external parties to the conflict, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, lack effective coordination of policies and have complicated the situation further. Pakistan, in the process of shifting its support away from Hekmatyar’s group, has failed to evolve any alternative policy, thereby losing its earlier effective clout to influence the events in Afghanistan.

To improve its relationship with the Central Asian states, Pakistan decided to bypass Hekmatyar in January, 1992, and proceeded to make a coalition of all other elements within the Afghan resistance, which was formalized under the Peshawar Agreement, signed among the various Mujahideen groups in March, 1992. 35 However, this led to the exclusion of the major Pushtoon groups, which constitute more than 45% of Afghanistan’s population and have traditionally been the ruler of the county.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have been more interested in promoting their sectional interests by supporting smaller groups, thus further complicating the process of reconciliation. 36 Iran has been arming Hizb-e-Wahdat consisting of shias from Hazarajat while Saudi Arabia has been financing Itihad-I-Islami, and extremist Sunni group led by Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, which has led to severe Shia-Sunni clashes inside Kabul since the Mujahideen’s takeover of Kabul. The United States either appears to have lost its interest in Afghanistan since the disintegration of the Soviet Union or perhaps prefers to work through its proxies such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. 37

The United Nations and most of the international community had by this time virtually 133

dropped Afghanistan from the political agenda. In these circumstances, Pakistan was again active in brokering a political settlement among the warring sides. At the urging of Islamabad, Tehran and Riyadh, the warring Afghan factions were asked for another peace accord in Islamabad. After a few days of intense, often tangled negotiations piloted by Pakistan’s’ Prime Minster and his team with the help of Iranian and Saudi envoys managed to reach a new peace accord on March 7, 1993 known as the Islamabad Accord. Iran too agreed to back the Islamabad Accord whole heartedly as now the Hizb-I-Wahdat was a signatory along with the smaller Harkat-I-Islami of Sheikh Asif Mohsin, another smaller Shi’ite Party.

The Peshawar Accord was mainly maneuvered by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia leaving out both Iran and their Pro-Tehran Shi’ite parties. This time more homework was done to conclude and draft the Islamabad Accord and an effort was made to define the powers of President of Prime Minister, the absence of which had led to the collapse of Peshawar Accord. The accord also gave a time for the formation of the cabinet, implementation of the electoral process and formation of the country’s constitution.

Apart from the conscious efforts to define the powers of the President and Prime Minister, there was vagueness especially in the formation of cabinet. Hezb-I-Islami was again given the portfolio of Premiership as was done in the Peshawar Accord, but with more powers. This time Hekmatyar decided to become the Prime Minister, contrary to his earlier decision of nominating Ustad Farid one of his commanders for this post. The Islamabad Accord was an effort to keep some balance between the Jamiat-I-Islamai and the Hizb-I-Islami.

THE ISLAMABAD ACCORD

Following were the key features of the Islamabad Accord:

 A new government will be formed for 18 months. Cabinet shall be formed in two weeks by the Prime Minster in consultation with the President and other Afghan leaders. President Rabbani would remain in office and Gulbadin Hekmatyar or his nominees would assume the office of Prime Minister. The accord also detailed the powers of the Prime Minster, the President and the cabinet; 134

 An electro process would be started in a period of not more than 18 months, with effect from December 29, 1992. This would include formation of an independent ‘Election Commission’ immediately. The election commission shall hold elections for a grand Constituent Assembly within eight months and the Constituent Assembly would formulate a constitution;  A ‘Defense Council’ comprising two members from each party will be formed. This council will retain the operational control of the Armed forces. Also the council with look into the collection of all heavy weapons. 38 After the conclusion of the accord, there was some hope that normalcy would return to Afghanistan but this could not happen. The ‘two executives’ were unable to agree on the post of Defense Minister as Hekmatyar wanted to replace Masud while Rabbani insisted to keep him. The two could not reach a power-sharing agreement and they accused each other for violating the accord. 39 At the same time Pakistan became engulfed in its own domestic political crisis. With the removal of Nawaz Sharif from the Premier ship, the Accord lost its most enthusiastic supporter. The subsequent talks among Mujahideen parties could not produce any result. 40

Islamabad has always been mindful of the necessity to ‘cement’ the troika Islamabad, Tehran, Riyadh – efforts at ending the factional fighting in Afghanistan. The Iranians too tend to view this accord with some hope. Deputy Foreign Minister Alauddin Broujerdi pointed out that the participation of all the Afghan groups indicated that “They recognize their problems can no longer be resolved through military means”. He added, “Every group is a part of the Afghan scene…Hekmatyar too is a reality…Both we and the Pakistan has told them that you are no longer fighting a jihad, you are fighting with your own brothers.” Broujerdi appreciated Islamabad’s efforts. Referring to Nawaz Sharif’s five-day-long personal participation, he said, “No Prime Minister in the world would have done this. 41

At the signing of the accord, all the leaders left for Mecca to perform Umra. As a gesture of acknowledging Iran’s significance as an important member of the ‘external Trioka-Islamabad, Riyadh and Tehran’, working on Afghan peace making, Islamabad proposed to the entire entourage to stop in Tehran on its way back from Madina. 42 The 135

Islamabad Accord; successor to the Peshawar Accord, essentially provided broad guidelines for peace-making in strife-ridden Afghanistan. 43

Nevertheless, the Islamabad Accord was significant in some respects. Firstly, for the first time in many years’ most warring factions of Afghanistan has moved away from gunpowder language and has sat down for dialogue. Secondly, the three most influential countries demonstrated a genuine interest in bringing peace to Afghanistan. 44 While the major portion of the accord deals with power sharing issues, it was also an attempt to reestablish the state. Immediate and unconditional release of all Afghan detainees held by government and different parties during the armed hostilities was agreed upon. Properties occupied by different armed groups during hostilities were to be returned to their original owners.

Although the Islamabad Accord was again signed by the Afghan leaders during there visits to Saudi Arabia and Iran, but it could not be implemented. The cabinet to be ‘formed through consolation with the President’ could not be agreed upon. The Prim Minister Hekmatyar wanted to remove Masud from the office of Defense Ministry while President Rabbani was not ready to endorse his proposal. Thus, the accord broke down. Hekmatyar attacked the capital and though he was repulsed, the attractive city, which had long escaped destruction during Jihad, was severely damaged.

The Islamabad Accord promised to achieve a peaceful political settlement in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister-designate Hekmatyar succeeded to enter the suburbs of Kabul with the help of its new ally, Hezb-I-Wahdat. A stalemate between Prime Minister Hekmatyar and President Rabbani over the crucial Defense Ministry annihilated the chances for any functioning of the government. Hekmatyar tried to form a cabinet in which he gave Masud the post of Deputy Prime Minster but President Rabbani refused to endorse the cabinet on the basis that he was not consulted. Although Masud had announced to cooperate with the new government of Hekmatyar, he never relinquished the de-facto control of Kabul to the ‘defense council’ as envisaged in the Islamabad Accord. Within two months after the signing of the accord, fresh fighting erupted in Afghanistan. 136

The installation of an interim Mujahideen government represented at least partial achievement of the decades-long quest of Islamabad for a friendly Afghanistan. The possibility of a Russian or Indian exercise of any influence in this strategic backyard of Pakistan was essentially eliminated. This does not mean that Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan were necessarily smooth with out irritants. Pakistan now faced the dilemma of how to react to the ongoing power struggle among Afghanistan’s new leaders. Pakistan’s active involvement to promote reconciliation could be branded as undue interference, while indifference to the infighting might cause further fragmentation Afghanistan. The most important development was internal political fragmentation. The Mujahideen parties were driven with fierce political and personal differences, which might further complicate the process of maintaining a stable governing coalition. The instability in turn contributed to ongoing instability in relations with other states ofregion. RABBANI GOVERNMENT On assumption of power, President Rabbani’s immediate actions were the setting up of a commission for holding elections, convening the widest possible representation of Afghan commander s, Ulema, intellectuals, elders and those who held representative status. But the holding of election was a difficult task. With millions of refugees yet to be repatriated, it posed the problem of how the delegates were to be chosen and on what population basis. The latest census in this connection was the one held by the UN in 1987. This was proposed s the basis but failed to muster unanimous support. The convening of the Loya Jirga (Gargagr and Gathering) invited further controversy over its terminology. The proposed Shoor-e-Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd (The Council of Wise Men) was denounced as a non-Afghan improvisation. There were demands for convening the more traditional Afghan Loya Jirga. This Shoora versus Jirga issue deepened as Rabbani’s four-month tenure was to expire by the end of October 1992.

The ‘Grand Gathering’ could not be convened because of Rabbani’s expiry of tenure, remained as distant as before. The infighting between Hekmatyar and Rabbani continued Rabbani, however, had managed to build up sufficient credibility, so that when his four- month tenure ended, the Leadership Council held an extraordinary meeting in Kabul on 137

31 October 1992, and approved an extension of 45 days in his tenure.45But, Rabbani failed to fulfill his agenda. The Hizb-e-Islami criticized him on the ground that his four months tenure was a complete failure in all direction and he could not honor his commitments to the Leadership Council with regard to the pull out of militia, removal of Communists, formation of the Ahle- Hal-o-Aqd Shoora, setting up a Commission of Islamic army and holding of meetings of the leadership Council. But unfortunately he did not do so. Either Rabbani was not interested in it or he wanted to extend his tenure one-way or the other.46 there was continued criticism of the suggested Hal-o-Aqd Shoora. Most people, it was argued, were not even familiar with this name. The Loya Jirga as an Afghan institution, was preferable because the majority of the Afghan demanded it and were familiar to its functions.47 By October 30, a fresh exchange of fire broke out between the Masud and Hekmatyar forces. As one observer lamented, the two had a great constructive and destructive potential. A greater understanding between the two could have brought the Tajiks and Pukhtoon together, some thing that Afghanistan desperately needed.

Around this lime there were reports of General Dostum's un-official visit to Pakistan and then onwards to Saudi Arabia.48 Through out these developments, Pakistan was in the forefront of media attention for its speculated, actual, potential or planned. Roles. Islamabad was perceived to play this role because of the comings of various Mujahideen leaders either to Peshawar and Islamabad or via Islamabad to other countries.49 Rabbani's extended tenure of 45 days remained precarious and was marked by "rowing differences over the shape of Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd Shoora. Afghans expressed skepticism over the possibility of any Shoora or Jirga being convened, given the ongoing conflicts between Masud and Hekmatyar. Also, there seemed no apparent consensus over a Presidential candidate to be selected unanimously or possible candidates lo contest elections. At Leadership Council important leaders were always missing. It indicated that none of them was serious to Share power and pull Afghanistan out to the civil war.50 This led to hostilities followed by cease-fires. Hekmatyar’s opposition had extended support to include Dostum as welt. Dostum had meanwhile established his own party-the Jumbish-e-Milli Afghanistan, represent entirely of Northern areas and demanded a seat for himself in the 'Leadership Council' and adequate representative in the 'Jihad 138

Council.51 Rabbani also announced that he would relinquish power only if the Leadership Council agreed to his successors and insisted for holding Shoora's meeting to select his successor.52 On 19 December 1992, Radio Kabul announced that 1000 Shoora members met and began their deliberations in Kabul amidst light security measures. Shoora members were hopeful of fruitful results. President Rabbani appealed to the opposition to help make the Shoora a success by honoring their earlier promises. As per Shoora’s decision Rabbani was re-elected President of the transitional government for a period of two years. It looked that the Afghans were at least, agreed upon one point; to displace one another. Kabul which had been spared any fighting during the war between Soviet backed regime and Mujahideen was devastated by power-hungry Afghan Mujahideen. Much of the city's population, swollen with earlier refugees, fled and 25000 were believed to have died as the result of the fighting. A stalemate ensued in which neither side was able to dislodge the other. In an attempt to break the deadlock, Hekmatyar cut a deal with Uzbek Leader Dostum in January 1994, who once again bet yard his former allies to join the opposition, which he hoped would be the winning side. But this odd couple', the most fundamentalist Mujahideen commander and the former communist general, failed to bring down Rabbani'-s Government.53

TENSION IN RELATIONS

When fighting between Rabbani and Hekmatyar intensified, Rabbani became suspicious that Pakistan is tilling towards Hikmatyar. The situation in Afghanistan has become quite complicated with changing alliances and shifting allegiances. Hikmatyar who had been extremely critical of Rabbani's alignment with the 'remnants of the Communist rcgime.54 Rashid Dostum, has now teamed up with Dostum to take on Rabbani. And one reason cited for Rabbani's reluctance to agree to the evacuation of Najibullah from Kabul, where he was in the custody of the United Nations, was Rabbani's fear that Najib would end up Joining hands with Hikmatyar in a demonstration of 'Pushtoon Unity. 55

Tehran, which was almost a passive participant of the Peshawar Accord, had now increased its influence in Afghanistan mainly over the Persian speaking Tajik of 139

Afghanistan. In order to broaden its influence from merely Shiite population of Afghanistan to the Sunni also, it signed in late 1991 an agreement with Tajikistan and Afghanistan's Jamit-I-IsIami for increasing cultural interaction between Persian speaking Iranians, Afghanistan and Tajiks. Iran also made efforts to unite non-Pushtoons of Afghanistan against the Pushtoons.

When Islamabad Accord was coming to a formal end, the Pakistan's Foreign Minister remarked that things happening in Afghanistan after 28 June would have no legitimacy. It was interpreted by Kabul as a pronouncement from Pakistan challenging the legitimacy of the rulers. After the Foreign Minister's statement, six Pakistani were shot dead by the forces loyal to President Rahhani while seven other Pakistani was arrested. In a statement issued by the Afghan embassy in New Delhi on 29th June. These Pakistani's were branded as mercenaries.56

But the sudden unexpected rise of Taliban changed the whole scenario in Afghanistan. The Taliban who had emerged in November 1994, reached the outskirts of Kabul conquering many provinces. Rabbani who had earlier welcomed Taliban, us long they were there Likening the position of his rival, Hikmatyar. But as they came closer to Kabul, Rabbani started criticizing Pakistan strongly that it was behind Taliban. The emergence of Taliban suddenly escalated the regional tension. Iran also severely criticized Pakistan of playing the US game; they regarded Taliban as 'the creation of America, sponsored by Saudi Arabia, and guided by Pakistan. 57 But Pakistan officially denied these charges. However, the stories published in the press indicated that the Taliban were being supported by Pakistan with the backing of UK, USA and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan has expressed its great out-rage at the undue involvement of India in the Afghanistan domestic affairs. India in a bid to create complications for Pakistan extended military and economic assistance to Masud. He, contrary to all expectation willingly accepted Indians friendship and forgot the lurking truth that it was India who had stood by the side of the Communist regime, and during that era, the Panjsher Valley was subjected to aerial strikes by the Indians pilots causing large scale human and material damages.58 140

Contrary to all diplomatic norms and the support and hospitality, which Professor Burhan-ud-din Rabbani and Ahmad shah Masud enjoyed during the days of Jihad, directed their vengeance against that very country, at the behest of inimical forces. The Taliban militias, after a series of spectacular victories, were closing on Kabul. Masud in a desperate move organized a protest march against Pakistan. But the protest turned into mob and attacked the Embassy of Pakistan. A group of Pushtoon Islamic Students and their leaders based in Kandahar, began to seize power from local warlords accused of criminal activities. They opened the region's roads to free transit and brought a high degree of order to the territories they took under their control. Processing a. more conservative Islamic state than the other parties, their small successes snowballed into a movement that quickly took control of almost all the Pushtoon provinces in the South, often without fighting. By March 1995 they were at the gates of Kabul. Rabbani government did little to resist their move in North, anticipating that Taliban were a greater danger to their rival Hikmatyar because they shared the same Pukhtoon base.59 upon the arrival of Taliban, however Hekmatyar’s Hezb-I-Islami troops quickly abandoned their positions from which they had shelled the capita for so long. Relations between Kabul and Islamabad suffered a severe blow after the Islamic state of Afghanistan accused Pakistan of interfering in its internal affairs. This was demonstrated by-setting on fire the Embassy of Pakistan in Kabul. The Afghan government accused Pakistan's ISI which executed the Afghan policy of Islamabad and was planning to bring to power in Kabul certain Mujahideen leaders.60 at the start, Pakistan supported Hikmatyar against the stale and then put her weight behind the coalition formed by Dostum, Mazari and Hikmatyar. When they failed to topple the government in Kabul, it created a new group namely Taliban.61 According to’ the Afghanistan government press, the first hostile act of Pakistan against the Islamic state at the start of the year 1995 was the imposition of restrictions on Afghan transit goods. This action resulted in open criticism of Pakistan's policy by President Rabbani during ECO summit in March 1995. According to the Afghan press, Pakistan continued to serve as the base of political and propaganda activities of the Afghan parties involved in the armed struggle against the state.62 When Pakistan became disappointed of 141

military victory of the Afghan opposition forces, it invited Sardar Abdul Walli, the cousin and son-in-law of the former King, to Launch a campaign for the return of the King. This move was considered by Afghanistan yet another example of Pakistan’s interference in their internal affairs of Afghanistan. The Rabbani regime argued that Taliban's defeat in Farah and Helmand provinces at the end of August 1996. Alarmed Pakistan-Islamabad advised Gulbaddin and Dostum to support Taliban and rushed with ammunition, fuel and advisors to the battle field in order to prevent the fall of Helmand to the state. Pakistan's support enabled them to defeat Ismail Khan and capture Herat. This support of Pakistan to the opposition forces resulted in anti-Pakistani demonstrations in Kabul, who wounded the staff of Pakistan's Embassy and .set on fire the Embassy building.63 The Rabbani government accused that the embassy incident provided an excuse for Pakistani leaders to carryout their anti Afghan state campaign more openly. It united the opposition parties by providing them fund and other resources to remain engaged in war against the Kabul government. In retaliation to attack on its Embassy in Kabul Pakistan expelled dozens of Afghan diplomats. The Rabbani regime said that against all the accepted diplomatic norms, Islamabad opened its Embassy in the Eastern city of Jalalabad, the province under Taliban control.64 In nutshell, the situation in Afghanistan continued to challenge Pakistan's security and economic interests even after the cessation of the Cold War. Throughout the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan remained center for Afghan resistance movement. It fully supported Afghan people in their struggle against foreign intervention and provided shelter to Afghan refugees who entered Pakistan affected by the situation in their country.65 After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, hostilities broke out among various Afghan groups, trying to maintain their hold in the country. Their quest for power not only. Shattered the Afghan society itself but hindered all the efforts made by its neighboring countries to develop the region as an economic bloc. Being any immediate neighbor, Pakistan was adversely affected by the internal turmoil of Afghanistan. It had to face the problems of terrorist activities of hostile Afghan groups, drug trafficking, arms 142

smuggling and presence of a large number of refugees. These problems further aggravated when the US which provided massive aid to Pakistan during the Afghan war against former Soviet Union, declared to suspend all economic and military aid to Pakistan.66

Besides these problems, intra-Afghan war also hampered Pakistan's efforts to develop its economic relations with the newly emerging Central Asian states. These landlocked states could not have the shortest and most economical outlet to the Arabian Sea via Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the continuing war in Afghanistan. The civil war also made it impossible to implement the accords signed between Pakistan and Central Asian states for building pipelines to transport oil and gas as well as other projects to promote development in the context of ECO.67 Pakistan declared its policy of neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and made alt-out efforts to develop reconciliation among various Afghan factions. It supported the efforts of the UN and the OIC for peace and security in the region- Pakistan made contacts with all Afghan warring factions and offered to host a regional peace conference to develop a national consensus among them so that peace could be maintained. Despite Pakistan's efforts to maintain peace in Afghanistan, it had to face hostile acts from the Afghan government. In February 1994, the incidents of hijacking of a school bus from Peshawar and ransacking of the Pakistan embassy in Kabul further created the tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Three Afghan gunmen hijacked a school bus from Peshawar carrying children and teachers and reached the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad.72 during the negotiations with Pakistani officials, they demanded the safe passage of 2000 truck loads of food supplies to Afghanistan and 15 million rupees. They also demanded that Pak-Afghan border should be reopened because thousands of Afghans were facing serious problems due to war and they should be allowed to cross into Pakistan. The hostages would not be released till their demands were accepted. However, the Pakistan Army Commandos gunned down the three Afghan hijackers and rescued the hostages. Protesting against the killing of the Afghan hijackers by Pakistan, a mob of Afghan demonstrators ransacked the Pakistan's Embassy in Kabul.7 143

REFERENCES 1 Bernett R. Robbin, the Fragmentation of Afghanistan and Collapse in the International System, Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd. 1996, p. 45. 2 Far Eastern Economic Review, December 12, 1988. p.3. 3 Khlass Rossane, “Afghansitan: The Accords”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No.5, summer 1988, pp. 922-930. 4 Ibid. 5 The News, December, 20, 1991. 6 Ibid.. 7 Ibid. 8 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, War Without Winners, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994, P. 159. 9 Ibid. pp. 160-165. 10 “Pakistan and the Gulf”, Economist, March 12, 1992, p.9. 11 Muhammad Islam, Pak-US Relations- the Afghan Factor, and Raziullah Azmi (ed.) Pak-America Relations, the Recent Past, Karachi: Royal book Company, 1994, p. 92. 12 The Muslim, Auguest, 1991. 13 Defense Journal, Vol. XXI, No. 7-8, 1995, p. 12. 14 The Muslim, December 13, 1992. 15 James South, “Afghanistan imbrioligo”, Asian Affairs, Vol. Xx, No. III, June 1991, p. 10. 16 Ibid. 17 Bernett R. Robbin, the Fragmentation of Afghanistan and Collapse in the International System, Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd. 1996, p. 48. 18 Nawa-I-Waqt, “Exit of Najibullah”, Special Report, April 24, 1994. 19 Ibid. 20 Bernett R. Robbin, opcit, pp. 45-48. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 45, No.3, July 1992, p.2. 144

24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 B. Rais, op. cit. p. 224. 27 Ibid. 28 Pakistan Horizon, opcit. 29 Rais, opcit. 30 Defence Journal, Vol. XXI. No. 7-8, 1995, pp. 10-12. 31 Rahimullah Yousafzai, “More Troubles Ahead for Afghans”, the News, Islamabad, January 2, 1993. 32 Tahir Amin, “Pakistan and the Central Asian States”, Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1994, p. 17. 33 Ibid. 34 The News, Islamabad, December 31, 1992. 35 Ibid. 36 Tahir Amin, opcit. P. 18 37 “Shift in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy”, The News, Islamabad, January, 28, 1992. 38 Tahir Amin, opcit. 39 The Nation, July, 3, 1994. 40 Ibid. 41 Defence Journal, opcit. 42 The News, March 10, 1993. 43 Ibid 44 The Nation, September 1994. 45 Ahmad Rashid, the Herald, Oct 1995. 46 Ibid. 47 The Nation, opcit. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 The Frontier Post, March 31, 1996. 51 Ibid. 145

52 Anthony Spaeth, “Kabul’s New Islamic Rule”, Time, Vov. 148, No. 15, October 7, 1996, P. 25. 53 Ibid. 54 The Nation, opcit. 55 Herald, Oct. 1995. 56 Ibid p17 57 Ibid. p22 58 Karamullah, “No About Turn on Afghanistan”, the Nation, September 3, 1997. 59 Ibid. p17 60 Ibid. p21 61 Ibid. p24 62 Herald opcit. September 24, 1999. P 24... 63 Mushahid Hussain “Taliban Pak. And The Nation, Region, 31, 1996. Reference which are in other Page NO. 137. 64 .Pak. Strategic Aims in Pipelines” The Nation, Islam Dec, 23 1999 p 16…

Chapter no- VI Emergence of taliban and its Impact on pak-Afghan relations 146

PRE TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN: - The ethnic crisis in Afghanistan grew intense over Rabbani’s refusal to quit the presidential office. This civil war pushed Afghanistan into anarchy endangering the life and property of everybody. Former Mujahideen commanders, with huge military hardware in their possession had become sovereign in their respective areas. In Southern Afghanistan the situation was more pathetic where looting killing kidnapping and rape were rampant.1 It is unreliable that Afghanistan at this time was acutely suffering from leadership crises. This was the worst period in Afghanistan history after the Russian withdrawal, a time when the state society relationship had completely broken down. There was no central rule, no state mechanism and no security. The entire country was in the hold of numerous warlords with their respective systems of administration. Kabul and area to its North - East were under the control of Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood. Hearts with Ismail Khan, Mazar-e-Sharif with Dostum, and the South Eastern districts were control by the Hikmatyar and so on. The country was turning in to a collection of city republics like those of ancient Greece. With indigenous economic resources almost extinct, the only viable course of action left to the local commander was to extract it form the local people, using all sorts of foul practices. The fighter militiamen were not getting, paid by their respective commanders many indulged in corruption, looting, drug trafficking and rape. While traveling through even a small area it was as if one was moving from state to state, after every few kilometers one come across a new check post with new people and new question. Along just one stretch of road from chaman to Kandahar, there were around 71 check posts. Money extortion and humiliating travelers were common every where, whether passenger, transporters or trader, all were equally victimized, This diminished further the already slim commerce and economy of the war ravaged country. The transformation of a meaningful jihad / war of liberation into a civil war and Turning of heroes into rubbers, drug dealers, and rapists made common Afghan felt highly scared and vulnerable. 2 The cities acquired a deserted look and no body dared leave home after sunset 147

tried out after long days of work people then had to guard their home in the night, even in broad day light people did not take their wives , sisters and daughters out of their homes for fear of their honor being looted3 Kabul which remained unaffected during the soviet occupation became the center of war. Similarly Kandahar and its environs were also one of the most effected areas. The extent of immorality and lawlessness can he gauged from the fact that a marriage between two boys ware celebrated around Kandahar with great jubilation. And Similarly a Hearty family events. Now the actual faces of almost all the Afghan leader were exposed to their nation they saw their leaders making and breaking alliances overnight. They were either incapable of unwilling to put things, back on the right track. No one proved trustworthy, failing even to fulfill the promises made in the precincts of the Holly Kaaba. Afghanistan had almost become a failed state. With its boundaries intact, it had the status under international law of an independent and sovereign country but in reality the writ of the Government did not extend even with in the capital. 4 EMERGENCE OF TALIBAN Taliban is the plural of Talib the term commonly used in Pushto for religious student, studying in a religious school/Madrasa. . Education in religious seminaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban did not first out of the blue as some commentators thought. They had always been an integral part of Afghan society, living in madrassa attached with masques, knocking from door to door to collect food for their meals, and entirely dependent on the generosity of the faithful of their education and upkeeps5. The name of Taliban first came to public notice, both inside and out side of Afghanistan in October 1994 when some Mujahiddin commanders in Kandahar area hijacked a 30 trucks of Pakistani convey with tempting load of food, Medicines, and gifts for central Asian States of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, dispatched by Pakistan interior minister major General Nasirullah Khan Baber (Retd) In two weeks the Taliban recaptured the convoy, killed the commanders and opened the road to central Asia. They also replaced the Mujahiddin appointed governor in the province of Kandahar Kabul and Helmand. 148

Other incident was the rape of three Hearty women, the confinement of two young boys dressed as girls in bases belonging to notorious Mujahiddin Commanders like Nadir Jan Saleh Jan and Daro Khan. such incidents exhausted the patience of Mullah Umer and his colleagues .As a stator of total 55 Taliban headed by Mullah Umer seized areas, where the rapes were committed. They started cleaning the road blocks set up by the Afghan commanders to open the highway to the normal vehicular traffic. According to Taliban sources in this process, the Pakistan trade caravan was released. Nearly 1500 Taliban form Afghan madrassa (religious school) joined their colleagues in Kandahar. The slogan of Taliban was”Surrender we are coming”. After the Hereti family incident, Mullah Umar who had returned from his studies, after the Russian withdrawal, decided to work towards bringing peace and introducing Islamic values in Afghanistan. With the help of some Taliban he “found (Tehrik- Islami - Taliban Afghanistan. With the following objectives,  To disarm all the rival militias.  To, fight against all those who did not accept their request to give up arms.  To enforce Islamic law in the areas they liberated, and.  To retain all the areas they captured.  The Taliban rose with these objectives and made spectacular6. . But the girl’s plight moved him to act. Gathering 30 former guerrilla fighters, who distributed among them 16 Kalashnikov rifles, 7 were led by him to attack on the checkpoint, freed the girls and tried the checkpoint commander by a noose to the barrel of an old Soviet tank. 8 This single episode is now part of Afghan folklore. Barely 30 months after taking up his rifle, Mullah Umar was the supreme ruler of most of Afghanistan. The Mullah, 40 years old, who had lost his right eye in the war against the Russians, is known his followers as Prince of all believers. Although he is universally known in Afghanistan as Mullah, (giver of knowledge) he is a shy man who still calls himself a Talib (seeker after knowledge). He has met only once with a foreign reporter, Mr. Rahimullah Yusufzai, whom he told that “we were fighting against Muslims who had gone wrong, and how could we remain quiet when we could see crimes being committed against women, and 149

the poor”. With each new action against the warlords, Taliban’s manpower, and arsenal grew. The new recruits also included many men who had served in crucial military positions as pilots, tank commanders and front-line infantry officers in the Afghan Communist forces that fought under Soviet control in the 1980’s. In June 1994, Pakistan decided to establish rail and road links to the Central Asia in order to tap the region resources. On September 14, 1994 Gen. Nasirullah Babar, the Interior Minister announced that the following week he would travel to Central Asia via Kandahar and Heart to negotiate the transit of a Pakistani convoy. Meanwhile Benazir Bhutto paid a visit to Turkmenistan to attend its independent day celebrations. The two powerful Afghan warlords, namely Rashid Dostum and Ismail-Khan, heads of the Shuras in Mazar-I-Sharif and Heart also took part in the Turkmenistan’s national day celebration at the invitation of the President. There Benazir Bhutto held long parleys with both the Afghan warlords who controlled Afghanistan’s borders with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. An agreement was reached and both the leaders assured full co-operation to Benazir Bhutto to facilitate the transportation of humanitarian convoys to Turkmenistan via Heart and Mazar-I-Sharif. On getting go ahead from Dostum and Ismail Khan, a convoy of thirty trucks loaded with food, cloths, and medical supplies left Quetta for Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted access to the Muslim Central Asian states so that to counter their isolation in ‘Post Cold War era’. Washington and other Western and Muslim states were no more interested in Afghanistan. For this purpose a friendly and stable Afghanistan would mean a potential economic bonanza for Pakistan and a strategic-depth which was cherished by Pakistan for a long time. It was also in the interest of Central Asian states to have an opening to the sea; otherwise, they could never be free from Russia. But outside the American-built airport at Kandahar, a Mujahideen commander, guarding one of the thousands of checkpoints, seized the convoy, demanding ransom. Once again, Taliban intervened, freeing the convoy, and hanging again from a tank barrel, the commander who had hijacked it. This event produced great enthusiasm in Pakistani official circles for Taliban on one hand and on the other, it gave rise to the 150

widespread belief that Taliban were created by Pakistan and Nasirullah Babar was the man behind the scene. On the other hand, regional powers like Russia, India, Iran and other were bent upon to out-maneuver Pakistan in the Afghan affairs. Indian offered extensive cooperation on economic field to Afghanistan. She also offered assistance in the training of the Armed Forces, including supply of defense hardware. . There were also reports that the Ahmed Shah Masud was receiving ‘Technical Assistance’ from India. Various reports indicated that Indian planes have been clandestinely flying into Afghanistan to provide material support. 9 It was ironical that Rabbani who had enjoyed support and hospitality from Pakistan during the days of Jihad had directed his vengeance against that very country. The Rabbani- Ahmed Shah Masud forces organized a mob that attacked Pakistan’s embassy including Pakistan ambassador, one of the embassy staff succumbed to his injuries later in the hospital. 10 Pakistan lodged a protest note with the Kabul government and demanded strong action against the alleged hooligans, and demanded due apology and compensation. But the Kabul government turned down the protest in a most scornful manner, and warned further more serious consequences, if Taliban did not stop rocketing Kabul. As a result, the relations between the two governments touched its lowest ebb, and as a protest, the government of Pakistan closed its Embassy at Kabul. 11 Against this back-drop, Pakistan had no other option but to support Taliban Movement and counter the interference of regional powers in Afghanistan and her subsequent isolation in the region. The restoration of order by Taliban was also in the interest of Pakistan. In December Pakistani workers were repairing the airport in Kandahar and the Kandahar Heart highway. Pakistan also sent three more convoy to the Central Asia and thus there emerged big prospects of having close commercial relations with the newly merged states, which could serve as a strategic depth against India. The Taliban movement has produced a fear among the regional states. The Iranians see Taliban as ‘Sunni fundamentalists’ who are essentially anti-Shia and who could spread their revolutionary message among the Sunni minorities the Baloch Turkmen and Hazara-who inhabit the Iranian side of the Iran-Afghan border. The Pushtuns have never 151

ruled before Heart. And Iran was clearly not willing to let them do so now. Mean while, the Indian connections with Rabbani has been pains-taxingly cultivated by R, A, W, in its old strategy, to keep creating problems for Pakistan. The move was part of the proxy war that India was waging in Karachi and other places to counter Pakistani support for the Kashmiri liberation fighter. To his end, India has rebuilt Masuood’s air force from the ground up, supplied advanced avionics and radar equipment to MIG fighter, helped modernize the key Bagram airbase outside Kabul and, in all probability, has also equipped Masud’s planes and heavy artillery with key munitions which they were lacking. Russia, for its part, has long enjoyed close links with Ahmad Shah Masud. In the mid- eighties, Soviet troops had negotiated two cease-fires in the Panjsher Valley with Masud. At that time, these moves had aroused the suspicions of General Zia as well as the Pushtun Mujahidin. Even after the fall of Kabul, Russia had continued to print currency notes for Afghan government and provide them ammunition through circuitous routes. On August 3, a Russian Iluyshin-76 cargo plane was forced to land in Kandahar Taliban jets. It was carrying 3.4 million rounds of ammunition had been bought from Albania, flown to Dubai and was on its way to Kabul when it was intercepted Taliban were convinced that Russia had funded and organized this purchase. 12 The Saudis, meanwhile, have obviously opted against playing a direct major role in Afghanistan. They are still smarting from the betrayal of their protégées, such as Hekmatyar, during the Gulf War. Almost all Saudi backed factions in Afghanistan decided to back Saddam Hussain during the war, despite the hundreds of millions of dollars these commanders had received from Riyadh in the eighties. 13 For Pakistan it will take years to reverse this change in the regional power balance on ties borders. Indian and Russian animosity aside, incurring Iran’s ire has been the biggest blow to the foreign policy establishment. 14 Although there are various Versions about the birth, organization, composition and successes. But many of the states and people think that they were the product of Pakistan because Pakistan was the first to recognize Taliban and supported and projected their ideas. The question of their funding is again a mystery. How do they get the money to 152

maintain their fighting forces and run their administration in a war torn country with very meager resources its is a real question? It is believed, as well as the Pakistani religious entities mentioned, they get handsome financial support from the Gulf States and some other Muslim countries. But many blames Pakistan for organizing training and arming the Taliban give no solid evidence to substantiate his claims. Ijlal Haider Zaidi and Rehimullah Yousafzai believe smuggling is a source of their funds. 15 Ahmed Rashid ads yield from poppy cultivation added to these sources of income of the opium dealer and transporter goes straight to the Taliban war chest. 16.

SHAPE AND SCOPE OF TALIBAN ADMINISTRATION The Taliban were a military force. It is a myth that they came to power with a shot being fired. They did not originate from a standard military training programme, but from a complex mixture of social and political contexts which went some way towards explaining their character17. The Taliban were not simply an example of villagers coming to the cities. Their values were not the values of the village, but the values of the village as interpreted by refugee camp dwellers or Madrassa students who typically had not known normal village life. They were a pathogenic force, whose view of the world conspicuously omitted the pragmatic moderation, which historically had muted the application of tribal and religious codes in Afghan society. Taliban were not at all representative of Afghanistan’s social complexities: they were an overwhelmingly Sunni Pushtoon group, and many of them were fiercely hostile to Afghanistan’s ethnic and Shiite minorities. Beware of the beggar who becomes king, runs a well-known Afghan proverb. The undisputed leader of the Taliban, from its inception to its collapse, was Mulla Muhammad Umar. He had little mass charismatic appeal, and was a poor speaker, but was respected for his piety by the top leadership of the movement. He had lost an eye as a combatant during the war against the Soviets, and plainly found his injury mortifying: he did not allow himself to be photographed, and in a meeting with one senior visitor kept twisting his head to hide his disfigurement. On March, 4th 1996 in a gathering of 153

Ulema at Kandahar, took the title of Amir- ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful), and to legitimate his authority, appeared in public with one of Afghanistan’s most sacred treasures, the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad (Khirqa-I Mubarak). Following this nomenclature, the Taliban re-titled their country ‘The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’. The deployment of this title was symbolically significant: it marked a claim to absolute authority, and a decisive repudiation of power sharing, or indeed of politics. When one knows one is right, there is no reason to give scope to others to propagate error. Shura meetings are no longer held, and the Kabul ministers are rarely consulted about key decisions. Mullah Umer has become much more isolated. The core group around him includes some Kandahari Ulema and judges of the Supreme Court of Kandahar (who are all above 70 years old, have never traveled outside Kandahar, and are extremist and simplistic in their views); a few powerful, hard-line individuals from the Taliban structure such as Mullah Nuruddin Turabi, Minister of Justice and head of the Religious Police, Chief of Army Staff Mullah Mohammad Hasan, and Commander Dadullah; individual Afghans working in Umar’s office who were educated in Pakistani Madrassas and who have a strongly expansionist and Jihadist view of the Taliban’s role in the Muslim world; Usama Bin Ladin and other Arabs who advise Umer on foreign policy (some Afghans from Qandahar even claim that Bin Ladin is consulted on domestic issues such as the Buddhas); and Pakistani ISI officers18. With in the Taliban, there were a number of distinct groups. The leaders were not young students, but like Mulla Umar himself had typically been combatants in Mujahidin party, most commonly the Hezb-e Islami of Khalis, and the Harakat Islami of Mawlavi Muhammadi (who strongly supported the Taliban). The Madrassa students who gave the movement its name, on the other hand, were often too young to have fought against the USSR. Many were orphans from refugee camps who had been recruited into Madrassas and had lacked any normal family or home life. To a large extent they were victims of the Soviet-Afghan war, and their inadequate socialization in significant measure accounted for their ability to do things which would have been unthinkable in traditional Afghan society, such as rain blows on women in the street. The movement also contained Khalqis who had joined the Taliban out of ethnic solidarity, whom the 154

prominent Talib Mulla Muhammad Masum Afghani described as ‘communists …. Who have abandoned their old ideas19 In addition, as the Taliban continued to spread through the country, a large number of people prudentially switched to their side, providing them with an ostensibly large, but in fact rather fragile support base. Once the Taliban has controlled on all the important provinces of Afghanistan including its capital Kabul. The central authority formed administrative team for each of the province. Governors for each province were installed and for each district in the provinces were appointed (Olus Wall) or District Head. The head of the provinces, districts with other respective departments used to be very much loyal to the central authority. They were to obey the order of the ‘Amir ul Momeineen’. Most of the governors and head of the different departments were not necessarily to be educated. They were to hold their offices by implementing the orders by any means. IMPOSING OF ISLAMIC PENAL CODE The Taliban’s ‘answer’ to the issue of security was rigorous application of Islamic law (Sharia). Their conception of law was a simple one: rather than seeing law as a complex tradition or discourse subject to evolution and reinterpretation, they viewed it as a rigid code of rules including penalties to be enforced. The message that there should be no compulsion in religion, contained in the Koran (Sura al-Baqarah, 2: 256) carried no weight with them. The agency for the enforcement of law was the religious police, or to give it its full title, Amr bil-Maroof WA Nahi An il-Munkir, the department responsible for ‘the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice’, an expression derived from the Koran. The religious police proved to be one of the best organized of the Taliban’s agencies, and also one of the most vicious. The combination of police powers and religious zealotry is a frightening one, under the Taliban the mere existence of such an agency served the purpose of deterring resistance, rules were obeyed by fear. The Religious Police had no concept of due process, let alone a sense that accused persons were innocent until proved guilty. Those who fell into their hands could to be treated abominably. In common with most totalitarian movements, the Taliban recognized no such thing as 155

‘private’ sphere of life, lying beyond the reach of public authorities. The period of Taliban rule was one in which, for once, the absence of a state-building agenda might actually have been a blessing in disguise. The policies of the Taliban have also aroused controversy because of their particularly detailed and onerous restrictions on how women and men should dress and behave. On 6th December 1996, the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice announced that it had punished 225 women the previous day, in accordance with the Shari’s, for violating its rules on clothing. It stated: As the dignity and honor of a Muslim woman is ensured by observing hejab [seclusion from society] as requested by Shari’s all honorable sisters are strongly asked to completely observe hejab as recommended by Shari’s. This can be achieved only if our dear sisters wear burqas, because full hejab cannot be achieved by wearing only a chador [a large piece of material that envelops the body and covers the head but leaves all or part of the face uncovered, at the discretion of the wearer]. In cases of violation, no one will have the right of complaint. Men have also been required to conform to a strict dress code, avoiding Western clothing and abstaining from shaving20. PRESENT –ONE PARTY POLITICAL SITUATION Since the Taliban did not recognize any realm of legitimate political contestation, political freedom did not exist in the areas over which they held sway. Media of communication were equally subject to control. Television broadcasts were discontinued, and Television sets banned. Radio broadcasts were limited to prayers and propaganda. Reporters sans Frontiers accurately described Afghanistan under the Taliban as ‘a country with no news or pictures’The Taliban’s early promises to withdraw from public life had long been forgotten. During the whole period of Taliban, the regime never tolerated any one to stand against them if any group would try to resist Taliban they were labeled against the Afghanistan even against the Islam. The one party system during the Taliban regime did not let any opposition to emerge in Afghanistan21. IMPLICABLE ROLE OF TALIBAN The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was unique, 156

their approach to the inhabitants of the country and to the rest of the world was difficult to understand and not easy to handle. Their implacable role was based on old traditional values, which did not permit the people ruled by them to go and spend their Lives with the passage of the time. Their policy of isolation created problems not only for them but also to those states that recognized them and projected them. Though the emergence of Taliban no doubt brought peace and stability to the areas under their control, but they failed to provide a viable political and administrative system for the country at large, capable of reflecting popular sentiments. Their premature drive to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic Shariah by denying freedom and imposing various curbs on the people especially women, greatly undermined their standing, and thus arrested their long cherished march towards the northern Afghanistan, where the people are opposed to the Taliban style of government. But the Taliban, despite their inherent short comings are capable enough to bring the whole country under their rule, as the anti-Taliban alliance comprising, Gen Dostum, Hezb-I-Wahdat and Ahmad Saha Masud have failed to maintain much needed unity among their ranks, and bogged down in internal infighting. But the Taliban are not a viable force to be reckoned to ensure permanent peace in the country. They might remain on national horizon for few years, till they are replaced by another force.22 In short the masses disillusioned with the prevalent conditions, have pinned their hopes on Zahir Shah, who is the only non-partisan personality capable enough to put the country on the track to peace and reconstruction. Moreover, the regional as well as the big powers are also in favor of bringing Zahir Shah back to the country to play his historic role. POWER STRUGGLE AND CIVIL WAR The rapid achievement of Taliban in the Southern provinces of Afghanistan and in those areas which are linked to Pakistan borders encouraged Taliban to go ahead. Taliban in very less time occupied the capital of the country and tried to push the forces opponent to them, but with the fall of Kabul, the situation was not as easy for Taliban as it was in Southern Province. 157

The period from 1996 to the fall of Taliban in Oct, 2001, had left the country in a very critical situation as their started a civil war between Taliban and the Northern alliance. The Taliban in order to occupy Kabul, Mazar –e-Shrif, Heart and other main province in the Northern parts had to face a very strong opposition, both the groups did not hesitate to massacre those whom they defined as enemies, when the Taliban occupied Mazar-e- Sharif on 8th Aug. 1998, they embarked on three days massacre which can be described as ‘genocidal in its ferocity’ in response the Uzbeks led by Abdul Rashid Dostum and Malik Pehlawan killed hundreds of Taliban when they recapture Mazar-e-Sharif. The civil war continued till the fall of Taliban. Ahmed Shah Masood who was assassinated just two days before the 9/11th tragedy had proved him undefeatable and was successful to maintain Panjshir valley independent from Taliban. Taliban in order to defeat him took all measures but was not successful. During the rule of Taliban the Hazara tribes who are mainly Shia in Bamian were the main target of Taliban. In open massacre hundreds of the people were killed. As the identities of the communities and the meanings of the lives of their members often are much too cultural practices and cultural property. The Taliban were prepared to disrupt the former and destroy the letter if they thought it necessary to do so. One manifestation of this was the prohibition of music, but much the most spectacular episode, which earned the Taliban world wide condemnation, was the destruction on 10th March, 2001 of Afghanistan two greatest archaeological treasures, the giant states of Buddha crushed in the cliffs above Bamiyan and smashing way the historical Kabul Museum. Such measures further extended the gulf and prolong the civil war which ended with the fall of Taliban. FOREIGN POLICY OF TALIBAN ADMINISTRATION In this modern era, The world has become a global village where each and every state tries to find friends and creates good relations with other countries there are about two hundred countries connected with each other in different spare of life and they in order to have close links have formed International organizations such UNO, NATO, European Union, OIC, SAARC, ASEAN etc. Different states have membership in different organizations; the purpose is to be able to preserve their interests. 158

Afghanistan, one of the important country too have membership in different world organization and played an important role in affairs but unfortunately, since the Taliban came to power, the country was isolated as due to civil war in Afghanistan and mainly because of Taliban’s rigid and traditional approach to world problems. They were not accepted in any organization. Taliban’s Administration only became successful in getting reorganizations by three countries namely Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate but the rest of the World did not recognize them although they had about 90% of area in their control. The Taliban Administration tried its best to find friends and get reorganization from them, but their suspicious role in the internal affairs, their behavior towards women, ill tolerance to opposition, harsh attitudes with foreigners and closing of educational institutions, a new brand of Islam did not let the world community to have confidence on them. In the external and foreign affairs, their strong links with all those organizations who were either declared terrorist or wanted in different states, their links with Osama Bin Laden, the most wanted person by USA, his presence in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan as his base camp23, all such measures did not let the Taliban regime to be recognized by the world. Instead of them Rabbani was considered as a legal representative of the country and he during this period used to take the seat of Afghanistan in different occasions even Ahmed Shah Masood, the stanch enemy of Taliban used to visit other states, particularly his speech in European parliament. The tragic event of 11th September 2001 further isolated the Taliban and the attack of USA on Afghanistan washed out the Taliban. So, the foreign policy of Taliban Administration was not a successful one. They were not able to find friends. Those three states that earlier recognized them dropped them after 11th September tragedy and Taliban’s regime ended with no feeling of sorry from any country of the world, even from Pakistan. PAKISTAN’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS Moderates in the Pakistani Foreign Policy establishment argue that the focus of Pakistan policy on its North - Western border should be opening of trade route to new states of central Asia. Naseerullah Khan Babar is reported to have argued that 159

Afghanistan would not be stable or a united country, for a long time, and that Pakistan could not afford to wait until then to expand its links with Central Asia. Instead of relying on the dubious claims of Hakmatyar, that he would soon take over Kabul and stabilize Afghanistan Pakistan should directly deal with whatever power existed on the ground to facilitate the development of ground trade to central Asia. If the route from Peshawar through Kabul and salang pass was blocked due to war in Kabul, Pakistan should seek to open the south-western route from Quetta through Kandahar to Heart to Turkemanistan, In June 1994 the Banzair Bhutto cabinet decided to proceed with building rail and road links to central Asia. The World Bank promised $ 1.5 m for the feasibility study. (25) After the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Pakistan was faced with two policy choices, either:  It could have tried seriously to broker peace and to form a coalition government in Afghanistan regardless of whether the Afghan Pashtun were to emerge as the leading force in Kabul thus, placing Pakistan as the critical power at the crossroad of Central Asia,  It could continue supporting the Afghan Pushtuns in their bid for power in Kabul, with the knowledge that access to Central Asia would remain blocked until this was achieved. 26 Pakistan, with its strong domestic Pushtuns lobby and the belief that the Afghan Pushtuns would quickly emerge victorious in Kabul, opted the second option and thus missed its economic opportunities in central Asia. A part of geo-political and geo- strategic interests of Pakistan in supporting Taliban, following are some of the perceived interests:  Pakistan is trying to salvage some or its bigger strategy and is working on the premise that if the whole of Afghanistan can not be secured then at least Taliban south can be used to create an opening to the Central Asian states;  Pakistan’s keen desire to implement gas and oil pipe line projects through Afghanistan is linked roots most important strategic aim to become a major trade and business conduit for Western companies dealing with Central Asia. Pakistan 160

is determined to be a major export route for Central Asian energy. With US sanctions on, it continues to hold out for Afghan pipeline routes. 27 The pipeline project could force the Afghan warlords into a kind of peace, save Pakistan’s economy form massive energy shortages in the next decade and even help improve relation with India. From Karachi, the pipeline could feed Asian markets Hungary for energy at far cheaper price than Middle East oil. 28  Pakistan wanted to involve USA in the region particularly in Afghanistan,. In an attempt to place Pakistan as a significant ‘geo-strategic’ ally of the US in the Post Cold war era. Since 1950, Islamabad’s close relationship with US, in particular the relationships between their two militaries, were based on Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union, China and the Persian Gulf, and its role as a key player in west Asia. The Pak-US relationship was also helped by the fat that India was allied with the Soviet Union. However, at the end of the Cold War, Pakistan’s strategic value for the US has diminished considerably, while its nuclear weapons program forced the US administration to cancel all military and economic aid in 1990. After Kabul feel to the Mujahideen, in 1992, the US also turned its back on Afghanistan. More recently India has begun to court Washington. Pakistan is concerned that US Business interest in India May leaden her to a tilt toward New Delhi. Pakistan thus sees Unocal’s gas and oil pipeline projects as a unique opportunity to re-establish itself in Washington’s eyes as a key strategic partner in Central Asia, for which a friendly Government in Afghanistan is a must.  The need for energy is Pakistan’s final objective to access cheap energy supplies particularly gas. Pakistan has proven gas reserves of 22 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Current consumption is 0.7 tcf/year with an annual increase in demand estimated at 0.07 tcf/year. Oil companies also estimate that there is presently a 0.4 tcf/year suppressed additional demand for gas. Gas accounts for 37 percent of Pakistan’s energy consumption and the largest fields at , Balochistan, are in the process of being depleted. By the year 2010, Pakistan will face between 5 and 8 bcf/year shortfall in gas. Islamabad’s other options – a gas pipeline from Iran and another 161

from Qatar, have been stalled for lack of funding and political problems. Pakistan has a comprehensive gas pipeline infrastructure that could feed Turkmen gas to major cities with little new investment. 29 Pakistan is keen to substitute gas for fuel oil, especially for industry and new power generation projects. Pakistan imported US $ 2.24 billion of oil In 1996-97, equivalent to 19 per cent of its total imports and 20% of its exports. Local production of oil, which was 70.000 b/d in the early 1990s, has dropped to 58,000b/d in 1996-97. Substituting gas for fuel oil would dramatically reduce the country’s oil import bill;  The US, UNOCAL and parts of the Pakistani business lobby want to see the gas pipeline extend to India, a move that would link the two warring neighbors in an economic partnership. The Nawaz Sharif government has initiated talks with India on the common disputes over Kashmir and other issues. 30 India is unwilling to discuss the Kashmir dispute, while Pakistan refuses to discuss economic and trade links with India until Kashmir is put on top of the agendas. Both governments face implacable domestic political foes if they are seen to be conceding too much to the other side. In this state of freeze, the US is arguing that foreign trade and economic ties before racking thorny political issues like Kashmir, would build confidence between the two nationals. All these interest and objectives could not be achieved until a stable, friendly, neutral, cooperative and non-hostile government is installed at Kabul. 31 Pakistan’s strategic agenda and its economic problems are still dwarfed by the crisis in Afghanistan, as far as the pipeline projects are concerned. The future course of Pakistan’s Afghan policy remains critical to the projects. Pakistan has consistently based its Afghan policy on backing the Afghan Pushtuns as opposed to the other Afghan ethnic minorities, as Pushtuns straddle the pours border between the two counties and dominates the North West Frontier Province and the Northern part of Balochistan Province. Thus the influential Pakistani Pushtuns within the military, bureaucracy and political leadership, strongly influence Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which is based on Pushtuns factor. Pakistan’s predicament is that it can not abandon the pro-Pushtuns 162

policy because of the sever political repercussions such a move may have in the NWFP. The loss of Kabul to the Tajiks has angered, hurt and dismayed Pakistani Pushtuns who have performed several political some results to keep up with events in Afghanistan. When, even Wali Khan has become a supporter of Pushtuns fundamentalist leaders like Hekmatyar, because the Pushtun can not stand to see Kabul being ruled by the Tajiks. 32 The last 23 years of war has forever altered the ethnic balance in Afghanistan. For better or for worse, the war has crushed the Pushtuns predominance and reduced them to just one more ethnic factor in the vicious fragmentation that is threatening to rent the very fabric of the Afghan State. An equitable sharing of powers among all ethnic groups in Afghanistan is vital for peace in the region. 33 The Pushtuns have to wake up to this reality and so does the Pakistan foreign policy establishment Changing Relations with the Taliban Government The Taliban claimed to have established an Islamic state during their six years rule in Afghanistan, However, in reality, what they made practice was any thing but not Islam. The ultimate good of a progressive state is to establish peace in the country, harmony among different people. Both were found missing during their six years of tenure.34 Pakistan was disappointed from Taliban when its efforts did not succeed in moderating Taliban’s policies on socio-cultural issues, the demolition of the Buddha statute, and the treatment of the volunteer of international welfare and relief agencies. The outside world too had a very poor impression of the way they behaved towards women and the non- Muslim minorities. The demolition of Buddha’s statues was enough to antagonize the world at large. They also turned down Pakistan’s request for not granting refuge to Pakistanis involved in acts of terrorism in Pakistan, maintaining that these were no such people in Afghanistan. Taliban’s image as hardliner and traditionalist and their biased attitude against women provoked the world and gave their opponents a chance to launch combined opposition by arming the Northern Alliance. 35 Afghanistan unfortunately once again fell prey to outside meddling. India kept its distance from Taliban in-order to be able to get allied with anti-Taliban forces at the opportune moment. Taliban’s diplomatic relations were confined to three countries only, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Most of the countries had yet to 163

recognize them. The USA Russia and Central Asian republics were opposing them. This provided India the opportunity to out plank its archrival Pakistan and it joined hands with Russia in strategic partnership on October 3, 2000 against the Taliban threat. 36 The West in general and the US in particular was getting restive at the presence of Osama bin laden and his followers in Afghanistan. Though the American policy towards the Taliban was initially ambivalent later the bombing of two US embassies in Kenya (Nairobi) and Tanzania (Dar-e-Salaam) in August 1998 changed the situation. It turned America against the Taliban as bin laden and his AL- Qaeda organization were held responsible for attacks37. The Taliban leadership was of the views that there was no evidence that Bin laden was responsible for such activities. 38 Their perception was that the rules of Islamic hospitality ruled out their expelling him or that he be handed over per trial. The US government has declared Osama a terrorist and on August 20, 1998 launched cruise missiles against suspected terrorist sites in Afghanistan. 39 The US also asked Pakistan to use its influence over Kabul for the extradition of Osama bin Laden. 40 The Pakistani government also asked the US government to make direct contact with the Taliban over the Osama issue41. the United Nations Security Council through a resolution asked the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden to the countries affected by his terrorism by November 14, 1999 otherwise sanctions would be imposed against it.42 Saudia Arabia too wanted Bin Laden handed over for trial there. When the Taliban leadership refused to handover laden and did not comply the instructions of the Security Council the economic sanctions against Afghanistan became effective with effect from November 15, 1999 43 These sanctions prevented Afghan’s Air Service Arianna from flying outside the country. The UN sanctions could cause under hardship to the Afghan people because discontinuation of supply of food stuffs and food stuffs and medicine could play havoc with the whole population. 44 these sanctions could also force a new wave of Afghan. Refugees into Pakistan and consequently Pakistan have so far continued the supply of foodstuff to Kabul on humanitarian grounds. Pakistan slightly pulled back from Taliban in 2000 but its policy makers, especially the ISI personnel dealing with Taliban, did not want to turn their back on them and they were stuck with the outdated concept of 164

strategic territorial depth. That the existence of a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan would provide territorial depth to Pakistan in any military conflict with India. This argument was premised on the assumption that the Taliban Government would share Pakistan’s regional security perceptions. Pakistan was soft paddling on Taliban and militant Islamic groups because the Pakistani military authorities, especially the ISI were using some of these groups for advancing their goals in Indian-administrated Kashmir. The ideologically motivated Islamic volunteers strengthened the insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan adopted a dual- track policy on Afghanistan. It began to deny any undercover or special linkages with and influence over the Taliban administration but quietly continued to help the Taliban government. What made these denials unsustainable was Pakistan’s defense of Taliban at the international forums. Pakistan lobbied with a large number of countries for recognition of the Taliban government and it advocated that Afghanistan’s seat in the UN should be given to the Taliban government plea was not accepted by the UN members. At times Pakistan was the only country that maintained favorable disposition towards the Afghanistan government. This naturally created the impression that Pakistan was a supporter and sympathizer of the Taliban government. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S ATTITUDE As far as the international community is concerned the basic question is that of their acceptability. The international community is not convinced of the administrative model they follow, and has concerns about their hard-line attitude particularly towards women. Coupled with this Afghanistan has, thanks to anarchic state of affairs over the past 23 years, become a hub of drug production and smuggling. The Taliban support Jihad whether in Chechnya or Kashmir, such factors have given the world community many excuses to distance themselves from Afghanistan, The Taliban have to realize that Afghanistan has to move in the contemporary world and it needs massive foreign aid for reconstruction and rehabilitation, If they do not pay heed to the concerns of the outer world the question of their recognition and foreign assistance will remain unresolved. This will mean continuation of problems both for the Afghan nation and the Taliban themselves. . 165

REFERENCES 1 Kamal Matinuddin henceforth matin, the Taliban Phenomena, oxford University press, 1999, P.P. 24 - 26. 2 Naqib Ullah can Taliban Unite Afghanistan. The frontier Post August, 5, 1999. 3 Danayal Saleem Gillani, who are Taliban, the frontier post August –28 1999. 4 Ibid. P. 141. 5 The Nation, Islamabad, 18-09-2000. 6 Matin, OP.Cit, PP. 171-172 7 Ibid.180 8 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban exporting extremism world Affairs, November, December 1999- P. 139. 9 Matin OP. Cit, PP- 50- 57. 10 Abdul Satter, Afghanistan, Past, present and future from Jihad. To civil war, the institute of Regional studies, Islamabad, 1997, PP, 462-3. 11 No change in Afghan policy say sattar. The News, March 13, 2000. 12 Musa Khan Jalalzai, Taliban and the great Game in Afghanistan Vanguards, publishers, 1999, P. 107. 13 Kamal Op. Cit P, 121 14 Ibid p, 127 15 Dr. Fazle Rehman merwat, Pak. Strategic role in the Afghan crisis, journal Pakistan study center University of Peshawar vol. Spring Autumn 1993. No 27, 28. P. 37. 16 Matin, op, cit PP 133, 40, 41. 17 No change in Afghan Policy say satter the News. March 13 2000. 18 US. Russian getting closer on Afghanistan policy report. The News June 5, 2000. 19 Maitiuddin Kamal, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush Afghanistan 1978-1991. P.64. 20 Boris Pethov, Afghanistan Today Impressions of Journalist, New Delhi, Sterling, Publishers, Privet Led. 1985, P.71 21 Mohammed Yousif and Mark Adkin, The Dear Trap Afghanistan Untold Story, Lahore Jung Publisher 5th Edition, 1983, P.37. 22 The Pipline War in Afghanistanistan .Musa Khan Jalalzai Mobile Institute of 166

International Affairs Lahore Maktaba Jadeed Press ,2000.p,65-67. 23 Khalid Akhter, “Pakistan can turn to be the biggest looser”, The Muslim, Islamabad, Oct 26, 1992. 24 The News, Islamabad, Nov. 2, 1992. 25 Dostum demands share in power”, The Frontier Post, Lahore, Nov. 13 1992. 26 Amera Saeed, op. cit. P. 144. 27 Thomas Barfeild, “The Afghan Morass”, Current Affairs, July 1996, p. 47 28 Bakhsh Rais, War Without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition after the Cold War (Karachi: Oxford University press, 1994), p.9. 29 The Muslim, Islamabad, Oct 28, 1992. 30 Khalid Mukhtar, OP.cit, Oct 23, 1992. 31 Mushahid Hussain, “Reversal in Afghanistan” The National, July3, 1994. 32 The News, 30 December, 1994.. 33 MushahidHussain.op.cit. 34 Dr Qazai Shakil Ahmad,’’Reconstruction of Afghanistan. Problims and Prospect,’’ Current Affairs, Lahore, AUGUST 2002, P33. 35 Rahimullah Yusafzai’’Anti Taliban Block’’The News, Islamabad, December 5,2000.. 36 Dawn. Karchi Oct 4,2000.alsoGurmeet Kanwal.Afghanistan Imbroglio’’ The States ManDelhi,November9,2000 . 37 Amin Saikal,’’The role of outside Actors in the Afghanistan Conflict;’’ in Afghanistan.A Country with out a State Christine Neoele. Karim (eds)Islamabad Vangauard Books, 2002 p225. 38 Dawn,Karachi.June 6,1998 to August 31.1998. 39 The News Islamabad, August21,1998. 40 The Washington Post,Wshting, DC,August 25, 1998. 41 The Nation, Lahore August30,1998. 42 The New York Times, New York,September.10.1999. 43 The News,Islamabad ,Nov 16, 2004.Dawn. 44 The Nation . Lahore December 10,2004.

Chapter- VII The event of 9/11 and War against terrorism: its impect on Pak –Afghan relations 167

There accord some of the historical events in the history of the world which brought changes to the political, social and economical order of the world. Such events demark the relations between the States and People. The tragic event of the 11th September, 2001, the day when the two twin towers of World Trade Center in New York USA and the building of Pentagon, Washington were attacked by Airplanes hijacked by some suicide attackers, killing thousands of the people and demolishing the World Trade Centre brought a very rapid changes to the world. The post 11th September scenario let the world to think seriously about such events, which used to be happening since long particularly the USA took it very serious as their people, buildings and country was under attack. The USA without prior investigations blamed AL-QAIDA of Osama Bin Laden responsible for the attack. Osama who had taken shelter in Afghanistan with Taliban was to face consequences. Surely with such blame on Osama bin Laden, Afghanistan was to face the threat of USA and other countries. The. Pakistan’s decision to join the US led coalition against its former ally Taliban for combating terrorism after the terrorist attacks on the symbols of the US financial (World Trade Centre, New York City) and military powers (Pentagon, Washington DC)on September 11, 2001was a major shift in Pakistan’s Afghan policy. By abandoning its support to the Taliban government Pakistan lost support among the Pushtuns, while it had already alienated the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Hazras grouped in the Northern Alliance, who now became the allies of the US. Importance of Afghanistan for Pakistan can hardly be under estimated. It is certainly Pakistan’s last line of defense from the north. Pakistan is directly facing political, economic and strategic consequences of present Afghanistan situation and crisis the impact of 9/11 on Pakistan’s domestic and external policies towards Afghanistan would be the focal point of discussion in this chapter. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the symbols of US financial and military power and the consequent tragic destruction of human life may well signify a new kind of world war in the twenty first century and instantaneously changed the political 168

landscape of the world.1. President Bush immediately put the US military on a global high alert and vowed to hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts. He delivered his message to the world on September 20, 2001: “Either you will us, or you are with the terrorists. Either you stand with civilization and good (US) or with barbarism and evil (Them). Choose and to those nations that choose wrongly, beware2. This message of us Bush to the world (voice) has become the animating concept of American foreign policy, transforming the entire focus of his administration. After resisting for while, the US finally announced on September 23, 2001 that it was willing to go public with evidence against Bin Laden.3 The announcement though did little to dispel the world wide cynicism regarding the FBI ability to conclusively link the attacks to Bin Laden. Most of this cynicism appears to have emanated from the conflicting statements issued by the FBI itself4. These terrorist attacks have dramatically changed the political landscape of the world and terrorism has emerged as great threat to the international peace and security.5 In this changed environment the world seems to be behind the US in its war against terrorism where as inwardly various under currents are gradually shaping up the strategic dynamics of the world in general and Asia in particular.6 The Taliban administration became the focus of the world attention especially for hosting the controversial Arab guest Osama bin Laden the Bush doctrine “either you are with us or against us” left no third option for those who were once supporters of the Taliban. Different countries are trying to adjust to the changed situation by participating in this war effort in a manner and extent that suit to their respective regimes. Stunned by attacks upset and desperate the US has apparently succeeded in having all and sundry to be on its side against what it terms ‘war’ against ‘terrorism’ against those whom it declares terrorists or accuses of harboring terrorists. 7 These terrorist attacks laid the foundation for emerging new world order, to which both Pakistan and India reacted in haste. At times, Pakistan was the only country that maintained favorable disposition towards the Afghanistan Government. This naturally created the impression that Pakistan was a supporter and sympathizer of the Taliban government. The terrorist attacks made it impossible for Pakistan to continue pursuing the dual-track approach on Afghanistan. 169

Pakistan asked the Taliban administration not to support Osama bin Laden and to hand over him to some international organizations (i.e. the OIC) or a neutral country for investigation into his role in global terrorism. On September 15, 2001, Pakistan announced that it would extend full co-operation to the international community in its fight against terrorism without involving its forces in any action beyond its geographical boundaries8. On September 19, 2001 Gen Musharraf, in his famous “Lay off”, speech said, they have offered all military facilities to America and are on their side. The objective is to get rid of Pakistan declared as a terrorist state and harm our strategic interests and the Kashmir cause”.9. Through he did not mention who they were but it was obvious he was referring to India. In India on the other hand apprehension was mounting as summed up in the Hindu’s editorial of September 18, that contours of a possible coalition are still far from clear.10 Again on September 20, the Hindu pointed out that “regardless of tacit American assurance that present tie-up between the US and Pakistan need not destabilize peace and politics elsewhere on the international stage, the plan of forming the nucleus of a globalize alliance against terrorism does not yet seem to have crystallized” 11 However, Pakistan’s unequivocal support-including logistical and intelligence assistance-against global terrorism. Its. (after the latter’s intransigent attitude towards Islamabad’s medication to defuse controversy over Laden’s extradition to the US), the Bush Administration’s priority to remove the Taliban government politico-economic stabilization of Pakistan in an effort to prevent latter’s nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of militants in India’s perspective had prima facie4prevented US from declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. 12 Pakistan joined the US led coalition against its former ally Taliban regime in Afghanistan to safeguard its national interest in a radically altered international scenario. 13 Secretary of State Colin Powel confirmed that Pakistan had agreed to all US requests made in connection with any planned military action against Osama Bin Laden, whom President George W Bush named as prime suspect in September 11 attacks 14. Addressing the reporters at Camp David President Bush thanked the government and people of Pakistan for their offer of unconditional support. He declared the war against terrorism and said that the US would do “whatever it takes” to hunt down “Terrorist 15. 170

After the unfortunate acts of terrorism on September 11, the UAE and Saudi Arabia withdrew their recognition of the Taliban government. By the time American military action resumed against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 Pakistan was the only country that had diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. 16 The Government of Pakistan argued that it was only serving diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in order to continue with the ongoing dialogue with the Taliban government and to provide the international community with a contact-point for interacting with the Taliban government in Afghanistan.17 However Pakistan made it clear from its policy statement and actions that it did not support the Taliban Government. A quite obvious change in the attitude of the government since the beginning of attacks on Afghanistan was felt at all levels. It seemed as Pakistani President and officials have become the spokesmen for the US in threatening Taliban and want to convey that our cooperation in the US led effort is unconditional and that we would not even let our national interests and integrity come in way of this cooperation 18. Innocent people are being killed in the massive air bombing that is going on in the name of destroying training camps and defense system of Taliban. The Government and its media are calling these attacks on terrorist’s camps.19. Quite contrary to his otherwise careful attitude the president himself subscribed to this view in his press conference20. The US forces were allowed unrestricted use of at least three of Pakistan’s airbases. The Government at first denied such reports even though international media was reporting such news ceaselessly but at last had to admit the fact21. The United States was seeking full and practical cooperation from Pakistan to hunt down the suspects involved in the attacks on the world trade center in New York and the Pentagon22. President Pervaz Musharraf again assured US President George Bush of Pakistan’s unstinted cooperation” in the fight against terrorism Musharraf had already conveyed the assurance of Pakistan’s unstinted cooperation” in the fight against international terrorism Colin Powell the American Secretary of State was happy with the response from Islamabad23. In this American-led war against terrorism. Pakistan decided to abandon the Taliban and side with Washington. As a result of this decision the basic assumptions of Pakistan’s Afghan policy that a Taliban controlled Afghanistan was in the interest of 171

Pakistan was discarded Pakistan had successfully broken out of its isolation by agreeing to provide unstinted support to the United States in its war against terrorism24. It was no longer a pariah state and could respond to India’s moves with greater confidence. Having made a U-turn on its Afghan policy it did not have to worry about the concerns of the international community about Pakistan’s support to the Taliban. Pakistan itself was suffering from domestic violence and terrorist activity. Musharraf was also assured of full support by the US to solve the Kashmir dispute and provide economic aid to Pakistan25.with a major shift in its Afghan policy, Pakistan has lost whatever influence it had in Afghanistan. Since the Soviet invasion of December 1979, Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan has been centered on three major issues. Early First, the massive refugee influx that began in 1980s tied Pakistan and US together much more closely than they had ever been in past. Second, Pakistan became frontline state in the last great battle of the cold war, which meant that it enjoyed an unprecedented closeness with the United States during the 1980’s and became the major patron of the Afghan Mujahideen (holy warriors) fighting against the Soviet army and Afghan government forces. Third, thus, by the 1980’s Afghanistan had come to be seen no longer as a minor neighborhood problem but as a major national security issue for Pakistan 26. In his effort to take the nation in confidence, president Musharraf spelled out Pakistan’s main concerns that had substantially contused towards the policy formation at this critical juncture of Pakistan history. Four concern were highlighted which included Four concern were highlighted which included Pakistan’s 1 Security, revival of economy 2 Defense of strategic 3 Nuclear missile assets, and the 4 Kashmir cause. Even cursory glance at them clearly reveals that each of these concerns deserves considerable attention27 but we feel that Pakistan totally fail to get any objective. The US openly at official level started to pressure Pakistan to stop cross border terrorism and blame for the transformation of nuclear technology to North Korea. US policy toward 172

Pakistan is fast bordering on the absorbed the realities of power not with standing. On the one hand US relationship with Pakistan has degenerated in to a one way traffic of punitive measures which are being dished out almost on a daily basis or so it would seem, and there the perception is as important as the reality on the ground on the days that there is no negative action against Pakistan by the US administration, there will be news of some US based study or the other, which condemns Pakistan for all manner of ills28. The official media and analysts favored Musharraf policy and argued that if military government had opposed the United States it could not have prevented punitive action against Afghanistan, which could have been launched from elsewhere, more ever, Pakistan could have been declared a terrorist state and that would have meant an end of this country, over Taliban policy was so isolated in character that it had even begun to create distance between US and to our best, time tested friends, via China and Iran.29 Post 9/11 phase and Pakistan In the chequered history of Pak- Afghan relation the post 9/11 phase is complicated by a new version of (great game) that engaged the major powers in the 19th and 20th centuries for the control of earth land of Asia30, the US was believed to have decided to more against Taliban regime any way, in the autumn of 2001, but the terrorist attacks on US provided an ample justification and Pakistan found itself obliged to join the global war against terror, this is the third time in history a world super power has intruded in Afghanistan, great Britain, in the 19th century, and the Soviet Union, in the late 20th century both had a bitter experience in their Afghan expedition, in the post-military operation, Pakistan was flooded with refugees, multiplying Pakistan’s problems caused by the Afghan refugees that are already in Pakistan military action in Afghanistan condemned in Pakistan by all the major sections of public opinion, this had triggered a country wide street agitation in the form of anti America frenzy,31. . Under the Bonn accord an Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai has been appointed has the interim head of Afghanistan who was latter elected president of Afghanistan, the Bonn conference, attended by four Afghan groups, agreed on setting up a 930 member council to run the administration, the next step was the convening of Loya Jirga which endorsed Hamid Karzai’s administration set up for .Afghanistan. 173

Pakistan expressed the hope that the agreement signed in Bonn on –interim authority in Afghanistan would usher in area of peace and stability in the war-ravaged country32, Pakistan also extended its felicitations to the Afghan people and the united nations on the agreement, ministry of foreign affairs spokes man said that Pakistan would continue to extend full support and assistance UN mediated political process for the restoration of durable peace in Afghanistan, we have faith in the wisdom of Afghan people and believe that the new interim authority would establish the foundation of stable and prosperous Afghanistan friendly to all its neighbors,33 .Pakistan Foreign minister Abdul Sattar told Reporters that news of the Del the step up an interim authority for post-Taliban Afghanistan was broken to President Pervez Musharraf at a cabinet meeting and we are delighted to hear the news, 34. Pakistan analyst remarked as:” while the US can take solace that a fluent English speaking America loving Afghan will replace the non English speaking compulsive anti Mullah Omar as the head of the government in Kabul, it is no less a miracle, under the present geo-strategic situation, for Pakistan to have fluent Urdu speaking Pakistan friendly Afghan citizen getting ready to lead the first post Taliban government in Afghanistan, 35. President Perez Musharraf telephoned Hamid Karzai and congratulated him ,36 .the president’s contact with Karzai was going to follow Pakistan’s recognition of the new Afghan set up as it assumed office on December 22, 2001, Islamabad had withdrawn diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government a few weeks back, Karzai was full of praise for the whole hearted support of Pakistan for millions of refugees for decades, on December 2001, US defense secretary Donal Remsfeld said that he was convinced that Pakistan did not fly any aero planes or helicopters in to Afghanistan to evacuate any Pakistani prisoners from there, 37 in an interview with MBS’s ‘’meet the press ‘’ Rumsfeld, who was asked to respond to the charges by the north alliance about Pakistani planes flying into Jalalabad to evacuate Pakistanis, said ‘’ according to my information neither Pakistan nor any other country flew any plains into Afghanistan to evacuate any body and Pakistan was cooperating fully with the US in its campaign against terrorism as it had deployed crack troops on the border with Afghan to stop any one from escaping into Pakistan,.38 Pakistani delegation visited Kabul to attend an impressive ceremony on December 22, 2001, marking the 174

assumption of office by the interim administration. The delegation, including foreign minister Abdul Sattar Edhi, Asfandyar Wali Khan, Rustum Shah Mohammad, Khadim Hussain Changezi and additional secretary Aziz Ahmed Khan, was received with kindness and respect on its arrival a Bagram airport,39. the delegation meet with different Afghan officials, foreign minister also conveyed to the Chairman, Hamid Karzai Pakistan’s offer to participate in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development, the Afghan leader welcomed the decision, in their speeches at the ceremony, all Afghan leader expressed their determination to put an end to strife, bring peace and begin construction in development of the country which, they said, would be a blessing for Afghanistan and its neighbor’s specially Pakistan,. the spokeman of ministry of foreign affairs Anwar Mohammad said on December 21, 2001that the government would issue an advisory to the central bank to freeze the assets and accounts of Ummah Tamer-e-Nau (UTN) accused by Washington of helping accused terrorist Osama bin Laden.40 Bush said that UTN had provided nuclear arms data to bin Laden the alleged mastermind of September 11, 2001 attacks in new York and Washington.41. Pakistan delivered notice to Washington on December 28, 2001 that it may note be able to provide crucial logistical support to US and British troops operating in Afghanistan in the face of possible conflict with India.42 two division of Pakistan troops are in north west frontier and Balochistan provinces, bordering Afghanistan to prevent Osama bin Laden in his AL Qaida fighter from entering Pakistan and provide support for the US led coalition forces more than 2,000 US troops are stationed in Pakistan which has also essentially handed over three air bases to the US forces. The military official said that Pakistan particularly needed the Jacobabad air base in southern Sindh provinces, where the concentration of India troops is largest. 43 Pakistan and Afghanistan have decided to enhance political cooperation aimed at benefiting the people of both countries. Speaking at a joint news conference with finances minister and Shaukat Aziz on January 10, 2002 Afghan finances minister Hidayat Amin Arsla said ‘’ I have come here to meet Pakistani friends and I gave a general picture of the problems that we are facing in our country and my hopes is that we will have productive relationship in future which should mutually benefit the people of both the country, 44 Pakistan and Afghan border authorities agreed to exchange criminals 175

wanted by each side and would take joint operation against the member of AL Qaida group, 45 The decision was taken at a meting held at the Chaman border, in Balochistan which was attended by governor of Kandahar Gul Agha, US official and Pakistani officials, Pakistan began formal moves to resurrect its relationship with Afghan on January 14, 2002 when it’s reopened its diplomatic mission in Kabul, 46. Pakistani diplomats told the newsmen in Kabul they were confident that hostility between two countries over. Islamabad’s sponsorship of Afghanistan’s former ruling Taliban regime would be replaced by mutual self-interest Pakistan’s diplomatic mission in Afghan capital was abandoned shortly after the US led bombing campaign in Afghan began on October 7,2001,47 Foreign minister Abdul Sattar said that Pakistan had committed to contribute an amount of $100 million to the Afghanistan’s rehabilitation program and it also included a credit line of US $50 million, he was talking to Ms-Sadak Ogala, Japanes Prime Minister’s special representative for Afghanistan’s assistance who called on him in Islamabad, 48 Afghan leader Hamid Karzai that he has forgotten about Pakistan’s support for Taliban in the past and he has best of intension for Islamabad based on Afghanistan’s national interest, he was interviewing with CNN, 49 CNN’s Wolf Blitzer asked him if he was confident that Musharraf would help Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai responded that Musharraf was the first president of a country to call him, even when he was away from Kabul in the control Afghanistan and he called to congratulate him and to extend his cooperation, 50 Afghan interim leader Hamid Karzai visited Pakistan in February 2002 and discussed bilateral relations whit president Musharraf both leaders acted pragmatically and prudently, when they announced , amid visible and touching signs of warmth and friendship at their joint news conference that they had already buried the past51. Both leaders demonstrated great good will for each other. The memorable scene, which lent spontaneity and genuineness to the show, was foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah cheering the two leaders when they talked of friendship between Pakistan new Afghanistan a known close friend of India52. The offer of sending two other known Indian friends to Pakistan defense minister general Faheem and interior minister Yunus Qanooni, was another positive gesture. By making his first official trip to Islamabad and 176

not to New Delhi, Karzai has also demonstrated diplomatic finances as his administration was already being accused of packing a lot of anti Pakistan’s elements. Some wrong perceptions have to be quickly removed and the Karzai visit has done just that simultaneously it has also addressed the domestic sensitivity of calming down Pakistan concerns and apprehensions on both sides of the Durand Line. With Karzai building a dependable bridge with Pakistan majority of Afghan Pashtun will stay reassumed and confident that they would not be bulldozed by other partners in a fragile. General Musharraf has given his complete assurance that Pakistan will remain with Afghanistan in all its endeavour’s to improve its lot. Pakistan is extremely interested in heaving a peaceful stable united and prosperous Afghanistan as its brotherly neighbor. Pakistan has handed over to Kabul a list of its 877 citizens being held by various Afghan warlords since the fall of Taliban and demanded their immediate repatriation. Sources in the interior ministry confirmed that the list was given to Hamid Karzai during his visit to Islamabad 53 The Northern Alliance (NA) commanders had sent letters to the families of the detainees demanding $5000 to 10,000 for the release of each prisoner. These Pakistanis had gone to Afghanistan in October 2001, to fight the US forces along with the Taliban. President Musharraf had raised the issue the release of 877 prisoners with the visiting Afghan ruler and asked him to resolve the issue as it was creating serious problems for the families of the detainees. It was also pointed out that the detainees mostly belonged to poor families and could not afford to meet the inhuman demands of the (NA) commanders. The Afghan ruler has told the Pakistani authorities that he would conduct an investigation into the matter and try to get the detainees released by the end of February 2002. Hamid Karzai paid two days sate visited India on February 26 and 27, 2002 putting to some extent at rest speculation that he is not too enthusiastic about India. No major political or security agreements were signed with Afghanistan during his visit nor were there any declarations of profound policies about bilateral relations or regional developments54. There was criticism and concern in some circles in India that despite the unqualified support which India gave to the campaign against the Taliban and the 177

promptitude with which India extended developmental assistance to Afghanistan Karzi has not given sufficient attention to India. As usual the irrelevant Indian lament was he went to Pakistan but he had not given any final dates for visit to India 55 President Musharraf visited Afghanistan on April 2, 2002 and held formal talks with Chairman Karzai. He was warmed welcome and received at the Kabul airport by Karzai. He was the first head of a country in the region who visited Kabul after the Karzai’s interim government took over in December 2001. Gen Musharraf was accompanied by a 10 member delegation 56 Mr. Karzai told the news briefing that they had discussed the prevention of sanctuaries of terrorists on both sides of Afghan Pakistan border and they had fruitful discussion on various issues including refuees transit trade start of air flights between various cities of the two countries and the war against drugs and terrorism 57 Gen Musharraf said “He was extremely glad that he saw Kabul in the hands of a new government. Which was trying to bring new conditions to Afghanistan to bring normally back into Afghanistan and to bring the general grandeur of this place back to Afghanistan and to Kabul and we will assist him (Karazai, all the way in whatever he wants to do in Afghanistan”58 President Musharraf recalled the centuries old ties between two countries and said: “we have common history geography our rivers and mountains are common we have common religion and there was no scope whatsoever for doing anything other than being brothers and for working in mutual interests 59 He expressed the hope that the visit of Gen. Musharraf will further promote the brotherly links between the two countries, besides paving the way for more economic activities in this region and there is no misunderstanding between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He announced that he will look into the release to those Pakistani prisoners who have no links with Al Qaida. This was the first formal state visit by a head of state after the fall of Taliban regime. Mr. Hamid Karzai had paid an official visit of Pakistan on February 8, 2002 at the head of a 20 member high level delegation along with foreign minister and finance minister. The former Afghan King Zahir Shah returned to Kabul on April 18, 2002 after nearly thirty years in self exile. Pakistan welcomed and hoped that his return will see the reunification of all Afghan people which should lead to successful Loya 178

Jirga 60 In the past Pakistan had not favored the return of Zahir Shah through at one time during the first government of Benazir efforts had been made to contact him, and emissaries from Islamabad had met the king. It was Pakistan’s point view that Zahir Shah as has been emphasized by him will be returning more as an elderly statesman rather than a monarch. India also welcomed the return of the former King Zahir Shah. The foreign office spokesperson said in a statement that we look forward to the former king playing unifying role as the new Afghanistan emerges from the clutches of fundamentalism obscurantism and terrorism and the former monarch and his family had maintained excellent relations with India and we also remained in contact over the past decade as various efforts were made to bring Afghanistan out of the conflict situation 61 Thirty Pakistanis who had gone to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban in October 2001 arrived Peshawar after being freed by the interim government. A special Pakistani plane was sent to Kabul to bring the freed prisoners of war to home. Except two injured young men the other Pakistanis were all old and weak. An Islamic group Tanzime Nifaz- e-Shariat Muhammad that had been banned by the government had taken the men from Malakanmd to Afghanistan to fight what it called jihad against the US troops. Talking to reporters at the Peshawar airport the freed men said they do not regret going to Afghanistan to take part in the holy war 62 They said all of them were released more than two months ago by Afghan deputy defense minister Abdul Rashid Dostam from the Shibergham prison due to their old age but were rearrested on Kabul while in their way to Pakistan. They blamed the Hamid Karzai led interim government for re-arresting them and locking them up in Kabul. They were all praise for Rasheed Dostam for his kind behavior and releasing them honorably, but came hard on Karzai government which put them behind the bars. Hundred of Pakistan is still being held in different jails in Afghanistan. Another group of 49 Pakistanis imprisoned in Shabarghan headquarter of Jauzjan province in the Northern Afghanistan was airlifted to Peshawar from Kabul on May 13, 2002. There are part of those thousands of people dispatched by banned Tahrik Nifaz Shirt Muhammadi to Afghanistan in October and Nevember 2001 and are mostly between 40 and 50 years. With the arrival of these 49 prisoners, the number of total detainees sent back from Afghanistan was reached 25363 Hamid Karzai Chairman of 179

Afghanistan’s interim government has said that he completely husts President Pervez Musharraf presumably politically. However, he insists that New Delhi help was crucial in Afghanistan’s future economic stake in the Central Asian hydro carbon reserves63. He told the newsmen that once a gas pipeline comes through from Turkmenistan, Afghanistan to Pakistan, India’s cooperation would be important and has already briefed New Delhi on the pipeline proposal. 64 Pakistan minister for Labor an Manpower Owais Ghani and others arrived in Kabul on May 21, 2002 by the inaugural PIA flight from Islamabad marking the resumption of air link between Pakistan minister for Labour and Manpower Owais Ghani and others arrived in Kabul on May 21, 2002 by the inaugural PIA flight from Islamabad marking the resumption of air link between Pakistan and Afghanistan after 23 years. The delegation called on Afghan interim administration chairman Hamid Karzai, and discussed with him bilateral relations, including enhancement of trade between the two counties65 Owais Ghani corrveyed the warm regards of Pervez Musharraf to Hamid Karzai, and apprised him of the rising tension following unprovoked shelling by India across the line of control. Expressing his concern over the situation, Hamid Karzai called on Pakistan and India to solve the dispute through negotiations and war is not a solution to the problems. He also welcomed the first PIA flight to Kabul and remarked that it would strengthen the trade bond between the two countries besides contributing to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. He also spoke of the close fraternal ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan and recalled the support given by Pakistan in the Jihad in his country. Foreign office spokesman, Aziz Ahmed Khan said that Pakistan is investigating into the reporters of nearly 30 Pakistanis who had airlifted from inside Afghanistan and flown through a Central Asian State to New Delhi. He was talking to News in Islamabad on July 5, 2002. He said that we have taken up the reporters about these Pakistanis both with the Hamid Karzai government and with the official of the US. Both countries have denied that such an incident has occurred. But we have still urged the Afghan government to be more alert 66. Officials in Islamabad are surprised how it was possible for aircraft to come into Afghan air peace or leave it without the American’s knowledge. Islamabad feared that if New Delhi resorts to use its relations with the Northern Alliance 180

and certain central Asian states not friendly to Pakistan, then these Pakistanis are likely to be used by India for its allegations of cross border terrorism. Earlier before the Hamid Karzai government was in place there were also reports of such of Pakistanis to India Afghan foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah and finance minister Dr, Ashraf Ghani visited Pakistan in August 2002 and held talks with a number of officials including Pervez Musharraf. They stressed the need for the two countries to boost cooperation in their efforts to stamp out terrorism and rooting out drug trafficking 67. Pervez Musharraf offered his government’s full cooperation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s infrastructure, which has been badly battered following years of war, fratricidal fighting and strife. The just concluded visit to Pakistan by two high ranking Afghan ministers was a reassuring sign that relations between the two neighbors are back on an even keel, following the fall of the Taliban regime. An India analyst wrote “Ordinary people in Afghanistan are quick to express their positive sentiment for India while hold Pakistan responsible for the civil wars. But India is determined to avoid any impression that its activism in Afghanistan is in any way tied to its own problems with Pakistan the long broader between Afghanistan and Pakistan makes Islamabad always an important player in Afghanistan. The current distrust between the two countries is deep and Pakistan has no one to blame but itself Islamabad looks at its own long-term interests and sheds its barely concealed hostility to Kabul, it could more towards liberal trading arrangements between land-locked Afghanistan. Pakistan and India All three nations and the region will stand to gain from such an arrangement” 68 Pakistan reiterated that it would not allow its territory to be used by anyone to destabilize Afghanistan. The assurance was given by foreign minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri during a meeting with visiting US presidential envoy to Afghanistan and Iraq Zalmay Khalilzada69 Kasuri underlined Pakistan’s continued support to president Karzai government in Afghanistan and agreed that stable prosperous Afghanistan was in Pakistan’s interest. Some Afghan officials have used suspected Taliban and Al-Quaeda extremists of a spate of attacks on the US and pro-government militia in southern and eastern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan. Afghan foreign minister 181

Abdullah said that recently there has been some security incidents which of course have been a cause of concern for the government of Afghanistan for the people of Afghanistan and for the international community and most of those activities were planned outside Afghanistan without naming any county. Afghan president Hamid Kazzai arrived in Islamabad on April 20, 2003 for two days official visit to Pakistan and held talks with President Musharraf Prime Minister Mir Zaffar Ullah Jamali and the other Pakistan officials. They had discussed several contentious issues including refugees transit trade cross border security terrorism and drug trafficking. Afghan President Hamid Karzai told the newsmen that his government favors the resolution of the Kashmir issue in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions. He was talking to the news reporters at a joint news conference with prime minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali at the Prime Minister House after their talks 70. Mr. Karzai said “we support the UN resolutions and in accordance to that we seek a resolution of the difficulties between India and Pakistan”. He gave this statement in response to a question about how his government would help the people of occupied Kashmir to attain their right of self determinations as granted to them by the UN Security Council resolutions number 91 and 122. The Afghan Interior Minister Ali Amjad visited Pakistan in July 2003 and discussed the security situation in Afghanistan with Pakistani officials. At a press conference at Islamabad on July 25, 2003, Pakistan interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat and his Afghan counterpart agreed that neither side would allow subversive elements to use its territory for creating trouble in the other 71 The Agreement came in the wake of a number of unpleasant incidents including the attack on Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul the anti Pakistan demonstrations in number of Afghan cities and the Hamid Karzai government’s own complaints against Islamabad. At the press conference Mr. Jalal claimed that some elements were using Pakistan territory to carry out sides into Afghanistan72. On its part Islamabad feels that there has been a menacing rise in anti Pakistan activity since the Kabul government allowed India to establish consulates in cities closer to Pakistan. The Afghan minister denied that India was involved in any anti- Pakistan activity, but given the state of Indo Pakistan relations Kabul must listen to 182

Pakistan’ concerns. The Afghan interior minister’s visit to Pakistan seems to have ended on positive note’ with the two sides agreeing on number of points. The proceedings of the press conference gave ample reason for all is believed that the two sides seem keen to sort out the differences and control the activities of those bent upon harming their bilateral relations. The situation has been complicated by the fact that there are certain influential elements in the Afghan government who do not hold a very charitable view of Pakistan and its government. Some of them hold important positions in Karzai’s administration and wield considerable influence in regions outside capital. Especially hostile to Pakistan is the Punjsheri group, which has often tended to follow an independent line in foreign policy that goes not only against that of the Karzai administration but is also against the spirit of the Bonn Accord. Meanwhile Mr. Jalali’s suggestion that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan be given special permits to travel freely across the border needs to be looked at cautiously because it could be easily misused by the very subversive elements the two countries want to stamp out. For the fourth time since the Soviet withdrawal in which Pakistan played a day role the embassy of Pakistan was ransacked in Kabul by a mob of students on July 8, 2003 73 The factions in the Northern Alliance, which dominate the interim government were apparently involved, in what was an outrage that could not have been perpetrated without official connivance or complicity. Indeed the governor of the state bank was reported to have led one of the demonstrations. Afghan interior minister Mr. Jalali during his visit to Islamabad assured Pakistani leaders that his country was eager to have cordial relations with Pakistan. After the Pakistan ambassador announced the closing of the mission as a mark of protest President Karzai spoke to President Musharraf expressing regret for the violation of diplomatic premises and offering to make good the losses. For all the resentments that exist in “Afghanistan against Pakistan, the maintenance of a working relationship is essential for this land locked county with a neighbor having the longest border as well as the most crucial transit facilities74. Leading English daily wrote in his editorial “One can hardly over emphasize the need for Pakistan to build a mutually rewarding relationship with Afghanistan. Our dealings with our western neighbor one must admit” have often been based on misreading of the 183

Afghan situation and on a failure to comprehend the dynamics of political change taking police in that country. As a result we have often faced disappointments and frustrations in managing our relations with Kabul. It is of very great importance that we follow the complex changes currently under way in Afghanistan with great care and not allow our earlier assumptions to colorful understanding of the intricacies of the Afghan reality. Some Afghan dignitaries, including President Karzai have been quite outspoken in articulation their concerns with regard to Pakistan Afghanistan relations. We need to formulate proper responses to these Afghan concerns75. Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani visited Pakistan in August 2003 to attend the meeting of the joint economic commission of Pakistan and Afghanistan in Islamabad. In the meeting the Afghan minister asked Pakistan to do away with the negative list of the 1965 trade pact and extend financial support to Afghanistan the way India was soing. By enforcing the negative list he said Pakistan has forfeited its right to have free trade with Afghanistan76 Referring to the broader question of bilateral economic relations, he bluntly told Pakistan to compete with India for competition was the spirit of the times. As the Afghan minister pointed out India had given the county 400 buses and was helping with establishing a fiberglass factory. New Delhi was also involved in several construction and educational projects across the county. We also know that India is helping Afghanistan in training its civil aviation staff and has given it three passenger airliners. In sharp contrast Pakistan seems to have concentrated on the political side of the relationship and paid far less attention to the economic dimension of their bilateral ties. It is true Pakistan has committed 100 million dollars to Afghanistan’s post war reconstruction, and the Afghan minister appreciated this gesture. The foreign minister Khurshid Mehmood Kassuri visited Afghanistan in August 2003 and discussed with Afghan officials on further cooperation between the two countries and to narrow the rift caused by on the recent attack on the Pakistan embassy in Kabul. The issues that have grabbed the headlines relate to better military and intelligence cooperation along the troubled Pakistan Afghanistan border. Mr. Kasuri said over 600 Pakistani held in Afghan jails would soon be repatriated to Pakistan where they would remain in custody pending a through screening. Many of them may turn out to be innocent victims of the ringing 184

calls for Jihad by some of our religious parties other may be ideologically committed and trained fighters whose release might pose a great dilemma77 Spurred no doubt by the blunt remark of the Afghan finance minister earlier August 2003, when he had more less asked Pakistan to stop complaining about what India was doing and instead do more on its own part. Mr. Kasuri has also reported on new measures of economic and social cooperation. PIA flights to Kabul are due to be increased and Pakistani banks will start operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan will also build secondary schools and medical clinics and it is in these fields where Pakistani help can most usefully improve the quality of the people of Afghanistan. Mr. Kasuri’s suggestion for more people to people exchanges should help to overcome some of the mistrust and misgivings dating back to Taliban era. Afghan President Hamid Karzai on July 25, 2004 abruptly and unexpectedly postponed a visit to Pakistan a day before the deadline for the nomination of the presidential candidates in Afghanistan’s upcoming election in October 2004. Mr. Karzai had been scheduled to fly to Pakistan for a two day visit on July 206, 2004 and the trip has been postponed because it coincided with the deadline for the presidential candidacy nominations78. Both Karzai and Musharraf agreed to reschedule the trip in the near future. President Musharraf said that Pakistan had arrested a top AL-Qaeda suspect wanted by the US. The suspect was arrested on July 29, 2004 but declined to name him79 Al Arabia news channel quoted that the arrested person is Tanzanian who is married to an Uzbek women may be Ahmed Khalfan Ghalani who is on the FBI’s most wanted terrorist list for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzada praised Pakistan for preventing cross border attacks during the Afghan election and said Islamabad played a useful and important role in ensuring peace at that critical stage. He told in a briefing at the Pentagon that I have to take advantage to the opportunity to say Pakistan played a useful important rule to cooperate to present as much as possible cross border operation. This display of good will from an envoy that is otherwise known for his blistering attacks on Pakistan was rare and short. He stopped abruptly while searching for more words to praise Pakistan and then moved on to other subject80. Afghan president Hamid Karzai paid a state visit to Islamabad on March 22, 2005. He met President Pervez 185

Musharraf Prime Minister Shaoukat Aziz and the other Pakistani officials81. He also attended the armed forces parade on Pakistan day and was the Chief Guest which showed the importance Islamabad attaches to the relations with its western neighbour. The Karzai visit was of great significance and he discussed bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The visit helped both Pakistan and Pakistan identify the areas of cooperation in the coming year. Pakistan realizing the future prospects agreed to cooperate in sectors like education health public transport82. A land locked county Afghanistan has traditionally relied on Pakistan for its trade with the outside world it has also depended on Pakistan for essential supplies including food oil and pharmaceuticals. On August 30, 2005 Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s spokeman Karim Rahimi said that Pakistan should not put pressure on Afghan refugees to return home83. He said on the eve of a Pakistani deadline for camps to close in remote region where troops have been battling Islamic militants. About 2.5 million Afghan refugees have returned home from Pakistan since the Taliban government was overthrown in late 2001, but more than million remain in Pakistan. The spokesman further said that the government of Afghanistan wanted that there should be no pressure on refugees and they should not be displaced by forced and return of refugees should be voluntary. Pakistani says that repatriation from camps in its Kurram and Bajour agencies is voluntary and it wants the 100,000 (one lac) refugees home and the camps closed by the end of August 2005. Pakistan has doubled the aid it offered to Afghan in 2002 to 200 million in 2005 and has provided extensive assistance in the humanitarian sphere by rebuilding hospitals and donating ambulance and other equipment 84 The situation in Afghanistan has not stabilized and the number of the US casualties has mounted steeply since the beginning of 2005. Despite the deployment of over 70,000 troops in the tribal area Pakistan is still facing occasional accusations of “not doing enough against the Taliban85 The US and Afghan official often complaint that Pakistan’s lawless tribal belt acts as a spring board for Taliban insurgents to launch attacks inside Afghanistan and have urged Islamabad to do more to stop militant incursions86 As the Bush administration wants to make Afghanistan a show piece of progress and democratization to divert attention from the setback it has been facing in Iran. Having 186

relied mainly on the Northern Alliance and giving sought to eliminate the Taliban who have close ethnic ties with tribes on the Pakistan side of the border the US has demanded firm and resolute action from the government of Pervez Musharraf in the counter terrorist operations87. Indeed the support and cooperation of Pakistan is critical to the war against terror in Afghanistan that spills over into Pakistan itself. This role involves having to move against elements in the tribal area that have ties with the Pushtoon population of East and South Afghanistan from which the Taliban had derived their support. It is also the largely Pushtoon militias of the Taliban who suffered the heaviest casualties during the US led attacks on Afghanistan. As such the resistance of the Taliban has a major component of the pushtoon tradition of revenge against those who shed their blood. In launching their operations in the tribal belt, the Pakistan army has sustained sizable casualties in killing or capturing Al Qaeda militants 88. Who have been given sanctuary by the local tribes whose traditional code requires that they must defend those under their protection? As wanted persons keep trickling in from Afghanistan across a porous border the Pakistan armed forces have to remain engaged in region that was not even open to them under the traditional agreements with the tribal leader going back to British times. The problem is complicated by the fact that most of the terrorists are not only well armed but also take advantage of the mountainous terrain rendering the task of apprehending them extremely difficult and dangerous. As some of them keep returning into Afghanistan, there have been allegations by Afghan Government leaders and even some American personalities (Like the former Ambassador Zulmay Khalalzada an American of Afghan descent) that Pakistan has been less than diligent in dealing effectively with Afghan militants seeking shelter on its territory. Under these circumstances Pakistan told US Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice that it was will to fence its border with Afghanistan to dispel allegations that Islamabad was not doing enough to stop cross border infiltration89. Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri told the Journalists in New York “we are fed up with these allegations and we have offered to fence the border but so far Afghanistan has not responded to our proposals” 90. He further said “There are people who say that President Musharraf wants to stop infiltrations but some is the ISI do not. We want all such allegations to stop. That is why, 187

we have proposed this fence. The US secretary of state said “This was a pleasant surprise for her and Pakistan had a vested interest in peace and stability in Afghanistan and three years ago our trade with Afghanistan was only $30 million a year now with improvement of peace in Afghanistan it has increased by 40 times”91. Mr. Kasuri said that peace in Afghanistan did not suit Afghan warlords and drug traffickers and they stirred trouble and put blame on Pakistan. He acknowledge that the proposed fence could create problems inside Pakistan where as a report suggested local Pashtoons Might oppose the proposal and we will deal with these problems when we come across them. Losing one’s patience and then seeking a brick and mortar solution to a political problem is just what we do not need if the rocky Pakistan Afghanistan relationship is to be stabilized Peaceful Afghan citizens have traditionally come `down to Pakistan to Pakistan’s plains during winter to earn a living and then go back How will a fence effect the life pattern on both sides of the border? Then there is the daunting physical task of erecting a fence along a 2500 km border. And even after we do that will that stop infiltration from either side? We have seen how those Benton trouble can make a mockery of the most stringent border controls. The question should be calmly thought through by both sides. It is ultimately the responsibility of the two governments to isolate militants through the political and economic development of the tribal areas. An English Daily Dawn criticized the proposal of border fencing and wrote “Are we for bringing down walls and barriers between countries and people or are we in favor of erecting new barricades? First this issue has to be resolved before the problem connected with the proposal to fence the Pakistan-Afghanistan border can be taken up”92 Political parties have opposed president Gen Pervez Musharraf’s offer to fence the Pakistan Afghanistan border to curb cross border infiltration. The Awami National Party (ANP) an opponent of the Durand Line agreement suggests that both governments should resolve issues through political means instead of fencing the border. Secretary Information ANP Zahid Khan said the party never recognized Durand Line as international border between two countries and would never support such a more93. He further said that Durand Line divides Pushtoon living on both side of the border and the party opposes the fencing proposal. The Jamaat-I-Islami (JI) termed the offer is 188

tantamount of officially accepting the Afghan government that Islamabad facilitated cross border terrorism in the region Senator Professor Mohammad Ibrahim Khan of the JI said that Gen Musharraf has become approver by offering to erect fence along the border. He said that the offer is unethical unnatural and impossible. On the one hand the government is talking about globalization and on the other it offers to demarcate the border wire. He further said that the Afghan government was leveling baseless charges of infiltration from this side of the border and that Pakistan was facilitating Taliban and other elements. 94 PPP spokesmen Senator Farhatullah Babar said that parliament due on September 18, 2005 Pakistan has found it necessary to increase its forces along the border with Afghanistan substantially adding 5,000 troops on the frontier of the NWFP and 45,00 along the border of Balochistan. This has raised the total number to 80,000 which is far higher than the combined forces of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) now mainly drawn from NATO and the US, and the Afghan security forces. These forces have been deployed to prevent Pushtoon dissidents and Al Qaeda remnants from interfering with the Afghan elections on September 18, 2005. The Corps commander Peshawar Lt. Gen Safdar Hussain said that fencing of the border with Afghanistan was not Pakistan’s problem and infiltration was Afghanistan’s problem and let the Afghan fence the border themselves.95 Emphasizing that security in Afghanistan was in Pakistan’s interest and he was deploying another 5,000 troops to completely seal the borders and reinforce the ongoing military operation in North Waziristan. . Pakistan forces tightened security along the long porous border with Afghanistan to prevent Taliban militants and their allies from disrupting Afghan parliamentary elections. The army spokesmen said that some 50 new check points had been set up along the border to plug all possible infiltration routes and frontier road traffic has also been suspended. Security forces backed by helicopter gunship also hunted Al-Qaeda militants believed to be hiding village in North Waziristan tribal region near Afghan border. An intelligence official told newsmen that five suspected militants had been arrested and their identity was still being ascertained.96 but US are not satisfied and demanding from Pakistan do more. 189

REFERENCES 1. Khalid Rehman, Terrorism: Challenge and way out pre- and post September 11 2. Senario, Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2001, pp. 47 -48. 3. The New York Times, New York. September 24, 2001. 4. www.whitehouse.gov/ news 5. The Washington Times, Washington DC, September 21, 2001. 6. Dr. Moeed Pirzada, “Kashmir”: Indian Strategic Initiative Since 9/11 and imperative for US policy in the Region”, IPR Journal, Volume 11 number1, Winter 2003,Islambad Policy Research Instutite,p.126 7. The News, Islamabad, September 16, 2001. 8. Dawn, Lahore, September 20, 2001. 9. The Hindu, Delhi, September 18, 2001. 10. Ibid. September 30,2001 11. Gaurave Kampani, “Placing the indo Pakistani standoff in perspective”, Centre for Non Proliferation studies, Monterey institute of International Studies, March 2002, P.8 also see Dan Balz, Bob Wood ward and jeff Himmel man, “Afghanistan Campaign Blue Print Emerges: Part 3 September 13”, the Washington Post, January 29, 2002, p. A01. 12. Dr Moeed Pirzada Kahmir: Indian Strategic Initiative Since 9/11 and imperative for US policy in the Region” opcit, p 126. 13. Dawn Karachi, October 8, 2001. 14. The news, Islamabad, October 10, 2001. 15. Dawn Lahore, September 15, 2001 to November 15, 2001. 16. Nawa-i-waqat (Urdu) Multan, January 10, 11, 12 13, 14-15 2002 17. The Nation Lahore January 20, 2002. 18. Ibid, September 21, 2001. 19. Dr. Shireen M.Mazari, “Comment”. Strategic Studies, winter 2001, p.3 20. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, “State of Relations with kabul”, Dawn, Lahore , September 15, 2005 21. The Nation, Lahore October 10, 2001. 190

22. Dawn , Islamabad , December 12, 2001. 23. The News Isamabad, December 6, 2001. 24. The Nation, Lahore, December 6, 2001. 25. Kamran Khan , “Karzai: a unique US-PAK Candidate” The News, Isamabad, December 6, 2001. 26. The NEWS, Islamabad, December 7, 2001 27. Dawn, Islamabad December 3, 2001. 28. The New York Times, New York December 3, 2001 29. Dawn Karachi, December 23, 2001. 30. The Nation, Lahore, December 23, 2001 31. The News Islamabad December 22, 2001 32. The Wahington post Washington Dc, December 20, 2001. 33. The News, Islamabad, December 29, 2001. 34. ibid. 35. Dawn, Islamabad, January 11, 2002. 36. Ibid, January 13, 2002. 37. The News, Islamabad January 15, 2002. 38. The Nation, Lahore, October 8, 2001. 39. The News, Islamabad, January 9, 2002. 40. Ibid, January 30, 2002. 41. Ibid. 42. Dawn, Karachi, February 9, 2002. 43. The News, Islamabad, February 9, 2002. 44. Ibid, Feburary, 11, 2002. 45. The Hindu, Delhi, February 28, 2002. 46. J.N Dixit, “A Matter of Relationship”, The Telegraph, Calcutta. March 12, 2002. 47. Dawn, Islamabad, April 3, 2002. 48. The News, Islamabad April 3, 2002. 49. The Nation Lahore April 3, 2002. 50. Dawn Islamabad april 3 2002. 191

51. The News Islamabad April 19 2002. 52. Hindu Dehli April 19 2002. 53. The Nation Lahore april 26 2002. 54. The New Islamabad April 26 2002. 55. Dawn Karachi April 26 2002. 56. The News Islamabad May 14 2002. 57. The Nation Islamabad May 14 2002. 58. The Indian Express New Delhi May 3 2005. 59. Dawn Islamabad May 4 2002. 60. The Nation Islamabad May 22 2002. 61. The News Islamabad July 6 2002 62. Dawn Islamabad August 29 2002 63. C. Raja Mohan India’s Forward Policy the Hindu Delhi February 22 2003. 64. The News Islamabad April 18 2003. 65. Dawn Islamabad April 23 2003. 66. the Nation Islamabad April 23 2003. 67. Dawn Islamabad July 26 2003. 68. The Nation Lahore July 26 2003 69. Dr Hassan.Askari Rizvi. Afghanistan and The United States and Pakistan foreign policy; Current Affairs, Lahore, November 2001,p 14. . 70. Muhammad Ishaq fani, Pakistan Relation with China, Following the Collapse of Soviet Union; Ph D Unpublished Dissertation, Department of Pakistan Studies,Bahuddin Zakariya University,Multan P,222. 71. Ibid p,224. 72. ibid p,34,35 73. Dr Hassan.Askari Rizvi. Afghanistan and The United States and Pakistan foreign policy; Current Affairs, Lahore, November 2001,p 16. . 74. stephen Tanner Afghanistan a military history from Alexander the great to the fall of Taliban Da Capo Press New Yark 2002 p,206. 75. ibid p,210-11. 192

76. ibid p,225-227. 77. david j. whittaker terrorists and terrorism in the contemporary world Routledge taylor&Erancis Group London and NewYork 2004 p,145. 78. Muhammad Ishaq fani, Pakistans Relation with China, Following the Collapse of Soviet Union; Ph D Unpublished Dissertation, Department of Pakistan 79. Studies,Bahuddin Zakariya University,Multan P,228-29. 80. ibid p,235-36 81. The News Islamabad ,August 18. 2003. 82. Dawn Islamabad, August 23 . 2003. 83. The Nation Islamabad ,August 23. 2003. 84. Dawn Islamabad, July 26 .2003. 85. The Nation Lahore ,July 26 2003 86. Imtaz Gul Theunholy Nexus Pak-Afghan Relations under Taliban Maktaba Jadeed Press-9-Rawelpandi Road, Lahore.2002.p 190- 92. 87. Ibid p.201-2. 88. Dr Riffat Hussan ,J,N.Dxit,Julie Sirrs The Anatomy of aConflict Afghanistan and 9/11.Paul Press,Okhla, new Delhi-2002 p.185-86. 89. ibid p.190 90. Ibid p.198-99. 91. Ibid Muhammad Ishaq fani, .235-36. 92. Kamal Matinuddin, ‘Pakistan,s policy towords Afghanistan andCentral Asia,inIjaz khan and Nasreen Ghufran,eds.Pakistan foreign policy regional perspective; Critique (Peshwer; Deportment of International Relations, University of Peshawer,p.105. 93. Ibid. p 92 94. Dr.Baber Shah,’Geo-Strategic Patterns of a post-Taliban Afghanistan, Strategic Studies (Islamabad) Spring 2002,p.45. 95. Ibid p 48 96. Dr. Riffat Hussain. J.N.D xit,Julie Sirrs, The Anatomy of Confilifct Afghanistan and 9/11, Paul Press, Okhala, New Dehli-2002 p. 188-190.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION 193

Pakistan’s foreign policy seriously lacks initiatives, strength and effectiveness. It is primarily due to the chaotic political situation in Pakistan that the decision makers are constrained to take any bold action. So the decision makers in Pakistan could not formulate an effective Afghanistan Policy. Pakistan,s Afghan relation throughout the whole time of their history but particularly in the time of Soviet Union invasion (1979) until the advent and Fall of Taliban (1994-2001) has been one of a war time ally rather then one of an honest broker. The strength of foreign policy is inextricably linked with the stability of the domestic structure. Domestically political situation in Pakistan like Pakistan is grave. Pakistan could not formulate an effective Afghanistan policy from (1947 up to 2001). Making an overall evaluation of Pakistan’s Afghan relations, from 1947 to 2001. Durand Line and Pashtunistan issue had always remained a thorn in Pak-Afghan relations since Pakistan's creation. Allegations and counter allegations, propaganda and counter propaganda marred their relations. These issues and propaganda had several times led to the closure of border and consulates in each other's countries. The cool and apathetic of the leaders of both the countries towards Pak-Afghan relations was the main cause of hostile relations since Pakistan,screation. In fact, no sincere efforts had been made from any side to solve the long –understanding dispute and eliminate the differences. Coupled with it, the attitude of foreign countries, particularly neighboring countries also contributed to the matter. Soviet Union assisted Afghanistan in it hostility towards Pakistan because it did not like Pakistan’s alignment with the west. India, the arch-rival of Pakistan followed the theory of national intrest. They extended every kind of moral and material support to Afghanistan to pressurize Pakistan for the Durand Line and Pashtunistan issue. The United States on its part did not want the expansion of Communism in Asia. Pakistan, being US ally in cold war, got the US support in opposition to Pashtunistan. In this way, the Pashtunistan issue became an issue of cold war between the two Super powers. Communist elements had deepened it roots in Afghanistan and its next intended target was hot water of Gawader’s Pakistan. This being the main reason that the US 194

refused to supply arms to Afghanistan, but it did finance several other developmental projects in Afghanistan. Ex-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after accession to power, in December, 1971 undertook a visit to Afghanistan. He wanted to thank Zahir Shah for remaining natural in Indo- Pakistan war. He also wanted; Afghanistan not to recognize Bangladesh. Along with it, he wanted to silence Afghanistan, support for National Aawami Party (NAP). To some extent his visit was successful. Though, he wanted to maintain friendly relation with Afghanistan in the coming years. However, the removal of NAP governments in Balochistan and NWFP created problems for both countries. Afghanistan never liked the use of force by the Pakistan Army against the Baloch and Pushtuns insurgent.Daud raised the issue of Baloch and Pushtuns question on international forums such as the United Nations, the Algiers Conference and Islamic Conference. Moreover, he gave asylum to the Pashtun and Baluch ‘Nationalist.’ Daud actually wanted the “right of self determination and autonomy for the Pashtuns. Though, Bhutto on his part extended recognition to Daud’s government in 1973, but he made it clear that he would not tolerate interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. He was actually following the policy of ‘Persuasion’ and intimidation’ against Daud. Bhutto as a counter- measure against Daud’s interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs used the dissident’s elements, the Islamists, in Afghanistan against Daud’s government. They made some coup attempts against Daud and finally succeeded in mobilizing the Panjsher uprising to destabilize Daud’s government. Though Daud succeeded in suppressing the coup and uprising, but he stopped interference in Pakistan’s internal matter furthermore. In Pak-Afghan relations, the role of the Shah of Iran had remained as an arbitrator. In Bhutto’s time, the Shah of Iran once again used his influence to create rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan and Iran jointly applied “carrot and stick” policy. Pakistan had to apply the stick and the Shah of Iran had to wield the carrot. The Shah of Iran’s interest in the matter was due to the US dictation. He was working as a policeman in the region on behalf of the US. The US wanted to detach Afghanistan from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, aid as well as Pashtunistan issue had made Afghanistan heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. The US used the Shah of Iran for the purpose by sponsoring him. The Shah of Iran generously gave the US money and aid to 195

Afghanistan for developmental projects to the extent that it exceeded the total Soviet’s aid. Afghanistan’s dependence on Soviet trade routes was also stopped by opening alternate trade routes through Iran and to a lesser extent in Pakistan. Besides it, the Soviet stance on Pashtunistan issue has also cooled down since 1960s due to new changes in the region. Afghanistan did not like this cool attitude of the Soviet Union on Pashtunistan. As a result the pendulum of Afghanistan started tilting towards Pakistan and Iran’s side. United States had also serious efforts to normalize the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan before Afghan Sour Revolution. There were exchange of visits between the head of the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan. But there happened big change in the political affairs of both the countries. The removal of Bhutto from government by general Zia in Pakistan and the Sour revolution in Afghanistan in April 1978 changed the atmosphere and created new opportunities and challenges for both the countries and also for superpowers.but1979 was the year that brought new challenges and opportunities for Pakistan on its North-Western Frontier. Opportunities to neutralize the pre- 1979 bitter experiences and challenges to face Soviet troops knocking its border. Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy during this period, up to the soviet withdrawal, can be called a thorough success. On one hand it adopted the policy of bringing political pressure on the USSR along with providing covert assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen, who effectively organized Afghan resistance and ultimately forced the USSR leave Afghanistan. On the other hand it cashed in on its position as a front-line state to gain military aid and modernize it army. Funds were available for economic development too but much of these were not properly utilized i.e. for long term, infrastructural development. The Geneva Accords have been criticized for failing to provide for an interim set-up, but bearing in mind the extraordinary pressures under which they were agreed upon, they were a remarkable achievement. On the negative side hosting millions of Afghan refugees has put Pakistan under great pressure. This directly affected Pakistan’s internal social and economic developments. Creating a drugs menace, smuggling, social violence and a Kalashnikov culture. On the Afghan side perpetual war conditions gave birth to warlords and religious militancy. U.S.A and her ally left Afghanistan after the Russian withdrawal without considering 196

and planning for the reconstruction of infrastructure and of political solution. Pakistan handled the internal affairs in its own way to fulfill her of having friendly government in Afghanistan for recognizing the Durand line, to have smoothes access to Central Asia and to create conducive environment for the repartition of Afghan refugees. The objectives that had looked clearly achievable were put in disarray. Like the other regional countries Pakistan had to rethink its policy in the renewed environment. In this Pakistan demonstrated lack of understanding of the Afghan character. Rather than rely on just one or two figures, it should have cultivated interests in Afghanistan in the long run. The emergence of the Taliban at this juncture proved a welcome change for Pakistan. Seeing their achievements and the mass support, they enjoyed, Pakistan felt they had the potential both to bring peace and stability of Afghanistan and achieve its own objectives. Pakistan, therefore, recognized the Taliban government. This widened the gap between Iran and Pakistan and even with the West. It is alarming that Iran has gained more from the situation and has isolated Pakistan on its Afghanistan policy. Iran seems to have taken over as leader of the regional anti-Taliban alliance. (I.e. Russia, CARs India etc). The tragic event of 9/11 brought a new diplomatic, Military and political approach to deal with Afghanistan. Pakistan understanding the seriousness of this tragic event urgently derecognizes the Taliban Government and was compelled to cooperate fully with UN backed Afghan government. Pakistan provided logistic support to NATO to fight against Osama and His AL-Qaida and also to topple down the Taliban Government. A huge number of Al-Qaida and Taliban fugitives took shelter in the tribal areas of Pakistan as a large number of them were already residing here. These elements carried its activities in Afghanistan. The Afghan government as well as the NATO blamed Pakistan for such ill activities. It also resulted in deteriorating the relations not only with Afghanistan but also with the West. The NATO forces even did not hesitate to attack them in Tribal areas of Pakistan. The use of military of Pakistan against them in tribal areas extended the resistance in different areas of Pakistan and it is now knocking the door of Capital of the Country.

197

Future Suggestions.

o There is a great need of closer interactions between the leaders of the two countries. Moreover, the frequent exchange of visits at the ministerial and secretarial level may be encouraged between the two countries. Such interactions will provide both the sides with an opportunity to remove miner irritants and misunderstood in their mutual relationship, and to give them meaningful, substantive and strategic dimension.

o It is strongly suggested that non-interference in the internal affairs of both the countires should be strictly observed as the ill relations between two countries is mainly due to it.

o The media of both the countries and international one should ply positive role and promote harmony and good gesture.

o Joint efforts by the two countries to make OIC more strong and effective in order to resolve the outstanding problems confronting the Muslim countries, particularly, Iraq, Palestine, and Kashmir. In this regard, the cooperation of other Muslim countries, especially, Saudi Arab, is essential.

o The agreements, deals, protocols concluded between the two countries from time to time, for the purpose of expansion of political and diplomatic relations may be enforce and properly implemented.

o The post Taliban political and security situation in Afghanistan will create a greater need for high degree of cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan because both the countries share borders with each other. The coordination and cooperation between the two countries will be important for bringing complete peace and stability in Afghanistan. In fact, the convergence of interest and policies of the two countries will serve a strong basis for their future security cooperation. If the two countries fail to response the emerging strategic challenges in the region, they will find their legitimate interests undermine by the powers who do not view favorably the improved relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 198

o The government of Pakistan may take concrete measures for the safety and the security of Afghanistan diplomats, nationals, and students, and businessmen living in Pakistan. o Collective efforts on the part of the two governments to root out the germ of Ethnicaland,sectarianism extremism once for all, and to bring complete peace and harmony between the different Ethnical and sectarian factions. o There is a great need for closer cooperation and collaboration between the two countries in Central Asia. Such cooperation will be vital from the economic point of view, which will provide both the countries with the opportunity for the expansion of their economic cooperation. For example, Gwader Port can be linked with Central Asia through the way of Boluchistan,s Chaman border and Afghanistan,s railway network . o Both the countries can mutually help each other to solve their problems at the regional and global level. Pakistan can play an active role in bringing better understanding between Afghanistan and USA. Similarly, Afghanistan can mediate in harmonizing Pakistan's relations with India. o Realization by both sides that they are by no mean locked in a zero-sum game and, given good faith, ways can always be found for both to benefit without other having to pay the cost. o There is a great need to institutionalize interaction at track II, level i.e. at the level of civil society to evolve better understanding and a new mode of conflict resolution. o An executable strategy between the two countries to exchange security information with each other in order to boost their securities. o The organization of an efficient, trained, and effective Task Force to access the level of smuggling and drug trafficking between the two countries. o The defense cooperation between the two countries must be flourished. The benefit of defense cooperation can help the two countries to emerge as a strong 199

Asia Block. The promotion of defense ties is necessary in the view of determination the security environment in the region. Secondly; such cooperation will help to explore the possibility of joint production in the different military projects. o There is a need to improve culture relations between the two countries, as it can help create mutually psychological perceptions towards each other. Pakistan and Afghanistan can organize annual art exhibition to each other's countries. o Exchange program between various universities and research institutions can be established. In addition, the universities of both the countries may arrange the visits of professors, scholar's intellectuals for the purpose of holding seminars, workshops, and conferences for the enhancement academic activities between the universities of the two countries the governments of the two countries shall provide maximum facilities regarding their transportation and logging. The procedure of visa for the scholars, intellectuals and professors may be relaxed. In this regard, the cooperation of Afghan Consulate is essential. o Efforts on the part of the two countries upgrade air links between Kabul and the major cities of Pakistan, particularly, Quetta. Direct flight between Kabul and Quetta can be established. Similarly, the railway track between Quetta and Qandahar can be improved in order to provide more facilities to the passengers and to people to people contacts. o Both the sides may take necessary measures to encourage tourism by exchanging information and by providing necessary facilities to tourist's i.e. to relax formalities for the visit of the tourists. In addition, the study tours may be arranged between the students of the two countries for the enhancement of their academic activities. o Both sides may provide necessary facilities for the promotion of sports through the exchange of books, publication, films, and participation in sport seminars. The two sides may also encourage sport festivals held on a different occasions in two countries. 200

o They're a need of close cooperation between the News Agencies of the two countries. Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and the Kabul Republic of Afghanistan Broadcast should cooperate in the various fields through the exchange of documentary films, microfilms and photographs. o There must be close interactions of professionals, experts and technician, especially doctors and engineers between the two countries. o Both the countries may encourage activities by exchanging information in Museums and hold exhibition of photographs of the historical places and traditional dresses and art. o The government of Afghanistan is requested to open Pakistani Culture Centers at least in Kabul and Qandahar for further expansion of social and cultural interaction between the two countries o Both the sides may encourage academic linkages between the selected universities. The number of scholarship for the university scholars at M.Phil and PhD level to each other's country annually may be increase. There is a great need to reduce the tariff and non-tariff barriers in order to expand the trade between the two countries. o The government of Afghanistan must review her import policy, which adversely affected Pakistan's export to Afghanistan. o Both the sides may take drastic measures for encouraging the chamber of commerce and industries. Economic planning in the two countries should be done in such a way that the interdependence between the two countries grows further. o The organization of trade fairs and industrial exhalations for the expansion of trade relations between the two countries must be encourage. o Both countries must promote the exchange of commercial information as well as the exchange of commercial magazines, journal, periodicals, newspapers and etc. o There shall be an exchange of information between the two countries on the trade- related laws, regulations and procedure. 201

o There is a need of increased interactions between the two countries in banking institutions through the periodic seminars, conferences and workshops. o Both the countries may review the ways and means to rationalize their border trade. The border points at (Washe) in the Qandahar province of Afghanistan and (Shorawake) in Noshki or any other mutually agreed place at Pak-Afghan border may be open in order to promote trade and people to people contacts. The need for closer cooperation and interaction between the traders, o businessmen and trade delegations between the two countries which will enable the traders and businessmen to understand each other's point of view, issues and problems relating their bilateral trade and to evolve a common strategy for their solution. o The Afghanistan’s businessmen should take the opportunity to invest in the different sectors of Pakistani economy, which has become more profitable due to the ongoing privatization procession Pakistan. o The number of commercial visits at the ministerial and secretarial level may be increase in order to find out the ways and means to remove hurdles existing in their mutual commercial relations. o Closer cooperation between the public and private sector institutions dealing with regional trade and commerce with a view to eradicate impediments in their trade. o Collective efforts on the part of the two countries to reactivate ECO. Pakistan and Afghanistan will utilize ECO to enhance their bilateral economic cooperation. Both the countries can initiate a fast tract process for bringing about a regional preferential trade along with the member countries under the umbrella of ECO. o Both the countries should contribute greatly towards the expansion, modernization and diversification of the state's economic base through the inflow of capital and technological resources. o Both the countries should emphasize the need for the construction of Pak, Afghan & India gas pipeline, which would be advantageous to both countries form, the 202

economic and political point of view. The construction of trilateral gas pipeline would prove an ideal platform to set off regional economic interdependence. The materialization of this project will provide a natural benefit of all the three countries. In addition, this project will be proving as valuable asset particularly in the wake of improvement of relations between Pakistan and India. o Joint efforts by the two countries to construct Quetta Qandahar-Ashakabad railway line and Gawader Sea port. o There is urgent need to make Pak-Afghan joint Ministerial Commission more strong and powerful to review and mentor the effective implementation of its various decisions. o Joint ventures in industries, science and technology which have already formulated between the two countries may be flourished. o There is a great need for the continuing process of dialogue between the experts in the fields such industries, agriculture and infrastructure. Exchange of media experts along with entrepreneurs would play a vital role in bringing the economic gap. o Afghanistan government may be persuade to encourage their government sector agencies to import wheat, rice, sugar, corn, paper, surgical goods, sport goods, gasoline and toys from Pakistan which, at present in not in the considerable volume and value. o Pakistan should to increase its export to Afghanistan in order to maintain the balance of trade, which has been greatly in Afghanistan favor. o There is a great need to form a rational and executable strategy for the improvement in trade relations. o Both the sides can form an appropriate trade strategy, in which both the countries should adjust each other's interest.

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1. Ali, Mehrunnisa, “Geneva accords and the Superpowers”. Pakistan Horizon. (Karachi), Vol. XLI, no. 32 (July 1988).

2. Chaudry, Mohammad Ahsen, “Political Restructuring of Afghanistan”, Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol.XLI, no.3 (July 1988).

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4. Awan, A. B., “Great Game in Afghanistan”, Globe Karachi), Vol.1, no.4 (august 1988). 5. Alvi, A.H., “development in Afghanistan”, The Concept of Islam. (Islamabad), Vol. I, no.9 (August-September 1981).

6. Amin, Tahir, “Moscow’s Kabul Connection: Lesson for Countries”, Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Vol.V, no.2 (Winter 1982).

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8. Dupree, Louis; “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan in 1987”, Current History. Vol.86, no.522 (October 1987).

9. Fallon, Joseph E., “Marxism in Afghanistan; the New colonialism”, Central Asia. (Peshawar), no.20 (Summer 1987).

10. Hussain, Syed Rifaat, “Soviet Afghan relations, 1919-1947: An appraisal”, Journal of Central Asia, (Isalamabad), Vol.X, no.2, (December, 1987).

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Articles in Newespaers

26 Nawa-I-Waqt, “Exit of Najibullah”, Special Report, April 24, 1994. 27 Rahimullah Yousafzay, “More Troubles Ahead for Afghans”, The News, Islamabad, January 2, 1993. 28 “ Shift in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy”, The News, Islamabad, January, 28, 1992. 29 kramullah, “No About Turn on Afghanistan”, The Nation, , 12 1997. 30 Mushahid Hussain “Taliban Pak. And The Nation, Region, 31, 1996. 31 Pak. Strategic Aims in Pipelines” The Nation, Islamabad, November, 18 1997. 32 Amad Rashid, “Pipelaine Dream” Herald, June 1997 PP. 33 Khalid Akhter, “Pakistan can turn to be the biggest looser”, The Muslim, Islamabad, Oct 26, 1992 34“ Dostum demands share in power”, The Frontier Post, Lahore, Nov. 13 1992.. 35 Thomas Barfeild, “The Afghan Morass”, Current Affairs, July 1996, p. 47. 36 John F. Burns, “How York times, Oct 23. 1996 the Afghan stubborn rulers took hold”, The New 37 hushahid Hussain, “Reversal in Afghanistan” The Nation, July3, 1994. 38. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, “State of Relations with kabul”, Dawn, Lahore , September 15, 2005 39.Saeed Pirzada Kahmir: Indian Strategic Initiative Since 9/11 and imperative for US policy in the Region”The Nation March 10,1994. 40 khalid Rehman, Terrorism: Challenge and way out pre- and post September The News june 5,2004 .

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NEWS PAPERS 1. The Wahadat 2. Jang (Urdu) 3. Mashriq (Urdu) 4. London Time. MAGZINES 1. The Economist 2. Wall Street Journal 3. Insight 4. globe 5. New Times 6. Spot Light, Pakistan 7. Press Review 8. Herald International 9. Financial Times 10. News Week USA 11. ar Eastern Economic 12. eview, Hong Kong Journals & Periodicals 1WUFA (Writers Union of free Afghanistan) Peshawar. P.I.I.A. 1. Pakistan Horizon, Karachi. 2. Strategic Studies, I.S.S.I. Islamabad. 3. Strategic Perspective. 4. Defense Review, G.H.Q. Rewalpindi. 5. Defense journal Karachi, 6. Foreign Affairs, USA 7. Current History. USA 8. Third world Quarterly. USA 9. The world Today.UK. 10. International Affairs, Royal institute of international Affairs. 213

11. Obis, USA. 12. Foreign Affair Pakistan, Islamabad. 13. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Villanova, USA 14. Current Affairs (Monthly) Pakistan 15. National Geographic 16. he Middle East 17. ational Foreign Assessment, USA. 18. Royal Asian Journal. Papers and Lectures Zehra, Nasim,’ Pak-Afghan Relations: Condations and Compulsion for strategic Relationship; Paper presented at the institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad December 5, 2004. Zaheer, Nigar Sajjad.;Pak-Afghan Relations(1947-1979);Paper delivered at thedepartment of History, University of Peshawer March 4 2004. Mazari Shireen M., ;The Emerging Anti-Terrorism Coalition: Implications for Pakistan And the Muslim World; Paper delivered at the Institute of St ratgic Studies , Islambad, September 21, 2003. Sarwar, Adnan,Pak-Afghan Relations After Sauer Revolution; Paper presented at Department of International Relations,University of Peshawer, March52004.s Wazarat, Talat Dr., US War of Terror; Implications for Pakistan South Asia; Paper presanted at The Department of History , University of Kara chi. March 4 ,2005. Personal Interviews Bukhari.Ibrahim Shah Dr., The Ex-Vice Chancellor,University of jamshoro, Hyderabad Sind Personal Interview Marchio,2006., Ahmad,MunirDr.,Director of Area Study Center for Middle East and Arab worlds Unvirsity of Balochistan,Quetta.Personal Interview, September 5,2006. Lubna,Dr., Assistant Professor,Deparment of International Relations, Quaid-e- Azam University Islambad, Personal Interview, October 10, 2004 214

Marwat,Fazal-ur-Rahim Dr., Associat Professor, Pakistan study Center,University of Pashwawer, Personal Intervie,December 5,2007. Sarwar,Adnan Dr., The chairman of the Department of International Relations, University of Pashawer, personal Interew, January 10,2007. Brach, Kaleem professor Deportment of ,History University of Balochistan personal Interew Quetta.March,5 2007. NEWS MEDIA A-Television 1. BBC. 2. VIRA, (Voice of Islamic Revolution Afghanistan). 3. PTV 4. GEO News 5. CNN 6. ARY One 7. Independent Television Netwerk 8. Indus Network 9. Khyber AVT 10. N.E.T.Network 11. P.T.V Bolan 12. PTV National 13. PTV World 14. WNDT, New York B. Radio All India Radio BBC Monitoring Service The Voice of Iran Radio Kabul Radio Tehran Radio Pakistan Voice of America 215

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