The Feudal Tentacles: Is Feudalism Dead
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Pakistan Perspectives Vol. 23, No.1, January-June 2018 Civil-Military Relations and Concordance Theory: A Case Study of Pakistan (1988-93) Qurat-ul-Ain Bashir* & Saiqa Hanif** Abstract The article attempts to apply the concordance model of Rebecca Schiff’s on Pakistan from 1988-93. The findings of the article have observed some contradictions and problem of oversimplification in the model with reference to Pakistan. The finding did not support her argument that concordance amid the three stake holders on four indicators could prevent military intervention in politics. In fact the results of this study are different than the model’s beliefs. ______ Introduction Rebecca L. Schiff’s ‘Theory of concordance’ argues that disagreement between three stake holders — military elite, civil elite and citizenry — on four indicators: social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the method of recruiting military personnel and the style of the military is the cause of military intervention in politics. It does not argue that absolute concordance is required between the three partners to prevent military rule but indicates that greater discordance will increase the possibility of martial law. The concordance theory also includes institutional and cultural changes that promote or prevent military’s political role.1 In the light of this discussion, the article attempts to test the concordance theory against the case study of Pakistan in the time frame of 1988-1993.2 The study will evaluate whether * Dr Qurat-ul-Ain Bashir, Assistant Professor, Department of History and Pakistan Studies, University of Gujrat, Gujrat. ** Ms. Saiqa Hanif, Associate Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Gujrat, Gujrat. 1 Rebecca L. Schiff, ‘Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance’, Armed Forces & Society, 22:1 (Fall 1995), p.10. 2 From 1988 to 1993 there were two civilian governments in Pakistan. The tenure of first government was from 22 December 1988 to 6 August 1990 which was formed by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Tenure of the second government was from 6 November 1990 to 18 July 1993 which was formed by Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). See Dawn, Karachi, 23 December 1988, 7 August 1990, 7 November 1990, 19 July1993. 114 Pakistan Perspectives concordance theory was the cause of delaying martial law in the said time frame or not. Stakeholders Before beginning this debate it is essential to define stakeholders and indicators of concordance theory with special reference to Pakistan. Citizenry: Citizenry was not a partner in power sharing3 so this stakeholder of Schiff’s theory is irrelevant in this case study. The military: According to concordance theory military means ‘the armed forces and the personnel’.4 In Pakistan only military elite entered into the process of negotiation with the political leadership, whereas armed personnel have no decision making role.5 So in this case the later part of the Schiff’s definition of military is irrelevant. The political leadership / civilian elite: Schiff’s defines political leadership in the context of functions. According to her it is required to figure out who represents government and effects the decisions related to support, mission and composition of the armed forces. This indicator excludes nature of the government institutions and method of selection of leadership and only include political actor that affects decisions related to armed forces. She indicates that ‘cabinet, presidents, prime minister, party leaders, parliaments and monarchies are all possible forms of government elites’.6 In Pakistan it is civil and military elite that effects the composition and functioning of the military. As far as the financial requirement of the nation’s army is concerned it could not be cut off by the political elite. The military elite had made it clear through its behavior that its financial interests had to be safeguarded and should not be touched upon.7 3 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 2nded. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.574. 4 Rebecca L. Schiff, op.cit., p.12. 5 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military & Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 2000), pp.147-48. 6 Rebecca L. Schiff, op.cit., p.12. 7 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp.151-52. Civil-Military Relations and … 115 Indicators The political decision making process: The political decision-making process includes institutional organisations of society which affects the functioning of military and its satisfaction. According to Schiff this indictor includes following factors: budget, size, materials and equipment, and structure. In this context she mentions that the nature of government, either democratic or authoritarian, is not important but it is important to identify the channel which determines the organisational and institutional decisions of the military. She argues: budgets, materials, size, and structure are issues decided upon by open parliaments, closed cabinets, special committees, and political elites, and may involve the participation of military officers. Often the military makes its need known through a governmental channel or agency that takes into consideration both military and societal resources and requirements.8 In Pakistan military elite directly sends its needs to politicians. The army needs have always been fulfilled irrespective of the status of economy and needs of society. Even taxation was increased to give lion’s share to army in the budget. In Pakistan the army has remained as a privileged class due to bad law and order situation of the country caused by internal and external security threats.9 Social composition of the official corps: The concordance theory has emphasized upon professional elite of the armed forces. Schiff’s idea of professional elite was based on Samuel P. Huntington theory on civil- military relations. Schiff has explained this indicator in these words: Most modern militaries have an officer corps that is in charge of broad institutional and day-to-day functioning of the armed forces; these are the career soldiers who dedicate their lives to soldiering and to the development of the military and the definition of its relationship to the rest of society. The officer is distinguished from the rank-and-file soldier, and, as leaders of the armed forces, the officer corps can provide not only the critical links between the citizenry and the military but also between the military and the government.10 8 Rebacca L. Schiff, op.cit., pp.15-16. 9 Hasan Akari Rizvi, op.cit., p.270. 10 Rebacca L. Schiff, op.cit., p.15. 116 Pakistan Perspectives She further explained that usually in a democratic society the social composition of the army is based on broader representation of the constituencies.11 But this broader representation is not a necessary requirement of concordance theory. The social composition of Pakistan’s army elite can be sought through market share approach. The market share of each province, the Federal Capital (Islamabad), Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) on army official level during the selected time frame is provided in the Table 1 Table 1: Market Share of the Pakistan Army Province Market share of army officials (%age) Punjab 71-78 Sindh 5-10 Balochistan 0-1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 15-20 Islamabad 1-2 Azad Kashmir 2-3 Northern Areas 0-0.5 FATA 0-1 Note: The citation criterion ranges from lowest to highest percentage point in the selected time frame: 1988-1993. Source: C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, ‘The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 34:1 (February 2011), p.19. The social composition of Pakistan army was not based on broader constituencies. The composition depicts over representation of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and under representation of rest of the areas.12 As army officials were drawn from the Pakistan Military Academy, therefore, mostly representatives of Punjab and KPK remained the military elite. In Pakistan military elite had belonged to landlord families, successful professionals and prominent families. The social 11 Rebaccal L. Schiff’s has explained this point through an example of India during British colonial period when army was drawn from particular Indian castes and classes. The example has taken from Stephan P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp.50-62. 12 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp.40-41. Civil-Military Relations and … 117 composition did not support the army’s status of being the national representative.13 Recruitment: The third indicator of concordance theory is related to the method of enlisting the citizenry into armed forces.14 The method of recruitment can be coercive or persuasive. The coercive recruitment is an indicator of lack of concordance between citizenry and military whereas persuasive recruitment was a symbol of concordance. In Pakistan, the recruitment of army is completely voluntary as per Article 39 ‘Participation of people in Armed Forces’ of 1973 constitution. The article stated that ‘state shall enable people from all parts of Pakistan to participate in the armed forces of Pakistan’.15 In Pakistan army personnel were largely drawn from lower middle class of the society which was not politically powerful.16 Hence this indicator is irrelevant against the case study of Pakistan. Style of military: Schiff defined this indicator as: This indicator basically refers to the outlook of armed forces, peoples’ views about them and beliefs that served as a driving force behind them. This indicator focused on relationship between army and the society in historical and cultural context. It seeks the attitude of military elite towards citizen in cultural context.17 In Pakistan the military is an obvious power.18 The martial laws were frequent and army had consciously politicized its role to a great extent.