Vietnam - Confidential Papers -1963-1966

Home , Charles Yost, George Ball (diplomat)

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items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Vietnam - confidential papers -1963-1966

Date Created 13/06/1963

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Container S-0866-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: Viet-Nam

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Selected Confidential Papers on the War in Viet-Nam up to the end of 1966 Memorandum to Secretary-General from Ralph Bunche 13 June 1963 Letter from President Johnson 16 August, 19&5 Meeting 27 February 1965 - Present: The Secretary-General, Governor Stevenson, Ambassador Yost, Mr. Bunche Notes on talk, with Adlai Stevenson 2 March 1965 Memorandum from Ralph J. Bunche to Secretary-General reference talk with Adlai Stevenson Cease-fire paper 14 April 1965 Viet-Ham 15 April 1965 Meeting held 23 April 1965 - Present: Adlai Stevenson, C. Yost, Secretary-General, J. Rolz-Bennett Viet-Ham 12 May 1965 Viet-Nam 17 May 1965 Viet-Warn 18 May 1965 Viet-Nam 1 June 1965 Meeting held - 8 July 1965 Letter from Paul G. Hoffman 14 July 1965 Meeting held 19 July 19^5 - Present: Dean Rusk, Harlan Cleveland Francis T.P. Plimpton,1 Secretary-General, Ralph J. Bunche, C.V. Narasimhan, Jose Rolz-Bennett 14 Meeting held 19 July 1965 - Note for the Record Viet-Nam 28 July 1965 Proposals regarding situation in Viet-Nam 12 August 1965 17 Meeting held - 24 August 19^5 - Present Ambassador Goldberg Ambassador Yost, Ralph Bunche 18) Aide-Memoire 27 August 1965 19; Remarks on United States Aide-memoire of 27 August 1965 20 Note on question of Viet-Nam 19 November 1965 21 French attitude and policy 26 November 19&5 22 Notes on question of Viet-Nam 24 November 1965 Notes on situation in Viet-Nam 2 December 1965 II Meeting held 7 December 1965 - Present; U Thant, George Ball, Arthur Goldberg, Jo Cisco, Richard Pedersen, Mr, Springsteen (assistant to George Ball) Ralph Bunche Meeting with Prime Minister Harold Wilson 16 December 1965 Note on situation in Viet-Nam 23 December 1965 Note on situation in Viet-Nam 2; December 1965 Note on situation in VietaNam 28 December 1965 Conversation with Felix Greene 4 January Conversation with Felix Greene 4 January 1966 Meeting held 10 January 1966 - Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost and Mr. Bunche Report of Interview with Mai Van Bo 10 January 1966 Interview with Huyn Van Tarn 13 January 1966 Meeting held 17 January 1966 - Present: Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost, U Thant, Mr. Ralph J. Bunche . Meeting held 19 January 1966 - Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost, Mr. Bunche Note for record of meeting 24 January 1966 - Present: Ambassador Goldberg, C. Yost, U Thant, J. Rolz-Bennett Meeting with Roy Bennett of London Tribune 27 January 1966 Notes on Viet-Nam situation 5 February 1966 Papers on. Viet-Nam Page two

!. 11) Notes on Vietnam situation 7 February 1966 12} Meeting held on 7 February 1966 - Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost, Mr. Bunche 13 Hote on situation in Viet-Nam 9 February 1966 14 Note on situation in Viet-Nam 11 February 1966 15 Note on situation in Viet-Nam 17 February 1966 16 Meeting held 28 February 1966 - Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost, Mr. Bunche 17 Note on Viet-Nam 31 May 1966 18 Meeting held 31 May 1966 - Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg 19 Letter from U Thant to Ho Chi Minh 28 June 1966 20 Notes on question of Viet-Wam 22 July 1966 21 Note by Simon Malley on his meeting with Tran Hoai Nam 28 July 1966 22 Notes on meeting held 2 August 1960 - Present: U Thant, George Ball, Joseph Sisco, Richard Pedersen, Ralph Bunche 23) Notes on meeting 22 August 1966 - Present: Dean Rusk., James Nabrit, U Thant 24) Visit of President Johnson to U Thant on 7 October 1966 Present: President Johnson, U Thant, Dean Rusk, Arthur Goldberg, Ralph Bunche 25) Meeting held 8 November 1966 - Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg and Ralph Bunche 26) Notes on question of Viet-Nam 19 December 1966 27) Notes on question of Viet-Nam 22 December 1966 ( • '.I 'i NATIpNS UNIES Wj^P UNITED NATIONS \ W^ j CENTRE D'INFORMATION DES NATIONS UNIES \ ./ POUR LA BELGIQUE, LA FRANCE ET LE LUXEMBOURG tt, AVENUE DE SEGUR . PARIS Vile TEL. : SUFfrcn 86 - 00 SUFIrcn 98-70 9 July 1965

Mr. Secretary-General,

Please find herewith a summary of yesterday's meeting. I apologize for the numerous typing errors. • I shall be in France until 15 August and

will remain, of course t at your disposal if you need me. Should I leave Paris, I would give my address to Mr. Gibson Parker so that I may be reached at any time.

Yours respectfully,

Jean UNITED NATIONS W/W$ NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK x '

CABLE: ADDRESS • UNATID NS NEWYO HK •

FILE NO.: 13 June 1963

To : The Secretary-General From: Ralph J. Bunche

Charles Yost on morning of 15th informed me that on the question of the repression of Buddhists in Vietnam the United States is concerned and is in constant touch with the Vietnamese Government on the matter with a view to its conciliation. The United States Government has urged the Government of Vietnam to take steps to alleviate the Buddhist grievances„ The United States Government has also passed to the United States Embassy in Saigon our concern about the issue. The United States has made no public statement about the question as yet, only because it feels that at this time such a statement might be counter productive.

DECLASSIFIED THE WHITE HOUSE ^ £ Tit # *"<,? WASHINGTON ^- . tTj fj 5V*S August 16, 1965

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Ambassador Goldberg has told me of his conversation with you on August 12 and has shown me the memorandum with respect to Viet Nam which you had given to him and to others.

I welcome your interest in the solution of this serious international problem and appreciate the spirit in which your thoughtful proposals have been prepared. We will of course give these proposals prompt and serious consideration and will respect their confidential character.

I appreciate your willingness to explore with interested parties on a personal and confidential basis the prospects for the cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam and for a settlement of its problems.

As soon as we have completed our studies of your proposals, Ambassador Goldberg, together with other representatives of the United States Government, will be prepared to discuss •with you within the next few days all aspects of the Viet Nam problem and to exchange views in detail, inter alia, on the specific points raised in your memorandum.

I shall personally follow with the greatest interest the progress of your exploratory talks.

Sincerely,

I 0 His Excellency U. Thant Secretary General of the United Nations New York, New York

copy

THE WHITE HOUSE Washington August 1.6, 1965

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Ambassador Goldberg has told me of his conversation with you on August 12 and has shown me the memorandum with respect to Viet Nam which you had given to him and to others.

I.welcome your interest in the solution of this serious international problem and appreciate the spirit in which your thoughtful proposals have been prepared. We will of course give these proposals prompt and serious consideration and will respect their confidential character.

As soon as we have completed our studies of your proposals, Ambassador Goldberg, together with other representatives of the United States Government,, will be prepared to discuss with you within the next few days all aspects of the Viet Nam problem and to exchange views in detail, inter alia, on the

His Excellency U. Thant Secretary General of the United Nations New York, New York 1. copy

specific points raised in your memorandum.

I shall personally follow with the greatest interest the progress of your exploratory talks.

Sincerely,,

(signed) Lyndon B. Johnson

2. 8 0) c. co

•»«>

ikr- Meeting of 2? February 1965 with Adlai Stevenson (10:45 a.m. to 12:50 p.m.)

Present: The Secretary-General Governor Stevenson Ambassador Yost Mr. Bunche Governor Stevenson expressed regret at the necessity for requesting this meeting. He stated that the authorities in Washington began reaching "3&&rt him by phone in Jamaica **&*# after the Secretary-General's press conference on the morning of Wednesday, 24 February. He was called back to Washington immediately and spent most of the day yesterday (Friday) with the President on the subject of the press conference, the Secretary-General and the United Nations. There was special regret in Washington over the public mention by the Secretary-General of the suggestions and proposals made by him in confidence to the United States. This act stunned the people in Washington who had assumed that the talks on these matters had been highly confidential and would be respected as such. They had also read into the Secretary-General's statements at the press conference some indication of unhappiness on his part that he had received no response to his proposals. Governor Stevenson observed that the reaction to the press conference had put him "in the dog house". The points causing consternation in Washington were the following: (1) The assertion that Burma had received no military assistance from the United States. In fact, said Governor Stevenson, the military assistance given to Burma by the United States to-date totalled $70.6 million. The great bulk of this assistance has been in military equipment such as light naval ships, helicopters, guns of various sizes, radar, etc. The assistance was "covered" by being included in the United States assistance budget without description as military assistance, and is, therefore, being sold to Burma for Burmese currency at fictitious prices amounting to only 10$ to 20# of the actual value of the articles. -2-

The press conference statement on this subject has put the United States in an embarrassing position both with the Burmese Government, because of the strict privacy of the arrangement, and with members of Congress, who are already asking to know the facts. (2) The statement that there had been no consideration or discussion of the question of the financial responsibility of the Security Council and the General Assembly with regard to peacekeeping operations. In fact, said Governor Stevenson, this matter was discussed by The Court in three pages of its advisory opinion. (3) The fact that in the press conference the "missing piece" was the absence of any indication that Hanoi is willing to give up its objective of taking over South Vietnam. The United States, he said, is willing to negotiate on the Vietnam problem whenever there is any indication of a willingness on the part of the Govern- ment of North Vietnam to abandon its designs on and interference in South Vietnam. Governor Stevenson remarked that no negotiations in modern times with the Communists could have been successful without a prior indication that both sides were willing to produce results and would make concessions toward that end. In this context he mentioned the Berlin blockade, Korea, Cuba and the nuclear test ban. The United States, he asserted, knows of no indication other than that Hanoi is determined to take over South Vietnam. The United States is aware of the number of efforts being made to find a solution to the Vietnam problem, such as those of the British and the French, of Secretary of State RuskyflfuH but unproductive discussions with Gromyko, Ambassador Cabot's talks in Warsaw with the Chinese Ambassador (the Chinese this time has been found to be more agreeable than in previous talks but nothing was forthcoming; the Chinese Ambassador called Ambassador Cabot a "liar" on several occasions, but the talks will continue^J&ie possibility of a Laos Conference, which might provide an opportunity for informal talks on VietnamJL ,

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In view of all these efforts and channels, the United States does not think it advisable at this time to consider a Geneva meeting of the 14, or even U Thant's proposed 5 plus 2 Conference. Governor Stevenson stressed that there could be no direct talks with Hanoi without the knowledge of South Vietnam. He added, however, that direct talks with Hanoi or with any other of the proposed channels are not categorically rejected by the United States. The United States, he said, certainly appreciates the Secretary-General's concern and efforts on this matter, but the essence of the problem is the attitude of North Vietnam. If the Secretary-General can ascertain that Hanoi is prepared to abandon the objective of taking over South Vietnam, the United States would certainly want to know about it, as this could be the basis for withdrawing United States troops from South Vietnam. Governor Stevenson confided that a third party, whose identity he was not permitted to disclose, had recently approached Hanoi and reported that the position of the Government there was that they would not be willing to talk with the United States as long as any American troops remained in South Vietnam, that North Vietnam anticipated and was prepared to absorb United States bombing raids in the North, that South Vietnam was crumbling and victory for North Vietnam was in sight, and that, therefore, they were un- receptive to the suggestion of negotiations. Governor Stevenson further confided that the military situation from the standpoint of South Vietnam and the United States was not good, but, he said, the United States has not yet "turned ji«5r%he military heat". Governor Stevenson referred to the White Paper on the aggression of North Vietnam, which was being issued by his Government and which had already leaked out. He would be delivering this paper in the course of the day with a request that it ^rfeirculated as a Security Council document. The South Vietnam situation, he said, is aggravated recently by the increasingly heavy flow of men and materiel into South Vietnam from the North. He stated that tens of thousands of men were thus involved and large amounts of equipment, almost all of which was of Chinese and Russian origin. The small arms and ammunition were almost all of Chinese manufacture. Quite accidentally, it had been discovered that there is considerable traffic in arms along the seacoast. The United States continues to feel that if any peaceable solution, which would protect the independence of South Vietnam, is possible, the United States would readily pursue it. President Johnson, said Governor Stevenson, was distressed about the press conference (a) because of the public revelation of the confidential talks with the United States, and (b) because of the indication that the American people are not being told the truth and that information is being withheld from them. This was unfortunate, as it was interpreted to mean a deliberate withholding, and has aggravated the relations of the Government with Congress. President Johnson, according to Governor Stevenson, wishes to assure the Secretary-General that he would do anything for peace in South Vietnam, but all the information available to the United States has given no assurance about the possibility of effective negotiations. The United States on its part will not escalate the war and will take no action beyond "measured responses". Governor Stevenson enquired as to whether U Thant has any information about Hanoi's intentions which would contradict the United States information. Otherwise, the United States must continue to be determined to see the Vietnam matter through.

The Secretary-General thanked Governor Stevenson for his comprehensive resume of the situation.

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The Secretary-General stated that his approach to the Vietnam problem was based on the following considerations: (1) In recent years Peking and Moscow have been falling apart and, therefore, the United States should be guided by an intention not to create any conditions likely to bring Peking and Moscow back together. He pointed out that Mr. Krushchev in .Auguas / ^^nad said to him that Vietnam is too far away to be of major concern to the Soviet Union. The Secretary-General thought that the new leaders of the Soviet Union probably had the same point of view and policy. Widening the rift between the Chinese and the Russians should be encouraged, he said. On the other hand, peace depends, in his view, on a rapprochement in all spheres between Washington and Moscow. But the trend now is in the reverse direction. The Secretary-General felt sure that the Soviet Union io now supplyiag arms to Hanoi. He added that Couve de Murville thinks that the Soviet arms to Hanoi would be transported by sea and not through China. (2) Hanoi all along has been more close to Moscow than to Peking. The French, he said, confirmed this belief. In July 1964 ©ouve de Murville had assured him that Hanoi is closer to Moscow than to Peking. (3) The mood and attitude of the Asian countries with regard to developments in South Vietnam must be weighed carefully. After many years of study, said the Secretary-General, he had concluded that even countries like India, Pakistan and Burma resent the developments in South Vietnam. He considered it significant that Ayub Khan is going to Peking before he goes to London and Washington. More and more, said U Thant, Asian public opinion is being alienated by the United States. The peoples of Southeast Asia also see a racial angle in the United States intervention. -6-

U Thant averred that if Burma had received United States military- assistance, China would definitely have come into Burma. He referred to talks he had had with Chou En-Lai in 1954. Chou En-Lai had said that China was communist and Burma was non-communist, but they could live together in peaceful co-existence. But if American bases had been established in Burma, Chinese policy would have to change. U Thant stated that he was with U Nu when he unsuccessfully urged Dulles to sign the Geneva Agreement in 1954. United States failure to do so, in the view of the Secretary-General, was a big mistake. Because the United States did not sign, South Vietnam also did not sign and, therefore, the anticipated elections were not held. Why is it, queried U Thant, that Nepal, a monarchy and pro-Western state, and Afghanistan, both with borders on China, have suffered no Chinese intervention. The Secretary-General observed that if the situation continues and United States attacks are intensified, Asia will be forced to take a stand increasingly unfavorable to the United States. The Asians favour negotiations. The Secretary-General expressed the view that the United States is in the best position to restore peace to South Vietnam. The first step would be to try to achieve a stable and broad-baseggovernment there, and toward this end some of the men now in exile should be brought back. The Secretary-General explained that last year he was becoming more and more concerned about developments in South Vietnam, but was somewhat encouraged by broadcasts from Hanoi which had been monitored. In analyzing these broadcasts, he had found them not as hostile as those emanating from Peking, and had noted in them indications of a willingness on the part of Hanoi to undertake talks. The Secretary-General said that he knows Ho Chi Mrh and through the Russians had asked him if Hanoi was still willing to talk with the United States. The reply was very prompt - it came in caet^* week*- and its favorable nature encouraged the Secretary-General. For such initial talks, the Secretary-General felt that no set agenda was needed, —7— since they would be entirely exploratory. The Secretary-General had informed Governor Stevenson of the action he had initiated and the response, and the question of venue for such talks -was raised. The Secretary-General had suggested Rangoon with the ambassadors from the United States and North Vietnam in Rangoon as the participants. In response to his enquiry, he had been informed that Burma would be willing to be host and to offer its good offices in such bilateral talks. But the Secretary-General had been advised that Washington was not prepared to undertake such talks as South Vietnam would be furious about them. It was then that the Secretary-General had suggested talks on the basis of 5 plus 2. There was a question tf^as to who could represent South Vietnam. He had indicated that Burma would not be in position to undertake the role of host for talks on a 5 plus 2 basis since this could not possibly be kept private and, therefore, he had suggested Geneva as a possible location and had also offered his own good offices. The Secretary-General iated that about ten days ago William Fry had published a story on the front page of the Chicago Sun Times, which gave almost all of the debails of the Secretary-General's approaches. The Secretary-General said that in the Secretariat only Bunche and Narasimhan had known of his approaches and he was certain that neither of them had had any contact with Bill Fry. Besides these two he had informed Lord Caradon of the United Kingdom. When the Fry story came out, Ambassador Barrington of Burma was deluged with questions about it. Thus, when the question of the Secretary-General's approaches and proposals came out in his press conference of the 24th, the Secretary- General felt that he had only two alternatives, namely, to tell a lie or to indicate, though not explicitly, that some suggestions and proposals had been made by him to the parties primarily concerned, but without any mention of the United States. Following this, Donald Grant asked if the United States was included in this category, and the Secretary-General felt that he could only say "yes". -8-

The Secretary-General had told Gouve de Murville the entire story of his approaches on Monday 22; he had told Fedorenko about the 5 plus 2 proposal on Tuesday 23rd; he had not tried to convey any such information to Peking. U Thant stated that he was sorry that some of the statements in his press conference had put the United States in an embarrassing position. He emphasized that he has the highest regard for President Johnson, -whom he considers to be both wise and moderate, and he had expressed this regard in his press conference. But when the questions on Vietnam arose, he was thinking only of the Chinese and Soviet rift and of Hanoi's leaning toward Moscow. The Secretary-General said that for the 5 plus 2 group it would be necessary to have precise terms' of reference, and, in his view, the initiative on this should come from one of the principal parties, particularly the United States or the Soviet Union. He added that he had informed the Observer of South Vietnam the other day about the 5 plus 2 proposal with Geneva as the venue, and also of his view that it would be helpful if the United States would produce draft terms of reference. With regard to the question of United States military assistance to Burma, the Secretary-General said that when he was in Burma in July he was told that Burma had not accepted military assistance from any source, and at the time of his press conference he did not know of any ptfalieiBgJ^n'VVV'-?'"a ^ arrangements for the purchase of military equipment from the United States in Burmese currency. The Secretary-General was inclined to the view that "*vi j^sr™"" this shouldJbeproperly considered as military assistance. Governor Stevenson said that Washington was embarrassed because the authorities there were getting questions from Congressmen about the matter and only a few had known of this private arrangement. The Secretary- General stated that he was very sorry about this. The Secretary-General stated that he had been trying to find out how Bill Fry got the information used in his story.

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The Secretary-General said that Mr. Suslov, the Soviet Under-Secretary, came to see him late on Wednesday afternoon to inform him that the Soviet Government was unhappy that the Secretary-General in his press conference had not insisted on the immediate withdrawal of the United States troops from South Vietnam. The Secretary-General stated that he had informed Mr. Suslov that he could not try in his press conference$to make everyone happy. The Secretary-General remarked that sometimes he was inclined to agree with what Ambassador Plimpton had said to Bunche the other night, to the effect that the Secretary-General ought not to have any press conferences. The Secretary-General reiterated that his major concern is to avert a rapprochement between Moscow and Peking. Governor Stevenson said that the United States had had hopes that Kosygin's visit to Hanoi would be helpful, but Hanoi launched a carefully planned attack which had been exactly time^or Kosygin's arrival and which caused him to promise aid to Hanoi. Governor Stevenson enquired with regard to the question of the terms of reference for the 5 plus 2 talks, whether the Secretary-General had seen any sign of hope for a disposition on the part of North Vietnam to consider a settlement on the basis of independence for South Vietnam and an end to interference from the North. The Secretary-General observed that Couve de Murville is trying to induce Peking not to insist on United States withdrawal before negotiations begin, noting that Mr. Kosygin yesterday called for such withdrawal and even coupled Korea with South Vietnam. Governor Stevenson remarked that the French approach is that there should be no pre-conditions by either side and thus the United States sees no promise in the French position. Governor Stevenson advised that it would have helped if the United States Mission could have had some warning, prior to the press conference, that the Secretary-General might be making some references to his proposals. The Governor thought that after the Fry article appeared it would have been better just to deny it, as he had done, rather than to communicate it to the French and the Russians.

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Governor Stevenson said that the United States Government is now troubled about how to handle the matter of military aid, with Burma, with Congress.,particularlyy^dth the military committee, and with other committees concerned. Governor Stevenson stated that at the moment the United Nations position in Washington is the worst he had ever seen. It is at its lowest level. There is talk in the Government about no further confidential discussions with the UN Secretariat in the future. The Permanent Representative has been put in a difficult position, he said, with the Department of State, the President, and possibly with Congress. There is some feeling that the Permanent Representative has not kept the Secretary-General well enough informed about the United States position and vice versa; in other words, that there has been a lack of effective communication between the Secretary- General and the United States Mission, ^owernor Stevenson stated that he personally would wish very much to keep this United Nations channel open. Governor Stevenson stated that Hanoi had published maps in their seven-year plan, which incorporates South Vietnam and its population and also Laos and Cambodia into North Vietnam. He again asked the Secretary-General what information he might have about the intentions and objectives of North Vietnam other than the conquest of all of Indochina. uovernor Stevenson referred to the reaction of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia to any intimation that the United States would abandon South Vietnam and thus open a bridge to their abandonment. Governor Stevenson said that the United States has given consideration to a possible third party but that Pakistan was ruled out because it would *l J ^M+*> \

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only by Hanoi. If they made a mass attack, say by 15 or more divisions, on South Vietnam, they could no doubt overrun it, but in that event the US aerial activity could inflict vast numbers of casualties (he mentioned >P 4 even millions). Governor Stevenson stated that Diem was the last remnant of stability in South Vietnam and the corner was turned when he became impossible. There has been chaos in South Vietnam ever since. Governor Stevenson said that he appreciates that the Secretary- General must have press conferences, but it would be very helpful if there could be advance consultations on matters affecting United States interests, such as thossoccurring in the last press conference. Governor Stevenson expressed the fear that present attitudes toward the United Nations, because of the feeling o£if Article 19 and the reaction to the press conference, may find reflection when Congress considers UN appropriations.

On the question of. Article 19, Governor Stevenson said that the Government understoodVUnited SfiateS'position, which permitted the *l K procedural vote on the Albanian effort, but that some Congressmen and others were claiming that this was an outright /'surrender ." lrovernor Stevenson said that a prevailing attitude in official Washington today is that the United Nations is necessary and that effort should be made to salvage what they could and that it might require 10 years for the organization to regain its strength. The ^overnor said that he had very little hope that anything constructive would come out of the negotiations by the committee being set up. On the termination of the talk with the Secretary-General, Governor Stevenson asked to have a short private talk with Mr. Bunche in his office. He informed Mr. Bunche that the picture in Washington was much more harsh even than that which he had conveyed to the Secretary-General. President Johnson, he said, was very angry and had gone so far as to say that they would not consider any more proposals from the Secretary-General. l The "overnor added that he himself was 'throug h *an' d would probably have to , ;/ 1f step down. -12-

Governor Stevenson stated that the United Nations ought to be able to do something in such a desperate situation in spite of the almost certain veto, •which would make action in the Security Council impossible, and the paralysis of the General Assembly. He thought there could be a direct appeal by a substantial number of members of the UN. He thought also that the Secretary-General might send someone like Barrington out to Vietnam to ascertain the true situation and the possibilities, or that the Secretary-General himself might go -with the intention of doing what he could, and, in any case, reporting on the situation objectively to the Security Council. 2 March 1965

Notes on short talk with Adlai Stevenson at the Hoffman dinner Sunday night, 28 February 1965, at 7:30 p.m.

Governor Stevenson said that the President had been very angry about the revelation in the press conference of the Secretary-General's proposals which he had considered fully confidential. Stevenson said that some of this anger had rubbed off on him. He was sure, however, that things would cool off as indeed he himself was cooling off on his immediate reaction that he was "through". The Secretary-General, therefore, should not jump to any hasty conclusions. A major difficulty was his relations with the Department and particularly with Rusk "whose feet are solidly imbedded in congressional concrete".

R.J.B.

. • < f UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES NEW YORK Rd) UNATIDNS NEWYORK •

REFERENCE:

To : The Secretary-General

From : Ralph J. Bunche Under-Secretary Subject: Talk with Adlai Stevenson at his office during lunch on 1 March 1965, from 1:20 to 2:50 p.m. (present: Governor Stevenson, Ralph J. Bunche)

I informed Governor Stevenson that you were considering asking for a postponement of the 20th anniversary celebration of the United Nations in San Francisco scheduled for June of this year. Governor Stevenson said that he could understand the reasons for this but he could not help but wonder whether the announcement of a postponement might not have a most adverse psychological impact, since it would be interpreted as a resignation to ultimate failure on the Article 19 issue and as a sure sign of the complete collapse of the UN. He thought that even a cancellation might be better than a postponement, though the impact of either would be bad. I informed Governor Stevenson of your reaction to the possibility that he might soon be giving up his position as Permanent Representative. Stevenson said that it had been his intention from the beginning not to stay beyond his four-year term and he had informed the President sometime ago that he would stay on a while after the Inauguration, but would wish to leave by the coming summer. Now, because of the difficulty in the Assembly, he is inclined to stay through the twentieth session and return to his law practice at the end of this year.

Governor Stevenson said that Bill Moyer of the White House staff came up to have lunch with him yesterday and advised him that the anger in the White House would "blow over in a hurry" and to forget about the matter. Governor Stevenson said that Dean Rusk had been counselling the President to exercise restraint, as against some other voices. He said that Dean Rusk may have confused the President a bit on the question of the Secretary-General1s proposals by attempting to draw a distinction between the suggested "procedures" and "proposals". Governor Stevenson gave me a copy of an incoming cable to the Mission from the Department concerning your proposals, which he thought you would

«V8M&CH UNITED NATIONS ^g^ff NATIONS UNIES

- 2 - be interested in seeing. Governor Stevenson said that there appeared to "be not much that could "be done to break the vicious circle on Viet-Nam, describing the situation as a "Greek tragedy".

From the standpoint of United States interest, what is most needed is a confirmation by a third party of the refusal of Hanoi to negotiate. Governor Stevenson revealed that the third party who had interceded, who was undisclosed in his talk with you on Saturday, was Canada. The Canadian, he stated, had a very rough time in Hanoi and was advised by the authorities there to tell the Americans to "come on, hit us with bombers anywhere they please; we are prepared to absorb all of their blows". Governor Stevenson deplored that it is impossible to get it across to the public that it is Hanoi and not the United States that refuses to talk. In this regard, he referred to the letter appealing for negotiations signed by a number of American professors which appeared in the New York Times on the morning of March 1. They assumed, he noted, that it was the United States and not Hanoi that was blocking negotiation. But the United States, Governor Stevenson stressed, cannot take the initiative in asking for talks or getting them underway. Washington's concern, he said, is to "put the cat on Hanoi's back where it belongs". The Governor stated that the United States realizes that its withdrawal from South Viet-Nam might have a disastrous effect on Southeast Asia as CV indicated last night gHPt-the talk at Paul Hoffman' s dinner. The United States, said the Governor, does not want to drive Hanoi into China's arms or to force the USSR to close the rift with China, but unless Hanoi ends its aggressive acts against South Viet-Nam the United States inexorably will be forced to take actions which will have these results, even though they are contrary to US interests. The difficulty for the United States, said the Governor, with regard to both of U Thant's proposals - the bilateral and the 5 + 2 - was that they required US initiative. But could the Secretary-General do one other thing - could he make it clear to the world now that it is Hanoi that refuses to talk and not the US. I expressed strong doubt that the Secretary-General could. The United States, said Stevenson, is "in a hell of a box" with undisclosed news that it is Hanoi and not the US that will not talk. Maybe, he added, they would talk or agree to talk if they were approached by the right people. At this point, I asked the Governor for his personal reaction to an UNITED NATIONS Mf NATIONS UNIES

- 3 - idea about a possible step which had not in any way "been "broached to the Secretary-General whereby the Secretary-General would follow up his earlier proposals by a formal proposal which could be in writing and unpublicized to North and South Viet-Nam, China, and the United States (and possibly France, the United Kingdom and the USSR) for agreement on talks looking toward an end of fighting and a settlement, and at the same time asking each party to submit views on an agenda (which, of course, would assume the quality of pre-conditions). Privately, Stevenson thought that Washington might be interested in such an approach and dictated an exploratory cable to Washington about it, and suggested that I not take it up with the Secretary-General until he was able to communicate to me Washington's reaction. As regards Pakistan as a possible third party, Stevenson said that they would, of course, be willing to accept Zafrulla Khan. Stevenson said that he was beginning to think that possibly the best thing that could be done would be for the Secretary-General to send someone out to the area; someone at the level of Spinelli. It would be necessary, the Governor thought, to let the atmosphere created by the press conference cool off a bit. Governor Stevenson thought that the United States and South Viet-Nam might reply to such an approach as suggested by stating the conditions that North Viet-Nam should cease active military assistance to the South Viet- namese rebels and ordering the Viet-Cong to stop its hostilities. Presumably, he thought, Hanoi (and China) would deny that the United Nations or the Secretary-General had any jurisdiction over the matter and/or demand impossible pre-conditions such as the immediate withdrawal of the US troops. Stevenson advised the Department that if they saw any merit in such an idea, he would explore it further with Bunche before the latter would submit it to U 'Ehant. I recall ay statement of 12 Fehnm-y aboat the dangerous situation in Viet Kaa, Hy serious concern, ovai* that situation continues. If anything* since February 3.2th tho Viet Saa situation has worsened and the threat of a vddenlng •war remains grave. ^Xn addi-tionj bloodahed continues and the losg of Hf0 and property mounts with each passi:og day. Fbwever, I have nofced sons recant efforts and developmeir&s in a hopeful direction,, One is the appeal of 1 April of the Seventeen Heads of State or.Government of Mon-Alimned Countries for the alsrt of negotiations on the ?iet Ham situation tdthout any preconditions. Another is the statement of Praslda-st Johnson in his speech of ? April indicating a readiness en the part of the Dnitad States Goverrsient to enter into "unconditional discussions" and tha appeal for "a greatly expanded cooperative

«. 2 ~ the Charter and .lay broad duty, as Sfiflretary-Osnornl of the United Nations,

to do vjhatever I reasonably and legitimately can In pursuit of peace 8 In the light of all the circumstances* therefore, I feel obliged to put forth a now effort In the fona of a most urgent appeal to all of the parties directly involved militarily in th

.cussions, although tho positions rsnsain. far apart. Obvioi-ia]ys a first and essential objective with ?e>;aa*d to that conflict is to br s cassation of hoetilit5.es as quickly as possible, I am suro, that ther^ is agreement with csy often-stated iriew that an cs5d.x-.ring solution of the problaas of Viet Kara isastj, and, iadeed, can only be sought arotxnd tho conference table rather than oa tha field of battle* In order to create teat clisisA© of quiet >Jhioh alone v/ould be eond&cive to a search for a peaceful solutions it is imperative to bring a quick end to the fighting,, Thsrefora, I now appeal most earnestly and urgently to all of the \ parties directly ir-v^lvad to agree to a^ temporary cessation of all hostile

/ jsilitary activityj whether overt or-coverts across all lines3 for a ,' duration of three months* at the earliest possible date bxti not later • '4: than. __.....,..-._._ _,. .,,,* li. April lf/65 My deep concern about the situation in Viet Nam and the imperative need to find a peaceful settlement of that situation continues, of course.

My efforts toward this end also continue although, in the nature of the case, most such efforts, toy whoever exerted, must be behind the scenes and in the realm of quiet diplomacy. You will understand, therefore, my inability today to say very much about Viet Nam. Although the threat to the peace of the world is no less grave today I may say that I find some recent developments to be heartening. As you know, I have welcomed and endorsed the appeal of 1 April of the

Seventeen Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries for the start of negotiations on the Viet Nam situation without any preconditions.

I consider this to be a sound approach because I believe that the only way to get discussions started which would lead to serious negotiation would be without any conditions. I would very much hope that this appeal will be responded to soon by all of the parties directly concerned, ^r*1 x**i f I.UMJ"M i-4y_ by North Viet Nam. I consider that the door to discussion and negotiation has at least been partially opened by President Johnson*s statement of 7 April endorsing "unconditional discussions" andvbhe indication reported in the press that Premier Pham Van Dong of North Viet Nam would be willing to undertake discussions, although under certain stated conditions. I strongly hope that there will be a prompt follow-up on the stated willingness ^JL^ O**~t-cC&~3 t^^o-C^-e-fl_ lAJ-<{j@P of -fefaes'i* two parties/to enter into discussions and that no effort wuaBrbe ^ spared to get discussions started with a minimum of delay. The world, which is gravely threatened by this conflict, is certainly due this mu«h.

15 April 1965 0CO COPIDMTIAL

Meeting held by Ambassador Stevenson with the Secretary-General on 23 April 1965

p . Ambassador Mlai Stevenson Secretary-General present: Ambassador C. Yost Mr. J. Rolz-Bennett

1. Ambassador Stevenson said he wished to review with the Secretary-General the latest developments concerning the situation in Viet-Nam. The United States Government was considerably disappointed at the lack of any positive response on the part of the North Vietnamese Government to the offer of unconditional talks made by President Johnson in the Baltimore speech on 6 April 1965. More than a week had elapsed and the only reaction by Hanoi was to pose conditions, some of which were clearly unacceptable to the United States. The very negative and stiff reaction of Peking was not surprising but the United States had hoped that Hanoi would consider President Johnson's statement in a different light from that of Communist China. Ambassador Stevenson wondered if there was any other step that could be usefully taken in the search for a peaceful solution. 2. The Secretary-General recalled the appeal made by the seventeen non-aligned nations as well as the statements issued by several heads of Government -- including the Prime Minister of India, the President of Pakistan, President Tito and President Ben Bella — pointing out that the offer for unconditional talks should be accompanied by a cessation of the bombings being carried out by the United States against North Viet-TTam. Many governments and sectors of public opinion in the world found it difficult to reconcile the United States offer for unconditional talks with the continued aerial -2-

attacks against North Viet-Nara, as this would in effect mean that if North Viet-Nam accepted the talks, it was doing so under duress. While it was not at all certain that calling off temporarily the bombings would induce North Viet-Nam to respond more positively to President Johnson's offer for talks, it might be worthwhile trying, all the more so since there were no indications that continued air attacks would succeed in changing Hanoi's attitude. Furthermore, a decision by the United States to stop the bombings would show to the world the American Government's genuine desire to find a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam conflict and would redress much of the criticism now levelled against the United States. 3* Ambassador Stevenson said that the draft of the Secretary- General's appeal for a temporary cease-fire in Viet-Nam was "very much alive" and that the United States Government continued to give it very careful consideration. In this connexion, Ambassador Stevenson wished to know what the Secretary-General's ideas were concerning the steps to be taken in regard to the cease-fire. k. In reply to Ambassador Stevenson's question, the Secretary- General said that the appeal would be addressed to the parties directly involved militarily in the conflict in Viet-Nam, urging them to agree to a temporary cessation of all hostile military activity, whether overt or covert, across all lines, for a duration of three months. This meant in fact a cease-fire embracing military activities across the frontiers of the Republic of Viet-Nam. ^He did not refer to military activities within the Republic of Viet-NamTJ No machinery was contemplated in the appeal concerning the question of verification and/or inspection of the cease-fire since it was felt that the mention of such machinery might introduce an additional difficulty at this stage. If the response to the appeal was encouraging, consideration could be given to the question of verification and/or -5- inspection. This meant that until such time as an impartial machinery was established for the supervision of the cease-fire, the parties (including the United States) would not "be prevented from carrying out surveillance flights within the Republic of Viet-Nam to ensure that the terms of the cease-fire were being observed. After issuing the appeal it was the intention of the Secretary- General to discuss with the signatories of the 17-nation appeal the desirability of these countries following up with another statement urging the parties to accept the Secretary-General's appeal. After that, initiatives could be taken in the light of the circumstances as they developed. 5. In reply to a question by Ambassador Stevenson, the Secretary-General said he saw no harm in the United States Government approaching the Government of the U.S.S.R. in order to seek clarification of the U.S.S.R.'s position concerning a peaceful settlement of the South Viet-Nam conflict. A.s was well known, in statements recently made by the Government of the U.S.S.R., the point had been stressed that no negotiations could be undertaken on the Vietnamese conflict as long as the United States continued to bomb North Viet-Nam. Other conditions had been also laid down in the Soviet statements, but the one concerning the halt of bombings in the Worth had been given first place. 6. Ambassador Stevenson was aware of the Secretary-General's scheduled departure for Vienna on Monday 26 April, and wondered whether in case the question of the appeal became urgent, it would be possible to contact the Secretary-General while on his travel. If developments did not move that quickly, the question of the appeal could be taken up upon the Secretary-General's return (scheduled for 5/6 May). 7. The Secretary-General said that during his forthcoming trip he could be contacted every day through the Executive Office here in New York. Sear I fisrrIM m?^r fsoai tte sjseting last Slte's&ag?1 t^o firistj, of the e©B$»8;t@a

&stitiat©s ' being assisted tigr the' IMtad Stations

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fe the political fieMa the ISMted States is la a strong |t0sition feee&use of l^rasideKt Jdm®onJ d sgfeeiaasit to ^ncondi- tioasl nôtiatiojis* AH infoamtiea that has cosae s$r Vie* âai lea&8 JBSS to believe that the heartfelt desist of the Vietass&se êasaats, SoKth aad Sforthj, is to see sa end to the shooting aad feoisîng* Hanoi hts refuged to ait®- into j teiol i© 2?esp0&8ifeie for the eemtinued shooting

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report I made to the tMted Ifetioas Icorjoiaic and to project© for" t&@ nescfe £ive jm»s of the is eacfesefi* '!£he resting tiras is five cc; Secretasy-Oeaieral V Shant Aribassador fioiacy Cabot todge Meeting held on 19 July 1965 at k.JQ p.m. in the \t\jJCyi* Conference Room of the Secretary- General

Present; Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State (USA) The Secretary-General Mr. Ear Ian Cleveland, Assistant Secretary Mr. Ralph J. Bunche of State for International Organization Mr. C. V. Narasimhan Affairs (USA) Mr. Jose Rolz-Bennett Mr. Francis T. P. Plimpton, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations (USA)

1. The Secretary-General thanked the Secretary of State for having found time to exchange views with him on various topics of mutual interest and concern.

Viet-Nam 2. In reply to a question by the Secretary-General, the Secretary of State said that the statement issued by Mr. Averell Harriman in Moscow after his first meeting with Mr. Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, had overstated the significance of the talks. There had been nothing particularly new in the views of the Soviet Government on Viet-Nam.

3. After the Secretary-General had reviewed some of the latest developments concerning the Vietnamese situation, the Secretary of State said that the United States Government had for several months been awaiting a sign from Hanoi that the Worth Vietnamese Government was willing to sit down at the conference table. No such indication had been received to date. On the contrary, the war efforts of the "communist side" had been increased. The United States saw two main alternatives for the peaceful solution of the Vietnamese question: either a conference or a de facto solution. As far as the United States was concerned, it would agree to a conference under the auspices of the United Nations, or the Geneva Agreements or a conference called by the 17 non-aligned countries. The - 2 -

United States had no preference but the fact was that up to now Hanoi had expressed no interest whatsoever in attending a conference. The second alternative would be a gradual decrease of military activity by Hanoi and the Viet-Cong, following a pattern similar to the one which developed in regard to the communist aggression against Greece immediately after World War II. The communist activity there began withering away without any formal peace settlement. k. The United States had had very frank talks with Moscow recently, and it became apparent that the USSR was unable to take political initiatives unless Hanoi took the first step. It was clear that the USSR could not control Hanoi and therefore was reluctant to speak for Hanoi. Thus the Soviet Union was being dragged along by the uncompromising position of Hanoi and Peking. As a result, the United States and Moscow were unable to make headway by themselves towards a solution of the Vietnamese situation. Hanoi remained the key. 5. Another point which ought to be kept in mind - the Secretary of State continued - was that it would be very difficult for the United States to talk with Hanoi without Saigon. Furthermore, unless Hanoi gave clear indication that they would be prepared to talk on the substance of the problem, there was little that could be done to pursue this course of action. 6. In reply to some questions raised by the Secretary-General concerning the nature of the conflict, the Secretary of State said very emphatically that Hanoi was responsible and should be held accountable for much of what was happening in the south. The 325th Division of North Viet-Nam was deployed in Laos and South Viet-Nam and had been placed there between November 196U and February 1965. If there was a genuine pull-back of these forces by Hanoi, such.a move would open all sorts of possibilities for a peaceful settlement. (There was a strong divergence between the Secretary-General and the Secretary of State on the recital of the background facts and the primary responsibility for the existing situation). Con- cerning the question of reorganizing the South Vietnamese Government and - 3 - broadening its representative basis, it should be kept in mind that no government could give way to any such reorganization just because some factions within the country opposed it. Would the French agree to reorganize its Government Just because there were some segments opposing it? Had the Burmese Government carried out any such reorganization during the time of the armed communist insurrection? Y. The Secretary-General recalled that as late as September 1964 there appeared the possibility of a "neutralization" of both Worth and South Viet-Nam. Such a course had been agreed upon in regard to Laos. The Secretary of State countered that the communists had not respected the neutralization of Laos and therefore this did not provide a good precedent. 8. The question of a cease-fire was also discussed. The Secretary of State said that under conditions of guerilla warfare it was difficult to call for and to implement a cease-fire. The United States, however, would be prepared to participate in a conference in which the question of a cease-fire would be the first order of business. It would not matter for the United States whether this was a conference of two (North and South Viet-Nam) or of twelve (Geneva conference). 9« There was an exchange of views concerning the assistance given on the one hand by the United States to South Viet-Nam and on the other by Moscow and Peking to North Viet-Nam. The question of the representation of South Viet-Nam at a conference was also raised, and the Secretary of State said that the United States could not agree to the Viet-Cong (NFL) sharing in the representation of South Viet-Nam. If the Viet-Cong wanted to be represented at the conference table, they could do so as part of the North Vietnamese delegation. 10. The Secretary of State said forcefully that Hanoi was attempting to impose a solution on South Viet-Nam and that this the United States would neither accept nor tolerate. The United States had confronted similar situations in the cases of Greece, Iran, Turkey, Korea and Laos, and had helped these countries to stop the communist thrust to impose their will on these countries. With equal resolve the United States was determined to resist the communist aggression against South Viet-Nam, and it simply would not allow them to get away with it, and the sooner Hanoi and Peking understood this, the better.

Article 19 11. Turning to the question of Article 19, the Secretary of State said that the United States was prepared to seek a solution that would ensure the normal functioning of the United Nations, but that in doing so, his Government wished to be very clear as to what the membership proposed to do and the consequences deriving therefrom. If a majority of the members of the United nations desired to subscribe to the view that contributions to peace-keeping activities of the United Nations should be made on a voluntary basis, thus in effect adhering to the basic Soviet thesis, the United States might be prepared to go along, but it would reserve for itself a right, equal to that exercised by the Soviet Union, of applying the principle of voluntary contributions to such activities of the United Nations as they may see fit. The United States Government and the Senate of the United States could not agree to a double standard being applied; this was the one thing that would not be acceptable. As an example, he mentioned that if UNCTAD were to decide on the establish- ment of a fund to subsidize exports from the developing countries to which the United States objected, his Government would reserve its right not to contribute. 12. Elaborating on the question concerning Article 19, the Secretary of State said that the acceptance of the Soviet thesis and the con- sequent attitude which the United States would have to adopt, would be tantamount to a change in the Charter, since in effect all budgetary contributions would become voluntary. If this was what the members wanted, the United States would not object to it, and the United States Senate might indeed be extremely pleased. He recalled in this connexion that it had been a veritable "miracle" that the Senate had ratified Article 17 and that they would jump at the chance of doing away with the mandatory nature of the budgetary provisions of the Charter. 13- The point was emphasized to the Secretary of State that the members of the Committee of 33 had all along "been dealing only with the peace- keeping activities and their financing, and that at no time had the view been expressed that normal budgetary responsibilities of the members should be placed on a voluntary "basis. The Secretary of State was urged to take this into account, and the hope was expressed that the United States Government would find it possible to agree to a solution circumscribed to the problem of peace-keeping operations. The Secretary of State was not receptive to this approach.

Dominican Republic ih. On the situation in the Dominican Republic, there was a brief exchange of views. The Secretary of State said that the United States Government was of the view that some of the early reports of the United Nations mission in the Dominican Republic had been biased and one-sided. This had lef-d to rather strained relations between the Inter-American Force and Mr. Mayobre and his team. The situation had lately improved, and at the political level contacts and liaison seemed now to be satisfactory. Relations between the United Nations mission and the Inter-American Force were yet to be smoothed out. There was still reluctance on the part of the military to make information available to the United Nations team as they were not sure to whom such information would be conveyed. 15- The Secretary of State also said that Ambassador Bunker was hopeful of an early political settlement of the Dominican crisis which he thought might come about in two-three weeks. SECRET 28 July 1965

VIET-NAM

Ambassador Morozov saw me today and conveyed to me the reactions of his Government to my informal proposals regarding the problem of Viet-Nam. On cease-fire, the Soviet Government considers that a distinction should be made between the unilateral action of the United States in bombing North Viet-Nam and the legitimate struggle of the Vietnamese people for independence. Therefore, if the Secretary- General's appeal is confined to cessation of United States bombing of North Viet-Nam, then the Soviet Government would consider such an appeal to be right and proper. But in the view of the Soviet Government, the Secretary-General should not equate the United States aggression with the legitimate struggle for independence of the Vietnamese people. In other words, according to Morozov, the Secretary-General should not ask the National Liberation Front to cease their military activities against the "United States aggressors and the puppet regime in Saigon". On the question of the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Government considers that the acceptance of Premier Phan-Van-Dong's four-point proposals of & April 1965 should serve as a basis for all future discussions oh. negotiations. The Soviet Government holds the view that these four-point proposals alone are the proper and sensible approach to the solution of the Viet-Nam problem. In this connexion Morozov drew my attention to Premier Kosygin's statement of 30 June 1965 in which he outlined the Soviet Government's attitude towards the problem. The Soviet Government will agree to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference if the United States and other participants accept the principles laid down in the four-point programme. Regarding the Secretary-General's proposal of equal representation for the National Liberation Front and the Saigon Government in any future international conferences, the Soviet Government finds it difficult to endorse it. In its view, the National Liberation Front alone represents the people of South Viet-Nam as is evident from the great successes achieved by the Front in their struggle for independence and the increasing assistance it has been receiving from the people of South Viet-Nam. So, in the view of the Soviet Union, the National Liberation Front alone should be recognized as competent to represent South Viet-Nam. - 2 - Viet-Ham 28 July 1965

I made the following observations by way of clarification. On cease-fire, my sole purpose is to create the necessary political and psychological climate congenial for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference or any other conference to be agreed to by the parties principally concerned. I do not intend the cease-fire requirement as a condition for the convening of any conference. I made it clear that in all United Nations involvements in the past in questions involving peace or war, cease-fire has been invariably the first requisite for the conduct of negotiations. I hold the view that all hostile military activities of the National Liberation Front as well as of the United States and of the Saigon Government should be stopped if the requisite atmosphere is to be created for the proper convening of an international conference. I explained to Morozov that in my view the cessation of United States bombing of North Viet-Nam alone will not create a necessary atmosphere for such a conference if fighting goes on uninterrupted in South Viet-Nam. On the question of the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, I agree with the Soviet Government that Premier Phan-Van-Dong's four-point programme should be the basis for approach. I told him that the third point needs some clarification. If it means the complete withdrawal of United States forces and military bases from South Viet-Nam as a condition for negotiations, then in my view, it is not realistic. If it is the case that the United States should recognize the principle of withdrawal as provided for in the Geneva Agreements of 1954, then the conference can take place, taking note of such United States assurances. Morozov had no comment on this observation. Regarding equal representation of the National Liberation Front and the Saigon Government in all future conferences, Morozov told me that it would be very difficult for the Soviet Government to go along with it, since in its view the National Liberation Front alone represents the people of South Viet-Nam. I explained to him that in my view it is the only realistic formula for future conferences. To insist on the National Liberation Front alone representing South Viet-Nam is not realistic as the other side will never accept it. Similarly, to insist on Saigon alone or whoever is in power in Saigon alone, should represent South Viet-Nam — 3 ~

Viet-Nam 28 July 1965 is also unrealistic as Hanoi and the National Liberation Front will never accept it. So, in my view, the question of double representation alone is sensible and realistic. I pointed out to him the precedent accepted in the case of Laos where three factions — centre, right and left — are represented in the Government. I told Morozov that I had presented these ideas to the United States but the United States could not accept them as Saigon 4*eTnot accept them. As Morozov already knows, the United States had come out with the counter proposal that the National Liberation Front could form part of the North Vietnamese delegation or speak through the North Vietnamese delegation in any international conference. I told him that such a proposal would not be accepted by Hanoi. I explained to Morozov that the question of representation of South Viet-Nam is now the crux of the problem. Everybody seems to agree to the need for reconvening the Geneva Conference, but there is no agreement regarding the question of South Vietnamese representation. I requested him to transmit my appeal to Moscow to reconsider this question in the light of what I had explained. I also informed him of my previous endeavours to get the reaction of the National Liberation Front to this question through President Ben Bella of Algeria in April 1965. I told him that so far I had not received any reply from Algeria, although I believe that Ben Bella must have communicated this proposal to the representative of the National Liberation Front stationed in Algiers. Proposals regarding the situation in Viet-Nam

On many occasions in the past the Secretary-General has expressed his very great concern about the conflict in Viet-Nam. Shab concern now intensifies out of his deep compassion for the people of Viet-Nam who daily are "being battered and torn by the ravages of a bitter war, and indeed for all those who are dying in it; and because of his growing anxiety over the increasing threat to the peace of the world from the war in Viet-Nam. For these reasons the Secretary-General feels compelled to do whatever he can to help towards a peaceful solution, and therefore he submits the following proposals regarding the situation in Viet- Nam. During the past few weeks, there have been a number of approaches by some United Nations members, including one of the parties in the Viet-Nam conflict with a view to having the United Nations use its influence to induce the parties to enter into negotiations and to evolve a peaceful solution to the Viet-Nam crisis. On 30 July 1965, the United States Government formally requested the members of the Security Council, through their President, to "respond effectively to the challenge raised by the present state of affairs in Southeast Asia". It is not for the Secretary-General in his official position to pass judgement on the foreign policy of Member States, in particular on the merit of initiatives which they take at the United Nations. It may be recalled that, for a long time now, the Secretary-General has been expressing certain personal views in relation to Viet-Nam. More than a year ago, on 8 July 196^, the Secretary-General said, "I do not see how the United Nations can be involved .,. in view of the fact that more than one of the parties concerned are not members of the United Nations and are not accountable to this Organization". This point of view has been consistently maintained by the Secretary-General, and has been frequently repeated by him since, in particular on Zk'February 1965 and on 9 July 1965. Today, as before, in the Secretary-General's opinion, actions which a United Nations organ might take would run a very serious risk of not being accepted by those parties to the Viet-Nam conflict which are not members of the United Nations. - 2 -

The Secretary-General has not anticipated any formal United Nations involvement in the Viet-Nam situation at this stage, although he has, on many occasions in the past, publicly stated his personal views on that question. For more than two years, he has maintained that this problem could not be solved by military means and should be discussed at the negotiating table. He has reiterated that the Geneva Conference of 195*1- would be the most appropriate framework for negotiations, and that the objectives of a settlement should be "a return to the essentials of the 195^ Geneva Agreements" (press conference of 8 July 196*4-; statement of 12 February 1965; and press conference of 15 April 1965). Those members of the United Nations which have recently made new requests to the Secretary-General, both public and private, to renew his good offices towards bringing about a settlement of the Viet-Nam crisis are certainly aware of these firmly-held views of the Secretary-General. Recent developments have served only to reinforce the Secretary-General's conviction that, though belated, a revival of the Geneva Agreements continues to offer the best road to a negotiated settlement. On 15 April 19^5, taking note of a statement by President Johnson on 25 Mareh and of the proposals of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam of 8 April, the Secretary-General had observed that there appeared to be a "broad consensus" among the parties that the Geneva Agreements could offer a clue to a settlement. of course, it is well known that great differences have existed from the early days following the conclusion of the Geneva Conference in regard to the manner in which the participants have interpreted the final declaration of the Conference. But, more recently, the Secretary-General has felt that there were a number of apparent similarities in the stated positions of the parties. Since these resemblances concern two basic features of the Geneva Agreements, the Secretary-General considers that it may be worth exploring further the question of whether there is between these positions a mere appearance of agreements or whether there exists also a preliminary basis for a more substantial degree of accord. From recent statements by some of the parties concerned, there appears to be already a consensus that a military neutralization of both parts of Viet-Nam should be an essential element in a future settlement, as it was at Geneva in 195^. It has been the position of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and of the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam that the military provisions of the Geneva Agreements should be implemented. On 8 April, Premier Pham Van Dong stated: "The two zones of Viet-Nam must refrain from joining any military alliance; there must be no foreign military - 3 -

"bases, troops or military personnel in their respective territories." When, in its 22 March statement, the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam demanded a withdrawal of the United States troops and bases, it was presumably stating its views in %he same spirit. The United States Government's policy has been stated as not to seek bases in Viet-Ham. On 7 April 19^5, President Johnson expounded the position that South Viet-Ham should be "tied to no alliance ... a military base for no other country". The Secretary-General, therefore, believes that the principle of a military neutralization of Viet-Nam involving the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Viet-Nam, could now be recognized as one of the bases for a settlement. Of course, a number of aspects of such a principle would need to be clarified, at first informally; and later the modalities could be the subject of negotiation. Furthermore, the Secretary-General has noted that, on 28 July 1965, President Johnson expressed the objective that "the people of South Viet-Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their destiny in free elections in the South or throughout all Viet-Nam, under international supervision". While this statement may need further clarification, the principle referred to is nevertheless clearly one of the essentials of the 195^ Geneva Agreements. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam are agreed in their view that "violations" of this principle by the Government of South Viet-Nam were responsible for the collapse of the 195^ settlement. On 26 June 1965, President Ho Chi Minh of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam stated to a West European newspaper that "democratic procedures must be guaranteed in Viet-Nam to create conditions for the restoration of normal relations between North and South Viet-Nam with a view towards the reunification of the country". Although Premier Pham Van Dong did not refer directly to these procedures in his proposal of 8 April 1965, nor did the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam in its 22 March statement, it is well known that they both have always firmly upheld the political procedures decided upon at Geneva. Therefore, in the view of the Secretary-General, it might be reasonable to expect the parties to agree that peaceful democratic procedures for the free expression of the will of the people of Viet-Nam, meaning elections under international supervision as established in the Geneva Agreements, might be a means of settling the political problems of South Viet-Nam and, at the appropriate time, the question of reunification. If, in the opinion of the parties, the Secretary-General's assessment of the different positions is not sufficiently warranted, the Secretary-General believes that more detailed explorations on a confidential preliminary basis could "be continued in order to Judge more clearly whether such a broad consensus on the tvo basic features of a future settlement, as noted above, really exists. In the Secretary-General's view, such explorations would in no way commit the parties to a formal negotiation which, for a variety of reasons they may not be prepared to undertake at this stage. They could be conducted by the Secretary-General, on his personal responsibility, by way of questions put informally to the parties as to the precise details of their respective positions. It should naturally be understood that, whatever the usefulness of such confidential explorations, it would be left to direct negotiation between the parties to decide on the modalities of implementing the principles of a settlement by a reconvening of the 195^ Geneva Conference. Assuming the existence of a broad consensus, the Secretary- General is greatly concerned that the chances of reopening the negotiations and of reconvening a Geneva Conference might be delayed, or even jeopardized, by procedural difficulties. For this very reason, the Secretary-General has refrained in the past from taking public initiatives, such as a call for a cease-fire or an appeal to the parties, as he had been urged to do by many sections of the United Nations membership, for fear that his actions would make it even more difficult for some parties to prepare the way for negotiations. The same consideration applies to the attitude of the Secretary-General towards the recent initiatives inside the United Nations organs. However, the Secretary-General has recently deemed it possible to make certain limited suggestions: 1. The Secretary-General has recommended "informal, private and confidential dialogues between some of the parties directly involved ... as a preliminary step toward the convening of a more formal conference". (Press conference of 2k February 19&5). 2. He has said that there must be a "cessation of all hostile military activities by all concerned". (Press conference of 9 July 1965). 3. Finally, the Secretary-General has stated that "to achieve a really effective cessation of military activities, the discussions must involve those who are actually fighting". (Press conference of 7 July 1965). In the view of the Secretary-General, the attention of the parties should now be directed primarily to creating an atmosphere more congenial for negotiations by bringing an early end to the appalling destruction of life and property in Viet-Nam. A /5 /t/p.j

cessation of all military operations "by all sides is, therefore, a practical necessity if useful negotiations are to be undertaken. It is difficult for the Secretary-General to advance specific proposals in this regard, inasmuch as a variety of formulae could be thought of, in order to make them more acceptable, from a unilateral and de facto curtailment of military activity to a more formal arrangement. Should a public appeal by the Secretary- General facilitate unilateral initiatives by the parties or the opening of direct discussions between them on a cease-fire, the Secretary-General would obviously be prepared to do so. Should it be necessary, on the other hand, for certain understandings to be exchanged confidentially before a de facto cease-fire could be arrived at, the Secretary-General could use the same confidential exploratory procedure suggested above. Hie good offices of anyone else acceptable to the parties could be equally feasible. The Secretary-General deems it necessary also to stress that the question of participants in the negotiations should not obstruct the way to a settlement. It is a question which could be solved only by agreeing that no fruitful discussions on ending the war in Viet-Ham could take place without involving all those who are actually fighting. As the Government in Saigon as well as the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam are actually engaged in military operations in Viet-Nam, it is the view of the Secretary-General that a future conference could not usefully discuss the suspension of military activity and the new political situation that would result in South Viet-Nam without the participation of representatives of the Government in Saigon and representatives of the National Front of Liberation of South Viet-Nam. In taking the liberty of transmitting to the parties concerned his personal assessment of the situation in Viet-Nam, the Secretary- General believes that he is acting within the limits of his good offices. The Secretary-General hopes that the divergent positions held by the parties on the r6*le of the United Nations with regard to Viet-Nam will not prevent them from giving their attention to his views. Indeed, he takes this opportunity to appeal to them to give their urgent consideration to his specific proposals. It has always been the Secretary-General's view that the prospects for a peaceful settlement will not be improved by delaying negotiations. Hie Secretary-General is also deeply concerned by the acute suffering and hardship to which the Vietnamese people have been subjected for so long. Moreover, there is the constant danger of escalation of the conflict. It is against this background that his present personal appeal to the parties has been conceived.

New York, 12 August 1965 -ie

•i

< .f- Meeting with Ambassador Goldberg, on lc/ v V Tuesday. 24 August 1965, 6 pm

Ambassador Goldberg, accompanied by Ambassador Yost, saw me today. Ralph Bunche was also present. Goldberg informed me that he was instructed by President Johnson to transmit the President's intention to announce at his press conference tomorrow

•cpgarding four changes in the personnel of the United States Mission in New York. He added that although Ambassador Plimpton will no longer be working with the Mission he will be a consultant on important questions before the United Nations. Then Ambassador Goldberg gave me the names of the new members of the United States Mission to replace the outgoing. Regarding the question of Vietnam Goldberg told me that Washington had analysed my proposals of 12 August and that the analysis and the assessment had been transmitted to Saigon for the purpose of a concerted reaction between Washington and Saigon to my proposals. In the view of Washington there should be no discrepancy between Washington's reaction and Saigon's reaction. In his view Washington's reaction would be affirmative and that he believed that Washington's reply would be communicated to me early next week. I told Goldberg that I was surprised and distressed at the new phase of the United States bombings of irrigation dams and hydroelectric plants in North Vietnam for three days in succession (Saturday, Sunday and Monday), according to newspaper reports. I told him that there was a great difference between military targets and non-military targets. The United States Government is fully aware of my views regarding the United States bombings of North Vietnam and I reminded him that I had all along opposed such bombings. The new phase involving the bombings of non-military targets, in my view, is much more objectionable since they would be tantamount to making-war on the people of North Vietnam. I requested him to convey my serious concern regarding the new phase and requested him to convey my appeal to the President to stop bombing non-military targets in North Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

By ML . UNARCH, Pate j/iz/l7 __i_i_|___IiijjBBlMMU»Mi>|MMM«mJM . jfraMrtBrTT^ Tif *~ ' ' / — 2 —

Goldberg told me that he was not aware of the implications of the new phase of United States bombings of North Vietnam, and he assured me that he would convey my request to President Johnson. He then asked me if I had received any reactions from Governments to my proposals of 12 August. I informed him that so far no reaction had been received. I also informed him that the representative of the Peoples' Republic of China and the representative of the National Front of Liberation of South Vietnam refused to accept anything from the United Nations and therefore I had to try a second channel to put across my proposals to these two addressees, and that no information has been received whether the second channel was more successful than the first. I also informed him that I have very good reasons to believe that my proposals of 12 August had reached Hanoi although I had not received any reaction from there. Goldberg then touched upon the question of Kashmir. Ralph &unche Save him a briefing on the latest developments. He then asked Ralph Bunche about the dispute between Israel and Jordan regarding the repair of a building on the Israel/Jordan frontier. Ralph ^tanche gave him a briefing on the latest developments. Goldberg then brought up the question of the ratification of the Charter. I informed him that it was my intention to invite the prospective candidates for the Security Council seats on 30 August and explain -to them the line of action I proposed to take. I also told him that if the prospective candidates agree I would put out a statement,which I read to him, on 31 August. I advised him that the United States should deposit the instrument of ratification on 31 August which is the latest date prescribed by the General Assembly Resolution. He agreed to do so. Regarding the question of Article 19 Goldberg told me that he would stick to what he had said in the Committee of 33 on 16 August and that he would not go beyond what he had said in future meetings. He also told me that he had talked to the representatives of the-;Soviet Union and France and his impression was that the Committee would be able to arrive at a consensus when it met next. He also informed me that if His Holiness the Pope were to decide to address the General Assembly it is President Johnson's intention to come to New fork and meet the Pope at the United Nations instead of the Pope's possibility of visiting Washington which would involve protocol problems. I thanked him for the information and asked him to convey my request to President Johnson to visit the United Nations and address the General Assembly in the course of its 20th session at any time convenient to him. If the President so decides, I told Goldberg that I would be privileged to give a luncheon in his honour at the United Nations. Goldberg assured me that he would convey this message to the President. Goldberg then told me that President Johnson was thinking of inviting the Secretary-General, the Undersecretaries and all the Permanent Representatives and their wives to a White House dinner on a date to be decided in due course after discussions with the Secretary-General. If the Secretary-General considers this proposal desirable President Johnson would send United States planes to New York to fetch the guests to and from Washington. I told him of my immediate reactions that although I thanked the President for his kind thought it could entail some delicate political problems and I promised to think this idea more thoroughly and let him know my reactions at a later date. Finally, Goldberg asked me whether the resumed 19th session would take place on 1st September as scheduled. I told him that to my knowledge the session would start definitely on 1st September and I expressed the hope that the big powers would come to an agreement regarding the consensus to be announced by the Chairman of the Committee of 33. AIDE-MEMOIRE

The United States believes that your memorandum of August 12 contains a number of highly constructive suggestions. It is our earnest hope that the memorandum will be useful in Initiating discussions which can provide a basis for the settlement of the Viet Nam conflict. The views expressed below are designed to contribute to this Important objective. We agree with your observation that the objective of a Viet Ham settlement should be "a return to the essentials of the 195^ Geneva Agreements". We concur in the principle you have set forth that neither zone in Viet Mam should adhere to a military alliance or furnish military bases to others, and that foreign troops should be withdrawn from both zones. You have already cited President Johnson's statement of April 7 to this effect on military alliances and military bases. On troop withdrawal, the United States stated on April 8 in reply to the 17-Nation Declaration on Viet Nam "... When conditions have been created in which the people of South Viet Ham can determine their own future free from external interference, the United States will be ready and eager to withdraw its forces from South Viet Nam". Equally basic is the principle of the Geneva Agreements that neither zone of Viet Nam should interfere in the affairs of the other zone. This principle was incorporated in numerous provisions of the Agreements, including Articles 19 and 2k of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam and in the provision of Article 5 of the Final Declaration of the 195^ Geneva Conference, - 2 - providing that the respective zones "shall not Toe utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy". It is the violation of this principle by the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam which has led to the conflict in Viet Ham and to the presence of American forces in the Republic of Viet Ham. These forces, like the forces of other states assisting the Republic of Viet Nam, have as their sole purpose its protection against aggression, consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter* It is therefore essential that provision be made in any settlement of the problem of Viet Nam for the withdrawal from South Viet Ham of the troops and cadres infiltrated from North Viet Warn into the south. The modalities and timing of withdrawal of American and other forces assisting the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam can, of course, only be worked out in the light of similar dispositions regarding the tens of thousands of regrouped southerners and northerners infiltrated by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam over the past several years. A third basic principle of the Geneva Agreements of 195^ was to ensure that the people of Viet Nam have the right of free choice. !Ehat purpose still guides our actions in two fundamental respects related to the Geneva Agreements: a. We maintain that the people of South Viet Nam should have the right to shape their own destiny by peaceful, democratic means and without interference from an aggressive neighbor to the north. b. We believe that the people of both South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam should have the right of free choice regarding the reunification of Viet Nam. As called for in the Geneva Agreements, any elections held for this purpose should be truly free and secret, with effective international supervision. It was in this sense that - 3 -

President Johnson on July 28 referred to "free elections ... throughout all Viet Main under international supervision". With respect to the political problems of South Viet Kara, we do not consider that the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 195^ are directly applicable to the resolution of the internal problems of either North or South Viet Nam separately, pending procedures for reunification as discussed above. In this connection, the United States Government notes that the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Viet Nam, on June 22, made clear the view of the Republic of Viet Nam that South Viet Nam should be free to shape its own destiny "in conformity with established democratic processes without any intervention of whatever form and whatever source". As Secretary Rusk noted on June 23, the United States Government fully supports this principle, and it was in this sense also that President Johnson referred on July 28 to "free elections in the South". North Viet Nam appears to have expressed a different point of view. We would welcome any appropriate efforts by the Secretary- General to determine whether these divergencies are in fact as profound as they now appear. We concur in the Secretary-General's suggestion that a cessation of military activity might be subject to a variety of formulae, and that it might initially be a matter for de facto action — by both sides — rather than for a more formal arrangement. In any unconditional discussions, or in a conference, conditions for the cessation of hostilities might well be the first order of business. Finally, with respect to the role of the so-called National Liberation Front, we agree that issues of this type need not and should not obstruct the way to a settlement. On July 28 President Johnson referred to negotiations taking place with governments (for example, if there should be a Geneva Conference, those governments which participated in the Geneva Conference of 195*0 > and indicated - 4 - that the Viet Cong would have no difficulty "being represented if Hanoi desired a peaceful settlement. We remain prepared to Immediately engage in •unconditional discussions looking toward a peaceful settlement the moment the other side is ready. This can be done, for example, through reconvening the 195^ Geneva Conference or "by other means, including dia- cussions through your good offices. We shall give serious consideration to any proposals of this character.

August 27, 1965 ir •I DECLASSIFIED

^ g Authoril STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

A few remarks on the United States Aide-memoire of 27 August 1965.

I. At first sight, the aide-memoire appears to offer little basis for serious negotiation.

1. It reopens the whole question of the origin of the present situation, while the Secretary-General had tried to avoid this controversy. 1 preliminary debate on whether the principle that "neither zone of Viet-Nam should interfere in the affairs of the other zone" as one of the essentials of the Geneva Agreements, could only lead to a barren argument. Geneva was a package deal: to quote, out of context, articles 19 and 21+ of the Agreement on the cessations of hostilities in Viet-Nam, and article 5 of the final declaration, is not correct. The military provisions of Geneva could not be expected to survive independently of the political settlement to which they were intended to be only a prelude. As the political settlement envisaged in article 7 did not take place, the rest of the Agreements could not stand alone. This was clearly specified in article 6 of the final declaration: ... "The military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary".

2. The aide-memoire appears to reject in part one of the Secretary-General's important points, namely that: . . . "elections under international supervision as established in the Geneva Agreements, might be a means of settling the political problems of South Viet-Nam, and, at the appropriate time, the question of reunification". The Secretary-General's proposals were based on one possible interpretation of President Johnson's 28 July press conference (. . . "the people of South Viet-Nam shall have - 2 -

the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South or throughout all Viet-Uam under international supervision"). Later on, a coma (,) was added after ". . in the South", so that the words "under international supervision" are now said to apply only to the elections regarding the reunification of Viet-Nam, and not to separate elections in the South. The aide-memoire of 2? August, therefore specifies ". .we do not consider that the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 are directly applicable to the resolution of the internal problems of either North or South Viet-Nam separately, pending procedures for reunification as discussed above". —' The aide-memoire then quotes the Foreign Minister of the Republic of 7iet-Nam who, on 22 June, said that South Viet-Nam should be free to shape its own destiny "in conformity with established democratic processes without any intervention of whatever form and whatever source", rejecting thereby the idea of internationally supervised elections.

One might wonder whether it was really President Johnson's intention on 28 July to make such a distinction, as now appears in the United States aide-memoire, or whether a new interpretation had to be given to his words in the face of the Saigon Government's strong objections to international control of elections in the South.

In any case, this new position of the 2? August aide-memoire raises a few questions.

a. Hby does the aide-memoire state that "North Viet-Nam appears to have expressed a different point of view"? In fact, point 3 of the & April Pham ?an Dong proposals contains an expression which is very close to the one used by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of

—' At Geneva, the question of elections to establish the regimes in the South and in the North separately did not arise because it was not envisaged that there would be separate regimesj the question of reunification came first. The modalities were to be discussed bilaterally by the authorities in each zone one year after the Geneva Agreements. - 3 -

Viet-Nam: "the problem of South ¥iet-Nam must be settled by the South Viet-Hamese themselves . . , without ^foreign interference". Up to now, Hanoi has not clarified whether "international supervision" would be considered as "foreign interference" by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Wam. What could have led the United States Government to believe that Hanoi has already accepted the idea?

b. Why is the United States Government interested in further efforts by the Secretary-General on this particular question? Either Hanoi is not interested in "internationally supervised elections" and there is no more divergence between Saigon and Hanoi but no possibility of further progress as well (the conflicting claims of Saigon and of the WFLSVH to be the ori^y ones to control future elections in the South leave obviously no room for negotiations); or Hanoi is interested in "internationally supervised elections" but, then, there are grave divergences between Saigon and Hanoi. How could the Secretary-General be expected to solve such an impasse? Could the United States aide-memoire be read as a very indirect way of asking the Secretary-General, in such an oceurence, to put pressure on Saigon to change its position? Or is it, in practice, closing the door to serious negotiation?

The refusal of Washington and Saigon to use the mechanism of Geneva to solve the political problems of South Viet-Mam could be very disturbing if it were final. Is the South Viet-Mamese Government afraid of the result of such "internationally supervised elections"? Or is Saigon trying to maintain a legal position: no control in the South since there is no control in the North? Or is it thereby vetoing any negotiation at this stage? - 4 -

This position is AH the more surprising inasmuch as the rejection of "internationally supervised elections" in South Viet-Nam does not correspond at all with the requirements of the other aspects of the United States aide-memoire.

•K-

II. Both political and military conditions are set for the withdrawal of the United States forces, the two aspects being linked together by the United States interpretation of the cause of the war, namely aggression from the Worth. The official simple reasoning has always been: if the aggression ceases, then the United States forces could be withdrawn. Inasmuch as the aide-memoire is a detailed development of this proposition, the whole approach could be expected to be rejected by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the NELSVN. However, in relation to previous United States official statements, new distinctions have been made, though it is difficult to determine whether it is a presage of a new flexibility in the United States position or simply a more sophisticated version of a rigid stand.

1. The withdrawal of "infiltrators" is no longer related to a halt in the air raids against North Viet-Nam as was expressed by Secretary of State Bean Rusk in his recent press conference (though on 27 August he was no longer as specific on this point). It is now presented as a counterpart to a phased withdrawal of American forces.

2. The "infiltrators" are now described as: "the tens of thousands of regrouped Southerners and Northerners infiltrated by North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam over the past several years" (incidentally, since most of them, according to United States military sources, had been killed, only a very small number would have to be withdrawn to meet the aide-memoire requirements). - 5 -

The reference to "regrouped Southerners" is strange. The expression has been used so far only by Hanoi: "Preparations" for sending back to the South the "regrouped Southerner combattants" have been publicized by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, but Hanoi has not stated that these Southerners have already been ordered to go. The Democratic Republic of ?iet-Nam has acknowledged that it was giving material assistance to the NELSVN, but has never admitted so far to the sending of troops and cadres. (If Washington's logic was pursued, should Hanoi now decide to send to the South these "Southerners" in order to provide the necessary counterpart to a United States troop withdrawal? The reasoning intended to de-escalate the war would result in further escalation.)

It is also interesting1 to see Washington make, for the first time, a distinction between the "Northerners" and the "regrouped Southerners". Is Washington also ready to make a distinction between these infiltrators and the rest of the Viet Cong forces, and between these forces and the NFLSVM as a political entity? A recognition that there is a genuine Southern element in the NFLSVN, whereas, before, these subtleties were all covered by the term "the Viet Cong".

More important than these new subtleties is the inescapable fact that the United States view of the military disengagement that could ". . * / create_y. . .the conditions * . . in which the people of South Viet-Nam can determine their own future free from external interference . ." runs into a series of contradictions and. leaves many unanswered questions.

a. Supposing one adopts the United States point of view, the aide-memoire does not clarify the type of operations which could brinff an end to the conflict. According to the aide-memoire, there

-* Aide-memoire, page one, as quoted from the 8 April reply to the 17 nation; declaration on Viet-Wam. - 6 -

seems to be required two different types of military agreement: (l) a cessation of military activity, and (2) a timed withdrawal of United States forces and of "infiltrators".

But even if these succeding steps were considered by the other side, what would be left after the completion of the phased withdrawal? South Viet-Namese Government forces only, with the KELSVH as a simple political movement? or South Viet-Namese Government forces and Viet Gong forces (supposedly deprived of their Northern element) plus the political body of the Front? The first alternative could never be accepted by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Ham since the HFLSVN would be entirely left at the mercy of the Saigon armed forces. And, in the second alternative, there must be another military arrangement to maintain a permanent cease-fire between the two rival armies confronting each other, in the South? And on which basis could such a cease-fire be expected to be maintained: integration of the rival forces, or a new territorial division between them in South Viet-Nam?

b. The United States aide-memoire is not very clear either as to who would be negotiating (l) the cessation of military activity, (2) the phased withdrawal. Washington has not accepted the Secretary-General's proposals, though it has not rejected them either. The vague formula used in the aide-memoire ("The Viet Cone would have no difficulty being represented") is contradicted by the earlier reference in the same paragraph to negotiations with "the Governments which participated in the Geneva Conference of 1954". All these uncertainties may reflect a not very firmly held line. - 7 -

c. Finally, within the United States framework of reasoning, the question nevertheless arises as to who is going to supervise the cease-fire and the phased withdrawal. The United States aide-memoire does not contain any suggestions for the supervision of the military arrangements that could bring an end to the hostilities. Obviously, there has to be a control mechanism acceptable to all parties. And if an international control is necessary for the implementation of the military provisions of .a flit ure agreement, how could it be rejected for the settlement of the political problems since, from the United States point of view, the two questions are tied. In practice, the aide-memoire, as it stands, would leave it to the Government of South Viet-Wam to decide that the conditions exist in South Viet-Wam for free elections, a proposition that could not be seriously considered by the other side.

It is difficult to assess whether Washington is earnestly willing to negotiate before some clarifications are given to the above questions. As it stands, most of the aide-memoire would be certainly rejected by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Wam and the IffiLSVltf. However, it is understandable that the United States Government is not prepared to announce any concessions to the Secretary-General without knowing if Hanoi is ready to engage in some negotiating exercises through him. Knowing that its negotiating position has serious flaws, the United States Government may even be showing extra rigidity for fear of giving in before the real bargaining is begun. Nevertheless, even if Hanoi had accepted his good offices, the Secretary-General could not do much on the basis of the aide-memoire without questioning Washington further. - 8 -

On the other hand, it is rather disturbing to note the coincidence between the sending of the aide-memoire and the decision to have daily B-52 raids on "suspected" Viet Cong positions in South Viet-Ham. These raids cannot but result in heavy civilian casualties. The whole peace offensive of the United States Government may therefore appear simply as an alibi for hiding the appalling decisions which have been made by the .American military authorities. Because the Secretary-General's own proposals have been initiated at the same time, they could very well look, in the eyes not only of Hanoi and Peking, but of the overall United Nations membership, as part of a United States cover-up operation. It is legitimate to feel the most serious concern as to the consequences it may have, not only for the Secretary-General himself (as being used by Washington), but also for the United Nations organisation, unless the Secretary-General finds a way of putting on record his anxiety for the fate of the Viet-Namese population as a result of these bombardments. Inasmuch as the United Nations spokesman has already publicly acknowledged the existence of the Secretary-General's peace efforts, it seems even more necessary for the Secretary-General to make his own stand clear. SECRET

19 November 1965

NOTE ON THE QUESTION OF VIET-NAM

Ambassador Seydoux saw me today and informed me of the conversation between the North Vietnamese representative in Paris and the French Head of the Asia Division in the Foreign Office on 9 November 1965. The Vietnamese representative informed the French official that North Viet-Nam was now receiving very substantial supplies, both military equipment and consumer goods, from her allies. He elaborated on the term "allies" by saying that it involves all socialist countries. According to him the food situation in North Viet-Nam had improved so much that in the last few weeks food ration had been increased by 100 per cent. He stressed that the People's Republic of China was the primary supplier of food. The Government of North Viet-Nam, according to him, is prepared to resist American aggression for 10, 15 or even 25 years if necessary. Ambassador Seydoux told me that the main purpose of his interview apparently was to stress the fact that the socialist countries were united in giving aid to North Viet-Nam, a situation which was not so even last year. When the French official asked him about the reported presence of regular North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam, Mr. Bo just smiled and did not answer the question. The French Foreign Office, according to Ambassador Seydoux, has been aware of the infiltration of "volunteers" from the North in South Viet-Nam in the last two years, and that the French Government has good reasons to believe that at present some North Vietnamese regulars are operating in South Viet-Nam. Mr. Bo also informed the French official that the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam are better fed and militarily better equipped now than ever before. When the French official asked Mr. Bo whether the war in Viet-Nam had affected food production in North Viet-Nam, Mr. Bo replied that in spite of United States bombing, there is increased production of crops in North Viet-Nam. Mr. Bo also pointed out to the French official that in spite of United States help to the Saigon Government, inflation is mounting in the South whereas the North Vietnamese currency remains stiij^o,. He also mentioned the fact that foreign diplomats stationed in Hanoi would testify to that fact. When I asked Ambassador Seydoux what the purpose of that interview could be, Seydoux was unable to draw any conclusions. However, he ventured the opinion that Hanoi wanted France to know that the entire Communist camp, unlike in the past, is now solidly behind Hanoi. December 1965

discussion, whlch

Vietnam *. Ball stated that Seoretary Qf

COI18,ltlng

D Thant reviewed for Mr. Ball Burl's experience and position

after the rar .hen his country »s internally troubled and faced a communist threat. The Government too, a decision at that time not to

accept any military assistance from the United States. He TOs certain that this ,ise and courageous decision saved Burma fro, eo»unist

intrusion, u Thant also referred to his tal* in Paris wlth deGaulle

-out the Vietnam situation and de Gaulle's stand for neutral «cll TOuld mean for Vietnam some arrangement similar to that affecting Austria.

Mr. Ball also referred to his talif with de (faulle atOTt ^

same time and de Gaulle's emphasis on this occasion on holding a »Mg Conference" on Vietnam.

referred to his meeting of AueJst 6,19ft ) in Washington t Johnson and their short di.cussion of the Tietna, question, in the course of *ich t, Thant had stressed the need for a "dialogue"

-v Authority ^raf -2- on the question. He also referred to the discussion at the luncheon given for him at the State Department on the same day, in the course of vhich he had fully reviewed his position on Vietnam, including Burma1s experience, after which Mr. Harriman had indicated that he agreed with the position taken by the Secretary-General.

On his return to New York, U Thant sought to get in touch with

Ho-Chi-Minh through the USSR about a meeting between a representative of North Vietnam and the US at some neutral place to explore the possibilities for talks leading to a peaceful solution. He received a favourable reply from Ho-Chi-Minh within three weeks. He informed

Adlai Stevenson of this. Stevenson was receptive to the idea and

U Thant suggested that this exploratory meeting might take place in

Rangoon and asked Stevenson to transmit this suggestion to Washington.

U Thant had received from his Government on l6 January 1965 word of

He Win1s willingness that Burma should be the host country for such a meeting. On 29 or JO January, a US reaction to the suggestion was received and it was negative on the grounds that such a meeting, if participated in by the United States, might bring about the fall of the South Vietnamese Government.

U Thant also recalled his approaches of April l8th and of

August 1965j the latter being the "long" paper.

Mr. Ball stated categorically that the idea of a coalition government solution to the Vietnamese problem had been and was still unacceptable to the United States because of the unhappy experience -3- in Laos and also because it would mean that the Vietcong would take over the country. Mr. Ball stated that the United States had been receiving signals from Hanoi through Canadian sources indicating that Hanoi was interested only in the handing over of South Vietnam to the Vietcong. The United

States, he said, had to have the concurrence of the Government of South Vietnam on any move made. The US appreciates the present hard realities

of the situation but is seeking any means to a peaceful solution. There has been, however, a hardening of the Hanoi position. U Thant agreed that there had been a hardening of Hanoi's position but stated that in his view the most disturbing sign was the common line that had now developed between Hanoi and Peking and the massive assistance which Worth Vietnam was now receiving from Peking. U Thant observed that it seemed quite apparent that the USSR was on the verge of making some very important decisions relating to Vietnam and Mr. Cisco confirmed that word to this effect was going around. 16 December 1965

S E C R. E T

Meeting with Prime Minister Harold Wilson

Prime Minister Wilson wanted me to give him a briefing on the latest situation regarding Vietnam. I recounted to him what I had told Mr. George Ball last Monday. He agreed with me that the indications were that Hanoi is now closer to Peking than ever before, but he was not sure whether the relations were as close as I thought. According to his information Hanoi was still closer to Moscow than to Peking and therefore there was still a chance of Hanoi coming to the conference table. He said that only last week he got an unconfirmed report from Hanoi that it would be agreeable to come to the conference table on the basis of Pham Van Dong's four points of 8 April. He then reiterated to me his Government's efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement. He explained the basis for his proposal for the four Commonwealth Prime Ministers mediation and his despatch .of Mr. Harold Davis to Hanoi and other efforts such as sending Mr. Michael Stewart to Moscow. Harold Davis1 mission was abhortive particularly because of a prior leak to the press before he left London. The arrangement was that his mission would be confidential and that there would be no announcement until his return to London and report to me. Since the news leaked Ho Chi Minn got offended and he did not even receive Davis. Discussions with the lower level were unproductive and Davis who had . pro-Hanoi sympathies came back disillusioned. Michael Stewart's mission to Moscow was also fruitless since the Russians did not want to make any moves for negotiations. Moscow strongly maintains that it was for Hanoi to decide on the next course of action and nobody else. Regarding my appeal for cease fire in Vietnam which I first made to Prime Minister Wilson in April and renewed again when we last met in London, his Government is of the view that the question of cease fire should be the first item at the conference and not an issue, before the conference. On this he agreed with the United States position. Regarding my understanding last year that an Austrian type constitution was possible for both North Vietnam and South Vietnam under international guarantees, he asked me if such international guarantees would apply to foreign relations only or equally applicable to domestic problems also. I told him that our objective should be to apply the same considerations to Vietnam as to Austria. Since Austria's domestic problems are not the subject of international guarantees

I do not think that the international guarantees proposed should apply to internal - 2 - problems of Vietnam. He said that there are strong possibilities of South Vietnam becoming communist if the fighting stops and he asked me if in such an eventuality international guarantors should not be involved in the domestic situation. I told him that ven if Austria decides to become communist such a situation will not affect the international guarantors and therefore the same criterion should apply to Vietnam. I agreed with him that there are now more chances for South Vietnam turning communist than before, and if the war goes on I am sure that the end result will be that South Vietnam.will be completely in the hands of the communists. I told him the situation would have been different if some agreement were reached even as late as last year. Wilson did not comment on this. In answer to my question he told me that he had no concrete proposals to make to President Johnson when he meets him this evening. SECRET 25 December 1965

NOTE OH THE SITUATION IK VIET-NAM Ambassador Yost saw me today and told me that several defectors from the North Vietnamese regular forces admitted that they passed through Cambodian territory in their entry into South Viet-Nam. On the basis of this and other information, the military authorities in Saigon had decided on the "hot pursuit policy", authorizing the soldiers to pursue the Viet Cong into Cambodian territory, if necessary. Before giving effect to this decision, Washington would want to request me to sound out Prince Sihanouk on the possibility of stationing UN observers on certain parts of the Cambodian South Vietnamese frontier. I reminded him of the negative attitude of the Cambodian Government towards such a proposal when the Security Council despatched a team to the area under the Security Council resolution. I told him that I believed that Prince Sihanouk would continue to maintain the same position, since even in his latest statement, he mentioned the International Control Commission to be the only competent body to undertake such a function. Ambassador Yost told me that Washington was not thinking in terms of 5,000 or 6,000 UN forces as desired by Primier Ky, but it was thinking of small groups of 5 or 6 observers each with the necessary helicopters to undertake the job. I told him that such an arrangement would not be effective, since the terrain is thick with jungles and mountainous, and infiltrations, if any, would take place at night. He told me in any case to think of Washington's suggestion. I promised to do so.

2? December 1965 Ambassador Yost saw me again today and informed me that Washington had got a message from Bangkok that Prince Sihanouk had broadcast yesterday that he would accept an observation team formed by the International Control Commission as he had proposed before. Yost told me that Washington was not agreeable to ICC involvement and still considers UN to be the more appropriate body to do observation work in the area. He told me that the US Ambassador in Thailand also agreed with that view. I told him that I am not convinced of the possibility of Sihanouk's acceptance of a UN team and that I don't want to be rebuffed by Cambodia by proposing such a step. I advised him that Washington should discuss with Canada about a possible ICC involvement. He promised to convey this suggestion to Washington. I asked him whether the bombing pause of North Viet-Nam had any particular significance. He told me that he did not know. SECRET

23 December 1965

NOTE ON THE SITUATION IN VIET-NAM

Ambassador Seydoux saw me today and informed me that his Foreign Office would like to release my message to General de Gaulle if it was agreeable to me. I told him that I had no objection to its release. It was agreed that the message would be released today. He also told me that two American Congressmen had visited Paris last month and they requested an interview with Tran Van Bo (North Vietnamese representative in France). Bo agreed to receive them, but before they could see him they were advised by the United States Embassy in Paris to get the green light from Washington. They requested Washington's permission, which was not granted. So they lost the opportunity to discuss with Bo. According to information available in Paris, more Chinese were now involved in the construction of roads and bridges in North Viet-Nam. The French Government had no information that the Chinese military was involved in such undertakings. He also had confirmation of the general assessment in this country about the ineffectiveness of Soviet SAMS in bringing down military planes. SAMS are effective only when the planes fly at very high altitudes. Since the United States military planes are flying at low altitudes in North Viet-Nam, conventional anti-aircraft guns are found to be more effective than SAMS. This information was relayed to Paris by French observers in Hanoi. He told me that the original French idea of sending M. ^€hauvel as the first French Ambassador to Peking was dropped. $€hauvel is now back in Paris after opening the French trade fair in Peking. SECRET. _ _ , -. ~/_ 2r8t December 1965

Note on the situation in Vietnam •

Ambassador Goldberg and Ambassador Yost came to my residence at 10:45 pm today. Goldberg told me that early in the day he got a telephone call from President Johnson while he was vacationing in the Carribeans and wanted him to see me urgently to convey his thanks to me for my new year's message endorsing the truce appeal by the Pope. He was vacationing at a place twelve miles from a United States naval station and he had to receive the call at the naval station. He came to New York in a navy plane to see me and he was taking off later in the night for Rome to see the Pope and to convey to him President Johnson's message of thanks for his truce appeal and to request him to continue with his endeavours for a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. His Government had already arranged for his audience with the Pope late tomorrow night and President Johnson had kindly placed a presidential plane for the trip. He told me that the United States bombing pause of North Vietnam had entered the fifth day in response to the Pope's appeal and my endorsement, and the President had decided to intensify the peace moves in the coming days with a view to extending the pause into next week. The President is also sending Mr. Harriman to Poland and other eastern european countries to impress upon those governments the need for a negotiated settlement and to encourage them to influence Hanoi to come to the conference table while the United States has shown its bona fides by a bombing pause. He assured me that the United States is now sincerely prepared to negotiate. Goldberg also told me that the United States Government had today informed its peace offensive to the following governments: 1. The Soviet Union, both through Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and Ambassador Kholer in Moscow; 2. France; 3. The United Kingdom; 4. The three members of the International Control Commission - Canada, India, Poland 5. Hungary; 6. North Vietnam - through Ambassador Byrod in Rangoon. Goldberg believed that Byrod would use the good offices of the Burmese Government for the transmittal of the message to Hanoi representative in Rangoon. - 2 -

When I asked him if he had any knowledge about the probable duration of the bombing pause, he repeated that the President had told him that it might go well into the whole of next week. I remarked that it might be helpful if the terminal date of the bombing pause was not communicated to the other side since I believe that the response from the other side would be more positive if they had the impression that the bombing pause would be indefinite. Goldberg also told me that while in Home he would see Mr, Fanfani, who had put in his resignation, and other leaders of the Italian Government. He also told me that the United States Government is pressing the Soviet Union to agree to convene the Geneva Conference as requested by the other co-chairman, the United Kingdom. Goldberg ventured the opinion that if Hanoi failed to respond favourably to United States peace moves Washington would be compelled to adopt harsher measures. He reminded me of what he said on the- last day of the General Assembly that he had recommended to President Johnson to address the last meeting of the General Assembly on the night of December 21 and announce his Government's decision to have a bombing pause to create a climate conducive to negotiations. Experts on Soviet policy like Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson advised the President against such a public declaration since such a course might put the Soviet Union in a difficult position. Thompson advised the President that all further attempts for negotiations should be done as privately as possible. That explains why the President did not address the last session of the General Assembly. I told Goldberg that 'Ehompson was right. His main purpose in visiting Rome was to appeal to the Pope to exert his utmost and utilize his influence to press Hanoi to come to the'conference table. I asked him if his Government had given sufficient thought to the question of South Vietnam at the conference table. Goldberg replied that from the President's speech on a previous occasion the question should not pose a serious obstacle. In reply to my next question regarding Sputh Vietnam's completely- negative attitude to the idea of a conference as reported ividely in the newspapers, Goldberg believed that South Vietnam was not as completely negative as ifc was made out in the press. In reply to my further question whether South Vietnam was consulted about the latest Washington moves for peace negotiations, Goldberg replied that he did not know. - 3

Goldberg then asked me whether I knew personally the North Vietnamese representative in Burma. I told him that I did not know him and he was the Consul General and an Ambassador since Burma has no diplomatic relations with either Worth Vietnam or South Vietnam. I also told him that ^outh Vietnam has also a Consul General in Rangoon. Goldberg then asked me in which country North Vietnam is represented by a top level diplomat. I told him that to my knowledge, Trang Van Bo, Head of a trade mission in Paris, is a top Hanoi diplomat. I then showed him the letter I received today from Felix Green sent to me from London. In his letter Felrx Green stated that he had long meetings with Ho Chi Minh among others and that he wanted to convey some information to me but that he was awaiting a United States visa to come to New York. I told Goldberg that it would be desirable obviously to grant him a visa as early as possible. Goldberg asked Yost to contact Washington the next morning with my recommendation to issue a visa to Felix Green. Goldberg left my house at 11:30 pm.

29 December 1965

Ambassador C.W. Yost saw me today and informed me that he had already conveyed my request for Felix Green's visa to Washington and that Goldberg himself had mentioned this to George Ball before he left for Home early this morning. He told me that the visa would be forthcoming any moment.

30 December 1965

Ambassador Yost saw me again today and tole me that he had received a message from Goldberg transmitting the good wishes for me from the Pope and asking me to continue with my efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. The Pope also assured Goldberg of his continuing efforts. The Pope received a long communication from Ho Chi Minh (which was published in today's papers) and the Pope told Goldberg that the reply was "harsh and distressing" but he assured Goldberg that he would continue with his efforts. He had no information when Goldberg would return to New York and also no information about the result of Harriman's mission. •

.. .A I told him about a newspaper item regarding the attempts of two American congressmen, while during their visit toParis last month,/LO see Trang Van Bo, Hanoi's representative. According to my information Bo agreed to talk to them but Washington discouraged the congressmen from seeing Bo. I told Yost that if the story were true Washington made a mistake in preventing the two congressmen from talking to Bo. Yost told me he would look into it.

Yost telephoned me later in the day that the visa had been given to Felix Green. Meeting to discuss Vietnam in the Secretary-General's C(3/" "V) Conference Room on 10 January 1966 at 11 a.m. /

Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost and Mr. Bunche

Ambassador Goldberg stated that President Johnson had asked him to inform the Secretary-General fully about recent actions by the United States Government relating to peace in Vietnam. The Ambassador said that he wished particularly to brief the Secretary-General on events following his talk with the Secretary-General on the night he embarked for Rome, from where he went also to Paris and London. Ambassador Harriman, he said, had visited Poland, India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand, while Governor Williams had gone all over Africa.

Mr. Goldberg advised that the United States had made in Rangoon a direct contact with the North Vietnam Government - United States Ambassador Byroade had established contact with the Consul General of Hanoi in Rangoon, who agreed to transmit to his Government a message from the United States Government and who had said significantly that he was transmitting the message to Hanoi by commercial channels. Ambassador Goldberg did not divulge the contents of the United States aide-memoire.

Ambassador Goldberg reported that in his visit to the Vatican the Holy Father had told him of his talk about peace in Vietnam with the Secretary- General. The Pope was informed that the United States would welcome any initiative on peace that he might take. The Pope expressed, said Mr. Goldberg, "great approval of the United States move" toward peace in Vietnam.

The Ambassador revealed that only the Secretary-General and the Pope had been told of the United States aide-memoire to Hanoi.

UNARCH:, Date -2-

Mr. GoMberg said that the Pope had received replies from both North and South Vietnam to his Christmas appeal. He characterised the North Vietnamese response as "negative" and that from South Vietnam as "positive". There had been no response from the North, he said, as yet to the Pope's second appeal.

Mr. Goldberg observed that he had been told that the Pope is sending to Hanoi the Head of Veritas, the Catholic charity organization. The Pope wishes to use him there as a channel of communication with the North Vietnamese authorities. The Pope also intended to use as a channel of communication, said Mr. Goldberg, the Papal Nuncio, the Archbishop in Saigon, who is Nuncio for all of Vietnam and Cambodia and who maintains an office in Cambodia.

Mr. Goldberg averred that the Pope had expressed his welcome of all efforts by the Secretary-General.

In Rome, Ambassador Goldberg said that he had also talked with Mr. Fanfani, who had explained to him why he had to resign. This was because, according to Fanfani, his wife had innocently given the party in which the ill-fated mission to Hanoi had been freely discussed with some quite free criticism of the United States and President Johnson, all in the presence of an -extreme right winger in the publication business.

Ambassador Goldberg stated that the Italian Government had been very JT(Tj&ttti4JiAfj^^ t ^ active in support of the United States initiative. jWsirfteStMoro thought that the bombing pause should be extended through the Vietnamese New Year, which comes on 23 January.

In Paris Ambassador Goldberg talked with General de Gaulle and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. General de Gaulle, he said, was courteous; -3- thought the United States move was a good initiative but that it would not succeed. In his view the only move that would work would be the withdrawal of United States forces. The General admitted that this would inevitably result in a Communist Vietnam, but he said it would be an asiatic communism which would be different from western communism. General de Gaulle said that the United States had the strength to continue the war in Vietnam and that if they did stay there for a year or two longer, Hanoi no doubt would come to a willingness to negotiate for peace.

Couve de Murville took a line different from that of the General, stating that a coalition government should be formed in South Vietnam before negotiations could take place.

Ambassador Goldberg did not see Chauvel, who, at the time Ambassador Goldberg was in Paris, had not seen either Gouve de Murville or de Gaulle, and who is said to have a very dire report about the attitudes and intentions of the Chinese Communists whom he found to be extremely belligerent.

Ambassador Goldberg found Prime Minister Wilson of the U.K. very favorably inclined to the United States initiative. Wilson intends to visit Moscow soon. He sent a communication to the Soviet Union in support of the United States initiative but had received no reply as yet.

Prime Minister Wilson, according to Ambassador Goldberg, knows about the United States direct approach to Hanoi.

Ambassador Goldberg said that Harriman had had a stormy reception at first in Warsaw, the Poles charging that the United States initiative was in fact an ultimatum.

But eventually, he declared, the Poles agreed to communicate to Hanoi -4- the United States position (this is the 14 points which the Poles themselves condensed to 5 points).

(Ambassador Yost promised to provide the Secretary-General -with a copy of the 14 points memorandum.)

Mr. Gomulka in Warsaw took a very hard line, a much tougher one than that taken by Mr. Rapacki. Mr. Goraulka said that the United States should get out of Vietnam, should accept Hanoi's 4 points, and that there was no place for the United States in Vietnam.

Mr. Harriman found that Tito was entirely favorable to the United States initiative.

Mr. Harriman reported also that Mr. Nasser had welcomed the United States initiative. Mr. Nasser had at first suggested that during the next four months there should be no increase in United States strength and no U.S. bombing in Vietnam, but he dropped this position when Ambassador Harriman protested its impracticability and impossibility. Ambassador Goldberg said that there was a subsequent feeling that "something is going on in Cairo".

Ambassador Harriman stated that Prime Minister Shastri had promised that he would raise the United States points with Mr. Kosygin at Tashkent, and Mr. Shastri had written to President Johnson to say that he had in fact taken up the matter with Mr. Kosygin, who had promised to ask Mr. Shelepin to inform Hanoi during his visit there that Prime Minister Shastri was in support of the United States initiative.

Ambassador Goldberg stated that the USSR knows about the Polish initiative.

Ambassador Goldberg advised that United States Ambassador Foy Kohler in -5-

Moscow, at the suggestion of Soviet officials, is to have direct contact with the llorth Vietnamese representative in Moscow.

Ambassador Goldberg stated that the Hungarian Ambassador in Washington had called on Dean Rusk who explained to him what the United States is doing toward peace in Vietnam. Hungary offered to take an initiative with Hanoi on the 14 points, although they are seeking clarifications on some of those points.Y|Vice President Humphrey and Harriman talked with the Japanese who are anxious to support the United States initiative and have asked the USSR to do so also. Japan also urged that the bombing pause be extended beyond the Vietnamese New Year. This, said Ambassador Goldberg, is the general view.

Ambassador Goldberg reported that Governor Williams had talked with most of the African leaders and had found a generally favorable African reaction to the United States effort. Governor Williams had found that there was some resentment amongst Africans over the fact that the Chinese had rebuffed the appeal of the nonaligned states last year. Nkrumah and some other African leaders said they would consult amongst themselves about the possibility of some new nonaligned states move on Vietnam. Governor Williams reported very considerable concern and suspicion amongst Africans about Communist Chinese intentions.

Ambassador Goldberg stated that President Johnson "has problems" on Vietnam. The Republicans and some Democratic Conservatives are tending to oppose the current pause. There have been some mumblings in Saigon. Ky has made a statement opposing negotiations. The President is facing an immediate difficulty with regard to his budget message, which is to be presented on 25 January. Ambassador Goldberg stated that at his last meeting -6- with the President the question was raised as to whether, if no response to the United States peace initiative was forthcoming, the issue should not be taken to the Security Council. A decision on this question had been deferred until Washington could know what the results would be of the various approaches that have been made.

Mr. Goldberg said that in general the Scandinavians had been favorable but that Erlander was the one sceptic.

The Czechs, he said, are the most negative about the initiative amongst the Communist bloc states. The Czechs assert that the Viet Cong should be recognized as the true government of South Vietnam. U Thant stated that information which he had indicated that North Vietnam might be more amenable to the United States initiative than the Viet Cong would be.

Ambassador Goldberg said that the Soviets had been very "reserved" on the subject.

Ambassador Goldberg stated that the United States had no information about a rumoured rift between Ho Chi Minh and other North Vietnamese officials.

Ambassador Goldberg informed that he would be going to Washington the next day and would see the President. He emphasized that the President was very sincere about this peace effort and that the President would welcome any views of the Secretary-General on the matter and any assistance on it from him.

Ambassador Goldberg said that he did not know how long the President had it in mind to maintain the existing bombing pause, but his personal conjecture was that it may be maintained through the Vietnamese New Year on 23 January. He said that he, Harriman and Williams have all recommended this. -7-

He pointed out, however, that the bombing of supply trails in Laos has continued with the consent of the Laotian Government.

The Secretary-General thanked Ambassador Goldberg for his information, observed that his own views on the Vietnamese situation were well-known to Ambassador Goldberg and to his Government and reiterated his well-known view that the bombing pause should be of indefinite duration. U Thant said that he would undertake to sound out the views of the other three members of the Big Four on their reactions to the United States effort. He said that he would inform the three that if there should be no reaction from Hanoi on the United States initiative, or if the reaction were to be negative, the United States may decide to take the issue to the Security Council.

Ambassador Goldberg stated that South Vietnam does not know about the United States aide-memoire to Hanoi. The United Kingdom and the USSR, along with the Secretary-General and the Pope, do know.

The meeting was over at noon, having lasted one hour. COTTHDEWTAL REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH MAI VAN BO* l/ll/,',6 x- by Sanford Gottlieb, January 10, 1966

I explained why I thought the "peace offensive" wns serious: A f5rowing realisation on the part of the Administration of the cost of the war; President Johnson's desire to concentrate on the Great Society; and the influence of the Pope. The new deed which has been added to American professions of peace is the pause in the bombings. I expressed my impression that the decision has not yet been made whether to continue the pause after TET. If there is no form of positive response from Hanoi •the pressures to escalate will grow. A continued lack of response from Hanoi will leave the peace movement with no creditible arguments. U.S. policy seems more fluid than previously, I added. I suggested that a form of positive response which Hanoi might find acceptable is a request for clarification of the U. S. position, made through intermediaries. Bo seemed interested and asked if this idea was shared by my friends and the Administration. I told him it waa certainly shared by my friendH although I had not discussed it with the Government. Never- theless, it was my impression that the Administration is looking for any sign of positive response and would be prepared to extend the pause if it detected one. He asked if theGovernment knew of my trip and I told him I had informed them. He then asked the names of officials I had seen recently and I nieTitioned William Bundy. Bo promised "to reflect" on the suggcintion t.h.,it Hanoi roquofit cJarl ficat'ion. of the U. S. position. I said I considered the question of Hanoi's Point 3 the main difference between the two sides, and expressed the need for clarification of its intent. Bo replied that in supporting the program of the NLF Hanoi is supporting the fundamental aspirations of the South Vietnam people - independence (the removal of foreign troop^ and the end of foreign political control), neutrality, democracy -(J^fcwwiwauw^a^for political parties to operate), and peace, 'the NLF has remained strong through the years of war, he added,

•ft Kai Van Bo is the renrRsentfittve of Hanoi, in Paris -2-

because its program reflected these aspirations. "War is the best election," he

declared, explaining I hat lh<- cost in l';i r higher (han spending an hour going In

t'lit- ballot, box. Tho'ir willing U> pay Ibis conl. h.ivr Imly "volrd" |<>r ,1 pn ip ram .

he indicated.

Bo specifically stated that Hanoi is not attempting to impose a communist

or socialist government on the South. Northerners and Southerners are brothers

in the same family, he .said, and any attempt to impose one's will will create

trouble. Tie implied Sou the morn are not ready for communism, lie stated

explicitly tba.f an economic blueprint for the Soul.li is not cnrom pa ssed within

l.he NLF program - just ind^pcndenco, i.v.jl r«i!Lt.y, democ rar y and pea tit*.

Bo refused to be drawn into a discussion of how to establish a representative

government in the South, saying that was a problem for the South Vietnamese

people. I made the point that the U. S. would show unwillingness to withdraw its troops as long as there was no framework created to meet this problem in an

orderly fashion. My personal view, I explained, is that a provisional government

of individuals who are unaligned with both Lin*; NLF and the present Saigon govern-

ment could be empowered to prepare free elections.

Bo would not go beyond a reiteration that the South Vietnamese should deal

with that problem and that the NLF represents a majority of the South Vietnamese.

He did leave the impression that of the points in the NLF program he considered

independence the most basic. Independence means not only the removal of foreign

troops but also, in thi.s context, the U.S. willingness to allow (he Sout.li Viet.name.se

to work out thei " own political future ..mo. g l.'ue«') sei ve.-:. At one point, in passing,

he mentioned the possibility of a "bourgeois^ democracy" as long as i( was not

dominated from outside.

Bo asked my impressions of the Administration's thinking on the future of South Vietnam. I replied that I thought the Administration is comm itted, within

the framework of a Holtlerm-nt., t.o the removal of l.roopn and bases, no military

alliances, f'rc.e cl ecliomj, a. I'rcr politifa.1 procr.MH and a policy oj' rcconc i I ia I ion.

However, the administration seems to rejecL a coalition in which the N LI' plays

a role because of fear the communists would take over. Bo appeared amused

:li||Pp|§l||f fSPf^^^lJl^^ " '• ^ ^ • at this assumption about the communists' ability to assume control once they participated in a government. Bo K.I id lie would like to believe I am right. .'ibonl. (In- "peace ol'f'rn.s i ve" ,

Ml.'ltcd l.li.il. 111*' Morlh V I f I M.I it i f.'ir .!!•<• I'ra I i ,'il ;: ,in'l judge l>y I.M l,;i, .ili'l I ti I'M I i oticil the 8, 000-man U, S. offensive Ln the "Iron Triangle." However, lie quickly abandoned any effort to claim that U. S. military deeds contradict its political actions when I reminded hum. of the pause in bombing. In July he was much more insistent on stating the contradictions. During this vis'u he seemed more relaxed and le^s defensive. I ti.sed the orea.Mion t.o repeat what I had lold \\<> in .Inly, I ha t the influence of tho Atn(;ric..m [x-;ir<- inovenitMit .should no I. be ovr r-('sl.itu,ited; lli.it it r;in nerve as a brake on the hard-liners, but little more. We did not discuss the 14 points in much detail since the conversation was directed primarily towards the essentials outlined above. I was unable to discern how familiar Bo was with the specifics of the 14 points. He did not challenge their official character. . , VM, f.V/ ;// "Bo said he hnd a copy of the January 9 New York Times aivinrGsiir , "The Reply to Hanoi" and mentioned having road Max "Frankcl'.s ;irticK' about Secretary Rusk. I asked if I could come back to aee him chiring my stay in Paris and he replied that he would be glad to see me "if there was anything new. " He seemed by this statement to assume that I was in touch with the Government.

The meeting lasted one and one-half hours and the discussion was conducted in French.

1 1 ''^;^ ^ .v..:-,r ... .:

:1K:;''^:f";- •••S'^.V-',.•: ••^..\] ^.^'•^•-•": '^'.V' CONFIDENTIAL cCO ^INTERVIEW WITH ITUYN VAN TAM, January 13, 1966, by SANFORD GOTTLIEB

Rf!nrf-r>onta),ivf> 0J' i,h,., [

Mr. Tarn had a very heavy nchedule and wn wore- able to upend only

45 minutes covering a wide range of subjects. He was warm and cordial, . -s. . '""promised to send my suggestions to the Front, and was prepared to make

specific proposals dealing with prisoners of war.

.•'•'•: He told mo the New York Times story of January 12 indical ing that a

reprencnlati ve of 1.hc Front in Algeria had suggc.sted the NLF would maUr concessions

in return for U; S. recognition was false, Tarn learned of the story, he said,

during an interview on January 12 with President Boumedienne. The only contact 1 with the New York Times correspondent during Tarn's tenure in Algiers was : r during a press conference on December 20, 1965, and there was neither a sub-

- sequent contact nor a personal interview. El Moudjahid of January 1^ published

: a denial of the Now Yor!<; Times Mlory, rilinp; I ho NIJ1' rrprrsrnt .il i V^JM in Algu-ra.

'T'-.tm'M inte rvicw wil h Pre.sid<-;nt l^oiuncditMine l.inlrd al>oul 1'» mlmil.i.'H,

. he said, indicating that the Algerian President did most of the talking. The

Algerians were clearly conveying information since Tarn observed that the NLF

L ' • did not have much opportunity to discuss its viewpoint.

I said that I had met in Paris with Mai Van Bo and h'id made the following

points: ]) the peace offensive is serious and President Johnson would like to end the war. and 2) a point of compromise between (lie pri'ntMit. posit i OHM of

Lhn Front find (ho U. .S, on Ihr

bo a |j rovi fi iona 1 government (>f non-aligned individuabi wlio.-K! (ash would b<% Ihrt

preparation of free elections. .On the first point, Pesjcplained the pressures for a peaceful settlement

arising from President Johnson's desire to build the Great Society, the growing

realization of the cost of the war, and the sustained interest of the Pope. I

eaid that T had suggested to Mai Van Bo that some form of positive response

wan IICCPMH.'I ry , in my opinion, HO lhal Ihc bombing p.ui.-ir and a IOMM boll itM.' r out

atmosphere could continue, Tlio kind of response I had suggested, 1 told Tarn, was a request for cl;i r ifi ration of Die U. S. position, lie promised to tr this information immediately to the NLF, adding only that there is a continuing need for "vigilance" .since only this week four thousand more U. 3. troops had been sent to Pleiku. However, Tarn did not belabor the point. On the question of a new government in Saigon, Tarn said that the Front has been thinking of a coalition of all truly "patriotic" elements. When I asked whether he was speaking of the immediate future or after peace is r OH to rod, he indicated ho me;mt the future and lhat there in no decision as yet to form ,\ provisional government. I replied that it is my impression the U.S. now rejects the notion of a coalition including the NLF. Therefore my suggestion of a provisional government of neutrals to prepare fres elections was made a.-> a means of finding common ground between the two contradictory positions. Tam said this is an interesting idea and promised to transmit it, too, to the Front. We did not attempt to discuss the name,1; of potential candidates for such a provisional government. Turning to the question of war prisoners, Tam authorised me to announce publicly that henceforth letters and gifts from the families of prisoners could be sent via his address in Algiers. Letters should be registered and gifts should not include food, he suggested. This invitation was extended specifically to the family of Gustav Hertz.

On the question of Mr. TTertx, about whom Tam and I have exchanged letters, he asked me to lell the family that Mr. Tlerlx, i.s alive and healthy, well fed .ind housed, However, B-5Z bombings make it difficult to guarantee his safely. Tam said the Front has information that Mr. Hertz was the CIA chief in Siigon under a USOM cover. He said the Front is very cautious about considering an exchange of Mr. Hertz for the only surviving NLF agent who attempted to assassinate Secretary McNamara because of previous experiences. When an American Army officer was captured in Venezuela by the "Venezuelan Front" and held hostage for one of the NLF's captured men, he said, two minutes after the American was released their man was executed by the Saigon government. Moreover, one of the two men captured during the

is;s^r^'!^an^;'ri'«V;;^'-«--^[?^S«^«f*?^-t!;; .'^•TT.a'T-",,-.,- ,-• .. •.; •: -:, •.» •• •*;; •.*•••'.••

'f.jw: i'li'-:'! .'v« i. • vV':1.- ';'• •" '. • "• •'• i;r.'v:' \ •• •• .'•/-. I '•'•'• • attempt on McNarnara's life has already been execuled by .Saigon and supporters of the Front would find it difficult to understand the release of Mr. Hert/- without being sure that the exchange would be reciprocated. "We share your humanitarian concerns, " Tarn said, "b ut what would you have us do?" I replied that beyond purely humanitarian considernti ons it is in tin- Front's .self-interest to change its image in the U.S. The1 Front is treated as an anonymous group of terrorists in the U. S. at present, I explained, adding (hat anything which might be done to exchange war prisoners could help overcome this image. Tarn replied that the Front is prepared to discuss the exchange of all prisoners, including Mr. Ilert/,. Th« N LF has its own K.ed Cross which is not affiliated with Ihe Internet ional Red CrosM. Neve rl heicss , ihc i\i!.,r bar. aprro-c! to o.bldc by the (i<:ncva Convent i on on the treatment oi war pri .MOMC rs. Wms»- the U.S. wants to discuss prisoner exchange, it can contact him. Tarn assorted, and the Algerian government is prepared to assist. Tarn claimed •thai: previous offers to discuss this through the good offices of President Ben Bella were unanswered by the American .side. 'Hefore leaving I. reminded Tarn that, the influent f> of the American peace movement ,'iliould not be ovc rrnl inn ted by the Front. I li.id .1 c h.inrc- l<> di.scus;; Lhi.B further with one f>( his aides alter leaving the lion :e tc> fetch a t.ixl, 'I'hf aide replied that the peace movement's "quality" combined with the Front's "quantity" could lead to victory. I observed that we had no interest in a. military victory by the Front. By victory, he replied, the Front means the achievement of the country's independence.

SG/hfo, Jatjuary 13, 1966

iu Ju

"1*0

M.of MM** \ V Meeting on Vietnam in the Secretary-General's Conference Room on Monday, 17 January 1966, at 11 a.m.

Present: Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost, U Thant, Mr. Ralph J. Bunche

Ambassador Goldberg stated that he had come to tell what he knew about developments since the last meeting, but this was not very much. We know, he said, that our message was delivered to the North. There has been no response of any kind. Vice-President Humphrey and Secretary of State Rusk met with Mr. Kosygin at Hew Delhi. The atmosphere was very friendly but they found Mr. Kosygin entirely non-committal. There was no indication of the USSR attitude. Kosygin did not reveal anything about Schelepin1 s discussions and the US knows nothing about them. Ambassador Goldberg asked Ambassador Dobrynin about the Soviet position and Dobrynin replied that Moscow was waiting to see Schelepin' s report on his visit. Mr. Goldberg said that Dobrynin was inclined to indicate that the US peace initiative was rather a good thing. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the US has some information pointing to a massing of Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam and there is fear that some type of offensive is being prepared for and very soon — possibly immediately after the lunar new year. Ambassador Goldberg said that they had heard nothing from the other sources - Poland, Hungary, Japan and India. U Thant, in response to a question_by Ambassador Goldberg, said that he had learned nothing new from HfeSsprGreentrgUA./ . Rolz-Bennett had talked with him in U Thant1 s absence. He is now in California visiting his wife. Mr. Green did express the view that North Vietnam is still closer to Moscow than to Peking. Ambassador Goldberg stated that he personally was becoming troubled about the absence of any response to the US approaches. He said that he still did not know what President Johnson will do with regard to the bombing pause. —p — U Thant stated that a key question continues to be how close Hanoi is to Peking. U Thant referred to his proposal of last February of a preliminary meeting of 5 plus 2, that is the big five plus South and North Vietnam. When it was put forward there was no programme, he said, but now there are the four points of North Vietnam and the fourteen points of the US. He had received no reaction from North Vietnam or the Vietcong on this proposal. U Thant observed that he had even suggested that the crux of the problem in such a meeting would be the representation for South Vietnam. He said that he had told the Russians that to think of representation of either the Vietcong or the South Vietnam government alone would be unrealistic. He had suggested, instead, a half and half representation arrangement for South Vietnam as a preliminary approach (that is half Saigon and half National Liberation Front). The French, said U Thant, had been very much interested in this approach. There had been no Soviet reaction to it, although both the French and the Soviet Representatives had asked about US reaction to it. The US response to U Thant1s proposal was that the Vietcong could be included in the North Vietnamese delegation. U Thant did not convey this to North Vietnam on the assumption that they would reject the US idea. U Thant raised the question of a new approach along this line that might now be made. Of course, he said, Ky would be negative toward it. The question is about the next step to be taken. Should the 5 plus 2 idea and the nature of the representation of South Vietnam be revived by someone? Ambassador Goldberg stated that his personal view was that the basic idea of 5 plus 2 is sound, for the purpose of starting a dialogue. Ky, of course, would oppose the half and half formula but, said Ambassador Goldberg, we could "fudge over" the question of representation. The Vietcong could have a "group" to be invited but not as a part of the government delegation of South Vietnam. But the Vietcong group could be of the same size as the delegation of the government of South Vietnam which would be present as the government. Ambassador Goldberg said that President Johnson1s present position is more flexible than the position previously taken by the Department of State which was that the Vietcong should have representation only by inclusion in the North Vietnamese delegation. He thought it would be worthwhile to explore U Thant1 s idea about representation. He reiterated that the Secretary-General has been invited by the President to continue his efforts. U Thant said that a revised formula could be "5 plus" instead of 5 plus 2. He took it for granted that Peking would reject such a formula. The key question is whether the USSR would have the courage to attend under such an arrangement and in the face of Chinese rejection. The question arose as to who . should take the initiative in a new approach along these lines. U Thant pointed out that he has been rebuffed by Peking in the past and that Peking continues to attack him saying that the US is still using him as a "go-between", referring to Ambassador Goldberg's visit to U Thant on the night he departed for Rome. U Thant said that, therefore, it is not clear whether he should undertake a new initiative in these circumstances. In any case, U Thant would welcome an official US reaction to the suggestion of a new initiative by someone along the lines just discussed. Ambassador Goldberg stated that he would have the official US reaction within a day or two. He thought that the French would be willing to take an initiative along this line since it is close to the approach which Couve de Murville favors. Ambassador Goldberg added that as a result of his talk with General De Gaulle there were indications that the General, for the first time, has a clear appreciation of the US position and is taking a more affirmative attitude. There is, he thought, a new current running in Prance. Ambassador Goldberg suggested that an initiative might be taken jointly, that is the Secretary-General and the French or the Secretary-General and the Pope. He personally felt that the two most effective sources of initiative would be the Pope and the Secretary-General. He noted, however, that Peking has not responded in any way to the Pope's appeal. The USSR, he said, has sent a non-committal reply. -k- U Thant enquired whether there was any new development with regard to a possible meeting of the Security Council on Vietnam. Ambassador Goldberg replied that Dobrynin1s position in their talks with him was that the Soviet reaction will be determined by the attitude of Hanoi. Other countries that have been sounded were found to be not enthusiastic about a Security Council meeting. France thought that such a meeting would not be fruitful and Australia was definitely against it on the grounds that it would tie the hands of the US in the future. The meeting ended at 11.50 a.m. c6)

Meeting on Vietnam held on 19 January 1966 at k p.m. in the Secretary-General1 s Conference Room Present: U Ihant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost, Mr. Bunche

Ambassador Goldberg stated that he had come to bring the official response of his Government to the questions about the conference and

representation in it raised by the Secretary-General at their last meeting. First, however, Ambassador Goldberg said that he vould wish to take up some preliminary matters. He reported that, from all of the soundings and approaches that the US had made "up to this very minute", the US had received no response at all from North Vietnam. He added that Ambassador Poy Kohler has been instructed to see the North Vietnamese Charge" in Moscow today and not to await the return of the North Vietnamese Ambassador who went to Hanoi with Sehelepin. Ambassador Goldberg said that the Poles, the Hungarians, the Romanians, Mr. Nasser and Rangoon had received no replies to the

approaches made. Justice Goldberg said that with regard to the rumoured diminution in the fighting in North Vietnam, the official assessment by US Intelligence

is that in number and intensity of incidents there has been no decrease at all. The Intelligence appraisal indicates, moreover, a big buildup by the Vietcong and North Vietnam with the likelihood of an early attack by them. Consequently, he observed, the US has had to give consideration to counter-measures to be taken in the event of such an attack. -2- Mr. Goldberg stated that the US cannot give to the Secretary-General any assurance as to how much longer the bombing pause will be extended. Ambassador Goldberg informed that on 18 January Mr. Rapacki had reported to US Ambassador Gronowski that Poland had received no word from Hanoi. Justice Goldberg said that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington had indicated that the Soviet Union had received no word from Hanoi about the American approach. Some US officials, commented Mr. Goldberg, see the Vietcong military buildup as taking advantage of the bombing pause. However, on the morning of 19 January, the White House had announced that no deadline or time limit for the pause had been set. The White House also denied the story in the

Hew York Times that the US had given assurance to Prime Minister Wilson that there would be no bombing prior to his forthcoming visit to Moscow.

Ambassador Goldberg then turned to the Secretary-General1 s ideas about a conference and representation in it. These ideas, he said, in general were regarded with some favor in Washington and there were some suggestions to offer about them. The US, he said, would respond affirmatively to an appeal made to the US, the USSR, the UK, China and North and South Vietnam (k- plus 2) to attend discussions on peace in Vietnam. In response to a question, Mr. Goldberg said that France had been neither included nor excluded in his statement for the reason that the US had no indication from France and Ambassador Goldberg himself had had no indication from General De Gaulle when he talked with him that France would wish to have any role in such a discussion. -3- Ambassador Goldberg said that the US had also given consideration to the place and time of a conference and he mentioned Vienna as a possible place and February first aa a possible time.

As to representation of others than those mentioned, (specifically the Vietcong) .Ambassador Goldberg said that this question raises serious difficulties for the US. He suggested a possible formula, nemely that at such a conference, any governments or groups expressing interest in the conference and wishing to be heard might be represented and given the opportunity to be heard. Thus, he said, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand might wish to be heard and could be heard. This formula, he urged, allowed flexibility. Ambassador Goldberg assured the Secretary-General that there was no disposition on the part of the US to veto or oppose French participation in such a conference; . omitting France was only a reflection of a US appraisal of what they saw as a:-rather Olympian lack of interest on the part of the French. General De Gaulle, he averred, had expressed the view tb him that negotiations on Vietnam now could not be fruitful. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the reaction to the Secretary- General1 s ideas which he had just outlined had been cleared by President Johnson, who had asked Ambassador Goldberg to convey it to the Secretary- General.

U Thant thanked Mr. Goldberg for this response and particularly for the promptness of it. He contrasted this promptness with the experience he usually had had on such questions in discussions with

Governor Stevenson. The Secretary-General stated that it would be in his view extremely difficult to consider the exclusion of France from -it- such a conference. The provision in the formula that any interested government or group could be heard is very wide, he thought.

Ambassador Goldberg said that this formulation could be narrowed to refer to those actually involved in the Vietnam conflict. U Thant stated that he considered also that the term "groups" in the formula was very wide in its connotation; so much so, in fact, that it couH. include many religious groups in Vietnam. The Secretary- General also enquired whether the US had any preference for Vienna as a meeting place and Ambassador Goldberg said there was no such preference and Vieiina had merely been mentioned as a possibility. > U Thant inquired whether consideration has been given to the question of terms of reference for a conference, and was he correct in assuming that the US was not insisting on any specific conditions for the conference. Ambassador Goldberg assured the Secretary-General that the US was posing no conditions for the conference, it could take up the k points or the Ik points or something else. There were no pre-conditinns, as President Johnson had stated. The Secretary-General referred at this point to a cable of 19 January which had been sent from Vientiane by Mr. Galetti, the UN Representative there.

Ambassador Goldberg stated that the US places high value on the

Secretary-General's participation in the-peace effort.

Mr. Goldberg stated that of all those approached the Poles and the Indians have shown the most active interest in the US peace effort and at a high level. -5- Mr. Goldberg stated that it was the assumption of the US that the Poles had cleared their role with the USSR. U Thant remarked that Cambodia, Laos and Thailand would "be "interested" parties with regard to any conference and, quite possibly, Malaysia also. China, he was sure, would reject any role but it would be a very important step forward if Hanoi and Saigon accepted participation. Hie Secretary- General asked whether whoever might make the new appeal might specify that the National Liberation Front would be invited. Merely to refer to "groups" would be too vague, he felt. There might be wording such as "the HLF and any other groups" interested and actively involved.

.Ambassador Goldberg said that the US does not wish to lose the South Vietnamese. The formula suggested by the US would not lose them. With regard to the Secretary-General* s point, Ambassador Goldberg said that he might suggest "groups interested, including the HLF", but he would like to take up this question with the people in Washington. U Thant recalled that President Johnson had told him in San Francisco that if he agreed to accept the MLF, the government in Saigon would fall. Ambassador Goldberg said that he would convey the Secretary- General' s thinking to the government, and would be going to Washington tonight. He planned to be back on Friday. He said that he would give to the Secretary-General, on his return, the further reaction of

Washington to what had been discussed in today1 s meeting. The Secretary-General again referred to the question of who would make the approach, mentioning Canada, Poland and India as possibilities. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the US would doubt that Canada alone could be effective in such an approach. Poland might be more -6- effective, but Poland might not be willing to take the initiative although

it was likely to react favorably to an initiative taken by the Secretary- General.

U Thant agreed with this view,

Ambassador Goldberg stated that the Chinese do not seem to know much about what is going on. Hanoi apparently has not told Peking of the US Mde-Me'moire of 50 December. Nor do the Chinese seem to know of the Polish initiative. Ambassador Goldberg in concludin g referred to Cyprus and informed the Secretary-General that the US, the UK and Canada were making the rounds seeking increased contributions for IMPICIP. He suggested that it would be gelpful if the Secretary-General himself would make the

approach to the Government of Cyprus with regard to the $700*000 bill which the Cypriots hold against the UN and which they should waive as a part of their contribution.

The meeting ended at 4.55 p.m. cO)

CONFIDENTIAL

Note for the record on the meeting between the Secretary-General and Ambassador A. Goldberg held on 2k January 1966, 11 a.m. Present: Arab. A. Goldberg (USA) The Secretary-General Arab. C. Yost Mr. J. Rolz-Bennett

Amb. Goldberg recalled the efforts being made by the United States Government to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Viet-Nam and President Johnson1s earnest desire to move the dispute from the battle- field to the conference table. Up to this moment, however, there had been no response from Hanoi to these peace efforts, and Amb. Goldberg wished to inform the Secretary-General that time was running out. The United States Government had as yet not decided on the resumption of air bombing of North Viet-Nam, but it could not wait indefinitely while Hanoi refused to respond to the peace efforts. There had been a meeting in Washington on Saturday, 22 January 1966, attended by Secretary of State Rusk, Amb. Goldberg, Amb. Harriman, Under- secretary Ball and military chiefs to review the situation. The meeting was informed that no response had been received from Hanoi to that part of the message which was transmitted to the North Viet-Namese Government through their representative in Rangoon, dealing with the pause in the bombing. The discussion at the meeting had not been easy as it was difficult to counter the military arguments in favour of an early resumption of the bombing. However, it was decided that a communication would be transmitted by the United States Government over the week-end to the countries which had been most helpful in regard to the recent United States peace initiatives, to the Pope and to the Secretary-General. While the US could not give any assurances as to how long it could maintain the bombing pause, the President especially wanted the Secretary-General to know of his deep and sincere desire for peace. In this connexion, he would welcome the Secretary-General's ideas as to what else might now be done. In explaining the United States thinking, Amb. Goldberg indicated that his Government did not know whether the pause in the bombing was the key to a peaceful solution or whether other more substantial things ought to be done. The US Government had carefully analyzed every single report that might give an indication of Hanoi's reaction. Of all these reports, the "Laos feeler" seemed to be the most significant. Prime Minister Souvanna - 2 -

Phouma had been encouraged to probe further the North Viet-Namese intentions.. The Laotian Premier was assured that the US did not intend to maintain its troops throughout the elections that might be held in South Viet-Nam. The question was to ensure free elections, and the US was ready to talk about all aspects of the matter. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma had talked with Worth Viet-Namese representatives but no response had been reported. There was nothing substantial either from the USSR, Poland, India or others. In the circumstances, the US Government felt that this might be the time for further initiatives. Amb. Goldberg recalled the Secretary-General's earlier suggestion as to the participants in peace talks. He thought the Secretary-General1s formula was better than the one which had been suggested at the time by the US. He was in a position to state that the US would acquiesce to a proposal for a conference to which the Governments of the US, the UK, the USSR, the People's Republic of China,, North Viet- Nam and South Viet-Nam would be invited. This conference would consider the views of other governments directly or indirectly involved in the conflict, as well as those of any interested group, including the National Liberation Front. As was well known, there were several other groups in South Viet-Nam, in addition to the NLF, who would request to be heard. There was another matter, Amb. Goldberg said, which he wished to bring to the attention of the Secretary-General in a most confidential manner. President Johnson was anxious to make it clear that his objective is to bring the Viet-Namese conflict to the conference table. It was in pursuance of this objective that he was considering addressing an appeal to the Governments of the UK, the USSR, the People's Republic of China, North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam for a foreign ministers meeting (including, naturally, the US) at an early date, for the purpose of exchanging views on what may be done regarding the Viet-Namese conflict. It was not a conference of peace negotiations that he had in mind, but rather a conference to explore ways of settling the problem. Certain proposals which had already been made could be discussed at such a conference. The above initiative was a further indication of the flexibility with which the President was approaching the question of Viet-Nam. As background, Amb. Goldberg said that such a move had been discussed by him and Under-Secretary Ball with the President prior to the "peace offensive". - 3 -

The suggestion was now revived and ready to go to the President after hearing the views of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General said that since Amb. Goldberg had invited him to give some views, he would like in the first place to say that the President's approach was very encouraging. Commenting on the question of a conference on Viet-Wam, he felt that France should be included among the Powers to be invited. On the point concerning the other parties that may be invited, the Secretary-General felt that the idea of having "several groups" represented might lead to considerable complications for the reason that there would be numerous groups claiming a right to sit at the conference. Also, it seemed unrealistic to treat the NLF as one of the groups since in effect the NLF was by far the most important of all. Similarly, the inclusion of "other parties directly or indirectly concerned" might lead to a proliferation of claims from several states and for an unusually large meeting. ' The Secretary-General felt that he should not be involved in initiating invitations to any such conference. The ICC would be a much better agent to formulate any invitation. In the view of the Secretary-General, the participants to the conference should be (l) the five big Powers; (2) the Governments of Hanoi and Saigon and (3) the NLF. As regards the invitation to the NLF, the Secretary-General said he might be able to explore the manner in which the Front might be represented. Amb. Goldberg agreed that the ICC would be the most favourable sponsor of the invitations. He also agreed that the Secretary-General should undertake the soundings about the possible representation of the NLF. Concerning the President's possible initiative, the Secretary-General thought also that France should be included among the governments invited to the conference. The problem was again to determine how the NLF might be represented. He wished to suggest that the President defer his initiative until the Secretary-General had contacted the members of the ICC. It would be helpful if the objectives to be sought as an outcome of any conference were clarified. It seemed to the Secretary-General that at the present time the best that the United States could hope for was to help in making North Viet-Uam "another Yugoslavia" and South Viet-Nam "another Cambodia", both countries being non-aligned and not permitting the estab- lishment on their territory of foreign troops or bases.- If the US was clear about its objectives, this would facilitate explorations about a conference. It seemed, however, that it would be more realistic to think in terms of North and South Viet-Nam becoming "another Yugoslavia". — The problem for the US, Amb. Goldberg said, was to determine what the South Viet-Namese themselves wished their country to be. Would they wish to have a government like that of Laos? like that of Cambodia? The United States would agree to any such wish, provided it was genuine. It would also be prepared to follow this line in regard to unification, if the South Viet-Namese concurred with any such formula. In passing, Amb. Goldberg said there were indications that the USSR would prefer the "Laos-Cambodia" type of regime for South Viet-Nam until they were clearer about the allegiances of the North Viet-Namese Government, particularly as regards the People's Republic of China. — The Secretary-General commented that free elections were desirable but it would take a long time to make such elections possible. He drew an analogy with the situation in Burma at the end of World War II where many areas were under communist occupation, and it would have been illu- sory to think of organizing elections. The Secretary-General felt, therefore, that a more realistic approach might be to broaden the South Viet-Namese Government and make it representative of all the groups in South Viet-Nam, including the NLF. This was the idea which he had suggested during his last press conference on 20 January 1966. Amb. Goldberg commented that in the view of the United States, to do anything about broadening the South Viet-Namese Government without the holding of a conference or talks would be disastrous. This was why the US had thought in terms of sending invitations to "groups". The US was prepared for all discussions leading to a peaceful solution and free elections. The US had asked through various channels for clarification of the point set forth by the Hanoi Government regarding the reconstitute ion of the South Viet-Wamese Government but had received no reply. This was an additional reason why the US preferred that invitations should be sent to all groups. The Secretary-General asked whether Amb. Goldberg agreed that the Secretary-General should consult with the members of the ICC /on the formula of 5 plus 2 plus "groups^/. Amb. Goldberg replied that he agreed but requested that no mention be made of the President's probable initiative. Concerning the venue of the conference, the US had no strong views; Geneva would be suitable. The idea of inviting foreign ministers to the meeting was dictated only by the - 5 - desire to raise the level of representation as high as possible. He wished the Secretary-General to know that the subject of the President's j possible initiative had not been cleared with the South Viet-Wamese Government. Amb. Goldberg wished the Secretary-General to know also that Presi- dent Johnson had not abandoned the idea of involving the Security Council in the Viet-Namese question. Notwithstanding Amb. Goldberg's personal feelings on the matter (which were known to the Secretary-General), he felt more and more that the involvement of the Security Council could not be avoided. There was a strong body of public opinion in the United States which thought that this avenue had not been tried by the Government and many congressmen and influential people shared this view. The Secretary-General commented that a debate in the Security Council raised the danger of forcing the USSR to come out very strongly against the United States, even more strongly than was their attitude outside of the United Nations. It was also pertinent to ask what would be the objective of a Security Council debate: was it to provide information? was it to obtain action by the Council? If the debate had the purpose of bringing information to the members of the Security Council and of the United Nations as a whole, that was one thing; but demanding action of the Security Council was another. It was obvious that any request to the Security Council for action would likely fail either because of vetoes or abstentions. Amb. Goldberg said he personally thought it would be valuable to provide information through a discussion in the Security Council. As far as action was concerned, there was a possibility of obtaining a resolution very much along the lines of the appeal made by the non-aligned countries some time ago, to the effect that efforts should be made to find a negotiated settlement and a peaceful solution of the problem. Many heads of state of countries visited recently by the various US envoys seemed to approve of this approach. As regards the Soviet attitude, Amb. Goldberg recalled what Amb. Dobrynin of the USSR replied when approached recently: "We (meaning the USSR) would say or do whatever Hanoi wanted us to say or do". Notwithstanding the views stated above, Amb. Goldberg pointed out that a Security Council meeting did not seem imminent. Other initiatives should take priority, but he wanted to emphasize that the President continued to think in terms of a United Nations involvement. - 6 -

In closing, Amb. Goldberg said that President Johnson was very concerned about the actions he may have to take if no progress was made towards finding a peaceful solution, particularly when the military chiefs advised him that the security of the US troops was involved. CONFIDENTIAL

27 January 1966

Roy Bennett of the LONDON TRIBUNE saw me today and gave me the following information: Last week he went down to Washington and saw a few Senators, including Senator Clark of Pennsylvania. According to them, President Johnson is going to resume "bombing of North Vietnam very soon, not because of Washington's often repeated reasons of stopping aggression from the North but because of the imperative need to stabilize the Ky Government in Saigon. According to latest information brought to President Johnson from Saigon, the present Government in Saigon would fall very soon if the United States bombing pause is further continued. According to Senator Clark's assessment, the President would resume bombing not for any other reason but to restore morale in South Vietnam so that no military coup is possible at least for the time being. Roy Bennett was also informed by a reliable source that a. South Vietnamese pilot flew in a plane to Cambodia and sought political asylum there. The same sources say that many colleagues of that defector were arrested by the Saigon Government to prevent further defections. President Johnson feels that similar things will continue to happen if the bombing pause is continued indefinitely. According to Roy Bennett, the United States bombed North Vietnam on 7 February 1965 for the first time in order to save the then Government of Saigon. The bombing produced the desired result. He also told me that some Senators were collecting signatures among themselves to be addressed to President Johnson to continue the bombing pause indefinitely. According to his information, 25 to 30 Senators would sign such an appeal. He also told me that George Ball and Ambassador Goldberg were definitely in favour of continued bombing pause, while Dean Rusk was for resumption of bombing. He said that the Mansfield report had a tremendous impact on the Senate as well as on the House. SECRET <- (?°

Notes on the Vietnam situation

5 February 1966

On Thursday, 2? January, I sent for the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia and informed him of my recent moves towards a solution of the Vietnam problem. I told him that it was time to revive my proposal of January 1965 to the effect that a preliminary meeting of Big 5 (including Peking) plus North Vietnam and South Vietnam should be revived. I reminded him that in my original proposal South Vietnam was to be represented equally by the National Liberation Front and the current Government in Saigon. My proposal was rejected both by Washington and Saigon in February 1965 since they maintained that the National Liberation Front could attend such a meeting as part of the delegation of North Vietnam. I informed Washington at that time that such a proposal was sure to be rejected by North Vietnam. I also told the Yugoslav Representative that I presented that proposal to Moscow, London, Paris, Hanoi, Saigon and the National Liberation Front, but no official reactions were received from any of them except Washington and Saigon. Both Moscow and Paris reacted favourably but not officially and Hanoi and the National Liberation Front had no reaction at all which in my view was encouraging. I told the Yugoslav Representative that I felt that we should revive that proposal since the deadlock still persists. I also told him that I had presented this proposal again to the United States two weeks ago and that the United States had come back with a counter proposal. Since I cannot reiterate this proposal to the parties concerned in the face of Washington's apparent rejection I asked him whether he would transmit this to his Government with a view to contacting some other non-aligned countries and come out collectively with a proposal on similar lines. He promised to do so. On Sunday, 30 January, Norman Cousins (Editor of the Saturday Review) came to see me at 6 p.m. and told me that he had definite information about the United States resumption of bombing North Vietnam that night and he asked me if I could telephone President Johnson to delay the decision since the resumption of bombing would damage the current delicate diplomatic negotiations. I told him that my normal contact should be with Ambassador Goldberg and not directly with a Head of State but I assured him that I would consult with Mr. Goldberg before making any move. He asked me not to reveal the source of this information and I promised to honour his trust. I tried to contact Mr. Goldberg but I was informed that he was at a dinner organized by the Anti-defamation League in his honour. At 11 p.m. that night Mr. Goldberg telephoned me and informed me of President Johnson's decision to resume bombing that very night in spite of his protestations. He said that the President's decision was very much to his regret and I told him that it was most regrettable. Without telling him that I had heard from Norman Cousins earlier I told him that it would be too late for me to make any plea to the President and he agreed. Dn the morning of Monday, January 31* Mr. Goldberg saw me and told me that President Johnson had called him at 8 a.m. that morning asked him to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to present the case of the United States. He had already requested the President of the Council (France) to call an immediate meeting. He would not insist on a meeting on that very day and he would be equally happy if it could take place on Tuesday. He reiterated his unhappiness at the resumption of bombing this morning. The Security Council met on Tuesday and Wednesday and decided to adopt the agenda by 9 votes against 2 with 4 abstentions. On Wednesday February 2 I attended a dinner given in my honour by the Council on Foreign Relations and John McCloy, President of the Council, told me that at a. meeting at the White House on Friday evening,which McCloy also attended, the question of resumption of bombing came up, Goldberg advised President Johnson to defer the decision on resumption of bombing but the President overruled him. McCloy indicated to me that he personaly was in agreement with the President. On Thursday,February 3* James Reston of the New York Times saw me and among others told me that George Ball, Assistant Secretary of State, has been in disagreement with the President's Vietnam policy and Dean Rusk's policy, and he had decided to resign in June this year. On the same day the Permanent Representative of Mauritania saw me and expressed his Government's indignation at the United States resumption of bombing. He told me that his country has diplomatic relations both with Peking and Hanoi and his Government would be very glad to play any part in any peace efforts. I thanked him for the offer and - 3 -

promised to discuss with him at a later date. On the same day the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia saw me and told me that his Government was indignant at the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam and it felt that the prospects for a peaceful solution became more remote. I then exchanged/wi£n him on the next step with the possible involvement of the Security Council in the light of the adoption of the agenda in the Council last night. I asked him that my proposal of a preliminary conference should not be taken up by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda, three members of the Security Council which abstained last night on the question of adoption of the agenda. Because of their abstentions they were now in a strong position to come out with some initiative and I consider that these three countries would be in the best position to take such initiative. He" agreed with me and promised to contact these three countries. I asked Ralph Bunche to contact Goldberg and explain to him my latest idea of getting the three African countries involved in taking such an initiative. I told Bunche that I did not want to send for Goldberg to my office since his visit might generate a lot of speculation. He agreed with me and promised to see Goldberg. On the same night (February 3) Ambassador Seydoux saw me and informed me that the Soviet Union would vote against any draft resolution that may be presented to the Security Council irrespective of the substance. According to Seydoux the Soviet Union would not take part in any discussion, both formal and informal, of the Vietnamese situation. Seydoux observed that the Soviet Union is very embarrassed by wide spread rumours that it would come to some kind of an agreed .formula with the United States. I told him of my proposal to get the three African countries involved in further initiatives, but Seydoux did not consider that it would have any chance in the light of the Soviet's position. S;eydoux also told me that he was told that the United States was thinking of a simple resolution of the Security Council requesting an early meeting of the Geneva Conference which, in the view of the United States, could not be vetoed by the Soviet Union, but in Seydoux1s view the Soviet Union will veto any resolution. On Friday,February 4, Bunche told me that he could not see Goldberg last night as he was in Washington but .that he saw him this morning. Goldberg told him what Seydoux told me the previous night that the Soviet Union had decided to veto any draft resolution in the Security Council and that the Soviet Union would not participate in discussions with any deJLegslteion on the Vietname situation. ...A - 4 -

In the light of this information Goldberg did not think that the^re was an early prospect of a Security Council meeting. On my proposal to get the three African countries involved in further initiatives Goldberg was not enthusiastic. According to him Mali would go along with Hanoi's position and Nigeria which had specific instructions from Lagos to vote for the adoption of the agenda abstained on the vote after an understanding had been reached with Mali which originally decided to vote against the adoption. According to Goldberg to show African unity all three African States abstained on the adoption of the agenda, Goldberg did not think that the suggestion of three African States for such an initiative will not be acceptable bo Washington, If a few others among/permanent members are to be involved Washington might be agreeable to it. Goldberg also confided to Bunche that if the inscription of ghe agenda were rejected by the Security Council it would the end of the United Nations as far as Washington is concerned. Goldberg told Bunche that Washington was very strong on this point and he had informed the African members of the Security Council before the voting took place. I told Bunche what Seydoux told me last night and in the light of these circumstances I should better leave the idea to Yugoslavia to work out a formula in consultation with some non-aligned delegations. SECRET C tf 0 Note on Vietnam situation

7 February 1966

Ambassador Lewandowski of Poland saw me today and told me the following: on receipt of President Johnson's 14 point peace plan in Warsaw the Polish Government sent Mr. Michalowski (his predecessor at the U.N.) to Hanoi to present the United States peace plan personally to the Government of North Vietnam. On the way out he stopped in Peking and the Chinese officials questioned the need to convey United States peace plan to Hanoi and they suggested that the Polish Government should have rejected it outright without presenting it to Hanoi since the plan was in their view a fake. Michalowski told the Chinese that it was for Hanoi to accept or reject it and not for Poland to speak on behalf of Hanoi. In Hanoi Michalowski met Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong and representatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The visit was made in the early part of January. The atmosphere in Hanoi was one of confusion since the Government and the party were split between those who favour Peking line and those who favour Moscow line. According to his assessment both Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong were closer to Moscow than to Peking but the second line leaders were definitely in favour of the tougher Peking line. With this background both Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong found it very difficult to make up their minds regarding Washington's peace moves, but all in Hanoi very much suspect United States intentions and they feel convinced that United States was going to stay in South Vietnam indefinitely. Michalowski also noticed that Hanoi is getting very substantial quantities of small arms and food from China and this aid is a very important factor in Hanoi's attitude towards Washington. While Hanoi's attitude was not so belligerent Michalowski found that the attitude of the National Liberation Front was very militant. The Front representatives told him that they would win the war although they may be forced-to fight for many years. They seemed to be confident that with the people of Vietnam behind them they could even drive out the americans from ^outh Vietnam. Michalowski got the impression that the Front was in no mood to negotiate while the americans were s building up their armed forces. Ho Chi Minh's attitude was different. When Michalowski told him about the Chinese remarks in Peking he said that Michalowski was right in bringing the 14 points to Hanoi for Hanoi's reaction and that the Chinese were wrong in suggesting that Poland could have rejected them outright without referring them to Hanoi. When Michalowski told the Front representatives that if they persisted in fighting it might even lead to world war 3> they replied that they were aware of it but since they have been fighting for liberation of their country for 20 years world war 3 would not make any difference to them. If their objective of complete independence is not achieved they will continue to fight. According'to the assessment of the Polish Government the key to the successful solution of the problem lies in two factors: a permanent bombing pause of North Vietnam, and the United States willingness to negotiate with the National Liberation Front. The Polish Government feels that without these two conditions there can be no solution of the problem. The Polish Government also believes that Hanoi will not insist on the immediate withdrawal of the United States forces but that the United States must show its sincere desire for peace by gradual .reduction ^of their arms forces in South Vietnam. Only such a gesture will convince Hanoi and the National Liberation Front of United States sincerity. I told Lewandowski of the revival of my one year old proposal on the question of South Vietnamese representation at any conference table by the equal representation of the National Liberation Front and the Government of Saigon. He told me that he thinks that this is no longer acceptable to Hanoi and the National Liberation Front without a definite assurance by Washington that the bombing pause will be indefinite and that the United States forces in South Vietnam will be progressively reduced. I asked him if he had conveyed this information to any Government and he told me that his Government had established very private contacts with the White House and he thinks that the United States Government has been informed of Michalowski's mission.

8 February 1966

Ambassador Tarabanov of Bulgaria saw me today and asked me if the newspaper reports of my contacts with the neutral countries are true. I told him that the reports were just press speculations and that I had not contacted any neutral governments since the Security Council meeting. He told me that there is no chance of any Security Council action since the Soviet Union had decided to vote - 3 -

against any resolution likely to be tabled and even would not participate in any discussions with members or non-members of the Security Gouncil onthe question of Vietnam. The position of the Soviet Union has been made known to the United States delegation and he did not think that the United States will ask for a meeting of the Security Council. I told him that I am aware of the United States position. He then asked me whether I was aware of the purpose of President Johnson's trip to Hawaii. I told him that I was completely in the dark. He told me that President Johnson's airport statement was most damaging for peace efforts and he was wondering whether this stiff line was taken as a cover for some sort of a flexible policy. I told him that I do not know the motivations behind President Johnson's public statements. Ambassador de Beus of the Netherlands saw me on the same day and explained to me his efforts with the non permanent members of the Security Council with a view to a possible declaration by the Security Council in the form of a consensus to be made by the President of the Security Council. He is fully aware of the Soviet position but he hopes the Soviet Union will come around to the idea of a simple declaration calling for the Geneva Conference. I told him that I did not agree with him since in my view the Soviet Union will even oppose the Security Council declaration requesting a Geneva Conference., In my view the key question now is the representation of South Vietnam and if this deadlock is not resolved I cannot envisage any conference. I told him that if Ky is to represent South Vietnam at the Geneva Conference Peking, Moscow and Hanoi will not attend and even France might refuse to attend. So I told him that the idea-of convening a Geneva Conference is not adequate. The question,of representation\of South Vietnam also must be dealt with to facilitate such a ^conference. He agreed with me and he • said he would be guided by my observations in his discussions with the non permanent members. > CO*-)

Meeting on Vietnam held on 7 February 1966 at 11:15 a.m. in the Secretary-General1 s Conference Room

Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost, Mr. Bunche

Ambassador Goldberg stated that there had been some "slight intimation" of a willingness on the part of Hanoi to enter into talks. He did not elaborate. Justice Goldberg stated that the US had some problems here, but on"the whole matters relating to Vietnam were not in bad shape. The Security Council is now seized with the issue, the US was not pressing for an early debate on it, although this was not excluded. He said that he himself, Ambassador Yost and Ambassador Eugenie Anderson have talked with just about all members of the Security Council except the USSR who refused to participate in any consultations on this question. Mrs. Anderson talked with the Representative of Bulgaria and found that he, unlike the Soviet Representative, is willing to consult on the question although taking the position firmly that it should not have been brought to the Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg said he had talked with Seydoux of France and had taken strong exception to the French abstention on inscription of the item on the agenda. He had done so, he said, having in mind especially the French position with regard to peace matters being the exclusive concern of the Security Council, and also because of the fact that, as a matter of both right and courtesy any member of the United Nations should be permitted to have an important question inscribed on the agenda. The Ambassador said that, speaking quite frankly, there would have been a "US crisis in its relations with the United Nations if the issue of Vietnam had not been inscribed on the Security Council agenda". Congress, he added, could never have understood such a negative action. The US Representative said that Ambassador Seydoux was not prepared to - 2 - indicate what the !Prench position would "be toward the endorsement of a new Geneva Conference by the Security Council. Goldberg said that he had put the question directly to Seydoux as to whether his Government would be opposed to a simple Security Council declaration, calling on the parties to reconvene the Geneva Conference with no inhibitions or limitations as regards modalities, representation "or anything". Seydoux had no answer and indicated that he was not prepared to give one. Goldberg informed Seydoux that he would "be back at him for an answer this week".

In strictest confidence, Justice Goldberg revealed that when Ambassador Dobrynin was approached he confined his reaction largely to reading his cabled instructions which followed strictly the Hanoi line as regards the four points, the acceptance of the NLF as the representatives of South Vietnam and non-involvement with the UN.

Chief Adebo had indicated that the simple declaration in support of a Geneva Conference would be a good idea and a desirable action. He regretted the resumption of the bombing. Mr. Goldberg advised him that he did also but that any new pause in the bombings would have to involve a reciprocal action.

Mali, when approached by Ambassador Yost, was of the view that the three African States should be given a full opportunity to consult the parties and that in themeantime, which would mean for quite some time yet, r

Jordan and the Netherlands were found to be sympathetic to some such approach.

The Representative of Japan, as President of the Council, was more cautious in his position and was inclined to wait for the results of the activity by the Africans.

Justice Goldberg said that he and some colleagues had been doing some thinking on possible moves and would appreciate the Secretary-General1s reactions and views. He stressed that the US would not wish to press in - 3 - the Security Council for anything -which would be disruptive, but he added that in time there will be public pressure in the US for Security Council action. He was particularly thinking about the possibility of a statement, declaration or resolution concerning a Geneva Conference that might be made. He was convinced, of course, that the USSR would oppose any statement, declaration or resolution except one which would embrace a flat US acceptance of Hanoi's four points and now also of the NLF as the Government of South Vietnam. He thought it might perhaps be helpful to turn back to an earlier idea. This would involve some of the non-permament members, who would not be designated by the Council, offering as a group their good offices, including their willingness to go anywhere, including all of the capitals, in the cause of peace in Vietnam. From the US standpoint this would have the advantage of providing "some movement". While not officially a UN move, this would obviously draw its inspiration from the UN. It would be in line with the Pope's proposal. It might further the dialogue which has just barely begun between the conflicting parties. The Representative of Mali, of course, would like to confine any such group to the African members. The US, he said, has reservations about this and believes that the group should include other members such as, especially, the President of the Council, the Repre- sentative of Japan. Mr. Goldberg thought that such a group might include the three African members, Japan, Jordan, which is an Asian country, the Netherlands as a Western country with no troops involved in the Vietnam war, and a Latin American country. New Zealand could not be considered since it has troops in Vietnam. The key to this idea is that the good offices group would be acting unofficially and outside of the United Nations. Ambassador Goldberg thought that such a group, each member of which would be backed by its own Government, might actually be received in Hanoi and by the NLF. He therefore saw some possibilities in this direction. Such an approach would be "deliberate" and thus would meet Mali's point of view. It would meet the US problem in that it would show that something is being done, and it might even meet - k - the USSR position.

Ambassador Goldberg stated that he would see no objection to the inclusion , if desired, of some other members.

In great confidence, Ambassador Goldberg informed that there has been another contact between Ambassador Byroad in Rangoon and the Consul-General of North Vietnam who gave the North Vietnamese response to the US note previously delivered through this channel. The meeting was friendly but the North Vietnamese response insisted that the US must accept Ho Chi Minn's four points. Ambassador Goldberg pointed out that the Poles, reporting on their contact, had employed the word "recognize" instead of "accept".

U Thant indicated his disagreement with Ambassador Goldberg1s interpretation of the meaning of Ho Chi MinH's letter regarding relations with the NLF. The Secretary-General pointed out that in the latter part of the letter Ho Chi Mirth had said that the United States must negotiate with the NLF but, in doing so, he did not specify that the US must "accept" the Front as the sole representative of South Vietnam. U Thant, therefore, did not interpret this statement to be a new condition; indeed, it might even be a "little climb-down" from the earlier North Vietnamese position. He said that Ambassador Seydoux had made a similar interpretation of the letter.

U Thant noted that Ambassador Seydoux had informed him that the USSR will not discuss the substance of the Vietnam question with anyone and will vote against any resolution on the question in the Security Council. He also stated that the French Government is of the view that nothing helpful can come out of a Security Council consideration af this question now and that therefore the issue should be dealt with outside the Council. Ambassador Seydoux made no observations about the Secretary-General's suggestion of an effort by the three Africans. He was definitely against any Security Council involvement at this time.

Justice Goldberg stated that the United Kingdom had again queried Moscow, this time as to the meaning of Fedorenko's statement in the Security Council, particularly as to whether the USSR as a Co-Chairman would be inclined to explore the possibility of a new Geneva meeting. The UK approach - 5 - was rebuffed. U Thant told of his talk last week during the Security Council meeting with the Representative of Bulgaria on the subject of possible Security Council action in support of a conference. The Bulgarian Representative had indicated that there would have to be more than a mere call for a conference; there would have to be a balanced approach which would involve denouncing the United States aggression, etc. But he admitted that such an action could not be obtained in the Security Council and thus it was unwise and unhelpful to have the issue before the Council.

The meeting adjourned at 12:15 hours. SECRET

NOTE ON THE SITUATION ON VIET-NAM

9 February 1966

Ambassador Arkhurst of Ghana saw Die today and told me that President Nknunah had asked him to come back to Accra for consultations on the situation in Viet-Nam since Nkrumah is going to Hanoi during the latter part of February. Arkhurst told me that he might be asked to accompany Nkrumah since he (Arkhurst) was in Hanoi last July in connexion with peace moves. He requested me to give him a latest briefing on the situation so that he might transmit it to Nkrumah. I told him that in my view there are three basic issues involved: the resumption of bombing of North Viet-Nam, the question of representation of South Viet-Nam in any conference and some gestures by either side to prove their sincerity for a peaceful settlement. I told him that in my view the resumption of bombing of North Viet-Nam on 31 January hampered peace efforts and that the United States should pause these bombings to create the necessary climate for negotiation. The question of the representation of South Viet-Nam is also a particular issue. In my view, both the Government in Saigon and the National Liberation Front should participate in the discussions. On this question President Nkrumah will be in a very good position to induce Hanoi to abandon its position that the Front alone should speak for South Viet-Nam, since it is unrealistic. Regarding the manifestation of sincerity by both sides, some concrete moves are necessary such as Hanoi's declaration to put a stop to further infiltration of forces to the South and the United States declaration to de-escalate by gradual reduction of armed personnel in South Viet-Nam instead of augmenting the force. In my view, these are the three current issues which must be tackled in right earnest by those directly involved. He agreed with my assessment and told me that President Nkrumah would be grateful to me for these ideas. He also told me that Nkrumah proposed to visit Peking also and looked forward to discussing with the Chinese leaders. When I asked him whether he is seeing Ambassador Goldberg before he leaves New York, he told me that he was seeing him that evening. - 2 -

In the same afternoon Ambassador Goldberg saw me briefly and told me that he believed that the footnote in Ho Chi-Minh's letter to India had certain significance. He reminded me that Ho Chi-Minh's particular reference to India's chairmanship of the International Control Commission indicates that the door is slightly opened for the ICC to take some initiatives. Goldberg told me that similar reference was made to ICG's special character in Ho Chi-Minh's letter to Canada and he believes that similar reference was made in his letter to Poland. He told me that he would go to Washington tomorrow and see the President and report to me on his return to New York. Ambassador Tremblay of Canada saw me the same evening and informed me of certain moves among the members of the Security Council regarding the matter likely to be taken up at the next meeting of the Security Council, and he asked for my views whether the Security Council should continue to take up the question. I told him that in my view the International Control Commission should take some initiative in the light of Ho Chi-Minh's latest letter to Canada, India and Poland. I also told him what I consider to be the three basic issues as I explained to Ambassador Arkhurst earlier in the day. He promised to convey this information to his Government so that the matter can be further discussed when his Foreign Minister comes here on 17 February.

10 February 1966 Ambassador Matsui of Japan, President of the Security Council, saw me today and reported to me his private and informal discussions with the non- permanent members of the Security Council. He told me that there was no early prospect of a Security Council meeting, since most of the members do not see any useful purpose in such an early meeting. He gave me a copy of a proposed statement to be made by him at the meeting if there is general agreement among the members, but he has found out that there was no general agreement even in this summing up. He also told me that the Soviet Union did not participate even in informal discussions and that it would veto any resolution proposed to be tabled at the meeting. In these circumstances he did not believe that a Security Council meeting, at least for some time, would be advisable. He asked me for my views on the situation and I repeated to him the three basic issues which I mentioned to Arkhurst and Tremblay on the previous day. Conf Identia 1

There is very grave concern and growing anxiety over the

continuing hostilities in Vietnam and a strong common desire for the early commencement of negotiations leading to a cessation of hostilities and a peaceful solution.

It is a common view that the Vietname problem should be

settled on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and that a further

conference along the lines of those held in Geneva in 1954 and 1962 would be conducive to that end.

It is therefore strongly urged that no effort be spared by all concerned, including those who are in a position to exercise influence on the belligerents, to bring about as soon as possible either such a conference or negotiations preliminary thereto. SECRET

Note on the Vietnam situation 11 February 1966

Ambassador Goldberg saw me today and told me that he had a long meeting with President Johnson yesterday when the President explained to him why he had to go to Hawaii to meet Ky. The President wanted him to tell me that the Hawaii Declaration should in no way hamper the peace efforts made both in and outside the United Nations. The President had been under heavy pressure from several sources to take a harder line on Vietnam and to satisfy these elements the President had to decide to have a summit meeting with the South Vietnamese in Hawaii. There was no change in United States policy regarding Vietnam and the primary purpose was to help the economic and social development of South Vietnam. Goldberg confided to me that in his personal opinion the Hawaii meeting and Declaration did not mean anything. Goldberg then told me that apart from the North Vietnamese contact with the American Ambassador in Rangoon on 30 January when the official reaction from Hanoi was received there were other indications that Hanoi is trying to establish more channels of communication with the United States. Hanoi informed Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in Vientiane that it was raising the level of its diplomatic mission in Laos to that of an embassy and that its first ambassador would be expected to arrive in Vientiane in 4 to 6 weeks. The United States Ambassador in Vientiane, William Sullivan, was an assistant to Ambassador Harriman at the Geneva conference on Laos in 1962 and Sullivan's contacts with North Vietnam have been very good. Goldberg thinks that Hanoi is willing to raise its mission in Vietiane to that of an embassy so as to establish closer contacts with Sullivan. Washington considers this information to be significant. Goldberg also maintains that the reference to the International Control Commission having extra responsibility in Ho Chi Minh's letter to India, Canada and Poland is significant, 'although the State Department does not share Goldberg's assessment on this point. Goldberg still feels that the ICC can and should play a more important role in making initiatives. - 2 -

Goldberg had not seen the President of the Security Council since he left for Washington yesterday but he understands that the President was not hopeful of an early meeting of the Council in face of Soviet attitude. However Goldberg still thinks that a summing up by the President with an expression of a desire to convene the Geneva Conference cannot be objected to by the Soviet Delegation. In his view although for the purpose of record the Soviet representative might raise an objection to such a procedure the Soviet will not create difficulties fore the President of the Council in making suchaa statement. He will take up the matter with the President (Japan) when he comes back from Chicago on Monday. He also told me that according to unconfirmed reports Shelepin, on his return from Hanoi, stopped in Peking and had a very unpleasant meeting with the Chinese leaders on the question of Vietnam. When I asked him if Washington had any further thought on my original proposal of a preliminary conference of 5 plus 2 involving the participation of the National Liberation Front, he told me that Washington's position remains the same. He asked me if a preliminary conference involving just the big 5 would not be feasible, I told him that it was an excellent idea since it will involve the participation of Peking. He thinks that the big 5, preferably at the Foreign Ministers' level should met and decide on the question of participation at the revived Geneva Conference. I told him that I will give very close consideration to this proposal and discuss with him on his return from Chicago. When I told him that recently Peking has been more insistent on the United States negotiating with the National Liberation Front, he told me that Bulgaria also presented the same ideas at their last informal discussions earlier this week. He said that Washington cannot under any circumstances accept it. Ambassador Seydoux saw me after Goldberg left and asked me if there were any . further developments regarding Vietnam. I told him Goldberg's latest idea of the big 5 meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level to consider the question of participants at a Geneva type conference to be convened later. Seydoux was very much interested i ' in the proposal and he remarked that it was amazing that the United States has taken up this idea implying that it is now prepared to talk to the Chinese on Vietnam. I also told him that in my view there are 3 key issues: 1. indefinite cessation of bombing of North Vietnam; 2. de-escalation of military involvement by both sides; and 3. the question of representation of South Vietnam in any future conference. 3 -

In my view if these issues can be tackled in preliminary discussions then the door to peace is opened. He agreed with me. I asked him if Ho Chi Minhfe request to General de Gaulle to take some initiative is likely to be responded affirmatively, Seydoux tole me that he understood that General de Gaulle had just today replied to Ho Chi Minh. He did not know the contents of the reply and he assured me that he would let me know as soon as he received it. Joseph Kraft, a journalist, who saw me earlier in the day told me that McGeorge Bundy had told him that the Secretary-General's attempts to bring about a secret meeting between representatives of Hanoi and Washington were brought to his notice only after the Secretary-General's press conference of 24 February 1965. He was kept completely in the dark for five months and he thought that President Johnson only knew of these attempts only in February. He blamed Dean Rusk for keeping the information from Stevenson to himself that long since Dean Rusk did , not believe in the genuine desire on the.part of Hanoi to discuss with the United States. ' ; SECRET

Note on the Vietnam situation

1? February 1966

Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin saw me at 6:30 p.m. today and discussed the situation in Vietnam. He said he had several consultations with the Prime Minister and the members of the cabinet regarding my proposal about the ICC involvement. The Canadian Government is in general agreement with me that the ICC should take more initiative in the Vietnam problem particularly in the light of Ho Chi Minh's letters to India, Canada and Poland expressing the special role of the ICC regarding the question of Vietnam. He had already discussed the possibility of an ICC initiative with the ambassadors of India and KLand but they do not seem to be very keen to take such an initiative right now. Poland's attitude will be guided by the attitude of the Soviet Union and according to information the Soviet Union is completely negative for any initiative from any quarter regarding the Vietnam.situation so long as in their opinion the United States is stepping up aggression. He also said that the Canadian representative in the ICC (Seaborn) has been replaced by a new man and it is found that the Hanoi leaders are much more coopaative with the new man than with Seaborn. For instance Seaborn had no contacts with either Ho Chi Minh or Pham Van Dong whereas the new man could establish contacts with them. The meetings were friendly, a fact which is different from the atmosphere in the past. He feels that the new atmosphere is indicative of the willingness of Hanoi to come to the conference table. He asked me about the chances of any Security Council initiative and the chances for non-aligned governments to take some initiative. He informed me that he was going to Washington the next daiy and scheduled to see Dean Rusk on Saturday. He also told me that he was having dinner with Goldberg tonight. I replied to him that this idea of ICC initiative had not been taken up with either India or Poland. I had mentioned this only to Canada and I intended to take the next move on the basis of the Canadian reaction. I agree with him that the time is not favourable for any initiative either by the ICC or the non-aligned countries. In my view the Security Council cannot and should not take any initiative for the reasons I have given in the past. Regarding Poland's attitude I agree with him that Poland will be guided primarily by the attitude of the Soviet Union and that my assessment is that the Soviet Union will not take any initiative even any position before the convening of the 23rd congress of the communist parties which is scheduled for 2? March 1966. In my view the 23rd congress will be historic. I believe that the congress has to take a definite decision regarding the position of the Chinese communist party. There are two possibilities: expell the Chinese communist party or a rapprochement between Moscow and Peking. The Soviet Union has to make a decision one way or the other. I do not see any middle course for Moscow. Regarding Hanoi leadership, in my view there are hawks and doves in Hanoi also. Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Cong and General Giap are doves with independent foreign policy, while the Secretary of the party in Hanoi and the representatives of the National Liberation Front in Hanoi can be considered as hawks with a"much tougher line. .This explains the lack of response from Hanoi to all peace probes. This assessment is confirmed by the Polish diplomat (Michalowski) who made a trip to Hanoi early in January in responsejto the 14 point offer of the United States. As regards the initiative of the non-aligned countries I told him that I had requested Yugoslavia, before the resumption of United States bombing of North Vietnam, t-d discuss with other non-aligned leaders with a view to taking some initiative. With the resumption of bombing the Yugoslav government is very much distressed and it informed me that maney peace initiative at this stage would be futile. Yugoslavia also informed/that in spite of the new situation it is in contact with other non-aligned countries including UAR. The UAR in turn has been in contact with Hanoi. Pham. Van Dong told UAR Ambassador in Hanoi that North Vietnam had pulled out a substantial number of armed forces in South Vietnam during the bombing pause, but the resumption of bombing necessitated Hanoi to reinforce their fighting forces in South Vietnam. Mr. Khkrumah also sought my views regarding Vietnam since he was going to Peking and Hanoi and I told him about the three most important aspects of the problem as I see it: 1. Cessation of bombing of North Vietnam; 2. de-escalation of military activities by all parties in South Vietnam; and 3. the participation of the National Liberation Front in any conference for discussions on negotiations. These three points were mentioned in the New York Times this morning. I stressed the fact that/three points were not my new proposals; they were simply the reiteration of my previous positions. I also told him that I had publicly supported General de Gaulle's position regarding the independence, neutrality and non-intervention in the affairs of both North and South Vietnam. Paul Martin asked me why de Gaulle had said that it was not time for him to take any initiative. I replied to him that according to my information General de Gaulle believed that President Johnson would not make any perceptible concessions during 1966 as the United States congressional elections will take place in November of this year. According to de Gaulle President Johnson would not give the impression to the American people that he would make concessions to the communists for fear that the democratic party would suffer a set back in the congressional elections. Paul Martin asked me if he could mention all these points to the Americans in his discussions with them and I told him that he should use his discretion but I feel that Michalowski's visit to Peking and Hanoi should not be mentioned since Poland had confided to me alone. I told him that the Americans might have known it from their own sources. The meeting lasted seventy minutes. cQt)

Meeting on Vietnam held on 28 February 1966 at 5 p.m. in the Secretary-General's Conference Boom Present: U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Yost, Mr. Bunche Ambassador Goldberg stated that before leaving for London on the morning of Tuesday March 1st for the annual US round-up with the British he wished to bring the Secretary-General up to date on Vietnam developments. The news regarding Vietnam, he said, was not very good. The British had no success in their approach and now the door was closed on the Rangoon contact. An Aide-Memoire had been received from North Vietnam "by the American Ambassador in Rangoon which made it clear that there was no desire by North Vietnam to carry on any further discussions. The Aide-Memoire said in effect that when the United States would have something new to say, the US could then take the initiative in resuming the discussion. It went on to observe that since the US bombing had been resumed, the US showed no indication of withdrawing its troops from South Vietnam and there was no acceptance by the US of Ho Chi Minhfs four points, they (North Vietnam) saw no point in carrying on any further discussion. Justice Goldberg said that it thus appears that for the time being there is not much North Vietnam interest in getting talks started. He said further that North Vietham had not made any big point of the issue of representation for the NLF in any talks. This, he remarked, was not given very much attention in the Soviet statements either* He thought that there was not much chance that anything could be done before the Communist Congress is over. He observed also that Hanoi may not be so anxious to encourage the separate nature of the Viet-Cong as Hanoi wishes to unify the country. The dominant theme of North Vietnam, he pointed out, is the withdrawal of US forces and not the resumption of bombing. This, Mr. Goldberg remarked, seems to support the fear that the Chinese line may "be becoming the dominant line in North Vietnam, that is "Americans get out". Mr. Goldberg said that he had encouraged Paul Martin of Canada to take initiatives as a member of the ICC but he accepted Martin*s view that this is not the proper time to take an initiative, certainly not before the Communist -2- Congress at the end of March (Mr. Harbin bad not mentioned to Mr. Goldberg that he had heard this view only shortly before talking with Mr. Goldberg from the Secretary-General and at the time of his talk with the Secretary- General Mr. Martin was not even aware that there was to be a Communist Congress). U Thant stated that his assessment of the Vietnam situation continues to be that the HLP is closer to Peking than to Moscow while North Vietnam is closer to Moscow than to Peking. The Secretary-General told of the recent visit to Hanoi of Mr. Michalowski of Poland after Mr, Herman's visit to Warsaw when Mr. Michalowski was seeking Hanoi*s reaction to the US l.k points. When Mr. Michalowski reached Peking en route to Hanoi the Chinese had tried to dissuade him from continuing on to Hanoi, telling him that the 14 points should have been rejected and not presented to Hanoi at all. Mr. Michalowski went on to Hanoi nevertheless and informed authorities there of the position the Chinese had taken. Ho Chi Minn told Michalowski that he had done the right thing and that it was for Hanoi alone to accept or reject the 14 points. Michalowski found no change in the North Vietnam line but the NLF was following a much harder line than was North Vietnam. Peking now is tending to ignore Hanoi and talk only of the Viet-Cong and the US while the Soviet Union is playing down the Viet-Cong and emphasizing Hanoi. The Secretary-General said that with regard to the 24th Communist Congress to be held in Moscow on 27 March it had not yet been decided whether to bring into the open the Soviet-Chinese rift. The Secretary-General told of the luncheon he had attended last Saturday in the home of Sir Alexander MacFarquhar with MacFarquhar*s son who is a publisher in Britain and a Chinese expert. Ambassador Federenko was a guest at the luncheon. In speaking of China, Federenko, who knows Mao Tse Tung well, said that he is now in his "dotage", that he speaks calmly of war between the US and China and thus gives evidence of being "deranged". Ambassador Goldberg said that Mr. Sehelepin on his visit to North Vietnam, did make an effort to achieve constructive results in Hanoi, although in a very low key. Sehelepin supported a 2-stage procedure in the Vietnam conflict, viz. l) elections in South Vietnam and 2) re-unification later by some kind of election machinery. Ho Chi Minn, however, held that -3- there should "be only one stage, namely an election at one time for the whole country. Schelepin considered this view to be unrealistic and impossible of attainment. Goldberg said he could not vouch for these reports but considered them accurate. U Thant said that "a gentleman" had told him the other day that President Johnson did not know until February of Ho Chi Minh*s acceptance in September of U Thant*s proposal regarding a pre-conference meeting in Rangoon. Ambassador Goldberg said he was unaware of this situation which came about under his predecessor, so he could not say what might have happened. On the question of Cyprus, Mr. Bunche reported that the Repre- sentatives of both Cyprus and Turkey were favourably inclined toward the idea of a gentleman's agreement not to engage in debate on the Cyprus situation at the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council, but to confine the action to a simple extension of the Force. Mr. Goldberg interjected that some Western members of the Council, and particularly the Netherlands, would want to speak rather bluntly about their unwillingness to continue to contribute unless some progress were being made toward a solution. The Secretary-General explained the idea of giving broader terms of reference to Bernardes which he was proposing to take up with the parties directly concerned immediately, and Ambassador Goldberg thought that this was an excellent idea and should go far to meet the demands of the Netherlands and others. The meeting ended at 6 o'clock. Confidential C 0?) NOTE ON VIETNAM Tuesday, 31 May 1966

Ambassador Goldberg saw me today and asked me if C.V. Narasimhan had reported to me on Friday before I left for Canada about his conversation with him on a possible request by Saigon for sending U.N. observess in connection with the forthcoming elections in South Vietnam in September. I told him that C.V. had conveyed this information to me before I left for Canada and asked him when that request was coming. He told me that the request should be coming any moment and he told me that the United States would endorse it. He requested me not to reject it outright but to enter into informal consultations with the members of the Security Council, particularly the big powers and convey the result of such t discussions to the Government of South Vietnam. He told me that the result would be negative but President Johnson was under heavy pressure from Senator Ribicoff and others for such a move. I told him that as soon as I received such a request I would consult informally with the Security Council members. Thursday, 2 June 1966

The Observer of South ^Vietnam, M. Nguyen-Duy-Lien, saw me today in the morning and informed me that his Government had instructed him to request the Secretary-General to send U.N. observers to South Vietnam before, during and after the elections for the constituent assembly which are planned to take place in September. He made it very clear that his Government's request was for observers and not supervisors. I told him that since it was a very important matter I would like to have the request in writing. He told me that he would send the request in writing this afternoon. At 4:45 p.m. I received the request in writing. After consultations with Stavropoulos, Ralph and Jose I decided on the following line of action: l) I will have informal consultations with the President of the Security Council and request him to consult the members of the Security Council informally. 2) Since the question of Vietnam is before the Security Council the Council is the proper organ for dealing with such matters. 3) On receipt of a report from the President of the Security Council on the result of his consultations I will reply to the Government of South Vietnam accordingly. I requested the President of the Security Council to see me at 6 p.m. He came and I explained to him the circumstances and my line of thinking. He agreed with me - 2 - and undertook to have informal consultations with the members of the Security Council and report to me accordingly. I informed him that both the United States and the United Kingdom have come out with an endorsement of this request and the Soviet Union and France will oppose any action by the United Nations. Confidential c Tuesday, 31 May 1966

Amb. Goldberg saw me today and brought up the following matters: 1) Indo-Pakistan conflict: He told me that his Government was very much concerned at the deteriorating situation between India and Pakistan and asked me if I could suggest a summit conference of the two Governments in order to ease tensions. I told him that to my knowledge India was also for a summit meeting but Pakistan always wanted the presence of a third party in any Indo-Pakistan summit meeting. He told me that his information was the other way around. I told him that I would make such a suggestion to the Secretary of State for External Affairs of India, Mr. Singh, who was coming to see me the same day. After Amb. Goldberg left Mr. Singh eame to see me and I suggested to him the desirability of an Indo-Pakistan summit meeting as early as possible to ease tensions. He took the suggestion very well and promised to bring it up with the Prime Minister on his return to India. 2) South Africa Amb. Goldberg told me that the Government of South Africa had madeoattempts to buy Cessna planes from Cessna Corporation in the United States but on the basis of the United Nations resolutions his Government refused to give a permit for the export of these planes to South Africa. Therefore vSouth Africa attempted to buy similar planes from the U.K. and Italy. The United States Government intervened and the transaction did not take place. Now he understands that the Government of South Africa is negotiating with France for the supply of similar planes and Italy for the supply of some spare parts for jet planes. He wonders if I could make some demarche to the representatives of France and Italy to hinder any such transactions on the basis of the United Nations resolutions. I promised to do what I can in the context of the resolutions. 3) South African Education Fund Amb. Goldberg told me that he had a request from the Secretariat for financial contributions toivards the newly established South African Education Fund. He had looked into the question and discovered that the United States had contributed a sum for the pilot project connected with the South African Education Fund but so far he had not received any report on the progress of that pilot project. In the absence of such a report it will be very difficult for his Government to come forth with new contributions. I promised to look into the matter. PERSQML AHP CCWIDEaBITIAL 28 June 1966 c(/<0

Bear Ma*. President, I was very pleased to receive the message that you sent to me through our common friend, the journalist and author, who met you In December 19^5 • He saw me here in January 1966 and conveyed to me your kind sentiments and good wishes, for which I am very grateful. Tour message recalled to me many happy memories of my visit to Hanoi in October 195^ along with Premier U Mi. As you may be aware, I have been engaged for some considerable time in personal' efforts to contribute towards a peaceful and just settlement of the tragic conflict in Viet-Ham, in conformity with the Geneva agreements of 195^• I shall be in Moscow towards the end of July, to be precise between 25 and 28 July. Seealling past contacts, of which you are aware, I feel it would be very useful if I could have a very private and confidential exchange of views with your Ambassador in Moscow. I shall be very glad If he can be authorised to have such an exchange of views with me, Permit me, Mr. Bresldent, to renew the assurances of my highest consideration. Yours sincerely^

.U Thant

Hie Ejccellency Ho Chi Mlnh ^resident of the Democratic Republic of ?iet-Harn Hanoi AHP . JPMTOEPJIAL 28 &me 1966

Bear Mp. 1 was wry pleased to receive the BESS sage that you seat to me throu^i our comifloa friend., the journalist aad author, who met you in Beeeraber 19^5. He saw me Here in January 19&5 and conveyed to me your kiad sentiments aad good wishes, for trhich 1 am vezy grateful. Your message recalled to me aaoy happy memories of my visit to Hanoi irtfitatofee y 195^ along witJa Premier -U Su,

As you 'cmy be awares I have been engaged for SOEIQ considerable time in personal efforts to contribute towards a peaceful and just settlement of the tragic conflict in Viet- Ham, in conformity with the GeiiervB. agreements of 195^, I sliali "be is Moscow towards the eM of July, to be precise betweea S5 awd 28 .July,. He calling; past contact % of which you are aware^ I feel it would 'fee very useful if I could have a very private aad confidential' exchange of views t-rith your .tobassactor in Itoscow. I shall be veyy glad if he can be authorized to have such an, exchange of vii@w^. mth. me.

Permit rie5 KEr, f^esident, to renew the assurances of my highest

Yours sincerely,

His Excellency Ho Chi Mtnh Ere&icteat of the Deiaocratic Bepublic 0f V&et-Sasa Bartoi 28 Jain 1966

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GM S ?tsMl SB Hiet SECRET

22 July 1966

THE QUESTION OF VIET-NAM

Ambassador Seydoux saw me today and told me that he met M. Sainteney who just returned from Peking and Hanoi, in Paris on the evening of 20 July, just before he (Seydoux) returned to New York. The following are the highlights of Sainteney's statement to Seydoux: 1. He first visited Peking where he had lived for 35 years as a businessman. He knew almost all the Chinese leaders, but there was no indication on their part to receive him while he was in Peking. So he did not make any attempt to see them. 2. The situation was completely different when he arrived in Hanoi. Ho Chi Manh whom he knows very well and other Vietnamese leaders received him very warmly and freely and frankly revealed to him their approach to the problem of Viet-Nam and their feelings. 3. Because of United States bombings in the daytime, all shops in Hanoi were opened very early in the morning and closed at 7 a.m., and they were again opened at 8 p.m. for a few hours. In spite of heavy bombings the people in Hanoi seemed to be carefree and he saw young couples gaily dressed loitering in the parks and near the lake almost every evening. He saw young girls drilling at 3 o'clock in the morning. He observed excellent morale among the Vietnamese people and the leaders he talked to seemed to be determined to fight to the last and they made light of United States arms and the fighting ability of the United States soldiers. His last visit to Hanoi was in 1957 when he saw the people drab and far from gay. He noticed a big difference now when the people were much better dressed and even gay in spite of the war. k- When the latest bombings took place in the vicinity of Hanoi, he was in the city. According to his information, civilian casualty was slight and the destruction was mostly on oil tanks, bridges and railways. Even the leaders refused to reveal the size of the damage or casualties. According to him the damage seemed to be extensive as the bombing was accurate and he had no doubt that the Americans were very careful not to hit civilian centres. - 2 -

5« Hanoi leaders told him that they were receiving massive military aid from the USSR and Czechoslovakia and very little military aid from China, which helped in the way of logistics and transportation of those arms and even foodstuffs across China. He was surprised to know that the North Vietnamese leaders stressed the fact that they were receiving less military aid from China than the outside world "believed. 6. According to Sainteney if only the Americans were to bomb the dikes and embankments on the Red River during the floods, it could be disastrous for the civilian population, as such bombings would cause a terrible disaster for millions of people. 7« He noticed in Hanoi intense hatred of the Americans and he had no doubt that the people were determined to fight to the last. Hanoi propaganda was also extremely effective and the leaders of the Communist Party were very able in disseminating war reports to the people. 8. SAMS and conventional anti-aircraft guns were exclusively manned by the Vietnamese who were far from efficient. It seemed that they were not properly trained to handle these weapons. The Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi told him that he was very disappointed with the manner in which the Vietnamese were operating those guns. According to him some missiles fell on populated areas without hitting the planes. He saw no evidence of the Chinese manning these guns. 9. According to information gathered in Hanoi, so .far 1,1*00 United States planes and helicopters were shot down over North Viet-Nam and between 200 and 300 United States combatants were captured. These figures were much higher than those admitted by the United States. 10. Regarding the Americans captured, Sainteney did not think that they would be executed, although they might be tried to rally public opinion behind the Government. 11. Every night he saw hundred of trucks passing through the streets of Hanoi and he was told that supplies to North Viet-Nam came via China and transported by sea and that a small proportion of the supplies were flown to Hanoi from China at night. The volume of traffic was much heavier by sea transport. 12. His impression was that China had succeeded in getting the United States trapped in Viet-Nam. The Chinese were in fact the winners and this was the opinion of at least one leader in Hanoi. - 5 -

13. According to Hanoi leaders, the fighting quality of G.I.'s was very poor and there was general feeling in Hanoi that the Vietnamese were the best guerrillas in the world and they seemed to be convinced that they were sure to win with the massive support of other Communist countries, particularly Russia and Czechoslovakia. lk. He was also informed that massive Chinese forces were gathered inside China near the Worth Vietnamese frontier, and he felt that China's participation and involvement at some stage could not be excluded. 15. The Russian Ambassador in Hanoi who was there for 15 years was very pessimistic about the trend of war. He (Ambassador) thought that the war might develop into a major war in East Asia and could even lead to World War III. That was also the feeling of some Ambassadors in Hanoi to whom he talked. Those Ambassadors who were not from Communist countries believed that even after the war, Viet-Wam would be in such a poor state that it would be ripe for China's complete control. 16. Sainteney was convinced that negotiations at present were out of question. One primary condition mentioned by Hanoi leaders was that the United States must make a formal commitment before such a conference that they did not intend to remain in South Viet-Nam after agreements are reached. Hanoi leaders were convinced that the Americans mean to stay in South Viet-Nam for a long time. IT* If any agreement is reached, Hanoi seems to be willing to agree to give some kind of autonomy to South Viet-Ham for some years before steps are taken for reunification. This interim period was mentioned at 4 or 5 years. From Hanoi, Sainteney visited Vientiene and Phnom Penh. He got the impression that Laos was completely controlled by the United States while Cambodia was trying to steer a neutral course, although Cambodian sympathies were with Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. Seydoux told me that Sainteney went to Peking and Hanoi not at the instigation of General de Gaulle as it was generally believed. He decided to go on his own and as he was a friend of General de Gaulle, he got from the General a letter to Ho Chi Minh. It was not true that he was sent by General de Gaulle with some proposals. Although he was a Gaullist, he has definite pro-American sentiments and he was critical of General de Gaulle in his attitude towards the Americans. Therefore, Sainteney feels that the present United States actions in Viet-Nam will inevitably push Hanoi closer into the hands of Peking. Sainteney still believes that Hanoi is much closer to Moscow than to Peking. SECRET

Note by Simon Malley on his meeting with Tran Hoai Nam, representative of the National Liberation Front in, Algiers, Algeria, on 28 July 1966

1. The possibility of Chinese intervention would have consequences. Until now it is us who have declined it for many reasons: a) more sufferings, destruction b) more Chinese influence in the long run c) greater possibilities of agreements without us, like in 1954. Peking has informed Ho and the NLF that they are ready to intervene - at the slightest appeal. They propose 2.000.000. At the moment, the Chinese are preparing roads, communications, logistics, food stocks, petrol, etc. But the time will come when pressure of events will force the NLF and Hanoi to request intervention. However, we would prefer it to be limited to Peking if possible. 2. He remains convinced that external and internal pressure on the USA will force it to revise its policy, although he is aware that the situation in the USA is different from that in France during the war in Indochina and in Algeria. 3. We do not want countries to intervene or men as mediators. But they can help us by upholding our theses - or part of our theses. To speak of negotiations this is to play the Americans hand, because the word "negotiate", according to the USA, has an implication which means negotiate unconditionally, negotiate under pressure of US troops, bombings, etc. We are well aware that sooner or later it will be necessary to "work out" an agreement on the respect and application of the Geneva agreements, but we feel that the time has not yet come, ^'o help us it is always necessary to refer to these agreements, apply them (as they provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops) BUT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED/ 4t China denounces these agreements, not as a unilateral policy, but as a result of USA policy. However, we consider these agreements as valid and legitimate and what the Chinese say does not mean a new policy for them but it is as a result of a situation created by the USA. 5. Neither Hanoi nor Peking will decide for us. Certainly, Ho Chi Minh is "our supreme leader", a man venerated by us and we admire him, but no one will speak in our name. If they want a settlement it is through us that they will have to go through. - 2 -

6. When U Thant speaks of negotiations, we are not happy. As a Burmese statesman U Thant was the object of all our admiration and of our confidence. We understand that he has a very difficult and delicate task and that he must use discretion, but he will help us further if he continues to speak about the problem within its real context - i.e. repeatedly request a return to the Geneva Agreements, their respect, their application, etc. and for him to stop mentioning negotiations. 7. At home U Thant has our deepest respect and we have always refrained from attacking him. But he is wrongly advised. He has many Indians surrounding him. Even the French have told us that. For example the position taken by Mrs. Gandhi who is playing the hand of the Americans. 8. The statements that U Thant makes often against the war, against bombings are very useful and we are deeply grateful to him - but to help us further it is necessary that these statements be made more emphatically because if as a result of his attitude U Thant is "boycotted" or strongly "opposed" by the USA, it would be better for the world to know that he has been the victim of USA machinations. We understand fully if he is compelled to resign as a result of american policy. What would be historical would be that he made it known to the world. This does not mean that we want him to leave his post, as we have nothing to do with the UN ... but it is of the man who shares our sufferings of whom I am talking about. Notes of meeting held on Tuesday 2 August 1966 in the Secretary-General's Conference Room at 10 a.m.

Present; The Secretary-General, George Ball, Under-Secretary of State; Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs; Richard Pedersen, Ambassador, United States Mission to the United Nations; and Ralph J. Buache, Under-Secretary

Mr. Ball opened the discussion by asking the Secretary-General if he had any information on his recent trip to Moscow, particularly bearing on Southeast Asia. The Secretary-General said that Mr. Breshnev had taken a much stronger and much more bitter position than Mr. Kosygin, but both Mr. Breshnev and Mr. Kosygin were strongly critical of the US intervention. Mr. Breshnev informed the Secretary-General that he had not intended to return to Moscow until Sunday in order to be present for the meeting of the Supreme Soviet but had decided to return on Friday in order to see the Secretary-General. Mr. Breshnev informed the Secretary-General that there were,thousands of volunteers ready to go to Vietnam as soon as they would be called for by Hanoi. U Thant stated that both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Breshnev had refused to discuss the question of relations with China, saying that this would be coming up in the Supreme Soviet. Mr. Kosygin gave U Thant the impression that he is tired and U Thant felt that he was ready to leave his office. Kosygin made it clear that he attached much importance to the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Mr. Kosygin started off his discussion with U Thant by expressing his wish that U Thant would stay on and make himself available for re-election, stating that U Thant is dedicated to peace and has roaohod experience in the work of peace and international affairs. He went on to convey the wish that U Thant should plan to return to Moscow next year in his present capacity. Then Mr. Kosygin turned to the question of Vietnam. At this point the Secretary-General repeated that it was Mr. Breshnev who had stated that there were/ thousands of Soviet volunteers ready to go to Vietnam on a moment* s notice. Mr. Kosygin then raised the question of Soviet under-representation in the Secretariat. In reply, U Thant pointed out that there had been 32 new Soviet nationals taken into the Secretariat but that almost simultaneously the Soviet Government had withdrawn the same number, that is 32. Mr. Kosygin went on to say that this policy had now been changed and that it was the intention of the Soviet Government to permit Soviet r* tl+ nationals to remain in the Secretariat for five. years. Mr. Kosygin also complained that the Secretary-General did not.consult the Soviet Under-Secretary on political matters. U Thant explained that he did often consult the Soviet Under-Secretary but could not consult him on all political questions for manifest reasons. Mr. Kosygin went on to point out that the Soviet Union still had only one Under-Secretary in the United Nations as against five Americans having positions as Under-Secretary or equivalent rank, namely, Bunche, Vaughan, Hoffman, Labouisse and Michelmore. The Secretary-General explained why the positions held by Vaughan and Labouisse particularly had to be occupied by Americans. Mr. Kosygin raised the question of Indonesia's intentions with regard to a return to the United Nations and asked the Secretary-General if he had had any indication as to what they might do. The Secretary-General said that there had been no formal indications of any kind but there had been some informal indications which somewhat encouraged the hope that Indonesia would return and possibly even in tha couroXr-^*~eo "of th.e forthcoming session of the General Assembly. U Thant said that Breshnev had repeated Kosygin 's views on U Thant agreeing to stay on as Secretary-General. On Vietnam, Mr. Breshnev indicated that it was his view that President Johnson was "getting wrong advice on Vietnam". Both Breshnev and Kosygin were convinced that the United States wishes to "garrison" South Vietnam with United States troops for a long time to come. The -3- objective of this would be to support a strong anti-communist Government in South Vietnam like the present Ky Government. Both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Breshnev stated firmly that the Soviet Union would take no initiative on any peace move in the Vietnam conflict, emphasizing that this initiative can come only from those who are engaged in the fighting. On this, U Thant expressed his personal view to Mr. Ball that the Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union on Vietnam and the fear of further such criticism is one obvious reason for the Soviet attitude against taking any initiative. The Secretary -General said that both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Breshnev on every occasion when the question was raised would say that the question of Soviet relations with China would be taken up in the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Soviet. They clearly had no intention of discussing this question with the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General said that Mr. Kouznetsov sat in on his talks with both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Breshnev. U Thant reiterated that both Kosygin and Breshnev, and Hanoi as well, are firmly convinced that the United States intends to stay on in Vietnam in support of Ky or someone like him. Mr. Ball asked what was the basis of U Thant *s statement at the airport with regard to the danger of the war escalating outside of South Vietnam and becoming a major war. U Thant replied that first of all this was because of the tone and the clear determination of both Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Breshnev with regard to giving all possible assistance to Hanoi to the extent that Hanoi wished it. To put it in American terms, said the Secretary-General, their policy on Vietnam would be the policy of the "hawks", u*fcU* 'V~. K*-*<~

Mr. Ball explained that the United States has very expensive and elaborate installations in Vietnam, but is willing to abandon them in Vietnam as it has done elsewhere although, obviously, this cannot be done overnight and would have to be carried out in stages. Mr. Ball went on to say that the US wishes only free elections in Vietnam and will abide by the decision of such elections. Mr. Ball said further that the United States would welcome any suggestions of how to improve the credibility of what the United States is saying about Vietnam. U Thant pointed to the differences between the positions of Pelting and Hanoi on the conditions for ending the fighting in Vietnam. Peking, he noted, insists on an immediate United States withdrawal, whereas Hanoi asks only assurance of United States withdrawal once agreement has been reached, together, of course, with an end to the bombing. In this regard U Thant pointed out that the distinction that must be made is between cessation of bombing and a pause in bombing. The cessation, he said, must be complete and indefinite. U Thant stated that he does not think that Hanoi insists on the position that the Vietcong must have the exclusive right to represent South Vietnam. Mr. Ball pointed out that the United States has said that the Vietcong must be represented. Mr. Ball then went on to say that the United States concern is that the United States should not be called upon to stop irrevocably the bombing with no assurance that anything would then happen that is happen if the bombing were to be stopped. He stressed what the effect of any such unconditional cessation would have on the American public opinion and the American people. Mr. Ball said further that President Johnson has sought to give the "other side" every opportunity to do something which would then permit him (the President) to bring the bombing to an end. Mr. Ball said that frankly the United States does not know what to do next. Mr. Ball said most firmly that the United States definitely does not wish to stay in Vietnam but rather wishes to get out of there at the earliest possible time following free elections in the country. With regard to the bombing, U Thant said that during the pause IB told Ambassador Goldberg of information he had that during the pause -5- North Vietnam had actually withdrawn some troops. Mr. Ball said that this was directly contrary to the information which the United States had. Mr. Ball then stated that "if there is a wish in Hanoi to bring the war to a peaceful conclusion we are willing to go all the way on a reciprocal basis, to give assurances about our withdrawal, which, of course, would have to be on a 'phased1 basis." But, Mr. Ball went on to say, our own observation is that the position of Hanoi is hardening. U Thant said that he had told Ambassador Goldberg of Ho Chi Minh's reference to the Yemen conflict in a talk he had had with a pressman. Yemen, he said, appealed to President Nasser to help his government against the attacks of the Royalists aided by Saudi Arabia. If, then, Nasser's aircraft were to bomb Saudi Arabia, which is helping the Royalist rebels, would the United States applaud such action? U Thant referred to General De Gaulle*s proposal for a non-aligned Vietnam. General De Gaulle, said U Thant, did not answer the question when U Thant asked whether Hanoi would accept a non-aligned arrangement. U Thant stated the belief that Ho Chi Minh probably would accept a non- aligned formula. U Thant referred to his visit to Washington in the late summer of |l 196jf,and recalled his emphasis there on the need for a "dialogue" on the subject of Vietnam. U Thant expressed the belief that Ho Chi Minh still wishes to be very independent of Peking and that he also wishes to be non--aligned. U Thant then related that in August 1964 he had asked Mr. Suslov, then the Soviet Under-Secretary in the Secretariat, to convey to Ho Chi Minh a personal message from the Secretary-General suggesting that he send someone somewhere to talk to the Americans about a -6- settlement of the Vietnam conflict. U Thant said that Ho Chi Minn replied that he would be happy to do so. In October, Adlai Stevenson informed U Thant that the President being in the midst of the election campaign had not been able to give the necessary attention to U Thant's suggestion. U Thant went on to say that on 16 January 1965* Ambassador Stevenson asked U Thant to suggest a place for such a meeting. On that same day, U Thant sent a cable to General Ne Win, suggesting Rangoon as a possible place for the meeting and that Ne Win offer Burma's hospitality Mint* i^i.-—» 1» &u »fh. i f»,. for it., U Thant informed Ambassador Stevenson of this and he agreed to it. U Thant advised Ambassador Stevenson of his opinion that Ambassador Henry Byroade, the US Ambassador to Burma, of whom U Thant had a very high opinion, would be a good United States representative in the suggested talks with the North Vietnamese. U Thant, through Suslov, then informed Hanoi that he had / *. / >J.«*->"--| sent a cable to He Win on lo January. U Thant was informed/that Ne Win agreed to the suggestion that Burma be host to such talks and Adlai was informed and also Ambassador Fedorenko. On 30 January, Ambassador Stevenson informed U Thant that the Govern- ment at Saigon was very insecure at the time and if there should be a leak about the suggested Rangoon talks the people of South Vietnam would be demoralized and the Government itself might fall. U Thant stated that he did not ask Ambassador Stevenson about the original source of this reply. U Thant informed Hanoi and the USSR of the American position. U Thant said that the situation then was like a "Greek tragedy". U Thant said that Peking had not known about the suggestion of talks between representatives of Hanoi and the United States and when they did get wind of it they immediately blamed the USSR and only criticized U Thant later (in February). The Secretary-General described this as a "lost opportunity". U Thant further said that in Washington, D.C., last June 14 at the time of the White House reception for the UN, Secretary of State -7- Rusk had told him that Ambassador Stevenson had not "been authorized to reject his suggestion of talks between the representatives of the US and North Vietnam. Rusk also informed U Thart that the United States had its own contacts with Hanoi and that North Vietnam had shown no interest in talking with the United States. Washington's contact apparently was the Canadian representative in Hanoi. U Thant had asked Foreign Minister Paul Martin and Prime Minister Lester Pearson of Canada about this and they both informed him that they had no knowledge of their representative, Mr. Seaborn, having had any contact with the Prime Minister of Horth Vietnam or with any other highly responsible official in that Government. U Thant went on to say that his last attempt to contact Hanoi had been in August of last year. U Thant said that the representative of Peking had refused to accept the Secretary-General's communication

R. J.B. \J t^^V*—C^rv- SECRET

THE QUESTION OF VIET-NAM

19 December 1966

Ambassador Goldberg saw me today at 10.30 a.m. and gave me a letter on the question of Viet-Ham vhich he said had been approved by President Johnson himself. He told me that he attended a meeting at the White House on Saturday (l? December) attended among others by Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ambassador Cabot Lodge. He recommended the continued cessation of hostilities beyond the holiday truces as proposed by Pope Paul and the Secretary-General, but his proposal was not acceptable to the President. Instead, the President had authorised him to give the letter which, he said, in effect gave me a free hand to make any suitable proposals. I read the letter in his presence and told him that I would give very close attention to it and I also told him that I did not anticipate favourable response from the other side so long as the bombing of North Viet-Nam was going on. He said that the letter would be released to the press at 12.30 p.m. today by Frank Carpenter. He also told me to make the necessary contacts to transmit this to the parties concerned. I told him that I would do all I could to bring about the easing of tensions and cessation of hostilities, but I expressed to him my guess that the National Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam would come out with a rejection of the Wnited States offer as it was addressed only to Hanoi. Goldberg told me he would leave everything to me and that I should suggest to him a future line of action. He also observed that it could be useful if Ambassador Cabot Lodge were to come to New York and see me and exchange views with me on Viet-Nam. He wanted my reaction. I told him that such a meeting could be useful.

I sent for Ambassador Fedorenko at 11.30 a.m. and told him the text of the Wnited States letter to me and asked him for comment. He said that his Government's views on Viet-Nam were well known and that he did not want to repeat them. He also told me that he had instructions not to discuss Viet-Sam with the Wnited States Representative at the Wnited Nations. He asked me if I had any steps in mind to take. I told him that I proposed to transmit the Wnited States letter to the other parties through Algeria - 2 - Viet-Ham - 19 December 19&6 Secret and that I had asked Ambassador louattoura to see me. I asked him if he would like to take a copy of this letter. He declined to take it. Fedorenko asked me if it vas true that recently the United States had direct contact with Hanoi. I told him that I had no knowledge of it.

I sent for Ambassador louattoura of Algeria at 32.13 p.m., and 1 explained to him as I did to Fedorenko. His first reaction was that either Hanoi or the National Liberation Front would not respond favourably to the ¥nited States offer while bombings are still going on and Vnited States reinforcements are being sent to Viet-Nam. In any case, he would transmit the message to Algiers immediately and request his Government to pass it on to the representatives of Hanoi and of the National Liberation Front for reaction. He assured me that he would transmit the reply to me as soon as it was received.

21 December 1966 At the Bulgarian luncheon today, I asked louattoura whether he had received any reply from Algeria. He told me that he had not. In his opinion, the earliest date for the receipt of the reply would be the coming weekend. He also told me that he was planning a vacation in Jamaica with effect from next Tuesday. I asked him to come and see me at 11 a.m. on Monday whether he received the reply or not, since I had a few things to discuss with him.

At the same luncheon, Ambassador Csatorday of Hungary told me that from what his Foreign Minister could gather from the Hanoi representative in ludapest, Hanoi would not respond positively to the latest ¥nited States offer. He asked me if I had relayed the message to Hanoi. I told him that I had requested the good offices of a friendly Government to transmit the same. - 5 -

Yiet-Mam Secret

22 December 1966

Ambassador Seydoux asked me at his luncheon today about my assessment of the latest 9nited States request. I told him that I was not optimistic and that I expected a reply early next week. He asked me if I proposed to reply to Ambassador Goldberg. I told him that since Goldberg's letter to me was official and public, my present intention is to reply to him in writing and make it official and public in the same manner as his letter has been treated. He asked me when I proposed to reply to him. I told him that I had not decided on the timing but that my present thinking is that it should be some time next week before the second bombing pause.

Ambassador El Kony of the tfnited Arab Republic saw me today and told me that his Government was very much interested in the latest Wnited States request to me and wanted to know the background of this. I explained to him thjrt circumstances and the action so far taken through the good offices of the Algerian Bepresentative. He told me that Hanoi had a high-powered representative in Cairo and perhaps his Government would like to seek the views of that representative. I asked him to please transmit to me any information he might get from Cairo. He promised to do so. He expressed disappointment at President Pazhwak's references to Viet-Nam in his concluding statement on 20 December. He asked me if Ambassador Fazhwak discussed with me before he made that statement. I told him that there was no discussion. SECRET

THE QUESTION OF VIET-NAM

2g December 1966

Ambassador Ignatieff of Canada saw me today and told me that the Foreign Minister of India, Mr. Chagla, informed the diplomatic representatives of Canada and Poland in New Delhi on 17 December that the Government of India was thinking of organizing a secret meeting of the International Control Commission (ICC) in New Delhi to discuss ways and means of contributing to the settlement of the Viet-Nam question. The Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi conveyed the message to Ottawa, and Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, sent a message to Foreign Minister Chagla on 20 December responding favourably to his proposal. Ambassador Ignatieff left a copy of that reply message with me. He also left with me a document entitled "Proposals for a Commission initiative: Points for discussion". He requested that both documents should be treated as secret. He also informed me that the reaction of the Polish Government to the Indian proposal was negative. According to the Polish Government, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had been requested by the United States Government to take fresh initiatives and that the Secretary- General had "occupied the stage", so the Polish Government was not inclined to reactivate the International Control Commission, at least at this moment. He requested me if I could inform the Polish Representative here that the Indian proposal would not run counter to my efforts and that it would rather be complementary. I told him that I would rather first check with the Indian Permanent Representative here before taking any further action. He told me that the Indian Government's contacts with the Canadian Government on this question were mainly through the Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi and the Indian High Commissioner in Ottawa (Genera, l Chawdry)Ct—iU-v., although the Indian Permanent Representative in New York was aware of these exchanges. He agreed with me that it would be in order if I first sounded out the Indian Representative's views before further action is taken. - 2 - Viet-Ham - 22 December 1966 Secret

I asked C.V. to sound out the Indian Representative's assessment privately, and C.V. reported to me on 23 December that the Indian Representative in New York had been apprised of the developments by his Government and he opined that it would be in order for me to send for the Representative of Poland and express to him my opinion that the Indian Government's proposal would not run counter to my proposed efforts. The Indian Representative, however, did not recommend that the two actions would be complementary. He would prefer to describe them as parallel.

23 December 1966

Before I sent for the Polish Representative, I got his request for an interview. He came to see me on 23 December and explained to me that he had received instructions from his Government regarding the Indian Government's request for the reactivation of the International Control Commission in private meeting of the three members in New Delhi. He also told me that the Canadian Government had responded favourably to the Indian initiative, but the Polish Government was not agreeable to it, since, in its view, nothing positive could be achieved by such an action. The Polish Government had in the past several instances of breakdowns of negotiations between the ¥nited States and North Viet-Nam in spite of initial favourable reactions from Washington. The Polish Government considers that no new step would be advisable so long as the ¥nited States was bombing North Viet-Nam. Any meeting of the International Control Commission in New DelM could not be kept secret, and if it were to leak, it would create very serious problems, particularly with regard to Polish-North Vietnamese relations. He then showed me a long memorandum prepared by the Polish Government. He asked me to read it, but he said that he had instructions not to leave it with me. I read it very carefully and found it most interesting. I asked him if I could take notes of the memorandum. He said that he had no objection. I took notes of the memorandum and the following are the main points: - 5 - Viet-Nam - 23 December 1966 Secret

In the middle of November 1966, the United States Ambassador in Saigon arranged a private meeting with the Polish Ambassador on the International Control Commission (Ambassador Levandovski) (who is not the former United Nations Representative) at the residence of the Italian Ambassador in Saigon. The meeting took place on l4 November and Ambassador Cabot Lodge raised the following points: (a) Washington was ready to de-escalate all military activities in Viet-Nam and was prepared to give assurances about the withdrawal of ¥nited States troops from Viet-Kara. Be wanted a package deal with the other side. He would be prepared to consider any proposal from Hanoi or the National Liberation Front. (b) The United States was aware that many governments and individuals had been suggesting the end of United States bombing before such talks could take place and that the cessation of bombing should not be linked with any other conditions. He told the Polish Ambassador in the presence of the Italian Ambassador that the ¥nited States was willing to stop bombing if it was certain that such cessation could definitely lead to some steps towards negotiations. The United States would not announce that the cessation of bombing was a manifestation of a ffaited States victory, since such an announcement would embarrass Hanoi. Ambassador Lodge stated that there should be two phases, the first phase being the stoppage of bombing of North Viet-Nam and the second phase would be, after a certain period, all subsequent matters to be dealt with. By all subsequent matters he emphasized that it involves all proposals by Hanoi, the National Liberation Front and the Wnited States. A second meeting took place again in the residence of the Italian Ambassador on 13 November, and Ambassador Lodge introduced some additional elements. He said that the Wnited States would agree to accept the principle of neutrality for South Viet-Nam after the withdrawal of Wnited States troops and liquidation of military bases. He also said that the United States would not ask for a declaration on the part of Hanoi to withdraw the regular troops from North Viet-Nam from the South. He agreed that the reunification of lorth and South Viet-Nam must be decided by the two parts at a subsequent date. In reply to a query by . 1* -

Viet-Ham - 25 December 1966 Secret the Polish representative, Lodge said that his statements were in accordance with the views of Washington. Lewandowski immediately left for Hanoi and returned to Saigon after contacts with the authorities in Hanoi. The next meeting took place on 1 December and Lewandowski told Lodge that Hanoi would like to get the direct confirmation of Lodge's points at a private meeting between a representative of Hanoi and a representative of Washington in Warsaw. If these points could be confirmed in direct talks by the United States representative, Hanoi saw the end of hostilities in Viet-Wam. Hanoi's only condition was that the meeting in Warsaw must be strictly secret, and if any publicity was given to it, Hanoi would immediately deny the same. Hanoi confirmed to Lewandowski that the stoppage of United States bombing was the indispensable miTiitmiin for peace talks. Lodge reacted favourably to both points. He said that he would advise Washington to designate a Waited States representative for direct talks in Warsaw and he assured Lewandowski that there would be no publicity about such talks. He said that he would immediately contact the President in Washington. On 5 December another meeting took place in the residence of the Italian Ambassador (Orlando). Lodge informed Lewandowski that the United States Ambassador in Warsaw (Sronouski) had been instructed by President Johnson to get in touch with the representative of Hanoi on 6 December and that Ambassador Gronouski would confirm the 1 December agreement to the representative of Hanoi. Lodge assured Lewandowski that no big name would be sent to Warsaw as it would create speculations, and he added that there was likely to be some difference of interpretation regarding the 1 December agreement. Lewandowski asked Lodge why the United States intensified the bombing of Worth Viet-Ham since 2 December after initial agreement had been reached between the United States and Poland. Lodge did not reply. Between 5 and 14 December, Foreign Minister Rapacki of Poland had several meetings with the United States Ambassador in Warsaw. Foreign Minister Rapacki asked him why Ambassador Lodge had brought in a new element of the possibility of "difference of interpretation" on the - 5 -

Viet-Nam - 25 December 1966 Secret agreement, and he also asked him why the United States bombing vas intensified after the 1 December agreement. The Foreign Minister expressed amazement and distress at the bombing of Hanoi itself. The ¥nited States Ambassador said that he would explain at the proposed meeting and he put the reason of the Hanoi bombing as "weather conditions". The Foreign Minister told the United States Ambassador that in his view for the United States military actions were more important than political actions and he reminded him that Hanoi would not yield to military pressure and that it was a unique opportunity and that the United States should seize it. While the secret meeting was being arranged in Warsaw, the United States escalated the bombing of North Viet-Nam including Hanoi on 13 December and on 1^ December. On 14 December Hanoi sent a message to Warsaw to terminate all projected talks. On the same day the Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Gronouski of Hanoi's message and he added that the full responsibility now rested with the United States. Rapacki also told Gronouski that from now on it would be very difficult to believe the words of the United States. On 19 December the United States Ambassador tried to justify the bombing of Hanoi and shifted the responsibility on others, particularly the authorities in Hanoi for having military targets in civilian areas. He reiterated the United States readiness to contact Hanoi again directly. The Foreign Minister expressed doubts about the possibility of future contacts. The United States Ambassador said that the holiday truce could facilitate such talks, but he did not say anything about the possibility of extending the truce to a longer period as proposed by the Pope and endorsed by the Secretary-Seneral of the United Nations. SECRET C .j

22 August 1966 Notes on a meeting between Secretary of State Dean Rusk (accompanied by Arab. James Nabrit) and the Secretary-General. Dean Rusk first brought up the question of the Thailand-Cambodia frontier. To his knowledge Thailand would accept the existing boundaries without any reference to French claims on Thai territory during the French occupation of Cambodia. Thailand would not accept the boundaries demarcated by the French but it would be agreeable to accept the de facto position. He also stressed that Thailand has no territorial claim in Cambodia and that it is prepared to recognize the independence and territorial integrity of Cambodia. I replied that to my knowledge in the course of the last three years Thailand had never mentioned to me the difference between the French demarcated boundaries and the existing boundaries. If my understanding is correct Thailand does not believe in Prince Sihanouk's statement and positions which in the view of Thailand are mercurial. Dean Rusk asked me to look into it since Ambassador de Ribbing is going to the area very soon. 3J,-' Dean Rusk then told me< rthe border problems between Cambodia and South Vietnam. >f He did not think that they were serious and even the claims on the disputed islands could be settled amicably if there is goodwill on both sides. He said that his Government supported Prince Sihanouk's proposal that the ICC should be augmented and patrol the frontier. He regretted that besides Canada the two other members would not go along with this proposal. His Government has definite information &hat at least on one or two occasions the vietcongs had used Cambodian territory but he was convinced that Sihanouk had no knowledge of these events. His Government regretted the bombing of a border village inhabited by Cambodians but shown on the maps as inside South Vietnam. A mapping team is going into the area and he personally felt that the bombing of that particular village was not necessary for military purposes. The United States is prepared to respect the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia and the United States is sincerely willing to improve relations with Cambodia and he asked me to do all I can to bring about better relations between the United States and Cambodia. I told him that Prince Sihanouk's policies are not properly understood in many countries. I am convinced that he wants to maintain the strictest neutrality in foreign affairs and he sincerely wants the existing frontiers - 2 - both with ICamfeodiS and South Vietnam to be respected. I told him that to the best of my knowledge he has not been giving any assistance to vietcongs. Dean Rusk repeated his request that I should do all I could to improve United States-Cambodian relations. Dean Rusk also said that he was also convinced of Sihanouk's non-involvement with vietcong activities in South Vietnam but he believes that his own forces have no control at the frontier. Dean Rusk then brought up the question of Sihanouk's old proposal to convene the Geneva conference to discuss Laos and he regretted that the two co-chairmen had not positively responded to his proposal. He said that the British were willing to go along with the proposal but Moscow was negative on it although there was nothing categorical by Moscow. He asked me if this matter came up during my discussions in Moscow. I told him that it did not. He then reverted to Cambodian-South Vietnamese relations and remarked that the local officials on both sides of the frontier were having normal relations in their day to day duties and said that it was an encouraging part of the problem. He then said that Prince Sihanouk had been asking for ransom from the United States for damages to property and loss of lives caused by United States military operations. He said that Sihanouk had asked for one tractor for one Cambodian killed but the United States cannot comply with such a proposal. He stressed the fact that the United States aid to Cambodia was greater than any aid given to any other country on the basis of population. I asked him whether any time had been set for Harriman's visit to Cambodia. He said that the visit was postponed at the request of Sihanouk. He did not know the real reason why Sihanouk had asked for the postponement. I asked him if his Government had any other alternative machinery in mind besides ICC to patrol the Cambodian-South Vietnamese frontier. He said that no alternative had been thought of but one possibility is the setting up of joint commissions comprising both the Cambodians and South Vietnames to look into the complaints. He said that this proposal was rejected by Cambodia. His Government would welcome any proposal from any quarter involving the setting up of some machinery to perform the task desired by Cambodia. For instance a committee comprising neutral countries would be welcome or the United Nations could think of some machinery. I told him that in Cambodia- South-Vietnamese problems the United Nations should not and cannot be involved. He then said that the United States did not prompt itas Thanat Khoman of Thailand to propose an Asian conference to discuss Vietnam. It was his own original idea. After he had proposed it the United States endorsed it. To his knowledge Hanoi had not rejected it categorically. (After Dean Rusk left the meeting I heard/the radio that Hanoi had categorially rejected the proposal.) Dean Rusk thinks that the projected meeting in September of Tito, Nasser and Mrs. Gandhi in India could lead to some initiatives regarding the solution of the Vietnam problem, but he admitted that Hanoi's initial reaction was not good. He said that he did not understand Hanoi's attitude since the United States had officially stated its acceptance of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. He said he was also baffled by General de Gaulle's attitude. He then mentioned that according to his information there were still fundamental differences between Peking and Hanoi particularly on the following issues: a) treatment to the American prisoners of warj b) Peking wanted to send volunteers and Hanoi was resisting the offer; c) Peking had recently disowned any obligation under the 1954 Geneva agreement but Hanoi reasserted its adherence to these agreements. He also said that problems had arisen among the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam because of ethnic differences. He asked me whether it was true that the Front is leaning closer towards Peking than to Hanoi. I told him that I had no information on which to base my assessment. He then asked me whether I think that General Giap was closer to Peking than to Ho Chi Minh. I told him that despite news to the contrary I believe that General Giap is very loyal to Ho Chi Minh. He asked me whether the present internal struggle in China was leading towards an extreme attitude regarding foreign policy or just a struggle for internal leadecship. I told him that I have no more information apart from newspaper reports but I feel that more extreme elements will come on top. He said that he is still baffled by the developments inside China. On Vietnam he reiterated his previous position that the United States was willing to discuss at any tine without conditions and he did not understand why Hanoi's attitude was consistently negative. I told him that in my view my three points alone could lead to an atmosphere congenial for negotiations. I told him that cessation of bombing of North Vietnam is a prerequisite to induce Hanoi to come to the conference table. He said that the United States had paused bombing of North Vietnam for 37 days without achieving any result. I explained to him the difference between pause and cessation from the point of view of Hanoirthen I reiterated the instances I gave to George Ball at our last meeting (Kashmir and Yemen). He asked me if Hanoi would come to the conference table and withdraw its troops from South Vietnam if the United States stopped bombing of North Vietnam. I told him that I did not know but that it was worth trying. Dean Rusk said that it would be very difficult to explain to the American people why the United States had stopped bombing of North Vietnam. I told him that the United States could respond to the proposal of certain non-aligned countries if the latter were to propose publicly to both sides to stop bombing of North Vietnam and to stop the infiltration of South Vietnam from the North. Then Washington could respond to such an appeal by the cessation of bombing and we should see what/reaction of Hanoi would be. I told him that I am confident that Hanoi would be more positive for discussions. He said that Hanoi has so far showed no signs of de-escalation. It is increasing its infiltration at a very accelerated pace and therefore the United States had to respond in similar terms. I told him that it explains the futility of bombing of North Vietnam, In spite of the escalated air activities of North Vietnam, Nofcth Vietnamese presence in the south had increased. I told him that in my view the United States is faced with two alternatives: to escalate still further by bombing industrial complexes or dams or blockading of the port of Haiphong; 2) to stop bombing altogether. I asked him whether the United States had decided to escalate still further in the North. He said that the United States had destroyed all targets of military value in the North and that it had no intention of doing more destruction not connected with the military activities. He assured me the naval blockade of Haiphong was out of the question. I told him that according to my information Hanoi is convinced that the United States is going to stay in South Vietnam indefinitely, garrisoned with American troops as in f the ca.se of South Korea, and proping up an anti-communist and pro-American dictator like Sygman Rhee or Ky. If the United States could dispel this notion Hanoi would be induced to come to the conference table. He said that President Johnson and he himself had said several times publicly that they would leave South Vietnam as soon as the North Vietnamese withdrew their troops from the South and let the people of South Vietnam decided their own future. I told him that these statements did not seem to convince Hanoi since the United States is spending billions of dollars for the building of massive military installations and naval bases in South Vietnam. I asked him how Hanoi would believe that the Americans would leave South Vietnam if they were spending hundreds of millions of dollars to build only one naval base at Cam Ranh. He said that the United States would be spending .millions in Cam Ranh Bay alone but Hanoi obviously did not understand how much wastage the American! could go through. - 5 -

He said that the United States would leave everjrthing in South Vietnam if the situation is right even though it might have spent billions of dollars for military installations. He said that the American leaders had made this very plain. He asked me if North Vietnam really meant to take over South Vietnam if the Americans were to leave. I told him that it was natural for Hanoi to think in terms of uniting the two sections of Vietnam under the Geneva agreements which it could have achieved in 1956 if the elections were to take place. I also told him that I understood the American fear of such an eventuality. So the best that the United States could expect^fo see that South Vietnam is politically not aligned. I told him that when General de Gaule proposed a conference in 1963 to create a non-aligned Southeast Asia comprising North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietna, and Cambodia, the United States should have responded to it favourably. I believe it was possible at that time to make the whole area ^ non-aligned and independent of outside powers. But still I believe that South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia can be made to be independent of outside powers. He asked me if Ho Chi Minn would go along with that. I told him that I did not know but it wqs worth trying. He said that it was tried in Laos but it failed because of interference from Worth Vietnam. I told him that regarding Laos if one is to be objective one has to take into consideration two Conflicting view points, that of the United States and of Hanoi. The United States believed that the Laotian experiment failed because of interference from North Vietnam. Hanoi feels that the Laotian experiment failed because of United States interference in Laos, C.I.A. activities and rigged elections. I told him that in my view the blame should be put on both sides. On the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam I told him that if Washington can seriously consider it, countries like the UAR, and Algeria can come up with public proposals for the cessation of bombing and the cessation of infiltration of South Vietnam by the North. Washington can then positively respond to such a proposal and we should wait and see how North Vietnam reacts. I told him that it will be impossible for Hanoi to come out publicly with a statement that if the Americans stop bombing they will stop infiltrating. Hanoi has to keep an eye on Peking's attitude and reaction since the United States has pushed Hanoi more and more closer towards Peking. After the cessation of bomiing private contacts can take place and I told him that I am hopeful that Hanoi will come to the conference table if it is convinced that the United States does not intend to stay in South Vietnam indefinitely. - 6 -

Dean Rusk then aske me if I could think of any (eastern iuropean country to play the role of mediator. I told him that I could not think of any since all eastern europeans, with the possible exception of Romania, is very closely associated with Moscow, and Moscow will not move so long as Hanoi does not want it to move. And Hanoi will not ask it to move with the full knowledge of Peking's opposition. He thanked me for my candid comments. He said he was coming to New York again during the General debate and looked forward to another meeting with me. He also rf- Crrr^-S C said that there were some prospectsythe United States and the Soviet Union -ega an agreement on outer space and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons during the Assembly session and he would discuss these questions with Gromyko in New York. i 7

7 October 1966

Visit of President lyndon B. Johnson to U Thant on 7 October 1966 at 3 p.m. in the Secretary-General's Conference Room Present; President Johnson, U Thant, Dean Rusk, Arthur Goldberg and Ralph J. Bunche

The President, Rusk and Goldberg sat on the north side of the table and U Thant and Ralph Bunche on the south side. President Johnson, very relaxed and leaning on the table toward U Thant across from him, began the discussion by explaining that he had made a late decision to talk with the editors at the Carnegie Endowment building across the street in addition to Dean Rusk who had previously agreed to speak to them and thus they got two speeches when they were only expecting one. He said that Dean Rusk took 20 minutes to take the editors around the world and it took him (IBJ) 25 minutes to take them across the Atlantic to Europe. He felt that he could not be just across the street from the UN and not come to pay his respects to the Secretary-General as evidence of his confidence in both the United Nations and the Secretary-General. He said that he wanted to assure the Secretary-General that the US would never fail to do more than its share toward a peaceful settlement of any dispute, whether in Viet Nam or anywhere else. The US, he said, will always be willing to sit down in peace talks on any honourable basis. He later twice reiterated this position. The President said that he was in "total disagreement" with the Secretary-General on one matter, namely his stated intention not to continue in his office. The organization and the world are in need of his continuing services now more than ever. At this point, the President said once again that the US would give its support to any earnest peace move. The United States, he said, would never be lacking on any peace effort. The President, looking extremely serious and disturbed, said that there were those who were tglling him that he was talking too much and too -2- often about peace and that this was being interpreted as a sign of weakness. He said that thus recently he had asked some such critics why they were saying this, what had he said, in fact, that they would not have had him say, or what had he not said that he should have said. One of them replied that he would not have included in his recent press conference what the President said about a schedule' of withdrawal from Viet Nam and our willingness to lay such a plan on the table if the other side would do likewise. The President then said to U Thant: "What would you say about that"? U Thant replied that he would not agree at all with those who advised the President not to keep on reiterating his desire for peace. U Thant thought that it was very necessary for him to continue to do so and that this should never be interpreted as a sign of weakness. U Thant then related in detail the story of his visit to North Viet Nam and his meeting with Ho-Chi-Minh, his conviction that Ho-Chi-Minh and North Viet Nam wished to be independent of Peking and non-alligned, of his efforts since 196^ in his approaches to Ho-Chi-Minh, including the proposed meeting at Rangoon. The details of these events are the same as have been stated in earlier meetings to Stevenson, Goldberg, Ball and Rusk, as reported in notes on such meetings. U Thant then told of a new effort which he said he had "not even told Ralph". He said that when in July of this year he had decided to accept the Soviet invitation to visit Moscow he had written a personal letter to Ho-Chi-Minh, telling him of the intended visit to Moscow and suggesting that he (Ho-Chi-Minh) might wish to have some message for him. The letter was written in French and was sent through the Russians. When U Thant was in Moscow the Ambassador from Hanoi asked to have a talk with him. An interpreter was needed and the Russians offered to provide one but, significantly, the North Viet Nam Embassy took the position that it would provide its own interpreter. The Russians were unhappy over this. U Thant*s purpose in this approach was to sound out whether Ho-Chi-Minh might have any private message for the USA. In his talk with the Ambassador from Hanoi, U Thant wished him to -3- thank Ho-Chi-Minh for his acceptance of U Thant's I$6k proposal regarding the meeting in Rangoon. There was no new word for the Americans. U Thant observed that the capitals of Algeria and Cambodia appeared to be useful for communication with Hanoi. U Thant stated that about six weeks ago he had received a message from one of the Ambassadors that Ho-Chi-Minh wishes him (U Thant) to continue with his peace efforts. He said that today's press reports indicate a polite Hanoi rejection of U Thant*s 3 points and especially point 2 on^fescalation. On the other hand, there was in Hanoi a rough reaction to the Pope's proposal. This, said U Thant, has been the first Hanoi reaction to his proposal, that is to two of the three points of the proposal. U Thant stated that his assessment of the present situation leads him to the conclusion that Hanoi is now more dependent on Peking than was the case two years ago. This, said U Thant, is also He Win's appraisal of the situation. U Thant thinks that Hanoi will not accept publicly any peace proposal to which Peking objects. In U Thantrs view, if the Russians wish Hanoi to go to the peace table they must get tougher on Peking than at present. Very much depends on Moscow in U Thant's view (as Rusk agrees). U Thant stated that in Hanoi Ho-Chi-Minh is a "dove". U Thant, in beginning the recital of his efforts, said that it was like a "Greek tragedy". When he completed the narration, the President said that he was unaware of most of this and that it was "like a new book" to him. When U Thant told of the Rangoon proposal, Dean Rusk interjected to say rather weakly that there had been "a misunderstanding" between Stevenson and himself in their telephone talks on the matter and that in fact Washington had never rejected the proposal and had intended that the door would be kept open. The President said to U Thant: "l very much regret the failure of your previous efforts". He went on to say that he was "totally unaware of any desire on the part of the other side to talk with us". He concluded -li- the discussion by saying to U Thant "You may be sure that the United States will not be a barrier to any honorable approach to peace". The President also said, as the meeting was breaking up at 5:^-5 p.m. that such talks are very useful and should be held more often. It was agreed that the press would be told that the Secretary-General and the President had had a very friendly and frank exchange of views with particular attention to Viet Nam. c

Meeting with Ambassador Goldberg in the Secretary-General's Conference Room on Tuesday 8 November 1966 at 5:30 p.m.

Present: The Secretary-General, Ambassador Goldberg and Bunche

Ambassador Goldberg began by explaining that he had had to cancel his scheduled meeting at noon on Monday with the Secretary-General because President Johnson had called him to Texas. The President had wanted him to stay over on Tuesday but Goldberg informed the President that he had an important meeting with Morosov on the Outer Space Agreement and wanted also not to delay further his meeting with the Secretary-General. Goldberg also gave the background to the press accounts of his projected visit to Southeast Asia. The Ambassador reported that the President had said to him that he wanted him to make a visit right away to South Viet Nam. Goldberg said that he asked the President why and to do what and the President told him that first of all he would want him to talk with Ky and his people and make sure that they would stand by the agreement reached at Manila and would not renege on it right away as they would be tempted to do once they got back home. Secondly, LBJ said to Goldberg, "ycu are my peace man and are known all over for your earnestness in your desire for peace and you have high credibility throughout the world". Goldberg advised the President that it would be extremely difficult forhim to make such a trip in the middle of the General Assembly with the negotiations going on on the Outer Space Agreement and on Non-Proliferation and the composition of the Commission on Southwest Africa, etc. Moreover, Goldberg told the President that if he were to go to that area he should not go to Viet Nam alone but to other places in Southeast Asia, such as Burma, and that he should also include a visit to the Eastern European countries that had been projected early in the fall, but not undertaken. Goldberg said that he definitely would not be going during the General Assembly. Goldberg then said he wanted first to talk about the China policy. He cautioned that what he was about to say on this matter should be treated - 2 - with utmost confidence for the time being. The United States, he said, will make a change in its policy on China. Now that the election is over, the US will give support to a proposal for a General Assembly committee to study ways and means of achieving universality in UN membership. This is not directly an announcement of and support for a two China policy, but it could lead to that. Goldberg said that this decision was reached yesterday (Monday 8 November) by the President at Johnson City on Goldberg's recommendation. Dean Rusk has agreed to it. The United States, said the Ambassador, will advise its allies about this new position on Wednesday the 9t,h, that is China, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will be informed then. Canada, he said, on its own has been developing a policy close to this line. Ambassador Goldberg said that it is recognized that the Administration will have "a very bad time" with Taiwan once they are informed about the change in policy. The decision on China policy earlier in the Fall was merely "to hold the line" until after the election, having in mind that Nixon and others would not fail to exploit this issue politically otherwise. Ambassador Goldberg had little doubt that the Administration will hold firm on this new policy, despite the violent reaction that can be expected from Taiwan, but he apparently does not entirely exclude the possibility of a back-down. Next Ambassador Goldberg took up the question of Viet Nam, saying that here again he wished to talk in utmost confidence. There had been "some developments" on the Viet Nam issue he said. The United States, he reported, has received a communication from the Swedish Government, saying that their Foreign Minister would be coming over here and would wish an appointment in New York with Dean Rusk on Friday the llth, indicating that the Swedish Foreign Minister has something important to report on Viet Nam. Mr. Goldberg said that he would keep the Secretary-General informed about this. Next Justice Goldberg reported that Mr. Manescu, the Foreign Minister of Romania, had had a long conversation with Dean Rusk and Goldberg when he was here . During the conversation, the Foreign Minister had asserted that if the United States would stop the bombing "conditions for fruitful discussion would then exist". The Foreign Minister was asked whether this - 3 - was to be interpreted as a "message" from Hanoi. He did not say that it was a "message" but that he was "given to understand" that he could be sure of what he had just communicated. The Foreign Minister asked for another meeting and Justice Goldberg met with him. Goldberg asked him what indication there was from Hanoi as to what would actually transpire if the United States did stop the bombing. The US was not informed by the Foreign Minister but it knows that a high-ranking Romanian delegation has been in Hanoi recently. Goldberg told the Foreign Minister that the United States would willingly consider a cessation of the bombing if there were to be some indication from Hanoi as to what would then follow. This is in line with the question about the bombing which LBJ has repeated several times, namely "would it be fruitful". Goldberg pointed out that if nothing were likely to happen then the bombing would continue. Ambassador Goldberg said that this meeting with the Romanian Foreign Minister took place just a day or two before his departure from the country. The United States has heard nothing further from that source. Ambassador Goldberg said that Foreign Minister Peter of Hungary had asked to see Dean Rusk when he was here and the conversation with him was about the same as that with Manescu. Ambassador Goldberg then told of Foreign Minister Gromyko*s visit with the President. Gromyko, he said, urged that the United States should suspend the bombing and that the USSR believed that if this were done it would "improve the climate". Gromyko would not go beyond this and therefore not as far as the Romanian and Hungarian conversations had gone, but Goldberg said that the feeling in Washington was that Gromyko was "more positive" this year than last about the willingness of the USSR to use its good offices (after, as U Thant observed, the cessation of bombing). Gromyko, Ambassador Goldberg repeated, was "more reserved" than Manescu and Peter had been, but he was "more cordial" than heretofore. The USSR, Mr. Goldberg observed, has had no recent high-level people in Hanoi to the best of US knowledge. A significant difference in Gromyko*s position this year as compared with last year was that despite Viet Nam the USSR, he said, was willing to go ahead with discussions and negotiations looking toward agreements - the - 4 - US/USSR air service agreement has ^ust "been concluded and the Outer Space agreement is "very near" according to Goldberg , since the USSR has agreed to the US formula with reference to the Secretary-General and, he added, on the "all States" provision where the same formula of the three depositaries as in the Test Ban agreement is "being applied. Ambassador Goldberg expressed confidence that the Outer Space agreement will come out of this General Assembly. As regards proliferation, Ambassador Goldberg stated that the USSR say that they are ready to "do business". Justice Goldberg said that he had an appointment to see President Pazhwak of the General Assembly this afternoon on a difference the United States was having with him over the question of the composition of the Commission established by the General Assembly Resolution on Southwest Africa. The United States, said Goldberg, is willing to serve on the Southwest Africa Commission even though France and the United Kingdom refuse to do so, provided the Commission has the proper composition. The United States, he observed, favours a composition similar to that of the Security Council, thus, there should be three Europeans, but Mr. Pazhwak is including only two Europeans. Moreover, the two Latin American members he proposes to include are the two furthest to the left, namely Chile and Mexico. The President of the Assembly also plans to include four African members instead of three, on the grounds that he must make this gesture towards the Africans. Mr. Pazhwak had not revealed to Ambassador Goldberg who the four African members would be. Mr. Goldberg said that he wishes strongly that the United States should participate on this Commission. At this point, U Thant said that the President of the General Assembly had asked his views on the composition of the Commission and that he had suggested Denmark as a European member and countries like Pakistan and Japan as possible members from Asia and Ethiopia and Nigeria likewise from Africa. Ambassador Goldberg said that Liberia had been pressing the United States hard to insist on the inclusion of Liberia as one of the Africans - 5 - since Liberia had joined with Ethiopia in bringing the case to the Court. Ambassador Goldberg said that he saw "some possibilities" on the Southwest Africa question. He said whether we like it or not we have to deal with and possibly negotiate with South Africa on the issue. He said he had informally called to the attention of Dr. Muller when he was here that there is an area of Southwest Africa, and this the "most fruitful11, which has virtually a completely black population. There is another part, he said, in which the population is mainly white. Goldberg's idea was that this "very fruitful" part of the territory with the black population could be given independence, while the other part with the predominantly white population could then be put under the United Nations trusteeship system by South Africa. At this point, U Thant referred to the talks he had had with the Ministers of Romania and Hungary. They had also told him that the United States should stop the bombing and had expressed to him their belief that if this were done, Hanoi would respond favourably. U Thant informed Ambassador Goldberg that Chester Ronning of Canada had come to see him last Saturday. U Thant had not met him before. Ronning had told the Secretary-General of his experience in North Viet Nam. On his last day in that country, he reported, he had been pressing Pham-Van-Dong of North Viet Nam for a "counter proposal". This meeting took place at 7 o'clock in the morning. Mr. Ronning had said that the early morning meetings had become a custom now because of the bombings. Pham-Van-Dong* Ronning said, was "tense and nervous" and had said that if the United States stopped the bombing Hanoi would then come to the conference table. This occurred last March and therefore before the United States began bombing the oil depots.

Arthur Goldberg said that he had heard something about Ronning*s conversation. He said that he himself in Washington had asked that before a final decision would be taken on bombing the oil depots there should be some information available about Ronning's final report. As a result of this, Goldberg said, Bill Bundy had gone to Ottawa for the purpose of checking. Goldberg had no recollection of any such positive element being * *

- 6 -

reported by Ronning. U Thant added that Ronning had told him that "before he was able to get back to Canada there was a press story (probably in Hong Kong) about Ronning's conversation and Hanoi's position and a report of Hanoi's denial. Ronning was very critical of some unnamed US diplomat for this leak (apparently someone he had seen in Laos) which he considered as having sabotaged any constructive result. U Thant asked if any date had been set for Goldberg's mission to Viet Warn. Ambassador Goldberg replied that it would not be until after the General Assembly and that it would be to Southeast Asia rather than specifically to Viet Warn, and would probably also include visits to Eastern European countries. The meeting ended at 6:25 p.m.