Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China Author(S): Nancy Bernkopf Tucker Reviewed Work(S): Source: the Journal of American History, Vol
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Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China Author(s): Nancy Bernkopf Tucker Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Jun., 2005), pp. 109-135 Published by: Organization of American Historians Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3660527 . Accessed: 17/05/2012 23:42 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Organization of American Historians is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of American History. http://www.jstor.org Taiwan Expendable?Nixon and Kissinger Go to China NancyBernkopf Tucker Therewere two storiesof Sino-Americanrelations in the 1960s and 1970s, the oft-told tale of normalizationwith the People'sRepublic of China and the less-notedsaga of friction with, and final abandonmentof, the Republicof China. These chroniclesof triumphand tragedyprogressed simultaneously, with nearlyidentical casts of characters on the Americanside and with the pivot of action for both the decisionto alterWash- ington'sofficial commitments in East Asia. For the United Statesthis could be seen as a coming-of-agestory: the Americansfinally facing reality,accepting the People'sRe- public'sexistence after decades of denial,triggering choruses of reliefworldwide. In fact, becausethe changein policywas so radical,a myth came to surroundit, originatedand cultivatedby RichardM. Nixon and Henry Kissinger,that told of a bolt-from-the-blue initiativeundertaken at greatpolitical risk but carriedout with consummateskill by the only individualswho could haverealized it. One day the United Stateswas weddedto its ally, the Republicof China situatedon the islandof Taiwan,and the next it had opened relationswith the People'sRepublic, which dominatedthe mainland.' As is true of myths in general,this one encompassedelements of truth and of fiction, paperingover sins and weighingheavily on futureefforts to understand,not just the de- velopmentof U.S. relationswith China, but especiallythe trajectoryof U.S. relations with Taiwan.The legendof Nixon and Kissinger'soutwitting the AmericanChina lobby, slayingthe Taiwandragon, and stormingthe Gate of HeavenlyPeace in Beijingto en- gage Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai leavesa varietyof issuesobscure. Reexamination of the opening to China clarifiesthe dynamicsof foreignpolicy makingat a watershedin the Cold War.Once Kissingerwent to Beijingand reachedan understandingwith his Nancy BernkopfTucker is professorof history at Georgetown University and the Georgetown School of Foreign Service. She wishes to thank WarrenI. Cohen for encouragement and inspiration, the Smith Richardson Foun- dation for generous support, and the anonymous readersfor the Journal of AmericanHistory for asking difficult questions. ' Henry Kissingershaped the history of the China opening in Henry Kissinger, TheWhite House Years(Boston, 1979); Henry Kissinger,Years of Upheaval(Boston, 1982); and Henry Kissinger,Diplomacy (New York, 1994). He upstaged RichardM. Nixon, whose memoir appearedthe year before Kissinger'sfirst volume. Richard M. Nixon, RN: TheMemoirs ofRichard Nixon (New York, 1978). Nixon grumbled in 1971 that Kissingerwanted to steal credit for the China opening. See H. R. Haldeman, TheHaldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994), 365, 367. Since Nixon was as zealous as Kissingerin keeping the archivalrecord on China closed, nonspe- cialists saw the events of 1971-1972 the way Kissingerintended. The most influential biographyof Kissingerfol- lowed his mythological version of the China initiative, declaring "asif by magic the American attitude . .. turned around ." Suddenly, Kissingersanctified the Chinese as human and relationswith them became acceptable.See Walter Isaacson,... Kissinger: A Biography(New York, 1992), 334. Kissinger'sdominance over the record meant that few questioned his assertionsregarding Taiwan. June 2005 The Journalof AmericanHistory 109 110 TheJournal of AmericanHistory June2005 Chinesehosts, afterall, the United Stateshad moreCommunists on its side than did the SovietUnion. Analystsgenerally agree that Nixon and Kissingeracted in the nationalinterest when they launchednormalization.2 The centralargument of this study,however, is that the means to that laudableend were deeply flawed, that they fundamentallyundermined U.S. credibilityand sowed the seedsof continuingdistrust in United States-Taiwanand United States-Chinarelations. Nixon and Kissingerwanted so intenselyto realizetheir goal that they surrenderedmore than was necessaryto achieveit, and the pricewas paid, not in the nearterm by the Nixon White House, but over the long term by the people of Taiwanand by U.S. diplomacywrit large.Indeed, their promiseswere bigger,their compromisesmore thoroughgoing,and their concessionsmore fundamentalthan they believedthe Americanpeople would readilyaccept. Thus, they relied on secrecyand "Chinafever" to maskthe collateraldamage. Subsequently, they ensuredthat for decades the historicalrecord would remaininadequate and inaccurate.What biographers,com- mentators,and historianswrote undersuch circumstancescontinued to mislead,subject to the complexinterplay of misunderstanding,misperception, and falsehood. To Nixon and Kissingerthe overarchinggeopolitical significance of a relationship with China justifiedeliminating all interveningobstacles. Thus the effort to replacean establishedrelationship with the Republicof China in favorof an excitingnew tie with a more exotic mainlandChina progressedin secret, involving a minimum of staff to provideanalysis.3 The pacewas grueling,and the focus relentlesslyon Beijing.Although Nixon understoodthat to placatedomestic political constituencies he had to createan appearanceof concernabout Taiwan, neither he nor Kissingeractively worried about the survivalof the governmentunder Chiang Kai-shekor thought seriouslyabout the will of the people on the island.Indeed, the recordthat can be assembledtoday shows that Nixon and Kissingerrarely reflected on Taiwanat all.4 2 Two works proved especially helpful for this study. For its critique of Nixon and Kissinger,see James Mann, About Face:A HistoryofAmerica's Curious Relationship with China,from Nixon to Clinton (New York, 1999). On China'srole, see Chen Jian, Mao'sChina and the Cold War(Chapel Hill, 2001). U.S.-Taiwan relationsplay a small part in the otherwise thoughtful literatureon the China opening. See Rosemary Foot, ThePractice ofPower: U.S. Relationswith China since 1949 (Oxford, 1995); PatrickTyler, A GreatWall: Six Presidentsand China:An Investi- gative History(New York, 1999); Harry Harding, TheFragile Relationship: The United Statesand China since 1972 (Washington, 1992); and Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation:The United Statesand China, 1969-1989 (Stan- ford, 1995). For evidence that the field is changing, see the fine studies of Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice:American Policy toward Taiwan and Relations(Washington, 2003); RichardC. Bush, At CrossPurposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relationssince 1942 (Armonk,U.S.-P.R.C. 2004); and John Garver,Sino-American Alliance: Na- tionalist China andAmerican Cold WarStrategy in Asia (Armonk, 1997). 3 Participantsin normalization, frustrated by Kissinger, have sought to correct the record. Marshall Green helped fund an oral history project at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia, and coauthored an ac- count: MarshallGreen, John H. Holdridge, and William N. Stokes, Warand Peacewith China:First-HandExperi- encesin the ForeignService of the UnitedStates (Bethesda, 1994). 4 New resources are becoming available at an accelerating pace. The Henry KissingerTelephone Conversa- tion Transcripts(Telcons) were releasedby the National Archives and RecordsAdministration in mid-2004. The Nixon White House Tapes have been releasedin severalsegments and are also at the National Archives. Complete transcriptsof Kissinger'sJuly 1971 meetings and Nixon's February1972 trip were finally declassifiedin December 2003 and were posted by William Burr,see National SecurityArchive, Nixon'sTrip to China <http://www.gwu.edu/ -nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/index.htm> (Feb. 7, 2005). An expanding universeof oral history interviews is availablefrom the U.S. ForeignAffairs Oral History Collection (Arlington,Va.). See Nancy BernkopfTucker,ed., China Confidential:American Diplomats and Sino-AmericanRelations, 1945-1996 (New York,2001). Recordsfrom the Chinese side have been releasedsporadically, with some appearingin the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War InternationalHistory Project Bulletin <http://cwihp.si.edu> (Feb. 7, 2005). Unfortunately,Taiwan lacks a program for the regulardeclassification of Cold War-era documents or a vehicle for disseminating its recordsabroad. Nixon and KissingerGo to China 111 As PremierZhou Enlaiwatches, Chairman Mao Zedonglectures National Security Adviser HenryKissinger during his 1971trip to China. CourtesyNationalArchives, 22 Feb73 E 320. The place of Taiwan in the calculus of the American China initiative illustrates the problem of relating to and dispensing with U.S. client states, given the dynamic ways democracy