THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND POLICY-MAKING IN CHINA 1945-1950. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA. ROBERT EMMERSON WATSON ~- Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. THE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES MAY 1996 The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 11 ABSTRACT. The thesis contributes to the broad body of literature which examines the role of Great Britain in the origins of the Cold War. In particular it focuses on the Foreign Office attitude towards the course of the Chinese Civil War, and ultimately the establishment of a Communist government in China between 1945 and 1950. It is a revisionist interpretation of cold war history drawn from a study of Anglo-American relations with regard to Chinese politics during this period. Traditional interpretations have emphasised the unchallenged nature of American involvement in China after the war. The thesis argues that during this period Britain actively sought to compete for such a predominant position, and specifically that the Foreign Office sought to replace the United States with Britain as the pre­ eminent Western influence in post-war Chinese politics. To this end, Britain gradually moved its policy from one of co­ operation with the United States to one of competition. Whilst originally seeking collaboration with Washington, the Foreign Office became increasingly frustrated with the problems within the American policy­ making machinery, and ultimately pursued a unilateral position in China. This was most evident after 1948 when the rapid collapse of the Kuomintang position forced Western states to closely consider their relationship with the Chinese communists. Different views of Mao's communism, and different policy objectives in China, consequently led the British to move away from the American position. The thesis demonstrates such differences had actually existed since 1945, and charts the gradual breakdown of relations between that point and 1950. It specifically argues that unilateral recognition was as much an attempt to demonstrate to the Americans the error of their ways as it was to 'secure a convenience' of limited trade with the communists. Source material is drawn primarily from the Foreign Office 371 series, and Record Group 59 of the State Department Papers. 111 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank the following for their help and support during the writing of this thesis. My archival research was greatly eased by the help of the staff of the Public Records Office at Kew, London, and at National Archives II at College Park, Maryland. Funding has been provided by the University of Leeds in my first year, and thereafter by the British Academy. Help has been forthcoming in various forms, particularly from Steve Hitchen, Martin O'Rourke, Rob Walter and Jayne Rodgers. Melissa Bailey and Jenny Greenhalgh offered tremendous hospitality during my research in London, and William Forrest was truly generous in sharing his Washington home with me whilst at College Park. My thanks is also extended to my supervisor, Dr. Caroline Kennedy­ Pipe of the Institute for International Studies, both for her support in securing grants to fund this thesis, and for her advice and guidance regarding its content. Nonetheless, any errors contained within the text are entirely my own. Table of Contents Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 Chapter One Anglo-American Relations in China, 1945-1946: An Entent Cordiale? ........... 30 Chapter Two The Civil War Intensifies: The British View of American Policy in 1947 ........ 78 Chapter Three Decisions Approach: 1948 .................................................................................. 126 Chapter Four The Collapse of the Kuomintang: January - June 1949 .................................... .186 Chapter Five The British Move Towards Recognition: July 1949 - January 1950 ................ 223 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 263 Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 286 1 Introduction This thesis contributes to the broad body of literature which examines the role of Great Britain in the origins of the Cold War. In particular it focuses on the Foreign Office attitude towards the course of the Chinese Civil War, and ultimately the establishment of a Communist government in China between 1945 and 1950. It is a revisionist interpretation of cold war history drawn from a study of Anglo-American relations with regard to Chinese politics during this period. Traditional interpretations have emphasised the unchallenged nature of American involvement in China after the war. The thesis argues that during this period Britain actively sought to compete for such a predominant position, and specifically that the Foreign Office sought to replace the United States with the United Kingdom as the pre-eminent Western influence in post-war Chinese politics. By examining the concept of competition between the pillars of the transatlantic alliance, it becomes evident that the United States and Great Britain did not naturally collude over policy, and that they were indeed frequently in conflict. In China, the concept of a 'Special Relationship' between Britain and the United States did not apply. British policy, formulated principally by the Foreign Office, evolved from a practice of accomodating or counterbalancing an incohesive American approach. Britain's unilateral recognition of the Chinese Communist Party's victory in the Chinese Civil War in October 1949 came in the face of American opposition, yet represented the culmination of long-standing British worries over the coherency of American policy and was therefore an attempt to strike an independent course. Washington's response to growing British assertiveness was often obstructive and competitive, with different views expressed by diplomats, military staff and 2 politicians. This confused and ill-defined reaction to British initiatives confirmed Foreign Office suspicions of dislocation and division within the American policy­ making process. As such, recognition was as much an attempt bluntly to demonstrate the error of American ways in their continued support for Chiang Kai-shek' s nationalists as it was an attempt to create a stronger regional position. Chapter One focuses on the British perspective of Chinese affairs immediately after World War Two. This involves a consideration of American policy towards post­ war China, the Foreign Office's interpretation of the American role, and the impact it had on subsequent British policy. Chapter Two examines the development of a clearer British policy during 1947 as separate issues emerged concerning the nature of Chinese communism and the strength of the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. Similarly it assesses in closer detail the British interpretation of the American position which had developed during and after the Marshall Mission in 1946. The third chapter highlights growing British dissatisfaction with the direction of American policy in China, and registers also a growing determination within the Foreign Office to offer alternative policies rather than simply following the American lead. Chapters Four and Five consider developments from January to June 1949, and from July to the British extension of 'de jure' recognition in January 1950. Chapter Four observes a clear reorientation of British policy away from the United States towards an acceptance of a communist victory, and the fifth chapter examines the execution of that policy and the final rift between Washington and London over the recognition issue. Through establishing what constituted British foreign policy goals in China, and comparing these with American policy, it will be possible to examine the extent and impact of competition between London and Washington over the formulation, direction and implementation of American policy. Whilst the Foreign Office perspective was pre- 3 occupied with a desire to trade with Communist China for as long as possible, American foreign policy was also shaped by a long-standing commitment to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, and a consideration of the strategic implications of a Communist victory in China for Korea and Japan. Through this narrative, a series of key questions are addressed. Whilst it is evident that recognition by Britain was a short term remedy to promote a limited period of trade with communist China, and hopefully in doing so preserve a longer term position for Britain in the Far East, to what extent was it intended as an attempt to direct American policy by demonstrating alternative, coherent policy options to Washington's? Did the Foreign Office seek to guide a United States which it perceived to be drifting and lacking in focus in the Far East? Did Britain seek to 'control' American policy in order to limit potential conflict in the region, and thereby safeguard its imperial position as its limited resources dwindled further? If it did, what policies did the Foreign Office pursue to this end - ultimately, did they aim to replace the United States with Britain as the pivotal Western power in China? The thesis assesses whether it is tenable to suggest that Britain was capable of exercising significant