United Nations Oral History Project

Harlan Cleveland 22 April 1990 pr: I NON·ClR~UJvfiJING I .l .-°,"1 '~""'. APRIL 22,1990 NON·ClR£W~JIN. ....: .'\ :'.~ . .., G I , HARLAN CLEVELAND . APRIL 22,1990 ., .- •.. ., '~""...... HARRIMAN,: .\ :'.~ :~.. ", . "r- . NEW YORK 4 JEANHARLANKRASNO, CLEVELANDINTERVIEWER· ut 1 HARRIMAN,TABLE OF CONTENTSNEW YORK JEAN KRASNO, INTERVIEWER TABLE OF CONTENTS US Support for UN and Congo Operation 1-3, 5, 24, 25

Goals of US Policy in Congo 4-7 US Support for UN and Congo Operation 1-3, 5, 24, 25 Communication Systems with Congo 7, 11 Goals of US policy in Congo 4-7 Involvement in Internal Politics 7, 8 Communication Systems with Congo 7, 11 Secession of Katanga 7-9 Involvement in Internal Politics 7, 8 Relations between State Dept. and US Mission 10-12 Secession of Katanga 7-9 Peace-keeping Troops 12-14, 17 Relations between State Dept. and US Mission 10-12 Rescue Mission 14-16 Peace-keepingPres. Johnson AdministrationTroops 12-14, 17 Rescue Mission 14-16 Support for Congo Operation 16, 17 Pres. Johnson Administration Educational Exchange 18 Support for Congo operation 16, 17 Soviet Involvement 18-20 Educational Exchange 18 criticism by Senator Dodd 21 Soviet Involvement 18-20 CIA and Lumumba's Death 22 criticism by Senator Dodd 21 Death of Dag Hammarskjold 23 CIA and Lumumba's Death 22 Selection of U Thant as S-G 23 Death of Dag Hammarskjold 23

Selection of U Thant as S-G 23

]1) f YUN INTERVIEW

APRIL 22,1990

HARLANYUN INTERVIECLEVELANDW HARRIMAN,APRIL 22,199NEW YORK0

JEANHARLANKRASNO, CLEVELANINTERVIEWERD HARRIMAN.TABLE OF CONTENTSNEW YORK JEAN KRASNO. INTERVIEWER TABLE OF CONTENTS US Support for UN and Congo Operation 1-3, 5, 24, 25

Goals of US Policy in Congo 4-7 US Support for UN and Congo Operation 1-3, 5, 24, 25 Communication Systems with Congo 7, 11 Goals of US Policy in Congo 4-7 Involvement in Internal Politics 7, 8 communication Systems with Congo 7, 11 Secession of Katanga 7-9 Involvement in Internal Politics 7, 8 Relations between State Dept. and US Mission 10-12 Secession of Katanga 7-9 Peace-keeping Troops 12-14, 17 Relations between State Dept. and US Mission 10-12 Rescue Mission 14-16 Pres.Peace-keepingJohnson AdministrationTroops 12-14, 17 Rescue Mission 14-16 Support for Congo Operation 16, 17 Pres. Johnson Administration Educational Exchange 18 Support for Congo Operation 16, 17 Soviet Involvement 18-20 Educational Exchange 18 criticism by Senator Dodd 21 Soviet Involvement 18-20 CIA and Lumumba's Death 22 criticism by Senator Dodd 21 Death of Dag Hammarskjold 23 CIA and Lumumba's Death Selection of U Thant as S-G 2322 Death of Dag Hammarskjold 23 Selection of U Thant as S-G 23 YON INTERVIEW

APRIL 22,1990

HARLANYON INTERVIECLEVELANDW

BARRIMAN,APRIL 22,199NEW YORK0

JEANHARLANKRASNO, CLEVELANINTERVIEWERD HARRIMAN, NEW YORK

JEAN KRASNO, INTERVIEWER

JK: For the record, Mr. Cleveland, could you explain what

your position was at the time of the Congo crisis? As I

JK: understandFor the record,it you Mr.were Cleveland,in the state couldDepartment. you explainAbout what whenyour positiondid that wasbegin? at the time of the Congo crisis? As I Cleveland:Itunderstandbegan three it youdays wereafter in Presidentthe state KennedyDepartment.was About wheninaugurated. did that Itbegin?was January 23, as I remember, of 1961. Cleveland:ItI was beganin thethreeKennedy days afterAdministration President theKennedywhole wastime that

heinaugurated.was President It wasand Januaryon after, 23, also,as I remember,with the ofJohnson 1961. Administration.I was in the KennedyMy first Administrationjob for almost the wholefive yearstime thatwas Assistanthe was PresidentSecretary and onof after,state also,for withInternational the Johnson OrganizationAdministration.Affairs. My firstAnd so,job allfor UNalmostproblems five asyearswell wasas otherAssistantinternational Secretaryorganizations of stateand forother Internationalmultilateral

problemsOrganization(except Affairs.a few Andthat so,were all veryUN problemsspecialized as welllike as

NATO,other internationalwhich was in organizationsthe European and Bureau)other multilateralbut most

internationalproblems (exceptorganizations a few that likewere Worldvery Weather,specializedUNESCO, like andNATO,World whichHealth, was inwere themy Europeanpigeons. Bureau)At that buttime mostwe belongedinternationalto 53 differentorganizationsintergovernmental like World Weather,organizations. UNESCO, But,and Worldthe centerpieceHealth, wereof mythe pigeons.j ob was backsAt thattopping time andwe instructingbelonged to 53the differentUS Mission intergovernmentalto the United Nationsorganizations.in New But, the centerpiece of the job was backstopping and 1 instructing the US Mission to the United Nations in New

1 York. And our gladiator up there, of course, was Adlai

Stevenson. At that time, both because he was so well

York.known andAnd becauseour gladiatorthe UN upwas there,much ofmore course,central wasto Adlaiour

stevenson.foreign policy, At thatthere time,was abothUN angle becauseto everythinghe was so wellthat happened.known and becauseSo I got theinvolved UN was inmuchwhatever more centralhappened. to ourIt wasforeignexciting. policy,It therewas awasvery a interestingUN angle to task.everythingThe State that happened.Department, Sothen I gotas now,involvedwas organized in whatevermostly happened.by regions It wasand exciting.countries, Itwhich, was aof verycourse, interestingis not the task.way Thethe worldstate

Department,really works. then asIt now,works was byorganizedmultilateral mostly diplomacy,by regions

mostly.and countries,Almost which,nothing ofinvolves course, onlyis nottwo thecountries. way the worldThe UNreallywas aworks.big crossroads It worksand byI had multilateralto deal with diplomacy,that from mostly.the Washington Almost endnothingand administer, involves onlyas twoit were, countries.from below The UNthe wasrather a bigcomplex crossroadsrelationships and I had betweento deal thiswith extremelythat from wellthe Washingtonknown ex-presidential end and administer,candidate as it were,who fromwas belowour Ambassadorthe rather complexto New relationshipsYork, the Secretary between ofthisState, extremelyDean

wellRusk, andknownPresident ex-presidentialKennedy andcandidatehis staff whoat thewas Whiteour

AmbassadorHouse. I had tothe Newfeeling York, Ithewas Secretarytrying to administerof state, thatDean Rusk,triangle andfromPresidentbelow, Kennedyfor UN affairsand his only,staff ofat course.the White JK: AsHouse.far asI hadthe theCongo feelingoperation I waswas tryingconcerned, to administerit began thatin thetriangleEisenhower from below,Administration for UN affairsin July, only,1960. of course.

JKCleveland:It: As farblew asjust the aboutCongo afteroperationIndependence. was concerned, it began in JK: theSo, Eisenhowerwhen you came Administrationon board there in July,had been1960.a change in

Cleveland:Itadministration. blew just aboutFrom afteryour Independence.vantage point in Washington, JK: didSo, whenyou seeyou acamechange on boardin thethereadministration's had been a changepolicy in towardadministration.the Congo From operationyour vantagewhen pointthe in Washington,Republican Administrationdid you see a leftchangeand inthe theDemocratic administration'sAdministration policy toward the Congo operation when the Republican 2 Administration ·left and the Democratic Administration

2 moved in?

Cleveland:No, there was actually a lot of continuity because the

movedposture in?of the Eisenhower Administration was to support Cleveland:No,the thereinitiative was actuallyof Dag a Hammarskjold,lot of continuityand itbecausewas histhe postureinitiative of thereally Eisenhowerto plunge Administrationin with both was tofeet, supportand theestablish initiativethere whatof Dagstill Hammarskjold,ranks as the andlargest it waspeace­ his keepinginitiativemission reallythere to hasplungeever inbeen. with Mybothpredecessor, feet, and

establishFran Wilcox, thereand whatthe peoplestill ranksin the asUS theMission largestto thepeace­UN keepingin New York,missionwere therejust hasas eversupportive been. Myof predecessor,that. The controversy,Fran wilcox, theand politicalthe peoplecontroversy in the US Missioninside theto unitedthe UN

statesin New aboutYork,the wereCongo, justreally as supportivedidn't develop of that.until laterThe controversy,that year, orthethe politicalfollowing controversyyear, when insidesome the ofUnitedthe statessupporters aboutof theMoise Congo,Tshombe, really didn'twho was developin charge untilof laterthe thatrich Katangayear, orarea theand followingwhom the year,Belgians, whenespecially some of the UnionsupportersMiniere, of Moisewere supporting,Tshombe, whogot wasinto in chargea tangle of withthe therich peopleKatanga inareaStanleyville and whom the underBelgians,Lumumba especiallywho were the

Unionoriented Miniere,toward werethe Communists.supporting, gotThere intowere a tanglesome middle with

peoplethe people-- the inPrime StanleyvilleMinister at underthe time Lumumbawas Adoula who --whowere wereorientedin Leopoldville.toward the Communists.In the United Therestates were somethere middlewere peoplesome people, -- the Primenotably MinisterSenator at Dodd,the timethe wasfather Adoulaof --whothe werepresent in SenatorLeopoldville.Dodd of Connecticut,In the Unitedwas statesa big theresupporter were ofsomeTshombe. people, Tshombenotably wantedSenatorthe Dodd,UN out theof fatherthere (itof wasthe thepresentBelgians Senatorreally) Dodd soof asConnecticut,to give Tshombe was a abigfree supporterhand in

Katangaof Tshombe.which Tshombethey felt wantedwould the beUN advantageousout of there for(it thewas

miningthe Belgiansinterests. really) Theso asUN topresence give Tshombethere, a freewith handRalph in KatangaBunche commuting which theyover feltthere wouldfor bethe advantageousUN, was a force for thatthe mining interests. The UN presence there, with Ralph 3 Bunche commuting over there for the UN, was a force that

3 had sort of buffaloed the soviets. They couldn't figure

out ••• they knew how to have a confrontation with us

hadbut theysort didn'tof buffaloedknow how theto soviets.have a confrontationThey couldn'twith figurethe UN.out • Later, • • theyof knewcourse, how thereto havecame a confrontationto be a controversy with us

butabout theythe didn'tfinancing know ofhowit to buthavein a theconfrontationearly stage withthe theUN

UN.solved Later,for ofus course,the problem there cameof sovietto be apresence controversyand aboutdomination the financingin the northern of it butpart inof thethe earlyCongo. stage the UN JK: solvedNow, you've for broughtus the upproblemseveral ofissues sovietthat presenceI want to andgo dominationinto a little in themore northerndeeply. partSo, ofmaybe the we'llCongo. start with

JK: Now,this you'velast one. broughtAs far up asseveralus policy, issueswhat thatwere I wantthe goalsto go

ofintous apolicy littlein morethe deeply.Congo as farSo, asmaybethe we'llState startDepartment with

thiswas concerned?last one. As far as us policy, what were the goals Cleveland:Iofthink us pOlicythat theyin thewere Congoessentially as far as thethe sameStateas Departmentthe UN's, wasas Hammarskjold's,concerned? to keep the country together so that Cleveland:Iit thinkdidn't thatsplit they wereapart, essentiallyto make itthe asameviable as thecountry UN's, aseconomically Hammarskjold's,and politically to keep the(not countryvery successfultogether soin thatthe

itlong didn'trun). splitMobutu apart,was head toof makethe armyit aat viablethat time. countryHe waseconomicallyour man in anda politicallyway. (not very successful in the

JK: So,longthe run).us wasMobutuinterested was headin ofkeeping the armythe at Congothat time.unified. He Cleveland:Keepingwas our manthe inCongo a way.unified and keeping the Soviets,the

JK: So,Communist the us influencewas interestedout of inthere. keepingAnd thealso, Congothere unified.was a Cleveland:Keepingvery important the Congoelement unifiedof, I andmade keepinga number theof Soviets,speeches theon thisCommunistsUbject influenceat the time,out ofof there.developing And also,the UN's therecapacity was a veryto act. importantI was elementinterested of, I madein thata numberand ofso speecheswas Adlai on Stevensonthis sUbjectand atso thewas time,Dean ofRusk developingwho had thebeen UN'sa UN capacityexpert

toearlier act. inI hiswas interestedlife. He inwas thatthe andfirst so wasAssistant Adlai stevenson and so was Dean Rusk who had been a UN expert 4 earlier in his life. He was the first Assistant

4 Secretary for what was then called United Nations affairs. So, we had very good support from him. The secretaryEuropean Bureaufor whatof thewas Statethen Departmentcalled unitedand toNationssome extentaffairs.the So,White weHouse had verystaff goodwere supportskeptical fromabout him.the UN.The

TheEuropeanAfrican BureauBureau, of ofthecourse, state wasDepartmentall in favorand toof somethe

Africans.extent the WhiteAnd I Housefound staffmyself werebeing skepticalassigned aboutrepeatedly, the UN. Theby Secretary African Bureau,Rusk, to ofkeep course,those wastwo regionalall in favorbureaus of outthe

Africans.of each other'sAnd I foundhair myselfand sort beingof assignedtriangulate repeatedly,between bythose Secretarytwo interests Rusk, toand keepour thoseinterest two regionalin the UN.bureausWe hadout aofvery eachexplicit, other's conscious,hair and sortand pUblicof triangulatenational interestbetween thosein developing two intereststhe UN andso that our itinterestcould solvein theproblems UN. We thathad aotherwise, very explicit,because conscious,of the USandposition pUblic nationalin the scheme interestof things,in developingwe felt thethat UN sowe thatwould it havecouldto solvego inproblemsand solve. that

Theotherwise,very first becausemeeting of thatthe uswe positionhad on this in subject,the schemewhich of mustthings,have webeen feltwithin that thewe wouldfirst havetwo ortothree go inweeks and solve.of the

Administration,The very first meetingwas the thatfirst we hadmeeting on thisthat subject,I chaired which mustafter haveI sat beendown withinat my thedesk. first I twofound or threemyself weekschairing of thea meetingAdministration,with four wasex-governors: the first meetingAverell thatHarriman I chairedwas afterthere, I andsatSoapy down Williamsat my desk.was there,I foundand myselfChet chairingBowles was a meetingthere, and, withof fourcourse, ex-governors:Adlai Stevenson. AverellAnd Harrimanwe developed was there,a very clearand Soapypolicy Williamsthat we waswere there,going andto Chetsupport Bowlesthe wasUN there,in terms and,of ofmoney, course,in Adlaiterms stevenson.of logistics And --we whichdevelopedwas verya veryimportant, clear policywe provided that we werea lot goingof airlift to supportfor them the -­UN andin termsalso politically,of money, in helpingterms ofto logisticsbeat the drum-- whichfor whatwas wasverygoing important,on with wesome providedof the a otherlot ofcountries airlift andfor helpingthem -­ toand keepalso thepolitically,Belgians athelpingleast toneutral beat theon drumthe subject.for what was going on with some of the other countries and helping 5 to keep the Belgians at least neutral on the SUbject.

5 Paul Henri Spaak was pretty good about it but he had a

lot of trouble internally with the fire eaters who were

veryPaul militantlyHenri Spaakin wasfavor prettyof thegoodUnion aboutMiniere. it but he had a

JK: Howlot didof troublesome of internallythese dynamics withthat the youfireare eaterstalking whoabout were veryrelate militantlyto the secessionin favor ofof theKatanga? Union Miniere.Originally, the JK: Howfirst didUN someresolution of thesehad dynamicsbeen to thatstay youout areof talkingthe internal about

relateaffairs tobut thelater secessionthat policyof Katanga?changed. Originally,How did thatthe

relatefirst UNto resolutionthe dynamics, had beenfor toexample, stay outwith of thethe internalsoviet Union?affairs but later that policy changed. How did that Cleveland:Letrelateme finishto the firstdynamics,about forour example,interests withand ourthe policy.soviet

union?Essentially our pitch was that if the UN weren't in there Cleveland:Letwe would me finishprobably firsthave aboutto be.our interestsThen over anda period our policy.of the

Essentiallynext year or ouryear pitchand awashalf thator iftwo theyears UN weren'tthe Congo in wouldthere weperiodically would probablyblow haveup tointo be. a Thenbig overissue a periodeither ofwith the nextdomestic year politicsor year andor a internationalhalf or two yearsincidents the Congoand wouldeach periodicallytime the President blow upwould intosay a tobigme, issue"I remembereither yourwith domesticsaying that politicsif the orUN internationalweren' t there incidentswe'd have andto eachbe

there.time theIs Presidentthat still wouldright, sayHarlan?" to me, And"I I'dremembersay, "Yes,your

that'ssaying stillthat right,if theMr. UN President."weren' t thereThen we'dhe'd havesay, to"Well be there.then, let'sIs thattake stillthe right,flack Harlan?"and stay withAnd I'dit." say,We "Yes,had verythat'sconsistent still right,support Mr. President."and a very Thenconsistent he'd say,policy "Well

then,throughout let's takethat theperiod flack andup stayuntil withthe it. IItime We hadof Hammarskjold'svery consistentdeath supportand thereafter.and a very consistentWe had very pOlicyclose throughoutrelationships, thatof course,period withup RalphuntilBunche. the Andtimeindeed of Hammarskjold'sfor part of the deathtime whenand thereafter.the UN troops Wewere had chasingvery closethe Katangarelationships,gendarmerie of course,around withthe country,Ralph Bunche.we were Andin betterindeed for part of the time when the UN troops were chasing the 6 Katanga gendarmerie around the country, we were in better

6 touch with what was going on than Ralph was because the word got to him about 24 hours late through a general in touchLeopoldville, with what"through was goingchannels." on than RalphWe had wasan becauseair attache the wordat the gotEmbassy to him aboutout there 24 hourswith latea planethroughchock a generalfull ofin communicationsLeopoldville, "throughequipment channels.and I could 1I We justhad ango airdownstairs attache at thethe stateEmbassyDepartment out thereand withtalk toa planethat person,chock fullI think of hecommunicationswas a colonel, equipmenton a single and I sidecouldband justradio go downstairsdirectly.

Then,at theby statearrangement Departmentwith andStevenson talk to onthatemergency person, things,I think heI'd wasoccasionally a colonel,call on athe singleUN directly, side bandalthough radio directly.we tried

Then,almost byalways arrangementto work withthrough stevensonthe onMission, emergencyof course.things,

I'dBut, occasionallyI would occasionally call the UNcall directly,up Ralph althoughBunche andwe triedsay, almost"Ralph, alwaysdo you toknow workwhere throughyour thetroops Mission,are today?" of course.And he'dBut, say,I would"Well, occasionallyI think I callknow." up RalphAnd I'd Bunchesay, and"Did say,you know"Ralph,that dothey you crossedknow wherethe yourKolwezi troopsRiver arethis today?"morning?" And

Andhe'd he'dsay, say,"Well,"Oh, I thinkmy God, I know."they're Andnot I'dsupposed say, IIDidto youdo that.know thatThe theySecurity crossedcouncil the Kolwezihas notRiversaid thisthat's morning?"all Andright, he'dyet." say, So,"Oh,it mywas God,a verythey'reinteresting not supposedtime. to do that.On theThesecession Security andcouncilon the hasinternal not saidpolitics, that'sthere all right,isn't anyyet."such So,thing itas wasstaying a veryout interestingof internal time.politics, of course.On the secessionEvery aid andprogram on thewe internalhave is involvedpolitics, deeplythere inisn'tinternal any suchpolitics. thing as stayingEven educational out of internalexchange politics,is an ofintervention course. Everyin internal aid programpolitics. we haveThe is importantinvolved deeplything isin tointernalkeep itpolitics.from being Evenparty educationalpolitics. exchangeBut, policyis an politicsinterventionit alwaysin internalis. politics.And our purposeThe importantand the thingUN's purposeis to keepwas itto keepfrom thebeingcountry partytogether politics.because But, withoutpolicy thepoliticsriches it ofalwaysKatanga is. theAndrest our ofpurposethe countryand the wouldUN's purpose was to keep the country together because without 7 the riches of Katanga the rest of the country would

7 really be a basket case. I went over there at one point

and did an economic study leading to the beginning of a

morereallyformal be a basketaid programcase. I andwentit overwas thereclear at onethat pointthe andsouthern did anpart economicof the studycountry leadingwould tobe theneeded beginningas part ofof a

morethe mix. formalSo, aiddespite programthe factand thatit waseveryone clearwas thatkidding the themselvessouthern partabout of thenot countrygetting wouldinvolved be neededin the as internalpart of theaffairs, mix. So,the despiteUnited theNations fact thatoperation everyonewas was clearlykidding

themselvesinvolved in aboutthe internal not gettingpolitics. involvedIt was in helpingthe internalguide

affairssome the, chiefthe unitedfigures onNationstheir relationshipsoperation waswith clearlyeach

otherinvolvedand inin thegeneral internalit waspolitics.very active It wasand helpingso were guidewe.

Wesomehad thea chiefcouple figuresof very onactive their Ambassadorsrelationshipsover withthere. each EdotherGullion and inwas generalthere forit wasa while very andactivehe wasand anso activistwere we. Wetype hadof aambassador.couple of very active Ambassadors over there. JK: EdDid Gullioyou dealn waswith therethe forBelgian a whileor theand Britishhe was Ambassadorsan activist typein Washington of ambassador.on some of these issues?

JKCleveland:: Yes,Did yousome, dealbut withthe theprotocol Belgian orwas thethat Britishif the AmbassadorsBelgians

hadin Washingtona problem onthey somecame of tothesethe issues?European Bureau and the Cleveland:Yes,European some,Bureau but wouldthe protocolfuss with wasus. thatBut ifI sawthe allBelgiansthose peoplehad a problemall the theytime cameat parties, to the ofEuropeancourse, Bureauand there and wasthe aEuropeancertain Bureauamount wouldof interaction. fuss with us. TheButsame I sawallwas true thoseon thepeopleAfrican all theside. time at parties, of course, and there was

JK: Thea certainBelgians amountwere ofnot interaction.interested inThebringing same wasthe truecountry on backthe Africantogether. side. JKCleveland:Not: The Belgiansat all. wereThey notwere interestedheavily influenced in bringingby thethe countrymining backinterests together.and by the Belgian citizens who were still down Cleveland:Notthere atand all.owned Theymost wereof heavilythe riches. influencedAnd I think by thethey miningfelt interests and by the Belgian citizens who were still down 8 there and owned most of the riches. And I think they felt

8 that they could dominate it better if it were a smaller

thing and they regarded Tshombe as their man. Whereas we

werethat theytrying couldto dominatebet on andit betterto build if itup werethe a smallercentral thinggovernment and theyof Adoularegardedand Tshombelater otheras theirpeople, man. eventuallyWhereas we

wereMobutu. trying to bet on and to build up the central JK: Howgovernmentsupportive of Adoulawere the andBritish later otherof the people,UN operation? eventually

Cleveland:Well,Mobutu.they were ambivalent, I would say. They voted for

JK: Howit. supportiveThey let it werego through the Britishthe security of the UNcouncil. operation?On the Cleveland:Well,other hand,they werethey ambivalent,were more influenced I would say.by BelgianThey votedpressure for thanit. Theywe were. let itThey go throughwere on thethe Securitysidelines council.but I wouldn't On the othersay they hand,were theyamong were morethe influencedchief litigants. by BelgianThe pressurechief

thanlitigants we were.were Theythe Belgians,were on thethe sidelinesUN, the Unitedbut I wouldn'tstates,

andsay somethey ofwerethe amongother theAfricans chiefwho litigants.saw the UN Theaction chiefas helpfullitigantsin weredeveloping the Belgians,an African the UN,state thethere. United States, JK: andDid thesomeBritish of the orotherthe AfricansFrench put whoany sawpressure the UN actionon the usas tohelpfulstay outin developingof the secession an Africanaffair? state there.

JK:Cleveland:I Diddon't the Britishrecall, butor theI think Frenchif putthey anyhad pressurebeen very on activethe US

toon stayit, I outwould of therecall. secession affair? JK:Cleveland:IYou don'tmentioned recall, Ralphbut I Bunchethink ifand theyAdlai had beenStevenson, very activewere thereon it, othersI wouldat recall.the UN in New York that you were in touch JK: with?You mentioned Ralph Bunche and Adlai Stevenson, were

Cleveland:Well,there othersthere atwere the fourUN in otherNew Yorkambassadors that you wereunder in Adlaitouch

with?stevenson and I saw all of them all the time. The most Cleveland:Well,active thereon this weresUbject four wereotherCharles ambassadorsYost, underwho was Adlaithe numberStevensonthree andman I sawalland the oftop themforeign all theservice time. officerThe mostin theactivemix, onand thisFrancis sUbjectPlimpton, were Charlesthe New Yost,York wholawyer, was whothe number three man and the top foreign service officer in 9 the mix, and Francis Plimpton, the New York lawyer, who

9

0·· was the Deputy Ambassador. But Charles Yost handled most of the high level diplomacy and was in day-to-day wastouch thewith DeputyBunche. Ambassador.Brian Urquhart But wasCharlesthere Yostand Generalhandled mostRikhye ofwas thein highcharge levelof diplomacythe military and operationwas in day-to-dayitself. JK: Weretouchyou within Bunche.touch withBrianthese Urquhartpeople wasfrequently, there and asGeneralmuch Rikhyeas everyday? was in charge of the military operation itself. JKCleveland:Not: Wereeveryday you in touchbecause withwe thesehad a peoplemission frequently,up there foras muchthat purpose.as everyday?But, I had an arrangement with stevenson that Cleveland:NotI went everydayup at becauseleast a weday hada week a missionand had upan thereoffice forright that nextpurpose.to his. But,I Iwas haddetermined an arrangementthat wewithwould stevensonnot get thatthe sortI wentof upproblem at leastthat a hadday happeneda week andfrequently had an officebefore rightthat nexttime andto his.happened I wasafter determinedthat time, thatfor we example,would notwhen getAndy the Youngsort ofwas problemup there thatin hadthe happenedCarter Administration. frequently beforeHe thatwas offtime theand happenedreservation afterabout that everytime, forthree example,or four whenweeks. Andy AdlaiYoung stevensonwas up therenever in thegot Carteroff the Administration.reservation that Hebadly was andoff Ithethink, reservationat least abouta part everyof it threeobviously or fourwas thatweeks.he wasAdlaisuch stevensona gentleman, never butgot alsooff thepart reservationof it was thatthathe badlyand Iandwere I think,in very atclose leasttouch a parton ofeverything, it obviouslyno wassecrets thatand he wasso on. suchHe a nevergentleman,got an butinstruction also part thatof ithe waswas thatsurprised he and by.I wereHe inwould veryoccasionally close touch produceon everything,some rhetoric no secretsup there and thatso on.would He neversurprise got usan ininstructionWashington, thatbut heusually was surprisedit was by.just Hegoing wouldfarther occasionallythan he producewas instructed some rhetoricbut in theup theresame direction,that would surpriselike in usthe inCuban washington,Missile butCrisis usuallywith itthat was famousjust goingpassage fartherat thanarms hewith was Zorin,instructed"Are butthere in thenuclear same weaponsdirection,in CUba?like inDon't the waitCubanfor Missilethe translation, Crisis withanswer that yesfamousor no."passageThat atwasn't arms withexactly Zorin,in our"Arescript. there nuclearBut, it weapons in CUba? Don't wait for the translation, answer 10 yes or no." That wasn't exactly in our script. But, it

10 was the most memorable thing that was said that

afternoon.

JK: wasSo, youthe wentmostup memorableto New York thingfrequently that andwas yousaidwere thatin

afternoon.touch with Leopoldville by radio. JK:Cleveland:And So, youalso wentdaily up cablesto New backYork andfrequentlyforth. andOf course,you werethe in touchEmbassy within Leopoldville wasby radio.formally responsible to the Cleveland:AndPresident also dailybut in cablespractice backwas andresponsible forth. Ofto course,the African the EmbassyBureau. inSo, Leopoldvillethe African was Bureauformallywould responsiblebe the actionto the

Presidentoffice for butsending in practicethem things. was responsibleAnd the European to the AfricanBureau wasBureau.the actionSo, theoffice Africanfor dealingBureau withwouldthe beBelgians. the actionI

officewas the foraction sendingoffice themfor things.dealing Andwith the NewEuropeanYork. BureauBut, wasthat themeant actionthat officeI often, for ordealingmy staff, with wrotethe Belgians.messages toI wasLeopoldville the actionor officeBrussels foror dealingLondon orwithParis. New York.Because But,we thathad the meantoperation that I hour-to-hour.often, or my staff,We had wroteto watch messagesit. Weto

hadLeopoldvillea very active or Brusselsand politically or London veryor Paris.important Becauseclient we

hadin Adlaithe operationStevenson hour-to-hour.up there. We Andhad toso, watch( init. theWe

hadbureaucratic a very activebroiling and politicallyand boiling veryon thisimportantSUbject) clientwe

tendedin Adlaito haveStevenson"the power up ofthere.the firstAnddraft." so, That(in is,the bureaucraticour client needed broilingan answer and boilingeven if iton shouldthis sUbject)be answered we bytendedsomebody to haveelse, lithemaybe powerthey of hadthe alreadyfirst draft."gone home Thatbut is,we wereour clientstill neededthere, anso weanswerwould evenwrite if it shouldout, clear be answeredit with

bythem somebodyand send else,it maybeoff. theyI had hada alreadyvery, very gone goodhome staff.but we

wereJoe sisco stillwas there,my firstso we deputywould writeand Dick it out,Gardiner clearwas it alsowith thema deputy and workingsend itmore off. on Ieconomic had a very,and specialized very good agencystaff.

Joeissues. siscoWal waster myKotschnig first deputywas anandold Dickhand Gardineron the economicwas also aside; deputyBill workingBuffum morewho onwas economiclater an andundersecretary specialized agencyat the issues• Walter Kotschnig was an old hand on the economic 11 side; Bill Buffum who was later an undersecretary at the

11 UN -- in Bunche's job, in fact -- was the head of our political section: Don McHenry who was later Ambassador UNto the-- inUN wasBunche'sa young job,first in yearfact foreign-- was servicethe headofficer. of our politicalSo, we had section:an excellent Don McHenrystaff. who was later Ambassador JK: toYou thementioned UN was athat youngat firsttimes yearyou had foreignbetter servicecommunications officer. So,with wethe hadCongo an excellentthan the staff.UN had. Did the UN have a JK: Youproblem mentionedwith havingthat atadequate times youcommunications had better communicationsfacilities? Cleveland:Yes,with theythe Congohad to thandeal thethrough UN had.their fieldDid thecommander UN havewho a problemwas General with havingPrem Chand. adequateHe communicationswas in Leopoldville facilities?at cleveland:Yes,headquarters. they had toLater deal throughon I think theirthey fieldhad commandera Brazilian who wasGeneral Generalthere. PremBut Chand.the brigadier He wasgeneral in Leopoldvillewho was running at headquarters.the outfit was Lateractually on I leadingthink theythe hadtroops a Braziliandown in GeneralKatanga: there.he was Butthe theman brigadierI described generalin the whopassage was runningin my bookthe outfit(The Obligations was actuallyof Power,leading1966). the troopsAnd he downwas anin Katanga:absolutely he charmingwas the mancharacter I describedwith ainvery the selfpassagestarting in my bookpersonality. (The ObligationsIf he felt ofsomething Power, 1966).needed toAndbe hedone washe'd an absolutelygo in and charmingdo it characterand tell withheadquarters a very selfabout startingit personality.afterwards. If he felt something needed to be done he'd JK: goIn yourin andbook doyou itmentioned and tellthat headquartersyou did make aabouttrip toit theafterwards.Congo. JKCleveland:: Yes,In yourseveral. book you mentioned that you did make a trip to JK: theYou Congo.mentioned also in your book a particular Indian Cleveland: Yes,officer several.who you said when they were planning a troop JK: movement,You mentionedhe wouldalso oftenin yourdrive bookin ahead.a particular Indian Cleveland:Right,officerand whothat youwould saidso whenastonish they thewereKatanga planninggendarmerie a troop that movement,they'd heeither woulddeal oftenwith drivehim inor ahead.they'd flee. He had Cleveland:Right, and that would so astonish the Katanga gendarmerie 12 that they'd either deal with him or they'd flee. He had

12 very good control of his troops.

JK: What was his name? I didn't recall that you mentioned it

in yourverybook. good control of his troops. JK:Cleveland:I Whatcan't was rememberhis name?his I didn'tname off recallhand. thatBut youI'm mentionedsure it's it in yourthe archives. book. Brian Urquhart would know. JK:Cleveland:IDid can'tyou haveremembera chance his tonamespeak off directlyhand. Butto thisI'm sureBrigadier it's

General?in the archives. Brian Urquhart would know. JK:Cleveland:Oh Didyes, you havethat's a chancehow I togot speakthese directlystories. to this Brigadier

JK: General?How did he manage to talk them out of combat? Cleveland:OhCleveland:I thinkyes, that'sit was howjust I thatgot thesehe was stories.very good at bluffing. JK: AndHow didit wasn't he managewholly to atalkbluff thembecause out ofthe combat?UN had I think Cleveland:Ifive thinkthousand it wastroops just thatin there he wasat oneverytime. good atMost bluffing.of them

Andwere itIndians, wasn't Gurkhaswholly aand bluffothers, becauseand thethey UNwere had knownI thinkas

goodfive thousandfighters. troopsThe gendarmeriein there at wasone time.a rag tagMostband of themand werethey Indians,weren't goingGurkhasto andtake others,on these and theyvery wereprofessional known as

goodsoldiers fighters.if they Thecould gendarmeriehelp it. So,wasthey a ragtended tag bandto avoid and theyconfrontations. weren't goingThere to reallytake onwasn't these averylot ofprofessionalbloodshed

soldiersin all that if theychasing couldaround help init. Katanga.So, they tended to avoid confrontations.Peacekeeping Theretroops reallyhave wasn'ta very a lotinteresting of bloodshedand

peculiarin all thatfunction. chasing aroundI call in Katanga.them "soldiers without

enemies.Peacekeeping" Soldiers troopsare havenot abrought very interestingup to not haveand peculiarenemies. function.Their whole educationI call themis to"soldiersdefeat somebody. without enemies.But the purpose " Soldiersof this arewas notnot tobroughtdefeat upanybody to notbut haveto enemies.keep the variousTheir wholefactions educationout of iseach to other'sdefeat somebody.hair and Butcalm thethings purposedown ofand thiskeep wasthings not toquiet. defeatEven anybodyin the butmore to keeporthodox the variouspeacekeeping factionsoperations out of eachon bordersother's likehair theand calm things down and keep things quiet. Even in the more 13 orthodox peacekeeping operations on borders like the

13 Sinai Peninsula, for example, or in Lebanon, the UN troops carried weapons but they didn't initiate any

Sinaishooting. Peninsula,There wasforan example,incident or(1 thinkin Lebanon,1 mentioned the UNit troopsin the book)carriedwhere weaponsa lot butof civiliansthey didn'tespecially initiatewomen any wereshooting.beating Thereon wasthe anIndian incidentsoldiers (I thinkas theyI mentionedstood atit attentionin the book)and wherenot onea lotof ofthem civiliansbroke ranks, especiallynot one womenof werethem hitbeatingback onor theanything. Indian ThissoldiersBrigadier as theyGeneral stood wasat attentionone of the andmost notgenuine one ofleaders them broke1 have ranks,met. not one of JK: themFor thehit backUN troops or anything.to learn Thisthis Brigadiernew style Generalit tookwas

oneretraining. of the most genuine leaders I have met. JKCleveland:: ForYes, theand itUN tooktroopsstrong to andlearnclear thisleadership new styleby somebodyit took whoretraining.understood what the exercise was. There was a Cleveland:MalaysianYes, and italso tookthere, strongeither and cleara major leadershipor a colonel, by somebodywho whohad aunderstoodcontingent whatof Malayan the exercisetroops. was.And theyTherewere wasalso a Malaysiangood and tough. also there,They hadeitherbeen afighting major orthe a Communistscolonel, whoin

hadthe a boondockscontingentin of MalaysiaMalayan troops.and they Andwere they verywere wellalso goodtrained. and tough.I was alsoThey impressedhad been fightingwith the thefact Communiststhat he had in thea clear boondocksidea ofinthe Malaysiacompletely and off-the-chartthey were verykind wellof trained.mission thatI waspeacekeeping also impressedtroops with thehave, factwhich that heis hadso adifferent clear ideafrom ofanything the completelyin military off-the-charthistory. kind of

JK: missionIn 1964 whenthatmost peacekeepingof the UN troopstroops hadhave,been whichtaken outis ofso differentthe Congo fromfighting anythingbroke inout militaryagain aroundhistory.stanleyville JK: Inand 1964there whenwere mostvarious of theincidents UN troopswhere had beenpeople takenwere outbeing of thebrutalized. Congo fightingThe US andbrokethe outBelgians again carriedaround stanleyvilleout a rescue andmission. there wereWere variousyou involved incidentsin wherethe planningpeople wereof beingthat brutalized.event? The US and the Belgians carried out a rescue mission. Were you involved in the planning of that 14 event?

14 Cleveland: Yes, very much involved, all night long.

JK: What were the circumstances around that event and how Cleveland: Yes, very much involved, all night long. were the people removed? JK: What were the circumstances around that event and how Cleveland:Well, they had some hostages and .•. JK: wereWere thesethe peopleGizenga's removed?people who had taken hostages? Cleveland:Well,Cleveland:Yes, ittheywas hadGizenga some byhostagesthat time. and .And • .they were Belgians JK: Werefor thethesemost Gizenga'spart. peopleWe decided who hadto takenhelp thehostages?Belgians. Cleveland:Yes,They itare wasour Gizengaallies, byafter that all.time. Also,And theyit was werenice Belgiansto be

ablefor theto mostwork part.with theWe decidedBelgians to andhelpnot the alwaysBelgians.be Theyadversarial are our withallies,the afterBelgians all. asAlso,on the it Katangawas niceissue. to be So,able wetodecided work withto help thethem; Belgianswe decided and notthat alwayswe should be adversarialnot engage inwithcombat, the Belgiansbut to supply as on thethe airKatangatransport. issue. So,It waswe decidedplanned veryto helpcarefully them; weand decidedwas carried that weout shouldwith

notremarkable engage secrecy.in combat, Usuallybut to operationssupply the likeair transport.that leak Itahead wasof plannedtime. veryAnd carefullythey got inandand wasout carriedbefore outgetting with remarkableinto very much secrecy.trouble. UsuallyThere operationswas a little likebit thatof a fireleak aheadfight butof time.not veryAndmuch. they got in and out before getting JK: So,into itverywas muchbasically trouble.Belgian Theretroops was a littlewith US bittransport. of a fire Cleveland:Yes,fight sortbut notof commandovery much.type troops. It was called the JK: So,hostage it wassnatch. basicallyWe were Belgianable troopsto get withthem USout transport.of there. Cleveland: Yes,It was sortabout of thecommandomost typesuccessful troops.thing It ofwas thatcalledkind theI hostagethink in snatch.modern historyWe wereother able thanto getthe themhostage out ofsnatch there.at theIt wasEntebbe aboutairport the mostthat successfulthe Israelis thinghad of carriedthat kindout. I thinkI stayed in modernup all historynight withotherthat thanoperation. the hostage Everysnatchfew at theminutes Entebbewe had airportreports thaton thehow Israelisthings were had going.carried out. JK: WhenI stayedthere upwas alla changenight within administration that operation.from KennedyEvery fewto minutes we had reports on how things were going. 15 JK: When there was a change in administration from Kennedy to

15 Johnson was there any change in the support for the UN

operation in the Congo?

Cleveland:No,Johnsonbecause was Johnson'there anys theme changewas incontinuity. the supportIn forfact, thehis UN

firstoperationintention in thewas Congo?to tell us all that we shouldn't even

Cleveland:putNo, becausein the pro Johnson'sforma resignation theme was continuity.that people Intend fact,to do.his

Andfirstactually intentionDean wasRusk to tellhad tous talkall thathim outwe shouldn'tof telling evenus notput into theresign. pro formaIt resignationwould set a thatbad peopleprecedent tend forto do.an Andincoming actuallypresident Dean Rusk tohad tojust talk foldhim outin of tellingeverybody us automaticallynot to resign.even Itif wouldhe intended set a tobaddo precedentthat. We forshould an

allincomingresign andpresidentthen he shouldto justreappoint fold us,inand everybodyjust the

keepautomaticallythe resignations even if hein intendedhis drawer. to do So,that.there We shouldwas a continuityall resign andin personnelthen he shouldand inreappointpolicy. us,Stevenson, and just thein fact,keep thethought resignationsthat he wasin hisgoing drawer.to have So,a muchthere closerwas a relationshipcontinuity inwith personnelthe White and Housein policy.when JohnsonStevenson,came inin becausefact, thoughtJohnson thatwas hishe wasgeneration going toand havehe had a muchnever closerquite gottenrelationshipused to withthe thefact Whitethat heHousewas whenworking Johnsonfor somebodycame in

because(Kennedy) Johnsonwho was wasabout his generationof an age toandbe hehis hadson. neverSo, quitein thegottenfirst used totwo the orfact threethat heweeks was workingof thefor somebodyJohnson

Administration(Kennedy) who washe wasaboutdown of onan theageranch to beover his theson.weekends So, in

andthe sofirstforth, twobut thator cooledthree offweekspretty of fast.the JohnsonJohnson andAdministrationstevenson were he wasreally down noton theon theranchsame overwave thelength weekendson mostand sothings. forth, but that cooled off pretty fast. Johnson

JK: Youand stevensonmentioned werethat reallythe US notsupplied on the sametransport wave lengthfor the on rescuemost things.operation. What other kind of logistic support JK: didYou thementionedUS provide thatduring the USthe suppliedCongo operation? transport for the Cleveland:Economicrescue operation.aid was the Whatmain otherthing. kind of logistic support did the US provide during the Congo operation? 16 Cleveland:Economic aid was the main thing.

16 JK: Economic aid directly to the Congo? Cleveland:Yes, we were the biggest provider of economic assistance. JK: EconomicI got very aidmuch directlyinvolved to inthethat. Congo?I had been in the aid Cleveland:Yes,business we wereearlier the biggestin providermy life, of economicduring theassistance.Truman AdministrationI got very much withinvolvedthe Marshallin that. Plan.I had beenSo, inI wasthe theaid businessnatural personearlierto sendin overmy life,to study duringthe aidthesituation Truman Administrationand try to figure with outthe whatMarshallthey Plan.needed So,and I whatwas the naturalbalance ofpersonpaYments to sendwas, overwhich to wasstudyimpossible the aid tosituationfigure andout becausetry to figurethere weren'tout whatany theynumbers neededfor andus whatto workthe balancewith. of paYments was, which was impossible to figure JK: outDid becausethe US gettheredirectly weren't involvedany numbersin thefor trainingus to workof with.personnel both military and civilian? JK:Cleveland:No, Did thethe militaryUS get directlycontingents involvedinvolved in werethe trainingprovided byof personnelcountries, bothCanadians, militaryGhanaians, and civilian?Indians, Malayans and so Cleveland:No,forth. the militaryAnd they contingentswere trained involvedmostly wereby providedtheir ownby countriescountries, Canadians,on the Ghanaians,hoof because Indians,there Malayanswasn't and anso forth.international And theypeace wereacademy trainedor anything.mostly by So,theirthere own wasn'tcountriesreally aontraining the hoofsystem. becauseI thinkthere that'swasn'twhat an droveinternationalRikhye to peaceestablish academythe Internationalor anything. Peaceso,Academy there wasn'tbecause reallythere wasa traininga big gap system.to be filledI thinkand hethat'shas hopedwhat droveto fill Rikhyeit. to establish the International Peace Academy JK: becauseIn the beginning there wasit a wasbig hopedgap tothat be filledthe Congolese and he haswould hopedbe ableto fillto fillit. in the military officers positions. I was JK: wonderingIn the beginningif the itUS washad hopedgotten thatinvolved the Congolesein training wouldthe be ableCongolese. to fill in the military officers positions. I was Cleveland:Well,wonderingyes, ifthere the wasUS hada lot gottenof educational involved inexchange, training the Congolese. 17 Cleveland:Well, yes, there was a lot of educational exchange,

17 people coming over and going to school. Some of the

Congolese military came over to our military schools, I

guess,people butcomingthat overwas notand somethinggoing to thatschool.I was involvedSome of in.the

But,CongoleseI was militaryinvolved camevery, oververy tomuch ourin militarythe economic schools,part. I guess, but that was not something that I was involved in.

JK: YouBut, hadI wasmentioned involved thatvery, oneveryof muchthe inUS theconcerns economicin part.the

Congo was the Soviet involvement. And you mentioned also

JK: Youin your had bookmentionedthat thethatUS onewas ofinterested the US concernsin keeping in thethe

SovietsCongo wasout theof Sovietthe Congo involvement.and pretty Andmuch you mentionedout of the alsoUN operationin your bookitself. that Attheone US pointwas interestedwhen Mobutu intook keepingover thethe

governmentSoviets outthe of Sovietsthe Congowere andkicked prettyout muchof outLeopoldville. of the UN Cleveland:Theyoperationmostly itself.left muchAt oneearlier pointthan whenthat, Mobututhough, took overat thethe

endgovernmentof the theEisenhower Soviets Administrationwere kicked outabout of Leopoldville.the time we

Cleveland:Theywere comingmostly in.leftThe muchperson earlierthat thandeserves that, thethough,most creditat the

forend thatof thewas EisenhowerRalph Bunche. AdministrationHe went over aboutthere theand timehe was we awerekind comingof nursemaid in. The personto the thatnew deservesgovernment. the mostHe stayedcredit overfor thatthere wasand Ralphcommuted Bunche.over He therewent overduring therethat andperiod. he was

Anda kindthe UNof hadnursemaida series toof thequite newstrong government.Secretary HeGeneral stayed

representativesover there and commutedlike UN ambassadors, over there asduringit were, thatresident period.

inAndLeopoldville. the UN had a seriesThey hadof quitethe Irishstrongpoet, SecretaryConor GeneralCruise

O'Brien,representativesover there likefor UN ambassadors,a while. So, asthe it UNwere,took residenta good

partin Leopoldville.of the brunt Theyof the hadadvising the Irishand poet,helping Conorthe Cruisenew governmentO'Brien, overget thereorganized. for a while.We did So,quite the aUNlot tookof athat, good too,part butof themore bruntunder ofthe thetable. advising and helping the new

JK: Asgovernmentfar as your getrecollection organized. isWe concerned,did quite thea lotSoviets of that,did

nottoo, havebut anymorepresence under thein table.Leopoldville after that point. JK: As far as your recollection is concerned, the Soviets did 18 not have any presence in Leopoldville after that point.

18 Cleveland:They didn't have an effective presence. They still had

an Embassy there, at least for a while until the Mobutu Cleveland:Theything. didn'tAnd, haveas usualan effectivewith their presence.embassies, Theythey stillhad hada ancovert Embassyoperation there, going.at leastBut, for theya whilewere untilreally thenot Mobutuvery thing.effective. And, Asas Iusualsaid, withthey theirwere embassies,buffaloed bytheythe hadUN. a

covertThat was operationsomething going.that wasBut,not theyin werethe categoriesreally not verythat

effective.they had learned As I tosaid,think theywith, werethe buffaloedUN being operationalby the UN. Thatthat way.was somethingThey thought thatof wasthe notUN asin sortthe categoriesof a committee. that

theyBut we hadthought learnedof toit thinkquite with,consciously the UN asbeingan actionoperationalbody.

thatPart way.of ourThey purposethought ofon theeach UN asof sortthe ofpeace-keeping a committee. Butoperations we thoughtwas ofto ittry quiteto leaveconsciouslya situation as an whereactionthe body.UN Parthad a ofgreater our capacitypurpose toon acteachafter of thethe crisispeace-keepingthan it hadoperationsbefore. wasSo, tothe trycrises to leavethemselves a situationwere wherebuilding the upUN hadthe UN'sa greatercapacity. capacityThat towas actour aftertheory theon crisisCyprus thanand the it

Middlehad before.East andSo, NewtheGuinea crisesand themselvesso forth. were building up

JK: theYou mentionedUN's capacity.also somethingThat was ourinteresting theory onin Cyprusthe book andthat the Middleeven though East andthere Newwere Guineasoviets and soin forth.the UN who could be JK: Youconsulted mentionedon alsothe somethingoperation interestingthat insomehow the booktheir that consultationseven though therewere wereavoided sovietson major in thedecisions. UN who could be Cleveland:consultedYes, well, theon UStheand operationthe UN secretariat that somehowwere in closetheir

consultationscahoots, you'd werehave avoidedto say retrospectively;on major decisions.it must have

Cleveland: Yes,looked well,that theway USto andthe theRussians. UN secretariatThe Russians were inhad closean Undersecretarycahoots, yOU'd haveGeneral to sayfor retrospectively;Special Political it mustAffairs have whichlooked meantthat wayyou to didn'tthe Russians.really reportThe Russiansanything had ofan Undersecretaryimportance to thatGeneraloffice. for They'dSpecialhave Politicalthese MilitaryAffairs whichCommittee meantmeetings you didn'twhich reallyweren't reportreally anythingterribly of importance to that office. They'd have these Military 19 Committee meetings which weren't really terribly

19 significant; the Cold War was on. There wasn't very much

informal conversation with the soviets, and I think that

Hammarskjsignificant;old theand Coldeventually War was on.U Thant,There wasn'ttoo, werevery muchnot sYmpatheticinformal conversationto them. Andwiththe thesoviets soviets,were andmore I thinkand morethat Hammarskjoffended oldby theandUN eventuallydeveloping Uits Thant,capacity too,to wereact, andnot

theysYmpatheticconsequently to them.made Andmore theand sovietsmore weretrouble moreabout and morethe

moneyoffendedand bystopped the UNpaying developingtheir dues.its capacityThat's whereto act,we gotand

theyinto consequentlythe crisis over made articlemore and19, morewhether troublethe aboutGeneral the moneyAssembly andwould stoppedlower payingthe theirboom ondues.the sovietsThat's whereand exclude we got

theminto fromthe crisisvoting. over article 19, whether the General JK: AssemblyYou mentioned wouldthat lowerSenator the boomDodd onhad theled sovietssome criticism and excludeof themthe UN fromoperation. voting. What was the basis of that criticism JK: Youand mentionedhow effective that wasSenatorit? DoddWas hadany ledof somethe criticismcriticism of the UN operation.operation warranted?What was the basis of that criticism Cleveland:Well,and howI thoughteffectivethat wasSenator it? WasDodd anycame of closethe criticismto being onof

the payrollUN operationof the warranted?Belgian interests that were involved.

Cleveland:Well,He was I virtuallythought thatthe Senator"Senator Doddfrom cameKatanga" close tothe beingway heon

theacted. payrollI failedof the toBelgiansee whatinterestsus interest that werewas involved.engaged Hehere. was virtuallyHis interest the was"Senatorobviously from Katanga"engaged. theHe waywas hea acted.powerful Iand failedarticulate to seeguy whatand usso heinterestwas able wasto engagedstir a here.lot of mudHis offinterestthe bottomwas obviouslyof the lakeengaged.and implyHe wasthat a powerfulanyone supporting and articulatethis UNguyoperation and so he waswas "pinko"able to andstirso a

lotforth, of amudtactic off leftthe overbottomfrom of thetheMcCarthy lake andperiod. imply But,that

anyonewith the supportingPresident thisas solidUN operationas he waswas on"pinko"it, andand theso forth,Secretary a tacticof State left over-- from(Secretary the McCarthyof Defense period.Robert But, withMcNamara the hadPresidentnever really as solidengaged as hehimself was onon theit, sUbject)and the Secretary of state -- (Secretary of Defense Robert 20 McNamara had never really engaged himself on the subject)

20 -­ Senator Dodd was a big annoyance but not a big

problem. One of the chief interests of the -­ Senator Dodd was a big annoyance but not a big President in the UN was to keep Adlai Stevenson on board problem.in the Democratic PartyOne ofbecause the chiefas you interestsknow Kennedy of onlythe wonPresidentby a fewin thehundred UN wasthousand to keep votes.Adlai stevensonIf on any on issueboard Adlaiin the StevensonDemocratichad Partydefected, because asresigned you knowin Kennedya huff onlyor wonanything by a likefew hundredthat, it thousandwould have votes.been a Ifmajor on anybody issueblow

Adlaito the StevensonDemocratic had defected,Party andresignedto inthe a huffKennedy or

Administration.anything like that,Whenever it woulda President have beengets a majorinto bodythe White blow Houseto thehe's Democraticalready thinking Partyabout andthe tonext theelection. Kennedy JK: YouAdministration.also mentioned Wheneverin your a bookPresidentthat bothgets theintoUN theand Whitethe USHousehave he'sbeen alreadybetter thinkingat discouraging about theviolence next election.rather than JK: resolvingYou also mentionedsome of inthe yourproblems book thatthat bothhave theled UN andto thethe trouble.us have been better at discouraging violence rather than Cleveland:Theyresolvingare bettersome ofat thepeacekeeping problems thatthan haveat peacemaking.led to the JK: So,trouble.taking a look at the Congo and the problems that have Cleveland:Theycontinued are betterto arise atthere, peacekeepingin what waythancould at peacemaking.the UN have JK: dealtSo, takingbetter a lookwith at thethe Congounderlying and theproblems problemsthat that werehave causingcontinuedthe tocrisis? arise there, in what way could the UN have Cleveland:Idealtthink betterthe UN withdid inthe theunderlyingCongo what problemsit set thatout toweredo andcausingwe set the itcrisis?out to do, which was to keep the country Cleveland:Itogether think theand UNto didmake init thea viable Congo countrywhat it andset tooutdevelop to do theand nationalwe set itleadership. out to do, whichThe only was problemto keepwas thethat countrythe nationaltogether leadershipand to maketurned it a viableout to becountrya General and towho developin the yearsthe nationalsince thenleadership.has become Themore only andproblemmore wascorrupt that andthe overbearingnational leadershipand steal turneding theout tocountry be a Generalblind, whoI think.in the years since then has become more and more corrupt and 21 overbearing and stealing the country blind, I think.

21 It's like Somoza or Pinochet or Marcos or some of the

other delightful characters that the United states has

It'ssupported like becauseSomoza orthey Pinochetwere thereor Marcosand theor someUS couldn't of the other delightful characters that the United states has figure out what else to do. But, during the time that I dealtsupportewithd becausethe Congo, theywhat wereeveryone there wasand worriedthe us aboutcouldn'twas

thatfigureMobutu out whatwasn't elsestrong to do.enough. But, duringThere thewas timereal thatdoubt I whendealthe witfinallyh the Congo,took overwhat everyonethat he wouldwas worriedmake it aboutbecause was thathe wasn't Mobutua wasn'tvery powerful strong enough.or charismatic There wasleader realat doubtall.

whenSo, in hea finallyway it hastookbeen oversurprising that he wouldthat hemakehas itlasted becauseso

helong wasn'andtdisappointinga very powerfulthat or powercharismatictended leaderto corrupt at all.so

much.So, in a way it has been surprising that he has lasted so JK: Duringlong andthe disappointingCongo crisis thatthere powerwere tendeda number to corruptof tragic so

much.deaths that occurred and a certain amount of suspicion JK: Duringsurrounding the Congothese deaths.crisis thereOne was werePatrice a numberLumumba. of tragicFrom yourdeathspoint that ofoccurredview and andfrom a certainthe sources amountof ofinformation suspicion

availablesurroundingto theseyou, wasdeaths.there Oneany wascomplicity Patrice Lumumba.on the part Fromof theyourWestern point ofpowers view inandhis fromdeath? the sources of information

Cleveland:Well,availableI don't to you,know wasfor therea fact anyabout complicitythat. onI havethe partalways of

assumedthe Westernthat powersthe CIA inwas his indeath?on the act, though probably

Cleveland:Well,not directly I don'tdoing know thefor assassinationa fact about that.but at Ileast havehelping always

toassumedfinance thatand thesupport CIA wasthe inanti-Lumumba on the act, thoughfolks up probablyin the Stanleyvillenot directly doingarea. theLumumba assassinationlooked like butquite at leasta threat helpingto USto financeinterests and atsupportthe timethe anti-Lumumbabecause he folkswas veryup inmuch the orientedStanleyvilletoward area. theLumumbasoviets lookedand likehe quitehad a thethreatmost to

USleadership interestsqualities at theof timeanybody becausearound heand wasit lookedvery muchlike

heorientedwas goingtowardto theend Sovietsup as leaderand he ofhadthe thecentral most leadership qualities of anybody around and it looked like 22 he was going to end up as leader of the central

22 government. I don't myself know and I assumed it would come out at some time like everything else the CIA seems

government.to do. But, I'veI don'tnever myselfseen knowany directand I assumedevidence itof wouldit.

JK: Thecomeother out attragic some timedeath likewas everythingthat of Dag elseHammarskjold. the CIA seems

Cleveland:Yes,to do.it's But,still I'venot neverclear seenwhether any directit was evidencean accident of it.or

JK: Thenot. otherIt tragicwas assumed death wasat thethat time,of Dagand Hammarskjold.I don't have Cleveland:Yes,evidence it'sthat stillit notwasn't, clear thatwhetherit wasit wasjust anan accidentaccident. or not.It was wayIt wasin theassumedjungle, atpretty the time,remote, andthe I placedon't wherehave theevidenceairplane thatfell it wasn't,down. that it was just an accident.

It wasI happened way in theto bejungle,in New prettyYork remote,when that thehappened. place whereI

wasthe awakenedairplane infellthe down.middle of the night. Dean Rusk was alsoI uphappenedthere becauseto be init Newwas duringYork whenthe thatGeneral happened.Assembly. I wasSo, weawakenedmet at inan theearly middlebreakfast, of the Stevensonnight. Deanand Rusk andwas onealsoor uptwo thereother becausepeople, it Yostwas duringand/or thePlimpton, Generaland Assembly.myself toSo, discusswe met atthe animplications early breakfast,and what stevensonwe ought andto Ruskdo. andWe drewone orup two aothervery people,short Yostlist and/orof peoplePlimpton,that and lookedmyself

acceptableto discuss atthethe implicationstime. There andwas whata Finn we oughtwho looked to do.like We adrewvery upgood a verybet. shortThe Asians list hadn'tof peoplehad itthatyet lookedand U Thantacceptablehad atbeen thearound time. Therequite wasa whilea Finn aswhothe lookedBurmese like Representativea very good bet.at theTheUN. AsiansAnd inhadn'tthe end hadthe itonly yet personand U

whoThantwas hadacceptable been aroundon the quiteUS list a andwhileon asthe theSoviet Burmeselist

turnedRepresentativeout to beat UtheThant. UN. AndU inThant the wasend thesomething only personof a disappointmentwho was acceptablefor theon theUS governmentus list andto onDean the Rusksovietand listso on.turnedHe outwas tovery beThird U Thant.World Uoriented, Thant wasand somethinghe was not ofat a alldisappointmentsYmpathetic forto the USUS governmenton Vietnam. to Dean Rusk and so JK: Inon. theHe wasCongo veryoperation Third Worldwas oriented,there any anddifference he was not ofat all sYmpathetic to the us on vietnam. 23 JK: In the Congo operation was there any difference of

23 opinion?

Cleveland:No, there wasn't. There was real continuity in the opinion? policy all around in that. The Congo operation sort of Cleveland:No,tapered thereoff wasn't.after '64Thereand wewashad realother continuitycrises toin dealthe pOlicywith. Theall aroundCongo was in that.long runningThe Congoand complex,operationlegally, sort of

taperedlogistically, off afterand politically.'64 and we hadThere otherhave crisesbeen atocouple deal

with.of books Theon Congothe sUbject.was long runningYou may andhave complex,seen the legally,one by

Kalb,logistically,Marvin Kalb'sand politically.wife. There have been a couple JK: We'veof bookscovered on theall sUbject.the questions You maythat haveI had seenprepared. the one byIs Kalb,there Marvinanything Kalb'sthat wife.you'd like to add? JKCleveland:Only: We've tocoveredemphasize all thethat questionsfor a thatthing I likehad prepared.that, which Is thererequired anythingdeciding thatto you'dsupport likethe toUN add?and then staying with

Cleveland:Onlythat decisionto emphasizeover threethat ratherfor a harrowingthing likeyears, that,it wouldwhich haverequiredbeen decidingimpossible to supportif we had thenot UN andhad thena consistency staying withof viewthat decisionand of support over threefrom ratherthe Secretary harrowingof years,State andit wouldfrom havethe President.been impossibleI think if wethe hadrole not thathad aI consistencywas trying toof viewplay anddid ofturn supportout to frombe quitethe Secretarycrucial andof Statequite andcentral from

becausethe President.somebody I hadthinkto thecoordinate role that theI wasWhite tryingHouse to

playrelations, did turnthe outrelations to be quitewith crucialthe other and quitebureaus, centralthe

becauserelations somebodywith Congress had toon thecoordinateSUbject, andthe theWhiterelations House

relations,and instructions the relationsto the mission with thein otherNew York, bureaus,and eventhe dealrelationswith withthe PentagonCongress toon thesome SUbject,extent onandthe thelogistical relations andsupport. instructions to the mission in New York, and even dealI withremember the Pentagonone of the to goldensome extentmoments on ofthemy logisticallife was goingsupport.over to meet with the members of the Joint Chiefs of StaffI rememberon the onesubject of theof goldenthe UN peacekeepingmoments of myin lifegeneral was going over to meet with the members of the Joint Chiefs 24 of Staff on the subject of the UN peacekeeping in general

24

= but with the Congo very much in everybody's mind. I was

proposing that we should predesignate some forces and do

butsome withtraining the Congofor this verynew muchkind in ofeverybody'smission and mind.get setI wasup

professionallyproposing that weto beshouldsupportive predesignateof the someUN's forcespeacekeeping and do

capacity.some trainingThe foracting this newChairman kind ofof missionthe Chiefs and getthat setday up

professionally(the Chairman was to sick)be supportivewas General of thecurtis UN's Lemaypeacekeepingwho was

acapacity.fire-eating Theairforce acting Chairmanofficer. ofSo, thethe Chiefsjob hadthat manyday

interesting(the Chairmanaspects was sick)to it.was General Curtis Lemay who was

JK: Thanka fire-eatingyou for takingairforcethe officer.time to doSo,this theinterview. job had many interesting aspects to it.

JK: Thank you for taking the time to do this interview.

25

25 INDEX OF NAMES

Adoula, Pres. Cyrille 3, 9

Bowles, Chester INDEX OF NAMES 5 9 Adoula,Buffum, Pres.William Cyrille 3, 11 5 Bowles,Bunche, ChesterRalph 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 18

Buffum,carter, WilliamPres. James 1110

Bunche,Dodd, Senator Ralph Thomas 3, 6, 7, 9,1, 10,3, 12,20, 1821 carter,Eisenhower, Pres.Pres. JamesDwight 2, 3, 1018

Dodd,Gardiner, SenatorRichard Thomas 1, 3, 20, 1121

Eisenhower,Gizenga, Antoine Pres. Dwight 2, 3, 1815

Gardiner,GUllion, EdmundRichard 118

Gizenga,Harriman, AntoineAverell 1, 155

Johnson,GUllion, EdmundPres. Lyndon 1, 168

Harriman,Kennedy, Pres.AverellJohn F. 1, 2, 15, 16,1, 215

Johnson,Kotschnig, Pres.WaIter Lyndon 1, 1116

Kennedy,Lemay, General Pres. JohnCurtis F. 1, 2, 15, 16, 2521

Kotschnig,Lumumba, Patrice Walter 1, 3, 2211

McHenry,Lemay, GeneralDon Curtis 1225

McNamara,Lumumba, PatriceRobert 1, 3, 2022

Mobutu,McHenry, SeseDon Seko 4, 9, 18, 19, 2212

O'Brien,McNamara, ConorRobertCruise 1820

Plimpton,Mobutu, SeseFrancis Seko 4, 9, 18, 19,9, 2322

O'Brien,Prem Chand, ConorGeneral Cruise 1218

Rikhye,Plimpton,General FrancisIndar 10,9, 1723

Rusk,Prem Chand,Dean General 2, 4, 5, 16, 2312 sisco,Rikhye, JosephGeneral Indar 10, 1117 Rusk, Dean 2, 4, 5, 16, 23 26 sisco, Joseph 11

26 Spaak, Paul Henri 6

Stevenson, Adlai 2, 4, 5, 7, 9-11, 16, 21, 23 Spaak, Paul Henri 6 Truman, Pres. Harry 17 stevenson, Adlai 2, 4, 5, 7, 9-11, 16, 21, 23 Tshombe, Moise 3, 9 Truman, Pres. Harry 17 Urquhart, Brian 10, 13 Tshombe, Moise 3, 9 Wilcox, Frances 3 Urquhart, Brian 10, 13 Williams, G. Mennen (Soapy) 5 Wilcox, Frances 3 Yost, Charles 9, 10, 23 Williams, G. Mennen (Soapy) 5 Young, Andrew 10, 12 Yost, Charles 9, 10, 23 Zorin, Valerian 10 Young, Andrew 10, 12

Zorin, Valerian 10

27

27

United Nations Oral History Project

Harlan Cleveland 22 April 1990 NON.CIRCULP.~li~,~l if YUN Interview I lAmbassador ~ar!an Cl~v~land <.:·::.r:.\~~;:~)lb.aI:l·.,:~.1.SS 11e lA~Cr1 s11 sf~,~l Interjriewe"dbyNON·CIRCUJames Sutterlin . AprilYUN Interview22, 1990 I {Ambassador."'Arden House, ~ar!aHarriman,n Cl~v~lanNY d '\ .:·::.r:.\~(;:~~b.aI1',::~.1.SS 11e Cr1 s 1 s Interviewed by James Sutterlin . TableAprilof 22,Contents 1990 ""Arden House, Harriman, NY I The Election of Secretaries-General Table of Contents --Selection of U Thant . 1-6 --Assessment of Hammarskjold 6 I The--UN Electioncrisis management of Secretaries-General 7 --Leadership in the UN system 8-10 --Selection of U Thant . 1-6 II The--AssessmentCuban Missile of Hammarskjoldcrisis 6 --UN crisis management 7 --Leadership--Background onin the UNBay systemof Pigs at the UN, 8-10 (Adlai stevenson's reaction) 11-15 II The--Kennedy Cuban Missileadministration's Crisis attitude toward the UN 11-15 --Stevenson's actions in the Security Council 19-24 --Background--Approach to onU Thantthe Bay of Pigs at the UN, 24-25 --U Thant's(Adlai Stevenson'sletter to Kennedy reaction)and Khrushchev 25-2611-15 --Kennedy--US suggestion administration'sof U Thant attitudeletter to towardCastro the UN 27-3011-15 --Stevenson's--contingency provisionactions infor the furtherSecurityintervention Council 19-24 --Approachby U Thant to U Thant 30-3124-25 --U--Adlai Thant'sStevenson's letter toattitude Kennedy inandthe Khrushchevcrisis 31-3325-26 --US--Negotiations suggestionin ofNew U ThantYork onletterremoval to Castroof the missiles 27-3033 --contingency--Assessment of provisionU Thant for further intervention 36-39 by U Thant 30-31 --Adlai Stevenson's attitude in the crisis 31-33 --Negotiations in New York on removal of the missiles 33 --Assessment of U Thant 36-39 YUN Interview Ambassador Harlan Cleveland Cuban Missile Crisis Interviewed by James Sutterlin AprilYUN Interview22, 1990 AmbassadorArden House, HarlanHarriman, ClevelandNY Cuban Missile Crisis Interviewed by James Sutterlin April 22, 1990 JS AmbassadorArdenCleveland, House,I Harriman,first want NYto thank you again for participating in this Yale university united Nations Oral

JS AmbassadorHistory Project, Cleveland,and I firstthought, want ifto wethankcould, you againwe would for beginparticipatingthis part inof thisyour Yaleconversation Universitytoday unitedon Nationsthe sUbject Oral Historyof the electionProject, ofandSecretary I thought,General if weU could,Thant. weYou, wouldat

beginthat point, this partI believe, of yourwere conversationthe head oftodaythe onInternational the subject

organizationof the electionDepartment of Secretaryin the GeneralState Department, U Thant. You,is that at

thatcorrect? point, I believe, were the head of the International

HC AssistantorganizationSecretary Departmentfor in theInternational State Department,Organization is that Affairs.correct? JSHC AssistantCould you describeSecretarywhat forhappened Internationalon the AmericanOrganizationside Affairs.after the sudden and unexpected death of Hammarskjold?

JS WhatCould youthoughts describewere whatput happenedtogether on thein Americanterms of sidea

afterreplacement? the sudden and unexpected death of Hammarskjold?

HC WhatWell, whatthoughtsI don't wererecall putis togetherthe full slate,in termsI must ofsay. a

replacement?I was awakened in the middle of the night with the news HC Well,about whatHammarskjold, I don't recalland with is thea summonsfull slate,to a I verymustearly say.

breakfast,I was awakenednot inin theAdlai' middles Waldorfof the nightapartment with thebut newsin

anotherabout Hammarskjold,suite in the andTowers withthere a summonswhere Ruskto awas. very Andearlyso

breakfast,we all got togethernot in Adlai'sthere for Waldorf-- Adlai apartmentStevenson, butDean in Ruskanotherand suitemyself, in theand TowersI don't thererecall wherewho Ruskelse was.was presentAnd so

webut allalmost got certainlytogether thereFrancis for Plimpton-- Adlaiand stevenson,Charlie YostDean

Rusk and myself, and I don't recall who else was present

but almost certainly Francis Plimpton and Charlie Yost were, and maybe somebody else from the state Department,

but I can't remember. And we began immediately to cast

were,about and camemaybeout, somebodyas I recall,else fromwith thethree statepeople Department,on the

butslate, I can'tone ofremember.whom was AndU Thant. we beganBut immediatelyhe was the toleast cast

preferredabout and cameon the out,general as I recall,theory thatwith hethreewould peopletend onto thebe

veryslate,Third one ofWorldish whom wasand Uwould Thant.cater But tohe thewas developingthe least

preferredcountry majority on the andgeneralalso theorywould tendthat tohe bewouldof atendBurmese to be-

verypassive Thirdnature, Worldishwhich andwas wouldthe cateropposite to ofthe thedevelopingSwedish

countryactivism majoritythat Dag andHammarskj also wouldold stood tend tofor. be ofI may a Burmesehave the ­

chronologypassive nature,wrong butwhichI believe was thethere oppositewas a ofFinn thenamed SwedishMax

activismsomething that••• Dag Hammarskjold stood for. I may have the

chronology wrong but I believe there was a Finn named Max

JS Hesomethingcame later. • • • There was a Finn at this point, and his name was Ralph Inkle, I believe. A Finn, and then the

JS HeTunisian came later.Mongi SlimThereand wasFrederick a Finn Bolandat thisof point,Ireland, andthey his werename wasall candidates.Ralph Inkle, I believe. A Finn, and then the

HC TunisianBut it rather Mongi rapidlySlim anddeveloped Frederickbut Bolandthe ofSoviet Ireland,list theywas

werequite alldifferent candidates.from ours, except that U Thant turned up

HC onButtheir it ratherlist, rapidlytoo. And developedso it was buta ratherthe Sovietrapid listprocess was

quiteof elimination different asfromI ours,remember. exceptThe thatbasic U Thantquestion, turned upas

onoften theirin list,the UN too.in thoseAnd sodays, it waswas a ratherwhatever rapidthe processUS and

ofSoviet eliminationUnion could as agreeI remember.on nobody Theelse basicwas question,going to getas

oftenin the inway the ofUN in thosebecause days,that waswas whateversuch a thedifficult US and

Sovietagreement unionand couldthe agreeappointment on nobodydid elserequire was goingSecurity to get

incouncil the wayaction, of therefore-- becauseyou thathad wasto have suchboth a difficultthe U. S.

agreementand the U.S.S.R. and the appointment did require Security

Council action, therefore you had to have both the U. S. 2 and the U.S.S.R.

2 JS This was still in the aftermath of the Soviet proposal

for a so called Troika, which I believe, at this point,

JS Thisthey hadwas notstillentirely in the givenaftermathup. of the soviet proposal HC That'sfor a soright. called SoTroika,it was whichpart I ofbelieve,our interest at thisto point,get a theysolution had notthat entirelywould knock giventhat up. on the head, finally. I HC That'smust say right.that ISonever it wasthought part ofthat ourthat interestwould tofly. get aI thoughtsolution itthatwas wouldjust knocka thatploy, on andthe head,I think finally.it wasI

mustessentially say thatjust I aneverploy. thoughtI don't thatthink thatthey would(the Soviets)fly. I thoughtreally thought it wasthat justa three-headed a ploy, andsecretariat I thinkwas itgoing was essentiallyto be approved. just a ploy.One I don'tthing; think ittheywas (the sortsoviets)of unconstitutionalreally thought thatunder a three-headedthe Charter secretariatand so we wasnever, goingI mustto besay, approved.took it very seriously.One thing; Thereit waswas a lotsortnoise of unconstitutionalabout it -­ newspapers, under muchthe Charterdebate inandthe soeditorials we never, -­I mustbut lookingsay, tookat itit veryfrom seriously.the inside, Thereit never was lookeda lot noiselike

aboutsomething it -­onnewspapers,which we muchhad debateto make in policy.the editorialsWe just -­ butobviously lookingwere at againstit from theit and inside,therefore it neverit wasn't lookedgoing like

tosomethinghappen. on which we had to make policy. We just JS Didobviouslythe US werework againstclosely itwith andone thereforeor more itother wasn'tcountries going toat thishappen.point in trying to decide or determine who would JS beDidthe the nextus workSecretary? closely with one or more other countries HC Thereat thiswas pointa good in dealtryingof toconsultation, decide or determinewhich was whonormal, would

withbe thethe nextBritish Secretary?and French, but I went back to

He WashingtonThere was a almostgood dealimmediately. of consultation,I usually whichjust was spentnormal,a withday or thetwo upBritishthere and thenFrench,I would butgo I backwentto mybackdesk. to WashingtonSo I wasn't almostinvolved immediately.in the I actualusuallycanvassing just spent ofa delegations.day or two up thereThe mission and thenwas I wouldorganized go backin tosuch my adesk.way So I wasn't involved in the actual canvassing of 3 delegations. The mission was organized in such a way

3 that there was somebody responsible for each group -- for

keeping in touch with each group, more or less organized

bythatgeography there was-- somebodyand those responsiblepeople, of forcourse, each groupall fanned-- for

keepingout and tookin touchsoundings. with eachBut group,my recollection more or lessof organizedit is -­

byyour geographyresearch --wouldand thosereveal people,how quickly of course,the decision all fannedwas

madeout and-- tookbut mysoundings.recollection But wasmy recollectionthat the consensus of it iscame -­

yourquite researchfast. would reveal how quickly the decision was

JS madeWell, --therebut wasmy recollectiona good bit of wasback thatand theforth consensusbecause camethe

quitesoviets, fast.while giving up the Troika idea, proposed that

JS Well,there thereshould wasbe a goodan interimbit of backadministration and forth becauseof four the

Soviets,Secretaries whileGeneral. giving Butup thethen, Troikayou may idea,recall proposedthat quite that

therean argument should developedbe an interimabout administrationhow many advisors of fourthe

Secretariessecretary General General.should But then,have youbecause, may recalleven thaton quitethe

Americanan argumentside, developedI believe, aboutaccording how tomanythe recordsadvisorsI havethe

secretaryhere, the USGeneralproposed shouldthat thehavenew because,Secretary-General, even on whothe

Americanwould be Uside,Thant, I believe,would have accordinga certain to numberthe recordsof advisors I have

here,who would the UScome proposedfrom the thatdifferent the new SecretarY-General,regions of the world. who

HC wouldThere beagain, U Thant,my recollectionwould have a iscertainthat numberwe were oftrying advisorsto

whostalemate would comethe fromSoviet thesuggestions different regionsfor converting of the world.the

HC ThereSecretariat again, intomy recollectiona committee. isAll thatof wetheir weresuggestions trying to

stalematehad that common the Sovietcharacteristic: suggestionsthat forit convertingwould become thea

Secretariatcollective executive into a committee.-- sort ofAlllike ofthe theirEEC suggestions-- and our

hadmindset thatwas commonthat characteristic:that was bad business. that itWe wouldhad putbecomea lot a

collectiveof emphasis executive-- in fact, -- sortI made of alikenumber the ofEEC speeches-- and ourin

mindsetthat period was thaton the thatSUbject was bad-- aboutbusiness.the UN'sWe had"capacity put a lotto

ofact. emphasis" In a --way,in fact,I was I arguingmade a withnumberthe of conventionalspeeches in

that period on the SUbject -- about the UN's "capacity to 4 act. " In a way, I was arguing with the conventional

4 wisdom of the UN experts that, well, after all, the UN is

a good thing because it is a place where everybody gets

wisdomto blow ofoffthe steamUN expertsand it'sthat,a well,good aftertalk place.all, the ButUN isI

aalways good thingargued becausethat what it iswas a importantplace whereabout everybodythe UN getswas

toits blowcapacity off steamto actand --it'snot a goodin an talkindependent place. Butway, I alwaysexactly, arguedbut in thata sort whatof wasobjective importantand aboutneutral theand UN non­was itssovereign capacityway --to andact that-- notthat inwas anwhy independentthe things way,that wereexactly,working but indid a sortwork. of objectiveThe World and neutralWeather andWatch, non­ sovereignarrangements way --forandcivil that thataviation, was whyarrangements the things thatfor weredivvying workingup the didelectromagnetic work. The frequencyWorld Weatherspectrum, Watch,and

worldarrangementssmallpox foreradication civil (whichaviation,was startedarrangementsduring thatfor divvyingperiod) all up seemedthe electromagneticto work for us frequencybecause we spectrum,empowered andan

worldinternational smallpox eradicationorganization (whichactually was startedto do duringsomething. that period)Whereas allthe seemedorganizations to work for thatus becausemostly we empoweredtalked had an difficultyinternationalgetting organizationaround to doingactuallyanything, to doUNESCO something.being Whereasan outstanding the organizationsexample even thatin those mostlydays. talkedSo thishad difficulty"capacity to gettingact" theme aroundran to throughdoing anything,much of whatUNESCOwe beingthen thoughtan outstandingwe were exampledoing. even in those days. So this JS And"capacityfor that to act"purpose themeyou ranthought throughthere muchwas of awhatneed we forthena thoughtstrong single we wereSecretary-General? doing.

JHCS AndYes. forAnd thatwith purposea staff youthat thoughtknew howthereto wasact. a needWe needed for a anstrongexecutive, single Secretary-General?in other words. Now our problem in HC thinkingYes. And about.anwith a staffU Thant thatwas knewthat howwe towere act. unlikelyWe neededto anfind executive,it in him a personin otherwho words.would beNowwilling our toproblemtake thein thinkingkind of independent about.an U initiativeThant was --thatto wepick wereup theunlikelyball and to runfindwith it init himin thea personway that who Hammarskjoldwould be willinghad been to takewilling the

kind of independent initiative -- to pick up the ball and 5 run with it in the way that Hammarskjold had been willing

5 to do. But even U Thant was a unitary executive -- U

Thant was an improvement over some committee. So that

wasto do.about Butwhere evenwe Ucame Thantout. was a unitary executive -- U

JS ThantIf I could was anjust improvementgo back for overone somemoment committee.to Hammarskjold's So that

wastenure, abouHammarskjoldt where we camewas out.an activist, certainly, and in

JS theIf I finalcould stagejust goof backhis forcareer one momentas Secretary-General, to Hammarskjold'sI believe,tenure, Hammarskjoldhe enjoyed wasthe anfull activist,support certainly,of the unitedand in thestates. finalBut stagethat ofwas hisnot careeralways asthe Secretary-General,case. I wondered, I believe,from your heperspective enjoyed astheAssistant full supportSecretary of oftheState unitedat

States.that point, But wasthatit wasyour not sensealwaysthat the Hammarskjoldcase. I wondered,could

continuefrom your alongperspectivethe path as thatAssistanthe was Secretarymoving orof thatStatehe, at perhaps,that point,had wasreached it yourthe senselimits thatof hisHammarskjoldcapacity, givencould thecontinueattitude alongof thethe pathSoviet thatUnion? he was moving or that he, HC perhaps,I think ashadfar reachedas US supportthe limitswas ofconcerned his capacity,he certainly given thecould attitudecontinue. of theBy Sovietthe time Union?I came into the picture, HC whichI thinkof ascourse far as inUS hissupportlife wasand concernedtenure was he verycertainlylate

could(January continue.1961), hisBy developmentthe time I ofcamethe intoUN's thecapacity picture,to whichact was ofperceived course inas hisclearly life inandthe tenureUS interest. was very late In(Januarythe Congo, 1961),we hisargued developmentto President of the Kennedy,UN's capacity(and heto keptact wasremembering perceived thisas clearlyat subsequent in the USmeetings), interest. that if

theIn theUN weren'tCongo, wein therearguedbUffaloing to Presidentthe RussiansKennedy, we(andwould he

kepthave torememberingbe. And the thisUN atwas subsequentobviously ameetings),much better thatmouse if thetrap UNthan weren'twe could in thereotherwise bUffaloinginvent. the ButRussiansthat themewe wouldof haveempowering to be. theAndUN the-- UNI wasused obviouslyto argue, a formuchexample, better mousethat thetrap waythan weyou couldwould otherwisemeasure invent.the successBut thatof themecrisis of managementempowering inthethe UN UN-- context,I used tofrom argue,the forUS pointexample,of view,that the way you would measure the success of crisis 6 management in the UN context, from the US point of view,

6 would be whether after each crisis the UN was stronger

and better set up with a capacity to act for the next

wouldcrisis, be whichwhetherthere afterwas eachbound crisisto bethesomewhere UN was strongerin the

world.and betterWe evenset uptried withto a getcapacitysome regularto act forarrangements the next crisis,for earmarking which thereforces wasand boundfacilities to beand somewhereso forth, in thatthe

world.would be Wemade evenavailable tried toto getthe someUN on regularrequest. arrangementsThe Joint

Chiefsfor earmarkingof Staff forcesdidn't andlike facilitiesthat idea andvery somuch. forth,But thatwe wouldhad very be madegood availablesupport forto thethe UNgeneral on request.policy Thefavoring Joint U.ChiefsN. peacekeeping, of Staff didn'tand forlikethe thatUN ideabeing veryin themuch.picture But we-­ hadin West veryNew goodGuinea, supportlater for on,theand generaleven onpolicythe Dominicanfavoring

U.Republic N. peacekeeping,where Latin andAmericanists for the UN beingin the in Departmentthe pictureand -­

thein Westfolks Newin Guinea,the White laterHouse on, wereand evenso appalled on the Dominicanat first

Republicwith our wherenotion Latinthat AmericanistsStevenson and inI thecame Departmentup with that and therethe folksshould in thebe Whitea UN Houseperson werealso so appalledinvolved atin firstthe withDominican our notionRepublic thataffair stevenson-- a UN andobserver. I came upAnd withalso, thatof therecourse, shouldwe argued be ita wasUN personnot our alsojurisdiction involved- thein OASthe Dominicanshould be Republicinvolved. affairSo I --don'ta UNthink observer.there wasAnd everalso, anyof course,serious wethought argued thatit waswe notwould our jurisdictiongo for any - kindthe OASof committeeshould be involved.to do peacekeeping; So I don't wethinkwanted thereinternational was ever any

organizationsserious thoughtwith thata "capacity we wouldto goact." for any kind of

JS committeeIn the end, to I dothink, peacekeeping;all U Thant we saidwantedwas internationalthat he was

goingorganizationsto invite witha limiteda "capacitynumber toof act."persons to serve as

JS hisIn thesenior end, advisors,I think, alland Uhe Thantspecifically said was listedthat heRalph was goingBunche toand invitea Russian a limitednamed numberArkadiev. of personsThis, presumably,to serve as washis quiteseniorsatisfactory advisors, andto thehe specificallyAmerican side. listed Ralph He RalphBuncheBunche and a wasRussianalready namedthere Arkadiev...• hadThis,been presumably,for years.

was quite satisfactory to the American side. 7 He Ralph Bunche was already there ..• had been for years.

7 JS Oh, yes, very much, very much .•• he'd been there since TrygveLie.

JSHC Oh,So thatyes, wasn'tvery much,an outside very muchadvisor. . • • he'd been there since JS TrygveNo Lie. HC SoAnd thatArkadiev wasn't wasan outsidejust theadvisor.ranking Soviet in the JS Nosecretariat. HCJS AndThat's Arkadievright. Sowasthat's just actuallythe rankingthe way SovietU Thant ingot outthe secretariat.of this particular problem. JSHC That'sIt was right.very Burmese. So that's actually the way U Thant got out JS ofBut, thisI had particularasked the problem.other question because, in fact, I HC wantedIt was veryto moveBurmese.ahead and ask you, based on this JS But,experience I had askedand your the ratherother questionintimate because,observation in fact,of the I

wantedoperation to ofmovethe aheadUnited andNations ask you,since basedthen andon eventhis experiencebefore, is andthis yourthe ratherright wayintimateto select observationa Secretary­ of the General,operationby ofnegotiations, the united soNationsto speak, sinceby findingthen andthe evenman before,or woman iswho thisis mostthe rightacceptable way toto selectthe most a Secretary­number of General,countries? by negotiations,Do you see this so asto aspeak,weakness by findingof a system the manor canor womanyou suggest who is somethingmost acceptablebetter? to the most number of HC Well,countries?I think Do youit's seeinherent this as ina weaknessthe structure of a systemif you or decidecan you tosuggesthave ansomethinginternational better?organization that is a HC Well,committee I thinkof sovereigns it's inherentwith a instaff, the you'restructurestuck if withyou decidethe sovereigns to have onan theinternationalappointment. organizationNow, in many that ways,is a committeeI've always of regardedsovereignsthe withTreaty a staff,of Rome you'reas a stuckbrilliant with

thedeparture sovereignsfrom theon committee-of-sovereigns-with-a-the appointment. Now, in many ways,staff sortI've alwaysof thing. regardedIt thewas Treatyone of of JeanRome asMonnet's a brilliantmost departureinteresting frominventions. the committee-of-sovereigns-with-a-First of all, peoplestaffare sort of thing. It was one of Jean Monnet's most 8 interesting inventions. First of all, people are

8 appointed by their governments, but they can't be removed

except by unanimous consent -- this would never happen.

Theyappointedare bypolitical their governments,level people, but theythe can'tmembers be removedof the

exceptCommission, by unanimoustypically consentex-cabinet -- thismembers would neveror sometimes happen.

Theysitting arecabinet politicalmembers levelwere people,appointed. the membersThey have ofa lotthe

Commission,of jurisdiction. typicallyThe ex-cabinetCommission membershas a ormonopoly sometimesof

sittingcertain cabinetsUbjects membersthat arewerelaid appointed.down in Theythe havetreaty a lotas

of"European." jurisdiction.They haveThethe Commissioncapacity tohasconsult a monopolypUblicly of­

certain- with labor,sUbjectsagriculture, that are laidthe downmedia inand thenow treatywith asa

directly"European."elected Theyparliament. have the capacityThen at tothe consultlast stagepUbliclythey ­

do- withhave labor,to go toagriculture,the committee theof mediasovereigns. and now Butwiththe a

Treatydirectlyof electedRome had parliament.this wonderful Thengimmick at the lastin it stagethat saysthey

dothe havecommittee to go ofto sovereignsthe committeecan't of edit,sovereigns.it can onlyBut saythe

Treatyyes or no,of Romebut ithadcan't this saywonderfulwe don't gimmicklike paragraphin it thateight says theand committeewe're going of sovereignsto rewrite can'tit edit,this itway. can only50 thesay yesCommission or no, buthas itthe can'tball sayand wegradually, don't like itparagraphtook quite eighta

andnumber we'reof yearsgoingfor toit rewriteto realize it thatthis itway.had the50ball, the

Commissionbut it really hashas thethe ballball andtucked gradually,well under it tookits armquitenow. a

numberIn fact, ofnowadays years foryou ithear to realizepeople thatin Europe it hadcomplaining the ball,

butthat itthe reallyEuropean has thecommission ball tuckedis sowellstrong underthat its itarmcould now. becomeIn fact,a nowadayskind of dictatorship.you hear people in Europe complaining J5 Whereasthat thein Europeanthe case commissionof the United is soNations strongyou've that itheard couldno

becomesuch complaints a kind of sincedictatorship.Hammarskjold.

JHC5 WhereasNot since in theHammarskjold, case of the unitedno. NationsAnd there you'veare heardsome no

suchsituations complaintsin Which, sinceif Hammarskjold.you have a strong enough person, HC Nota committee since Hammarskjold,of sovereigns withno. a Andstaff therecan reallyare someact

situations in Which, if you have a strong enough person, 9 a committee of sovereigns with a staff can really act

9 like an executive agent. I think that's been true of the

World Bank and the IMF, by and large, which have had a

likestrong an leadershipexecutive agent.strong I thinkexecutive that's leadership.been true of Butthe

Worldit's not Bankthe andnorm, the itIMF,has bynot andbeen large,the normwhichat haveUNESCO hador a

strongFAO or mostleadershipof the otherstrongagencies. executiveIt has leadership.been the norm,But

it'sinterestingly not the norm,enough, it hasin the notUN beenEnvironmental the norm atProgramme, UNESCO or maybeFAO or becausemost of theUNEP otherisn' agencies.t a Specialized It has beenAgency. the norm,The

degreeinterestinglyof initiative enough, inthat theMustafa UN EnvironmentalTolba and Programme,his staff

maybehave been becauseable toUNEPtake, isn'ton thingsa Specializedlike the MediterraneanAgency. The

degreeclean upof andinitiativemore recentlythat Mustafathe TolbaOzone andTreaty, his staffmore

haverecently, been ableis very to take,impressive. on thingsIn likefact, theat Mediterraneanthis American

cleanseminar upon andthe moreqlobal recentlyenvironment the weOzonewere Treaty,attending moreat

ArdenrecentlyHouse,, is veryI wrote impressive.a paragraph In fact,patting at thisUNEF Americanon the back,seminarwhich on thegot qlobalthrough environmentby acclamation. we were attending at

JS ArdenThat's House,surprising I wrotebecause a paragraphthere's notpattingsuch UNEFa generally on the back,positive whichassessment got throughof UNEP, by acclamation.I think. JHCS That'sWell, itsurprisinghas got allbecausethe problemsthere's notwith suchthe abureaucracy generally positiveand besides assessmentit's in Nairobiof UNEP,so I nobodythink. knows really knows

He Well,very muchit hasabout got howall ittheworks. problemsBut, within thefact, bureaucracyUNEP has

andserved besidesas it'scatalyst in Nairobiand so gadflynobody knowsand reallyinnovator, knows verydemonstrating much abouta capacityhow it works.to act. But,I go inback fact,to UNEPthat oldhas

servedtheme, I stillas catalystthink that andthat's gadflythe right andtheme innovator,and that

demonstratingthat's the way aan capacityinternational to act.organization I go back toought thatto oldbe

theme,judged. I still think that that's the right theme and that

JS withthat'sU theThant wayanin office,internationalfate broughtorganizationthe USoughtand tohim be togetherjudged. on a number of issues, the outcome of which were

JS with U Thant in office, fate brought the US and him 10 together on a number of issues, the outcome of which were

10 controversial from the US perspective, I think. One of

them was viet Nam which I don't propose to discuss, but

controversialthe other was fromCuba theand US theperspective,Cuban Missile I think.Crisis. One ofI

wonderthem wasif Vietyou Namwould whichjust I don'tdescribe proposehow toyou discuss,saw thatbut thesituation other developwas Cuba fromand thethe perspectiveCuban Missileof crisis.the state I wonderDepartment if youbeginning, would justreally, describewith howthe youBay sawof Pigsthat

becausesituationthat developwas anfromissue the perspectiveat the UN whichof thethe stateUS Departmentrepresentative beginning,had to handle, really,and withereth thewere Bayproblems, of Pigsif becauseI am not mistaken.that was anCould issueyou describeat the thatUN whicha little thebit? US HC Well,representativethere was hada torecurring handle, andCuban thereitem wereon problems,the General if AssemblyI am not mistaken.agenda in Couldwhich, youin describevarious waysthat aand littlewith bit?new HC Well,evidence thereeach wastime, a recurringthe Cubans Cubanwould itemaccuse on theus ofGeneralbeing

Assemblyabout to invadeagenda them.in which,Such inan variousitem was waysdue forand debatewith newin evidencethe General eachAssembly time, theon theCubansday wouldthe CIA accuseinvaded us ofCuba being abouta brilliant to invadepiece them.of timing,such an weitemalways was duethought, for debateon the in thepart Generalof the AssemblyCIA. We onwere the daynot theterribly CIA invadedwell briefed. Cuba aTracy brilliantBarnes piececame upof thetiming,week webefore alwaysand thought,I went uponwith the parthim andof theArthur CIA.Schlesinger We were notfrom terriblythe White wellHouse, briefed.and

TracyAdlai Barneswas briefed came upand thewe weekall beforetalked andabout I wentit upand withwe himdidn't andlike Arthurit verySchlesingermuch, butfromon thethe Whiteother House,hand theyand Adlaihadn't was-- theybriefedwere andassuring we allus talkedthat theseaboutwere it andreally we didn'tfreedom likefighters. it veryThey much,didn't but tellon theus otheranything handnearly they hadn'tall the --truththeyabout were theassuringdegree usto thatwhich thesethe werewhole reallything wasfreedoma straight fighters.CIA Theyoperation. didn't tellSo Adlai, us anythingI think, nearlywas.

allalways theuncomfortable truth about thewith degreeit but tohe whichwasn't thegoing wholeout thingin wasthe streetsa straightand opposingCIA operation.it or anything.So Adlai,Well, I think,the first was. always uncomfortable with it but he wasn't going out in 11 the streets and opposing it or anything. Well, the first

11 thing that happened before it got thrown in to the UN was that on the day that that Cuban item was starting, Adlai wasthingon thatthe floorhappenedof thebeforeGeneral it gotAssembly thrown anyway.in to theA UNpilot was thatflying on atheplane day withthat Cubanthat Cubanmarkings itemlanded was starting,in a swamp Adlaiin wasFlorida on theand floorannounced of the thatGeneralhe Assemblyhad defected. anyway. ItA pilotlater turnedflying aout planethat withthis Cubanwas markingsa pilot landedthat hadin a flownswamp toin

NicaraguaFlorida andand announcedback, but thatit hemade had adefected.big splash Itin laterthe media.turned outSO,of thatcourse, this waswe wanteda pilotto thatknow righthad flownaway toin

Nicaraguaour Bureau andwhat back,was goingbut iton madeso we acould big tellsplashstevenson in the media.what he So,could ofsay course,because we therewantedhe towas knowon rightthe flooraway ofin ourthe GeneralBureau whatAssembly was goingand everybody on so we elsecouldwas telllistening stevensonto whatthe samehe couldradio saynews becauseprograms there heand wasreading on the thefloorsame of thenewspapers. General AssemblySo I got andhold everybodyof the Latinelse wasAmerican listeningbureau to theand thesameLatin radioAmerican news programsBureau gotandhold readingof the theCIA sameand theynewspapers.came back Sowith I gotthis holdstory of thethat, Latinyes, Americanindeed, bureauthere wasand athedefector Latin andAmericanso on. BureauAnd we gotauthorized hold of Stevensonthe CIA andto theysay that. came backHe said withit, thisthen storyhe compounded that, yes,the indeed,error. thereHis wasalert a defectorstaff saw andthe sosame on. storyAnd wecoming authorizedout of stevensonFlorida with to saythe that.pilot's Hecover said story,it, thenso hethey compoundedtear the thestory error.off Histhe

APalertticker staffand sawrush the itsameinto storystevenson coming andout heof says,Florida"Well, with theI just pilot'shave coverconfirmation story, sohere," they thentear hethereads storythe offsame the

APcover tickerstory andover rushagain. it intoIn stevensonless than andtwenty-four he says, "Well,hours someI justenterprising have confirmationreporter here,"scratched then hethe readsside theof samethe coverairplane storyand overfound again.US Air InForce lessmarkings than twenty-fourunderneath hoursthe someCUban enterprisingmarkings. Soreporterthe cover scratchedblew off theand sideAdlai of wasthe absolutelyairplane andfit foundto be ustied. Air ForceHe was markingsa rather underneathmild person, the

Cuban markings. So the cover blew off and Adlai was 12 absolutely fit to be tied. He was a rather mild person,

12 really, and tolerant, but he was just furious that his government could have hung him out to dry that way. And hereally,was veryand nicetolerant,about butnot heblaming was justme for furiousit. Ithatwas thehis proximategovernmentauthorizer could haveof hungthat himmistake, out to ofdrythat thatlie. way. SoAndwe healready was veryhad nicea rather aboutsour nottaste blamingin ourme formouth it.about I wasCuba, the but,proximatealthough authorizerit's not ofreally that mistake,part of ofyour thatinquiry lie. here,So we alreadyto me it's had alwaysa ratherbeen souran tasteinteresting in our mouthcontrast aboutbetween Cuba, but,the Bayalthoughof Pigs it'sand notthe reallyCuban Missilepart of Crisis.your inquiryThe Bay here,of toPigs meoperation it's alwayshappened been anin interestingApril of the contrastyear '61, betweenwhich wasthe theBay yearof PigsKennedy and thecame Cubaninto Missileoffice. Crisis.Kennedy Thehad Baynever of beenPigs anoperationexecutive. happenedThe lastin Aprilexecutive of the jobyearthat '61,John whichF. wasKennedy the yearhad hadKennedybefore camehe intotook offoverice.as KennedyPresident hadof neverthe unitedbeen anstates executive.was to Thebe headlast ofexecutivea PT boat, job andthathe Johndidn't F.

Kennedyknow. I hadlater hadasked beforeone heof tookthe Jointover asChiefs Presidentof Staff of howthe unitedit had stateshappened wasthat to bethey headhad of nevera PT boat,told theand Presidenthe didn't thatknow. fromI latera military asked onepoint of theof view,Joint thisChiefsoperation of Staffwas, how itin hindsight,had happenedobviously that theyfor hadthe neverbirds. toldI thejust Presidenthappened thatto sit fromnext a military-to this man,pointwho of view,has since this retired,operationon was,an airplanein hindsight,and Iobviouslygot talking for theto birds.him. HeI justsaid, happened"Well,

Harlan,to sit nextyou -towon't thisbelieve man, whothis, has butsincewe retired,were sitting on an aroundairplane-- andwe wereI gotall talkingold enough to tohim.be hisHe fathersaid, --"Well,but

Harlan,he was thisyou charismaticwon't believeyoung this,political but wehero wereand sittingwe were waitingaround --towespeak were whenall oldwe enoughwere spoken to be histo, fatherand he --neverbut heasked was us."this charismaticI used to teach young publicpoliticaladministration. hero and we wereMy waitingdiagnosis to isspeakthat whenan executivewe were spokenlearns, to,usually and heon neverthe hoofasked ratherus." thanI usedby tostudying, teach pUblichow toadministration.be a leader. AnMy diagnosis is that an executive learns, usually on the 13 hoof rather than by studying, how to be a leader. An

13 experienced executive learns that the way you "execute"

is mostly by asking questions. People gradually get the

experiencedidea from the executivedrift of learnsyour questions that the inwaywhich you direction"execute" they'reis mostlygoing by askingto go. questions.In April Peopleof '61, graduallyKennedy getdidn't the haveidea fromthat thefeel driftfor ofthe yourexecutive questionsfunction. in which directionEighteen monthsthey're latergoing heto go.had itIn toAprila tee.of '61, HeKennedyparticipated didn't havepersonally that feelin the forstaff thework execution theve Cubanfunction.Missile EighteenCrisis monthsasking skepticallater he questionshad it toall a thetee.time. He participated

JS personallyCould I just in theinterrupt staff worka minute on theto Cubanask Missilethere was, Crisisof course,asking skepticalextensive questionscriticism allin thethe UNtime.of the Bay of Pigs JS Couldoperation. I justDid interruptthis in aany minuteway effectto askthe thereattitude was, of thecourse,Kennedy extensiveadministration criticismtoward in thethe UN UNof andthetoward Bay ofusing Pigs theoperation.UN? Did this in any way effect the attitude of HC Well,the KennedyI'm not administrationsure it was towarda big factor.the UN andFirst towardof usingall,

withinthe UN? a day of the invasion, Kennedy comes out pUblicly HC Well,and says, I'm "OK,not sureit was ita wasbooboo. a bigLet's factor.go onFirstfrom ofthere." all, withinSo the a factday ofthat the thereinvasion,was Kennedycriticism comesof outthe pUbliclyUN was andobviously says, "OK,not surprising,it was a booboo.and nobodyLet's feltgo onsort fromof there."huffy aboutSo theit factsince thatwe'd thereobviously was donecriticismsomething of thewrong. UN Andwas theobviouslyPresident not himselfsurprising,had saidand nobodyso. So, feltno, sortI don't of huffythink thataboutthat it sincewas a we'dbig obviouslyfactor. A donemore somethingsurprising wrong.thing wasAnd thethat Presidentit didn't himselfparticularly had saidrub so.off So,badly no, onI don'tStevenson. think Histhatcolleagues that was a atbigthe factor.UN sympathized A more surprisingwith him and thingdidn't was blamethat ithim didn'tfor lying particularlyto them. rubSo offthen badlyin a onway stevenson.it passed Hisover, colleaguespartly because at thethe UN Presidentsympathizedstepped with himup soandfast didn'tand blamecoolly_ himI've for oftenlying contrastedto them. Sothat thenwith inNixon's a way ithandling passed over, partly because the President stepped up so fast and 14 coolly. I've often contrasted that with Nixon's handling

14 of the watergate burglary. If he had come out the next

day and said, "Hey, burglary? We don't do that kind of

ofstuff," the watergatethe whole burglary.history would If hehave hadbeen comedifferent. out the nextDo

dayyou wantand said,to move "Hey,to burglary?the Missile WeCrisis? don't do that kind of

JS stuff,"I'd like theto movewholeahead historyto thewouldmissile have beencrisis different.if we could, Do

youyes. wantI just to movedid, tothough, the Missileas we move Crisis?along to there, want JS toI'd getlikesome to moveof aheadyour toperception the missileof crisisthe developing if we could,US yes.attitude I justtoward did,the though,united asNations we moveitself. along toI there,assume, wantas

weto gogetlater somein ofthe yourstory perceptionafter Kennedy's of the death,developingthe viet US

Namattitudesituation toward theaffected united Nationsthe attitude itself. ofI assume,the usas

weadministration go later in the• story after Kennedy's death, the viet

HC MostNam importantly,situation affectedit soured theRusk, attitudewho was basicallyof the veryUS

proadministrationUN and interested • in the UN. JSHC MostWell importantly,that's exactly it whatsouredI wantedRusk, whoto ask,was basicallybecause as verywe

progo intoUN andthe interestedCuban Missile in theCrisis UN. period then you would

J5 Wellsay that that'sthe exactlyattitude whatof theI wantedus remained to ask,positive becausetoward as we

thego intoUN and thetoward Cuban utilizationMissile Crisisof theperiodUN. then you would

He I'dsay thatsay thatthe attitudethe attitude of theof USthe remainedSecretary positiveof State towardwas verythe UNmuch andso. towardThat utilizationwas not particularly of the UN. true of some of He theI'd sayother thatbureaus the attitudewho still of thefel Secretaryt they wereof statein wasthe verybilateral much so.diplomacy That wasbusiness, not particularlyand George trueBall ofwas somenever of

athegreat otherUN user.bureausBut whoRusk stilldefinitely felt theywas, wereand I inalways the

hadbilateralvery good diplomacyaccess business,to him and andhe Georgewas always Ball verywas nevermuch

ainterested great UN user.in what Butwe Ruskwere definitelydoing. was,So thatand Iwas alwaysone hadfactor. very goodIn the accessWhite toHouse, him andusing he wasthe alwaysUN was verynot muchthe

sortinterestedof thing in thatwhatwould we wereoccur doing.naturally. 50 thatIt required was onea

factor. In the White House, using the UN was not the 15 sort of thing that would occur naturally. It required a

15 lot of reminding. In the early days of the Kennedy administration, we had a rather interesting central problemlot of reminding.because the Innew thepresident early dayswould of pickthe Kennedyup the newspaperadministration,in the wemorning, had a whichratherhe interestingread while centralhe was stillproblemin becausebed, and thehe wouldnew Presidentsee three wouldfront-page pick storiesup the aboutnewspaperwhat inhe thewas doingmorning,in Washington,which he readand whilehe would he seewas threestill otherin bed,stories and he aboutwould whatsee threeAdlai front-pagewas doing storiesin NY. TheaboutNY whatTimes he atwasthat doingtime, in Washington,more so than andnow, he tendedwould seeto coverthree theotherUN asstoriesif it aboutwere localwhat politics,Adlai was sodoingit got ingood NY. coverageThe NY Timesin theat thatNY Times. time, moreAnd soI beganthan now,to gettendedthese to rumblescover thefrom UN theas ifWhite it wereHouse localstaff. politics,Mac Bundy, so itwould got goodask wascoveragethat positionin the NYwe Times.took on Andthe AngolaI beganissue to getthat thesewas justrumbleson fromthe frontthe Whitepage Housethis staff.morning Mac-- Bundy,was that wouldreally ask clearedwas thatwith positionus? Andwe tookI talked on theto AngolaRusk about issueit thatand Macwas

Bundyjust onand theArthur frontSchlesinger, page this morningwho had --beenwas assignedthat reallyto makeclearedsure withthat us?Stevenson And I talkedwas happy. to Rusk (Forabouta itcouple and Macof weeksBundy heandthought Arthur heSchlesinger,was in charge whoof hadUN beenaffairs assignedand then to wemakegot surethat thatsettled.) stevensonFinally was Machappy.Bundy (Forand Ia workedcoupleout of aweeksscheme he thoughtwhereby heat wasthe in chargeend of ofthe UN affairsday, with and Ruskthen agreeingwe got thatthat settled.)I could Finallybypass Machim Bundy(and andthe I dayworkedending out usuallya schemeabout wherebyseven at thirty,the endeight, of thenine day,o'clock, with Ruskten o'clock,agreeing whatever),that I couldI wouldbypasswrite him a(andone-page the daymemo endingthat saidusuallywhat aboutwe had sevendone thirty,that day eight,with specialnine o'clock,emphasis tenon thingso'clock,that Whatever),were likely I wouldto be writecovered a one-pageby the media. memo thatAnd insaidthose whatdays, we hadturning done thaton theday televisionwith specialat emphasisthe end ofon thethingsworking that wereday was likelynot toas bemuch coveredhow everybody by the media.got their And in those days, turning on the television at the end of 16 the working day was not as much how everybody got their

16 first hard news. Newspapers were still more important.

And that memo was put into Kennedy's bedtime reading firstfolder hardand news.when heNewspapersopened the werenewspaper still morein the important.morning

Andand sawthatwhat memowe washad beenput intodoing Kennedy'sin NY he wasbedtimein a positionreading tofoldersay, and"Well, whenI knewhe openedthat." theAnd newspaperwith that insmall, the morningalmost andgimmicky, saw whatprocedure we had beenthe wholedoing problemin NY he wentwas inaway. a position toKennedy say, "Well,was very I knewconscious that." allAnd thewithway thatthrough, small, almostright gimmicky,until his proceduredeath, of thehow wholeimportant problemit waswentto away.keep Adlai

Kennedystevenson washappy veryand consciousin the administration.all the way through,Adlai wasrighta untilgrumbler, his adeath,cheerful of howgrumbler, importantand ita couplewas to ofkeeptimes Adlaia weekstevensonI'd get happysomebody and inrushing the administration.into my office Adlaiand closing was a grumbler,the door anda cheerfulsaying, grumbler,"You know, andmy a cousincouplesat of nexttimes toa weekAdlai I'dstevenson get somebodylast nightrUShingat intoa party my officeand he andsaid closinghe was thegoing doorto andresign." saying,The "Youfirst know,two myor cousinthree sattimes nextthis to

Adlaihappened stevensonI went lastup tonightGeorge at a Ballparty whoand hadhe saidworked he wasso goingclosely towith resign."Adlai beforeThe firstin his twocampaign or three•.. times"George, this we'vehappenedgot I a wentreal upproblem." to GeorgeGeorge Ball wouldwho hadsay, worked"Pay noso closelyattention withto Adlaiit, just beforekeep indoing his campaignwhat you're • . . doing,"George,it we'vedoesn't gotmean a realanything, problem."it's notGeorgegoing wouldto happen." say, "PayAnd heno wasattentionright. toBut it,it justwas verykeep importantdoing whatthat you'reAdlai doing,be kept it doesn'ton the reservation.mean anything, That'sit's notWhy goingArthur to happen."Schlesinger Andwas he wasassigned right.to Butworry it aboutwas verythat importantfor the Whitethat AdlaiHouse. be Theykept oncleared the reservation.Illinois jUdgeships That's withWhy Arthurhim. WhenSchlesingerJackie went was assignedto NY, Adlai to worrywas her aboutescort thatto forthe thetheateri White House.they likedThey clearedeach other Illinoisvery much.jUdgeshipsAnd withKennedy him. invitedWhen JackieStevenson went todown: NY, wheneverAdlai wasthere her escortwas any toimportant the theater;meeting, theyhe wouldliked each other very much. And Kennedy invited Stevenson 17 down: whenever there was any important meeting, he would

17 make sure that Stevenson was invited. That, by the way,

made my job even more interesting because even if it was

makenot suresomething that stevensonthat the was invited.Bureau ofThat,International by the way,

madeOrganization my job evenAffairs more interestingwas handling becauseat all even-- ifsay, it wasthe

notBerlin somethingcrisis -- thatAdlai thewould Bureaulook toofme Internationalto brief him

organizationbefore the White AffairsHouse wasmeeting. handlingAnd at soallI could-- say,go andthe

Berlininvade thecrisisjurisdiction -- Adlai ofwouldall thelookother to mebureaus to briefto findhim

beforeout .what theI neededWhite Housefor my meeting.client. ThisAnd wasso Ialso couldimportant go and

invadein our relationsthe jurisdictionwith the ofother all thebureaus otherbecause bureauswe tohad finda

clientout whatwho I neededusually forneeded my client.an answer This wasfaster alsothan importantother

bureaus'in our relationsclients withdid, theand otherit was bureausmore important because wefor hadour a

client whobecause usuallyour neededclient anwas answera cabinet fastermember than andothera

memberbureaus'of clientsthe National did, andSecurity it wasCouncil. more importantSo we tended for ourto

clienthave tithe becausepower ourof theclientfirst wasdraft." a cabinet member and a

JS memberNow when of theit didNationalcome Securityto the Cuban Council.Missile So weCrisis, tended myto

haveimpression "the poweris, and of thisthe firstmay be draft."wrong, that it was U Thant JS Nowwho tookwhen theit initiativedid come toin theorder Cubanfrom Missilehis position Crisis,to trymy

toimpressionreduce theis, andlevel thisof maythe becrisis wrong,and thatprovide it was aU meansThant

whothrough took whichthe initiativethe two sides in ordercould fromcome histogether. position to try

HC Wellto reducethat's thethe levelway ofit wasthe supposedcrisis andto providelook. Buta meansyou

throughhave to leadwhichup theto twothat sidesthrough couldthe comevery together.beginning of the

HC Wellcrisis. that'sAt thethe veryway beginningit was supposedof the crisisto look.they Butcalled you

have-- there to leadwere up tofourteen that throughpeople thewho verywere beginningcalled ofin thea

crisis.consultation At theand verybecame beginningthe Executiof the vecrisisCommittee, they calledthe

--EXCOM.there It'swere interestingfourteen peoplethat whothe wereNational calledSecurity in a consulCounciltatonlyion meetsand becamein times theof tranquillity,Executive Coromibutttee,when youthe

EXCOM. It's interesting that the National Security 18 Council only meets in times of tranquillity, but when you

18 have a crisis you have a special group of some sort. That's not exactly what the drafters of the 1947 law [the haveNational a crisissecurity you Act]havehad a specialin mind. group of some sort.

That'sMost of notthe exactlyarguments what amongthe draftersthose 14 ofpeople the 1947(1 lawwas [thenot

Nationalone of them, securitybut Adlai Act] was),had inhad mind.to do with the military Mostoptions. of theThere argumentswas the amongAir Forcethose wanting,14 peopleas (Iusual, was notto onedo aof "surgicalthem, but Adlaistrike." was), Thehad tonotion do withof thea militaryblockade options.emerged. ThereAfter wasabout the Airtwo Forcedays wanting,or three, as whenusual,they to dobrought a "surgicalin a second strike."tier of Thepeople, notionof whomof a1 wasblockadeone.

Myemerged.somewhat Afterprejudiced about twoversion days ofor thethree,Cuban whenMissile they broughtCrisis isin thata secondthings tierbegan of people,to get sensibleof whom I whenwas theyone. Mybrought somewhatin some prejudicedstaff people versionto do ofsome thesolid Cubananalytical Missile work.Crisis Butis thatof course thingsas beganone of tothe getstaff sensiblepeople whenthat's theya broughtnatural view.in some staff people to do some solid analytical work.Our staff Butwork of coursedid strongly as one proposeof the staffthat wepeopleshould that'shandle a thenaturalpolitics view. of the matter in multilateral forums, that weOurshould staff workgo to didthe stronglyOAS and proposethat we thatshould we goshouldto the handleUN.

Andthe politicsif 1 can continueof the matterthis ainlittle multilateralbit •.. forums,because that1 wehad shoulda, for gome, to verythe OASdramatic and thatcrisis we shouldin the gocoordination to the UN.

Andof that if I scenariocan continueon the thisday aafter littlethe bitPresident • . . becauserevealed I thehad a,missiles for me, inverya dramatictelevision crisisspeech in theon coordinationthe Monday ofevening. that scenarioOn the on Monday,the day afteraccording the Presidentto plan, revealedwe had depositedthe missileswith inthe a OAStelevisiona request speechfor anon "immediate"the Monday meetingevening. by whichOn thewe Monday,meant first accordingthing intothe plan,morning we hadand wedepositeddeposited withwith thethe OASUN a a requestrequest forfor anan "immediate" meeting by whichwhich wewe didn'tmeant firstmean thethingright in theaway morningbecause andwe we deposited with the UN a request for an "immediate" 19 meeting by which we didn't mean the right away because we

19 wanted some time to present the issue to the OAS first.

As you remember, the scheme was to have the blockade be wanteda Hemispheric some timeaction to presentbefore wethetalked issue toto thethe restOAS offirst.the worldAs youabout remember,it. Sotheon schemeTuesday wasmorning to havethe theLatin blockadeAmerican be ministersa Hemisphericwere actionmeeting beforeover inwe thetalkedPan toAmerican the restbuilding of the world-- Dean aboutRusk it.went Soover on Tuesdaypersonally morningwith theEd MartinLatin Americanwho was ministersthe Assistant wereSecretary meeting overof Inter-American in the Pan AmericanAffairs building-- and

by-- Deanlunchtime Rusk wentthey overdidn't personallyhave a consensus, with Ed Martinwhich waswho notwas

thesurprising Assistantbecause Secretarythey ofonly Inter-Americanjust heard Affairsabout it-- theand

bynight lunchtimebefore. theyMany didn'tof them havedidn't a consensus,have instructions which wasyet, not

andsurprisingthey had becauseto go theyhome onlyat lunchjust heardand callaboutup ittheir the

nightforeign before.ministers Manyand of themso on. didn'tA Latin have lunchinstructionstends to yet,be andlonger theythan hadsome to lunchesgo homeand atso lunchit wasn't and actuallycall up untiltheir aboutforeignfour ministerso'clock andthat so theon. OASA Latinmeeting lunchreconvened tends to -­be

maybelongera thanlittle somebit lunchesbefore andfour. so itThe wasn'tSecurity actuallycouncil untilhad

beenabout calledfour o'clockfor four that0' clock.the OAS meetingIn the reconvenedchair of the-­

maybeSecurity a littlecouncil, bit bybeforethe accident four. Theof monthlySecurityrotation council washad

Valerianbeen calledZorin forof fourthe USSR,0'clock.and theIn thefirst chairspeaker of wasthe

securityobviously Council,going to bybe theStevenson. accident ofWell monthlywe had rotationworked wason

Valeriana speech allZorinthrough of thethe USSR,weekend and --theArthur first Schlesinger,speaker was

TomobviouslyWilson, goingwho towas be myStevenson.special assistantWell we hadfor workedwriting on

athings speechfor allStevenson through tothesay, weekendand myself.-- ArthurTom Schlesinger,and Arthur

Tomhad bothWilson,gone whoup wasto NY,my specialalso my assistantdeputy Joe forSisco, writingto

thingshelp, andfor StevensonI stayed toback say,in andWashington myself. Tomto coordinateand Arthur

hadthings. both Igoneknew upthe tospeech NY, alsowas prettymy deputylong, Joeabout Sisco,an hour to help,long, andand soI westayedhad a backlittle in leewayWashingtonwith theto OAScoordinateaction

things. I knew the speech was pretty long, about an hour 20 long, and so we had a little leeway with the OAS action

20 but not too much. And I told Ed Martin the timing problem. Well, it comes along about 4:45 and still no wordbut notfrom toothe much.Pan AmAndbuilding I toldand Ed stevensonMartin theis comingtiming downproblem.to about Well,three it comesor four alongpages aboutfrom 4:45the end.and stillFinally no thewordphone from ringsthe Panand Amit's buildingEd Martin andsaying, stevenson"OK, everybodyis coming butdownUruguay to abouthas threeagreed." or fourUruguay, pages fromat that thetime, end. hadFinallynine presidentsthe phone ringsand andthey it'shad Edsome Martindifficulty saying, deciding"OK, everybodyon a policybut Uruguayquestion. has agreed."So the Uruguay,Secretary atauthorized that time, mehadto ninego aheadpresidentsand get andit theyinto hadthe somespeech. difficultyI called decidinga number on a mypolicysecretary question.called Soa thenumber Secretary-- of aauthorizedphone that's me rightto go outsideahead andthe getSecurity it intoCouncil, the speech.and we'd I calledhad a girl a numbersitting onmy thatsecretaryphone calledall afternoon a number just-- ofto a bephonesure that'snobody rightwas usingoutsideit theso Securitythat we couldCouncil,get andat that.we'd hadAnd a girlI asked sittingher toon thatgo in phoneand getall Joeafternoonsisco offjust theto befloor. sure nobodyI'm in wasmy officeusing itwith so severalthat we memberscould getof myat staffthat. watchingAnd I askedall this her onto television,go in and getof course.Joe siscoI offcould thesee floor.Joe siscoI'm getin upmy fromofficebehind with Ambassadorseveral membersStevenson, of my staffand go watchingout and alltake thismy call.on television,I dictated of acourse.paragraph I couldto him, seeand Joetold siscohim getwhere up tofromput behindit into Ambassadorthe speech. stevenson,Then andI could go outsee andhim takecome my back,call. onI ourdictatedTV screen, a paragraphsaw him toput him,a pieceand toldof paper him wheredown into frontput itof intoStevenson. the speech.But stevensonThen I couldobviously see himdidn't come seeback,the on pieceour TVof screen,paper. sawHe himwas putsitting a piecethere of paperwith downhis manuscriptin front ofheld Stevenson.up this way,But Stevensonin full flight obviouslyof oratory. didn't

Iseewas thetrying pieceto offigure paper.out: He iswasthere sittingtime thereto get withJoe histo manuscriptcome out again held andup thistell way,him toin dofullsomething. flight of Thenoratory.the phoneI was ringstryingand to myfiguresecretary out: comesis therein absolutelytime to getwhite Joe asto come out again and tell him to do something. Then the 21 phone rings and my secretary comes in absolutely white as

21 a sheet -- she was normally a very cool customer -- and

she said, "The President's on the phone. I mean

personally!a sheet -- she11 So wasI picknormallyup the a phonevery cooland acustomerfamiliar --voiceand shesays, said,"l just "Theheard President'sabout the OASon theaction. phone.Is thereI meanany

waypersonally!"of getting So itI pickinto up Stevenson'the phone sandspeech a familiarbefore voicehe

says,finishes? "I just11 I reviewedheard aboutmy lifethe OASbriefly, action.wondering Is therewhat anyI waywould ofhave gettingisaid tif intowe hadn'tStevenson'sthought speechto coverbeforethat he

elementaryfinishes? II base,I reviewedand I finallymy life said,briefly,"Well, wonderingMr. President what I we'vewould donehave ansaidinsert if onwe thathadn'tand we'vethoughtput toit incoverfront thatof him,elementarbut yI base,don't. and I "Andfinally justsaid,as "Well,I was Mr.saying Presidentthat, we'veon television done an insertI can on thatsee andAdlai we'velooking put it aroundin fronthis of manuscript,him, but I don't.seeing there"Andwas anjustinsert as I andwas pickingsaying that,it up

onand televisionstarting to readI canit. seeThe AdlaiPresident lookingsaid, around"Oh, I see,his manuscript,he's picking seeingit up thereand reading was an insertit now. andThank pickingyou itvery up muchand startingHarlan." toI readwrote it.this Theup Presidentone time, said,and I "Oh,ended I thatsee, he'sstory pickingby saying it up"The andCuban readingMissile it now.Crisis Thankwasn't you over,very

muchbut mine Harlan.was." II I wrote this up one time, and I ended that Sostorywe wereby sayingvery multilateralliThe Cuban Missilefrom the Crisisbeginning. wasn't Weover,had

buta big minefight was."with the CIA about releasing the photos becauseSo we weretheyvery didn'tmultilateralwant fromto showthe beginning.how good Wetheir had photographica big fight resolutionwith the CIAwas. about releasing the photos JS becauseThose are theythe photosdidn't thatwant Adlaito showStevenson how sharedgood theirwith photographicthem. resolution was.

JHCS ThoseYeah. areWe thethen photosmade, thatI think, Adlai stevensona very good sharedtactical with them.decision not to use them in the opening speech, to wait HC untilYeah. weWewere thenchallenged, made, I think,and thena veryroll goodthem tacticalout as decision not to use them in the opening speech, to wait 22 until we were challenged, and then roll them out as

22 rebuttal. Zorin absolutely fell like a ripe apple into

our hands because he said, in effect, "Who says there are

missilesrebuttal. inZorinCuba?" absolutelyWe had fellhad likethis a messageripe applefrom intoa

businessour hands manbecause-- name, he said,I think, in effect,was Knox, "Who says•.• thereDo youare

missilesknow that inpart Cuba?"of the Westory? had had this message from a JS businessNo man -- name, I think, was Knox, • . • Do you HC know••• thatwho hadpartgone of theto seestory?Khrushchev in Moscow that very JS Noday. Khrushchev had boasted of having nuclear warheads HC in Cuba.• who Knoxhad gonecame tohightailing see Khrushchevover toin theMoscowU. S. thatEmbassy, very day.and the.KhrushchevEmbassy hadshot boastedus a offlash havingmessage nuclearabout warheadsit,

repeatedin Cuba. toKnoxStevenson. came hightailingSo we had overin toour thehands U. S.a Embassy,piece of

andevidence the. thatEmbassygave shotStevenson us a flashconfidence messageto aboutface downit,

repeatedZorin. Itowondered Stevenson.later So whetherwe had inthat our businessmanhands a pieceever of

evidencerealized howthatimportant gave Stevensonwas the confidencepart he played. to faceAnd downso

ZorineZorin questionedI wonderedit laterand stevenson whether thatsaid, businessman"Oh, would everyou

realizedlike to see howthese importantmissiles?" was theAnd partthen he atplayed.a signal And-- soI meanZorin wequestionedhad this itall andworked Stevensonout ahead said,of "Oh,time would-- doors you likeflew toopen, seeeasels these missiles?"were rolled Andin and thenso atforth a signal-- it --wasI

meana media we eventhad thisof theall firstworkedwater. out aheadAnd ofI thinktime that-- doorsthe

dramaflew open,of that, easelsincluding were rolledgetting in andthe soOAS forthon board-- it andwas

athen mediathe eventdrama ofin thethe Securityfirst water.Council, And worked,I think asthatfar theas

dramaanything of canthat,work includingin politics, gettingperfectly, the OAS onand boardwas veryand thenpersuasive the dramato everybody,in the Securityincluding Council,U Thant. worked, as far as

anythingSo, here youcan haveworka inblockade politics,-- theperfectly,"quarantine" and wasof Cuba.very

persuasiveKhrushchev's toships everybody,are heading includingtoward U Thant.the blockade. The

So,question here youwas havewhat a toblockadedo about --it.the "quarantine"We suggested ofand Cuba.got

Khrushchev's ships are heading toward the blockade. The 23 question was what to do about it. We suggested and got

23 clearance on the idea of getting U Thant to tell

Khrushchev not to challenge t he blockade, and also tell

usclearancenot to fighton theabout ideait. of Notgettingjust toU tellThantKhrushchev to tell

notKhrushchevto. We nothad toa challengedebate about t he thatblockade,one. andI argued,also tellI

usremember not tovery fightclearly, about it.that theNot importantjust to tellthing Khrushchevwas that

thenot UNto. shouldWe hadbe atelling debate bothaboutsides that toone.cool I it,argued,that's I

whatrememberthe UNverydoes. clearly,So we thatwrote, the inimportantfact, a thingmessage was forthatU

Thantthe UNto shouldsend tobe bothtellingthe U.S.both andsidesthe toSoviet cool it,Union. that'sIt

whatwas alreadythe UN does.late Soat wenight; wrote,we in gotfact,the a messagedraft upforto U

Thantstevenson, to sendand toStevenson, both the oru.S.Yost, and maybethe Soviet-- I'm Union.not clear It

wasoh that already-- actually late atwent night;over towe UgotThant's the residencedraft up andto

wentstevenson,over itandwith Stevenson,him, and or UYost,Thant maybeauthorized -­ I'm notit toclearbe

senton thatto -­bothactuallyKennedy wentand overKhrushchev, to U Thant'sand residencethat's theand wentletter overthat ithe withwas him,referring and U toThantin there.authorized it to be

JS sentBecause to hebothdoes Kennedynot give andthat Khrushchev,background andin histhat'sbook. the

HC Wellletterhe thatwouldn't, he wasobviously, referring I tomean, in there.you can't admit that JS Becauseone of the he litigantsdoes not giveis doing thatyour backgrounddrafting infor hisyou. book.But HC Wellhe knows he wouldn't,it because obviously,he got itI mean,from ouryou people.can't admit that JS Soonethe of theletter litigantswas actually is doingsuggested your draftingand partly for you.drafted But

heon knowsthe American it becauseside. he got it from our people.

JSHC SoOh theyes, letterand not waseven actuallyin NY, suggestedin my office. and partlyAnd thendraftedwe

hadon theto Americanwait and side.see and it did not take very long and I HC Ohnotice yes, thatand that'snot evenconfirmed in NY, here.in my office.It took suchAnd thena short we hadlength to waitof time and thatsee andZorin it didwas notcaught take offverybase longby andit, I

noticeaccording thatto that'sU Thant's confirmedstory. here.And Itin tookeffect suchit a wasshortby replyinglength ofto timethe thatUN he Zorinwas able was tocaughtsave aofflittle base faceby it,by

according to U Thant's story. And in effect it was by 24 replying to the UN he was able to save a little face by

24 saying, "Well, we certainly wouldn' t turn our boats

around because we're afraid of your pickets your

saying,destroyer "Well,pickets we -­certainlybut the UNwouldn'asked t usturnto soour.••. boats

JS AndaroundKhrushchev because didwe'rereply afraidto U Thant,of youras picketsI recall, ratheryour

destroyerquickly. pickets -­ but the UN asked us to so . • • . JSHC AndRather Khrushchevquickly, didand replyI just to Ulooked Thant, upas thatI recall,part, ratherI was quickly.reading that part. Zorin was beating on his desk and

HC Rathertelling quickly,U Thant andhe Ihad justto lookedthrow theup thatbook part,at usI wasfor readingillegal blockadethat part.under Zorininternational was beatinglaw, on andhis sodeskforth. and

AndtellingU Thant U Thantgoes downhe hadand toless throwthan thesixty bookminutes at uslater, for

illegalit says onblockadethat page, underhe internationalbrought a note law,saying and -­so no,forth.the

Anddeputy U ThantSoviet goesrepresentative down and lesscomes than tosixtyhim, minutesZorin didn'tlater,

doit saysit for on facethat page,reasons he -­broughtwith thisa notemessage saying in-­ Russianno, the deputyand he sovietreads itrepresentativeto U Thant, and comesit tosays him,that Zorinin view didn'tof doyour itrequest for facewe reasonstake it -­verywithseriously. this message in Russian

JS andCould he Ireadsjust itask to Uat Thant,that andpoint, it saysgiven thatthe inAmerican view of

yourparticipation request we fromtake itthe verybeginning seriously. and U Thant's

JS Couldinitiative, I justit askis atto thatme surprisingpoint, giventhat theKhrushchev American

participationresponded more quicklyfrom thethan beginningthe American andside. U CanThant'syou explaininitiative,that? it is to me surprising that Khrushchev HC Onlyrespondedthat moreit was quicklydifficult than theto Americanpersuade side.all the Canother you peopleexplain thatthat?had to clear it, especially in the White

HC OnlyHouse, thatthat itwe waswere difficultguilty of toanything. persuade Thereall thewas stillother

peoplea little thatbit hadof toresentment, clear it, inespeciallythe White inHouse the Whitestaff House,especially, that wethat wereU Thant's guilty messageof anything.had beenThereaddressed was stillto botha littlesides. bit I ofmean resentment,how could wein -­thewe're Whiteas Housepure asstaffthe especially, that U Thant's message had been addressed to 25 both sides. I mean how could we -­ we're as pure as the

25 driven snow. Some of the people just didn't get the

politics of it. I kept trying to explain to people that

drivenpolitics snow.at the SomeUN areof justthe peopleas practical just didn'tas politics get thein

politicsother places. of it. YouI keptknow, tryingmost peopleto explain(including to peoplemembers that politicsof Congress) at thethought UN areof justthe UN as inpracticalsort of anas etherealpoliticsway in otherand didn't places.really You thinkknow, ofmostit peopleas a snake (includingpit of membersa very ofcomplicated Congress) andthoughtinteresting of the UNform in sortof politics. of an etherealThen waywe andalso didn'tdeveloped reallya message think offor itU asThant a snaketo send pit toof castro,a very

complicatedasking him toand acceptinterestinginspection. form of politics.This was a Thenlittle we

alsolater. developed a message for U Thant to send to Castro,

JS Thisaskingwas himafter to theacceptRussians inspection.had agreed. This was a little HC Welllater.they hadn't agreed, I mean, there was never an JS Thisagreement. was afterThey thejust Russiansturned hadtheir agreed.boats around. The HC Wellagreement they camehadn'tthe followingagreed, I Februarymean, thereafter wasvishinsky never andan McCloyagreement.had a Theylong justnegotiation. turned theirI'll boatssay something around. inThea momentagreementabout camethat, the followingtoo. We Februarynever thought after Vishinskythat Castro and McCloywould agree had a tolonginspection. negotiation.We thoughtI'll sayit somethingwas important in a momentthat the aboutquestion that,be too.put andWe thatneverit thoughtnot be putthatby Castrous wouldwe didn't agreehave to inspection.diplomatic relationsWe thoughtanyway it was --importantbut we

thatcould've the questionfound some be wayput toandget thatthe itword not beto puthim. by Butus U

Thantwe didn'twas anxioushave diplomaticto get things relationscalmed anywaydown and-- anxiousbut we

tocould'vebe helpful. found someSo we waygot tohim getto the-- wordhe actually to him. sentBut inU allThantthree was anxiousmessages, to asgetI thingsrecall, calmedto Castro down reiteratingand anxious

differentto be helpful.proposals So wefor gotinspection, him to -- hesoftening actuallyit sentsome. in Weallkept threesuggesting messages,new as gimmicks.I recall, to Castro reiterating JS Thedifferentcontact proposalswith U Thant for inspection,on this was softeningstevenson? it some. We kept suggesting new gimmicks. 26 JS The contact with U Thant on this was stevenson?

26 HC stevenson, Yost. Yost did a lot of the real scurrying

back and forth, and Ralph [Bunche] was still there. And

HC stevenson,some was gotten Yost. throughYost didRalph, a lot too.of theBut realthe scurryingaccess,

backespecially and forth,by Yost, and Ralphwas very [Bunche]good. wasU Thantstill trustedthere. Andhim

andsomerespected was gottenhim throughas the professional's Ralph, too. professionalBut the access,that

heespeciallywas. Did byyou Yost,know washim? very good. U Thant trusted him

JS andNo, respectedI'd met him himbut as theI did professional'snot know him. professional that

HC Absolutelyhe was. Didlovely, you knowlow him?key, the ultimate professional and

JS greatNo, I'dto metwork himwith. but I Adidlot notof knowmy business him. with Mission HC wasAbsolutelyreally lovely,done with lowhim. key, theYou ultimateonly had professionalto say it once and

greatand he togot workall with.the ramifications A lot of myimmediately. business withHe Missionwas an

wasold pro.really Alsodone hewithspoke him.French You onlyfluently had to-- whichsay itwas oncea

bigand hehelp got-- alland thehe'd ramificationsbeen in Europe, immediately.he'd been Hein wasAsia, an

andold hepro.went Alsoto allhe spokeof the Frenchcocktail fluentlyparties -­wherewhichmuch was ofa thebig helpreal -­negotiationand he'd wasbeendone. in Europe, he'd been in Asia,

HC Whatand hewe wentwere todoing, all ofand the quitecocktailconsciously parties wherein fact, muchwas of thetrying realto negotiationestablish a waslittle done.new piece of international

HC Whatlaw. weIt werewas doing,obviously and quiteagainst consciouslyinternational in fact,law wasin

generaltrying toto establishflyover another a littlesovereign's new piece territoryof internationalif they

didn'tlaw. Itwant wasyou obviouslyto. And againstwhile you internationalcould fly and lawtake in

picturesgeneral todiagonally, fly over anotherwhich sovereign'sis how the U2s terrididtoryit andif theyhow didn'tsome of wantthose you picturesto. And actuallywhile yougot couldtaken, fly thatand takewas picturesawkward and diagonally,also very whichexpensive. is how Sothewhat U2s wedidwere it anddoing, how

really,some of wasthosesetting picturesup a situationactually ingotwhich taken,we couldthat say,was

awkward"Well, in andgeneral, also veryinvading expensive.another Soperson's what we wereairspace doing,is

badreally,business. was settingBut inup extremisa situationand inif whichthe UN wehas couldasked say,a

"Well, in general, invading another person's airspace is 27 bad business. But in extremis and if the UN has asked a

27 country to accept inspection and they won't accept it,

and it's a matter of national security, that makes it

countrylegally toall acceptright inspectionto flyover" and --theywhich won'twe acceptthen didit,

andregularly. it's a matterAfter aofwhile nationalthat security,legal question that makessort ofit

wentlegallyaway allwhen rightthe satellitesto fly over"got --up whichthere andwe thenwe'd getdid

regularly.such good picturesAfter a fromwhilethem. that Andlegalsince questionnobody sortcould of

wentshoot awathey whensatellites the satellitesdown, itgothad up therebecome andsort we'dof geta practicalsuch good picturesinternational from lawthem.that Andflying sinceover nobodysome couldone shootelse's theterritory satellitesis all down,right itonce hadyou're becomein sortspace. of a Aspracticayou know,l internationalthere has never law thatbeen aflyinglegal overdetermination some one

else'sas to where territorythe air is allstops rightand spaceonce you'rebegins. in space.I presided

Asat youthe know,only meetingthere hason thatneverSUbject been a whichlegal maydeterminationhave ever

asbeen toheld, whereat thethe airend stopsof which and spacewe decided begins.that I wepresideddidn't needat theto onlydecide meetingthis onquestion that SUbjectin order whichto mayhave havea space ever beenprogram. held, at the end of which we decided that we didn't needSo,as to thingsdecide workedthis questionout after in theorderMissile to haveCrisis, a spacewe

program.had, in a sense, our permission, our legal justification

So,for asdoing thingsthe workedsurveillance out afterof the Missiletaking outCrisis,of thewe

had,missiles. in a sense,And Castro our permission,really couldn't our legal-- in justificationa way he was

estoppedfor doingfrom the sayingsurveillanceanything ofand thehe takingwas estopped out of fromthe missiles.shooting downAnd anCastroairplane reallybecause couldn'tall --hellin a wouldway hehave was estoppedbroken loose fromif sayinghe had anythingdone that. and he was estopped from

JS Right.shootingIf downI recall an airplanecorrectly, becauseU Thant all madehell hiswouldtrip haveto

brokenCuba and loosedid ifmeet he hadwith doneCastro, that. and a U2 plane or a JS Right.similar planeIf I recallhad been correctly,shot down Ujust Thantbefore made thathis tripand the to

Cubapilot andwas didbeing meetheld withby Castro.Castro, and a U2 plane or a similar plane had been shot down just before that and the 28 pilot was being held by Castro.

28 HC I think that incident happened before the missiles were

revealed.

HCJS OneI thinkwas beforethat incidentand I believe happened before the missiles were HC Wasrevealed.there another one after?

JS OneI think was so.beforeI believeand I believeit did affect to a certain extent

HC UWasThant's there conversationsanother one after?in Cuba, but again

JSHC IDidn't thinkthey so. eventuallyI believe itsend didthat affectpilot to back?a certain extent JS UYes, Thant'sthey did.conversationsThe point inthere Cuba, wasbutthat againapparently the HC sovietsDidn't theyhad senteventuallyinstructions send thatthat pilotno American back? plane was JS Yes,to be theyshot did.down butThethat pointit therewas actually was thata apparentlySoviet officer the sovietsand gun hadwhich sentshot instructionsthe plane thatdown noand Americanthat particular plane was officerto be shothadn't down gottenbut thatthe itword. was actually a Soviet officer HC There'sand gun alwayswhich someshot sonthe ofplanea bitch downthat andhasn't that particulargotten the word.officer hadn't gotten the word. JSHC ThatThere'sit alwayswas not somethe sonCubans of a whobitchdid thatit buthasn't..• gotten the HC What'sword. conveyed by those two stories -- the message to JS ThatKbrushchev it was andnot thethree Cubansmessages who didto itCastro but . . • is how HC What'sextremely conveyeduseful byto thoseAmerican two foreignstoriespolicy -­ thethe messageUN could to beKhrushchevif we were andskillful three aboutmessagesit. toAnd Castrothat was a islesson how thatextremelyI rubbed usefulin toat Americanevery opportunityforeign policywith thethe UN Whitecould Housebe if westaff. were skillful about it. And that was a lesson JS Nowthat itI wasrubbedat somein atpoint everyhere opportunityjust prior withto thethe climaxWhite Housethat it's staff.now known that President Kennedy sent a letter JS whichNow itapparently was at somereached pointAdlai here Stevensonjust priorfor to deliverythe climaxto UthatThant it'sasking now knownhis further that Presidentintervention Kennedyin the sentevent a letterthat whichthe crisis apparentlydeteriorated reachedfurther. Adlai stevensonWere you foraware deliveryof that to U Thant asking his further intervention in the event that 29 the crisis deteriorated further. Were you aware of that

29 in the state Department at that time? Are you familiar

with this particular ? HC Yes.in theAs stateI recall DepartmentI learned at thatabout time?it from AreNew youYork. familiarOur

relationswith this particularwere really very good. And? if they got HC somethingYes. As I likerecallthat I .•.learnedthe aboutturf problemsit from Newwere York.not suchOur thatrelationsthey wouldn'twere reallytell meveryabout good.it and Andvice ifversa. they Whengot Isomethinglearned likesomething that . that • . thethey turfweren't problemssupposed were notto knowsuch I'dthattell theythem. wouldn't tell me about it and vice versa. When JS It'sI learnedhistorically somethinginteresting that they weren'tsince itsupposedwould suggestto know

confirmationI'd tell them.of what you have been saying and that even JS inIt'sthe historicallyWhite House, interestingat that point, sincethey it didwouldsee suggesta role forconfirmationthe Secretary-General of what you havein beenthe sayingmost andserious that evenof circumstances.in the White House, at that point, they did see a role HC Veryfor muchthe so.Secretary-GeneralAnd I think that inthe thedrama mostin theseriousSecurity of Councilcircumstances.plus U Thant's willingness to carry our mail, as HC itVerywere, much so.-­ thoseAnd I thinkthings, thatI thethink, dramadeeply in the affectedSecurity Kennedy'sCouncil plusthinking U Thant'sand willingnessthe thinking toof carrythe ourWhite mail,House as staff.it were,They -­sawthosethat things,it wasn't I justthink,airy deeplyfairy Adlaiaffectedup thereKennedy'swanting thinkingto be andsentimental. the thinking Itof wasthe aWhitepractical House politicalstaff. Theyoperation saw thatthere. it wasn't just airy fairy Adlai up JS Nowtherethat wantingbrings tome beto thesentimental.next question It Iwaswanted a practicalto ask. Anpoliticalimpression operationgrew up there.that Adlai Stevenson had, in fact, JS favoredNow that abringsdifferent me to thepolicy next thanquestionthe I onewantedthat to ask.was

Anfollowed. impressionCan grewyou upgive thatthe Adlaibackground Stevensonof that?had, in fact, HC Yeah,favoredI can.a differentIn one policyof the meetingsthan the ofoneEXCOM, thatAdlai was said,followed.in effect,Can you "Well,give thewe backgroundcould always of that?take those HC Yeah, I can. In one of the meetings of EXCOM, Adlai 30 said, in effect, "Well, we could always take those

30 missiles out of Turkey because we don't really want them there anyway, do we?" And Kennedy was rather, well, he missileswas sore outnot ofat Turkeythat proposal, because wehe don'twas sorereallyat wantthe themfact thatthere theyanyway,hadn't do we?"already And Kennedybeen taken was rather,out because well, he wasthought sorethey not hadat beenthat orderedproposal,taken he wasout somesore timeat thebefore, fact butthatthey theywere hadn'tstill alreadythere. Mybeenimpression taken outis --becauseI'd have he thoughtto research they hadthis been-- orderedbut my takenimpression out someis timethat before,Bobby butKennedy they hadwerealso stillmade there.that Myproposal, impressionbut is some-- I'dof havethe hardlinersto research (andthisBobby -- butwas mygenerally impressiona hardliner) is that Bobbywere Kennedyapparently hadoffended also madeby thisthat ideaproposal,and somebody but sometalked of theto hardlinersCharlie Bartlett (and Bobbyabout wasit. generallyNow the afact hardliner)that Charles were apparentlyBartlett was offendedsomething by thislike ideaKennedy's and somebodybest talkedfriend to Charliesuggests Bartlettthat it was aboutprobably it. KennedyNow the himselffact thatthat Charlestalked Bartlettto Bartlett, waswhether somethingunthinkingly like Kennedy'sor not. Orbestit mayfriendhave beensuggestsBobby, thatwhich it waswouldn't probably haveKennedybeen himselfunthinkingly that talkedbut withto Bartlett,malice aforethoughtwhether unthinkinglyin his case.or not.And Or soit Bartlettmay have beencomes Bobby,out with whichthis wouldn'tin the Saturday have beenEvening unthinkinglyPost, I think but withit was. maliceAnd aforethoughtall hell broke in loose,his case.and AdlaiAnd soreally Bartlettwas comesgoing outto resign.with thisAnd in theI rushed Saturdayup toEveningNY to Post,talk I tothinkhim aboutit was.it. AndI alltalked hellto brokeeverybody, loose, andI talked Adlai toreallyRusk, wasI goingtalked toto resign.people Andin theI rushedWhite upHouse, to NY andto talkI said to himthe aboutPresident it. justI talkedhas to tocountermand everybody, thisI talkedarticle. to Rusk,And I talkeddrafted toa letterpeople whichin thewas Whitesomewhat House,watered and I down,said butthe

Presidenteventually justwas senthas toby countermandKennedy to Stevensonthis article.to say Andthat I draftedwe love youa letterdearly, whichbut notwasfingering somewhat whowateredwas responsible down, but eventuallyfor the leak. was sent by Kennedy to Stevenson to say that we love you dearly, but not fingering who was responsible 31 for the leak.

31 stevenson was really deeply offended by that and, of

course, it did reflect the view of people in the White

stevensoHouse that,n wasin reallya pinch, deeplyAdlai offendedwas likely by tothatbe and,soft ofon

course,the Russians. it did Andreflectthat hadthe alreadyview ofbeen peopleevidenced in the byWhitethe

Housedecision that,to sendin a Johnpinch,J. McCloy,Adlai wasto negotiatelikely to thebe softdeal on

paperthe Russians.about the AndCuban that missiles,had alreadyeven beenthough evidencedthey bywere the

decisionalready being to sendtaken Johnout. J. McCloy,The deal to onnegotiatepaper, in thea waydealwas on

paperalmost aboutpost thefacto Cubanby themissiles,time itevenwas thoughfinally theysigned, were

alreadysealed and beingdelivered. taken out.McCloy The dealwas onvery paper,conscious in a wayof wasthe

almostdifficul postty and factothe embarrassmentby the time thatit wasit wouldfinallycreate signed,for

sealedStevenson and fordelivered.him to beMcCloyup there. was veryAnd weconsciousworked ofout thean

difficultarrangementy and-- theMcCloy embarrassmentand I were thatinvolved it wouldin createthat for

stevensoWhereby ntheforassignment him to be wasup there.given toAndthe we Missionworked outto doan

arrangementthis negotiation -- McCloyand McCloyand I wasweresent involvedup as inan thatad hoc

wherebymember ofthethe assignmentMission. wasThat givenmeant tothat the everyMissiontelegram to do

thisthat camenegotiationinto Washington and McCloyon thiswas sentwas signedup as stevenson.an ad hoc

Andmemberthat ofhelped.the Mission.I mean, Thatit was meanta small that thing,every telegrambut that

helped.that came into Washington on this was signed stevenson.

JS AndWhy thatwas thehelped.decision I mean,made itto washave a thesesmall negotiationsthing, but thatin

helpedNY? •.It's another interesting aspect of the UN's

JS Whyposition. was the decision made to have these negotiations in HC Well,NY? forIt'sthe anothersame reason interestingthat -- andaspectthat mayof wellthe haveUN's

position.been Rusk's proposal, I don't know, but it would stand to

HC Well,reason. forEvery the sameyear, reasonRusk wouldthat --spendand twothatweeks may wellup there have

doingbeen Rusk'sbilateral proposal,diplomacy. I don'tHe know,would butsee it fiftywould orstandsixty to

reason.foreign ministersEvery year,during Rusk thewouldgeneral spend twodebate. weeks Andup thereRusk

doing bilateral diplomacy. He would see fifty or sixty 32 foreign ministers during the general debate. And Rusk

32 was very sensitive. The first year of the Kennedy

Administration I was afraid the two locomotives (the wasSecretary very ofsensitive.state and theThe Ambassadorfirst yearto ofthe theU.N.) KennedyI was Administrationworking for were I onwasa collisionafraid thecourse two andlocomotiveswere going (theto

Secretarycrash. Because of statethe andnormal the Ambassadorthing is tothat the theU.N.)Foreign I was workingMinister forgoes wereand on makesa collisionthe first coursespeech. and wereThe goingfirst to year,crash. 1961,Becausewe had theKennedy normal goingthingup isto thatthe U.N.the Foreignin New MinisterYork. But goeshe wasand upmakesthere thenot firstas the speech.us representative The first year,but there 1961,as wethe hadhost. KennedyWe goingstill uphad tothe theus U.N.speech in Newto

York.give. ButAnd heso wasI went up thereup to notsee asRusk thejust us representativeto say that I butthought therethere as thewas host.going Weto stillbe trouble had thewith us speechstevenson to give.about this.And soI Ifound wentthat up tohe seehad alreadyRusk justthought to sayabout that itI thought-- naturally,there beingwas goinga bright to befellow. trouble Hewithsaid, stevenson"Look, we'veabout this.got the I world'sfound thatbest he known,had alreadybest thoughtloved, andaboutmost it --skillfulnaturally,megaphone being upa brightthere. fellow.It would He besaid,absolutely "Look, we'vesilly gotfor theme world'sto go up bestand known,make thebestus loved,speech. and mostWhy skillfuldoesn't Stevenson megaphonemake up thethere.us speech?It wouldAnd I'llbe absolutelythen come upsillya forday meor totwo go laterup and andmake startthe usseeing speech.foreign Why doesn'ministers."t StevensonAnd makethat's thethe us wayspeech?it wasAnd forI'llevery then yearcome upthat a I daywas there.or two Kennedylater cameand upstartagain seeingin 1963. foreignLBJ ministers."came up almost Andas soonthat'sas thehe became way itPresident. was for everyAlmost yearthe verythat Ifirst was there.thing heKennedydid was, camein upeffect, again into 1963.introduce LBJ camehimself up almostto the asworld soon asby hecoming becameto President.the UN with Almosta huge the veryreception, first shakingthing heeverybody's did was, hand.in effect,(Briefing to introducehim for himselfthose encounters, to the worldwhich by Icomingdid goingto theup UN-- withI've a gothugea reception,picture of myselfshakingtalking everybody'swith LBJhand.in one(Briefingof these himlittle for those encounters, which I did going up -- I've got a 33 picture of myself talking with LBJ in one of these little

33 executive jets -- was quite an experience.) So negotiating about withdrawal of the missiles in a U.N. executivecontext was jetsthe --mostwas naturalquite anthing experience.)in the world. That wasSo negotiatinga place you aboutcould withdrawaltalk to ofanybody. the missilesWe could in a U.N.even contexttalk with wasthe theCUbans most there.natural Andthinglater in theon weworld.could evenThat wastalk a withplaceNicaragua you couldat talkthe U.N. to anybody.So I think We thatcouldit evenwas talka kind withof thea CUbansnatural there.arrangement And laterand onit we suitedcould eventhe soviets,talk withtoo. NicaraguaIt would at havethe U.N.been awkwardSo I thinkfor thatthe Soviets it was toa kindcome ofand ado naturalit in Washingtonarrangement-- andit wouldit suialmostted thebe soviets,coming to too.pay tribute,It would haveas it beenwere, awkwardon their for theknees. SovietsWe tocouldn't come anddo itdo init Moscow.in WashingtonI mean, --nobodyit wouldat thatalmostpoint be wouldcoming haveto paywanted tribute,a high as itlevel were,representative on their knees.of theWe couldn'tPresident doto itbe inresident Moscow.in MoscowI mean, fornobodywhat atturned that outpointto wouldbe three haveor wantedfour months. a highWe levelcould, representativeI suppose, have of donethe

Presidentit in Geneva to beor residentParis, the in wayMoscowwe didfor laterwhat turnedwith Averall out to beHarriman three goingor fourto months.Paris to Wetalk could,with Ithe suppose,North vietnamese have done itfor inthe Genevabetter orpart Paris,of thea year. way weAnyway, did laterit was withdone Averallthat Harrimanway, but, goingin tofact, ParisMcCloy to talkwas withnegotiator. the North VietnameseBut the forsymbolism the betterwas maintained part of a year.and McCloy Anyway,was itvery wascareful done thatto way,maintain but,the in symbolism.fact, McCloyHe waswas verynegotiator.good about Butthat. the

Andsymbolismeventually was maintainedhe had theand McCloyfamous wasconversation very carefulwith to maintainVishinsky, thesitting symbolism.on the Hefence wasof veryhis goodwon estate,about that.with

AndVishinsky eventuallysaying, he"Never had again."the famousI think conversationhistorians-­ with Vishinsky,they've already sittingrecorded on the andfencethey ofwill his wonrecord estate,that thatwith

Vishinskywas the beginning saying, of"Neverthe realagain."arms Irace, thinkof historians-­the real trip they'veup to fifty alreadythousand recordednuclear and weaponsthey willon recordthe two thatsides. that was the beginning of the real arms race, of the real trip 34 up to fifty thousand nuclear weapons on the two sides.

34 JS I would like to ask one final question in this regard.

I realize that the Vietnamese war had a substantial

JS Iimpact wouldon likethe toimpression ask one infinalWashington questionof inU thisThant, regard.but I

wouldI realizelike thatto theask Vietnameseif you would war hadgive a yoursubstantialfinal

conclusion,impact on theso impressionto speak, onin theWashingtonperformance of U ofThant,U Thant butas I

wouldthe Secretary-General. like to ask ifHow youwould wouldyou assessgive yourhis tenure? final

He Well,conclusion,I think sohe towas speak,over- onimpressed the performancewith the ofneed U Thantto stay as

thein goodSecretary-General.with the "Group Howof would77" [the you developing-countryassess his tenure? He Well,caucus] I thinkand under-impressed he was over-impressedwith thewithvarious the needkinds to stayof powerin goodthat withthe thegreat "Grouppowers of do,77" after[the all,developing-countryhave. He was alsocaucus]offended and under-impressedby the idea of witha land the warvariousin Asia, kindswith of powerwhite thatsoldiers the greatcoming powersover do,to afterfight all,it. have.On the Heother was

hand,also offendedhe was abypro. the ideaAnd onof thea landmany warthings in Asia,which withwe

whitedealt withsoldiershim, comingfor the overmost topart, fighthe it.was willingOn the tootherbe hand,a pro andhe wasto bea discreet.pro. And Foron theseveral manymonths thingshe whichheld weon

todealtthe, withsecret him,of thefor Rangoonthe mostmeeting part, hethat wasnever willinghappened; to be hea proheld andthat to untilbe discreet.he just hadFor toseveralblow it.monthsBut hehe helddidn't on blow,to the,for secretweeks ofand the weeksRangoonand meetingweeks, thatand neverhe didn't happened;blow

hefor helda couple that untilof weeks he justafter hadstevenson to blow it.got backBut hefrom didn'this

blow.vacation for andweekstold andhim weekswhat andthe weeks,answer andhad heto didn'tbe, whichblow

wasfor ano. coupleWhen of weekshe did afterblow, stevensonthat was got reallyback fromdeeply his

vacationoffensive andto Rusk.told himIn whatmy presence the answerRusk hadsaid to tobe,U whichThant waspersonally no. Whenon the hetelephone, did blow,"Who thatdo wasyou thinkreallyyou deeplyare,

offensivea country?" to AndRusk.the Infact my thatpresenceLBJ orRuskhis saidspokesman to U Thantsaid personallythat there onnever the hadtelephone,been such "Whoa doproposal you think-- thatyou are,was ajust country?"a misunderstanding And the factas thatto what LBJ wasor hismeant spokesmanby proposal. said

that there never had been such a proposal -- that was 35 just a misunderstanding as to what was meant by proposal.

35 They meant no §ubstantive proposal, whereas U Thant was

only making a procedural proposal. But to U Thant, for

whomThey meantit would no substantivehave been wholly proposal,inappropriate whereas U toThantmake wasa

onlysubstantive making proposal,a proceduralhe hadproposal.gone theButlimit to Uin Thant,making fora

whomprocedural it wouldproposal, have beenand whollyeven picking inappropriateRangoon towhich makewas a

hissubstantiveown country. proposal, he had gone the limit in making a

JS proceduralThere was oneproposal,other --andand evenI realize pickingthat Rangoonthis whichhappened was

hisafter ownyou country.had left the Department to go to NATO -- one JS Thereother wasaction, one otherthough, -- thatand I UrealizeThant tookthat thiswhich happenedhad an

aftereffect, youI think,had leftwell theI Departmentwould like toto goask toyou NATOfrom --yourone

othersomewhat action,distant though,posting thatin UBrussels, Thant tookand whichthat washad hisan

decisioneffect, I tothink,authorize well theI wouldwithdrawal like toof askUNEF youon fromNasser's your

somewhatrequest. distant posting in Brussels, and that was his HC well, I followed that rather closely because of J decision to authorize the withdrawal of UNEF on Nasser's professionalrequest. interest. I thought, at the time -- and He well,even said,I followedI even sent thattelegrams ratherabout closelyit in becausemy capacity of J professionalas an alumnus, interest.sort of, I ofthought,UN affairs at the-- thattime it-- wasand

whollyeven said,unnecessary, I even sentthat telegramsit was aaboutvery itbad inprecedent my capacityto

withdrawas an alumnus,because sortonly of,one sideof UNhad affairsasked him-- thatto. UitThant was

whollyundoubtedly unnecessary,said to thathimself, it was"Well, a veryonly bad precedentone side tois

withdrawrelevant because theonlyother one sideside hadnever askedagreed him to.to itUin Thantthe

undoubtedlyfirst place --saidnever to agreedhimself,to "Well,have any onlysoldiers one sideon theis

relevantIsraeli side."because theSo ifotherNasser side didn'tnever agreedwant themto it onin the

Egyptianfirst placeside --ofneverthe agreedborder, toit havereally any wouldsoldiersbe unfairon the

Israelinot to withdraw side." them.So if ButNasserI was didn'tafraid wantthat them that onwould the Egyptianbe such a sidedevastating of the border,precedent itto reallythe UN's would"capacity be unfairto

not to withdraw them. But I was afraid that that would 36 be such a devastating precedent to the UN's "capacity to

36 act" as peacekeeper that it was a bad mistake.

JS And that seems to have been the general impression,

certainlyact" as peacekeeperin the White thatHouse it was-- athe badJohnson mistake.White House

JS wasAnd thatdismayed,I seems to believe,have beenif theI'm generalcorrect, impression,by that

decision.certainly in the White House -- the Johnson White House HC wasBecause dismayed,Iagain, you believe,see, these ifthings I'm keepcorrect,recurring, by thatas

decision.in the Congo case and others. The problem for the United

HC states,Because becauseagain, youof itssee,position these thingsin the keepscheme recurring,of things, as wasin theso Congooften casethat andif theothers.UN didn't The problemact, we forwould thehave Unitedto

states,act and becausethat would of itsstrike positionall inkinds the schemeof sparks of things,that wouldn'twas so oftenbe sparksthat ifif thethe UN UNdidn'tacted. act, Andwe wouldthat washavethe to

philosophyact and thatthat wouldwe hadstrikeat theall timekinds ofof whysparksthe UN'sthat

wouldn'tcapacity tobe actsparkswas ifin thethe vitalUN acted.interest Andof thatthe wasus. theIt wasphilosophya hard thatsell wein hadWashington, at the timeyou know,of whybut theI UN'skept capacitytrying to tosell actit wasand, in theindeed, vitalI madeinteresta number of theof us.pUblic It

wasspeeches a hardabout sellit. in TheyWashington,were spread you allknow,over butthe I statekept

tryingDepartment to sellBulletins, it and, becauseindeed, II madewas tryinga numberto ofget pUblicthe

wholespeechescommunity about it.of peopleThey werethat spreadwere interested allover thein thestateUN toDepartmentcatch this Bulletins,point that becausethe UN I isn'twas tryingjust a talk-place.to get the JS wholeI ask communitythis question of peoplerather thatfrequently were interestedbecause inI thethink UN toit's catchimportant this pointto thattry tothe identifyUN isn't justthat a pointtalk-place.where

JS AmericanI ask thisconfidence questionin ratherthe UN frequentlyas a viable becauseorganization I thinkin

theit'smaintenance important ofto peacetry toand identifysecurity occurred,that pointand wherethis

Americanis one of confidencethe places inthat the youUN ascan a viableat least organizationpostulate isin

thesuch maintenancea point. That of peaceleaves andaside securityentirely occurred,the question and thisas tois onewhether of theU Thantplacesreally that youhad canany atchoice leastor postulatewhat would is such a point. That leaves aside entirely the question as 37 to whether U Thant really had any choice or what would

37 have happened if he had, in fact, referred to the General

Assembly. Nonetheless, the perception, I think, in a

havegood happenedmany places if heas had,a result in fact,of that referredaction towas thethat Generalthe

Assembly.UN is not reliable.Nonetheless,Certainly the perception,that had I anthink,effect in ona

goodIsrael. many places as a result of that action was that the

He UNOf courseis not thereliable.fact we wereCertainlydisappointed that hadlate an becauseeffect weon

wentIsrael.on so long using the voting arrangements we had He Ofcontrived, course theand factbecause we werethey disappointedturned out so latewell becausein our own we wentinterest, on so becauselong usingof thecourse votingwe arrangementshad an "automatic we had

majority."contrived, andThen becausewe began theyhaving turnedthe outsame so wellkind inof ourvotes own

interest,except that becausewe were ofon coursethe minority we hadside. an "automaticThe way I

majority."described itThenat the we begantime was havingthat theall sameof the kindUN ofGeneral votes

Assemblyexcept thatvotes we arewerethe onsame thekind minorityof thing side.(except Thefor waythe I describedones that areit atunanimous, the time waswhich thatwere allsome of verythe UNimportant General Assemblyones like votesthe World are theWeather same kindWatch). of thingAll of(exceptthe disputed for the

votesones thatare arethe unanimous,same: it'swhichthe weremajority some verytelling importantthe

minorityones likehow the itWorldshould Weatherbehave Watch).and the Allminority of theis disputedvoting

votesno. That's are thewhat same:we did toit'sthe theeleven majorityvotes oftellingthe soviet the

minoritybloc for howyears. it shouldThen the behave"Group andof the77" minoritystarted isdoing votingit

no.to us.That'sThey whatstarted we didtelling to the uselevenwhat voteswe should of thedo, soviethow

muchbloc weforshould years. contributeThen the to"Groupthem. of Those77" startedmajority doingvotes it

tonever us. includedThey starteda clause tellingabout ushow whatthe wemajority should do,should how

muchbehave. we shouldBut the contributeinteresting to them.thing toThoseme ismajoritythat the votesUN,

whenevernever includedthe nations a clauseget togetherabout howon thethe majorityassumption shouldthat behave.they're goingBut theto haveinterestingto do something thing totogether me is that-- whetherthe UN, wheneverit is the theLaw nationsof the Seaget ortogetherworld weather on the assumptionor dividing thatthe

they're going to have to do something together -- whether 38 it is the Law of the Sea or world weather or dividing the

38 radio frequencies or whatever -- they act by "consensus." I find that most audiences that I talk to tend to think

thatradio"consensus" frequenciesmeans or whatever"unanimous -- theyconsent," act byand "consensus."everybody hasI finda veto.that mostSo audiencesI finally thatdeveloped I talk toa definitiontend to thinkof

thatconsensus "consensus"which I'dmeansbe "unanimousinterested consent,"in your reaction and everybodyto hasthat aon veto.any given So issueI finallyconsensus developedis "the a acquiescencedefinition of

consensusthose who whichcare I'dsupported be interestedby the inapathy your reactionof those towho thatdon't." on any given issue consensus is "the acquiescence of JS thoseThat's whoa very caregood supporteddefinition. by theI remember apathy thatof thoseyou wrote who don't."an article, I think, for the NY Times Sunday Magazine on JS That'sconsensus. a very good definition. I remember that you wrote He That'san article,right. I think,You have for athegood NY Timesmemory Sundaybecause Magazinethat was on

consensus.1960. He That's right. You have a good memory because that was

1960.

39

39 INDEX OF NAMES

Arkadiev, Georgy P. INDEX8 OF NAMES

Ball, George 6, 9, 16, 18

Arkadiev,Barnes, Tracy Georgy P. 118

Ball,Bartlett, GeorgeCharles 326, 9, 16, 18

Barnes,Boland, TracyFrederick 112

Bartlett,Bunche, Ralph Charles 8,32 27

Boland,Bundy, McGeorgeFrederick 16,2 17

Bunche,Castro, RalphFidel 27,8, 2729, 30

Bundy,Hammarskjold, McGeorgeDag 1,16, 2,17 6, 10

Castro,Harriman, FidelAverell 27,1, 3529, 30

Hammarskjold,Inkle, Ralph Dag 1,2 2, 6, 10

. Harriman,Kennedy, RobertAverell 321, 35

KInkle,e n Ralphn e d y , P r e2 s i d e n t J 0 h n F .

. Kennedy, Robert ·326, 13-18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 30-32, 34, 35

KKhrushchev, e n n e dNikita y , S. P r e 23-26,s i d 30e n t J 0 h n F .

Knox, FNU 23,6, 13-18,24 20, 22, 23, 25, 30-32, 34, 35

Khrushchev,Johnson, Lyndon NikitaB. s. 23-26,34, 37 30

Knox,Lie, TrygveFNU 23,8, 1324

Johnson,Martin, EdLyndon B. 34,20, 2137

Lie,McCloy, TrygveJohn J. 8,27, 1333, 35

Martin,Monnet, EdJean 20,9 21

McCloy,Nasser, JohnGammal J. Abdel 27,37, 33,38 35

Monnet,Nixon, RichardJean 915

Nasser, Gammal Abdel 37, 38 40 Nixon, Richard 15

40 Plimpton, Franeis 1

Rusk, . Dean 1, 15-17, 20, 32-34, 36 sehlesinger,Plimpton, FrancisArthur Jr. 12,1 17, 18, 21

Siseo,Rusk, . DeanJoseph 21,1, 15-17,22 20, 32-34, 36

Slim,Schlesinger,Mongi Arthur Jr. 212, 17, 18, 21

Stevenson,Sisco, JosephAdlai 1,7,12,13,15,16-1921-25,27,21, 22

Slim, Mongi 30-34,2 36

Thant,Stevenson,U Adlai 1,1,7,12,13,15,16-1921-25,27,2, 4-8, 11, 19, 24-31, 36, 37, 39

Tolba, Mustafa 1030-34, 36

Vishinsky,Thant, U Andrei 1,27, 2,35 4-8, 11, 19, 24-31, 36, 37, 39

Wilson,Tolba, MustafaTom 2110

Vishinsky,Yost, Charles Andrei 2,27, 25,35 27, 28 wilson,Zorin, ValerianTom 21,21 23-26

Yost, Charles 2, 25, 27, 28

Zorin, Valerian 21, 23-26

41

41