Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–02–2 June 2002 Vol. 15, No. 2 From the Commandant June 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 2

In 1952, facing the threat of communism and mindful of lessons learned during the global war that had ended only seven years before, the United States established the 10th Special Forces Group, a small group of men that was capable of performing unconventional warfare in Europe. In the 50 years since, the world has seen many changes, but not all of those changes have been for the better. The Cold War has ended, but new threats have emerged. Technology has provided capabilities undreamed of 50 years ago, but that tech- nology can be targeted by enemies using simple or out-of-date weapons. Our conven- tional forces have no equal on the conven- world on a daily basis. The unique capabil- tional battlefield, but we still require, per- ities of SF soldiers, their flexibility, and haps more than ever, forces capable of per- their ability to operate on every continent forming unconventional warfare. are due in large part to their specialized SF has grown to five active-duty groups training. That training is and always will and two groups in the Army National be critical to the success and versatility of Guard. It has retained its UW focus, and SF. As we celebrate SF’s 50th anniversary, the capabilities and training required for we should not forget that this year also UW have given SF the capability to per- marks the 50th anniversary of the creation form other missions. Even though SF did of the Psychological Warfare Center, the not perform its UW mission in Europe, it organization responsible for training Spe- has performed its other missions in all cial Forces and other elements of U.S. psy- parts of the world. Whenever the nation chological warfare. As the inheritors of the has required soldiers for difficult missions legacy of the Psywar Center, we the per- that must be performed discreetly, it has sonnel of today’s JFK Special Warfare Cen- called on Special Forces. ter and School are both proud of our role The battle streamers of the SF Regiment and humbled by its responsibilities. read like a roll call of the trouble spots and conflicts of the late 20th century, and SF’s performance thus far in the 21st century has been impressive. The quiet perform- ance of their duties has in many cases kept SF soldiers from gaining a great deal of Major General William G. Boykin recognition, and yet within SF’s ranks, there has been no shortage of heroes — men such as Bull Simons, Nick Rowe, Dick Meadows, and the many SF recipients of the Medal of Honor. As the articles in this issue of Special Warfare make clear, SF soldiers continue to perform their missions throughout the PB 80–02–2 Contents June 2002 Special Warfare Vol. 15, No. 2

Commander & Commandant Major General William G. Boykin Features Editor 2 The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces Jerry D. Steelman by Ian Sutherland Associate Editor 14 The History of the 1st SF Group in the Republic Sylvia W. McCarley of the Philippines: 1957-2002 Graphics & Design Bruce S. Barfield 16 A History of SF Operations in Somalia: 1992-1995 by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski Automation Clerk Gloria H. Sawyer 28 Operation Focus Relief: 3rd SF Group Builds Relations In Western Africa 31 Exercise Balance Magic: 19th SF Group Practices Medicine in the Heart of Asia

V E AS 34 The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group Conducts R I RT T A E S LI B E T UW in Afghanistan Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 42 7th SF Group Provides Two Decades of Excellence Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special- in Latin America operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. by Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Burton and Captain Robert Lee Wilson Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This 48 Operation White Star: Prelude to Vietnam publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. by Dr. Kenn Finlayson Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, 52 The 10th SF Group Keeps Kosovo Stable USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special by Captains Robert W. Schaefer and M. Davis Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare 56 The 281st Aviation Company: The Roots of Army Special and the authors. Operations Aviation Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private by Dr. C.H. Briscoe subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special 60 The 20th SF Group in Flintlock 2001 Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web (https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Eric K. Shinseki General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: Departments 62 Enlisted Career Notes Joel B. Hudson 63 Officer Career Notes Administrative Assistant to the 64 Foreign SOF Secretary of the Army 66 Update 0210001 Headquarters, Department of the Army 68 Book Reviews The OSS Operational Groups: Origin of Army Special Forces

by Ian Sutherland

he operational elements of Major Alfred T. Cox to a group of enemy facilities and lines of com- United States Army Special newly assigned officers who would munication deep behind the lines. TForces are direct descen- form the “French” OGs, the concept Much of the training that Major dants of the units of the U.S. Office was to use American soldiers who Cox and others developed for the of Strategic Services, or OSS, that had language skills and were OGs was based on the experience were infiltrated into metropolitan trained in commando-type tactics. of British commandos. It placed a France during World War II. The The soldiers would not only pro- heavy emphasis on physical train- OSS units were tasked to organize, vide training and material support ing, demolitions, special weapons train, supply and direct the Maquis for the resistance, they would also and the hit-and-run offensive oper- of the Forces Francaises de l’In- form the nucleus for local resist- ational techniques of guerrillas. terieur, or FFI, in support of Oper- ance forces who would attack Al Cox, an Infantry officer, was a ation Overlord, the invasion of strong and agile athlete who had Normandy in June 1944; and Oper- played three major sports while ation Dragoon, the invasion of studying civil engineering at Lehigh Southern France, in August 1944. University. During his senior year, This is not to imply that Army SF he had been named captain of the is not a direct descendant of the football team and co-captain of the OSS units employed in other areas baseball team. He was elected pres- of the world that were active in the ident of his class during his junior development, support and direction and senior years, and he was a of the indigenous resistance to Axis member of Phi Beta Kappa.2 occupation. However, the organiza- The OSS had recruited Cox tion and the mission of the opera- when he was an instructor of guer- tional detachments of the original rilla warfare at the Infantry School 10th SF Group bear a remarkable at Fort Benning, Ga. With the resemblance to the organization assistance of men like 1st Lieu- and activities of the OSS Opera- tenant Art Frizzell, Cox led the tional Group, or OG, that became French OGs through the demand- Company B, 2671st Special Recon- ing training in preparation for the naissance Battalion, Separate (Pro- day when the tactics and tech- visional) in August 1944. niques would be put to use against The OGs were Major General USASOC Archive the Wehrmacht. William Donovan’s idea. As Lieu- Sergeant Caesar Civetella, a member of OG The French OGs arrived in tenant Colonel Serge Obolensky1 Lafayette, receives the Bronze Star from North Africa in February 1944. explained when he introduced Major General William Donovan in 1945. Referred to as Unit B, 1st Contin-

2 Special Warfare OSS Operational Group Field Service Headquarters

Commander (Major)

Medical (Captain)

Adjutant Transportation Communications Ass’t Section Ldr. Armorer (First Lieutenant) (First Lieutenant) (First Lieutenant) (Sergeant) (T/5)

Admin. Assistant Assistant Assistant Motorcyclist (First Sergeant) (Tech. Sergeant) (Tech. Sergeant)

Clerk Assistant Assistant (T/5) (T/5) (T/5)

Clerk Assistant (T/5) (T/5)

6 Radio Operators 6 Cryptographers (T/5) gent Operational Groups, 2677 the 2677th Headquarters Compa- left shoulders in the hope that it Headquarters Company OSS (Pro- ny of the OSS. The event that would somehow ensure their treat- visional), the French OGs were prompted the separation was the ment as prisoners of war. organized as a field-service head- execution of two officers and 13 In the spring of 1944, the French quarters, or FSHQ, commanded by enlisted men of Mission Ginny OGs7 were placed under the tacti- Major Cox. The OG FSHQ was the from Unit A, 1st Contingent (Ital- cal control of the Special Projects echelon above the OG, and it con- ian OGs). All the members of Operations Center, G-3 Special trolled and directed the activities Ginny had been captured March Operations, Allied Forces Head- of two to five OGs. The FSHQ con- 22, 1944, on an operation in Italy to quarters, in Algiers. The OGs of sisted of eight officers and 20 destroy a railway tunnel on the La Unit B had been organized into 14 enlisted men and was comparable Spezia-Genoa railroad line. During OG sections, and the plan was for to the SF B-detachment of later interrogation, they had disclosed each section to organize and train years. Organizationally, the FSHQ the details of their OSS associa- the French Resistance, the Maquis, included the operations, medical, tion, and it was feared that they for the purpose of delaying the communication, supply and admin- were executed because of their movement of enemy reserves to the istrative personnel who were OSS connection.4 invasion lodgment area in Nor- active in the training, preparation, The French OGs were aware mandy; to harass enemy lines of deployment and support of the that their involvement in guerrilla communication in their area of OGs in the operational area.3 warfare would bring harsh treat- operations in southern France; and In August 1944, Unit B was re- ment from the enemy if they were to conduct such sabotage opera- designated Company B, 2671st captured.5 Many of the soldiers tions as were directed by the Special Reconnaissance Battalion, may not have been aware of the Supreme Allied Commander, Separate (Provisional) to distance implications of Hitler’s Komman- Mediterranean in support of Oper- the purely military OGs from the dobefehl,6 but they sewed the patch ation Overlord.8 “agents, spies, and saboteurs” of of the Seventh U.S. Army on their To prepare the troops for com-

June 2002 3 mitment deep within the enemy- OG Ruth infiltrated Aug. 4 and from moving along the railroads occupied areas of southern France, was met by a disorganized group of and highways in the area. the OGs’ arduous training in the Francs-tireurs et Partisans,or OG Pat and OG Alice were Atlas Mountains of North Africa FTP,13 personnel who were expect- deployed Aug. 6. Pat parachuted had emphasized night patrolling ing a supply drop. After a consider- onto drop zone Virgule in the and scouting, guerrilla warfare, able delay in moving to its area of Department of Tarn to cut lines of demolitions and fieldcraft. operation, Ruth began attacking communication within the triangle The first section to be deployed bridges to prevent the Germans of Toulouse, Bedarieux and Sever- was Operation Emily,9 commanded by Art Frizzell. Emily departed on the night of June 6, 1944. But the weather system that battered the Normandy beaches reached South- ern France, as well, and the drop zone was obscured. Emily returned to Algiers. Two days later, Emily suc- cessfully infiltrated on drop zone Chenier, near La Bastride-du-Haut- mont in the department of Cantal.10 The members of Emily were met on the drop zone by British Major R. MacPherson of Jedburgh Team Qui- nine,11 who had landed there only a few minutes ahead of them. Emily was assigned the mission of denying the Wehrmacht the use of the rail by- pass from Cahors-Figeac and Figeac- Brive in the Department of Lot.12 OG Justine was the second sec- tion to deploy. Justine, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Vernon G. Hop- per, parachuted onto drop zone Taille Crayon near Vassieux on the Vercours plateau during the early morning of June 29. Justine’s mis- sion was to strengthen the Maquis in the Vercours region and to carry out guerrilla warfare against Ger- man supply lines, lines of communi- cation and telecommunications. OG Louise arrived on drop zone Tandem, in the Department of Ardeche, July 18, to strengthen the Maquis, to harass the Germans, and to reconnoiter the west bank of the Rhone River and the area of Ales-Langogne. OG Betsy was also dropped onto drop zone Tandem, but it arrived July 26. Betsy joined Louise and assisted in attacking USASOC Archive targets and harassing and attack- Major Alfred T. Cox, commander of the “French” OGs, was an Infantry officer who was teaching ing German installations and lines guerrilla warfare at the Infantry School when he was recruited by the OSS. of communication.

4 Special Warfare ac. Further to the northeast in the Route Nationale 117 and to inter- his unit in the field, Cox; Captain Department of Drome, Alice landed dict lines of communication in the Morin, his executive officer; Cap- on drop zone Framboise, three kilo- Carcassonne Gap area of the tain J. ”Doc” Hamblet, the unit meters southwest of Bourdeaux, to Department of Aude. medical officer; and five enlisted reconnoiter National Highway The next day,Aug. 13, an Italian- men, boarded a bomber in Algiers Number 7 and Route Napoleon, to speaking section, OG Nancy, infil- Aug. 24. As Mission Lehigh, they report German troop movements, trated onto drop zone Armature would parachute into southern and, with the Maquis, to interdict near Saint Christol on the Franco- France to aid the resistance move- and harass German columns Italian border to interdict lines of ment in the Ardeche Department whenever possible. communication in the region of the and coordinate the operations of Near dawn on Aug. 12, OG Peg Montgenevre pass. Another Ital- the other OG sections in the Rhone parachuted onto the wrong drop ian-speaking section, OG Helen, River west-bank area. zone. The reception party was also departed Aug. 13 for France to Shortly after midnight on Aug. expecting a supply drop. According block Col de Larche in the Alps, but 25, Lehigh landed in German-occu- to Lieutenant Grahl H. Weeks, the because of weather, Helen had to pied France. The infiltration was OG team leader, “The Maquis were return to North Africa. generally successful, but Sergeant very excited about the unexpected Cox was deeply involved in the Campbell, the unit first sergeant, American arrival, and it was some pre-mission preparation of the OG, was injured on landing.14 Another time before we could get them and he personally conducted the casualty of the drop was the radio,15 started to work.” Peg’s mission was final briefing for each section but Corporal Rockman was able to to harass German forces along before it departed. With the bulk of repair it and establish contact with

June 2002 5 a vehicle accident Aug. 20. The four U.S. wounded from OG Betsy and 25 Maquis casualties from the German air attack were initially treated in the French infirmary at Vanosc and then evac- uated to the hospital in Saint Agreve, 35 kilometers away. The French doctors had worked furi- ously on the wounded, but they were unable to save Sergeant Barnabe, one of the Betsy squad leaders, who died shortly after surgery. Some days later, the other wounded had been transferred to the hospital at Chambon-sur- Lignon. Each OG section had a medical aidman who had received exten- sive medical training in the U.S. before joining the OSS. The medics provided excellent treatment in the USASOC Archive field. Their medical supplies Members of OG Alice pose with members of the French Maquis in September 1944. The Ameri- included sulfonamides, which the cans had great respect for the dedication of the French partisans. French lacked, and they were later able to obtain penicillin.18 As a the base station at the Special Proj- communist movement, at best medical officer, Hamblet was avail- ects Operations Center in North owed only begrudging allegiance to able to assist the French in devel- Africa. After assembling, the per- CFLN. Vanel considered the FTP to oping field medical services and sonnel moved by local motor trans- be poorly trained, undisciplined evacuation systems, but the pace of portation to an inn at Devesset. and generally unreliable. operations precluded that type of At Devesset, Cox spoke for sever- Vanel explained that the areas advisory effort.19 al hours with Commandant Paul along the German lines of commu- Cox traveled by motor vehicle20 Vaucheret, also known as Vanel, nication were divided into sectors, to the sector where the members of about the enemy and friendly situ- and that each sector was assigned OG Louise were operating. Louise ation in the Ardeche. Vanel was to either an AS or an FTP battal- had received 37 mm guns Aug. 15, chief of the Interallied Military ion. For political reasons, there was and early in the morning of Aug. Mission Pectorial and was the no liaison between the sectors, 25, near the city of Vallons, Lieu- appointed commander of the FFI in which complicated the coordina- tenant Rickerson, the executive Ardeche.16 Cox learned from Vanel tion of operations. officer of Louise, with other mem- that the resistance movement in During the afternoon, Hamblet bers of the section, took withdraw- Ardeche consisted of approximate- and several others visited the hos- ing German forces under fire. Late ly 5,000 armed men organized into pital at Chambon-sur-Lignon. They in the afternoon, the Maquis secu- battalions. The Armée Secrete,or found T/5 Bilodeau of OG Louise, rity force on the flanks of the gun AS, some of whom were sedentaries who had broken his leg during the position withdrew without warn- (comparable to the minutemen of parachute jump on July 18. They ing. The Germans attacked the colonial America), owed their alle- also found Sergeant Linnell, T/5 St. guns, which the Americans were giance to General de Gaulle’s Sauveur and Private Crough, all of forced to abandon after a fierce Comite Francais de la Liberation OG Betsy, who had been wounded firefight. Cox learned that this was Nationale, or CFLN,17 and were by shrapnel from a bomb dropped not the first time for a sudden well-trained, disciplined military by a German aircraft Aug. 10; and withdrawal on the part of the units. On the other hand, the FTP, Sergeant Lynch, also of Betsy, who Maquis. the military arm of the French had suffered a broken collarbone in Upon his return to Val-les-bains,

6 Special Warfare Cox recommended to Vanel that 300 yards from the road, where Americans tumbled into bed, dis- each OG section be assigned to a they lay, covered with brush, while turbed only by the noises coming sector in which the Maquis had several German patrols beat the from the German column that demonstrated good leadership, dis- bushes nearby. moved throughout the night. cipline and combat ability. Cox An hour later, the two men were The next morning, still in civil- insisted that Vanel ensure proper startled by two women who ian clothing, the two men crossed liaison between sectors and that a splashed up the ditch searching for the road during a break in the Ger- centrally located reserve of a place to hide. The nerve-wracking man column and gained the cover materiel and troops be established. wait continued, and the women of the heavily forested hills, where The reserve would be deployed to added to the danger with their they once again donned their uni- tip the scales when it appeared unconcerned chatter. Miraculously, forms. (Ten days later, Cox that the Germans were about to the German patrols that were returned to the area to thank the defeat the Maquis. prowling the fields and tree line family for their hospitality. He On the morning of Aug. 27, Cox, nearby failed to locate the group. learned that German patrols had Hamblet, Morin, and Sergeants After dark, two Frenchmen dis- searched all the homes in the val- Delage, Beaudoin and O’Lear drove covered the little group and led ley less than an hour after he and to Annonay. Shortly after arriving, them to a house away from the road. Delage had departed. The men, he they learned from the Maquis that After they changed into French was told, were taken further up the a German column was moving civilian clothing and hid their wet valley as hostages and later, for north near Tournon. They departed uniforms and equipment in the some unexplained reason, shot.) immediately for Tournon. When barn’s hayloft, Cox and Delange Morin and O’Lear spent an they arrived there, a Frenchman were led to the house, where the uncomfortable night in the woods, warned them that Germans were French family, at the risk of their and when daylight returned, they only a few kilometers away. lives, provided the sanctuary of were located by the Maquis. Ham- Cox, Morin, Delage and O’Lear their home to the two men. blet and Beaudoin hitchhiked to struck out toward the top of a hill The women prepared a meal, Devesset, where they were reunit- to observe the German column, which the soldiers devoured and ed with the other four men later in while Hamblet and Beaudoin hid washed down with a delicious red the morning. That afternoon, they the vehicle. Unfortunately, the wine. Tired to the bone, the two learned that personnel from Betsy advance guard of the German col- umn — two open cars and a double line of infantry — appeared on the road in front of the four men and immediately began firing on them. Morin and O’Lear managed to fade safely back into the mountains, as did Hamblet and Beaudoin, who had moved up after hiding the motor vehicle. Cox and Delage, however, were caught in the open, and they ran, zig-zagging across a plowed field. Fortunately, the Ger- man column was more concerned with the Maquis than with the two fleeing men. The German column leap- frogged forward with professional precision and placed small-arms fire, automatic-weapons fire and mortar fire on likely ambush sites USASOC Archive along the road. Cox and Delange Soldiers of the OGs and members of the Maquis aboard local transportation. The OG members managed to sprint through a line of later agreed that their training should have placed more emphasis on the operation and mainte- trees to a water-filled ditch some nance of foreign vehicles.

June 2002 7 had been strafed by what was could exact a tremendous materiel four battalion commanders. thought to have been a U.S. plane. and psychological toll on the flee- The colonel, who spoke fluent T/5 Raymond Bisson, the section ing German forces. Unfortunately, French, explained to the inter- medic, had been killed. Lieutenant the more certain the success of the preter, Collette, that he wished to Paul E. Boudreau, the section Allied armies became, the more the discuss terms with the American leader, had been seriously wounded Maquis leadership wanted to commander. Collette contacted Cox and had been evacuated to the hos- behave like a conventional force. at Devesset, but before Cox could pital at Chambon-sur-Lignon. The Maquis leadership focused arrive, a French armored-recon- Information concerning the Ger- more and more on the liberation of naissance vehicle appeared and man column that Cox and Delage Lyon and other large cities in the began firing at the Germans. With- had narrowly avoided was passed area, ignoring the opportunity to out further negotiation, the Ger- to the OSS base station in Algiers. batter the retreating German man officers threw their hands in Intelligence received from the columns. the air, shouting, “We surrender to Maquis in the Tournon area over During the night of Aug. 29, OGs you Americans!” the next few days indicated that Helen and Lafayette had parachuted The number of German prison- German combat forces and sup- in. In the afternoon, Lafayette depart- ers taken was two colonels, six porting units consisting of approxi- ed for the Maquis headquarters at majors, 22 captains and lieu- mately 50,000 troops, more than a Chateau Olivier in a truck provided tenants, and 3,794 enlisted men. thousand vehicles, a few half- by the Maquis. OG Helen remained The Americans later learned that tracks and some artillery, had in Devesset until Aug. 31, then moved the two colonels, one of the majors passed through Tournon continu- by truck to Saint-Etienne. and 150 other German POWs had ously for four days and nights. In the early morning of Aug. 31, been executed on the orders of a On Aug. 29, Cox and Lieutenant after spending the night at Maquis chief for atrocities they McKenzie, who had accompanied Chateau Olivier, Lieutenant Odilon had committed against the Maquis him to Val-les-bains, learned that a Fontaine of OG Lafayette, joined by and French civilians. German column was preparing to Lieutenant Rickerson and T/5 At FFI headquarters in Yzeron, move from Vallons to Privas. Henry D. Collette of OG Louise and Cox learned that the long-awaited McKenzie hurriedly departed to a Maquis officer, traveled to attack on Lyon was scheduled for bring up Louise and the 37 mm Chomerac to investigate reports of Sept. 2, and he hurriedly returned guns, which they had recovered German forces in the area. When to Devesset. On Sept. 1, OG from Vallons. Cox, Vanel and the they arrived, they learned the William, commanded by 1st Lieu- local Maquis chiefs performed a strength and the location of the tenant Harry L. Herres, arrived in reconnaissance of the area, but the German units from a German southern France, parachuting in Maquis became bogged down in POW who was being held by the strong winds just before midnight. endless discussion when they Maquis. Cox issued OG William a warning began planning. Another German prisoner order for the attack on Lyon, and The Maquis placed a company on agreed to assist them in contacting he returned to Yzeron with Ham- every route the Germans were like- the German commanders. This blet and McKinzie to arrange the ly to use. Theoretically then, the POW went through the lines and use of the OGs in the attack. Cox Maquis would have the Germans returned with a Russian who was established contact with the chief surrounded, but in reality, the Ger- the company commander of a Rus- of staff of the French 1st Armored mans blasted through the single sian volunteer unit with the Ger- Division, which would take part in Maquis company on the route they man Army. The Russian told them the attack. had chosen and continued on their that there were five battalions of The next morning, Cox joined OG way unmolested by the other German troops in the hills east of Helen, which was to spearhead the Maquis units. Cox was exasperat- Chomerac. attack in their sector.Apprehensive- ed; there had been too much talk The U.S. party left the Russian ly, Cox watched Helen move out in and not enough action. with the Maquis and made their battle formation on the outskirts of Cox knew that small bands oper- way to the German position, where the city. He knew only too well that ating in true guerrilla fashion — they contacted a German battalion if the Germans elected to put up a hitting and running, slashing con- commander, a major. The major fight, it would take more than the tinually at the enemy’s flanks and contacted his commander, a lightly armed Maquis to drive them fading into the countryside — colonel, who arrived with the other out. He and Hamblet proceeded on

8 Special Warfare foot toward the high ground on the ice21 firing rifles and submachine ed down and summarily executed. west bank of the Saone River that guns from windows. The Maquis Women who were accused of con- overlooked Lyon. To their amaze- and the French armored cars sorting with the Germans were ment, they found that they were opened up with all their weapons, stripped, branded, mutilated and ahead of the attacking Maquis. spraying the front of the buildings. tortured before being shot. In the Huge crowds of French civilians Civilians were everywhere, hugging frenzy, the mob killed several swarmed around them, giving them and kissing the men as they fired, “agents” of allied intelligence, even a wild welcome. “No comic South with complete disregard of all the as one victim was claiming that he American revolution ever had as firing.” could prove he was a loyal French- much firing and as little effect. The The festive mood of the civilians man. Fortunately, in a few days the opposition consisted of, at most, two and Maquis quickly turned nasty. FFI imposed control over the city, German machine guns and the Mil- The Miliciens were ruthlessly hunt- and the mayhem slowly diminished. Major Douglas G. Bonner of the 4th Special Forces Unit22 located Cox in Lyon, and the two decided to assemble the OG sections at Grenoble. Cox sent Hamblet to arrange the evacuation of the wounded to the assembly area, and by Sept. 17, all units had closed on Grenoble. The 14 OG sections that had infil- trated southern France were, in general, successful at organizing and training the Maquis. In concert with those Maquis forces, the OGs conducted operations to destroy pri- ority targets on the railroads and highways. They also established roadblocks and ambushes, and they cut communication and power lines in order to harass and impede the enemy forces that were moving toward and away from the invasion beaches. Through their communication link with Algiers, the OGs relayed vital order-of-battle information for their area of operations. Several of the sections located and assisted downed allied airmen. The least tangible, but probably the most important aspect, of the OGs was the tremendous lift their presence gave to the Maquis.23 As a result of their operations with the Maquis, the OGs reported 461 German soldiers killed in action, 467 wounded in action, and National Archives 10,021 German prisoners of war In August 1944, French civilians shave the head of a French woman to punish her for having per- taken. sonal relations with members of the German occupation force. During the stay in Grenoble, Cox conducted a post-operations cri-

June 2002 9 their equipment, on the whole, to be satisfactory. Complaints about the footgear and clothing indicate that the jump boot did not hold up well in the mountainous terrain, and that the U.S. field jacket did not provide sufficient protection against the cold. The use of the mountain sleeping bag allowed the soldiers to sleep comfortably almost regardless of conditions. The consensus was that the car- bine with folding stock, the .45-cal- iber pistol and the Marlin subma- chine gun were useful at short range. However, the soldiers agreed that the Browning Auto- matic Rifle and light machine gun were essential and should have been available from the beginning. The SSTR-1, the radio issued to the OG sections, was compact and lightweight, and it had the neces- sary range, but it was not durable. Most of its failures were due to minor flaws in the basic compo- nents and their construction. With only two or three exceptions, the operators had no idea how the radio functioned and therefore could not correct the failures. Even the operators who understood the sets had neither the tools nor the spare parts to repair them. The power pack was the second most likely component to fail. The major- ity of the power-pack failures were related to loose connections, shorts, Reprinted with permission of Bill Mauldin. Copyright 1944 by Bill Mauldin lack of insulation and overheating Bill Mauldin’s cartoon is based on the fact that partisan activities took a psychological toll on the of the unit. soldiers of the German occupation force. The unanimous conclusion among the OGs, Jedburghs and tique. All OG members expressed problems were more difficult than other elements was that the OSS the opinion that the extensive the operations. units were committed much too training they had received was The OG members generally late to achieve maximum effect on effective. All personnel had agreed that more emphasis should the Maquis. In the experience of received basic infantry, guerrilla have been placed on the operation the OGs, every day that was spent warfare, mountain operations and and maintenance of foreign in training the Maquis brought a parachute training prior to deploy- weapons and vehicles, on methods greater combat effectiveness. ment. At least 50 percent of the of instruction, on French military The consensus was that the real training was conducted during nomenclature, and on radio main- Maquis, the patriotic Frenchmen darkness, and some of the men tenance and repair (for the radio who risked everything in order to commented that the field training operators). The soldiers considered liberate France from the Nazis,

10 Special Warfare were above praise. Many of them, however, on rare occasions FFI tions, the FA Team, SF Operational operating in small bands or as indi- chiefs deliberately hampered OG Detachment Regiment, as organ- viduals, carried the fight to the activities. The actions of the FFI ized under the original TO&E 33-2 Germans for three to four years chiefs often had a political basis: approved in April 1952, was autho- without adequate supplies of food, serious animosity existed between rized 15 men: a detachment com- weapons or ammunition. Their the various groups. The consensus mander, an executive officer and 13 presence in the countryside made among the OGs was that no politi- enlisted men. The FA team was, in the occupation a continual hell for cal group should be permitted to theory, capable of organizing, sup- the Germans. have a “private” army. porting and directing a regimental- While the organization and the After studying the experience of sized guerrilla unit. discipline of each Maquis unit var- the Jedburgh teams in southern The functional specialties repre- ied, the presence of former officers France, Lieutenant Colonel Ken- sented on the FA Team were med- and NCOs of the French army usu- neth H. Baker, in his final report of ical, demolitions, communications, ally resulted in a well-disciplined the SPOC Debriefing Operations weapons, operations and intelli- and better-trained force. The FFI at Avignon, strongly recommended gence. The scouts of the OG section organizations could have been that all future operations contem- were replaced on the FA Team by more effective had the Maquis plated for Jedburgh teams be additional specialists in medical, been required to confine their strictly separated from political weapons, demolitions, and opera- efforts to guerrilla warfare, harass- considerations. If that was not pos- tions and intelligence. The field ing the fleeing enemy at every sible, then the team should be fully radio repairman was added to the opportunity. Instead, the FFI often briefed on all the political aspects FA Team organization because of attempted to bring together a large of its task, and personnel should be the problems the OSS operational force as an army of liberation of the selected with the political aspects teams had experienced with their larger towns in the area. in mind. The same observations communications equipment in the In general, the OG sections were would be valid for OGs as well. field. In southern France, the next warmly received by the French; Similar to the French OG sec- echelon in the OG organization functioned in a similar manner to that envisioned for the FB Team, Special Forces Operational Detach- ment District B. Colonel Aaron Bank, who was an OG, a Jedburgh and a member of the Special Operations Branch of the OSS, was involved in and exposed to the OSS/SOE field activities in the European, Mediterranean and China-Burma- India theaters of operation. Bank was personally involved in the con- flicts that would arise over com- mand and control. In an after- action report, he complained that Interallied Military Mission Isotrope “had decided beforehand as to our disposition and also the distribution of our arms, which immediately created a barrier between us, as I had been briefed to operate as a guerrilla organizer National Archives and leader, and the disposition of OSS Jedburgh teams attend a demolitions class at Milton Hall, England, in 1944. The Jedburghs my arms was my own affair.” Bank and the OGs agreed that they were committed too late in the war to achieve maximum effect. later concluded, “Jeds should never work with Missions as there is a

June 2002 11 constant clash.”24 His experience in services by operating coast-and-air doing research for a book on the southern France may account for watchers stations, providing infor- activities of the OSS Operational the hierarchical arrangement of mation, obstructing Japanese com- Groups. the FA, FB and FC teams in the munications and operations, and 10th SF Group and for the concepts maintaining the morale and loyal- Notes: of their deployment and support. ty of the civilian population.”27 1 Lieutenant Colonel Serge Obolensky parachuted into Sardinia in September Bank was also well aware of the Regardless of which person had 1943 to persuade Italian General Basso, OSS/SOE support organizations in the most influence on the Depart- who was the commanding general of the North Africa, Britain, France and ment of the Army’s acceptance of Italian troops on the island, to assist in neu- the Far East. He knew from first- the organization and on the con- tralizing the 270,000 Italian and 19,000 hand experience what was neces- cept of employment of the 10th SF German troops on the islands and to assist in securing the flank of the Salerno inva- sary for the support of the UW mis- Group in 1952, the implication is sion. In August 1944, Obolensky was infil- sion that was envisioned for Spe- that U.S. Army Special Forces is a trated into the southern part of Indre cial Forces. His experience was synthesis of the organizational and Department of France as commander of incorporated into the 1952 SF operational experience of the OSS. Operation Patrick. Serge Obolensky, The TO&E that established the SF It is not clear whether Aaron Bank Memoirs of Serge Obolensky: One Man in His Time (London: Hutchinson, 1960). group and the SFOB. The SF group and Al Cox, who worked for the 2 The Lehigh University Epitome (year- and the SFOB would perform CIA after World War II, ever con- book), 1940. essentially the same role as the ferred during the development of 3 During World War II, the operational OSS/SOE command-and-control, the 10th SF Group. Veterans of the units, including the OGs, were imbedded in logistics-support and communica- French OGs now insist that Cox an elaborate organization for command and control, logistics support and communica- tions organizations. taught Bank everything he knew tions that, in many respects, was replicated Brigadier General Russell W. about guerrilla warfare and that in the U.S. Army Special Forces operational Volckmann, who some insist was as therefore Cox had a definite influ- base. responsible for the development of ence on the ultimate form and sub- 4 Information supplied by Albert Mater- U.S. Army Special Forces as Bank stance of the 10th SF Group. azzi, operations Officer, Company A, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, Separate was, certainly made an important (Provisional), including basic operating contribution to the form and sub- instructions for Ginny, report of the Ginny stance of the emerging Special Ian Sutherland is an assistant operation, report of the first attempt to Forces. Volckmann, who had prosecuting attorney for Cape relieve Ginny party, report of the second refused to surrender to the Japan- Girardeau County, Mo. A former attempt to relieve Ginny party, and other documents related to the execution of the ese in 1941, evaded into the moun- Army officer who retired in 1979 as officers and men of Mission Ginny. Copy in tains of northern Luzon and organ- a lieutenant colonel, he served in a the Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations ized five regiments of Philippine variety of assignments, including Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. guerrillas.25 The OSS and SOE the 82nd Airborne Division; the 1st 5 Cox wrote to the commander of the were not involved in the develop- Battalion, 3rd U.S. Infantry (the 2677th Headquarters Company OSS (Provi- sional), in early May 1944, “I sincerely ment, support or direction of those Old Guard); the 5th Special Forces believe that I am speaking for myself, for guerrilla forces. The Allied Intelli- Group; and the American Embassy many of my officers, and for many of my gence Bureau, organized under the in Teheran, Iran. He served three men, in saying that we realize fully the assistant chief of staff, G2 in the years in Vietnam with the 5th SF risks entailed in our type of operations and Southwest Pacific Theater, provid- Group and other government agen- that we are ready and anxious to assume those risks. … It would be a terrible disap- ed the organization and support for cies. In addition to a bachelor’s pointment to many of us if the OG idea were Volckmann’s guerrilla forces. degree, he holds a master’s in zoolo- to be abndoned [sic]”; A. Materazzi docu- However, the arrangement did gy and physiology from Tulane ments, letter to Lieutenant Colonel Gamble, not work well. “The special opera- University, a master’s of public Subject: Future Employment of Operational tions group was primarily con- administration from Harvard Uni- Groups, dated 8 May 1944. 6 Part of Hitler’s Kommandobefehl (Com- cerned with fostering resistance versity, and a law degree from the mando Order) stated, “From now on all ene- and conducting sabotage behind University of Missouri at Colum- mies on so-called commando missions in the enemy’s lines, while AIB was bia. He is the author of The U.S. Europe or Africa challenged by German primarily concerned with strategic Army Special Forces, 1952-1982 troops, even if they are to all appearances and combat intelligence.”26 Being (1990) and Brightlight (2001) a soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in that as it may, the “Philippine historical novel based on his experi- flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. guerrilla units performed valuable ences in Vietnam. He is currently

12 Special Warfare It does not make any difference whether France, 20 September 1944, 2. Archives, 34 and 35, Location: 190/6/15/4; Martin, they are landed from ships or aeroplanes for U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “Report on Jedburghs (Zone Sud).” their actions, or whether they are dropped Fort Bragg, N.C. (Also located at Record 25 Operational Report of Team “Packard” in by parachute. Even if these individuals Group 226, E 190 Box 741, National Gard and Lozere Departments, dated 10 when found should be prepared to give Archives II.) October 1944, signed Aaron Bank, Captain, themselves up, as a matter of principle, no 15 Damage to radio gear during the para- Infantry. National Archives Record Group pardon is to be granted them.” chute drop was a problem that plagued the 226, Entry 101, Box 1, Folders 34 and 35, 7 In April 1944, two OGs and personnel for operational units. Location: 190/6/15/4; “History of OSS Aid to a field service headquarters from Unit B, 1st 16 Paul Gaujac, Special Forces in the Inva- French Resistance,” National Archives Contingent, were transferred to the United sion of France (Translated by Janice Lert) Record Group 226, Entry 190, Box 741, Kingdom under the command of Lieutenant (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 1999). Location: 190/10/4/2. Colonel Serge Obolensky, who was concur- 17 Arthur Layton Funk, Hidden Ally. The 26 The Special Forces Regimental History rently the commanding officer of the OGs, French Resistance, Special Operations and Calendar, 1994. Office of the Command His- European Theater of Operations. NARA the Landings in Southern France, 1944 torian, U.S. Army Special Operations Com- Microfilm M-1623, Roll No. 9, Vol. 4-A, Janu- (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992). mand, Fort Bragg, N.C. ary-June 1944, Operational Groups, 6. 18 Personal communications with Dr. John 27 FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of 8 Directive SHAEF/17240/13/ops, Role of Hamblet, 10 April 2000. Guerrilla Warfare, Headquarters, Depart- resistance groups in the South of France, 19 Hamblet was not the only medical officer ment of the Army, October 1951, 6-7. dated 21 May 1944, contained in Special who was infiltrated into France. Captain Operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Fred B. Agee, U.S. Army Medical Corps, was Operations, Section VII, “Resistance in infiltrated into the Haute Vienne Depart- France.” Copy located in the Archives, U.S. ment, as Mission Antagonist, to provide Army Special Operations Command, Fort medical services to members of the Maquis; Bragg, N.C. to assist in organizing such other medical 9 The operation name was used to identify services as were available for the purpose of the OG section and FSHQ. Each operation serving members of the Maquis; and to had a named signal plan: For Emily it was cooperate as far as possible with any doctors Helium, and for Lehigh it was Simone. located in nearby villages who were in any 10 Personal communications with A.P. way serving the Maquis. NARA Microfilm Frizzell, May 2000. Set M-1623, Roll No. 9 (OSS Aid to the 11 Arthur Brown, The Jedburghs: A Short French Resistance). History. Archives, U.S. Army Special Opera- 20 Motor transportation was readily avail- tions Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Jedburgh able to the Maquis. Unfortunately, the vehi- teams were ostensibly composed of Ameri- cles were notoriously unreliable and the dri- can, British and French soldiers, when in ving was often reckless. fact, only 10 of the 101 Jedburgh teams 21 Michael Pearson, Tears of Glory: The were so composed. Eighteen of the teams Betrayal of Vercors 1944 (London: Macmil- had two Frenchmen or Dutchmen, depend- lan, 1978). The Milice were political police ing on the destination; 32 had two Ameri- directed by the puppet government at cans; and 41 had two British soldiers. The Vichy; they wore distinctive blue uniforms. teams were infiltrated into France for the They were the French equivalent of the purpose of organizing, supporting and Gestapo. Their methods were every bit as directing the Resistance. Eight teams, brutal as the Gestapo’s and even more Clarence, Claude, Daniel II, Dicing, Dudley hated. II, Edward, Gambling and Stanley II, were 22 Funk, Hidden Ally, 38-39. Special Forces deployed to Holland. Unit No. 4 was commanded by Lieutenant 12 Initially, the railway bridge over the Cele Colonel William G. Bartlett. British Lieu- River at Conduche was selected, and on tenant Colonel E.S.N. Head was the deputy June 12, 1944, the bridge was destroyed by commander. The unit consisted of 22 officers OG Emily, which was supported by FTP per- (10 U.S. and 12 British) and 42 enlisted men sonnel. Operations Report, Company B, (12 U.S. and 30 British). 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, 23 Operations Report, Commander’s Report. Separate (Prov.), Operation Emily. 24 Isotrope had promised the FTP eight 13 The FTP was controlled by the French Bren automatic rifles and 40 Enfield rifles communist party and was often at odds that Team Packard had brought in. Bank with the other resistance groups. concluded that the FTP “was always more 14 Of the 27 officers and 155 enlisted men interested in politics than fighting the Ger- who parachuted into southern France, 23 mans. They never used all the arms they were listed as wounded in action, 10 of received and in my opinion are keeping the whom were injured on the jump. Command- arms for ulterior motives. They should be ing Officers Report, Operational Report. disarmed as fast as possible.” Operational Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Report, Team Packard. National Archives Battalion, Separate (Prov.), Grenoble, Record Group 226, Entry 101, Box 1, Folders

June 2002 13 The History of the 1st SF Group in the Republic of the Philippines: 1957-2002

ince its activation in July During the late 1960s, the assistance and provided a U.S. 1957, the 1st Special Forces Philippine Special Forces were dis- presence in Asia while simultane- SGroup has maintained a close banded because of political in- ously supporting the 1st SF association with the Philippines. fighting. The Philippine Scout Group’s mission in the Republic of The 1st SF Group has conducted Rangers survived those turbulent Vietnam. The 97th Civil Affairs numerous missions, ranging from years and became the nucleus of a Group, the 156th Medical Detach- humanitarian assistance and for- Philippine special-operations com- ment, the 400th Army Security eign internal defense to the ongo- mand that continues to accomplish Agency Detachment, the 441st Mil- ing unconventional-warfare opera- a variety of missions ranging from itary Intelligence Detachment and tions in support of Operation special reconnaissance to civic the 539th Engineer Detachment Enduring Freedom. No matter action. augmented the 1st SF Group’s which mission they have been The 1st SF Group’s heavy efforts in accomplishing the SAF assigned, the soldiers of the 1st SF involvement in humanitarian- Asia mission. Group have always stood assistance and civic-action pro- Having gained a vast amount of “balikatan” (shoulder to shoulder) grams throughout Asia contributed experience in Thailand and in Viet- with their counterparts in the significantly to the success of the nam, the personnel of SAFAsia Armed Forces of the Philippines, or Philippine civic-action program. earned the respect and the admira- AFP. During the late 1960s and early tion of the Philippine people. In During the late 1950s, the 1st SF 1970s, the 1st SF Group reorgan- 1972, the rapid response, dedica- Group began training the cadre of ized into the Special Action Force tion and professionalism of SAF the Philippine Scout Rangers. Asia, or SAF Asia. This organiza- Asia’s disaster-assistance-and- Using a curriculum that mirrored tion ensured theaterwide security relief team saved thousands of that used by U.S. Army Rangers at lives in severely flooded provinces that time, the 1st SF Group of the Philippines and earned the focused on developing the cadre’s 1st SF Group the Philippine Presi- leadership abilities and training dential Unit Citation. them in infantry tactics. Eventual- In 1974, the 1st SF Group was ly, some of the Philippine scout deactivated, ending 17 years of SF units split off to form the Philip- influence in Southeast Asia. pine Special Forces, which were Almost 10 years later, the 1st SF activated to counter both the grow- Group’s colors were unfurled again ing communist insurgency in the U.S. Army photo at Fort Lewis, Wash., and within northern provinces and the resur- Graduation ceremony for the 1st Advanced one month of its reactivation, the gence of Islamic nationalism in the Ranger class of the Philippine Army, in 1958. The 1st SF Group once again had southern provinces. instructors were members of the 1st SF Group. deployed soldiers to the Philip-

14 Special Warfare After a careful analysis of the pos- sible courses of action and after con- sultation with the U.S. State Department, the Philippine govern- ment decided to establish the light- reaction company, or LRC. The unit consists of a company of AFP sol- diers from the Philippine special- operations command, armed with the latest equipment and trained by the 1st SF Group. Accompanied by soldiers of the 1st SF Group, the LRC is currently conducting a vari- ety of operations throughout the Philippines. Almost immediately after the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, the president of the Philippines offered to assist the U.S. in the global war on terrorism. After definite confir- Photo by Kyran V. Adams mation of links between Philippine A soldier from the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group, teaches Philippine soldiers to conduct insertion bandit groups and terrorist cells, and extraction operations. The training took place at Fort Magsaysay in May 2001. the Philippine people once again welcomed the soldiers of the 1st SF pines to ensure the stability of the continued to send soldiers to the Group to train, advise and assist region. 1st SF Group soldiers con- Philippines, but they were restrict- the AFP in destroying those organ- tinued to hone their combat skills ed to training Philippine soldiers izations. Today soldiers of the two at Clark Air Force Base, at Subic for “other than combat” missions. countries are once again standing Bay’s Green Beach live-fire area, However, the Philippine and Amer- shoulder-to-shoulder, helping to rid and at the Crow Valley bombing ican people realized the value and the world of the terrorist plague. range. necessity of increasing the combat The 1st SF Group has a proud Unilateral training, however, capability of the AFP, and by the history in the Philippines, and was not the 1st SF Group’s only end of the 1990s, soldiers of the 1st today’s 1st SF Group soldiers go focus during the late 1980s. The SF Group were once again training forth in the spirit of the SF soldiers group’s detachments, companies the AFP in the war-fighting skills who went before them. Alongside and battalions continued to partic- that are vital to success in combat. their AFP counterparts, they will ipate in the annual Exercise Even after the Philippine govern- accomplish their assigned missions Balikatan. They also conducted ment signed peace treaties with with the dedication and the quiet numerous humanitarian-assist- Islamic nationalist groups, and even professionalism that are symbol- ance and civic-action projects after communist insurgencies had ized by the green beret. through the program known as almost ceased to exist in the Philip- Joint Combined Exchange Train- pines, a new menace emerged. Ban- ing, or JCET. But political and dit groups in the southern provinces This article was written by mem- environmental forces became were kidnapping and killing Fil- bers of the 1st Special Forces training distracters for the 1st ipinos and foreigners. These groups Group. Group — the U.S. military with- were not only destroying the Philip- drawal from the Philippines, cou- pine tourist industry, they were pled with the eruption of Mount spreading fear and discontent Pinatubo and unsuccessful negoti- among the people. In the depths of ations of the military base agree- the Asian economic crisis, the ment, forced the group to reduce its Philippine government sought a operations in the Philippines. military solution to help deal with After 1992, the 1st SF Group the problem.

June 2002 15 A History of SF Operations in Somalia: 1992-1995

by Colonel Joseph D. Celeski

he conflict in Somalia pro- 1991. A severe drought, widespread NEO, of the U.S. Embassy. An SF vides an excellent example of banditry and escalating clan war- sergeant from the 5th SF Group, Tthe value of integrating fare had brought on the largest who was already deployed to Soma- United States Army Special Forces, famine of that decade. By the end of lia as a member of a technical or SF, in conjunction with other 1991, more than 4.5 million people assistance field team, was tasked special-operations forces, or SOF, had been displaced as refugees, and to serve as an SF liaison element to in a military operation other than more than 300,000 Somalis had the U.S. Marines. From aboard a war in both rural and urban com- died of starvation. circling AC-130, the SF NCO pro- bat environments. The first use of SF occurred in vided information about locations Although A-detachments from January 1991, during the noncom- throughout Mogadishu to assist the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 10th SF batant evacuation operation, or the Marines as they conducted the Groups operated in Somalia during the period of U.S. involvement, the seven casualties of the conflict — one killed in action and six wound- ed in action — occurred during the rotation of the 5th SF Group. The United Nations role in Soma- lia was unique. For the first time, U.N. forces were used to resolve an intra-state conflict in a failed state. Fourteen warring tribal clans had devastated the country in a civil war that had begun with the col- lapse of the Siad Barre regime in

The views expressed in this arti- cle are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United

States Special Forces Command, DoD photo USASOC, USSOCOM, the Depart- A U.S. Air Force C-130 off-loads humanitarian-relief supplies in Somalia during Operation Pro- ment of the Army, the Department vide Relief. The delivery of food supplies was difficult because of a lack of force protection for of Defense, or the U.S. government. the airlift personnel.

16 Special Warfare operation. By Jan. 31, 1992, a tenuous cease-fire was in place, and a small contingent of U.N. military observers had deployed to Somalia. The cease-fire was ineffective: thefts by bandits and confiscations of relief supplies by warring clans still posed a threat to the delivery of relief supplies. The U.N. deployed forces in April 1992 (under U.N. Security Council Reso- lution 751) to provide protection for the U.N.-sponsored humanitarian aid and to provide a secure envi- ronment for the delivery of relief supplies. When the additional observers from the U.N. Operation in Soma- lia, or UNOSOM, were unable to improve the situation, President Photo courtesy Ken Barriger George Bush authorized the use of A desert mobility vehicle of the quick-reaction force is loaded aboard a C-130. While aircraft deliv- U.S. forces to increase the airlifts of ered food supplies, the QRF aircraft circled overhead to provide security. food. Operation Provide Relief began Aug. 15, 1992, and ended rity role, the 2nd Battalion person- In early October 1992, SF per- Dec. 9, 1992. nel brought along two desert- sonnel made their first landing in The U.S. involvement in Somalia mobility vehicles, or DMVs, armed Somalia. A three-man survey-and- represented a new use of the with .50-caliber machine guns and assessment team from the 2/5th SF armed forces as a means of resolv- MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers. Group accompanied members of an ing and containing an intra-state Air Force C-130s and C-141s flew Air Force engineering team into conflict. The mission of the joint multiple relief flights of humanitar- Belet Huen. Led by CWO 3 Rick task force (the staff of the U.S. Cen- ian supplies to airfields at Bardera, Dietrich, the team contacted the tral Command, or CENTCOM; and Baledogle, Baidoa and Kismaayo. factions and clan elders to work out the 1st Marine Expeditionary The SF security teams loaded their agreements for the continued land- Force) was threefold: Provide airlift DMVs aboard Airborne Battlefield ing and delivery of relief supplies. of humanitarian relief, provide Command and Control Center, or On occasion, if the threat warrant- support services, and provide force ABCCC, aircraft. The ABCCC C- ed, the mounted SF security ele- protection for airlift forces. 130s circled the airfields while the ment would land and deploy into In August 1992, elements of the relief flights were on the ground. positions on the airfields while the 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group, The planes were prepared to land off-loading of humanitarian sup- deployed to Mombassa, Kenya, as and provide security or to partici- plies took place. part of Operation Provide Relief. pate in ground combat-search-and- In November, the staff of the 2nd Their mission was to provide secu- rescue missions, as required. Battalion redeployed to the U.S. rity to U.S. Air Force personnel SF medics and other team mem- Company C, 2/5th SF Group, which during humanitarian-assistance bers would occasionally fly in the had just arrived in Somalia, airlift flights. The deployment con- landing aircraft. They conducted assumed the quick-reaction-force, or sisted of approximately 70 person- assessments and facilitated the QRF, mission. The ABCCC aircraft nel: seven personnel from the 2nd transfer of supplies by coordinat- made two flights each day (morning Battalion’s forward operating base, ing with clan factions; tribal elders; and afternoon), with a two-hour FOB 52, who acted as the com- the U.S. Agency for International overlap between the flights. A six- to mand-and-control element; and SF Development; U.N. relief agencies; eight-man QRF flew in each air- B-detachment 540 with four A- and personnel from nongovern- craft. Each SF team flew a morning detachments. To assist in the secu- ment organizations, or NGOs. flight one day, flew an afternoon

June 2002 17 flight the next day, and took the secure. Two Marine Corps AH-1 returned to the Baledogle airfield. third day off. Company C’s four Cobra gunships provided air cover They did not encounter any Somali detachments flew the QRF missions and relayed information about the gunmen this time. The Air Force from Nov. 23 to Dec 28. strength and positions of hostile engineers brought in heavy equip- On Dec. 4, personnel from B- forces. Once on the ground, Detach- ment to clear vegetation from the detachment 560 landed at the ment 565 confiscated 27 weapons sides of both the runway and the Baledogle airfield to provide secu- and large quantities of ammuni- taxiways. On Dec. 11, Detachment rity for Air Force engineers who tion from the Somali airfield secu- 565 confiscated 18 more weapons were there to conduct an airfield rity force at gunpoint. The SF sol- from Somalis who were moving assessment for follow-on landings diers found three technical vehi- near the airfield. On Dec. 12, of forces of the 10th Mountain Divi- cles, two jeeps equipped with 106 Detachment 565 confiscated 10 sion. The Americans were met by mm recoilless rifles, and a land more weapons from Somalis. the local Somali airfield security rover with an M-2 .50-caliber On Dec. 16, Detachments 565 and force, who greeted them by point- machine gun and an M-1919A4 564 were assigned to an airfield- ing their weapons at them. The .30-caliber machine gun. The team security mission in Kismaayo. The security force and the engineers disabled the 106 mm recoilless purpose of the mission was to departed the airfield. rifles and confiscated the 106 mm secure the airfield for the landing of On Dec. 10, A-detachment 565 ammunition. After the airfield was coalition Belgian peacekeeping was given the mission of securing secure, the ODB established com- forces. Detachment 565 confiscated the Baledogle airfield. Detachment mand and control in the control 18 weapons. Detachment 564 con- 565’s plan was to infiltrate its two tower, which offered a better view fiscated eight cases of small-arms DMVs, its eight personnel, and an of Detachment 565’s roving vehicle ammunition, rounds for a 57 mm Air Force combat-control team rid- security force. Air Force engineers recoilless rifle, and two rifles.1 ing motorcycles, from a C-130. B- arrived to assess the asphalt sur- detachment 560 would conduct face of the runway. By late after- Restore Hope command and control, and main- noon on Dec. 10, all elements had When clan violence continued to tain security around the aircraft on returned to Mombassa by C-130. interfere with UNOSOM relief the ground until the airfield was On Dec. 11 and 12, the team operations, the need for expanded peacekeeping in Somalia was clear. On Dec. 3, 1992, U.N. Resolution 794 authorized “all means neces- sary to establish a secure humani- tarian assistance environment.” President Bush authorized the deployment of U.S. forces on Opera- tion Restore Hope.2 Operation Restore Hope — called the unified task force, or UNITAF — was a U.S.-led joint and multinational force that would use military means to enforce the U.N. mandate. On Dec. 9, to ensure that relief supplies would be delivered to Mogadishu’s outlying districts and that the lines of communication necessary for humanitarian relief would be protected, CENTCOM deployed combat forces from the U.S. Marines, the 10th Mountain Photo courtesy Ken Barriger Division, and Army SOF, including SF soldiers of the QRF conduct a security sweep of the Baledogle airfield on Dec. 10, 1993. The SF coalition-support teams, or SF soldiers secured the airfleld so that Belgian peacekeeping forces could land. CSTs, from the 1st, 3rd, 5th and

18 Special Warfare 10th SF Groups. UNITAF was responsible for seven major operational areas: The French were in Oddur; the Canadi- ans in Belet Huen; the Australians in Baidoa; the Italians in Buulo- Barde; the Marines in Bardera; the Belgian contingent and an infantry-battalion task force from the 10th Mountain Division in Kismaayo; and forces from the Marines and the 10th Mountain, along with the remaining members of the multinational force, in Mogadishu. Members of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group, per- formed the first SF ground mission in Somalia. They had deployed from Mombassa to Belet Huen in late December 1992 with five A- Photo courtesy Joseph Celeski detachments to form the Army SF soldiers at a base camp in Belet Huen display weapons they had seized from warring Somali SOF, or ARSOF, component of a factions during area-reconnaissance patrols. joint special-operations task force, or JSOTF, led by Special Opera- ventional warfare, or UW). ing convoy security-escort duties). tions Command-Central, or SOC- One team in Belet Huen was reas- A significant amount of combat CENT. Company C was augmented signed to the town of Fer Fer (along occurred in the Kismaayo sector by Detachment 526 from Company the Ethiopian border) to monitor between armed Somali factions B, 1/5th SF Group, which was Ethiopian military incursions into and troops of the 10th Mountain assigned to the Marine-controlled Somalia and to monitor and interdict Division. Initially, the 10th did not Bardera sector. As CSTs from the shipments of illegal arms. A-detach- have access to intelligence on the other SF groups arrived, the ment 316 (from the 3rd SF Group) clan factions, and it required requirement for a command-and- was the Moroccan CST; teams from human intelligence. After coordi- control element larger than an the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the nating with the intelligence assets advanced operational base, or 10th SF Group were assigned as of the 10th, SF teams began sup- AOB, became obvious. On Jan. 12, CSTs with the Italian, German and plying reconnaissance reports and 1993, the FOB from the 2/5th once French contingents. area assessments. CSTs were also again deployed to Mogadishu to The missions of the Army Special able to provide situational aware- serve as the ARSOF headquarters. Operations Task Force, or ARSOTF, ness related to their clan factions The Marines had secured the port were to conduct UW by sending and their multinational partners. of Kismaayo Dec. 20, 1992. SF B- teams to meet with clan leaders and Other missions that SF per- detachment 560 (with two A-detach- by assisting the U.N. with demobi- formed in support of the 10th ments) was assigned to Kismaayo as lization efforts and weapons collec- Mountain Division included: the special-operations command- tion; to provide force protection • Mounted reconnaissance of and-control element, or SOCCE. The (countersniper and battlefield infor- remote areas in order to conduct SOCCE had one team located as far mation gathering); to provide area area assessments and to make south as the Somalia-Kenya border, assessments that update intelli- contact with clan and faction living with and monitoring the activ- gence; to provide selected CSTs to leaders. During a recon opera- ities of General Morgan and his U.N. forces; to facilitate humanitar- tion in March 1993, four mem- armed clan. The team assisted in the ian activities; to conduct border sur- bers of a CST from Company A, demobilization of Morgan’s armed veillance and interdict shipments of 2/5th, were traveling to a meet- soldiers and in collecting the soldiers’ illegal arms; and to provide area ing of tribal elders in Belet weapons (a classic mission of uncon- security to relief operations (includ- Huen. Their vehicle struck a

June 2002 19 caps or Middle-Eastern style head- gear. They would enter a village, find out which clan was in charge there, and establish a rapport that helped to set the stage for the arrival of Marine mechanized infantry who would come to disarm the locals. Continue Hope On April 12, 1993, the 2/5th Group’s FOB and its organic teams redeployed to Fort Campbell, Ky. On May 4, with food supplies flow- ing again and with more than 37,000 U.N. soldiers deployed to Somalia, UNITAF passed opera- tions to the U.N.-led UNOSOM II. On May 5, the U.S. forces remain- Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer ing under Operation Restore Hope SF soldiers from Detachment 525 depart Mogadishu on an area-assessment mission in April assumed a new mission, Operation 1993. Continue Hope, which expanded the U.N. mandate to include opera- mine, mortally wounding the leaving the FOB of the 2/5th SF tions under the Title VII charter — medic and injuring the other Group as the commander of the peacemaking. three passengers. The medic, ARSOF component of the JTF. The A large U.S. logistics-support ele- Sergeant First Class Robert teams from the other SF groups ment remained in Mogadishu, as Deeks, was able to treat the also returned home, and from that well as a U.S. QRF composed of wounded before he died. He was time on, SF’s Somalia involvement assets of the 10th Mountain Divi- the only SF soldier killed in was handled through a rotation of sion. The SOCCE from Company B, action in Somalia. units from the 5th SF Group. 1/5th SF Group, which had • Surveillance of the Ethiopian In mid-February, Company C, deployed to Somalia in March 1993 border in order to report acts of 2/5th SF Group, consolidated its with two mounted A-detachments banditry against humanitarian teams to establish the AOB head- (523 and 525), was under the oper- organizations, to ascertain the quarters and a base of operations on ational control of the QRF. Without source of arms-smuggling, and the compound of the American the presence of the massive combat to report incursions by Ethiopi- Embassy in Mogadishu. For the power of the U.S., the warring fac- an forces into Somalia. remainder of their time in Somalia, tions became more aggressive in • Special reconnaissance of the SF soldiers assisted in providing their activities. By early June, named areas of interest in and security for food-relief operations. UNOSOM II forces in Mogadishu around Kismaayo.3 Armed and mounted A-detach- were closed-up in their separate SF teams were assigned to work ments traveled in relief columns to compounds. with all three of the major clan fac- provide protection from snipers and Prior to the assumption of tions — General Morgan’s, General from looting and attack. The JTF responsibility by UNOSOM II, Aideed’s and Colonel Jess’s — to commander also assigned the A- SOCCE 520 had conducted opera- assist in demobilizing clan fighters detachments to perform several tions during April 1993 in support and to confiscate the armed fac- long-range reconnaissance mis- of UNITAF. Each of its area-famil- tions’ heavy weapons. In accom- sions. On those missions, the iarization missions produced valu- plishing these UW tasks, the SF detachments, despite carrying a full able intelligence for UNOSOM, teams became the primary source war-load of weapons and ammuni- CENTCOM, the Defense Intelli- of battlefield intelligence. tion on their DMVs, attempted to gence Agency, and other govern- By the end of February 1993, the appear less threatening by assum- ment agencies. SOCCE personnel SOCCENT JSOTF had redeployed, ing a casual posture — wearing soft

20 Special Warfare met many of the indigenous lead- while its armed militiamen Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th ers and gained an appreciation for deployed. The Somalis were imme- SF Group, conducted force-protec- the terrain and operations of coali- diately engaged by one of the DMV tion activities in support of UNO- tion forces in the areas of gunners, who killed the technical SOM II. The company employed Kismaayo, Bardera, Baidoa, gunner, disabled the truck’s .50- counter snipers in static positions Merka, Belet Huen and Galcaio. caliber machine gun and destroyed at the embassy compound and On April 23, Detachment 525 the vehicle. roamed to “hot spots” around the engaged in combat with militia- The Somalis suffered one dead university complex. As the situa- men from the Al-Itihad Al-Islami, and three wounded. There were no tion warranted, the company or AIAI, fundamentalist Islamic friendly casualties. For their actions extended its sniper positions to organization near Gaarbaharey. that day, several members of external areas and to U.N. strong- Mounted SF teams frequently Detachment 525 were recommend- points throughout Mogadishu. As encountered “technicals.” The light ed for decorations. one of the commanders of the 10th civilian pickup trucks served as the In mid-May, SOCCE 520 was Mountain Division task force stat- armed clansmen’s firepower-and- tasked to deploy mounted detach- ed, “Periodically, one of our sniper mobility platforms. The trucks had ments and a liaison element to teams armed with Barrett .50-cal- been hastily camouflaged with Kismaayo following an outbreak of iber or M-24 7.62 mm sniper rifles spray paint, and heavy machine fighting there. SOCCE 520 partici- would observe and engage a mili- guns had been mounted on the pated in a combined contingency tiaman driving a technical or car- truck beds. Members of the militia operation with the QRF and Bel- rying a crew-served weapon. These would pile onto the trucks, armed gians and conducted special-recon- snipers were lethal, and they with AK-47s, machine guns, and naissance, or SR, missions in and proved [to be] a superb deterrent rocket-propelled grenades, or around Kismaayo. As warlord against the movement and trans- RPGs. Many of the armed trucks Mohamed Farah Aideed’s anti- port of militia weapons near our were initially rented by NGOs for UNOSOM propaganda increased, compounds. With a single shot, protection. NGOs could not legally SOCCE 520 also took the lead in they could reach out and touch a pay for protection with humanitar- planning the seizure of the main belligerent at 1,000 meters, and ian funds, so they would list their radio station in Mogadishu. they did so frequently.”4 armed guards as “technical assis- tants” on their books — thus the nickname “technicals.” A split team from Detachment 525, led by Sergeant First Class Otto Hicks, was in the area of Bardera when the company received the mission to attempt to co-opt the AIAI in the town of Bela How into working with the U.N. The team drove its two DMVs to Bela How and attempted to negoti- ate with the AIAI. When the nego- tiations failed, the team left town, followed by one technical. When the two DMVs were close to friend- ly lines, Hicks decided to stop the technical so that the team wouldn’t be caught between two militia fac- tions. After deploying his two vehi- cles in a wadi, Hicks and another NCO walked back to intercept the Photo courtesy Joseph Celeski technical and to direct the Somali SF soldiers in DMVs accompany convoys of relief supplies to provide security from attacks by militia to stop following them. The bandits and warring Somali factions. technical stopped and opened fire

June 2002 21 In Mogadishu, U.S. military Brigade:“A Special Forces soldier, carried two teams of snipers and snipers made shots that averaged equipped with night optics and a spotters equipped with a hand- 400 meters. The rules of engage- Barrett .50-caliber sniper rifle sus- held laser designator. The Special ment for UNOSOM II were unique pended from the troop compartment Forces snipers would sit on wooden in that they allowed forces to ceiling of a Black Hawk, was able to benches in the troop compartment engage technicals or men who were place a couple of armor-piercing with their feet braced against carrying crew-served weapons (e.g., rounds through the tube of an aban- cargo straps and their rifles slung RPGs or machine guns) without doned 120 mm mortar, rendering it from the ceiling. Airborne snipers provocation. Any Somali clansmen useless. The mortar crew fled in were only employed for a couple of armed with sniper weapons (a rifle haste upon hearing the approaching months; we eventually ceased oper- with a scope could fit the category) helicopter.”5 ations because of concerns for the could also be engaged without Casper further describes this teams’ safety if the aircraft experi- provocation. However, clansmen unique employment of snipers in enced a hard landing.”6 who carried AK-47s but did not an urban environment, “Our heli- After Aideed’s militia attacked point them at U.N. forces in a copter snipers also proved and killed several Pakistani peace- threatening manner were consid- extremely effective. Equipped with keepers in June 1993, U.N. forces ered to be off-limits. the Barrett, the sniper flights were took a more aggressive role to sub- SF aerial snipers assisted the avi- usually in concert with our ‘Eyes due Aideed’s influence. On June 5, ation assets of the 10th Mountain Over Mogadishu’ night missions. personnel from SOCCE 520 accom- Division’s 2-14th Infantry Task Force The sniper aircraft (UH-60) would panied officials of the UNOSOM when they began the “Eyes Over trail the lead helicopter by about a Ceasefire and Disarmament Com- Mogadishu” program — the nearly half-mile. Although the aircraft mittee on an announced forced constant presence of armed heli- were completely blacked out, if the inspection of the so-called autho- copters over the city. Retired Colonel lead helicopter attracted ground rized weapons-storage sites. SF Lawrence E. Casper, who command- fire, the sniper aircraft would personnel assisted in the catego- ed the Falcon Brigade Task Force in observe, acquire, and engage the rization of the various weapons Mogadishu, wrote about the use of target with the aid of night-vision and in developing target folders for urban snipers in his book, Falcon accessories. Typically, the helos possible use in the future. Using the targeting information, SOCCE 520 briefed AH-1 pilots, AC-130 crews and QRF commanders and staff on all targets prior to the seizure-and-destruction operations conducted June 12. The first direct activities against Aideed began with AC-130 gun- ships destroying his home, his garage compound (a storage area for technicals), and his clan’s weapons-storage areas. SOCCENT deployed a JSOTF with four AC- 130s and two KC-135 air-refueling tankers to control this phase of the mission. The deputy commander of the 5th SF Group, Lieutenant Colonel “Moe” Elmore, was assigned to the headquarters of UNOSOM II as the special-opera- tions coordination element, or Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer SOCOORD, to enhance coordina- Two SF snipers set up a Blackhawk helicopter prior to an aerial sniper mission as part of “Eyes tion between the JSOTF and UNO- Over Mogadishu.” The wooden bench was taken from a U.N. dining hall. SOM. Beginning June 12, the gun- ships conducted four nights of

22 Special Warfare armed-reconnaissance and direct- brought home to SOCCE 520 when action operations. From June 12 to a two-vehicle convoy carrying June 17, SOCCE 520 provided Elmore to the airport was ground control for AC-130 strikes ambushed not more than two miles on selected targets in Mogadishu. from the embassy compound. During the same period, the com- On July 23, Sergeant Major Pat pany also provided CSTs to coali- Ballogg planned to accompany tion forces that were conducting Detachment 523 on a counter- cordon-and-search operations at sniper operation.7 The group, the Aideed enclave, and it placed a mounted in 523’s DMVs, was going sniper team atop a building over- to a range area out of town to zero looking the Aideed compound. Dur- weapons before moving into the ing the AC-130 strikes, the Compa- operational area. Elmore had ny B commander and his sniper missed his helicopter taxi from the team were perched atop the build- embassy compound to the airfield, ing and called for close air support, and the unit gave him a lift. One of or CAS, from the AC-130s. the column’s DMVs was armed On the fourth night of the gun- with a MK-19 grenade launcher; ship attacks, UNOSOM II forces Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer the other carried a .50-caliber M-2 mounted a cordon-and-search mis- The Aideed compound, following attacks by machine gun. The trail vehicle also sion with four multinational units AC-130 gunships on June 12, 1993. had one squad automatic weapon to flush Aideed’s leadership from and an M-24 sniper weapon. Each his compound, to clean up capture Aideed during his vehicu- member of the group had his per- Mogadishu and to reassert U.N. lar movements. The concept was to sonal weapons with the basic load, control. The SOCCE and its two A- employ SR teams and aerial as well as other ammunition for fir- detachments split into three CSTs snipers to detect Aideed when he ing at the range. Individuals were in order to maneuver with Pak- was in vehicular movement, then protected by Kevlar helmets and istani, Italian and Moroccan forces. attack the column with Cobras “Zinner” body armor. As a precau- The CAS team with the Moroccan from the 10th Mountain Division. tion against land mines, the DMVs task force came under intense fire Upon the arrival of the Marine had been equipped with Kevlar during the operation and respond- Expeditionary Unit, the mission soft blast blanket linings and with ed upon the task-force command- was handed over to the Marines. armored front windows. The SF er’s request with fire from MK-19 However, Detachment 523 contin- personnel locked and loaded their grenade launchers that silenced ued to provide an aerial sniper weapons, pointed them outward, observed sources of enemy fire. Fol- team that performed aerial target and departed the embassy com- lowing nine hours of combat, the interdiction at night. The mission, pound around 10 a.m., choosing an team’s disabled DMV was towed later referred to as Eyes Over unused route along side streets. back to the U.S. Embassy com- Mogadishu, proved to be a valuable The column rounded a corner pound under the supporting fire of alternative to the use of Cobra gun- onto a straight dirt road about 300 a counterattack by forces of the ships at night. On Aug. 10, the aer- meters long. The two-story, flat- French Foreign Legion. ial sniper team evaded antiaircraft front buildings on either side of the During the remainder of June fire and destroyed a Somali techni- road left just enough room for two and July, Aideed clansmen con- cal armed with a 57 mm rocket pod vehicles to pass. The street was stantly attacked U.N. forces in that had been firing on the airfield deserted, and a ruined blue bus sat retaliation for the actions early in and that had killed at least two on the left side. About 200 feet June. In late June, CENTCOM Somali militiamen. down the road, Ballogg (in the lead directed SOCCE 520 to develop a The security of Mogadishu deteri- vehicle) could see a side street or concept for the capture of Aideed. orated throughout July, as was evi- alley. Suddenly, Ballogg’s vehicle Major Dave Jesmer, the Company denced by the increasing frequency was hit by two rounds: one in the B commander; a British SAS offi- of attacks on the U.N. compounds center of each side of the armored cer who was observing the compa- and by the ambushes of U.N. vehi- windshield. The shooters were in ny’s operations; and Lieutenant cles in the city. The danger inherent the blue bus. Simultaneously, Colonel Elmore devised a plan to in urban guerrilla warfare was armed clansmen in the alley to the

June 2002 23 Year” in 1995 for his actions.9 During early August, Detach- ment 525 trained Malaysian snipers, who had received new equipment just prior to their arrival in Somalia. At the same time, Detachment 523 intensified its aerial sniper coverage to include support for a renewed attempt by the QRF to capture Aideed. JTF-Somalia Company C, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, deployed on its rotation to Somalia in September 1993. Upon arrival, it assumed the ongo- ing missions from elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th SF Group. Pri- Photo courtesy Dave Jesmer marily, the B-detachment per- One of the DMVs involved in the ambush in Mogadishu on July 23, 1993. Note the bullet strikes formed as the SOCCE to the UNO- on the front and side windows. SOM II QRF while the A-detach- ments performed traditional roles right opened fire. The Somalis (8- vehicle came within five feet of the of SR, DA and coalition-support. 12 personnel) had AK-47s and attacking Somalis. The employment of SF sniper either threw grenades or fired To clear the ambush zone, the teams became the primary form of RPGs (this was uncertain in the trail vehicle backed up and fired as DA throughout the city, including confusion). The enemy was as close the lead vehicle moved forward. the continuation of the Eyes Over as 14 feet, and the action took place Bowers was combat-ineffective Mogadishu program aboard avia- in seconds. because of the pain of his wound. tion assets of the 10th Mountain Ballogg was hit in the right The Zinner vest kept him in the Division. Company C employed shoulder and in the right hand by turret, and he could not get out. He sniper teams at the embassy com- an AK-47 round. Pieces of one of had to stand on his injured leg. pound, at the Pakistani stadium the rounds that hit the windshield Hoepner, in the lead vehicle, drove and on top of the soap factory. It came through and inflicted addi- as fast as he could to the airfield — also had a team of snipers hidden tional wounds on his side and in on flat tires. in a shipping container at the new his mouth. SFC Mike Bowers, rid- Fortunately, when the group port area. ing in the hatch position as the arrived at the airfield, a Moroccan CSTs operated with Pakistani, gunner in the lead vehicle, was hit medical platoon was training Bangladeshi, Moroccan and Egypt- above the right knee and lost four there. The Moroccans immediately ian forces at their strongpoints in inches of his right femur. began to bandage the wounded SF the city. These teams were instru- Sergeant First Class Chuck soldiers. Hoepner, an SF medic, mental in providing daily situa- Beebe, riding in the trail vehicle, took over the treatment.8 Ballogg tional awareness and direct links immediately provided effective and Bowers were flown by heli- to AC-130 CAS, if needed. The fire, killing the Somalis who were copter to the field hospital, where remaining teams were tasked with attempting to sweep forward to the they remained for a short time SR to ascertain the locations of lead vehicle. Ballogg, although before being transferred to Land- shipments of illegal weapons. wounded, could still use his M-16, stuhl, Germany. They were later As a result of increased hostili- and he returned the Somalis’ fire awarded Purple Hearts; Hoepner ties from Aideed’s warring clan fac- as Sergeant First Class Lance and Beebe received decorations for tion, CENTCOM deployed TF Hoepner drove through the kill valor. Bower later received the Vet- Ranger to apprehend Aideed. That zone while firing his 9 mm pistol erans of the Office of Strategic Ser- decision resulted in the tragic over Ballogg’s right shoulder. The vices Award as the “Operator of the

24 Special Warfare Ranger mission and the clash with to positions around the city to pro- weapons, and SF personnel formed Aideed’s forces on Oct. 3, 1993. The vide force protection. an impromptu mobile training team raid by TF Ranger was just one of a The snipers carried out several to teach the UAE soldiers about the series of raids conducted through- successful engagements, including weapons system and about the out Mogadishu to apprehend key a shot taken by SF snipers at the employment of urban snipers. members of Aideed’s leadership Pakistani stadium on a technical at infrastructure. Task-force Ranger’s a range of 900 meters. Throughout The withdrawal picture-perfect air assault quickly the remainder of October and into When the drawdown of U.S. forces changed to brutal, close combat mid-December, SOF snipers count- began in mid-December 1993, the when members of the task force ed more than 26 successful engage- JSOTF-Somalia began a phased attempted to rescue the pilots of a ments on armed clansmen. withdrawal to the environs of the air- Blackhawk downed by RPG fire. Company C performed other mis- field. Company C, 3/5th SF Group, After the battle and the subse- sions, such as providing armed with its six teams and an additional quent extraction of TF Ranger from escorts for U.S. Air Force personnel A-detachment from the 1/5th SF Somalia, U.S. armor units deployed who were performing airfield Group, withdrew from the embassy to UNOSOM II under the com- assessments on airfields in Bale- compound to sniper positions sur- mand of JTF-Somalia. dogle, Baidoa and Kismaayo. The rounding the airfield and old port Company C, 3/5th SF Group, was company also performed humani- area. One team remained at the uni- present in Mogadishu during the tarian activities — mainly deliver- versity compound to provide force- Oct. 3 raid by Task Force Ranger, ing school supplies and clothing to protection for U.S. logistics units. but it did not participate in the bat- Somali children in various safe sub- More than six sniper engagements tle. The company did assist in other urbs of Mogadishu. For a short peri- occurred during this period, involving ways: Two of the unit’s DMVs were od of time, one SF detachment per- Somali hostiles equipped with RPGs on loan to the Rangers that day. All formed foreign internal defense or crew-served weapons. The JSOTF the company’s medics were dis- with an element from the United continued to provide armed recon- patched to the hospital to treat the Arab Emirates. The UAE contin- naissance missions over Mogadishu task force’s wounded, and other gent had received new sniper members of the company reported to the hospital to give blood. Lieu- tenant Colonel John Holcombe, the surgeon general of the 46th Combat Support Hospital in Mogadishu, later remarked, “The SOF medics treated every casualty correctly. They made tough medical decisions. They ran out of supplies. They did an outstanding job. They were very, very good.” Immediately after the raid, SOC- CENT was ordered back into Mogadishu to form the JSOTF- Somalia under an expanded U.S. military presence, JTF-Somalia. Company C, 3/5th SF Group, was placed under the operational con- trol of the JSOTF. The company commander was assigned the mis- sion of forming a sniper task force composed of organic SF, Navy SEALs from the carrier battle Photo courtesy Joseph Celeski group, and Marine snipers from Members of Company C, 3/5th SF Group, distribute school supplies and children’s clothing dur- the 13th Marine Expeditionary ing a humanitarian-assistance mission. Unit. These snipers were deployed

June 2002 25 nightly with the AC-130s. On Jan. 15, with the arrival of the B-detachment headquarters from 1/5th SF Group, Company C redeployed. As the mission contin- ued to draw down, the Marines were given the responsibility for providing a presence on the perimeter of the airfield, and the remaining SF contingents in the- ater redeployed home. By March, the Marines had relinquished responsibility to the Egyptian forces under UNOSOM II. The U.S. Congress mandated the withdraw- al of all U.S. troops from Somalia by March 31, 1994, and the JSOTF headquarters and staff withdrew to Mombassa. They returned to the U.S. in April. Photo courtesy Rickie Young NEO Somalia Mounted teams from Company B, 1/5th SF Group, aboard the USS Belleau Wood at the port of As UNOSOM II forces began to Mombassa, Kenya. The ship was en route to Mogadishu. withdraw and to downsize after American forces had withdrawn, it flown to safe havens in Kenya. had an Air Force detachment of was feared that the Somali clans The NEO was conducted without AC-130s and KC-135s from the would once again assume their bel- incident. 16th Special Operations Squadron, ligerent posture toward the U.N. In headquartered at the Mombassa April 1994, the commander of U.S. Operation United Shield Airport. Central Command tasked SOC- In January 1995, Combined Task From Jan. 26 to Jan. 28, the CENT to be prepared to conduct an Force United Shield, formed from JSOTF deployed to Mombassa. In NEO in the coming months. the 1st Marine Expeditionary early February, the USS Belleau As the situation deteriorated in Force, was given the mission to Wood, with the 23rd Marine Expe- the fall of 1994, the USLO in assist in the withdrawal of all ditionary Unit, or MEU, steamed Mogadishu felt it prudent to UNOSOM II forces from north from Mombassa, rehearsing remove the bulk of the 150 or so Mogadishu. SOCCENT was alerted amphibious assaults along the coast American citizens from Moga- and began planning for the mission of Kenya. The commander of the dishu. In September, SOCCENT Sept. 30, 1994. In early January 1/5th SF Group (who was the was tasked to assist with a low- 1995, SOF planners deployed to ARSOTF commander) and his S3 key, semi-permissive NEO of the Camp Pendleton, Calif., and were the SOCOORD to the MEU. USLO in Mogadishu. It formed a briefed the JTF commander, Lieu- Company B of the 1/5th and four of small JSOTF with AC-130 gun- tenant General Zinni, to gain his its A-detachments, deploying as ships to provide overhead CAP approval for the SOF portion of the CSTs, were on board. Aboard ship, during the operation to evacuate operations plan. SF teams joined with civilian sub- the Americans through the west- The JSOTF United Shield was ject-matter experts to teach the ern portion of Mogadishu. The formed to conduct operations from Marines nonlethal means of combat Americans were collected, Jan. 9 through March 10, 1995. The for use against the Somalis. The A- processed and moved to the air- JSOTF headquarters was formed detachments learned to use sticky field via an old airport bypass from members of the SOCCENT foam, beanbag rounds, weapon-fired road outside of town. From the staff, augmented by a senior war- nets, etc., and then instructed the Mogadishu airfield (still UNO- rant officer and NCOs from the Marines in their use. The JTF com- SOM II-controlled), they were 1/5th SF Group. The JSOTF also mander was interested in employ- ing nonlethal weapons to avoid an

26 Special Warfare all-out firefight. 3 “US Army Forces, Somalia,” 10th Moun- The SF advanced operating base, Colonel Joseph D. tain Division After Action Report, Summa- or AOB, and three CSTs went Celeski is commander ry, Headquarters 10th Mountain Division, of the 3rd Special Fort Drum, N.Y., 2 June 1993. ashore via Marine hovercraft in 4 Lawrence E. Casper, Falcon Brigade: mid-February, approximately two Forces Group. His pre- Combat and Command in Somalia and weeks ahead of the Marines’ relief- vious assignment was Haiti (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Reiner Publish- in-place of the remaining UNO- deputy commander, ers, 2001), 133. 5 SOM II forces. One CST was held U.S. Army Special Casper, Falcon Brigade, 96. Forces Command. Colonel Celeski 6 Casper, Falcon Brigade, 133-34. in reserve, to provide guides as 7 Interview with Command Sergeant required, or to act as a CST for enlisted in the Army in 1974. In 1978, Major Pat Ballogg, 4 February 2002. withdrawing Pakistani and he graduated from Army Officer 8 “The … true hero in the ambush was SFC Bangladeshi units. An Air Force Candidate School and was commis- Lance Hoepner, who had the presence of combat-control team went ashore sioned as an armor officer. In 1983, mind to call in a SITREP to me enabling us Colonel Celeski completed the SF to get a MEDEVAC to the airport and a with the AOB to provide air traffic Cobra gunship in the air, return fire with control for evacuation aircraft, as Qualification Course and was his 9 mm and get the damaged vehicle out well as to provide additional con- assigned to the 5th SF Group as a of the kill zone. Once at the airfield, he was trol of JTF aircraft over detachment commander. His other the one to treat our two casualties in the Mogadishu. assignments in the 5th Group vehicle.” E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel include company commander, battal- Dave Jesmer, 27 February 2002. The CSTs linked up with their 9 The story as related, courtesy of CSM Pat Pakistani and Bangladeshi coun- ion S3, group S3, and battalion com- Ballogg. terparts, made detailed sector mander. Colonel Celeski has also sketches, performed tactical served as adviser to the Royal Jor- recons, and conducted rehearsals danian 1st Armor Battalion; as the for the upcoming relief-in-place by J3 ground operations officer and as the Marines. The CSTs maintained the deputy J5 for plans in the Special contact with their counterparts to Operations Command-Central; as facilitate the Marines’ coming G3 and as chief of staff with the U.S. ashore. The relief-in-place began Army SF Command; and as com- Feb. 27, 1995. The CSTs passed mander of the Combined Joint Spe- their sector sketches and their area cial Operations Task Force in Saraje- information to the Marines as they vo, in support of NATO’s Operation came ashore. Joint Forge. Colonel Celeski is a On Feb. 27 and 28, the AOB and graduate of the Armor Officer the CSTs moved their vehicles and Advanced Course, the Infantry Offi- equipment back to the Belleau cer Advanced Course, the Marine Wood. The members of both the B- Amphibious Warfare Course, the detachment and the A-detach- Army Command and General Staff ments exfiltrated with the Marine College, the Air Force Command and elements on March 1. The JTF left General Staff College, the Armed the beach March 2, without inci- Forces Staff College, the Army War dent. Lieutenant General Zinni College and the Army Force Manage- was the last Marine off the beach. ment Course. He holds a bachelor’s By March 3, all units had steamed degree in political science from out of the operational waters of Columbus College and a master’s Somalia. The task force returned to degree in public administration from Mombassa, and Operation United Shippensburg University. Shield was over. The assets of the 5th SF Group conducted redeploy- Notes: 1 Written summary provided by Master ment activities throughout early Sergeant Ken Barriger, February 2002. March, and all forces were back at 2 “United States Special Operations Com- Fort Campbell by March 10, mand History,” USSOCOM History and 1995. Research Office, MacDill AFB, Fla., Septem- ber 1998, 44-48.

June 2002 27 Operation Focus Relief: 3rd SF Group Builds Relations in Western Africa

rom August 2000 until December OFR, the U.S. extended a $66 million mili- 2001, elements of the 3rd Special tary-aid-and-training package to Nigeria, of FForces Group, in coordination with which $20 million was to be used for a mili- the United States Department of State, tary training program. deployed to western Africa to train units of The 3rd SF Group’s primary goal was to three countries as part of Operation Focus develop and implement a program to Relief, or OFR. instruct soldiers of Nigeria, Ghana and The Focus Relief initiative was first Senegal in the tactics and techniques of announced by President Bill Clinton in an combat operations that they would need in address to the Nigerian National Assembly combating the RUF. The 3rd SF Group in August 2000. The delivered nearly seven battalions’ worth of operation’s primary uniforms, medical equipment, communica- goal was to equip tion systems, rifles, mortars, machine guns, and train as many ammunition, and light-wheeled noncombat as seven battalions vehicles to the three nations. of soldiers from On Aug. 23, 2000, the first of the 3rd SF Nigeria, Ghana and Group’s soldiers in Nigeria, A-detachment Senegal to conduct 353, established a medical mobile training peace-enforcement team, or MTT. In addition to training near- operations in Sierra ly 100 Nigerian soldiers in combat lifesav- Leone, where rebels ing techniques used for preventing shock of the Revolution- and for stabilizing and evacuating injured Photo by J.B. Keefer ary United Front, or wounded people, the MTT began build- A soldier from the 3rd SF or RUF, were battling United Nations ing rapport with the Nigerian soldiers. Group trains a Nigerian peacekeepers and the government of Sierra That rapport would be beneficial later on, soldier in combat lifesav- Leone over control of that country’s dia- when the 3rd SF Group would begin train- ing techniques during mond mines. ing Nigerian infantry battalions. Operation Focus Relief in August 2000. Another goal of OFR was to rebuild rela- On Oct. 9, 2000, 250 members of the 3rd tions with the Nigerian military and to help Group’s 2nd Battalion began the first 10- improve its effectiveness. Until May 1999, week OFR training rotation, in Nigeria. when President Olusegun Obasanjo was The Nigerian 26th and 195th motorized elected and Nigeria was returned to civilian infantry battalions (from Sokoto and rule, the country had spent 16 years under Ibadan) participated in training that a military government, and it was trying to focused on individual and collective combat re-establish its military forces. As part of tasks that would be required in conducting

28 Special Warfare Soldiers from the 1st Bat- talion, 3rd SF Group, issue weapons to Senegalese soldiers who are receiving small-arms training as part of Operation Focus Relief. Photo by David D. Underwood Jr. company-level offensive and defensive Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant combat operations against the RUF in Colonel Jay Glover, began the second train- Sierra Leone. The training was also ing rotation, OFR II, in Ghana and in Sene- designed to build up the capabilities of gal. The 1st Battalion’s Forward Opera- combat-support units and to strengthen tional Base, or FOB, 31 was located in company-level command and control. The Accra, Ghana. FOB 31’s Advanced Opera- program of instruction, or POI, had been tional Base, or AOB, 310 instructed one vetted by both the U.N. and the Depart- battalion of Ghanaian infantrymen, while ment of State. AOB 330 instructed one battalion of Sene- During the training rotation, each Niger- galese infantrymen in Theis, Senegal. ian soldier received uniforms, load-bearing OFR II taught the same 10-week POI equipment, a Kevlar helmet, a poncho, can- that had been used during OFR I. Both teens, an entrenching tool and a new rifle. Ghana and Senegal provided a 750-man The 2nd Battalion trained more than 1,200 battalion, continuing the strenuous train- soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel Dino Roth, ing during possibly the worst months of the commander of the 2nd Battalion, said the year. The weather fluctuated from hot to Nigerian soldiers were willing and eager to hotter, increasing the number of heat casu- learn. The greatest problem for U.S. and alties. Both battalions graduated early in Nigerian soldiers was the heat — tempera- August, providing two additional battal- tures ranged from 88 to 95 degrees. With ions for peace-enforcement duties in Sierra the majority of training taking place on Leone. rifle ranges and mortar ranges, water sup- OFR III was the largest of the three rota- plies were a major concern. Ceremonies tions. Elements of the 3rd Group’s 3rd Bat- were held in mid-December 2000 to cele- talion, which was commanded by Lieu- brate the end of OFR I. Many Nigerian dig- tenant Colonel Timothy Sherwood, con- nitaries praised the success of the training ducted the training from Sept. 17 to Dec. and thanked the soldiers of the 2nd Battal- 15, 2001. The 3rd Battalion trained three ion, 3rd SFG, for a job well-done. Nigerian battalions — more than 2,200 sol- On May 29, 2000, the 3rd Group’s 1st diers — at four locations in Nigeria: Abuja,

June 2002 29 where FOB 33 provided command and con- ing, resulting in outstanding host-nation trol for the three other locations; Ilorin, participation and cooperation in the train- where AOB 370 trained the 222nd Niger- ing program. Each OFR rotation ended ian Infantry Battalion; Serti, where AOB with a field-training exercise that maxi- 380 trained the 20th Nigerian Infantry mized the participation of the host-nation Battalion; and Bernin Kebbi, where AOB military forces. 390 trained the 1st Nigerian Infantry Bat- OFR owes its success to the men of the talion. Training for all three Nigerian bat- 3rd SF Group. Each battalion in the 3rd SF talions followed the 10-week POI that had Group deployed its entire FOB into theatre, providing command and control, logistics support, and internal and external commu- nications for seven AOBs and 28 A-detach- ments. Each battalion was responsible for training more than 1,500 soldiers, for moni- toring their progress and for providing any necessary remedial training. The team members taught the classes and issued the equipment. Addressing the soldiers of his company, Major David Duffy, commander of Compa- ny B, 3/3rd SF Group, said, “The hard work and effort you have put into the last 10 weeks of training … have been remark- able. The cooperation, camaraderie and professionalism demonstrated every day of the training period have been nothing less than phenomenal.”

This article was written by members of the 3rd Special Forces Group.

Photo by Jim Hampshire A Nigerian battalion been used during the previous OFR rota- commander thanks the tions. According to the U.S. Ambassador to soldiers from the 3rd SF Nigeria, Howard F. Jeter, OFR III facilitat- Group who trained his ed an unprecedented level of cooperation, soldiers during Opera- tion Focus Relief. rapport and interoperability between the government of Nigeria, the Nigerian Min- istry of Defense and the U.S. Embassy. FOB 33 was the first U.S. Army unit to deploy with the Joint Base Station, or JBS, and to integrate the JBS into its communi- cations package. JBS allowed the FOB to connect to SIPR and NIPR nets and to operate DSN phone lines. The JBS provid- ed communications with the SCAMP radio, which transmitted secure high-frequency communications to the AOBs and to the 3rd SF Group base operations at Fort Bragg, N.C. Each AOB developed excellent rapport with the Nigerian battalion it was train-

30 Special Warfare Exercise Balance Magic: 19th SF Group Practices Medicine in the Heart of Asia

hile America was being rocked by Because 18Ds now have to meet a para- the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, medic requirement, more than 90 percent Wa group of Special Forces medical of the 18D refresher medical training dur- sergeants and other medical personnel from ing the last three years has been devoted to the 19th Special Forces Group were training trauma. But in deployments for UW, as in one of the most remote areas of the world, detachments gain and maintain rapport Mongolia, as part of Exercise Balance with the local population, many of the Magic. Far from the 21st-century technology demands placed on SF medics will involve that is available in the United States, the the non-trauma subspecialties. soldiers gained a unique insight into the practice of unconventional medicine. Mongolia Eight SF medical NCOs, the 19th SF Mongolia offers a unique training envi- Group surgeon, the 19th SF Group dentist, ronment. Its terrain is mostly open plains the former 19th SF Group surgeon and the or steppe, but about 10 percent of the ter- 20th SF Group veterinarian, along with per- sonnel from the 426th Civil Affairs Battalion, trained in Mongolia to improve their skills in obstetrics (childbirth), in dental care and in veterinary medicine — skills that are critical in unconventional warfare, or UW. The exer- cise was supported by a dedicated C-130 from the U.S. Air Force’s 353rd Special Operations Group. In addition, personnel from the 19th Group performed an airborne operation with the Mongolian defense forces, making the exercise truly a joint-combined event. The medical focus of Exercise Balance Magic required SF medical NCOs to devel- op their skills in non-trauma subspecial- ties — veterinary, dental and obstetric — that are difficult for SF medics to acquire in the U.S. The goals in those skill areas U.S. Army photo are outlined in the 18D scope of practice, The 19th SF Group’s dentist talks with a local horseman formulated by the surgeon’s office of the during Exercise Balance Magic, conducted in Mongolia U.S. Army Special Operations Command. in 2001.

June 2002 31 15 deliveries a day and accounts for 45 percent of the babies born in the city each year. By the end of the mission, the medics had performed 20 deliveries, had observed another 100, and had examined and cared for 34 newborns. The two physicians had delivered two babies under primitive con- ditions, and they had observed three Cae- sarean sections and a hysterectomy. Dental training The purpose of the dental training was U.S. Army photo to allow the SF medics to develop the A medical NCO from the 19th SF Group assists a Mon- skills needed to provide emergency dental golian dentist. NCOs performed fillings, extractions and care to team members and to provide other dental procedures. basic dental care to the local population. rain is forest. Mongolia’s average altitude Training included diagnosis and treat- is more than 5,000 feet above ground ment of simple and complex dental prob- level, and its average annual temperature lems (including oral infections and is below freezing. The population of 2.5 abscesses, extractions, and simple million is predominantly Mongol, but the restorations). The training was conducted country has many minority groups, such in Ulaanbataar, at the oral and maxillofa- as Kazakhs and Uzbecks. Forty percent of cial clinic of the Central University Hos- Mongolians are under the age of 15. pital, the main teaching hospital for the Almost half of the people of Mongolia live National Medical University of Mongolia. in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar. By mission’s end, the medics had treated Agriculture and livestock are Mongo- 122 patients and had performed 241 lia’s economic foundation, but the growing extractions. Their training experience in development of the country’s vast mineral the oral clinic was unique: All the cases resources will drive Mongolia’s growth in involved complex extractions, and the the future. Foreign investment is encour- patients had been referred by other facili- aged, and Mongolians welcome Americans ties. The objective was for the 18Ds to warmly. The Mongolian language is diffi- acquire as much experience as possible. cult to master. The U.S. Army’s only Mon- Fortunately, the doctors had sufficient golian speaker, a member of the Utah time to allow the NCOs to perform the National Guard’s 300th Military Intelli- gence Battalion, accompanied the mission to provide crucial language support. Civil- ian-contract translators also provided valuable assistance, making it possible for the SF medics to conduct training at dif- ferent locations simultaneously. Obstetrics The obstetrics portion of the medical mission required all eight SF medics to perform at least one hands-on delivery (most medics performed more), and sever- al of the NCOs observed other procedures, such as Caesarean sections. The obstetrics U.S. Army photo training was conducted in Ulaanbaatar at Medical NCOs from the 19th SF Group assist the 19th SF Group surgeon and Mongolian medical personnel in the 1st Woman’s Hospital, which averages performing a Caesarean section.

32 Special Warfare extractions themselves and to work through most of the complications that they encountered. Veterinary medicine With the help of the School of Veteri- nary Science and Biotechnology at the Mongolian State University of Agricul- ture, medics participated in hands-on procedures with horses, cattle, sheep and goats. During the training, the medics performed physical exams, selected meth- ods of animal restraint, made casts and administered medication (including vac- cinating and deworming 250 sheep and 25 horses). The medics encountered advanced cases involving canine kerato- conjuntivitis and ulceration, canine trau- matic injury with multiple orthopedic U.S. Army photo injuries, and infectious respiratory dis- An SF medical NCO performs a veterinary medical eases of sheep. Additional classes and inspection on Mongolian livestock during Operation practical exercises taught the SF medics Balance Magic. subjects such as foodborne diseases and ly important to success in UW, and to carcass evaluation. establishing trust with indigenous forces. While the primary mission of the SF The exercise also set the stage for further medic is to preserve the health of the training with the Mongolian military team, knowledge of veterinary care is forces during 2002. invaluable in extended or UW operations, where animals play a key role either by transporting equipment or from their role This article was written by the medical in the economic stability of a community. staff of the 19th Special Forces Group. Many of the medical skills that are nec- essary for the treatment of humans are similar to the skills needed for the treat- ment of animals. Veterinary training gives SF medics additional practice and experience that will strengthen their diagnostic and treatment skills for human patients as well. Throughout the exercise, the team aug- mented the hands-on exercises with lec- tures to ensure that medics understood the theoretical basis for the treatment. Exposure to highly competent Mongolian health-care personnel, who are well- trained in Russian-style medicine, and time spent working with the group den- tist and the group surgeon gave the 19th SF Group medics unique insights into the practice of low-technology medicine in a rugged and austere environment. The skills the medics acquired will be critical-

June 2002 33 The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group Conducts UW in Afghanistan

he liberation of the city of Mazar-e memo, he stated, “Unconventional Warfare is Sharif in northern Afghanistan on Nov. the umbrella mission for everything we do.” T10, 2001, marked the first major mili- Only 13 months later, elements of the 5th SF tary victory of Operation Enduring Freedom Group participated in the liberation of and boosted the confidence of the Northern Mazar-e Sharif, after fighting one of the most Alliance. The liberation heralded the defeat unusual campaigns in the history of UW.The and the collapse of the Taliban, not only in past was indeed prelude. northern Afghanistan, but throughout Afghanistan. Background After the libera- Mazar-e Sharif, the second largest city tion of Mazar-e in Afghanistan, is the cultural, economic, Sharif, the Taliban religious and strategic center of northern suffered defeat after Afghanistan. The magnificent Blue defeat at the hands Mosque at the center of the city is of opposition forces believed to be the burial place of Ali, the that were integrat- cousin and son-in-law of Mohammed and ed with United the fourth Caliph of Islam. The city was States Special For- once a waypoint on the ancient Silk Road, ces detachments. and it boasts an ethnically diverse popu- The success of the lation of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and opposition forces not Pashtuns. Because it has the longest air- DoD photo only vindicated the field runway in Afghanistan, and because General Abdul Rashid strategic choices made by the U.S. national of its proximity to Freedom Bridge, a Dostum, leader of the leadership, it also demonstrated the power, road/rail bridge that spans the Amu largest Afghan faction of viability and full-spectrum utility of U.S. the Northern Alliance. Darya River between Afghanistan and Army Special Forces and the relevance of Uzbekistan, Mazar-e Sharif is also a SF’s role in unconventional warfare, or UW, major economic hub. in the 21st century. Mazar-e Sharif served as a strategically vital Soviet base during the 1980s. During Moving forward to our past the late 1990s, the city was the scene of bitter On Aug. 10, 2000, the commanding gener- internal fighting, and it changed hands sev- al of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command eral times. A militia under General Abdul issued a memorandum stating that SF would Rashid Dostum, an Afghan of Uzbek ethnici- return to its core mission of UW. In that ty who served as an officer during the com-

34 Special Warfare Despite its relative lack of experience on horseback, A-detachment 595, which had no organic mobility assets, borrowed horses and mules from General Dostum’s horse-mounted forces.

DoD photo munist regime of Najibullah, had controlled external support. They remained isolated, much of Northern Afghanistan since 1992. poorly equipped and struggling to survive, However, Dostum had been forced to flee until early November 2001. Afghanistan in May 1997 when some of his subordinates betrayed him and joined forces Combat operations with the Taliban. An uprising by ethnic Haz- On Oct. 20, 2001, the first SF element aras forced the Taliban from Mazar-e Sharif (Detachment 595) infiltrated the Darya-e after only five days, but it also led to fighting Suf valley, whose rugged terrain provided between the militia forces of the Uzbeks and the Northern Alliance forces with a sanctu- the Hazaras. ary approximately 110 kilometers south of Although Mazar-e Sharif had been Mazar-e Sharif. After linking up with Gen- spared the shelling that devastated other eral Dostum, the detachment immediately major cities in Afghanistan, thousands died began an assessment of the situation and as the Taliban and factions of the Northern began preparing for offensive action against Alliance struggled to control the city. The the Taliban. dead included 11 Iranian diplomats and an During the next two weeks, Detachment untold number of Hazaras who were mas- 595 continued its assessment and began sacred when the Taliban seized the city directing a series of airstrikes against the Aug. 8, 1998. When the city fell, the rem- Taliban forces to the north. With both nants of the Northern Alliance forces, rep- Northern Alliance and Taliban forces wide- resenting three of the major factions, with- ly dispersed, it was sometimes necessary drew southward through the Balkh Valley for the detachment to split into multiple to strongholds in the mountains. The cells. In order to move effectively on the largest faction was the predominantly battlefield, the detachment, which had no Afghan-Uzbek Jumbish Milli Islami forces, organic means of mobility, adopted indige- commanded by General Dostum. General nous methods of transportation. Despite a Mohammed Atta commanded the mainly relative lack of experience on horseback, Afghan-Tajik Jamiat-e Islami forces, and especially in difficult terrain and at night, Haji Mohammed Mohaqqeq led the Hazara the detachment borrowed horses and forces of Hizb-e Wahdat. Although the fac- mules from General Dostum’s horse- tions were relatively secure in the steep mounted forces. Using horses and mules as mountains and deep river valleys, they their primary means of battlefield move- were effectively cut off from nearly all

June 2002 35 ment, the SF soldiers achieved a level of their past differences, the three Afghan fac- battlefield mobility that, in the inhos- tions had agreed to cooperate in order to pitable terrain, was unmatched by any achieve their shared goal of liberating motorized vehicle. Mazar-e Sharif. Furthermore, all the Afghan The success of the initial airstrikes pro- factions had agreed to nominally subordinate vided the Northern Alliance forces an oppor- their forces to General Dostum. This cooper- tunity to begin pushing northwest toward ation, while welcome and necessary, required the Balkh Valley. But the ill-equipped a great deal of coordination to synchronize Northern Alliance forces lacked the arms the maneuver of ground forces and, most and ammunition necessary for a sustained importantly, to prevent fratricide. offensive. Their ability to defend against a Few of the factional commanders, at any Taliban counterattack after they had level, possessed any experience in the con- mounted an offensive operation was prob- duct of large coordinated offensives. Most lematic at best. Although the Northern were extremely proficient at performing small-unit actions. But combining their Except for the senior commanders, the forces of forces (three separate and distinct major formations and numerous subordinate com- the Northern Alliance lacked a reliable means of mands) into a coordinated offensive under battlefield communication. … Furthermore, the one major formation was clearly uncharted territory and a distinct challenge. multiple subordinate commanders, many of Except for the senior commanders, the forces of the Northern Alliance lacked a reli- whom had never been trained in map-reading, able means of battlefield communication. lacked any means of tracking and reporting their Their communication systems, mainly two- way radios, had no interoperability with locations as the offensive progressed. those of U.S. forces. Furthermore, the multi- ple subordinate commanders, many of whom Alliance forces had received limited sup- had never been trained in map-reading, plies of blankets, rice and horse feed, the lacked any means of tracking and reporting expected deliveries of arms and ammuni- their locations as the offensive progressed. tion had not yet arrived. Furthermore, as Finally, because the disparate forces surviving Taliban forces regrouped and con- lacked any semblance of a uniform, visual centrated their defenses, it became more dif- identification, particularly at long dis- ficult for the Northern Alliance to advance. tances, was nearly impossible. The tasks of In preparation for an expanded SF pres- preventing fratricide and synchronizing ence and in anticipation of a protracted multiple combat elements fell to the SF campaign, ODC 53, a small command-and- detachments. The SF detachments were control element, infiltrated Darya Suf Nov. split into sub-elements — three-man cells 2, 2001. This eight-man element, composed in many instances — so that they could of SF soldiers and personnel from U.S. Air support as many commanders as possible Force special-tactics squadrons, was tasked and provide accurate reporting on the to provide high-level liaison with General progress of the battle. Dostum, to assist in operational planning The planned offensive called for simulta- and to provide command and control for neous attacks through the Darya Balkh the expanded SF presence. Two days later, River valley in the west and through the A-detachment 534 infiltrated at Darya-e Darya Suf River valley in the east. The Balkh, which is located approximately 40 advancing forces would meet at the conflu- kilometers west of Darya Suf, and linked ence of the two rivers. At the southern edge up with Jamiat-e Islami forces under Gen- of the Balkh Valley, where the steep moun- eral Mohammed Atta. tain passes give way to fertile plains, the The three SF elements, working in concert, forces of Dostum and Atta would attack on would assist the Northern Alliance forces in axes parallel to the Tangi Gap. Mohaqqeq the critical battle for Mazar-e Sharif. Despite forces would conduct supporting attacks in

36 Special Warfare Not all members of the Northern Alliance were lucky enough to have motorized transportation. General Dostum’s forces used horses and mules as their primary means of battlefield movement. DoD photo the east to screen Dostum’s flank. All three and pledged allegiance to the Northern forces would join for an assault on the Alliance. That victory was short-lived, how- heavily mined and well-defended Tangi ever. In a stunning turnabout, the same Gap. Once they passed through the gap, Taliban forces attacked Atta’s forces as the city of Mazar-e Sharif would lie 40 kilo- they entered Akopruk. The surprise attack meters to the north. forced the stunned Jamiat forces to with- Dostum had boldly declared that the city draw and regroup. of Shulgerah, centrally located in the The battle resumed Nov. 6. In the east, Balkh Valley, was key to controlling north- after a rapid initial advance facilitated by ern Afghanistan, and that once Shulgerah devastatingly accurate airstrikes, Dostum’s fell, Mazar-e Sharif and the six northern and Mohaqqeq’s forces stalled near the vil- provinces would fall like dominoes. Dostum lage of Boi Becha, where a series of well- believed that his forces required only suffi- defended Taliban positions controlled key cient arms, ammunition and air support. avenues of approach. In one instance, the But given the stiff resistance of the Taliban Taliban mounted a counterattack and near- and the tentative advances of the Northern ly overran a position manned by three mem- Alliance forces, Dostum’s claims appeared bers of Detachment 595. The team members to be far from a sure bet. maintained their position and calmly direct- The diligent efforts of the SF detach- ed airstrikes, preventing a serious setback ments, their interagency partners and the for the Northern Alliance offensive. Air Force personnel provided the arms, Meanwhile, precision airstrikes against ammunition and air support, and the the Taliban positions in Boi Becha had seri- offensive began Nov. 5, 2001, with an MC- ously weakened the Taliban defenses, but the 130 delivering two BLU-82 15,000-pound airstrikes had failed to dislodge the defend- bombs. In the west, Atta’s forces had seized ers. Throughout the day, Dostum’s cavalry the village of Akopruk with little resist- had massed behind the ridges to the east of ance as local Taliban forces surrendered the village. As the sun began to set, the cav-

June 2002 37 alry mounted a charge. Hundreds of horse- retreat toward the Tangi Gap. men, firing their rifles while at a full gallop, By Nov. 9, the retreating Taliban forces had assaulted the Taliban positions. The first cav- reorganized, and they concentrated their alry attack of the 21st century, facilitated by defense on the key terrain around the Tangi SF-directed airstrikes, sent the stunned Tal- Gap. While his forces advanced, Dostum com- iban forces fleeing, and the morale of the municated not only with his commanders but Northern Alliance forces soared. also with Taliban commanders throughout While Dostum’s forces were engaged northern Afghanistan. Using an international around Boi Becha, Atta’s forces were maritime satellite telephone powered by car batteries and solar panels, Dostum, in keeping with Afghan tradition, negotiated with Tal- iban commanders in every northern province for their surrenders and for their loyalty. Although negotiations with some Taliban commanders were successful, other command- ers resisted, particularly those who had close ties to the Kandaharis and to al-Qaeda. The Afghan tradition of surrender and transfer of loyalty is not unlike what the U.S. experienced during the Civil War, with pris- oner exchanges, paroles and pardons. The Afghans, in keeping with their custom, expect soldiers who have surrendered to abide by the conditions of their surrender agreement and to behave honorably. But the vast numbers of Arabs, Pakistanis, Chechens, Uighers and other foreign nation- als who were members of al-Qaeda ignored the Afghan custom. They used individual surrenders as a means of furthering their cause, often creating treacherous conditions. The final push began early on the morn- ing of Nov. 9, with Northern Alliance forces massing near the Tangi Gap. The Taliban forces were well-positioned around the nar- row, heavily mined gap, and they were sup- ported by rockets and artillery. Once again, teams of SF soldiers, moving around the battlefield and directing airstrikes against Taliban positions, helped establish the con- ditions necessary for successful ground assaults by Northern Alliance forces. As key DoD photo Taliban positions were systematically Airstrikes directed by engaged in a fierce battle to retake Ako- reduced by SF-directed airstrikes, the teams of SF soldiers pruk. Again, airstrikes directed by teams of Northern Alliance forces advanced. The pre- assisted the ground SF soldiers facilitated the ground action of cision of the airstrikes left the surviving Tal- operations of the North- the Northern Alliance. The Northern iban forces stunned, and those who could do ern Alliance and allowed its forces to make rapid Alliance forces made a series of rapid so began to flee their positions. advances. advances through the Balkh Valley against As word of the defeat reached the Tal- Taliban forces. Despite being reinforced by iban forces in Mazar-e Sharif, many of thousands of volunteers from Pakistani them abandoned their positions and madrassas and by contingents of al-Qaeda retreated toward Konduz, but the path of forces, the Taliban were in a headlong their retreat was heavily interdicted by

38 Special Warfare SF-directed airstrikes that produced a straightforward — advise and assist the swath of destruction. Near midday on Nov. Northern Alliance in conducting combat oper- 10, triumphant Northern Alliance forces, ations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda — accompanied by their SF advisers, there were many challenges that made the streamed into Mazar-e Sharif and were mission difficult and that required the inge- welcomed by jubilant crowds of citizens. In nuity and adaptability of SF soldiers. the other provinces, simultaneous The situation on the ground presented advances by Northern Alliance forces, cou- challenges in four areas: organization, pled with negotiated surrenders, led to an training, logistics and morale. Although almost complete collapse of the Taliban in the major factions were united in their northern Afghanistan. opposition to the Taliban, they had signifi- The remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda cant differences with each other, and they forces, still more than 600 strong, consoli- felt no real allegiance to anything higher dated and formed a stronghold at the for- then their own party or ethnic group. At mer Sultan Razzia Girls School near the one time or another during the previous heart of Mazar-e Sharif. Their position was decade, the groups had taken up arms located in a heavily populated residential against one another or supported each district, only blocks from the Blue Mosque. other’s rival factions. Although none of The forces fortified the school compound these events were uncommon in internal and, although surrounded, they refused to surrender. When fighting erupted, Dostum, As Dostum had predicted, the northern who was highly confident of the capabilities of the SF detachments, requested airstrikes provinces fell like dominoes, and the Taliban against this last bastion of Taliban power in Mazar-e Sharif, despite the proximity of the was dealt a stunning defeat from which it Blue Mosque and the density of the civilian would not recover. Within two weeks, … the population. SF soldiers directed four bombs into the three-story school building, reduc- last remaining pocket of Taliban resistance in ing part of it to rubble and setting the con- ditions for an assault that would clear out northern Afghanistan, at Konduz, was cleared. the surviving Taliban forces. With the elim- ination of the Taliban resistance, Mazar-e Afghan politics, they created a significant Sharif was completely liberated. level of distrust between the factions. All As Dostum had predicted, the northern the factions had a common distrust of Dos- provinces fell like dominoes, and the Tal- tum. His history as a commander in the iban was dealt a stunning defeat from Afghan army under the puppet regime of which it would not recover. Within two the hated Najibullah, and his role in fight- weeks, despite a four-day insurrection ing the mujahedeen still generated tension staged by Taliban prisoners at Qala-I- among the leaders of the factions. Jengi prison, the last remaining pocket of The Northern Alliance forces generally Taliban resistance in northern Afghan- lacked organization at either the tactical or istan, at Konduz, was cleared. Within four the operational level. Even within the fac- weeks, the Taliban had surrendered at tions, there appeared to be little organiza- Kandahar, the birthplace and the heart of tion. Contingents were developed around the Taliban movement. On Dec. 21, geographic or ethnic loyalties. A force from Afghanistan established an interim gov- one village might have 200 men, while the ernment in Kabul. force of another village might have only 50. The lack of organization was compound- The challenge of UW ed by the fact that the Afghan command- Although the missions assigned to the SF ers, who were more pragmatic than ideo- detachments operating in northern logical, changed sides frequently (usually Afghanistan appeared to be relatively going to the side that appeared to have the best chance of winning) and took their

June 2002 39 troops with them. Dostum’s ability to per- rural populations of farmers and nomads, suade opposing commanders to switch few of the soldiers could read, and fewer sides — often demonstrated during late- still could use a map or a compass. While night negotiations conducted outside the many of the soldiers were proficient in the purview of U.S. forces — did not lessen ten- use of their individual weapons and were sions. Although switching sides is a tradi- capable of conducting ambushes, they were tional Afghan approach to conflict resolu- only marginally capable of conducting larg- tion, the ill will that commanders feel er offensive operations. toward their former enemies is not easily When the SF soldiers arrived in dissolved. And, as the reversal at Akopruk Afghanistan, they found that even the demonstrated, new allies can quickly units that appeared to be well-trained and revert to enemies. well-organized did not have sufficient As former Taliban switched their alle- training and organization to overcome the giance to the Northern Alliance, the fac- shortages of weapons, ammunition, food and clothing. The overall logistics posture of the Northern Alliance forces was less than favorable, as were the type, quantity and condition of the weapons used by the Northern Alliance. Finally, the success of the Taliban had left the Northern Alliance forces with low confidence and low morale. These challenges, while not uncommon in a UW scenario, were exacerbated by strategic and environmental pressures. Operation Enduring Freedom had begun with a series of airstrikes against key tar- gets throughout Afghanistan. Although the attacks caused significant damage, they did little to reduce the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan. Indeed, the Taliban became more defiant and accused the U.S. of strik- ing civilian targets. Despite the falseness DoD photo of the claims, the Taliban forces were suc- An SF soldier gives med- tions sometimes tried to win their loyalty cessful in garnering some international ical aid to a captured Tal- in order to ensure post-conflict power. For sympathy, particularly in the Middle East. iban soldier who was example, ethnic Pashtuns who had been That sympathy resulted in international wounded during the lib- staunch supporters of the Taliban changed demands, some of which came from key eration of Mazar-e Sharif. their allegiance to the Jamiat-e Islami, but U.S. allies, for the U.S. to bring an end to were still identified as Taliban by the eth- civilian casualties. nic Hazaras of Hezb-e Wahdat, who had Simultaneously, domestic pressures for suffered mightily at the hands of the Pash- tangible results were also mounting. Final- tuns. The resentment necessitated fre- ly, because of an already dismal humani- quent and close cooperation between the tarian situation in Afghanistan, many SF detachments who were working with observers feared that a catastrophe of the different factions in order to prevent unimaginable proportions would befall the fratricide. The SF detachments also exer- country with the onset of the harsh winter. cised care to prevent the appearance that These factors combined to produce an oper- the U.S. forces favored one faction over ational imperative for rapid and tangible another. progress. Although the Northern Alliance forces The difficulty of placing U.S. forces on had been fighting the Taliban for several the battlefield made the compressed time- years, many of them lacked any formal mil- line even more problematic. The Hindu itary training. Having been recruited from Kush mountain range, with peaks rising

40 Special Warfare above 17,000 feet, combined with the onset of winter and increasingly poor weather to make infiltration difficult. The treacherous terrain made airborne operations almost impossible, and the high altitudes and low temperatures made rotary-wing infiltra- tion extremely difficult. When the imperative for quick results combined with the difficulties of infiltra- tion, the SF detachments were compelled to go on the offensive only days after they hit the ground. There was no time for detailed assessments, force reorganization DoD photo or remedial training for the Northern Six-wheeled vehicles provided the SF soldiers a much- Alliance forces. There was barely enough needed logistics-support capability. Two of the vehicles time to gain the trust and confidence of the fit easily onto an MH-47. notoriously xenophobic Afghans. Neverthe- been borrowed from the 1-87th Infantry at less, each SF element managed to do so. a forward staging base. The vehicles, which The key elements in overcoming the obsta- were easily loaded onto MH-47s, provided cles presented by the compressed timeline a much-needed logistics-support capability. were the SF soldiers’ cross-cultural-com- Despite their unsuitability for the most munications abilities, their demonstrated severe terrain, the vehicles allowed two competence and professionalism (especial- detachments to move large quantities of ly with regard to medical care), their abili- supplies rapidly. Their utility became more ty to operate in a decentralized manner critical as the pace of the offensive became and their genuine commitment. Those more swift. The vehicles not only support- qualities contributed immeasurably to the ed a movement of more than 100 km, they SF elements’ ability to rapidly integrate also survived the conflict. They were with the Northern Alliance forces. returned to their owners with a few bullet The weather and the difficult terrain also holes and some marks of wear, but they limited the allowable cargo load of the infil- remained fully mission-capable. tration platforms; therefore, the amount of Despite significant challenges, SF ele- equipment that the detachments could ments demonstrated that a small number bring was limited. The most significant lim- of SF soldiers can produce sizable results. itation was that detachments were unable The principal reason that SF can produce to bring any vehicles that would provide such results (and will continue to do so) is them with battlefield mobility. The detach- the quality of the soldiers found on SF ments were able to partially overcome that detachments. limitation by adopting indigenous methods It was the young men on those detach- of transportation. However, there are no ments who won the war in the north: men “extra” horses and mules in Afghanistan. who fought alongside their Afghan counter- Every horse that an SF soldier used was one parts, becoming, for a time, the focus of the less available for use by a Northern Alliance American effort in Afghanistan. And consid- soldier, and every mule that carried ruck- ering the individual strength and resolve of sacks was one less available for carrying those men, they can be described in the food or ammunition for the Northern words of Shakespeare: “He is a soldier, fit to Alliance forces. stand by Caesar and give direction.” Again, the adaptability and the ingenu- ity of the SF soldiers allowed them to develop a solution. In what may have been This article was written by personnel of a first for SF, one detachment managed to the 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces infiltrate with two six-wheeled vehicles Group. that resemble large golf carts. They had

June 2002 41 7th SF Group Provides Two Decades of Excellence in Latin America

by Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Burton and Captain Robert Lee Wilson

he 7th Special Forces Group, with its counternarcotics and engagement, can be regional focus of Latin America, has clearly illustrated in the 7th SF Group’s Tplayed an important role in Central and missions of the past two decades. South America. The group’s presence has been particularly important over the last 20 years. El Salvador, 1979-1990 Whether battling Marxist guerrillas, main- After suffering a military coup late in taining peace along contested borders, restor- 1979, El Salvador rapidly destabilized and ing legitimate government to besieged appeared to be headed toward civil war. nations, or stemming the flow of illegal drugs Within a year of the coup, the Marxist into the United States, 7th Group soldiers Farabundo Marti para Liberacion Nacional, were ready for each new requirement. Their or FMLN, arose from the union of five small- missions over the last two decades highlight er insurgent groups.1 The FMLN fueled its the many successes of the Latin American movement with popular dissatisfaction for people and U.S. foreign policy in the region. government reforms, and it was backed with weapons and training received from other Evolution communist regimes. In 1982, numerous right wing and Marx- Shortly after the suspension of U.S. aid to ist dictatorships existed throughout Latin El Salvador, the U.S. State Department America; two decades later, every country in decided that the biggest threat to the coun- the region except Cuba has a democratical- try and the region was the leftist insur- ly elected government. The primary focus of gents, and aid was promptly restored. In U.S. Latin American foreign policy in the 1982, the U.S. military began training and 1980s was regional stability through con- advising the Salvadoran army in Honduras, taining communism, mainly in Nicaragua, and by 1983, U.S. military advisers were liv- El Salvador and neighboring Central Amer- ing with and advising Salvadoran brigades ican countries. Today, counternarcotics throughout the country.2 Many of the advis- efforts in the Andean Ridge region of South ers were from the 7th SF Group. America have become a dominant concern The U.S. placed an informal cap of 55 sol- of U.S. foreign policy. The policy of engage- diers on the advisory mission in El Sal- ment — developing, and maintaining close vador, and typically one officer and one NCO socioeconomic and military ties with coun- worked with a brigade.3 The advisers pro- tries to strengthen their democratic institu- vided much-needed tactical and technical tions — has also been a key U.S. goal. This assistance to their Salvadoran counter- policy evolution, from counterinsurgency to parts. While the principal mission of the

42 Special Warfare A soldier from the 7th SF Group (left) instructs Mexican soldiers in advanced marksmanship techniques during the Mexican Training Initia- tive in 1997.

U.S. Army photo U.S. soldiers was advising, at times they Manuel Noriega, commander of the Pana- found themselves engaged in combat. manian Defense Forces, or PDF, effectively Sergeant First Class Gregory Fronius, of the seized power in Panama in 1988 when he 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group, was killed decided to ignore all orders of Panama’s March 31, 1987, during an FMLN attack on civilian government. Relations between the a Salvadoran camp in El Paraiso. One year countries soured further when Noriega was later, the same camp was attacked again.4 indicted in the U.S. on drug-smuggling The SF advisors provided more than tech- charges. In 1989, when Panama held its nical and tactical assistance during the El elections, Noriega invalidated the results. Salvador mission. They incorporated The opposition candidates organized a large human rights into all aspects of their train- parade and protest in Panama City, but ing and worked to transform the Salvado- Noriega promptly suppressed the demon- ran army into the type of professional stration using pipe- and bat-wielding thugs organization that could gain the respect and he named his “dignity battalions.” support of the civilian populace. The hard As Noriega consolidated power in 1989, he work of the SF advisers had a profound set the stage for a collision between his coun- effect on the conflict. As the Salvadoran try and the U.S. In December, he declared a army increased in professionalism and state of war with the U.S., and there were capability, the guerrillas found their popu- several skirmishes between U.S. forces and lar support waning, and in 1990, the FMLN the PDF.The 7th SF Group had one element, signed a peace treaty with the Salvadoran its 3rd Battalion, permanently stationed in government. The work of the soldiers of the Panama. As the situation worsened, one com- 7th SF Group in El Salvador, largely over- pany from each of the group’s two stateside looked by people outside of the special-oper- battalions rotated to Panama to augment the ations community, is one of the great mili- 3rd Battalion. To prepare for the looming tary success stories of recent times. It illus- hostilities, the SF units participated in sever- trates how a small group of SF soldiers can al joint training exercises. On Dec. 19, 1989, dramatically alter the strategic situation U.S. forces began Operation Just Cause to and affect national centers of gravity. neutralize the PDF; to create a stable, demo- cratic environment in Panama; and to appre- Panama, 1989-1990 hend Noriega. During the late 1980s, relations between The 7th Group’s 3rd Battalion, reinforced the U.S. and Panama deteriorated. General by troops from Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th

June 2002 43 Soldiers from the 7th SF Group who are serving as observers with JTF Safe Border receive an operations briefing in Patuca, Ecuador, in 1995.

U.S. Army photo Group, formed the key combat element 82nd Airborne Division.6 known as Task Force Black. Elements of TF Personnel from the 7th Group secured Black already in-theater disabled vital PDF- many PDF garrisons throughout Panama.7 controlled TV and radio stations at H-hour, Many of the SF soldiers in Task Force Black just prior to the invasion of U.S.-based had lived in Panama for years; they knew forces.5 the psyche of the typical PDF commander, Another element of TF Black received the and in some cases, they knew the Panaman- mission to secure the Pacora River bridge, ian officers personally. SF soldiers would which would be the key avenue of approach approach garrison commanders and for the PDF as it attempted to reinforce its demand that they surrender unconditional- forces at the Torrijos-Tocumen airport. This ly in order to avoid a battle with follow-on element, commanded by Major Kevin Hig- U.S. forces. Most of the PDF commanders gins of Company A, 3/7th SF Group, arrived surrendered on the spot. at the bridge as a PDF armed convoy pre- As garrison after garrison surrendered or pared to cross. Staff Sergeant Daniel fell to U.S. forces, Panama was rapidly liber- McDonald fired an AT-4 and halted the lead ated from Noriega. The strongman himself vehicle instantly, as other members of Com- surrendered to U.S. forces Jan. 3, 1990, after pany A fired on trailing vehicles. The men of hiding in the Papal Nunciatura for nearly Company A cleared the remaining vehicles, the whole invasion. Just Cause ended offi- seized several prisoners, and established a cially Jan. 12, 1990, but the 7th Group’s blocking position to prevent the PDF from work was far from over. Operation Promote crossing the bridge. Throughout the night, Liberty began immediately after hostilities TF Black defended the bridge against sever- ended in Panama, and the group transi- al attacks by motorized PDF forces, at times tioned into foreign-internal-defense and directing fire from AC-130 gunships circling nation-building activities. overhead. At 2:30 p.m., Dec. 20, TF Black The 7th Group deployed its headquarters was relieved in place by elements of the and its 2nd Battalion (reinforced with ele-

44 Special Warfare ments of the 1st Battalion) to Panama to ca was a key factor in getting the two con- support Promote Liberty, and its forces were tentious nations to work toward a perma- operational by Jan 4, 1990. The forces were nent settlement. MOMEP was another mis- instrumental in restoring order and in re- sion that accomplished a great deal but establishing a civil-defense force through- received little recognition outside military out the country. The 7th Group accom- circles. General Barry McCaffrey, the com- plished its objectives rapidly in Promote manding general of U.S. Southern Com- Liberty, and it redeployed all but one com- mand at the time of MOMEP’s inception, pany Feb. 15, 1990. stated, “This was the most successful peace- The defense of the Pacora River bridge keeping mission in U.S. history.”9 The con- was the 7th Group’s most dramatic mission tinued peace along the Ecuador-Peru border during Just Cause, but it can be argued that is a testament to the accomplishments of th group’s greatest contribution to the oper- the soldiers who participated in MOMEP. ation was orchestrating the surrender of numerous PDF garrisons. The cultural Mexican Training Initiative expertise and interpersonal skills of the SF As part of a renewed commitment by the soldiers were force multipliers; they con- Clinton administration for increased mili- served combat power that would have been tary cooperation between the U.S. and Mex- used to neutralize the garrisons (not to ico, the U.S. Army was directed to perform mention numerous lives). The final effects of the Mexican Training Initiative, or MTI, to Just Cause and Promote Liberty are evi- provide training that would enhance the dent: Panama assumed control of the Canal capabilities of the Mexican army. The mis- in 1999, and the country has had numerous sion of training Mexico’s counterdrug forces free elections during the last decade. was delegated to the commander of the 7th SF Group. MOMEP, 1995-1998 MTI training began in April 1996 at Fort In 1995, Ecuador and Peru went to war Bragg, N.C. Soldiers from Company B, 3rd over disputed territory in the Amazon Battalion, 7th SF Group, trained officers of the basin, a dense jungle region that both Mexican army in advanced marksmanship, nations have claimed for decades. Following reconnaissance, close-quarters battle and some bloody skirmishes earlier in the year, human rights to enhance the Mexican army’s the two countries signed the Itamaraty counterdrug capabilities. The MTI mission Treaty in February 1995, establishing a later rotated to personnel from the 7th cease-fire and created a peacekeeping mis- Group’s 1st and 2nd battalions and Group sion — The Military Observer Mission, Support Company. Training also included Ecuador and Peru, or MOMEP, to ensure MTI instructor courses, which taught selected that both sides adhered to the treaty.8 The Mexican army officers to build effective train- U.S. component of the peacekeeping force ing cadres in Mexico. A large number of Mexi- was organized under Joint Task Force Safe can officers deployed to Fort Bragg for MTI Border, and it consisted primarily of officers from 1996 until September 1998, when the and soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF program was discontinued.10 Group. MOMEP was headquartered in The MTI was ground-breaking in terms of Patuca, Ecuador, and it maintained a pres- the level of cooperation that the U.S. and ence in Bagua, Peru. From the two sites, sol- Mexican governments achieved. It was part diers of the 7th Group maintained check- of a larger effort to improve relations with points in the isolated jungle regions to help our southern neighbor. keep the peace. Enlisted soldiers and offi- cers selected from all three of the 7th Colombia 1998 – Present Group’s battalions, initially spent 179 days More than 80 percent of the cocaine that deployed to Joint Task Force Safe Border; is consumed globally comes from the rotations were later shortened to 90 days. Andean Ridge region of South America, The 7th Group’s presence in Latin Ameri- and much of the cocaine from the Andean

June 2002 45 Ridge comes from Colombia.11 Profits from itary aid could be used only for counter- this illicit trade help finance insurgencies drug operations, not for combating insur- that have raged for three decades and have gent forces. With the narcotics trade so cost thousands of Colombians their lives. entwined with the insurgency and the The largest insurgent group, the Revolu- areas under insurgent control, keeping tionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or the two operations separate would prove FARC, fought the government to a stale- to be a daunting task. mate for years. In 1998, in a dramatic over- The Colombian army decided to create a ture to attain a peace agreement with the new unit that would be specifically trained rebels, Colombian president Andres Pas- for combating narcoterrorist operations. The trana granted the FARC a demilitarized new unit, the Counter-Narcotics Brigade, or zone.12 Until 2002, when the government BACNA, would be formed and trained in the rescinded the demilitarized zone, the area of Colombia known as Tres Esquinas. FARC used its Switzerland-sized piece of The 7th Group received the mission to train Colombia as a staging base for waging war the new unit one battalion at a time and to against the Colombian military and for have all three of the BACNA battalions supporting cocaine production. operational by December 2000. President Pastrana, exasperated by the Although the 7th SF Group had main- violence stemming from the drug trade tained a presence in Colombia, not until and pressured by the U.S. and Europe, Plan Colombia went into effect did the 7th developed Plan Colombia with foreign Group deploy an organic company. In order support in 1999. The U.S. government to train the BACNA, the 7th Group would pledged $1.5 billion in aid to the besieged deploy a reinforced company on a 90-day Colombian government. A large portion of cycle to train each battalion. At the end of the U.S. aid would consist of military the cycle, a new SF company would rotate in training and equipment, especially much- to train the next battalion. The strategy needed helicopters. The provision of mili- would enable the 7th Group to accomplish tary aid held one caveat, however: the mil- its counterdrug mission in Colombia and

Soldiers from the 7th SF Group train Colombian soldiers in airmobile oper- ations in 2000 as part of the Colombian Coun- ternarcotics Initiative.

U.S. Army photo

46 Special Warfare remain engaged throughout the rest of Cen- large, red “7” and the words, Lo que Sea, tral and South America. The operational Cuando Sea, Donde Sea (Anything, Any- tempo resulting from the 7th Group’s com- time, Anywhere). mitments at the end of the 1990s required that every detachment in the group deploy into theater during its battalion-deploy- Lieutenant Colonel Paul S. Burton is ment cycle. executive officer for the 7th SF Group. His The first elements to deploy for the previous special-operations assignments BACNA training mission, which came to be include S3, 7th SF Group; S3, SOTD; com- known as the Colombian Counternarcotics pany commander, battalion staff officer Initiative, or C2I, arrived in Tres Esquinas and detachment commander in the 3rd in March of 1999. In a matter of weeks, the Battalion, 7th SF Group; and detachment first BACNA battalion was receiving multi- commander in Company A, 1st Battalion, echelon training. A-detachments worked in 7th SF Group. He holds a bachelor’s degree the field with squads and platoons, training in history from Arizona State University them in the finer points of patrolling and and a master’s degree in military art and combat operations. Simultaneously, other science from the Command and General SF soldiers worked with the BACNA staff to Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. build their capabilities for planning and operational control. The first iteration of C2I Captain Robert Lee Wilson is command- was a resounding success, and immediately er of Headquarters and Headquarters Com- after completing its training, the first pany, 7th SF Group. He previously served BACNA battalion deployed to support coun- as an SF detachment commander in the 7th terdrug operations. SF Group. Commissioned through ROTC The two subsequent C2I iterations con- as an Infantry officer, Wilson holds a bach- ducted training at Larandia, which has bet- elor’s degree in finance from the University ter facilities for training and logistics than of Connecticut. Tres Esquinas does. The second and third iterations were as successful as the first, Notes: and the last battalion of BACNA was opera- 1 Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, eds., El Sal- vador at War: An Oral History (Washington, D.C.: tional in December 2000, right on schedule. National Defense University Press, 1988), li. As the war against narcoterrorists contin- 2 Ibid. ues in Colombia, soldiers from the 7th 3 Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Lambert, Lieutenant Group continue to provide additional train- Colonel Frank Pedrozo and Colonel Ranger Roach, ing to BACNA units as they rotate off the “Interview: Special Forces in El Salvador,” Special Warfare, October 1993, 35. front lines of the drug war. 4 Sergeant First Class John Terzian, “SF Advisers in El Salvador: The Attack on El Paraiso,” Special War- Conclusion fare, Spring 2001, 25. The 7th SF Group has been and 5 Wayne Kirkbride, Special Forces in Latin America (Published by the author, 1991), 126. remains heavily engaged in Latin Ameri- 6 Ibid., 125. ca. The group has played an important 7 http://call.army.mil/products/ctc_bull/90- role in many of the pivotal events in the 9/9091ch1b.htm. countries of Central and South America 8 Sergeant First Class Douglas Ide, “M-O-M-E-P during the past two decades. The 7th Spells Peace,” Soldiers,February 1996, 31. 9 Major Sean Swindel, 7th SF Group War College Group’s missions have varied from peace- Brief, November 1996, Slide 30. time engagement to advisory operations 10 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Reeder, Mexican Train- to combat, and the group’s advance notifi- ing Initiative After Action Report, October 1998, 3. cation has varied from a few months to a 11 Drug Enforcement Agency Web site, Cocaine pro- few minutes. The diverse missions and duction information, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/ pubs/intel/cocaine.htm. varied planning times come as little sur- 12 Juan Forero, “Colombian Rebels Hijack a Plane and prise to the 7th Group’s soldiers, each of Kidnap a Senator,” New York Times, 21 February 2002. whom carries a unit coin etched with a

June 2002 47 Operation White Star: Prelude to Vietnam

by Dr. Kenn Finlayson

rior to the Vietnam War, United bers of the Royal Laotian army in coun- States Army Special Forces soldiers terinsurgency tactics. Hotfoot was subse- Pconducted three years of intensive quently renamed White Star; the SF sol- operations in Laos. From July 1959 to diers began wearing military garb; and the October 1962, SF soldiers rotated through number of SF soldiers gradually increased the country as mobile training teams, or to a peak of 433 by July 1962.2 MTTs, in support of the Royal Simons based his training teams in the Laotian government’s opera- military districts established by the Royal tions against the Pathet Lao Laotian army. The northern district was communist insurgency. The headquartered in Luang Prabang; the cen- mission, Operation White tral district operated around the capital of Star, formally ended with the Vientiane; the lower central district cen- declaration of Laotian neu- tered on Savannakhet; and the southern trality in July 1962. It proved district was headquartered near Pahkse.3 to be a foreshadowing of the Simons later increased the number of wider use of SF in Vietnam. training teams to accommodate a fifth dis- Operation White Star intro- trict that was located in the Plain of Jars duced the SF soldiers to the area, west of Ban Man.4 classic foreign internal Simons’ men began training the Lao- defense, or FID, mission. Ini- tians on Sept. 1, 1959, with an initial class tially, the MTTs and units of of 1,138.5 Simons later returned with the the French army shared the sixth White Star rotation in November responsibility for improving 1961. By that time, the mission had the combat capabilities of the expanded to include training for Laos’ Meo Laotians, whose army was and Kha tribes as well. plagued with dissension and From the outset, the SF soldiers found low morale. themselves trying to overcome two funda- The first rotation of Ameri- mental hurdles: the French and the Lao- USASOC Archive cans arrived in Laos in July tians. Of the two, the French proved to be a A soldier from the 7th SF 1959. Called “Hotfoot,” and led by Lieu- short-term problem, because the French Group assigned to the tenant Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons, advisory element, the Mission Militaire White Star mission in Laos the contingent consisted of 107 SF soldiers Francaise d’Instruction pres le Gouverne- in 1961. from the 77th SF Group.1 Wearing civilian ment Royal du Laos, withdrew from the dress and theoretically operating in a clan- country Dec. 17, 1960.6 destine fashion, Simons’ men trained mem- The French, entrenched in Laos since

48 Special Warfare the formation of the Royal Laotian army in da. They are content. They live in a 1954, grudgingly acceded to the Americans subsistence economy, and generally the authority to teach military skills and there is enough rice to go around. The techniques, but they retained the right to Lao gentleness traditionally has teach the tactical employment of weapons. enchanted the foreign visitor, particu- Sergeant Roy Mathews worked with the larly the one not trying to go anywhere French Royal Marines in the southern Laot- or do anything in a hurry.9 ian town of Pakse. “At that time we were not The White Star advisers faced an almost allowed to teach any tactics whatsoever,” he insurmountable task in trying to instill a said. “We were strictly technical advisers. … sense of urgency and purpose in the Laot- We could not say ‘This is the way it is ian soldiers, to implement rigid training deployed.’ The French Royal Marines schedules and to inculcate an aggressive stepped in and taught the combat part of it.”7 attitude toward the Pathet Lao, who were The Laotians soon came to prefer the attempting to take over the country.All the Americans to the French. Simons while, the SF soldiers had to communicate explained why that occurred: “I think that through interpreters and share training the French have had beat into their skulls time with the French army. With the phys- for many, many years the colonial attitude ical and cultural difficulties inherent in the as well as the big-brother attitude and the mission, the Americans often fell victim to idea that these people will look up to them unrealistic expectations and the ensuing because they are French and because they frustration at their inability to achieve are white. Nothing could be further from progress in the training of their Laotian the truth.” Eventually the Laotians eased counterparts. As one member recounted in the French out and turned all of the tacti- an interview in 1962: cal training over to the Americans. The second hurdle confronting the Amer- We weren’t ready for [the situation icans lay with the Laotian people them- that] we walked into. We weren’t men- selves. In the late 1950s, Laos had only tally prepared, and all the new teams recently become a sovereign nation, and were given the same idea. The team the new state presented a cultural and that replaced me came in there so full political conundrum for the White Star of go, go, go that they couldn’t hold it. … personnel. The majority of the Laotian That was the biggest problem we trainees were recruited from small villages had — no true picture of what the sit- and hamlets around the country. In most uation was. I went over there with instances, the only requirement for mili- such an … illusion.10 tary service was that the trainee be tall The White Star teams generally operat- enough to reach a certain mark on a bam- ed in a decentralized manner, often as half- boo stalk.8 Most of the trainees were illit- teams of six or seven men. The prevailing erate, and many did not know that Laos philosophy — that the team on the ground was an independent nation or that it pos- could best assess the requirements of the sessed a standing army. Their allegiance units being trained — gave the teams con- remained in their village or their tribe, and siderable freedom to conduct the training they were not particularly motivated to as they saw fit. The higher echelons pro- fight or even to learn to fight. Compound- vided supplies for the teams and took care ing these problems was the general cultur- of personnel and administration problems, al make-up of the Laotian people: but they rarely conveyed to the teams any They are dreamy, gentle, bucolic, guidance on training or advising. nonaggressive people … who live in As one veteran of White Star described bamboo-and-thatch houses on stilts, the situation: “We were teaching too many wading tranquilly in their marshy subordinates over there when we should paddies, fishing in the lazy rivers, and have been teaching the superiors. Why worshipping in the curly-roofed pago- teach the lower-grade people when higher-

June 2002 49 ups don’t know how to utilize [the skills Colonel, wonderful idea, that is really taught]? It’s a waste of time.”11 thinking,” and everybody was happy.12 The Laotian culture figured prominently The presence of the Americans did bring in the effectiveness of the Americans’ style enhanced prestige, along with the added of teaching. Laotian officers and NCOs bonus of improved equipment and an occa- were reticent about risking any loss of sional helicopter flight, to the Laotian prestige by placing themselves in positions units and their commanders. In this sense, where they might be seen as deficient in a the Americans were welcome. However, in particular skill. Providing the Laotians a larger context, a profound sensitivity to with face-saving alternatives, such as their recent past precluded many Laotians working after hours with the officers, from wholeheartedly embracing the Amer- proved difficult and doubled the workload ican advisers. One veteran of White Star of the SF team. In addition, the status-con- felt that the Laotians were reluctant to scious Laotian officers, particularly those take advice from the Americans because of of field-grade rank, made the advisory role their recent experience with the French: frustrating for the American officers. In “They said, well, if we do what they sug- attempting to advise a Laotian battalion gest or tell us, [Laos] will eventually end up commander, an American captain or lieu- like it was before ’54, except the U.S. will be tenant often found it necessary to tender running [the country] instead of the French. his advice in such a manner as to allow the So actually I think we were more or less liai- commander to arrive at the appropriate son personnel rather than advisers.”13 decision on his own, and at his own pace. Working with the Royal Laotian army As one adviser remarked: posed a complex set of problems for the He was a colonel and I was a captain. White Star teams. Following the initial rota- And he didn’t expect me to tell him tion, the mission expanded to incorporate anything, but I [learned] to make sug- the Kau and Meo hill tribes. The expansion gestions or comments, [then] not to say introduced further complexity. a thing about it for 24 or even maybe The training of the hill tribes most close- 48 hours. Then he would come up with ly mirrored the pure SF unconventional- the same thing as his own idea and warfare mission. The SF teams trained [he] would be just as happy as a little companies of 100 men for a counterinsur- child would. … So I would say, “Fine gency mission. In January 1960, SF began

Virtually identical to the OSS mission of training Kachin hill tribes during World War II, White Star also proved to be a train- ing ground for SF mis- sions in Vietnam.

USASOC Archive

50 Special Warfare training the Kau, who were previously Sydnor. Many of those who served with the known as the Maquis companies, after the White Star teams went on to play promi- French resistance movement of World War nent roles in the SF operations in Vietnam II. The Kau proved to be adept fighters, and in various operations years afterward. and they quickly drew the admiration of The lessons gained from White Star are the American advisers. Captain Newlin valid in today’s SF environment, and they Harpersett noted, “The leaders are intelli- reinforce Brigadier General William B. gent, hard-working and quick to learn. Rosson’s observation: They are a terrific guerrilla potential in “An individual or a unit may be extreme- the mountains of this particular region. ly well-trained for counterinsurgency in They respect us and thank us for all we terms of tactical and technical proficiency, have taught them.”14 yet be of little value for want of ability to The Meo tribesmen proved to be equally communicate with the friendly forces we keen pupils, and under the American tute- seek to assist and for want of understand- lage, both tribes developed into effective ing of the problems and attitudes of the counterinsurgency forces. The American country concerned.”16 relationship with the tribes continued throughout the war in Indochina, as SF MTTs visited Laos after the close of the Dr. Kenn Finlayson is the command his- White Star mission.15 If anything, the SF torian for the JFK Special Warfare Center advisers proved to be more successful at and School. working with the hill tribes than they were at working with the Royal Laotian army. Notes: In many ways, the White Star operation 1 Stephen Sherman, Who’s Who from White Star (Houston, Texas: Radix Press, 1994), 1-4. represents the quintessential SF mission. 2 Ibid., II. Virtually identical to the World War II mis- 3 Arthur D. Simons, text of briefing, October 1959. sion in which the Office of Strategic Ser- Contained in the collected papers of Brigadier Gener- vices’ Detachment 101 trained the Kachin al Donald Blackburn, ARSOF Archives, USAJFK- hill tribes in Burma, White Star proved to SWCS, Fort Bragg, N.C., 2. 4 Ibid. be a training ground for the SF soldiers, 5 Ibid., 8. and the experience paid many dividends 6 Sherman, III. during the Vietnam War. 7 Interview with Roy Mathews, conducted by Dr. On many levels — technical, tactical, cul- Stanley Sandler, USAJFKSWCS historian, in 1989. tural and political — an analysis of the 8 Alfred J. Kraemer and Edward C. Stewart, Cross- Cultural Problems of U.S. Army Personnel in Laos and White Star operation reveals the require- Their Implications for Area Training, The George ments and the pitfalls inherent in both Washington University Human Resources Research FID and counterinsurgency missions. In Office, September 1964, 5. having to deal with a culture radically dif- 9 Oden Meeker, The Little World of Laos (New York: ferent from that of the U.S., the White Star Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), 23. 10 Kraemer and Stewart, 5. soldiers learned valuable lessons. Close 11 Ibid., 6. association with the Central Intelligence 12 Ibid., 13. Agency and the U.S. Department of State 13 Ibid. were also hallmarks of the White Star mis- 14 Newlin R. Harpersett, “Maquis Report,” 26 Janu- sion. The mission underwent various per- ary 1960, ARSOF Archives, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, N.C., 3. mutations, going from a supposedly clan- 15 James K. Bruton, letter written to Dr. Stanley San- destine operation conducted by military dler, 30 August 1990, ARSOF Archives, USAJFK- personnel in civilian clothes to a major SWCS, Fort Bragg, N.C. commitment for SF in the years leading up 16 Brigadier General William B. Rosson, “Accent on to the Vietnam War. Cold War Capabilities,” Army Information Digest (May 1962), 5. The list of White Star veterans contains many of the most notable figures in the history of SF, including Bull Simons, Dick Meadows, Charlie Beckwith and Elliot

June 2002 51 The 10th SF Group Keeps Kosovo Stable

by Captains Robert W. Schaefer and M. Davis

ince the conclusion of the NATO air war Falcon, is responsible for Multinational in the summer of 1999, the men of the Brigade-East, or MNB-E. S10th Special Forces Group have main- MNB-E borders Serbia and the former tained a presence in the Serbian province of Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, or Kosovo in support of NATO’s Kosovo Forces, FYROM. The commander of MNB-E/Task or KFOR. Force Falcon is usually a brigadier general With the introduction of ground forces that from a U.S. maneuver division. He com- summer, the KFOR commander divided Koso- mands two U.S. brigades; a Russian vo into five sectors, known as Multinational brigade, or RUSBDE; a Greek battalion, or Brigades North, East, South, West and Cen- GRKBAT; and a combined battalion of Pol- tral. Each sector was placed under the subor- ish and Ukrainian forces, or POLUKRBAT. dinate command of one of the NATO coun- In support of Task Force Falcon, the per- tries. The U.S. military contingent, Task Force sonnel of the 10th SF Group operate a spe-

10th SF Group soldiers of A-detachment 092 with their Russian coun- terparts near Kamenica, Kosovo, in January 2002.

U.S. Army photo

52 Special Warfare LCE Helps Storm Terrorist Camp

In late spring 2001, members of the RUSBDE, together with their LCE, captured a suspicious Kosovar at a traffic-control point near the northern Kosovo border with Ser- bia. The Kosovar was carrying a pistol and a notebook that contained grid coordinates, weapons serial numbers and ammunition counts. Because the man possessed an ille- gal weapon and because there was incriminating evidence, the KFOR soldiers detained him and transported him to the Russian compound for interrogation. From the interrogation, the RUSBDE and the LCE learned that a terrorist training camp was operating in the Vela Glava Valley, along the Serbian border. The camp was said to have 30 members, entrenched weapons systems and mortar pits. On the basis of that information, the RUSBDE began preparing a mission to eliminate the training installation. The LCE aided the Russians with the orders and rehearsals, and it escort- ed the Russian element to the alleged training camp’s location. As the KFOR soldiers arrived at the camp, they observed members of the insurgency patrolling at a small roadblock. The KFOR soldiers dismounted from their armored vehicles and were immediately met with gunfire from the woodline. Members of both the RUSBAT and the LCE returned fire and began maneuvering for an assault on the enemy positions. With the support of an MK-19 grenade launcher and an M-2 .50-cal- iber machine gun, the composite U.S./Russian patrol secured the training camp without sustaining casualties. As the patrol consolidated on the objective and began to reorganize, it processed and treated nine prisoners (two wounded and seven unscathed); captured enemy uniforms, weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and machine guns; and obtained valu- able information about the insurgency.

cial-operations command-and-control ele- LCEs called in artillery support for the Rus- ment, or SOCCE. sian Airborne Brigade (the first instance of The SOCCE commands all special-opera- such interaction since World War II). The tions forces in MNB-E; a reconnaissance LCEs also commanded Russian and Polish and surveillance, or R&S, section; four liai- soldiers during complex tactical operations son teams, or LTs; and three liaison-coordi- against armed insurgents. The SF soldiers’ nation elements, or LCEs. The SOCCE has skills in languages and cross-cultural com- proven to be an invaluable source of situa- munication allow them to assist the host- tional awareness and real-time information nation commanders, staff and leaders of for the commander of Task Force Falcon. small units with mission planning, actions on Working with other NATO units often pre- the objective, and medical support. sents conventional commanders with unique The SF soldiers in Kosovo often draw on challenges. An LCE is assigned to the RUS- their skills in unconventional warfare, or BDE, the GRKBAT and the POLUKRBAT to UW. Nowhere are those skills used and help solve any problems that might arise. adapted more than on the LTs. LTs live and The LCE lives on its host unit’s compound work with Kosovars in the different munic- and conducts all its operations in conjunction ipalities, or opstinas. The LTs’ mission is to with the supported unit. In addition to build- provide “ground truth” to the task force. In ing rapport, the LCE ensures interoperabili- order to do that, LTs divide their sectors ty and a real-time, redundant communica- into smaller sectors, based on the size and tions link between the host nation and Task the ethnic origin of the sector’s population. Force Falcon. Each LT uses two-man teams to patrol its In the early days of the Kosovo mission, sector daily.

June 2002 53 Liaison Team Aids Local Election

In September 2001, Tefik Agushi, leader of the largest group of minority Romas (gyp- sies) in the U.S. sector of Kosovo, died. During the previous year, when Kosovo had elected municipal leaders in the first nationwide democratic election in the history of the region, the U.N. municipal administrator had appointed Agushi the official repre- sentative for the Roma community. Agushi’s death left the Roma community with no formally recognized leader. The situation gave rise to a conflict: The U.N., the KFOR and the ethnic Albanian municipal leadership wanted the Romas to conduct a demo- cratic and U.N.-sanctioned general election, but the Romas were adamant about choos- ing their new leader in accordance with their traditional methods. Because the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, would be conducting nationwide parliamentary elections in another month, OSCE was originally asked to provide assistance with the Roma election; however, because the election of a municipal assemblyman was not required by the U.S. Department of State, the assist- ance would not have been part of the OSCE’s charter, and the organization could not help. The U.N. and KFOR threatened to simply appoint a leader from the Roma com- munity, and the Romas threatened to boycott any further political cooperation with the new government — thereby thwarting the international community’s goals for Kosovo. At that point, the liaison team, or LT, responsible for the Roma community inter- vened. Unfettered by bureaucracy and familiar with the strange and sometimes eccen- tric (by Western standards) traditions of the Romas, the LT met with the U.N. munici- pal administrator and made recommendations for solving the problem. The local U.N. staff was not trained in conducting elections, and their minority-affairs officer was inexperienced, so the U.N. administrator accepted the recommended course of action and asked the LT to assume responsibility for the project. He knew that the Romas would adopt a course of action proposed by the SF soldiers, whom they had come to accept as members of their community. By building a consensus among all interested organizations before implementing a plan, and by consulting with OSCE on internationally recognized election procedures, the LT was able to tailor an electoral process that satisfied the requirements of the interna- tional organizations and that respected the traditions of the Roma community. Because the LT worked outside regular Army KFOR procedures, and because it had a reputation for getting things done, all the parties were more willing to compromise and work toward a common goal. As a result, two SF soldiers were able to accomplish what hundreds of high-level international representatives could not. The resulting election was the first democratic election in Kosovo for a minority group. The election, under the eyes of inter- national observers, became a watershed event for the community, which now felt that the international organizations had finally come to recognize the Romas and their way of life.

Each team’s goal is to know and “live” its such equipment as a means of force protec- sector. The two SF warriors make them- tion, the LT patrols rely on their extensive selves approachable in order to follow the training and situational awareness to special-operations imperative, “Know your remain alert and out of danger. Their operational environment.” Patrol members approachability allows them to gain valu- wear uniforms that have no identifying able information, but it also adds to their patches or badges, and unlike other NATO warrior ethos and mystique. The Kosovars soldiers, the SF soldiers wear no ballistic use the LTs to relay information to the task helmets, load-bearing equipment, or body force because they know that when they armor. Although NATO forces routinely use inform the LT patrols first, their problems

54 Special Warfare are often quickly alleviated. This value to daily operational needs. the populace, the rapport that the patrols Some of the missions that the task force have with the locals, and the mystique sur- deems necessary are beyond the scope of its rounding the soldiers from an “unknown” organic assets. Those missions require the but obviously “special” unit help deter any use of the SOCCE’s R&S section, which has a threat. more robust capability for conducting special The patrols work with municipal leaders; reconnaissance than the task force’s organic citizens; business owners; government organ- scouts or long-range surveillance forces. The izations; nongovernment organizations, or R&S section encompasses a variety of spe- NGOs; and local KFOR commanders and cial-operations specialties. The R&S section their staffs to solve local issues and to learn provides the task-force commander with how the population will react to various task- mature operators who can operate in force initiatives. The “ground truth” that the extreme conditions and who can send near- LTs are able to provide becomes an indis- real-time imagery to the SOCCE, from which pensable tool for daily operations of the task it is relayed to the TF Falcon tactical-opera- force. tions center. R&S missions can be nominated Often, the LTs are the only conduit of infor- by the SOCCE elements, by the TF Falcon mation available to the task force concerning G2, or through the SOCCE internal targeting the current situation in Kosovo, including process. The interoperability of Army SOF incipient insurgencies, smuggling and other and other services’ SOF in the SOCCE is a illegal activities. Such information is vital in true success story. determining potential flashpoints, identifying Because of the 10th SF Group’s UW roots, persons who are to be detained, and defining skills in the languages of the Balkans and proficiency in special reconnaissance and direct action, the soldiers of the 10th SF Group are ideally suited for aiding TF Falcon and KFOR in the mission of maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo.

Captain Robert W. Schaefer is the S5 for the 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group. Captain Schaefer was commander of the first RUS LCE in Kosovo in 1999 and subsequently received the 1999 OSS/SOCOM Award of Excellence for his actions with the Russian Airborne Brigade. During 2001, he served as commander of the liaison team in Gnjilane, Kosovo. He is a distinguished military gradu- ate of the University of Louisville.

Captain M. Davis is commander of SF A- detachment 051. During the fall of 2001, he served as the SOCCE/company executive officer for Company B, 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group, during the unit’s rotation to Koso- vo. He is a distinguished military graduate of James Madison University.

U.S. army photo Captain Don Redd, commander of A-detachment 093, discusses current affairs with a Serbian businessman in Strpce, Kosovo.

June 2002 55 The 281st Aviation Company: The Roots of Army Special Operations Aviation

by Dr. C.H. Briscoe

edicating Army helicopter units to tions Group, or MACV-SOG. Project Delta the support of special-operations remained the only special-operations force Dground forces — a concept that under the command of the 5th SF Group.2 seems basic today — was, in fact, a by- The increased operational demands also product of the Vietnam War. left less time available for B-52 to train In April 1964, the United States initiat- replacements, prompting the establish- ed efforts to upgrade the quality and the ment of the MACV Recondo School to train timeliness of U.S. strategic intelligence. To new personnel for the teams. The training bring the collection of strategic intelligence at the MACV Recondo School was later more under American control, the U.S. cre- expanded to include long-range reconnais- ated Project Leaping sance teams that were assigned to U.S. and Lena, which would allied forces.3 penetrate the Ho At the urging of Majors Arthur Strange Chi Minh trail. That and Charlie Beckwith, the 145th Aviation project led to the cre- Platoon (lift) was placed under the opera- ation of Special tional control of the 5th SF Group on Dec. 25, Forces Detachment 1965, to provide dedicated helicopters and B-52 (later called crews for Project Delta’s training and opera- Project Delta).1 tional missions. One month later, the 6th The success of B- Aviation Platoon (attack) joined the 145th to 52 led to increased form the 2/171st Aviation Company. operational demands On July 14, 1966, the 281st Aviation that resulted in the Company (assault helicopter) assumed the formation of Projects mission of supporting the 5th SF Group, Omega (B-50) and and it retained that mission until Feb. 23, Sigma (B-56), both of 1970. According to Clyde J. Sincere Jr., which ran from May once the 281st was assigned to support the 1966 to May 1967. 5th Group, “U.S. Special Forces became As special operations more responsive in fielding mobile-reaction USASOC Archive expanded across the forces to deal with crisis situations.”4 The “Wolf Pack” patch borders of Cambodia and Laos, the Omega With the exception of operational securi- of the 281st Aviation and Sigma projects led to the creation of ty, deception was the most important factor Company. Command and Control North, South and during helicopter infiltrations of teams.5 Central under the Military Assistance Experience had proved that infiltration Command Vietnam-Studies and Observa- was best accomplished at last light —

56 Special Warfare A crew chief from the 281st stands beside a UH-1C “Hog Frog” that is equipped with 2.75-inch rocket pods and a “chin- mounted” 40 mm gre- nade launcher.

USASOC Archive pilots could still see well enough to insert vision goggles were not available. Limited the force and slip away from the landing time for remaining on the objective (about zone, but in a few minutes, air and ground 20 minutes) also made night operations elements would be covered by darkness. more difficult.9 Aircrews had to rely on Because the enemy soon became familiar strobe lights and pen flares to guide them to with that tactic, U.S. forces had to devise the teams that were waiting to be extracted. methods of confusing him as to the exact But once the members of the aircrew estab- point of debarkation. Helicopters often set lished visual contact with the team on the down briefly at three or more points in the ground and made verbal identification, the vicinity of the primary landing zone to cre- team could no longer use strobes and flares. ate uncertainty, and teams rappelled into Their use was forbidden in order to protect very small clearings or climbed down rope the pilot’s night vision. To further protect ladders into old bomb craters.6 Another the pilot’s night vision, the co-pilot focused trick was to fly three helicopters in single his attention on the instruments inside the file. The lead helicopter would touch down cockpit while the pilot focused his attention momentarily to discharge its reconnais- outside the helicopter. sance team as the other two aircraft passed The probability that a force would have overhead. The lead helicopter would then to be recovered before the completion of its rejoin the flight as the last one in the file.7 mission was inversely proportional to the Rapid extraction of a compromised team size of the force. Road-runner teams (com- was extremely important, and command- posed of four Vietnamese) and long-range and-control elements had to be prepared to reconnaissance teams (composed of two SF extract teams at a moment’s notice. Cap- soldiers and four Vietnamese) were the tain Bill Larrabee, who was a Project Delta most vulnerable to enemy forces. Ordinari- operations officer, explained, “We have our ly, helicopters lifted small patrols from own choppers assigned to us. We have three landing zones. But if a team had to be choppers — two gunships and a slick — recovered from a position that was unsuit- manned at all times. The crews sleep on able for the aircraft to touch down, res- them. If one of our patrols gets into trouble, cuers would lift team members using a [they] only [have] to whisper one word into rope ladder or a block-and-tackle rig. Team a radio, and the choppers are in the air to members could snap-link onto the ropes or get [them] out, day or night.”8 hold on to the ropes and lock arms.10 During the Vietnam War, night helicopter Use of the folding ladder to facilitate flying was risky business, because night- helicopter extractions dates back to the

June 2002 57 World War II helicopter demonstrations of 150837 May 1967. Team observed 30 man Otto Sikorsky.11 But it was not until VC platoon vic XT956637. At 151430 May, Sergeant Major Charles T. McGuire designed team spotted by estimated two VC platoons the first-generation individual extraction vic XT963363. VC fired a rifle grenade near harness — initially a snap-link and rope the team and began advancing. A team sling that fit under the armpits, and later a member threw an M-26 grenade when the web harness — that soldiers could escape in VC were about 15 meters away, killing five seconds, ascending with the aircraft.12 Hold- VC. Team took cover in two old foxholes and ing on with their arms, however, denied res- killed four additional VC. Gunships sup- cued soldiers the ability to return fire during pressed fire and team was extracted under lift-out. fire vic XT963636 at 151525 May 1967.14 The second-generation harness, the The pilots who flew those dangerous STABO system, corrected the problem and missions were young men, 19 and 20 allowed the soldiers to keep their hands free. years old, who were attracted by the The STABO rig proved to be one of the most adventure of the Army’s helicopter pilot innovative reconnaissance hardware items program. Possessing superb hand-and-eye produced during the Viet- coordination, courage and a youthful nam War. Another inser- sense of invincibility, the pilots of the tion/extraction system 281st regularly flew their birds into hot was the metal-rung and LZs with little or no thought for their own cable-ladder system that safety, and they forced their aircraft do was created for the U.S. things that they were not designed to do. Navy CH-46 helicopter. The Hog Frog pilots loaded their gunships Master Sergeant Norman with so many rockets and with so much Doney adapted that sys- ammo that they routinely had to perform tem for use with UH-1 a “lift and bounce, lift and bounce” maneu- helicopters.13 ver on their skids in order to get their Excerpts from the mis- birds airborne.15 USASOC Archive sion reports of several Directed by their crew chiefs, the pilots A warrant-officer pilot Project Sigma road-runner and recon eased their aircraft down through triple- and crew chief of the teams in the vicinity of Phouc Vinh and canopy jungle, with limbs and branches 281st’s 22nd Assault near the Long Nguyen Secret Zone in the Platoon stand in front of only inches from the rotors. When the air- III Corps Tactical Zone highlight the dan- their “slick” command- craft were low enough, the aircrew would ger of helicopter extractions under fire: and-control helicopter. drop a jungle penetrator or a STABO kit to RT Msn 1 extracted by sling under fire pick up the ground forces; then they would vic XT988682 at 011810 May 1967. reverse the process to escape. These acts RT Msn 4 extracted by sling under fire required superb coordination and complete vic YT008813 at 030850 May 1967. trust among the aircrew. RT Msn 13 infiltrated vic XT981651 at The lines below are taken from the poem 151245 May 1967. Team encountered VC “Fire in the Hole,” written by James R. Jar- force of seven men at 151500 May and rett, who served in Project Delta. They reveal opened fire, killing 2 VC. the strong bond that formed between the spe- RR Msn 1 was fired on vic XT678527 cial-operations ground and aviation forces in during movement to LZ. One man wounded Vietnam: in action, left arm (died of wounds) and Darkened jungle holds the fate, team extracted under fire at 281710 April Comrades trapped beyond the gate. 1967 vic XT665509. Aircraft screaming fast and low, RR Msn 22 infiltrated vic XT938346 at Death pursues the team below. 140807 May 1967, and was extracted by Courage their shield from loss of hope, rope ladder vic XT973389 at 151000 May Hope as frail as STABO rope. 1967. Rotors whine, gunners in the door, RR Msn 23 infiltrated vic XT941622 at Swiftly go these dogs of war.

58 Special Warfare A creed unknown to most mankind, 10 Kelly, 146-47. Never leave a man behind. 11 Ralph Alex, “How Are You Fixed for Blades? The Saga of the Helicopter, Circa 1940-60,” in Walter J. The effects of the Vietnam War were Boyne and Donald S. Lopez, eds., Vertical Flight: The numerous, and many are still with us Age of the Helicopter (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian today. The STABO rig of the Vietnam era Institution Press, 1984), 21-22. 12 Kelly, 146-47. has evolved into the single-point individual 13 The STABO rig, which freed the individual’s hands extraction system. While helicopter rap- to fire his weapon during ascent, was developed by pelling continues to be the staple of the Air Major Robert L. Stevens (the ST of STABO), Captain Assault School, the fast-rope insertion- John C. Knabb (the AB of STABO), and Sergeant First extraction system offers more advantages Class Clifford Roberts (the O part of STABO). Shelby L. Stanton, Rangers at War: Combat Recon in Vietnam to the ground forces and reduces helicopter (New York: Orion Books, 1992), 303; Mitchell & Funk hover time. interview. But one of the most significant effects is 14 Kelly, 205-10. the hereditary connection of the 281st Avia- 15 Mitchell & Funk interview. tion Company to the 160th Special Opera- tions Aviation Regiment. Often the impor- tance of training special-operations ground forces and air elements together is over- looked, but operations in Panama, South- west Asia and Afghanistan have revalidated the need for that training. The strong cama- raderie, created in training and reinforced in combat, between the Army SOF ground forces and their organic air assets during Vietnam not only continues, but promises to pay dividends in future operations.

Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori- an for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Notes: 1 Project Leaping Lena required a large amount of specialized equipment. Because Captain Larry O’Neill, the supply officer, habitually marked the shipments for Detachment B-52 with a chalk triangle, the unit became referred to as Project Delta. Colonel Robert Mitchell and Fred Funk, interview by Dr. C.H. Briscoe and Dr. Kenn Finlayson, 4 September 2001, transcript, hereafter Mitchell & Funk interview, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Archives, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. 2 Colonel Francis J. Kelly, Vietnam Studies: Special Forces 1961-1971 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), 107-08; Mitchell & Funk interview. 3 Kelly, 107-08; Mitchell & Funk interview. 4 Shelby Stanton, Special Forces at War: An Illus- trated History, Southeast Asia 1957-1975 (Char- lottesville, Va.: Howell Press, 1990), 153. 5 Kelly, 143; Mitchell & Funk interview. 6 Mitchell & Funk interview. 7 Kelly, 143. 8 Jim Morris, War Story (New York: Dell, 1979), 278- 79; Mitchell & Funk interview. 9 Kelly, 143; Mitchell & Funk interview.

June 2002 59 The 20th SF Group in Flintlock 2001

uring Flintlock 2001, a Special approved by the commander of the 20th Forces A-detachment from the 20th Group: SF Group, Detachment 2031, togeth- D ODA 2031 conducts unilateral tacti- er with active-component A-detachments cal training and trains 120 Malian from the 3rd SF Group, deployed as part of personnel in light-infantry skills as Advanced Operational Base, or AOB, 390. part of Flintlock - 01 from 09 June The 35-day deployment was preceded by a 2001 to 12 July 2001 in the vicinity of five-month train-up. The exercise encom- Sikasso, Mali in order to increase the passed excellent team training, an austere FID skills of the detachment, the environment and interaction with the local organic capability and efficiency of military and host-country civilians. the Malian Army, and promote stabil- A National Guard SF team that is ity in the region. Be prepared to con- attached to an active-component forward duct real-world unilateral operations operational base, or in theater immediately upon notifica- FOB, finds itself in tion by FOB. a unique situation. Detachment 2031 The mission statement addressed all of the had to analyze the issues raised for Detachment 2031 by both mission require- groups, and the statement served the detach- ments and the ment well throughout Flintlock 2001. intent of the mis- In accordance with the first clause of the sion from the per- mission statement, Detachment 2031 ini- spective of both the tially focused on internal training. The com- 20th SF Group and mander of the 20th Group, however, advised the 3rd SF Group. the detachment to make the most of the This was a some- opportunity afforded by the 3rd Group and U.S. Army photo what challenging by the environment in Mali. The detach- Soldiers from the 20th task, because the requirements of the two ment conducted training based on its mis- SF Group build rapport groups did not necessarily coincide. The sion-essential task list: FID; direct action, or with Malian airborne sol- 20th SF Group placed its emphasis on uni- DA; and unconventional warfare, or UW. diers during a wing- lateral training, and the 3rd SF Group The training was especially effective, as the exchange ceremony. placed its emphasis on foreign internal austere environment added a level of real- defense, or FID. After conducting a detailed ism and stress that cannot be replicated in mission analysis, Detachment 2031 arrived the armory in Springfield, Mass., where the at a reworked mission statement that was 20th SF Group has its headquarters.

60 Special Warfare Detachment 2031 was also able to focus critical to Detachment 2031’s accomplish- on cross-training and SF common-task ments. Upon its arrival at Fort Bragg, the training. Again, the real-world environment detachment was incorporated into Company and the excellent support from AOB 390 C, 1/3rd SF Group. Throughout the deploy- contributed to an outstanding training situ- ment, National Guard teams and active-com- ation. The deployment allowed all members ponent teams were treated alike. In fact, the to have an unmatched training experience. mix of National Guard and active-component Even if no other training had been con- teams was critical to the operations in Sikas- ducted, the exercise would have been a suc- so. Because of problems with air transporta- cessful one for Detachment 2031. But the tion, many of the mechanics and support per- detachment’s role during the Flintlock 2001 sonnel were late in arriving at Sikasso. But exercise was to train 120 Malian soldiers in electrical power to the AOB was not delayed, checkpoint operations and light-infantry because Detachment 2031’s personnel includ- skills. The detachment spent months devel- ed two licensed electricians who installed all oping the program of instruction, or POI, required wiring and generator hookups. which was based largely on similar FID Detachment 2031 personnel also included an missions performed in Latin America by the emergency-room nurse, who provided a capa- U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM. bility that is not nor- Prior to deploying to Fort Bragg, Detach- mally available in ment 2031 had rehearsed all classes at the the AOB during an Springfield armory.This preparation allowed active-component the detachment to provide the AOB with a deployment. meaningful plan immediately upon its Similarly, the arrival at Fort Bragg. Once on the ground in active-component Mali, Detachment 2031 ran three iterations personnel at the of its three-day POI. As a result, the detach- AOB and ODA lev- ment was able to train three 40-man pla- els were an invalu- toons through the “crawl” and “walk” phases able asset to the of light-infantry tactics. During the last iter- National Guard sol- ation of training, the teams from the 3rd SF diers. They provid- Group attached personnel to observe the ed subject-matter U.S. Army photo Malians and ultimately to take control of the expertise on new equipment that would oth- A soldier from the 20th host-nation troops in order to continue train- erwise have been unavailable to the Nation- SF Group instructs Malian ing and finish the exercise once Detachment al Guard personnel. On average, the sol- soldiers on small-unit tactics. 2031 had re-deployed. diers of Detachment 2031 had graduated The success of Detachment 2031 was due from the SF Qualification Course at Fort in large part to the skill, professionalism Bragg 15 years earlier. and preparation of its soldiers and their The Flintlock 2001 deployment/exercise ability to work together. In this regard, was an unqualified success. The command- Detachment 2031 was greater than the er’s intent, as briefed to the group com- sum of its parts, as are all successful A- mander, was accomplished, and Detach- detachments. Detachment 2031 has sup- ment 2031 built an excellent rapport with ported operations in the U.S. European FOB 33, AOB 390 and the two active-com- Command and SOUTHCOM, and it has ponent A-detachments. To a man, the worked with the 10th, 7th and 3rd SF detachment felt that Flintlock 2001 was groups. The institutional memory of the worthwhile and that integrating National team stretches back to 1973, but no one Guard and active-component units is an remembers a true integration of National excellent way of operating. Guard and active-component units prior to Flintlock 2001. During the exercise, the ODA was integrat- This article was written by members of ed into both FOB 33 and AOB 390. The rap- the 20th Special Forces Group. port that developed among all personnel was

June 2002 61 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

Former SF soldiers may be The Special Forces Prior Service Accessions Program has established accessed on active duty procedures for evaluating and accessing CMF-18-qualified NCOs who had previously served on active duty or in the reserve component and who are interested in re-applying for SF service in the active component. Those who are eligible include prior-service personnel, SF reserve-com- ponent personnel, and active-duty soldiers who are SF-qualified but are not serving in a CMF-18 skill. Applicants will be accessed on active duty under a conditional contract. The contract specifies that if soldiers are selected by the assessment- and-review board, they will serve on active duty in CMF 18. Soldiers who do not meet the assessment prerequisites or the board criteria will be reclassified into another MOS as directed by the Total Army Personnel Command, or TAPC, consistent with the needs of the Army. The Special Warfare Center and School will evaluate an applicant’s physical ability, duty performance, psychological stability and security clearance prior to the applicant’s appearance before the assessment-and- review board. Evaluation criteria include a complete physical examina- tion, the Army Physical Fitness Test, psychological testing, and a 12-mile road march. The assessment-and-review board will convene at Fort Bragg once the candidates have completed their assessment-and-evalua- tion criteria. Applicants who are selected by the review board will be accessed into active-duty SF in accordance with the guidelines of both TAPC and the Army Recruiting Command. Applicants who are not selected will not be re-evaluated for at least 12 months. For more information, telephone MSG Brian Nulf at DSN 239-8423/9002 or commercial (910) 432-8423/9002.

62 Special Warfare Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

Competition keen for SF The SF Officer Branch at PERSCOM provides the following data from the battalion command fiscal year 2003 battalion-command selection board: • All officers selected in the tactical and TSS categories performed excep- tionally well in branch-qualifying, or BQ, major positions. Those in the institutional category performed nearly as well. • BQ time as a major ranged from 22 to 45 months, with 29 months the average. •Four of those selected (two TSS and two institutional) were non-resident MEL 4 graduates. Thus, resident MEL 4 is not a discriminator. The battalion-command cut is extremely tough for SF because of the small number of SF battalion commands and the exceptional quality of the SF Branch. Anything less than exceptional BQ performance as a major is a discriminator. SF officers who are not selected for battalion command but perform well as lieutenant colonels still have a chance of being selected for colonel — an opportunity not available in the other combat-arms branch- es. Of the 17 SF lieutenant colonels who were selected for colonel on the last board, four had not commanded as lieutenant colonels.

PERSCOM points of contact SF Branch chief LTC Chris Allen DSN 221-3173 [email protected] LTC assignments MAJ Jack Jensen DSN 221-3169 [email protected] MAJ assignments MAJ Ron Tuczak DSN 221-5739 [email protected] CPT assignments MAJ Roy Douglas DSN 221-3175 [email protected] Future readiness CPT Steve Johnson DSN 221-3178 [email protected] Field-grade tech Ms. Sandra Bryant DSN 221-7915 [email protected]

The commercial telephone prefix for the numbers listed above is (703) 325-. Address correspondence to Department of the Army; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-OPE-SF; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414.

June 2002 63 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Chinese Army trains In the Chengdu military region of southwest China, the Chinese army is special-operations force training a special-operations force. According to Chinese reports, the force is making “extensive use of high-technology and new-generation equip- ment” and is training to perform a range of “reconnaissance and intelli- gence-gathering, secret infiltration, raiding and sabotage, joint operations, hostage rescue,” and other missions. The unit benefits from a training environment that ranges from tropic-like jungle areas, to plains, and to mountains that are more than 4,300 meters above sea level. The training environment also includes large cities and extensive rural areas. Substan- tial training — including a two-month exercise — has been conducted in snow-covered mountainous areas of the region in winter, with the goal of improving the unit’s capabilities to operate in a “high-altitude frigid zone.”

German special-ops The Bundeswehr’s still-developing Special Operations Division, or DSO, in public eye and one of its subordinate elements, the Special Forces Command, or KSK, have received increased media coverage since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The DSO, which includes two airborne brigades trained for traditional air assault missions as well as the KSK and other elements, was established several years ago and is expected to reach a full strength of 8,000 personnel by the end of 2003. Despite aus- tere German military budgets, DSO elements are reportedly receiving new equipment, including communications means, light armor and specialized weapons. DSO still lacks long-range air transport and modernized combat helicopters. It has been a stated German goal in on-going transformation and military-reform efforts to create mobile forces capable of dealing with the new challenges in the contemporary operational environment. The war on terrorism quickly highlighted the DSO as the German force best-suited for missions beyond traditional central European and regional require- ments. KSK soldiers, whose past overseas missions have reportedly includ- ed deployments to the Balkans and to the Middle East, are widely report- ed to be engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan together with spe- cial units from the U.S., Britain and other allies, but the German govern- ment has been largely silent on specifics.

Shining Path may target Over the last few months, a number of regional specialists have reported U.S. interests in Peru new activity by Sendero Luminoso — the Maoist Shining Path terrorist group that was largely dismantled in the 1990s. Shining Path members are reportedly reorganizing politically in Peruvian universities and in poverty- stricken settlements around Lima, as well as preparing for bombings and other direct terrorist acts in urban and rural settings. The growing danger of renewed activity was particularly underscored by a bomb detonation shortly before the arrival of President Bush in Lima in March 2002. In addi- tion, some regional specialists believe the Shining Path may be allied with external terrorist groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Force of

64 Special Warfare Colombia and Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Long involved in the drug trade with Peruvian coca cultivators and Colombian traffickers, Sendero is also reportedly linked to opium-poppy cultivation and heroin-trafficking to fund its reorganization and sustainment efforts. Peruvian Interior Minister Fer- nando Rospigliosi recently acknowledged that Shining Path reorganization attempts are under way, and while stipulating that a return to the wide- spread terrorism of the early 1990s is unlikely, he did note the potential for attacks on U.S. interests in Peru.

The Ukraine to create The Ukrainian General Staff has announced its intention to create special special-operations forces units capable of conducting reconnaissance-sabotage missions and other operations on enemy territory. The new units will also perform counter- terrorist duties and operate together with other rapid-reaction and so- called “front line” forces that collectively may total 50,000 personnel by 2005. The formation and equipping of these new units is termed part of a larger Ukrainian military reform and restructuring effort.

Guerrilla group condemns The Mexican Popular Revolutionary Army, or EPR, guerrilla group contin- Mexican president Fox ues to project a political presence and a public face through its internet pub- for supporting U.S. lication, El Insurgente, as well as through it armed actions and surprise appearances. The EPR — engaged earlier this year in a recruiting effort in the Costa Grande mountains of Guerrero state — issued a statement in May condemning Mexican President Vicente Fox as a supporter of Yankee impe- rialism. The EPR singled out the Fox administration’s support of counter- terrorist cooperation and activities with the U.S. and others. In particular, the EPR charged that Fox “allowed Argentine, Spanish, and, of course, Yan- kee police to act inside Mexican territory to apprehend and [to] send back home those who were fighting for social causes and who still had faith in Mexican solidarity … the Fox administration is acting in complicity with the imperialists’ fight against alleged terrorists.” Also noted was support of “the creation of the Northern Command and the participation of the Mexican Navy in joint military maneuvers with the United States, even though the SDN [National Defense Secretariat] denies this.” In recent months, armed EPR members have shown up in a number of villages where they distributed propaganda leaflets, painted slogans on local structures, and encouraged residents to join them in their efforts against the government. The propa- ganda leaflets emphasized the enduring links that the EPR members have to past guerrilla movements. Some of the leaflets celebrated the memory of the Mexican guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas Barrientos, who was killed in the Guerrero mountains by the Mexican Army and police in 1974. While the EPR appearances have not involved observed acts of violence, the late-Jan- uary killing of a leader of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, by armed men wearing military-like gear and carrying assault rifles, was sus- pected by some to have links to EPR. The PRI official was killed by AK-47 and shotgun rounds. Regrettably for the violent area, guerrillas, drug traf- fickers, paramilitaries and other criminal or political groups can be num- bered among the suspects.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

June 2002 65 Update Special Warfare

Army SF Command’s mount, especially during conflict Burford receives first star with nations that do not abide by the Geneva Conventions. FM 3-05.70, Brigadier General David P. Bur- Survival (formerly FM 21-76), has ford was promoted in a ceremony been submitted to the Army Train- April 26, 2002, at the U.S. Army ing Support Center for printing and Special Operations Command’s for distribution to the force. The Dick Meadows Field. manual provides in-depth informa- Burford, deputy commanding tion about the terrain, vegetation, general of the U.S. Army Special weather and other conditions that Forces Command, received his stars are critical to SF soldiers’ ability to from his wife, Susan, and from survive in various environments. Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, Chapters 20, 21 and 22 of FM 3- commander of the Army SF Com- 05.70 address survival movement mand. Burford is a National in hostile areas; camouflage and Guardsman from the 20th Special stalking methods; contact with the Forces Group, Fort McClellan, Ala. Photo by Kyle Cosner local populace; survivor’s behavior; European detachment BG David P. Burford’s wife, Susan, pins a star on his and changes in political allegiance. shoulder during the ceremony at Fort Bragg April 26. The other chapters have been assigned to 112th SOSB must have the ability to solve prob- updated from earlier versions of Thirty-two soldiers formerly lems quickly.” the manual. assigned to the 52nd Signal Battal- The split in the unit will leave a Closely allied to survival are ion in Stuttgart, Germany, official- void within the 52nd Signal Battal- resistance and escape. The Center ly became members of U.S. special- ion, according to the battalion com- and School has completed the pub- operations forces April 2, 2002. The mander, Lieutenant Colonel Cyrus lication and distribution of FM 3- soldiers are now designated as a E. Gwyn Jr. “It’s a bittersweet 05.71, Resistance and Escape, detachment of the 112th Special moment,” he said. “They brought a dated August 2001, to aid soldiers Operations Signal Battalion, but warrior attitude to the battalion … in surviving captivity and to pro- are forward-deployed to the Special especially in physical fitness and vide instruction on various tech- Operations Command-Europe. soldier skills.” niques of escape. The manual is The 52nd Signal Battalion has About 100 people attended a 45- classified confidential. been responsible for providing com- minute ceremony in Washington During recent operations in munication to the special-opera- Square at Patch Barracks, during Afghanistan, U.S. Army Special tions community in the European which the special-operations soldiers Forces once again found them- theater since 1985. changed their guidon and berets for selves accomplishing the mission The unit is responsible for opera- new ones that bore the symbol of the by using pack animals. Pack ani- tions from the southernmost tip of 112th Special Operations Signal mals were used extensively during Africa to Finland in the north, said Battalion. — David Josar, Euro- the Korean War, were important Army Lieutenant Colonel John pean Stars & Stripes during Operation Uphold Democ- Forsyth, director of SOCEUR’s com- racy in Haiti, and are used munications and electronics division. SF manuals cover survival, throughout the U.S. Southern “What is special about the sol- resistance, pack animals Command’s area of responsibility. diers,” Forsyth said, “is they are FM 31-27, Pack Animals in Sup- able to operate in small units of When soldiers are working within port of Army Special Operations, just one or two men, making them a non-permissive environment, the published in February 2000, helps highly mobile. The soldiers also necessity to evade capture is para- to prepare soldiers for the chal-

66 Special Warfare lenges of moving personnel and tise to Hampsey’s project. duty on or after Sept. 11, 2001. equipment in denied areas. Redes- Together with Major Todd Ges- The authorization to reinstate ignated FM 3-05.213, it is undergo- ling, an operations-research-sys- the NDSM is contained in MILPER ing revision. tem-analysis officer; and David R. message number 02-150. The Holdsworth, a senior military ana- NDSM is now awarded for honor- Measures of effectiveness lyst with the Illinois Institute of able active service during the fol- important in PSYOP Technology Research Institute’s lowing inclusive periods: June 27, Discerning the measures of effec- Modeling and Simulation Informa- 1950, to July 27, 1954; Jan. 1, 1961, tiveness, or MOE, to determine tion Analysis Center, Hampsey has to Aug. 14, 1974; Aug. 2, 1990, to campaign success may be one of devised a prototypical model to Nov. 30, 1995; and Sept. 11, 2001, the most difficult steps in the exe- assist PSYOP personnel in accurate- to a date to be determined. cution of psychological operations, ly determining the effectiveness of For the award of the NDSM after or PSYOP. Taking into considera- their programs. Sept. 11, 2001, the following per- tion the myriad processes and The model examines PSYOP task sons will not be considered as per- functions that contribute to the execution and the target-audience forming active service: success or failure of a PSYOP pro- behavioral responses to determine • Army National Guard and U.S. gram presents even further chal- campaign success. Task execution Army Reserve personnel on lenges. As the target audience’s identifies whether or not the devel- short tours of duty to fulfill attitudes, beliefs and behaviors are opment, production, distribution, training obligations under an examined, can the supported com- and dissemination tasks are com- inactive duty training program. mander accurately surmise the pleted to standard. The model also • Any service member on temporary degree to which PSYOP con- examines the magnitude and the duty or temporary active duty to tributed to the success of his mis- direction of any change in the target serve on boards, courts, commis- sion? After any operation, PSYOP audience’s behavior. sions and like organizations. commanders and planners are Finally, the model assesses success • Any service member on active duty often called upon to explain the in terms of the degree that the target for the sole purpose of undergoing outcome of PSYOP campaigns. audience’s behavior change is sus- a physical examination. The Psychological Operations tained over time and how the change Executive Order 12778, dated Training and Doctrine Division, aligns with campaign objectives. The Oct. 18, 1991, has authorized a one- Directorate of Training and Doctrine, model therefore evaluates the com- time-only exception for members of U.S. Army Special Warfare Center pleted tasks from planning to execu- the Army National Guard and U.S. and School, is soliciting suggestions tion; most notably, the PSYOP prod- Army Reserve who were part of the from the PSYOP community to help ucts, the media selection, and the selected reserve in good standing clarify which MOE methodologies objective in relation to the target during the period Aug. 2, 1990, to may be feasible for evaluation and audience’s actions. Nov. 30, 1995. modification of PSYOP programs. The progress of the proposed For more information, telephone Examples of successful MOE would MOE model will be discussed in an Arlette King at DSN 221-9171, or also be useful. article in a future issue of Special commercial (703) 325-9171; e-mail: The PSYOP Division will use the Warfare. Interested persons may [email protected]; or feedback to provide assistance to provide input to Hampsey at DSN visit the home page of the Army Major Russell Hampsey, a PSYOP 299-6950, commercial (813) 828- Awards Branch at http://www.pers- analyst at the Special Operations 6950; or e-mail [email protected]. com.army.mil/tagd/awards. Center for Force Structure, They may also contact Lynn Gilfus, Resources, and Strategic Assess- PSYOP Training and Doctrine ments, Wargaming Simulations Division, at DSN 239-1318, com- and Analysis Division, U.S. Special mercial (910) 432-1318; or e-mail Operations Command. Hampsey [email protected]. leads a team of experts who are DoD reinstates National developing a methodology that will ascertain not only the degree of Defense Service Medal PSYOP success, but also the fac- The Department of Defense has tors contributing to an effective reinstated the National Defense program. The PSYOP Division is Service Medal for members of the providing PSYOP doctrinal exper- U.S. armed forces serving on active

June 2002 67 Book Reviews Special Warfare

Green Berets in the Vanguard: the origins of the green beret and Inside Special Forces 1953- shoulder-sleeve insignia, of early 1963. By Chalmers Archer Jr. relations with OGAs, of training Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute host-nation soldiers, and of the Press, 2001. ISBN: 1-55750-023-1 gap between policy-makers and (hardback). 168 pages. $28.95. the troops on the ground who had to execute the policy. Archer fin- Chalmers Archer Jr. offers a ishes the book with some insight- unique historical perspective on ful lessons learned and a wise U.S. Army Special Forces during look toward the future. its formative years. An African- Archer writes a thoughtful American who served as a med- account of his service in Special ical sergeant during the early Forces. His commendable history days of U.S. Army Special Forces, of the training, missions and Archer provides an engaging types of soldiers during the early story for those who are interested days of SF helps to fill a gap in both in special operations and in the rich lineage of Army Special the initial stages of U.S. military Forces. Archer’s book is relevant involvement in Southeast Asia. In to those who are interested in the the book, Archer skillfully blends early years of the U.S. involve- his capabilities as an award-win- on a variety of missions and oper- ment in Southeast Asia, as well as ning writer and as an educator ations that took him to Hawaii, to those who enjoy a well-written with his military experience to Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, Oki- and authoritative account of SF produce a thoughtful and capti- nawa and Laos. history. Green Berets in the Van- vating story on his rich experi- Trained as a medical NCO, guard is highly readable, relevant ence in Special Forces. Archer brings a values-based and and recommended. Archer weaves an intriguing dignified appreciation for the sup- story about his life in Special port that he and his teammates MAJ Fred T. Krawchuk Forces with the values he grew up provided to host-nation communi- 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group with and the importance of team- ties. A former college professor, Stuttgart, Germany work and communities. He has an Archer reflects authoritatively on uncanny knack of offering macro past SF operations and operators, U. S. Army Special Warfare: Its and micro perspectives of situa- and he expresses a kinship with Origins (Revised Edition). tions on the ground. At the same those who went before him. Alfred H. Paddock Jr. (Lawrence, time he offers strategic sugges- Throughout the book, he stresses Kan: University Press of Kansas, tions of the employment of SF, he the values of teamwork, commit- 2002). ISBN 0-7006-1177-0. 280 also speaks authoritatively on the ment, courage and community. pages. $35. local norms and customs of the The values-based, multifaceted host-nation people with whom he roles and the human dimensions U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its served. Archer pays close atten- of SF form a theme that he Origins, by Alfred H. Paddock Jr., tion to what is happening at the superbly carries throughout the was published in 1982 in a very grass-roots level and ties it clear- book. limited paperback edition by the ly into a strategic framework. Interspersed throughout the National Defense University, or Archer views SF soldiers as book are a variety of colorful NDU. Possession of the book was field diplomats, trainers, leaders vignettes that help explain the pretty much limited to those fortu- and fighters. He bases his account legacy of Army SF. Archer tells of nate enough to know the author or

68 Special Warfare to have access to NDU’s generous figure in the development of both warfare paladins, Colonels Volck- shelves. To those few fortunate of these organizations. mann, Fertig, and Bank, struggled enough to acquire a copy, the book As he retyped the book, Paddock to establish Special Forces in an was a treasure. It was lent only to integrated the additional facts and Army whose attitude varied from the most trustworthy, and with references. The result is a book, antipathy to hostility. This story maledictions should it not be which while technically a reprint, should be a revelation to those who returned promptly. is largely new, with numerous sec- think there was an element of In the years since its publication, tions enhanced by extensive addi- inevitability about the creation of the book has become a collector’s tions of information. The revised Special Forces. prize. One bookstore in Washing- edition has all the strengths of the This very readable book provides ton, D.C., asked almost $200 for a original and even greater depth. prime professional knowledge not well-used copy, a fact that gave the As indicated above in the discus- only of the foundation of Psycho- book’s author, who received noth- sion of the earlier work, this is a logical Operations and Special ing from its publication, near car- serious history.There are hundreds Forces but also of the workings of diac arrest. of end notes. These are so full of military bureaucracies. I heartily In addition to being rare, the interesting facts, explanations, and recommend it to every Psychologi- book was unique. It was one of the references that the reader will find cal Operations and Special Forces few books extant that described himself flipping back and forth to operator, regardless of grade or the creation of Special Forces in determine “Who said that?” There assignment. I would like to partic- precise detail and without mythi- are also some 36 pages of notes, 14 ularly recommend it to the senior cal attachments to earlier irregu- pages of sources, a nine-page index, SF NCO who told me with sinceri- lar organizations, such as the New and a highly helpful glossary. ty that SF was created by the CIA England rangers, “Swamp Fox” These dry facts concerning the and to the SF officer who, with Marion’s partisans, or various author’s historical probity should equal sincerity, assured me that Civil War irregulars. And, unlike not intimidate the reader. Despite President Kennedy created Special many books that address the its meticulous presentation of facts, Forces. founding of Special Forces, it was the book is highly readable. It is not, not a memoir but a serious histo- like much that has been written COL J. H. Crerar ry. That is an important distinc- about Special Forces, a tale of der- U.S. Army (ret.) tion. While the book may not have ring-do and door-kicking. It is, once Vienna, Va. had the personal experiences and the World War II roots have been viewpoints that often make mem- explained, a story of organizational oirs engaging reading, it had the struggle. It is a story of how Robert facts, carefully researched and McClure and his three guerrilla- meticulously referenced. Late last year, the University of Kansas wisely decided that the book deserved to be reprinted. Unfortunately for the author, but fortunately for the reader, reprint- ing demanded computer-format- ted text. The original had been written on a typewriter. The author, Al Paddock, had to retype the entire text. During the intervening years, he had continued probing into the early days of the Army’s Psycho- logical Operations and Special Forces organizations, acquiring additional information and insights. He was particularly for- tunate in locating and receiving access to the papers of Major Gen- eral Robert A. McClure, a central

June 2002 69 Special Warfare

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