U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001-2014
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U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, Gillian S. Oak C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1236 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9210-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover Image: DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chris Fahey, U.S. Navy/Released Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report examines the role of U.S. special operations forces in Oper- ation Enduring Freedom—Philippines from 2001 to 2014. The report documents the chief activities of U.S. special operations forces and their effects on transnational terrorist threats in the southern Philippines, the capacity and capability of the Philippine security forces, and the U.S.-Philippines bilateral relationship. The purpose of the report is to provide an authoritative and comprehensive account of a long-duration special operations mission to aid policymakers and military planners, as well as for use in professional military education. This detailed account illustrates the varied and robust types of operational assistance provided as a critical component of foreign internal defense, which dis- tinguishes this special operations mission from security cooperation activities and train-and-equip missions. Foreign internal defense often includes training and equipping, but the focus is on employing and not just building capacity and capability. And unlike security coopera- tion, which often aims to secure access and build relationships, foreign internal defense seeks to harness those activities to achieve an opera- tional result. To achieve that result, U.S. forces carry out a wide range of enabling and advisory activities on or near the battlefield, which can include direct support to combat or combat advising in accor- dance with rules of engagement established by U.S. policy and host- nation agreement, as well as civil affairs and information operations. Although the specific activities can vary, the U.S. emphasis in foreign internal defense is on supporting the objectives, plans, and operations of the host nation and partner forces. iii iv U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 This research was sponsored by the Office of the Assistant -Sec retary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments .............................................................xxix Abbreviations .................................................................. xxxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Study Purpose ...................................................................... 1 Research Approach ................................................................. 2 Organization of the Report ....................................................... 6 CHAPTER TWO U.S.-Philippine Relations in Historical Perspective ....................... 9 Multiple Threat Groups ..........................................................11 Pre–Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines Decision to Support the Light Reaction Company ...............................................13 CHAPTER THREE 2001–2004: The Initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom— Philippines ...................................................................17 U.S.-Philippine Policy Decisions ................................................17 The Initial Assessment ............................................................19 Joint Task Force 510 and the Terms of Reference ............................ 23 v vi U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 2003–2004: Transition to Joint Special Operations Task Force— Philippines ................................................................... 36 Summary .......................................................................... 42 CHAPTER FOUR 2005–2007: The Move to Jolo and Operation Ultimatum ...............45 Assessment and Adaptation ......................................................45 Operation Ultimatum: Plan Execution ....................................... 50 Summary ...........................................................................59 CHAPTER FIVE 2008–2010: Expansion of Effort ..............................................63 Assessment and Adaptation ..................................................... 64 Plan Execution.................................................................... 66 Increased Emphasis on Armed Forces of Philippines Targeting of Abu Sayyaf Group Leaders ..................................................71 Summary ...........................................................................76 CHAPTER SIX 2010–2012: Transitioning Up .................................................79 Assessment and Adaptation ..................................................... 80 Plan Execution.....................................................................82 Summary .......................................................................... 92 CHAPTER SEVEN 2012–2014: Zamboanga Siege and Transitioning Out ...................95 Assessment and Adaptation ..................................................... 96 Plan Execution.................................................................... 98 Summary ......................................................................... 107 CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusion ...................................................................... 111 Overall Outcomes ............................................................... 114 Limiting Factors ................................................................. 123 Key Contributing Factors ...................................................... 125 Generalizability of Findings ................................................... 130 Contents vii APPENDIXES A. Balikatan 02-1 Terms of Reference ..................................... 133 B. Plan Analysis Tool ......................................................... 137 Bibliography .................................................................... 139 Figures S.1. Enemy-Initiated Attacks in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, 2000–2012 .......................................................... xix 3.1. U.S. Military Assistance to the Philippines, 2000–2012 .......19 3.2. Joint Task Force 510 Task Structure for Its Advise-and- Assist Relationship with the Armed Forces of the Philippines ............................................................33 3.3. Enemy-Initiated Incidents in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, 2000–2004 .......................................................... 43 4.1. Diagram of Operation Ultimatum Concept .....................51 4.2. Enemy-Initiated Incidents in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, 2005–2007 ...........................................................61 5.1. Disposition of Forces as of September 2007 ..................... 66 5.2. U.S. Government and Contract Resources Provided to Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines ..............74 5.3. Information-Gathering and Sharing ..............................75 5.4. Enemy-Initiated Incidents in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi- Tawi, 2008–2010 ................................................... 77 6.1. Enemy-Initiated Incidents in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi- Tawi, 2010–2012 ....................................................93 8.1. Enemy-Initiated Attacks, by Province and Year ................ 116 ix Summary The purpose of this report is to document the activities of U.S. special operations forces (SOF)