FM 31-22: US Army Countterinsurgency Forces
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL OBSOLETE U. S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES DO NOT CHARGEmmiw . - t -. I 6237) p I LJ ~LL-..P k HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY C NOVEMBER 1963 AGO 6448A FIELDMANUAL HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY NO. 31-22 WASHINGTON,D.C., 12 November 1963 U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. GENERAL J Section I. Introduction---------------------. 1.2 11. U.S. policy and definrtlons .......................... 3,4 111. Insurgency-history, causes of phases ............................... 6-8 IV. Factors in the prevention of insurgency............................. 9-11 CFIAPTEK 2. ROLES OF NONMILITARY AGENCIES AND OTEJER SERVICES Section I. National 12-16 11. Other military services................................ 17-19 PART Two. RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANIZATION CHAPTER 3. U.S. AND INDIGENOUS COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES Section I. 20-21 11. The special action force (SAF) ....................................... 22-25 111. Other U.S. Army counterinsurgency forces ................................ 26-28 IV. Organization for counterinsurgency--------------------- 2952 SPECIAL ACTION FORCE AND SAF BACKUP FORCES, ORGANIZA- TION AND CAPABILITIES. - . 33-69 COMBAT AND COMBAn:1SIJPPORT UNITS............................... 60-80 COMBAT SERVICE SUP??OB-Tf:fU~~~+------__-------L----------- 81-87 INTELLIGENCE------------------- 88-93 LOGISTICS PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES--------------------------- 94-98 99-105 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS------------------------------------------ 106-110 INDIGENOUS PARAMILITARY FORCES 111-118 TRAINING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY 119-124 FORCES. APPENDIX I. REFERENCES--~--------------------------- ------- 11. EXAMPLES OF CIVIC ACTION------------- -- ------- 111. SECURE POPULATION ------- IV. TRANSPORTATION ------- v. SPECIAL COUNTERINSURGENCY MEASURES........................... ------- VI. GUIDELINES FOR ADVISORS AND MEMBERS OF MTT's ------- VII. SAMPLE TRAINING PROGRAMS................................ ------- PART ONE INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1 GENERAL Section I. INTRODUCTION 1. Purpose and Scope on the organization, operations, control, admin- istration, and logistical support of U.S. Army a. This manual together with its classified counterinsurgency forces in all phases of in- supplement (FM 31-22A) provides informa- surgency. It should be used jointly with other tion and guidance to commanders and staffs for doctrinal publications providing guidance, tech- the training and operational employment of niques and procedures for field operations. units, teams, and individuals designated as U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces. It describes the organization, missions, and methods of em- 2. Changes ployment of U.S. Army Special Action Forces Users of this manual are encouraged to sub- (SAF), specially trained brigade-size backup mit recommended changes or comments to im- forces, support units, and individuals who are prove the manual. Comments should be keyed deployed to advise, train and/or provide opera- to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the tional assistance to a host country's counter- text in which the change is recommended. Rea- insurgency forces. It explains the relationship sons should be provided for each comment to of U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces to insure understanding and complete evaluation. MAAG's/Missions and other elements of the Comments should be forwarded directly to Com- U.S. Country Team engaged in supporting a manding Officer, U.S. Army Combat Develop- host country's counterinsurgency effort. ments Command Special Warfare Agency, Fort b. This manual contains U.S. Army doctrine Bragg, N.C. Section I!. U.S. POLICY AND DEFINITIONS 3. U.S. Policy ance for U.S. Army counterinsurgency elements as an extension of the interdepartmental con- a. Approved integrated interdepartmental cept. policy guidance has been developed for the em- ployment abroad of all relevant U.S. resources b. A major objective of U.S. policy is to to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency. In- thwart further communist inroads into non- cluded is a concept for the development of communist areas by safeguarding and assisting counterinsurgency plans and programs, and the the less developed nations in fulfilling their* functions and responsibilities of the major de- aspirations to remain free, and to fashion ways partments of the government and their over- of life independent from communism or other seas representatives. The chief of the diplo- totalitarian domination or control. matic mission, as the head of the U.S. country c. The overall U.S. objective in the field of team, is charged with the development of the overseas internal defense is to encoupage and Country Internal Defense Plan. The Depart- assist vulnerable nations to develop balanced ment of the Army has formulated broad guid- capabilities for the internal defense of their AGO 6448A 3 societies. Psychologically, few of the develop- b. Military qvic Acticm. The use of pre- ing nations are aware of the insidious nature ponderantly indigenous military forces on proj- of the threat posed by communist subversion, ects useful to the local population at all levels nor do they know how to cope with the blan- in such fields as education, training, public dishments and false hopes raised by communist works, agriculture, transportation, communica- propaganda. An adequate internal defense re- tions, health, sanitation and other areas .con- quires mobilizatioq of national resources and tributing to economic and social development, their effective use through political, social, eco- which would also serve to improve the stand- nomic, milibry and psychological measures. ing of the indigenous military forces with the Psychological operations can help to bridge the population. gap between the people and the government and c. Psychological Operations. This term in- can assist in mobilizing the human resources cludes psychological warfare, and, in addition, of the nation. The key aspect of the U.S. role encompasses those political, military, economic, in countering subversion and insurgency in and ideological actions planned and conducted these countries is assisting these peoples to to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups help themselves. The major effort should be the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior from the indigenous government because the favorable to the achievement of national ob- problems in each area are local and unique to jectives. that society. These existing problems must be solved primarily by the local people and their d. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces. governments. U.S. policy is to provide addi- Those forces which are comprised of Special tional resources and capabilities to augment Action Forces and other U.S. Army units, ele- their own efforts in a constructive and accept- ments or personnel trained and designated for able manner in accordance with the local situ- a counterinsurgency mission assignment. These ation, with the credit for accomplished mis- forces are capable of operating in vulnerable sions accruing in the fullest degree possible to areas, when invited by a host government, to the local government. provide training and military advice and op erational assistance to indigenous military and 4. Definitions paramilitary forces engaged in maintaining or restoring internal security and defeating sub- a. Ccncnterinsurgency. Those military, para- versive insurgency. military, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat e. Levels of insurgency. See paragraph 8. subversive insurgency. f. Country Team. Sge paragraph 16. Section 111. INSURGENCY -HIS1'ORY, CAUSES AND PREVENTION 5. Examples of lnsurgency Movements torical insurgency movements are cited by cause and results as follows : a. Since World W-ar 11, insurgent movements of major dimensions have occurred in Greece, (1) National independence. the Philippines, Malaya, Indo-China, (Vietnam, (a)Algeria is an example of a country Laos, Cambodia), Algeria, Cuba, Indonesia, which was seeking national inde- China and several other countries. In many pendence. The Algerian war, or in- cases, these movements have involved hundreds surrection, was in progress for of thousands of men on both sides in struggles many years. Prior to the end of lasting up to fifteen years. Insurgent activities hostilities, the French committed a of more limited extent and duration have oc- military force of approximately curred in many other areas. Some insurrec- 400,000 troops in an effort to crush tions have resulted in the violent overthrow of the insurrection. Although success- existing governments. In some cases these new ful militarily, the French failed to governments have been or become either com- suppress the insurrection for polit- munist or communist-dominated. Some his- ical reasons. Algeria under French 4 AGO 6448A rule did not represent a truly colo- campaign which defeated the Huks nial status; the desire for national is considered a model, particularly independence was greatly influ- in the area of civic improvements enced by French hegemony in Al- and psychological operations im- gerian political, economic and social plemented by the government to systems. Efforts by the French to overcome those grievances which negotiate a settlement were found led to much of the peasant discon- ' to be too little and too late. The tent. rebels forced the French to grant (b) The overthrow of the Batista gov- Algeria political independence in ernment in Cuba by the Castro 1962. The popular