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Executive Summary of the NBI-NPS SIT Report

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Number Acknowledgments V III Acronyms Used Xl Executive Summary XVlll I. Introduction A. Authority and Mandate of the NBI-NPS SIT 1. Legal Authority 2 2. Mandate 4 B. Scope and Limitations of the Investigation 1. Scope . 5 a. Administrative and Criminal Liability of Certain Public Officers 5 b. Criminal Liability 6 2. Limitations 7 C. Methodologies Employed 9 1. Testimonial 10 . a. Witnesses Interviewed 10 2. Documentary Evidence 10 a. Sworn Statements 11 b. Medico-Legal Reports 19 c. Intelligence and Situational Reports 19 d. Photographic Evidence 20 e. Board of Inquiry (BOI) Report 20 f. MILF Special Investigation Commission on 20 the Mamasapano Incident g. Committee Report No. 120, Senate of the 21 Philippines 3. Site Inspection at Barangay Tukanalipao, 21 Mamasapano 4. Forensic Evidence 22 I-~~~~~~--~_._-----------------~----------_.- - _ a. Ballistics 23 b. Site Measurements 23 5. Other object evidence 23 6. Electronic Documents/Data Message 23 a. Uploaded Videos Depicting Stages of the Mamasapano Incident 24 b. Other Videos Examined by the NBI 25 c. Video Stored in Mobile Phone in the Possession of a Witness 25 7. Video Footage Shot by GMA News 26 D. The Ceasefire Agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and its Consequences on the Fact Finding Investigation A. Historical Background 27 B. Scope of the Ceasefire Agreement 30 C. Dialogue of the Secretary of Justice and the 32 Joint NBI-NPS Special Investigation Team with the MILF Central Committee on March 10, 2015 C. Impact of the Ceasefire Agreement on the Fact 33 Finding Investigation III. Oplan EXODUS and its Consequences at 36 Barangays Pidsandawan and Tukanalipao in Mamasapano, Maguindanao A. Prelude to Exodus 1. Oplans Prior to EXODUS 36 2. The Reconnaissance Phase 39 3. The Mission Planning Phase and Concept of 40 Operations for Oplan EXODUS th 4. Preparations of the 84 SAC, the Assault 43 Team (Main Effort) 5. Briefings Conducted Among Different SAB/ 43 SAC Units ii a. Rules of Engagement 46 b. The Possibility of an Encounter with MILF, BIFF and PAGs 46 c. D-Day Reset to January 24,2015 47 6. The Role of the First Wave of Intelligence 48 Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (IST AR) B. The Execution of Oplan EXODUS on 48 January 24-25,2015 1. Tactical Command Post Narrative 48 a. P/Dir. Getulio P. Napefias 48 b. PCSupt. Noli G. Talmo 50 c. S/Supt. Richard Dela Rosa 52 d. P/Supt. Michael John C. Mangahis 53 e. P/Supt. Abraham D. Abayari 55 f. PSI Lyndon A. Espe 56 g. P03 Lloyd T. Ensoy 58 2. The 84th Seaborne Company's Narrative of the Capture/Kill Plan at Barangay Pidsandawan 60 and Adjoining Barangays a. P/Supt. Raymund A. Train 62 b. SPO 1 Allan L. Franco 65 th c. Team 1 (841), 84 SAC 67 th d. Team 3 (843), 84 SAC 72 th e. Team 2 (842), 84 SAC 77 f. Team 4 (844), 84th SAC th 82 3. The 55 SAC's (Main Effort 2) Narrative of the Clash with Rebels at Brgy. Tukanalipao 83 4. The Blocking and Containment Force's Narrative 87 5. The Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP) Narrative a. M/Gen. Edmundo R. Pangilinan 129 b. Lt. Gen. Rustico o. Guerrero 131 c. Col. Robert I. Velasco 133 d. Lt. Col. Allan Hambala 134 e. Col. Gener P. Del Rosario 135 f. Col. Melquiades L. Feliciano 136 g. L1. Col. Gregorio B. Hernandez, Jr. 138 iii h. Lt. Col. Romeo N. Bautista 139 i. Lt. Col. Danilo D. Benavides 141 j. Sgt. Whiler D. Jaranilla 141 k. 2nd Lt. Lylevan L. Pafiamogan and nd 2 Lt. Rigor Rivera 142 6. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)/ Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities' (CCCH) Narrative 142 a. Major Carlos T. Sol, Jr. 142 b. Ronnie L. Arap, Jr. 145 c. Dave C. Jungco 145 7. The Narrative of the 146 C. MARATHON's Narrative 1. Testimony of Marathon 156 2. Recapitulation of Suspects Identified by MARATHON 163 D. Forensic Evidence of the Clash at Barangay Tukanalipao 164 1. Measurements Taken at Sitio AmiliI, Barangay Tukanalipao 164 2. Results of the Ballistics Examination 166 3. Other Object Evidence Collected at Barangay 167 Tukanalipao, Mamasapano E. Video Evidence of Post Clash Situation at Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano 167 1. Uploaded Video Clips and Digital Forensic Examination 168 2. Video Clips with Subtitles 169 3. Identification of the Video Taker 172 4. Identification of the Video Uploader 173 5. Video Footage ofGMA News Interview of P02 Christopher Lalan 173 IV. The Board of Inquiry (BOI) Report 177 A. Objectives 177 iv B. Factual Conclusions 177 C. Recommendations 179 V. The Senate Report 180 A. Legal Basis 180 B'. Observations/Findings 180 C. Recommendations 187 VI. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Special Investigative Commission Report 189 A. Objectives 189 B. Narrative 189 C. Findings 192 VII. The NBI-NPS SIT's Factual Findings 194 A. Mamasapano at a Glance 194 B. Significant Facts 195 C. Sequence of Events 196 1. Warrant of Arrest Against High Value Targets (HVTs) 196 2. Marwan Resisted and was Killed 197 3. The 55th SAC was not supposed to be at the Tukanalipao cornfield 198 th 4. The 55 SAC Fired First 199 5. There was "Pintakasi" by members of the MILF, BIFF and PAGs against the 55th SAC 201 6. By 8:00 AM, the MILF, BIFF and PAGs involved in the Pintakasi against the 55th SAC already knew that they were fighting against police officers 202 7. Some wounded 55th SAC members came out of the cornfield with their hands raised but were still killed 202 8. After the firefight, the MILF, BIFF and PAGs involved crossed over to the cornfield to 202 v th fmish off the dying 55 SAC members 203 VIII. Criminal Liabilities of Persons Involved in 204 the Mamasapano Incident A. Framework 204 B. The Ceasefire Agreement and its Effects on the 204 Enforcement of Penal Laws at Mamasapano C. Penal Laws Relevant to the Events at Barangay 207 Pidsandawan and Tukanalipao. 1. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) a. Republic Act No. 9851 (the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity) 207 2. Revised Penal Code 211 a. Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Murder 212 b. Theft 214 D. Conspiracy between and among the Armed Groups Involved and the "Pintakasi" Phenomenon 216 IX. Recommendations 219 A. Filing of Complaints for Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Murder against 219 Identified Suspects B. Temporary Non-Disclosure of the Suspects' 219 Identity C. Temporary Non-Disclosure of MARATHON's 220 Identity D. More Facts versus Slight Delay: The Need to 220 Continue the Investigation vi 1. Third Party Eyewitnesses at Barangay 221 Pidsandawan 2. Establishment of an Approximate Sequence of SAF Commandos' Deaths at Barangay 222 Tukanalipao 3. P02 Lalan and Proof of Death ofRis Alleged 222 Victims at Barangay Tukanalipao 4. The American Involvement in Oplan 223 EXODUS ANNEXES SOJ Issuances and Letters A Agreements Relating to Peace Process B Sworn Statements of Witnesses and SAF Personnel C PNP Medico-Legal Report D NBI Documentary Evidence E Digital Evidence Collected and Processed by NBI F Photographs Taken by the NBI G-R DOJ Orders/ Proceedings I Reports J Other Reports K vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For a period lasting seventy four (74) days, days that easily merged into nights, the undersigned prosecutors and agents of the NBI-NPS SIT conducted its inquiry on the Mamasapano incident. They read thousands of pages of affidavits and other voluminous documents. They personally conducted detailed interviews and rigorous interrogations of witnesses in several provinces and cities in Mindanao, including Mamasapano in Maguindanao. The NBI-NPS SIT examined a variety of video, photographic and other electronic data and studied and analyzed various technical reports. The task seemed insurmountable given the limited time imposed on us to submit this report. However, fully conscious of the indignant national demand to ferret out the entire truth surrounding the Mamasapano incident and to hold to account all those criminally responsible, the NBI-NPS SIT was able to complete this report with the crucial help and invaluable assistance of the following persons and organizations: Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II, Department of Interior and Local Government, Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin, Department of National Defense, Deputy Director General Leonardo A. Espina, Officer-in-Charge, Philippine National Police, P/Director Benjamin B. Magalong, Chairman, PNP Board of Inquiry (BOI), PlDirector Francisco Don C. Montenegro, PNP Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), C/Supt. Theresa Ann B. Cid, Chief, PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Gov. Esmael G. Mangudadatu, Province of Maguindanao, Major General Edmundo Pangilinan, Commanding General, 6th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Brigadier General Carlito G. Galvez, Jr. (ret.), Chairman, GPH Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, Brigadier General Arnold M. Quiapo, Chief, Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Col. Melquiades L. Feliciano, Brigade th Commander, 601 st Infantry Brigade, 6 Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Capt. Jose Philip G. De Castro, th Intelligence Officer, 60 I st Infantry Brigade, 6 Infantry Division, Philippine Army, S/Supt. Rodelio B. Jocson, Provincial Director, Maguindanao Police Provincial Office, Mayor Tahirodin Benzar A. Ampatuan, Vlll Municipality of Mamasapano, Atty. Martin T. Meiiez, Director of the Witness Protection and Secun Benefits Pro am, NBI Forensic Investigation Service - Deputy Director Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, Hiyasmin G. Abarrientos, Ligaya S. Banawan, Jovito Del Rosario, Angelito H. Perez, NBI Photography Publication Laboratory Division - Chief Roland M. Demetria, Renato C. Marcos, Joel DLC Langas, Madeliene V.
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