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THE WAR REPORT ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017

ANNYSSA BELLAL

THE ACADEMY A JOINT CENTER OF THE WAR REPORT ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The War Report 2017 was supervised and edited by Dr Annyssa Bellal, Strategic Ad- viser on IHL and Senior Research Fellow at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (Geneva Academy). The different sections on selected armed conflicts were written by individual authors and copy-edited by Munizha Ahmad-Cooke. The War Report 2017 also builds on past editions since 2012. The Geneva Academy would like to thank the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAE) for its support to the Geneva Academy’s research on this issue.

DISCLAIMERS This report is the work of the editor and authors. The views expressed in it do not necessarily reflect those of the Geneva Academy. The qualification of any situation of armed violence as an armed conflict under international law should not be read such as to trigger war clauses in insurance contracts and does not in any way affect the need for due diligence by any natural or legal person in their work in any of the situations referred to. Furthermore, facts, matters or opinions contained in the report are provided by the Geneva Academy without assuming responsibility to any user of the report who may rely on its contents in whole or in part.

The designation of armed non-state actors, states or territories does not imply any judgement by the Geneva Academy regarding the legal status of such actors, states or territories, or their authorities and institutions, or the delimitation of their boundaries, or the status of any states or territories that border them.

March 2018

ISBN: 978-2-9701003-5-5

Cross asanAssociate. is currentlyworking intheLegalDivisionof InternationalCommitteeofthe Red ArmedConflictsproject and previously involvedinthework ontheRuleofLaw in the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. She was law degreesfromtheUniversities ofPotsdamandNanterre,aswellanLLMfrom Caroline SiewertistheauthorofsectiononAfghanistan andSomalia.Sheholds is pursuingaMaster’sdegreeinInternational LawattheGraduateInstitute,Geneva. Graduate InstituteofInternationalandDevelopmentStudies,Geneva. Currently,she Geneva andadiplomainInternationalAffairsMultilateral Governance fromthe d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon, a diploma in Transnational Law from the University of versity ofGeneva.ShealsoobtainedadiplomainPoliticalScience fromtheInstitut and aMaster’sdegreeinEuropeanStudiesfromtheGlobal InstituteattheUni- holds aMaster’sdegreeinAdministrativeLawfromDelRosario University,Bogotá, yer specializedinpublicinternationallaw,globalgovernanceand accountability.She Ana BeatrizBalcazarMorenoistheauthoronsectionColombia.Shealaw - Colombian GovernmentandtheFARC-EPin2016. lawyer, ontheimplementationofHavanapeaceagreement reachedbetweenthe International HumanitarianLawandHumanRights.Sheiscurrentlyworking,asa ternational HumanitarianLawandHumanRightsfromtheGenevaAcademyof She isaColombianlawyerspecializedinconflictresolution,andholdsanLLMIn- Laura BaronMendozaistheauthorofsectionsonMyanmarandPhilippines. vulnerable groups. worked inBoliviafortheUNOfficeonDrugsandCrime,accesstojusticeof Development Studies,Geneva,focusingoninternationalhumanitarianlaw.Shehas pursuing aMasterinInternationalLawattheGraduateInstituteofand Ximena MercedesGalvezLimaistheauthorofsectiononElSalvador.She law andhasworkedforhumanrightsorganizationsinMexico,BrusselsGeneva. Geneva. Shespecializesininternationalhumanrightslawandcriminal ternational LawattheGraduateInstituteofInternationalandDevelopmentStudies, Julie LambinistheauthorofsectiononMexico.ShepursuingaMasterinIn- offices ofaninternationallawfirm. ment Studies,Geneva.ShepreviouslyworkedforsevenyearsinseveralUSandAsian at HarvardKennedySchoolandtheGraduateInstituteofInternationalDevelop- US-trained lawyerfromSpaincurrentlypursuingadualdegreegraduateprogramme Monste FerreristheauthorofsectiononconflictinIsrael/Palestine.Shea the UniversityofGenevaGlobalStudiesInstitute. Journalism at Webster University, Geneva, and a Lecturer on International Relations at the MiddleEast.HeisamemberofFacultyInternationalCommunicationsand Vicken CheterianistheauthorofsectiononKurdishmilitaryformationsin focus onMiddleEasternStudies. LLM degreeinHumanRightsandHumanitarianActionatSciencesPo(Paris)witha citizen ofIsraelandapractisinglawyerinthatcountry.Heiscurrentlypursuingan Sari ArrafistheauthorofsectionsonLibya,NigeriaandYemen.HeaPalestinian

INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHORS 5 THE WAR REPORTTHE WAR :REPORT: ARMED ARMED CONFLICTS CONFLICTS IN 2017IN 2016 66 CONTENTS b. a. 1. 1. THE PALESTINIAN–ISRAELI ARMED CONFLICT: FIFTY YEARS ON 4. 3. 2. 1. E. D. A. D. C. C. B. A. B. A. A. B. SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 PART 2 1 PART INTRODUCTION SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

WHEN DOES AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING A SITUATION OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT RULES APPLICABLE IN A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WHEN DOES A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 Land Expropriation,EconomicStagnation, DemolitionsandSettlements Sustained Violence The WestBankandEastJerusalem WHICH ARMED CONFLICTS OCCURRED IN 2017? NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WHAT IS AN ARMED CONFLICT? : SUMMARY :

: KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF

20 20 24 24 28 26 26 29 22 22 34 23 23 32 35 33 33 33 33 16 13 17

CONTENTS 7 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 8

3. 2. 1. 2. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 1. 3. Jerusalem 2. 1. Settlements b. Hamas a. 2. e. d. c.

C. B. B. A. D. D. C. D. C. B. A. SELECTED NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

THE PALESTINIAN–ISRAELI ARMED CONFLICT FIFTY YEARS ON KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF THE US IN COMBAT OPERATIONS KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: ARMED GANG VIOLENCE SPOILS THE PEACE PROCESS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT National LiberationArmy(ELN) Criminal bands(BACRIM) Colombian ArmedForces The IslamicStateinAfghanistan(KhorasanBranch) The HaqqaniNetwork The Taliban The UnitedStatesArmedForces Afghan Forces Fatah andHamasReconciliation The Blockade The GazaStrip The PalestinianAuthority Arbitrary Detention Freedom ofMovementandtheSeparationBarrier THE PEACE PROCESS COLOMBIA: ARMED GANG VIOLENCE SPOILS OF THE UNITED STATES IN COMBAT OPERATIONS AFGHANISTAN: INCREASED INVOLVEMENT

40 48 49 49 42 42 42 50 62 45 58 56 59 59 38 38 63 39 47 52 52 55 55 53 53 37 41 61 51 51 51 The BeltranLyvaOrganization(BLO) La FamiliaMichoacana The Zetas 3. 2. 1. 5. 10. 9. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 4. 2. 1. 3.

B. A. B. A. B. A. D. C. C. C. D. D.

MAIN ARMED GANGS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS BUT NOT AN ARMED CONFLICT UNDER IHL KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: HIGH LEVEL OF ARMED GANG VIOLENCE, KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: ARMED GANG VIOLENCE SLIDING INTO ARMED CONFLICT? KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY CONTINUE WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS The JaliscoCartelNewGeneration(CJNG) The SinaloaCartel Mexican SecurityForces Libyan NationalGuard(LNG) Benghazi DefenseBrigades(BDB) Derna MujahideenShuraCouncil(DMSC) Islamic StateinLibya(ISIL) Former Ansaral-ShariainLibya(ASL) Benghazi RevolutionariesShuraCouncil(BRSC) Misratan ThirdForce Libya ShieldForces(LSF) The ZintaniMilitias Libyan NationalArmy(LNA) Mara Barrio18(MS-18) Mara Salvatrucha(MS-13) ARMED CONFLICT? MEXICO: ARMED GANG VIOLENCE SLIDING INTO LIBYA: CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY CONTINUE BUT NOT AN ARMED CONFLICT UNDER IHL EL SALVADOR: HIGH LEVEL OF ARMED GANG VIOLENCE,

64 88 88 86 89 86 86 68 89 69 82 70 70 70 65 83 83 87 79 79 79 78 78 78 78 67 91 77 77 77 77 77 71

CONTENTS 9 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 10 b. a. a. 3. f. e. d. c. b. a. 2. 1. 8. 2. 1. 7. 3. Militias 2. 1. 6.

B. A. D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTIONS C. B. A. D. C. D. C. B. A.

PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN MINDANAO KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: A LONG-RUNNING AND MULTIFACETED CONFLICT PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN NORTHERN RAKHINE KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ROHINGYA INSURGENCY WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: A FOCUS ON THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT Children andArmed Conflict The ‘WaronDrugs’ Campaign The HumanitarianCrisis The NewPeople’sArmy(NPA) Foreign Fighters The BangsamoroIslamicFreedomFighters–BIFF The MauteGroup The AbuSayyafGroup–ASG The MILF The MNLF the BangsmoroIslamicFreedomFighters(BIFF)andForeignFighters. Liberation Front(MILF)DissidentFactions:AbuSayyaf,theMauteGroup, The MoroNationalLiberationFront(MNLF)andIslamic The PhilippineArmedForces Boko Haram Nigerian ArmedForces Ethnic ArmedOrganizations(EAOs) Myanmar ArmedForces(Tatmadaw) CONFLICT IN MINDANAO THE PHILIPPINES: A LONG-RUNNING AND MULTIFACETED NIGERIA: A FOCUS ON THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN RAKHINE MYANMAR: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ROHINGYA INSURGENCY

100 100 109 109 109 126 126 126 122 125 123 123 123 101 114 114 118 118 119 121 121 112 117 117 111 96 96 92 92 95 95 95

7. 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 11. 4. 3. 2. 1. 10. 6. Al-Shabaab 5. 4. 3. 2. 1. 9. C. D. A. C. B. D. A. B. D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS C. A. B.

FORMATIONS IN MIDDLE EASTERN BATTLEFIELDS KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: A FOCUS ON THE KURDISH QUESTION AND MILITARY WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: AN INCREASINGLY COMPLICATED MOSAIC WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: ESCALATING FATALITIES PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT Al-Qaeda intheArabPeninsula(AQAP) The SouthernMovementor TransitionalCouncil The Houthis(alsocalledAnsarAllah) Saleh-Aligned Forces The UnitedStates The Saudi-LedCoalition Yemeni ArmedForces The IraqiPeshmerga The DemocraticUnionParty(PYD)/People’sProtectionUnits(YPG) The KurdistanWorkers’Party(PKK) Turkish ArmedForces The AfricanUnionMissioninSomalia(AMISOM) Ethiopian ArmedForces United StatesArmedForces Kenyan ArmedForces Somali ArmedForces COMPLICATED MOSAIC ARMED CONFLICTS IN YEMEN IN 2017: AN INCREASINGLY FORMATIONS IN MIDDLE EASTERN BATTLEFIELDS TURKEY IN 2017: A FOCUS ON THE KURDISH MILITARY THE ARMED CONFLICT IN SOMALIA: ESCALATING FATALITIES

INTRODUCTION

144 144 144 128 128 128 129 129 129 130 130 154 143 134 134 138 138 138 139 152 152 152 127 127 155 133 153 153 153 141 157 151

CONTENTS 11 THE WAR REPORT THE WAR :REPORT: ARMED ARMED CONFLICTS CONFLICTS IN 2017IN 2016 1212 organized armedgroups(orbetweensuchthemselves). Thus,reportsde- cially theextentofclashesbetweenarmedforces,or armedforcesand crossing thethresholdintoarmedconflict;otherfactorsarealsopertinent,espe- of Genocide. Art 6, Rome Statute; see also Convention Art 2, 1948 on thePrevention and Punishmentof the Crime national, ethnical, racial orreligious group, assuch: 2 other inhumaneacts.Art7(1)(a)–(k),Rome Statute. pregnancy, enforced sterilization, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid and cible transfer of population,imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced of whichattack theperpetrator hasknowledge. Suchactsare murder, extermination, enslavement, for certain actsare undertaken aspart of awidespread orsystematic attack against acivilianpopulation, Rome Statute of the International CriminalCourt (Rome Statute), crimes against humanity occur where 1 may constitutecrimesagainsthumanity within astatemayclaimnotonlyhundreds,buteventhousands,oflives–and lence asanarmedconflictisnotsimplyanumbersgame.Indeed,violence life maybeinanystateorterritory,thequalificationofasituationarmedvio- Further, asexplainedinmoredetaillater,howeversignificant(andtragic)lossof ing theapplicablelaw,butiscertainlynotconclusive. amount toanarmedconflictisrelevantinformationforthepurposesofdetermin- Consequently, whetherastateaffirmsthatparticularsituationdoes,ordoesnot, the existenceofanarmedconflictisobjectivetestandnotanational‘decision’. armed conflict(although,unquestionably,thesituationsmaycoincide).Moreover, a situationthreateninginternationalpeaceandsecurityisnotsynonymforan cation thataparticularsituationofarmedviolenceconstitutesanconflict; No nationalorsupranationalbodyisauthoritativeinitsdeterminationimpli- tion witharmedconflicts. Committee oftheRedCross(ICRC)hasaformalrole in protectiononlyconnec- only becommittedinconnectionwithanarmedconflict.Third,theInternational participation, see the ‘Summary Rules’ sections in PartI). Second, war crimes may forces oracivilian‘participatingdirectlyinhostilities’(forthedurationofsuch does notprohibittheintentionaluse of lethalforceagainsta member ofthearmed law of law enforcement,appliesonly in a situation of armed conflict. Notably, IHL less restrictiveinitsprohibitionsontheuseoflethalforcethanisinternational First and foremost, IHL governing the conduct of hostilities, which is markedly istence ofanarmedconflictisimportantbecauseithasfar-reachingimplications. main andprovidelegalanalysisundertheframeworkofinternationallaw.Theex- The purposeofWarReportistocollectinformationanddatainthepublicdo- under internationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)andcriminal(ICL). that amounted to armed conflicts in accordance with the definitions recognized This workidentifies,describesanddiscussessituationsofarmedviolencein2017 Crimesagainst humanityare those crimesthat‘shock theconscience of humanity’.Underthe1998 Genocide‘means any of thefollowing actscommitted withintent to destroy, inwholeorpart, a f. e. d. b. Causing serious bodilyormental harm to membersof thegroup; a. Forcibly transferring children of thegroup to another group.’ Imposing measures intended to prevent birthswithinthegroup; in wholeorpart; Deliberately inflictingonthegroup conditions of life calculated to bringaboutitsphysical destruction Killing membersof thegroup; 1 orevengenocide 2 –withoutnecessarily -

INTRODUCTION 13 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 14 3 violence thatamounttoanarmedconflictunderIHL. (rulac.org), anonlinedatabasethatidentifiesandclassifiesallsituationsofarmed junction withtheRuleofLawinArmedConflictsportalGenevaAcademy of complete overviewofthehistoryallconflicts,2012,2013and2014editions Part IIfocusesanddetailsthesituationsofselectedarmedconflictsin2017.Fora law, certaincontroversiesandimprecisionnotwithstanding. on thebasisofexplicitcriteriathat,webelieve,bestreflectexistentinternational Part Iofthisworklistsandsummarizesthearmedconflictsthatoccurredin2017 have significanceunderinternationallaw. be valuableforpoliticalsciencepurposes,butsuchcategorizationsdonot,perse, tailing ‘wars’basedon,forexample,25or1,000battlefielddeathsannuallycan At: http://www.rulac.org/. The WarReportarerecommended.2017mayalsobereadincon- 3

INTRODUCTION 15 THE WAR REPORT THE WAR :REPORT: ARMED ARMED CONFLICTS CONFLICTS IN 2017IN 2016 1616 SUMMARY PART 1 LOAC framework. hostilities) isbetter termed IHLwhile‘Hague’law (ontheconduct of hostilities) falls withinthebroader protection of those in thepower of aparty to conflict whoare not, ornolonger, participating directly in conflict (LOAC). Today, this is theprevailing view, althoughithasbeen argued that‘Geneva’ law (onthe 6 cessed 6March 2018). Press, 2010, SSRN, 2008, p132,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222757 (last ac Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict inInternational Humanitarian Law , CambridgeUniversity 2000, See, Cullen, e.g., fn 34. ‘The A. Threshold of Non-International Armed Conflict’, Cullen, in A. Criminal Court,, Finalized Draft Text of theElementsof Crimes,UNdocPCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 2November “international armed conflict” includesmilitary occupation’. Preparatory Commission for theInternational 5 Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, theUKandUS. Italy, Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg, Mongolia,Montenegro, theNetherlands,New Zealand, Norway, Finland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosniaand Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, mission and are, asaconsequence, concerned by thisarmed conflict: Albania, Armenia,Australia, Austria, advise andassist Afghan security forces andinstitutions. The following states are contributing to the Organization (NATO) inAfghanistan, replacing theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF),to train, 4 In accordancewithIHL(alsocalledthelawofarmedconflict,LOAC), 1. WHAT IS AN ARMED CONFLICT? dan, Syria,Thailand,Turkey,UkraineandYemen. Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan,the Philippines, Somalia,South Sudan, Su- ritory of21states:Afghanistan,Colombia,theDRC,Egypt,India,Iraq,Libya,Mali, At leastatotalof38non-internationalarmedconflictsoccurredin2017theter- Syria, Thailand,Turkey,Ukraine,WesternSaharaandYemen. mar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt, Eritrea,Georgia,India,Iraq,Lebanon,Libya,Mali,Mexico,Moldova,Myan- istan, Azerbaijan,Colombia,Cyprus,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC), In 2017,atleast55armedconflictsoccurredin29statesandterritoriesAfghan- there aretwocategoriesofarmedconflict:internationalconflict(IAC)and pation thatalsoformspartofthelawinternationalarmedconflict. and Western Sahara). These occupations are governed by the law of military occu- (Azerbaijan, Cyprus,Eritrea,Georgia,Lebanon,Moldova,Palestine,Syria,Ukraine In addition,belligerentoccupationscontinuedinpartsof10statesandterritories conflicts betweenLibyaandEgypt,IsraelSyria,aswellTurkeyIraq. in Syria. Inaddition, there have been a series of short-lived international armed between SyriaandthedifferentstatesbelongingtoUnitedStates-ledcoalition territory of6states:betweenIndiaandPakistan,UkraineRussia,aswell Of the55conflicts,internationalarmedconflictshavebeentakingplacein The Elementsof Crimesestablished undertheInternational CriminalCourt (ICC) provide term that‘the Views differ asto whetherinternational humanitarian law (IHL) isasynonym for thelaw of armed On1January2015, theResolute SupportMission was established by theNorthAtlantic Treaty 4

5 6 andICL, The -

PART 1 : SUMMARY 17 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 18 2014, §1197.2014, 9 national-humanitarian-law-legal-concepts (last accessed 6March 2018). 873 (March 2009), Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts andActual Situations’, 91 International article-170308.htm (last accessed 6March 2018); S.Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts inInternational Paper, 17March 2008, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict- Red Cross (ICRC), How is theTerm acdec/en/51002.htm (last accessed 6March 2018). See generally also International Committee of the Interlocutory Appeal onJurisdiction, IT-94-1, 2October 1995,§70, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/ 8 accessed 6March 2018). first&part=1&cid=460406. This decision hasnoinfluence definitionof armed ontheIHL/ICL conflict (last juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=147061&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ= apatrides, Fourth Chamber, Judgment,Case noC-285/12, §35,http://curia.europa.eu/ 30January2014, volved ortheduration of the conflict.’ CJEU, Aboubacar Diakité vCommissaire général auxréfugiés etaux assessment of the intensity of the armed confrontations, the level of organisation of thearmed forces in- carry out,inadditionto anappraisal of the level of violence present intheterritory concerned, aseparate conflict not of an international character” under international humanitarian law; nor is it necessary to more armed groups confront each other. Itisnot necessary for thatconflict to becategorized as“armed an internal armed conflict exists ‘ifaState’s armed forces confront oneormore armed groups oriftwo or conflict’. Inadecision theCourt inJanuary2014, of Justice of theEuropean Union(CJEU) determined that lian’s life orperson by reason of indiscriminate violence insituationsof international orinternal armed According to Art 15(c) of the Directive, serious harm consists of a ‘serious and individual threat to a civi- case. 7 Criminal Court’s(ICC’s)TrialChamberjudgmentinMarch2014theKatanga the fragmentationofconflicttheory,hasbeensupportedbyInternational the same time and in parallel in any given state. This position, sometimes called different armed conflicts, comprising one or both categories, may be ongoing at not acaseof‘either-or’inanygivengeographicalsituation.Accordingly,several Furthermore, andeventhoughthisunderstandingisnotuniversallyshared,it constitute aNIAC.Thisissueisdiscussedbelow. IAC differs from – i.e. is, in general, significantly lower than – that necessary to groups withinastate.Thismeansthatthelevelofviolenceneededtotriggeran between governmentalauthoritiesandorganizedarmedgroups,orsuch force betweenstates,whileaNIACexistswhenthereisprotractedarmedviolence Thus, intheviewofICTY,anIACexistswheneverthereisaresorttoarmed non-international armedconflict(NIAC). example, thereweredistinctNIACsin2017Yemenpittingandthecon- and organizedarmedgroupsorbetweensuchwithinaState.’ between Statesorprotractedarmedviolencegovernmentalauthorities the national CriminalTribunalforthe former Yugoslavia(ICTY)ina1995decision definition ofthetwocategorieswasadvancedbyAppealsChamberInter- The European Union(EU) also uses theterm ‘internal armed conflict’ to determine, ICTY, Prosecutor vDusko Tadić (aka ‘Dule’),Appeals Chamber, Decision ontheDefence Motion for See, e.g., ICC, Prosecutor vGermainKatanga, Trial ChamberII,Judgment,ICC-01/04-01/07, 7March

Tadić case:‘[A]narmedconflictexistswheneverthereisaresorttoforce 9 Suchfragmentationisevidencedinanumberofrecentarmedconflicts.For himself orherself of theprotection of thatcountry’. Art2(e),EU Directive 2004/83. face areal riskof suffering serious harm…andisunable,or, owing to suchrisk,unwilling to avail or inthecase of astateless person, to hisorhercountry of former habitualresidence, would been shown for believing thattheperson concerned, ifreturned to hisorhercountry of origin, person whodoesnot asarefugee qualify butinrespect of whomsubstantial grounds have for thepurposes of protection underEU law, whetherathird country nationalorastateless https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/typology-armed-conflicts-inter Armed Conflict” Defined inInternational Humanitarian Law?, Opinion 7 Avaluableandwidelycitedgeneral Review of theRed Cross (IRRC) 8

confirms thisinterpretation,andnotesthat though, limitedtoareaswherecombatisoccurring.The2016ICRCCommentary C1257F7D004BA0EC#174 (last accessed 6March 2018). icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=59F6CDFA490736C1 of the Condition of theWounded and SickinArmed Forces intheField.§460, https://ihl-databases. 12 International Law of Armed Conflicts, Hart,2008, pp94–6. 11 10 state engagedinanarmedconflict. mon Article3tothe1949GenevaConventions,applythroughoutterritoryofa a consequence,numberoffundamentalrules,includingthosesetoutinCom- IHL generallyappliesthroughouttheterritoryofstateorstatesconcerned.As the conflictin other areasthatit controls. Whenanarmedconflict is inprogress, each other.Warcrimesmay,however,becommittedbyamemberofpartyto ited totheareaswherepartiesconflictareconductinghostilitiesagainst In anyevent,theexistenceofanarmedconflicteithercategoryisgenerallylim- (AQAP) inthesouthofcountry. separate NIAC broke outbetweenYemen and al-Qaedain the ArabianPeninsula solidated forces led by Saudi Arabia against Houthi rebels in the North, while a See, e.g., Arts 35–46, 1949Geneva Convention IV. See also R.Kolb andR.Hyde, AnIntroduction to the ICRC, 2016 Commentary onArt3of theFirst Geneva Convention: Convention (I)for theAmelioration See section onYemen, below. rights law. in theboundariessetbyapplicableinternationalandregionalhuman exclusively by domesticcriminalandlaw enforcement regimes,with- have nosuchconnectiontotheconflictgenerallyremainregulated between thatactandthenon-internationalarmedconflict. Acts that of humanitarianlawtoaspecificactthereforerequirescertainnexus armed conflictandforhumanitarianlawtoapply…Theapplicability parties to theconflict’ for that act to be committed in the contextof the hostilities occurringinotherpartsoftheterritoriescontrolledby As notedbytheICTY,aparticularactmustbe‘closelyrelatedto ritory thereforefallnecessarilyunderthehumanitarianlawregime. a Statepartytotheconflictdoesnotmeanthatallactswithinter- the applicabilityofhumanitarianlawinwholeterritory 12

11 10 Rulesgoverningtheconductofhostilitiesare,

PART 1 : SUMMARY 19 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 20 whether ornotthepartyattackedresists’. ity oftheGenevaConventionsbetweentwoStates...Itisalsonoconcern of armedforcebyoneStateagainsttheterritoryanothertriggersapplicabil- whether thelatterstatefightsback.Thus,asHans-PeterGasserexplains,‘anyuse er one state uses armed force against the territory of another state, irrespectiveof ad bellum(thelawgoverninginterstateuseofforce),anIACalsoexistswhenev- humanitarian law.’ forces wouldsparkaninternationalarmedconflictandleadtotheapplicabilityof ists …Evenminorskirmishesbetweenthearmedforces,betheyland,airornaval reach a certain level of intensity before it can be said that an armed conflict ex- armed conflict,thereisnorequirementthattheuseofforcebetweenParties As underlinedbytheICRCCommentaryoncommonArticle2,‘forinternational armé international, Schulthess, 2016. C1257F7D0036B518 (last accessed 6March 2018). See also D. Carron, L’acte déclencheur d’unconflit icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EA of the Condition of theWounded andSick inArmed Forces intheField,§§236–237, https://ihl-databases. 15 International Red Cross andRed Crescent Movement, Paul Haupt, 1993, pp510–11. 14 p 131. Protocols’, Hague Academy of International law (RCADI), 13 between twoStatesbringstheConventionsintoeffect.’ of thearmedforcestwoStatesclashwitheachother...Anykindusearms Article 2commontotheGenevaConventionscanalwaysbeassumedwhenparts rich Schindlerobserves,‘theexistenceofanarmedconflictwithinthemeaning the armedforcebebetweentwoormorestates.Itisundoubtedlytruethat,asDiet- there isaresorttoarmedforcebetweenStates’)toonarrowinitsinsistencethat If understoodstrictly,theICTY’sdefinitionofanIACinTadićcase(‘whenever state ofwarisnotrecognizedbyonethem’. which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the Conventions ‘shallapplytoallcasesofdeclaredwaroranyotherarmedconflict According to Common Article 2 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, each of the four 2. INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT of hostilitiesand/orthecontinuedexercisesomedegree authoritybylocal occupation vagueunderIHL,butotherfactualelements–such asthecontinuation International CommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),‘[n]otonly isthedefinitionof a belligerentoccupationoccursis,though,notfinallysettled. Accordingtothe 2 commontothefour1949GenevaConventions.Theprecise momentatwhich occupies it,evenifthereisnoarmedresistanceatall.This setdowninArticle In addition,anIACincludesanysituationinwhichonestateinvadesanotherand A. CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT D. Schindler, ‘The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and ICRC, 2016 Commentary onArt2of theFirst Geneva Convention: Convention (I)for theAmelioration H.-P. Gasser, ‘International Humanitarian Law: AnIntroduction’, inH.Haug (ed), Humanityfor All:The 15

Recueil des cours, vol 163, Brill/Nijhoff, 1979, 13 But,consistentwithjus

sia hadsoughttoannexpartofUkrainianterritory(Crimea). state. Subsequently,however,thefactsongrounddemonstratedclearlythatRus- time oftheletterandcouldnotthereforebeconsideredgenuinelytorepresent Yanukovych did not effectively control the police or armed forces of Ukraine at the However, without prejudice to the legality of his removal under Ukrainian law, Mr had seemingly authorized Russian military intervention in a letter dated 1March. occupying Ukraine, given that deposed Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, been approvedbythelegitimatesovereign’. control overaterritorythatdoesnotbelongtoit;[and](b)itsinterventionhas exist, ‘twoconditionsmustbefulfilled:(a)theoccupierisabletoexerciseeffective exercised’. AccordingtoSylvainVité,foroccupationinthemeaningofArticle42 extends onlytotheterritorywheresuchauthorityhasbeenestablishedandcanbe when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation Article 42ofthe1907HagueRegulationsreads:‘Territoryisconsideredoccupied un-security-council-with-appeal-by-legal-president-yanukovych/. Yanukovych’, 19 2003, §217, footnotes omitted. Mladen Naletilic,aka ‘Tuta’and Vinko Martinovic, aka ‘Štela’, Trial Chamber, JudgmentIT-98-34-T, 31March ICC, occupation was occurring: against andidentified anon-exhaustive list of factors to take into account when determining whetheran 18 17 IRRC 885(Spring2012). M. Zwanenburg, M.Bothe andM.Sassòli, ‘IstheLaw of Occupation Applicable to theInvasion Phase?’ 94 to the31st International Conference of theRed Cross andRed Crescent, Geneva, October 2011. See, e.g., 16 render thelegalclassificationofaparticularsituationquitecomplex.’ authorities, orbytheforeignforcesduringandafterphaseoutperiod–may curs. may befactualandlegalissuesconcerningwhetherwhenanoccupationoc- with respecttoNATO’smilitaryinvolvementinAfghanistan,forinstance.Butthere the latterstate’sconsent,twostatesarenotengagedinanIAC.Thisiscase Of course,whereonestateusesarmedforceontheterritoryofanotherwith with noarmedresistance.’ tion oftheterritoryaHighContractingParty,evenifsaidoccupationmeets Article 2,‘[t]heConventionshallalsoapplytoallcasesofpartialortotaloccupa- the applicationof1949GenevaConventionsislower.Accordingtocommon Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts inInternational Humanitarian Law’, supra fn8,74. IntheKatanga case, the ICC Trial Chambercited withapproval trialjudgmentinthecase theICTY See, e.g., L. Stangret, ‘Russia Provides UN Security Council withAppeal by “Legal President” ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law andtheChallengesof Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, Report Prosecutor vGermainKatanga, trialchamberjudgment,supra fn9,§§1180, citingICTY, Prosecutor v 18 • • • • • InMarch2014,theissuearoseofwhetherornotRussianFederationwas the occupying power hasissued andenforced directions to thecivilianpopulation. a temporary administration hasbeen established over theterritory; reasonable timeto make theauthorityof theoccupying power felt; the occupying power hasasufficientforce present, orthecapacity to send troops withina ful, doesnot affect thereality of occupation; may not beconsidered asoccupied territory. However, sporadic local resistance, even success- the enemy’s forces have surrendered, been defeated orwithdrawn. Inthisrespect, battle areas pied authorities,whichmust have been rendered incapable of functioningpublicly; the occupying power must beinapositionto substitute itsown authorityfor thatof theoccu- Euromaidan Press, 5 March http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/03/05/russia-provides- 2014, 17 Arguably,however,thethresholdfor 16

PART 1 : SUMMARY 21 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 22 racist regimesintheexerciseoftheirrightself-determination’. peoples arefightingagainstcolonialdominationandalienoccupation controversially, anIACmayalsoexistwherethereisarmedconflict‘inwhich same asforanIAC–thatis,muchlowerthanitisNIAC. of armed violence for such a conflict to occur is not settled,butis probably the directly inhostilities. 23 University Press, 2005, §3.4.2. regulated by common Article3.UKMinistry of Defence, The Manual of theLaw of Armed Conflict, Oxford 22 vociferously whenit was adopted. Ithasnever been applied inpractice. 21 Germain Katanga, trialchamberjudgment,supra fn9,§§1177 etseq. their respective armiesorthrough others actingontheirbehalf.’ Unofficial translation.) ICC, Prosecutor v en leur nom.’ (‘An international armed conflict exists whenever armed hostilities oppose states through tilités armésopposent desÉtats àtravers leursarmées respectives ouàtravers d’autres acteurs agissant Trial Chamber further approved this position: ‘Un conflit armé international existe dès lors que des hos- The Trial Chamberexpressly approved theTadić dicta onthisissue. Inthe2014 Katanga judgment,theICC Prosecutor vThomas Lubanga Dyilo,Trial Chamber, Judgment,ICC-01/04-01/06, 14March 2012, §541. See similarlytheviews of theTrial Chamber of theICC initsjudgmentthe2012 Lubanga case: ICC, 115 etseq; ICTY, Prosecutor vBlaškić,Trial Chamber, Judgment,IT-95-14-T, 3March 2000, §§149–50. 20 conduct ofhostilities,internationallawalsorequiresthatparties toaconflicttake Although itisunderstoodthatciviliancasualtiesmaynotalwaysbeavoidedinthe law giventherequisiteintent(mensrea). an indiscriminateattack),andbotharewarcrimesundercustomaryinternational failing todistinguishinmilitaryoperationsbetweenciviliansandcombatants(i.e. and schools).DeliberatelytargetingciviliansisaseriousviolationofIHL,astoo civilian population,individualciviliansorobjects(e.g.homes,hospitals Syria orIndiaandPakistanin2013)totargetonlymilitaryobjectivesnotthe obliges ‘partiestoaconflict’(inotherwords,thewarringparties,i.e.Israeland to all.Thebasisofthelawarmedconflictisruledistinction.This tions andtheir1977AdditionalProtocols,representcustomarylawapplicable an IAC are set out in the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conven- The basic principles and rules of IHL applicable to the conduct of hostilities in tentially targeteachother’sarmedforcesanywhere. parallel to any IAC, where militarily necessary, states involved in an IAC may po- NIAC (seebelow).Withoutprejudicetojusadbellum,therulesofwhichapplyin The geographical scope of an IAC is potentially far broader than is the case for a eign stateisdeemedtohave‘overallcontrol’overtheactionsofANSA. (ANSA) operatinginanotherstatewhenthatsupportissosignificantthefor- There mayalsobeanIACwhenonestatesupportsarmednon-stateactor C. SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT B. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT See Art1(4), 1977 Additional Protocol I.The USanda numberof other states opposed thisprovision Civiliansonlylose their‘general protection’ against hostilities if, andfor suchtimeas,they participate This is not, though, the position of the UK, which argues thatthethreshold is thesameas for a NIAC See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor vTadić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment,IT-94-1-A, 15July1999,§§84and 23 22 21 Thethreshold 20 More ment ofdetainees,anotionthatlawarmedconflictrulesgoverning theconduct beyond theactivecessationofhostilities,includingthosepertaining tothetreat- 26 25 indiscriminate, andcertainly there isnogeneral agreement asto whichweapons mightfulfil thiscriterion. between civilianandmilitary targets’. Ithas sometimes been claimed thatnoweapons are ‘inherently’ its 1996Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,referred to ‘weapons thatare incapable of distinguishing 24 is reached’inthecaseofanIAC. and extendsbeyondthecessationofhostilitiesuntilageneral conclusionofpeace in theTadićcasesuggestedthatIHLapplies‘frominitiationof...armed conflicts The precisedurationofaninternationalarmedconflictisadifficult issue.TheICTY on theoccupyingstateextraterritoriallywithregardtoterritories itoccupies. Hague Regulations). In addition, international human rights law (HRL) is binding or totheoccupationascloselypossibleandprovidingsecurity(Article43of tering thelocallifeofpopulationunderitscontrol,maintainingitaswaspri- mains inforce.Atthesametime,occupyingpowerisresponsibleforadminis- territories itoccupiesandlocallawthatwasapplicablepriortotheoccupationre- reached. Duringthisperiod,theoccupantdoesnotenjoysovereignrightsover supposed to be a temporary situation, which lasts until a political agreement is ternational law.Theunderpinningofthelawmilitaryoccupationisthatit the 1949GenevaConventionIV,1977AdditionalProtocolIandcustomaryin- ritory, applicablelawissetoutinthe1907HagueRegulations(Articles42–56), Subject tothediscussionabove,duringabelligerentoccupationofforeignter- The use of indiscriminate weapons, to takepartinhostilities.Recruitingchildrenunder15yearsoldisawarcrime. Children mustnotberecruitedintoarmedforcesorgroupsnorallowed military advantage,areprohibited. ly orseverallywouldbe‘excessive’comparedtotheexpected‘concreteanddirect’ injuries amongthecivilianpopulation,ordamagetoobjects,whichjoint- attacks againstlawfulmilitaryobjectivesthatmaybeexpectedtocausedeathsor damage tocivilianobjects).Inaddition,accordingtheruleofproportionality, all feasibleprecautionsinanyattacktominimizeciviliandeathsandinjuries(and erential treatment. assistance tothecivilianpopulation,womenandchildrenarebegrantedpref- status ofprisonerwar,withtheassociatedrightsandobligations. Captured combatants(primarily,membersofarmedforces)aretobeaccordedthe who arehorsdecombat,becauseofsickness,wounds,detentionoranyothercause. visions, partiestoaninternationalconflictmustrespectandprotectcombatants injury orunnecessarysuffering’,isprohibited.Inaddition,amongmanyotherpro- E. WHEN DOES AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? D. SUMMARY IHL RULES GOVERNING A SITUATION OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION These are set out,inparticular, in1949Geneva Convention III. ICTY, Prosecutor vTadić, appeals chamber decision, supra fn8,§70. Art8(2)(a)(xx)of theRome Statute refers to ‘inherently’ indiscriminate weapons, while the ICJ, in 26 WhilecertainIHLobligationswillclearlyextend 24 or weapons ‘of a nature to cause superfluous 25 Inproviding

PART 1 : SUMMARY 23 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 24 to internationalhumanitarianlaw.’ ganized andshort-livedinsurrections,orterroristactivities,which arenotsubject purpose, asaminimum,ofdistinguishinganarmedconflict from banditry,unor- an internalormixedcharacter,thesecloselyrelatedcriteriaare usedsolelyforthe armed violencehasbeenreached. The requirementof‘protracted armed violence’meansthata certain thresholdof turn. organized armedgroup,orbetweensuchgroups.Theseelementsarediscussedin and third,theviolencemusttakeplacebetweenarmedforcesatleastone armed group(orbetweensuchgroupswithinastateoracrossstate’sborders); conducted bygovernmentforcesandatleastoneorganizednon-governmental nition. First,theremustbe‘protractedarmedviolence’;second,violence There arethreecumulativerequirementsforaNIAC,accordingtotheTadićdefi- international border. armed violenceoccursbetweentwoormoreorganizedgroupsacrossan explicitly foreseenbytheTadićdecision,aNIACwillalsooccurwhereintense 30 Humanitarian Law andtheChallengesof Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, supra fn16,p8. 29 28 Milošević, Trial Chamber, Decision onMotion for Judgmentof Acquittal, IT-02-54-T, §17. 16June2004, Brahimaj, Trial Chamber, Judgment,IT-04-84-T, 3April2008, §§40etseq; ICTY, Prosecutor vSlobodan and Judgment, 7 May 1997, §562; see also ICTY, the word’s meaning inordinary parlance isoneof duration, not intensity). ICTY, Prosecutor vTadić, Opinion to ‘protracted’ armed whenqualifying violence was aninsistence ontheintensity of conflict (even though 27 typically possess and useavarietyofweaponscontrolsignificantlogistical Organized armedgroupsarethosewithacommand-and-control structure,who and intensearmedviolence In accordancewiththedefinitioninTadićcase,aNIACissituationofregular 3. NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT conflict without such an oscillation amounting to an active cessation of hostilities. ation intheregularityandextentofarmedviolenceduringasituation have effectivelyceasedistooexpansive.Nonetheless,therewilloftenbeafluctu- of hostilitiespertaintoactscommittedafterthepointatwhichactive nature, areexplicitlydeterminednottoamountarmedconflicts. cluding ‘riots,isolatedandsporadicactsofviolence’otherasimilar armed groupswithinastate.Situations of ‘internaldisturbancesandtensions’,in- also occurinasituationofintensearmedviolencebetweentwoormoreorganized army, andoneormoreorganizednon-governmentalarmedgroups.ANIACwill A. CRITERIA FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT In the trial judgment in Art1(2),1977 Additional Protocol II;see also Art8(2)(d),Rome Statute. ICTY, Prosecutor vTadić. AstheICRC hasnoted, violence ‘the must reach acertain level of intensity’. ICRC, ‘International Tadić and other cases, confirmed the ICTY that the specific meaning itgave 27 betweenthesecurityforcesofastate,especially 29 AccordingtotheICTY,‘[i]nanarmedconflictof 30 Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, and Lahi Idriz Balaj, 28 Althoughnot tual combat. ‘conflict’ and ‘between’ is, The thirdcriterionispotentiallycontroversial.Inherentinthenotionofwords War Report2017withregardspecificallytothesituationinMexico. network, canbeapartytoanarmedconflict. group whoseaimispurelylucrative,suchasadrugscarteloranorganizedcrime individual confrontations’. tive factorsforanarmedconflictinclude‘thenumber,durationandintensityof territory ofasinglestate. Armed ConflictstatesthatNIACsare‘armedconfrontations’occurringwithinthe 36 Law-of-NIAC.pdf (last accessed 6March 2018). Conflict With Commentary, 2006, p3,http://stage.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Manual-on-the- 35 34 Chamber, Judgment,IT-95-13/1-T, 27 September 2007, §407 andsources cited infootnote 1592. and over aperiodof time’.See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor vMileMrkšić,Miroslav Radić,andVeselin Šljivančin , Trial sity criterion:seriousness ‘the of attacks andpotential increase inarmed clashes,theirspread over territory 33 32 IT-03-66-T, 30November 2005, §170. 31 case andcitedaboveof‘terroristactivities,whicharenotsubject tointernational pear tofallmore accurately withinthenotion expressed bythe ICTY in theTadić the armedorsecurityforcesofastate,isnotengagedinNIAC.Suchsituationsap - body-borne IEDs(BBIEDs),butwhichdoesnotengageindirect‘hostilities’with provised explosivedevices(IEDs),landmines,vehicle-borneIEDs(VBIEDs)or Thus, anarmedgroupthatconstructsandemplaces(ordeliverstoatarget)im- cal orreligiousagendaforittobepartyaNIAC; conflict. It is not, however,necessary that an armed group have a particular politi- the determinationoftheirstatusunderinternationallawwithrespecttoanarmed elements bystatesorotherentities;suchdesignationshavenoconsequencefor sometimes calledrebels,insurgents,terrorists,criminalgangsoranti-government other organized armed groups, such groups are ‘party’ to a NIAC. These groups are When engagedinregular and intense armed confrontations with armed forces or capacity thatgivesthemthecapabilitytoconductregularmilitaryoperations. Kosovo LiberationArmyandtheSerbforces,statedthat that anarmedconflictexistedinKosovobeforetheendofMay1998between See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor vFatmir Haradin Limaj, Bala,andIsakMusliu,Trial Chamber, Judgment, In cases before the ICTY, the Tribunal has tended to consider the number of clashes as part of the inten- International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts inInternational Humanitarian Law’, supra fn8,78. ICTY, trialchamberjudgment, supra Limaj fn31, §172, footnote omitted. ICTY, Haradinaj trialchamberjudgment,supra fn27, §49. varied operationsisafurtherindicatorofitslevelorganisation. Kosovka Mitrovica in the north ... The ability of the KLA to engage in such Kosovo–Macedonian borderinthesouthandmunicipalityofMitrovice/ in the west, to near Prishtina/Pristina in the east, to Prizren/Prizren and the with substantial Serbian forces in areas from the Kosovo–Albanian border by theendofMay1998KLAunitswereconstantlyengagedinarmedclashes 33 InitsjudgmentintheHaradinajcase,ICTYstatedthatindica- 35 The War Report 34 IntheLimajcase,ICTYTrialChamber,infinding TheSanRemoManualontheLawofNon-International The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed argues, a requirement that there be ac- 32 ThisdiscussiontakesplaceinThe 31 therefore,anorganizedarmed 36

PART 1 : SUMMARY 25 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 26 concerted orinisolation’. stituted bythecommissionofordinarycrimesincludingactsterrorismwhether conflict” ofitselfandinitscontextdenotesasituationkindwhichisnotcon- 1977 AdditionalProtocolI,theUKenteredadeclarationwhereby‘theterm“armed set fortheapplicationofIHL’. cumstance ofthelevel‘organisation’and‘intensity’fallingbelowthreshold by virtueofapeacesettlementbeingreached,butratherthemorefactualcir- position hasbeenadvancedbyRogierBartels:‘NIACsdonotnecessarilyendonly when eithercriterionisnolongerfulfilled,aNIACcanbesaidtohaveended.This on oforganization.Establishingthesesituationsasfactisclearlychallenging,but are killedorcaptured,thegroupmay,asaconsequence,nolongerfulfilcriteri- armed groupthatispartytosuchaconflictfragmentsoritsseniorcommanders NIAC mustbefrequentbutnotnecessarilydailyorevenweekly.Further,whenan 42 scope-application-ihl-non-international-armed-conflicts-end-part-2/ (last accessed 6March 2018). Part 2’,OpinioJuris,19February http://opiniojuris.org/2014/02/19/guest-post-bartels-temporal- 2014, 41 to (non-international) armed conflict. 40 39 Milošević trialchamberdecision, supra fn27, §26. with respect to theUK,butrather to set outtheUK’s understanding of theterm. See also, e.g., ICTY, it ismore accurately termed a‘declaration’ because itdoesnot seek to theterms modify of theProtocol University Press, 2012, p233.Sivakumaran refers to the‘understanding’ of theUKasa‘reservation’, but cessed 6March 2018), cited inS.Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, Oxford http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument (last ac 38 37 Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions refers to a NIAC ‘occurring in [until] apeacefulsettlementisachieved’. ing totheTadićdecision,IHLapplies‘incaseofinternalconflicts[i.e.NIACs], More complicatedisthe determination ofwhenaNIACiseffectively over. Accord- humanitarian law’. conflict asitmayundertheclassificationofIAC. is particularlydifficult,sinceanindividualattackdoesnotamounttoarmed ‘cessation ofactivehostilities’inarmedconflictsanon-internationalcharacter despite theexistenceofaceasefire. case ofalastingcessationarmedconfrontationswithoutrealriskresumption, that aNIACwouldendbythemerefactoneofpartiesceasestoexistorin The 2016ICRCCommentaryontheGenevaConventionsof1949alsospecifies C. THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT B. WHEN DOES A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT END? These situationsare governed by theinternational law of law enforcement, including,inparticular, HRL. R. Bartels, ‘Temporal Scope of Application of IHL: When Do Non-International Armed Conflicts End? Declaration of 28January1998, ICTY, Tadić, supra fn8,§70. ICRC, 2016 Commentary onArt3of theFirst Geneva Convention, supra fn12,§489–491. Asnoted above, inrelevant treaties ‘isolated andsporadic actsof violence’ explicitly donot amount 37 AsSandeshSivakumaranhasnoted,uponratificationofthe 38

42 39 Thisistooexpansive.Identifyingthe 40 Clashesbetweenpartiestoa - tories’ thataregeographicallyunconnected. sial isthequestionofwhetheranarmedconflictmayexistacross‘multipleterri- sometimes (unhelpfully)termeda‘transnationalarmedconflict’.Morecontrover- 49 48 47 in theterritory of oneof the HighContracting Parties’ (emphasisadded). 46 45 reference to theTaliban. (last accessed 6March 2018). Later, however, theObama Administration started quietlydropping the Center for Scholars,Washington, 30April2012, DC, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/brennanspeech/ the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy’, Remarks of JohnO. Brennan, Woodrow Wilson International al-Qa’ida, theTaliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks.’ ‘The Ethics and Efficacy of from 2013–2017), stated: ‘As amatter of international law, theUnited States isinanarmed conflict with Advisor for HomelandSecurity andCounterterrorism (later, Director of theUSCentral Intelligence Agency 44 humanitarian-law-contemporary-conflicts (last accessed 6March 2018). University, 2003, p8,https://hhi.harvard.edu/publications/temporal-scope-application-international- Cambridge, January27–29, 2003, Program onHumanitarian Policy and Conflict Research atHarvard High-Level ExpertMeeting ontheReaffirmation andDevelopment of International Humanitarian Law, International Humanitarian Law inContemporary Conflicts, Background Paper prepared for the Informal 43 It is not contested here that an armed conflict may exist on ‘a single territory’, ing isgovernedbytheauthorityofaStateParty. only apply to a situationin which the territory on which an armed conflict is ongo- an armedconflictislimitedtotheterritoryofasinglestateorthatprovisions the territoryofoneHighContractingParties’.Thiscanbetakentomeanthat ciated forces’. engaged ina‘globalarmedconflict’againstwith‘theTaliban,al-Qaeda,andasso- of internationallaw.SomeargumentsweremadeinthepastbyUS,thatitwas This positiondoesnotmean,however,thataglobalizedNIACexistsasmatter limitation, atleastwithrespectto‘spill-over’fromoneterritoryanother. sions. Further,undercustomarylaw,thereisarguablynosuchstrictgeographical ventions, thereisverylittleterritorythatwouldnotbecoveredbythetreatyprovi- November 2016,allUnitedNationsMemberStateswerepartytotheGenevaCon- that, today,itmayhave‘acoreterritoryplusoverspillontodifferentterritory’, those foreignstates. conflict appliestoanyhostileactbythenon-statepartyonterritoryof conflict involves foreign states intervening on behalf ofthatstate, the lawof armed NIAC existsontheterritoryofonestateagainstanon-statearmedgroup,andthat as amatteroflaw’. a territorialbase…globalnon-internationalarmedconflictdoesnotexist,atleast, NIAC tobesimplyglobal.AccordingSivakumaran,anarmedconflictmust‘have cross internationalborders,itisnotpossibleunderexistinglawfora Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, supra fn38,p234. For ahelpful discussion of thisissue, see, e.g., D. Jinks,The Temporal Scope of Application of Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, supra fn38,p234. Indeed, thetext of common Article3refers to ‘armed conflict not of aninternational character occurring Ibid. Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts inInternational Humanitarian Law’, supra fn8,74. For example, in2012 JohnBrennan, thenAssistant to theUSPresident, andDeputyNationalSecurity 44 NosuchconflictexistsunderIHL/ICL.WhileaNIACcancertainly 45 49 48 Accordingtoonetheory,wherea 43 Ifitisthelatter,giventhat,asof 46 or or 47

PART 1 : SUMMARY 27 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 28 by internationalhumanrightsobligations.’ actors, suchastheTaliban,exercisedefactocontroloverterritory,theyarebound ties, internationalhumanrightslawincreasinglyrecognizesthatwherenon-State armed groups,cannotformallybecomepartiestointernationalhumanrightstrea- February 2012that‘[w]hilenon-StateactorsinAfghanistan,including tory. Forinstance,theUNAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan(UNAMA)stated other customaryhumanrightsobligations,forexamplewheretheycontrolterri- recruited intoarmedforcesorgroups,norallowedtotakepartinhostilities. because ofsickness,wounds,detentionoranyothercause.Childrenmustnotbe Non-State Actors inAfghanistan’, 93 IRRC 881(2011). 2012, piv. See also inthisregard Bellal,G.Giacca A. andS.Casey-Maslen, ‘International Law andArmed 53 tance, torture orenforced disappearances –can never be justified.’ individuals andnon-State collective entities,including armed groups. Acts violatingiuscogens –for ins- minimum, humanrightsobligationsconstituting peremptory international law (iuscogens) bindStates, Republic, UNdoc A/HRC/19/69, 22February 2012, §106: ‘Inthisregard, thecommission notes that,ata 52 colour, sex, language,religion orsocial origin’. other obligationsunderinternational law anddonot involve discrimination solely ontheground of race, required by theexigencies of thesituation,provided thatsuchmeasures are not inconsistent withtheir and the existence of which isofficially proclaimed’. Any derogation must be only ‘totheextent strictly and Political Rightsmay onlyoccur of publicemergency in‘time whichthreatens thelife of thenation 51 military operations’ andto implementtheProtocol. and thatthey control apart of theterritory so asto enablethemto ‘carry outsustained andconcerted and opposing‘dissident’ armed forces; thatthedissident armed forces are underaresponsible command; cation of 1977 Additional Protocol II,namely:confrontation between thearmed forces of thegovernment Geneva Conventions of 12August 1949,1987, Certain p1348. criteria are explicitly required for theappli- of non-international armed conflict’. ICRC, Commentary ontheAdditional Protocols of 8June1977 to the does not have exactly thesamefieldof application ascommon Article3,whichappliesinall situations the article,ICRC notes thattheProtocol ‘only appliesto conflicts of acertain degree of intensity and 50 in hostilities,oranyfighterwhohaslaiddownhisarmsishorsdecombat conduct ofhostilitiesitisprohibitedtoattackanyciviliantakingnodirectpart Accordingly, basedonapplicablerulesofthelawarmedconflict,during certain circumstances,the1977AdditionalProtocolII. all otherprovisionsofthelawarmedconflictapplicabletoaNIAC,aswellas,in (by virtue of their universalapplication under customary international law) and groups. ThisalwaysincludescommonArticle3tothe1949GenevaConventions IHL isapplicabletoallpartiestheconflict,whetherstateornon-statearmed are alsoboundbybothapplicabletreaty executions, tortureandenforceddisappearances). by atleastperemptoryHRLnorms(e.g.prohibitionsonsummaryorarbitrary There isalsoincreasingacceptancethatnon-statearmedgroupsarebound determining lawfuluseofforce. the applicablelaw,whileoutside such areas,HRLisarguablythelegalframework tilities arebeingactivelyconducted,thelawofarmedconflictiswidelyregardedas D. RULES APPLICABLE IN A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT Derogations from other humanrights in accordance with the 1966 International Covenant on Civil See, Afghanistan: e.g., UNAMA, AnnualReport 2011, Protection of Civiliansin Armed Conflict , February See, e.g., HRC, Report of theIndependent International Commission of InquiryontheSyrian Arab The scope of application of 1977 Additional Protocol IIisset outinArt1. Inits1987 commentary on 51 andcustomaryHRL.Inareaswherehos- 53 52 Theymayalsobeboundby 50 StatesengagedinaNIAC

Libya andEgypt,IsraelSyria, aswellbetweenTurkeyandIraq. tion, therehavebeenaseriesofshort-livedinternationalarmed conflictsbetween Saudi Arabia,Turkey,theUnitedArabEmiratesand Kingdom).Inaddi- gium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, Netherlands, composing theinternationalcoalitionconductingairstrikes in Syria(theUS,Bel- as aseriesofinternationalarmedconflictsbetweenSyriaand thedifferentstates ably aparallelinternationalarmedconflictbetweenUkraine andRussia,aswell line withtheRuleof Law inArmedConflictsProject(rulac.org),that there isargu- In additiontotheconflictbetweenIndiaandPakistan,TheWarReport considers,in The followingtablessummarizethe17IACsand38NIACsthattookplacein2017. 4. WHICH ARMED CONFLICTS OCCURRED IN 2017? until provedguiltyaccordingtolaw. sentence. Everyonechargedwithacriminaloffenceshallbepresumedinnocent conduct agenuinedefenceandtobeableappealagainstbothconviction against him/her,tounderstandthecourtproceedings,haveopportunity essential judicialguarantees.Thisincludesadefendant’srighttoknowthecharges No onemaybeconvictedorsentenced,exceptpursuanttoafairtrialaffordingall grading treatmentisprohibited.Summaryorarbitraryexecutionsare gious beliefs.Murder,torture,rape,bodilyinjuryorothercruel,humiliatingde- conﬂict mustbetreatedhumanelyandinaccordancewiththeirsex,age,reli- deprivation oflibertyisprohibited.Anyonedetainedbyapartytoanarmed Enforced disappearancesareprohibited.Hostagesshallnotbetaken.Arbitrary damage tocivilianobjects. and inanyeventtominimize,incidentallossofcivilianlife,injurycivilians military advantageanticipated.Allfeasibleprecautionsmustbetakentoavoid, civilian objects,oracombinationofboth,inrelationtotheconcreteanddirect prohibited iftheymaybeexpectedtocause‘excessive’harmeitherciviliansor Attacks againstlawfulmilitaryobjectives(militarypersonnelorequipment)are a warcrime. unnecessary suffering’,isprohibited.Violatinganyoftheserulesmayconstitute of indiscriminateweapons,orweapons‘ofanaturetocausesuperﬂuousinjury tween militaryobjectivesandciviliansand/orcivilianobjects,areprohibited.Use itary objectives.Indiscriminateattacks,namelyattacksthatdonotdistinguishbe- civilian objects.Civilianobjectsareanybuildingsorareasthatnotlawfulmil- Recruiting childrenunder15yearsoldisawarcrime.Itprohibitedtoattack A. INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017

PART 1 : SUMMARY 29 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 30 tion Army(ARSA). broke outinMyanmarbetweenthearmedforcesandArakan RohingaSalva- in 2017betweentheMexicanGovernmentandarmedgangs. Anewconflictalso At least 38 NIACs in 21 states occurred in 2017. Arguably, there wasa ‘new’ conflict Table 2.BelligerentOccupationsin2017 key occupiedpartofnorthernSyria(fordetails,seetheprofileonTurkeyatrulac.org). There wasonemoresituationofbelligerentoccupationin2017than2016,asTur- Table 1.ActiveConﬂictsin2017 B. NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Conflict no. Conflict no Conflict no. Conflict location DRC Colombia Colombia Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Western Sahara Ukraine Syria Syria Palestine Moldova Lebanon Georgia Eritrea Cyprus Azerbaijan Iraq Syria Libya Syria Ukraine India andPakistan Location ofoccupation Location ofconflict des Patriotes pour unCongo Libre etSouverain (APCLS) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vAlliedDemocratic Forces/Alliance Colombia varmedgangs(BACRIM) Colombia vNationalLiberation Army(ELN) Afghanistan vIslamicState inAfghanistan (Khorasan branch, IS-K) Afghanistan vHaqqaniNetwork Afghanistan andtheUSAvQuetta Shura Taliban Parties to conflict Morocco Russia Turkey Israel Israel Russian Federation Israel Russian Federation Ethiopia Turkey Armenia Turkey vIraq Israel vSyria Egypt vLibya International coalition vSyria Ukraine vRussia India vPakistan Occupier Parties to conflict

55 54 53 52 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 Conflict no. Conflict location Yemen Yemen Yemen Yemen Ukraine Turkey Thailand Syria Syria Syria Syria Syria Sudan Sudan South Sudan Somalia Philippines Philippines Pakistan Nigeria Myanmar Mexico Mali Libya Libya Iraq India Egypt DRC DRC DRC DRC Yemen vtheSouthernMovement Yemen vAQAP al-Houthi val-QaedaintheArabian Peninsula AQAP Yemen val-Houthi Ukraine vDonetskPeople’s Republic &LuhanskPeople’s Republic Turkey vKurdish Worker’s Party (PKK)+YPG/YPJ inSyria Thailand vBarisanRevolusi Nasionalindependence movement Free Syrian ArmyvHezbollah YPG-YPJ vIS Syria, Russia vIslamicState (IS) Syria vHaiy’aTahrir al-Sham (former al-Nusra front) Syria, Russia vFree Syrian Army Sudan vJustice andEquality Movement (JEM) Sudan vSPLM/A-North South SudanvPeople’s Liberation Army(dissident faction) Somalia, AMISOM,Ethiopia,Kenya, UgandaandUSAval-Shabaab Philippines vNPA Philippines vvarious armedgroups, incl.AbuSayyaf Group, BIFF, Maute Group Pakistan vTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)andTTPsplinter groups Nigeria, withthesupportofCameroon, NigerandChadvBoko Haram Myanmar vvarious ARSA andDKBA AA, armedgroups, MN-DAA, TNLA, incl.KIA, Mexico vtheSinaloaCartel andtheJalisco Cartel NewGeneration MA) val-QaedaintheIslamicMaghreb (AQIM), AnsarDine Mali andUNMultidimensionalIntegrated Stabilization Mission inMali(MINUS- Libya (withsupportoftheUSA)vIslamicState Libya vseveral armedgroups, includingLibya ShieldandAnsaral-Sharia Iraq vIslamicState India vNaxalite Maoists Beit al-Maqdis) Egypt vWilayat Sinai(‘State ofSinai’or‘Province ofSinai’,knownasAnsar DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vAlliedDemocratic Forces (ADF-Nalu) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vTheNdumaDefense ofCongo-Rénové (NDC-R) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vTheNdumaDefense ofCongo (NDC) du Rwanda (FDLR) DRC (withsupportofMONUSCO) vForces Démocratiques pourlaLibération Parties to conflict

PART 1 : SUMMARY 31 THE WAR REPORT THE WAR :REPORT: ARMED ARMED CONFLICTS CONFLICTS IN 2017IN 2016 3232 see pp30–31 above. an impact onthelegal situationof thearmed conflict concerned. For acomplete list of armed conflicts, 54 The selection of armed conflicts has been made according to relevant facts which, we believe, have OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017 IN PART 2 54

East Jerusalem,inregardtolandconfiscation,economicrestrictions, unlawful tory policieson,andseverelylimittherightsof,Palestiniansin theWestBankand and human rights. Between 2015 and 2017, Israel continued to impose discrimina- since 1967hasresultedinmassviolationsofinternationalhumanitarian law(IHL) expansion ofsettlements,freedommovementandarbitrary detentions.Palestin- 56 provisions). Ibid.,§93. but deniestheapplicabilityofGCIV (althoughitclaimstoapplytheConvention’shumanitarian related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf Palestinian Territory , Advisory §§98–101, Opinion,9July2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case- International Court of Justice Legal (ICJ), Consequences of theConstruction of aWall intheOccupied 1977 Additional Protocol I,thelatter two largely reflecting customary international law. See generally in accordance with the1907 HagueRegulations, the1949Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV)andthe 55 Israel’s militaryoccupation 1. TheWestBankandEastJerusalem ade ofGaza. And finally,2017markedadecadesinceIsraelandEgypt’sland,seaairblock- itary occupationoftheWestBank,Gaza,EastJerusalemandGolanHeights. the 50-yearanniversaryof1967Arab-Israeliwar,whichledtoIsraelimil- Balfour Declaration,whichwasissuedon2November1917.Thisyearalsomarked widens everyyear. demned and others celebrated, highlighting the schism between both sides that memorated severallandmarkanniversariesin2017–thatsomecon- The protracted,century-longconflictengulfingIsraelisandPalestinianscom- Palestinian conflictandhighlights2017’smostimportantdevelopments. independence in1948.Thisyear’sWarReportprovidesanupdateontheIsraeli– Partition Planof1947,theresultingArab–IsraeliwarandIsrael’sdeclaration The virtue ofIsrael’scontinuedmilitaryoccupationPalestinianterritory. Israel andPalestinewereengagedinaninternationalarmedconflict2017by Classification oftheConfict 1. THE PALESTINIAN–ISRAELI ARMED CONFLICT: FIFTY YEARS ON A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICTS SELECTED INTERNATIONAL AstheOccupying Power intheWest Bank,Israel must administer theoccupied territory’s population 446, 22March Ibid.,§120;seealso UNSCRes446, 1979. War Report2014includedahistoryoftheconflictsinceUnitedNations The mostsignificantofthesewasthecentenarydivisive 55 oftheWestBankandannexationEastJerusalem . Israelaccepts theapplicabilityofHagueRegulations

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PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 33 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 34 referred toas‘lone-wolf’attacks. primarily by individuals acting without the sponsorship of any armed group, and vehicular attacks(ramming)onIsraelipassersbyandsecurityforces,committed lence fromthePalestiniansideconsistedofstabbings(orattemptedstabbings)and Bank andIsrael,includingbystanders,protesterssuspectedassailants. security forceskilled269Palestiniansandinjured22,688intheWest estinians killed62IsraelicitizensandsoldiersintheWestBankIsrael 2017 29-december-2015-11-january-2016 (last accessed 5March 2018). However, HRW World Reports 2016, January 2016, 14 January 2016, accessed 5March 2018); for 2015 Protection data, see OCHA, of CiviliansReport /19 December 2015–11 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/protection-civilians-report-27-december-2016-9-january-2017 (last Protectiondata, see OCHA, of CiviliansReport /27 December 2016–9 January 2017, 12January2017, protection-civilians-report-19-december-2017-1-january-2018 (last accessed 5March 2018); for 2016 Civilians Report 61 Israel MFA, ‘Wave of Terror 2015-2018’, supra fn58. 2017, 881individualswere injured, thisfigure includes‘uninvolved Palestinians’, whichisnot defined. cessed 5March 2018). AlthoughtheIsrael MFA indicates thatbetween September 2015 andDecember World Report 2016, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/israel/palestine (last ac ‘Israel/Palestine: Events of 2016’, supra fn58;for 2015 data see HRW, ‘Israel/Palestine: Events of 2015’, 60 Palestinian%20Violence%20and%20Terrorism%20sinc.aspx (last accessed 5March 2018). until January2018, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Victims%20of%20 59 israel/palestine (last accessed 5March 2018). Palestine: Events of 2016’, World Report 2017 , org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/israel/palestine (last accessed 5March 2018); HRW, ‘Israel/ Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Israel andPalestine: Events of 2017’, World Report 2018 , Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-of-terror-October-2015.aspx 58 cessed 5March 2018). mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-of-terror-October-2015.aspx 57 then againinJuly–August2017. significant surgeofviolencetakingplacebetweenOctober2015andmid-2016, Sustained clashesbetweenIsraelisandPalestinianshavepersisted,withthemost a. SustainedViolence to havebeenpartofaconcerted,organizedeffortbymilitantgroup. ian attacksagainstIsraelicivilianshavealsocontinued,mostofwhichdonotseem injured 427Israeliciviliansandsecurityofficers. and liveammunition. Israeli militaryrespondedharshlytodemonstrators,usingteargas,rubberbullets OCHA’s figures, whichprovide data for theWest BankandGaza separately. a total of 18,650. Note thatthedata provided by HRW includedata for theWest BankandGaza, unlike Gaza between January2015 andDecember 2017 were: 3,494 in2017, 3,203 in2016 and11,953 in2015, ties). According to HRW, thetotal number of Palestinians injured by Israelis inIsrael, theWest Bankand during this timeframe (although they are almost identical in regard to the number of Palestinian fatali - For 2017 data, see UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Israel MFA), ‘Wave of Terror 2015–2017’, 17December 2017, http:// Israel MFA, ‘Wave of Terror 2015–2018,’ 13February 2018, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/ Israel MFA, ‘Victims of Palestinian Violence andTerrorism Since September 2000’, data of fatalities For 2017 data, see HRW, ‘Israel andPalestine: Events of 2017’, supra fn58;for 2016 data see HRW, and2018 (supra fns58and60)depart significantly inthenumberof Palestinians whowere injured / 19 December 2017–1 January 2018, 4 January 2018, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/ https://www.ochaopt.org/content/protection-civilians-weekly-report- 58 57 BetweenJanuary2015andDecember2017,Pal- Inadditiontodemonstrations,mostofthevio- https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/ 60 Duringthesameperiod,Israeli (last accessed 5 March 2018); Human https://www.hrw. Protection of (last ac 61 59 The and - -

vate investmentandeconomicactivityintheWestBankbyPalestinians. homes andrelocate.Theseland-userestrictionshavealsoseverelyconstrainedpri- stricted inaccessingandusingtheirland,manyhavebeenforcedtoleave in theWestBank,andalsotoconnectiveinfrastructuredevelopment. renders AreaCindispensabletotheefficientmovementofgoodsandpeoplewith- territory intheWestBank.AccordingtoWorldBank,thisgeographicalreality Areas AandB,whichrepresent227isolatedenclaves,AreaCistheonlycontiguous extremely difficult. any use,includingconstructionandgrazing.Obtainingsuchpermitshasproved Pages/PunitivedemolitionsinOPT.aspx (last accessed 5March 2018). Homes inOccupied Palestinian Territory’, 28December 2015, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/ Office of theHighCommissioner for HumanRights(OHCHR),‘Punitive DemolitionsDestroy More Than Including East Jerusalem,Report of theSecretary-General, UNdocA/HRC/34/38, 16 March 2017; UN 67 66 Monday-1-PM-sept-11-AHLC-report-September-8.pdf (lastaccessed 5March 2018). §41, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/515891504884716866/pdf/119657-WP-PUBLIC-on- 65 vement (last accessed 5March 2018). HRW, ‘Israel andPalestine: Events of 2017’, supra fn58. 64 israel-50-years-occupation-abuses (last accessed 5March 2018). 63 Protocol Concerning CivilAffairs. 62 demolitions across the West Bank. Israeli authoritiesalsocontinuedtheirwidespreadpracticeofhomeandstructure and theGazaStrip(OsloAgreement), Pursuant tothe1995Israeli–PalestinianInterimAgreementonWestBank b. LandExpropriation,EconomicStagnation,DemolitionsandSettlements expansion ofsettlements. ating thousandsofacresPalestinianland,inmanycasesfortheconstructionor ral parks,surveylandandothersimilarlyrestrictivespaces,effectivelyexpropri- Area C’s land by designating large tracts as firingzones,nature reserves andnatu- As theadministratorofAreaC,IsraelhaslimitedPalestinianuse70percent in planning,buildinganddevelopment. and IsraelhasthereforecontinuedtoassumeadministrationofAreaC,including five-year interimperiod,thetimetableforthistransferwasneverimplemented, be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction by the 1999 conclusion of the the OsloAgreementenvisionedthatpowersandresponsibilitiesinAreaCwould maining 60percentoftheland,isadministeredexclusivelybyIsrael.Although (administratively) and Israel (security); and (iii) Area C, which consists of the re- imately 22percentofthearea,isadministeredbybothPalestinianAuthority administered bythePalestinianAuthority;(ii)AreaB,whichconsistsofapprox- (i) Area A, which consists of approximately 18 percent of the area, is exclusively three instances:whenabuildingpermitisnotsoughtprior toconstruction(ad- UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, HRW, ‘Israel: 50Years of Occupation Abuses’, 4June2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/04/ The World Bank,Economic Monitoring Report to theAd HocLiaison Committee, 18September 2017, Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement ontheWest BankandtheGaza Strip, Art2,Appendix1, Ibid. B’Tselem, ‘Restrictions onMovement’, 11 November 2017, https://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_mo 64 Asaresultoftheseregulations,Palestinianshavebeenre- 63 Theremaining30percentoflandrequiresapermitfor 67 Israeli authorities demolish homes in one of 62 theWestBankisdividedintothreeareas: 66 65 Unlike

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 35 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 36 of Palestinians. of IHLandinternationalhumanrightslaw. Old City,leadingtoanincreaseinevictionsofPalestinianfamilies. pand settlementsonPalestinian-ownedlandhavecontinued,particularlyinthe tivity, authorizingconstructionworkfornewsettlementhousingunits. the WestBankandEastJerusalem. imately 600,000Israelicitizenscurrentlyresideinsettlementsandoutpostsacross Jerusalem. including 180residentialinhabitedstructures,ofwhich48werelocatedinEast raeli authoritiesconfiscatedand/ordemolished734Palestinian-ownedstructures, 76 March 2018). 75 74 Situation intheOccupied Palestinian Territory, suprafn67, §19. Parties totheFourthGeneva ConventionDeclaration, 17December 2014, §8;HRC,HumanRights UNGA Res70/89, 9 December 2015;HRC Res31/36,24March 2016;Conference of HighContracting 73 72 supra fn67, §20. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; HRC, Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 71 otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf (lastaccessed 5March 2018). December 2017, §62,quoting OCHAdata,https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017- 70 69 Occupied Syrian 16March Golan,UNdocA/HR/34/39, 2017, §47. 68 tive services,housing,educationandmedicalcare. settlements acrosstheWestBank,whileprovidingthemwithsecurity,administra- At thesametime,IsraelcontinuedtofacilitatetransferofIsraelicitizens settlements. ties havetargetedcommunitiesforrelocation,especiallyiftheyareclosetoIsraeli East JerusalemandtheWestBank,particularlyinAreaC,whereIsraeliauthori- demolitions havebeenidentifiedasakeyelementof‘coerciveenvironment’in Israeli civilianorsecuritypersonnel(punitivedemolition).AccordingtotheHRC, referred toas‘collectivepunishment’–whohaveharmedorattemptedharman such demolitions),orasapunitivemeasureagainstanindividualtheirfamily– operation (militarydemolition–theonlyvalidreasonunderinternationallawfor ministrative demolition);iftheauthoritiesdeemitnecessaryaspartofamilitary under theInternationalCriminalCourt. and isconsideredawarcrimethatmayleadtoindividualcriminalresponsibility ulation totheterritoryitoccupiesisinbreachofFourthGenevaConvention, times, violenttensionbetweensettlementpopulationsandPalestinians.Between in furtherdisplacementofPalestiniansandhavealsocreatedsignificantand,at of settlementsandtheirexclusiveroadssecurityinfrastructurehaveresulted Art53, GC IV;Art1, International Covenant onEconomic, SocialandCultural Rights;Art17, International ICJ, Wall case, supra fn55,§120;UNSCRes2334,23December 2016;UNSCRes465,1March 1980; B’Tselem, ‘Settlements’, 11 November 2017, https://www.btselem.org/settlements (last accessed 5 HRC, HumanRightsSituationintheOccupied Palestinian Territory, supra fn67. HRW, ‘Israel andPalestine: Events of 2017’, supra fn58. HRC, Israeli SettlementsintheOccupied Palestinian Territory, supra fn68. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, 4 HRC, HumanRightsSituationintheOccupied Palestinian Territory, supra fn67. HRC, Israeli Settlements intheOccupied Palestinian Territory, IncludingEast Jerusalem, andthe 70 Forcibletransferofpopulationinanoccupiedterritoryisviolation 68 Thehomedemolitionshaveledtothedisplacementofthousands 69 Forexample,between1August2016and30November2017,Is- 75 InEastJerusaleminparticular,effortstoex- 73 Israelalsoincreaseditssettlementac- 71 72 Thetransferofastate’spop- 76 Thegrowth 74 Approx- their land. munities, blockingthousandsofPalestiniansfromfreelyaccessingandcultivating cess tofarmlandandlandgrazeanimalsapproximately150Palestiniancom- The nearly100checkpointslocatedacrosstheWestBank allowing muchofittobeconfiscatedbytheIsraeliGovernment. salem, willbeisolatedfromtherestofWestBank. Once completed,approximately9.4percentoftheWestBank,includingEastJeru- without noticeorexplanation.InthecaseofEastJerusalem, whichIsraelunlaw- access througharoadorsignificantlyincreasetraveltimewithin theWestBank severe restrictionofmovementforPalestinians,asthesecheckpoints canforbid school andotherdailydestinations. them tocrosscheckpointsonadailybasisaccesstheirwork,familyandfriends, estinians are trapped between the Separation Barrier and the Green Line, requiring freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads#list (last accessed 5March 2018). 84 83 net.au/news/2017-06-06/occupied-lives-palestinians-israel-military-control/8578368. West BankHave Now Spent50Years UnderIsraeli Military Control’, ABC 82 81 80 March 2018). 79 78 and 2016, respectively, supra fn61. 77 Approximately 85percentoftheSeparationBarrierfallswithinWestBank. and resourceswestoftheSeparationBarrier(areasreferredtoas‘seamzones’). As currentlybuilt,theSeparationBarrierhaseffectivelyannexedPalestinianlands on byIsraeliandArabForcesfollowingthe1948Arab–IsraeliWar. referred toasthe Green Line)–adividinglinebetweenIsraelandPalestineagreed amongst otherreasons,itdepartedmarkedlyfromtheArmisticeLineof1949(also (ICJ) foundtheSeparationBarriertobeillegalunderinternationallawbecause, Bank andIsrael.Initsadvisoryopinionof2004,theInternationalCourtJustice or wall (a system of fences and some sections of concrete wall) dividing the West ly throughcheckpointsspreadacrosstheWestBankandSeparationBarrier and betweentheWestBankGazaStrip,Israelabroad,primari- Israel controlsthefreedomofmovementPalestinianswithinWestBank c. FreedomofMovementandtheSeparationBarrier ages toPalestinianpropertyin322separateincidentstheWestBank. 2015 and2017,Israelisettlerviolenceledtothedeathof179Palestiniansdam- by September2017. tinued tobuildtheSeparationBarrier,havingcompletedapproximately65percent Ibid. For 2017, 2016 and2015 figures Protection ondemolitions,see OCHA, of CiviliansReport 2018, 2017 See ICJ, Wall case, supra fn55,§72. OCHA, ‘West OCHA, BankBarrier’,https://www.ochaopt.org/theme/west-bank-barrier (last accessed 5 HRC, HumanRightsSituationintheOccupied Palestinian Territory, supra fn67. HRW, ‘Israel/Palestine: Events of 2016’, supra fn58;S.McNeill, ‘Occupied Lives: Palestinians inthe B’Tselem, ‘List of Checkpoints and Forbidden Roads, 8 February 2017, https://www.btselem.org/ HRC, HumanRightsSituationintheOccupied Palestinian Territory, supra fn67. 83 Thus,manyPalestinianshavebeenforcedtoabandonlucrativelands, 79 82 TheSeparationBarrierhasalsolimitedac- 81 Approximately11,000Pal- , 30June2017, http://www.abc. 84 haveresultedinthe 78 Israelhascon- 77 80

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 37 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 38 tested byorganizinga40-dayhungerstrikeinmid-2017. West Bankhasbeenaccusedofarbitrarilyarrestingjournalists, arrests andtorturemistreatmentofdetainees. to beheldwithintheoccupiedterritory. detains PalestiniansinsideIsrael,violatinginternationallaw,whichrequiresthem 93 on-freedom-of-expression/ (last accessed 5March 2018). 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/08/palestine-dangerous-escalation-in-attacks- 92 middle-east-and-north-africa/palestine-state-of/report-palestine-state-of/ 91 al-shabaka.org/briefs/corruption-in-palestine/ (last accessed 5March 2018). 90 israel.html. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/27/world/middleeast/palestinian-prisoners-hunger-strike- 89 March 2018). etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491484/EXPO-AFET_SP%282013%29491484_EN.pdf (last accessed 5 External Policies of theEuropean Union,12March 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ International Legal Obligations:Israel’s Treatment of Palestinian Prisoners, Directorate-General for policies-towards-palestinian-prisoners/ (last accessed 5March 2018). See generally N.Ishaq,Violating 13 April 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/israel-must-end-unlawful-and-cruel- 88 5 March 2018). 87 86 December 2015; UNGARes 6December and71/96, 2016. 85 Bank, thePAanditssecurityserviceshavebeenaccusedofcorruption, Bank hasbeencontrolledbythepoliticalfactionFatah.IngoverningWest Since theHamas–Fatahsplitin2007,Palestinian Authority (PA)intheWest e. ThePalestinianAuthority fully annexedin1967, Palestinian administrativedetaineeswithoutchargeortrial. from thedefendantandtheirlawyer.InDecember2017,Israelwasholding434 is heldwithoutchargeortrial,andtheevidenceconsidered‘secret’witheld to amilitaryorderonSecurityProvisions.Inadministrativedetention,person In theWestBank,Israeliauthoritiescarryoutadministrativedetentionspursuant d. ArbitraryDetention political criticismofFatahandthePA. dents fortheirallegedaffiliationwithHamasorotherpoliticalopponents parent andarbitraryapprovalprocess. to obtainapermitenterthecityandaccessIsrael,whichinvolvesnon-trans- sealed offaccesstoitforPalestiniansresidingintheWestBank,unlesstheyareable Amnesty International, ‘Palestine (State of) 2016/2017’, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/ Addameer, ‘Statistics’, November 2017, http://www.addameer.org/statistics/20171130 (last accessed Amnesty International, ‘Palestine (State of) 2016/2017’, supra fn91. See generally UNSCRes 478, 20 August 1980;UNSCRes 476, 30June1980;UNGARes 70/88, 9 Amnesty International, ‘Palestine: Dangerous Escalation in Attacks on Freedom of Expression’, 23August Amnesty International, ‘Israel Must End‘Unlawful andCruel’Policies Towards Palestinian Prisoners’, I. Fisher, ‘Palestinian Prisoners EndHunger Strike in Israel After 40 Days’, The New York Times , 27 May B’Tselem, ‘Restrictions onMovement’, supra fn64. T. Dana, ‘Corruption inPalestine: ASelf-Enforcing System’, Al-Shabaka, 18August 2015, https:// 85 theSeparationBarrierandcheckpointshavecompletely 93 86 TheIndependentCommissionforHuman

88 About1,000Palestinianprisonerspro- 91 Inparticular,thePAin 89 (last accessed 5March 2018). 87 TheIsraelimilitary 92 activistsandstu- 90 arbitrary

to the1993OsloAccords. tent actionapparentlytakenbyFatahtopreventsuchstatements. against Israelandencouragedviolentconfrontation,withnoconcertedconsis- East Quartet’sfindings,thatsomemembersofFatahpubliclysupportedattacks Finally, theUN Human Rights Council (HRC)reported,referring to the Middle 100 eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_12_Israel_and_Palestine.pdf (last accessed 5March 2018). Cooperation: What Next? European UnionInstitute for Security Studies, May 2017, https://www.iss.europa. creasingly likened by Palestinians to cooperation with the‘enemy’. J. Lisiecka, Israeli–Palestinian Security 99 Including East Jerusalem,UNdocA/HRC/35/19.Add.1, 15June2017, §35. Recommendations Addressed to allParties Since 2009 With Regard to theOccupied Palestinian Territory, 98 news/2017/12/20/palestine-reform-restrictive-cybercrime-law (last accessed 5March 2018). 97 human-rights-activist-charged-under-repressive-new-cybercrimes-law/ (last accessed 5March 2018). Cybercrimes Law’, 7September 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2017/09/palestinian- 96 5 March 2018). tions/behind-firewall-repercussions-pa-%E2%80%98electronic-crimes-law%E2%80%99 (last accessed Repercussions of thePA ‘Electronic CrimesLaw’, 20 August 2017, http://www.addameer.org/publica lation-of-the-palestinian-cyber-crime-law/ (last accessed 5March 2018); Addameer, BehindaFirewall: the Palestinian Cyber CrimeLaw’, 2August 2017, https://7amleh.org/2017/08/02/the-full-english-trans 95 rls/hrrpt/2016/nea/265502.htm. Human RightsReports: Israel and The Occupied Territories, 3March 2017, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/ 94 and October2017. detainees committedbythePA’ssecurityforcesinWestBankbetweenJanuary Palestine, receivedatotalof205complaintstortureandotherill-treatment Rights (ICHR),astatutorycommissionthatmonitorshumanrightsviolationsin surveillance, forceserviceproviderstoretainconsumerdataandblockwebsites. to privacy and freedomof expression, including the authorities’ right to conduct criticism, anumberofproblematicprovisionsremainthatlimitcitizens’rights tice Ministryproposedseveralamendmentstothelawinresponsewidespread and severely banned online expression. Crimes Lawbyexecutivedecree,whichimposedtightcontrolsonmediafreedom Further, inJune2017,PresidentAbbas’administrationintroducedtheElectronic security alliance(unpopularwithmanyPalestinians statements, thePAinWestBankandIsraeliGovernmenthaveupheldtheir subsequently charged underthelawforcriticizing PA. Fatah andHamasledtotheirsplitin2007didnotagreerenounce was imposed after Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections, a conflict between 2017 marked10yearsoftheblockadeGazabyIsraelandEgypt.The 2. TheGazaStrip HRW, ‘Palestine: Reform Restrictive Cybercrime Law’, 20 December 2017, https://www.hrw.org/ 7amleh–The Arab Center for theAdvancement of Social Media, ‘The FullEnglishTranslation of HRC, Additional Information Pertaining to theComprehensive Review ontheStatus of Approximately 64percent of Palestinians are against theIsraeli–Palestinian security cooperation, in- Amnesty International, ‘Palestinian HumanRightsActivist Charged UnderRepressive New HRW, ‘Israel andPalestine: Events of 2017’, supra fn58;see also Ibid. 94

100

95 A number of human rights activists were 99 ), firstestablishedpursuant U.S. Department of State, 2016 96 AlthoughtheJus- 98 Despitethese 97

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 39 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 40 ployment ratesinGazareached44percent. cent ofwaterpumpedinGazawascontaminatedandthusundrinkable. critical conditionbytheendof2017.AsreportedinNovember2017,over95per- have beencatastrophicforGaza.Theinfrastructureandpublicserviceswereina The effectsoftheblockadeandpunitivemeasuresimposedbyFatahin2017 (discussed belowunder‘FatahandHamasReconciliation’). has imposeditsownpunitivemeasurestoforceHamasintoareconciliationdeal restrictions onthemovementofpeople.Asmid-2017,PAinWestBank lar movementofgoodsatthecrossingitcontrolsinRafah,andimposedincreased companions andprominentbusinesspeople.Egypthassimilarlyblockedallregu- ceptional humanitarian cases’, whichprimarilyrefers to medicalpatients,their from Gazaandseverelylimitedtheentryexitofpersonsbyallowingonly‘ex- As partofIsrael’scontrolGaza’sborder,ithasblockednearlyalloutgoinggoods a. TheBlockade air space. ings by land apart from the one entry point into Egypt, as well as Gaza’s sea and argue thatinpractice,theoccupationcontinuesasIsraelcontrolsallbordercross- two tofourhoursaday(withgenerators providing someextendedperiods). (last accessed 5March 2018). liefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-impact-gaza-electricity-crisis-may-2017 106 5 March 2018). ming-humanitarian-catastrophe-highlights-need-to-lift-israels-10-year-illegal-blockade/ (last accessed 10-Year Illegal Blockade’, 14June2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gaza-loo 2018); Amnesty International, ‘Gaza: Looming Humanitarian Catastrophe HighlightsNeed to LiftIsrael’s in Gaza’, 15May 2017, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/Gaza-power-fuel-crisis (last accessed 5March city.html; International Committee of theRed Cross (ICRC), ‘Electricity Shortages Affect allAspects of Life https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/world/middleeast/palestinian-authority-hamas-gaza-electri Hamas, Palestinian AuthorityCuts Electricity Payments for Gaza’, The New York Times, 27 April 2017, which madeupapproximately 30percent of Gaza’s total power needs. I.Kershner, ‘Challenging 2017, President Abbas decided to stop fundingtheelectricity thatIsrael supplied to theGaza Strip, 105 104 5 March 2018). 103 102 strip/?utm_term=.a0275e0638b0. www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/07/02/does-israel-actually-occupy-the-gaza- 101 of themilitarygovernment. as itdismantledallsettlements,withdrewitsmilitaryforcesanddeclaredtheend ments betweenIsraelandthePA.claimsitnolongeroccupiesGazaStrip violence againstIsrael,recognizethestateofIsraelandhonourallpreviousagree- ened treatment cycles, resulting in a decreased quality of sewage. critical servicesbeingprovidedtothepublic.Wastewaterplantsoperatedonshort- to thepowershortage,hospitalsworkedatminimalcapacity,withonlymost R.Eglash, ‘DoesIsrael Actually Occupy theGaza Strip?’, 2July2015, The Washington Post, https:// B’Tselem, ‘The Gaza Strip’, 11 November 2017, https://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip (last accessed Ibid. Althoughthe flow of electricity was already inadequate between 2015 and early 2017, in April OCHA, The Humanitarian OCHA, Impact of theGaza Electricity Crisis,May 2017, 4May 2017, https://re World Bank, Economic Monitoring Report, supra fn65. 102

101 However,Palestinianhumanrightsorganizations 104 Electricitywasprovidedforonly 106 According to 103 Unem- 105 Due

border crossingsforGazans. Gaza into early retirement. servants byabout30percentandforcedmorethan6,000civilbasedin In mid-2017, the PA reduced the salaries of approximately 50,000 Gaza-based civil arbitrarily detained,mistreatedandtortured. dissenters, especiallyjournalistsfromoppositionmediaoutlets,whohavebeen Hamas inGazahasbeenaccusedoflaunchingarepressivecampaignagainst attacks fromGaza. between January2015and2017resultingfromviolenceinorrocketmortar pected assailants. proximately 12,150PalestinianinGaza,including bystanders, protestersandsus- 2017, Israelisecurityforceskilledapproximately64Palestiniansandinjuredap- the UNOfficeforCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,between2015and has continued to respond with overwhelmingly superior firepower. ued tolaunchrocketandmortarattacks(attimesindiscriminately)onIsrael;Israel 115 114 Report 2018, 2017 and2016, respectively, supra fn61. 113 (last accessed 5March 2018). Council’s of Jerusalem, andHarakat as-Sabirin Nasran li-Filastin. Palestinian Territories, American Foreign Policy Gaza, includingJaysh al-Islam, Jaysh al-Ummah,Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Mujahideen Shura Council intheEnvirons Brigade. There are also other smallerarmed groups, some affiliated to al-Qaeda, thatoperate inandfrom military wing,theAl-Nasser Salahal-Deen Brigades;andFatah anditsmilitary wing,theAl-Aqsa Martyrs Izz ad-Dinal-Qassam Brigades;thePalestinian IslamicJihad;thePopular Resistance Committees andits 112 111 110 109 past-to-present/gaza-humanitarian-catastrophe/ (last accessed 5March 2018). Chronicle for theMiddleEast andNorthAfrica, 22August 2017, https://fanack.com/palestine/history- 108 Developments intheEconomy of theOccupied Palestinian Territory, UNdocTD/B/62/3, 6July2015. 107 Since OperationProtectiveEdgein2014,Palestinianarmedgroups b. Hamas the factorsthatmayrenderGazaunlivableby2020’. lated ramificationsofthehighpopulationdensityandovercrowdingareamong the UN Conference on Trade and Development, ‘the social, health and security-re- leaving anumberofschools,hospitalsandbusinessesonlypartlyoperational. used forGaza’spowerplant;unabletopaythenewtaxes,plantranoutoffuel, between JanuaryandOctober2017. complaints oftortureandotherill-treatmentdetaineesbyHamassecurityforces its humanitarian crisis. The punitivemeasurestakenbyFatahin2017againstGazafurtherexacerbated Ibid. For 2017, 2016 and2015 figures oncasualties andinjuriesinGaza, Protection see OCHA, of Civilians HRW, ‘Israel andPalestine: Events of 2017’, supra fn58. The mainPalestinian armed groups operating from Gaza includeHamasanditsmilitary wing,the Amnesty International, ‘Palestine’, supra fn92. Ibid. UNConference onTrade andDevelopment, Report onUNCTAD Assistance to thePalestinian People: ‘Gaza Strip Faces Humanitarian Catastrophe asPresident’s Punitive Measures Take Effect,’ Fanack Ibid World Almanacof Islamism,22September 2017, http://almanac.afpc.org/palestinian-territories 113 Israeliauthoritieshavereportednofatalitiesorinjuries 108 In April 2017, the PA imposeda tax on industrial diesel 110 111 Finally, President Abbas further restricted medical 115 114 TheICHRreceivedatotalof193 107

112 According to havecontin- 109

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 41 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 42 ruary 2017to‘initiateastabbingintifadabehindbarstargetingIsraelisoldiers’. legislative committeeofHamas’bureau,urgedallimprisonedPalestiniansinFeb- gazas-next-war-looms-isis-vows-defeat-hamas-failing-stop-trump-770694. Radical Rival Hamasfor Failing to Stop Trump’, Newsweek , 4January2018, http://www.newsweek.com/ com/middle-east-news/palestinians/1.833052; J. Moore, ‘Gaza’s Next War: ISISVows to Overthrow Militant, Accuses Gaza Group of Abandoning Palestinians’, Haaretz, 4January2018, https://www.haaretz. Hamas collaborator andcall onISIS’sfollowers to attack Hamas.J. Khoury, ‘ISISinSinaiExecutes Hamas 120 www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2015-10-28/what-isis-talks-about-when-it-talks-about-palestine. 119 understanding-isiss-palestine-propaganda/. ISIS’s Palestine Propaganda’, Al-Shabaka, 30March 2016, https://al-shabaka.org/commentaries/ www.atimes.com/article/hamas-powerless-isis-gains-ground-palestine/; S. Batrawi, ‘Understanding 118 117 116 2016, theUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)passedResolution2334, whichcondemned, lines, withseveralmajordevelopmentswithinthepastyear. On23December The expansionof,andoperationsin,settlementshavecontinued todrawhead- 1. Settlements Strip. popularity atleastwithacertainpartofPalestiniansociety,especiallyintheGaza – SinaiProvince(ISIL-SP).Accordingtovariousreports,ISIL-SPhasbeengaining port, thencertainlyintermsofpublicity,istheIslamicStateIraqandLevant One ofthesegroupsthatispoisedtokeepgrowing,ifnotinnumbersandsup- or (4)SalafistGroups. the following:(1)Hamas-affiliated,(2)Fatah-affiliated,(3)PalestinianIslamicJihad groups operatinginGazaandtheWestBankcangenerallybecategorizedasoneof and HamasbeingthetwokeypoliticalfactionsinPalestine.Themultiplearmed The partiestotheconflictareIsraelandPalestine,withFatahinWestBank on howto carry outstabbings.’ terrorism and openly call for violence against Jews,including instructing viewers noting that Hamas and other radical factions in Gaza ‘use mediaoutlets to glorify ian authorities’ persistent use of statements meant to incite violence against Israel, Further, theHRCin2017highlightedseveralreportsthatdocumentPalestin- a Salafijihadistdoctrineandmethodology. it ofbeingafalserepresentativeIslamicideology–onethatdoesnotadhereto militia member. war againstHamasbypubliclybroadcastingtheexecutionofaHamas-affiliated ARMED CONFLICT FIFTY YEARS ON C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: THE PALESTINIAN–ISRAELI B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS Ibid. S. Moubayed, ‘Hamas Powerless as ISIS Gains Ground in Palestine’, S.Batrawi, ‘What ISISTalks AboutWhen ItTalks AboutPalestine,’ Foreign Affairs, 28October 2015, https:// HRC, Additional Information supra fn98,§35. Inthevideo, published online,membersof ISIL-SP execute anindividualwhomthey asa identify 118 IthasbeenastrongcriticofHamas(andFatah)forseveralyears,accusing 120

116 Forexample, Moshir ElMasry, a memberofthe 119 InJanuary2018,itformallydeclared Asia Times , 11 January 2017, http://

117 with 14votesto0,anabstentionfromtheUnitedStates is essentialforsalvagingthetwo-Statesolution’.TheUNSCpassedresolution 2334 alsosignificantly stated that‘thecessationof all Israelisettlementactivities abstention-at-the-UN-476370. 2016, http://www.jpost.com/American-Politics/Read-Full-text-of-US-envoy-Powers-speech-following- 125 state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/266119.htm (last accessed 5March 2018). 124 the-u-n-resolution-on-israeli-settlements/ (last accessed 5March 2018). December 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/12/26/whats-new-and-whats-not-in- 123 sc12657.doc.htm (last accessed 5March 2018). International Law, Security Council Reaffirms’, 23December 2016, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ 122 121 estinian civilians,inviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlaw’. Israeli settlers,confiscationofland,demolitionhomesanddisplacementPal- since 1967,including‘theconstructionandexpansionofsettlements,transfer inter alia, two-state solution’. has gottensomuchworsethatitisnowputtingatrisktheveryviabilityof Ambassador totheUNSamanthaPowersfurthernoted,‘[t]hesettlementproblem considered acceptable. ment failing to progress in peace negotiations at apace the Obama administration administration –astepmanyregardedaspunishmentforNetanyahu’sgovern- The USdecisiontoabstaincameattheveryendofPresidentObama’seight-year the US’slongstandingpolicyofshieldingIsraelfromsuchUNinitiatives. li history,withan agenda drivenby the most extreme elements’. ment tosettlements.Hedescribedthecoalitionas‘mostrightwinginIsrae- coalition forjeopardizingthetwo-statesolutionasaresultofitssteadfastcommit- plaining theUSdecisiontoabstainonUNSCvote,KerryblamedNetanyahu’s to restartthepeaceprocess,butthesetalksalsofailedinMarch2014.When ex- Then, in2013,JohnKerry,PresidentObama’ssecondSecretaryofState,attempted from hisMiddleEastpostafteronlytwoyears,havingmadelimitedprogress. who wasinstrumentalintheNorthernIrelandpeaceprocess,butresigned broker peaceintheMiddleEast,firstwithGeorgeMitchell,adiplomaticveteran and laterfrombeingapproved(despitethefactthattransition administrationsare back-channel attemptsatthetime to prevent the resolution from being tabled ed, former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was involved in significant Palestine generally,andinparticularthesettlementissue.Aswaslaterreport- time of Resolution2334’s vote President-elect) and his administration on Israel– Equally significantistheearlypositioningofPresidentTrump(whowasat UNSCRes supra 2334, fn73.

‘FullText of USEnvoy Power’s Speech Following Abstention attheUN’,The Jerusalem Post, 24 December United Nations,‘Israel’s SettlementsHave NoLegal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of J. Kerry, ‘Remarks onMiddleEast Peace’, Washington, D.C., 28December 2016, https://2009-2017. N. Sachs,‘What’s New andWhat’s Not intheU.N. Resolution onIsraeli Settlements,’Brookings, 26 all measuresaimedatalteringthedemographiccompositionofPalestine 125

123 TheObamaadministrationhadmademultipleeffortsto 122 –departingfrom 124 As formerUS 121 Resolution

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 43 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 44 Bank’. that thelegislation‘opensfloodgatestopotentialannexationofWest the UN’scoordinatorforMiddleEastpeaceprocess,NickyMladenov,claiming Palestinian land built by settlers in good faith or with government support. unconstitutional andincontraventionoftheFourthGenevaConvention, outside Israel,withIsrael’sAttorneyGeneral,AvichaiMandelblit,describingitas August 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-freezes-controversial-outpost-legalization-law/. 133 132 extraordinary-brief-and-what-it-means (last accessed 5March 2018). December 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/israels-settlement-regularization-law-attorney-generals- Extraordinary BriefandWhat ItMeans for Israel’s Legal Stance onIllegal Settlements’, Lawfare Blog,8 lestinians-west-bank.html; E.Chachko, ‘Israel’s SettlementRegularization Law: The Attorney General’s 6 February 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/world/middleeast/israel-settlement-law-pa 131 news/world-middle-east-38888649. Passes Controversial Law onWest BankSettlements’, BBC News, 7February 2017, http://www.bbc.com/ February 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/13786bba-ed46-11e6-930f-061b01e23655; see also ‘Israel 130 bank-outposts-with-sweeping-new-legislation/. The Times of Israel, 6February 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-historic-first-israel-legalizes-west- 129 tion of theIsraeli government. Underinternational law, both outposts andsettlements are considered illegal. 128 https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-and-us-to-work-to-annul-un-anti-settlement-resolution/. 127 taking-office/. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/17/logan-trump-israel-flynn-pressured-u-n-on-israel-vote-before- 126 votes to52,whichretroactivelylegalizesIsraelioutposts on 6February2017,whenIsrael’sKnessetpassedthe‘RegularisationLaw’by60 The mostsignificantdomesticdevelopmentinrelationtosettlementstookplace discouraged from taking any active role prior to inauguration). outpost thathadbeenevacuatedfollowingarulingbytheIsraeliHighCourtofJus- struction ofAmichai,anewsettlementaimedathousingtheresidentsanillegal In additiontolegalsteps,Israel’ssecuritycabinetinMarch2017approvedthecon- August issuedaninjunctiontofreezeitsimplementationpendingdecision. ing toapproximately4,000settlerhomes. it allowsfortheretroactivelegalizationoflandinmorethan50outposts,amount- rate for the long-term use of their property but will not be able to reclaim it. So far, der thelaw,Palestinianlandownerswillbeofferedcompensationabovemarket any ofthepermanentmembers). that itwouldrequireanewmotion,majorityon the Councilandnovetofrom mistake andisworkingcloselywithIsraeltooverturnit(achallengingtask,given Ambassador totheUN,NikkiHaley,hasmadeclearthatResolution2334wasa I. Fisher, ‘Israel Passes Provocative Law to Retroactively Legalize Settlements’, J. MagidandS.Winer, ‘HighCourt Freezes Controversial Outpost Legalization Law’, The Times of Israel, 17 ‘Israel andUSto Work to AnnulUNAnti-Settlement Resolution’, The Times of Israel, 7June2017, UnderIsraeli law, outposts are considered illegal Israeli settlements, constructed without theauthoriza- Reed, ‘Israeli SettlementLaw’, supra fn130. J. Reed, ‘Israeli Settlement Law “Crosses Thick Red Line”, Warns UN Envoy’, FinancialTimes , 7 C. Lynch, C. ‘Flynn Pressured U.N. On Israel Vote Before Taking Office’, R.Wootliff, ‘InHistoric First, Israel Legalizes West BankOutposts With Sweeping New Legislation’, 132 TheIsraeliHighCourthasnotyetruledonitsconstitutionalitybutin 127 130 Itisextremelycontroversialinand Foreign Policy , 13 February 2017, 128 onprivately-owned 126 The New York Times , The current US 131 129 and Un- 133

2018. postponed twice,firsttoDecember2017,andmostrecentlythequarterof the databasewasduetobepublishedinMarch2017,itsreleasehasalreadybeen have anadverseimpactonthehumanrightsofPalestinianpeople.Although companies assesstheiractivitiesinIsraelisettlementstoensurethattheydonot rights ofthePalestinianpeople. tions oftheIsraelisettlementsoncivil,political,economic,socialandcultural tive isa2013HRCreportonthefact-findingmissiontoinvestigateimplica- sign-reconciliation-accord-idUSKBN1CH0F5. 12 October 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-talks/palestinian-rivals-fatah-hamas- 141 hamas-gaza.html. York Times, 12 October 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/world/middleeast/palestinians-fatah- 140 139 https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/26/israel-races-to-head-off-un-settlement-blacklist.html. or maintain settlements. ‘Israel Races to Head OffUNSettlement“Blacklist”’, CNBC, 26 November 2017, and security firms,aswell asmultinationalcorporations thatprovide equipment orservices used to build letters thatthey willbeonthelist. These includeIsraeli banks, supermarkets, restaurant chains,buslines 138 7 February 2013. People Throughout theOccupied Palestinian Territory, IncludingEast Jerusalem’,UN doc A/HRC/22/63, of theIsraeli SettlementsontheCivil,Political, Economic, SocialandCultural Rightsof thePalestinian 137 gID=E/ (last accessed 5March 2018). 24 March 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=18535&Lan 136 bank-settlement-in-20-years-idUSKBN1711K6. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-settlement/israeli-cabinet-approves-first-west- 135 September 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.810403. 134 parties intheWestBankandGaza. reconciliation agreementtocreateanationalconsensusgovernmentunitingboth On 11October2017,thetwomainPalestinianfactions,FatahandHamas,signeda 2. FatahandHamasReconciliation tice. thus asignificantanddefiantstepbytheIsraeliGovernment. been madelegalasdiscussedabove),thisisthefirstnewsettlementsince1999,and pressure topreventitspublication. the WestBank,EastJerusalemandGolanHeights. produce adatabaseofallbusinessenterprisesoperatinginIsraelisettlements In March2016,theHRCvoted,with32countriesinfavourand15abstaining,to dential andnationalcouncilelectionsaretobeheldwithinoneyear. lift itssanctions,easingGaza’seconomicblockade.Inaddition,legislative,presi- Gaza tothePA(includingRafahborderwithEgypt)and,inreturn,will Cairo. Aspartofthedeal,Hamashasagreedtotransferadministrativecontrol N.al-Mughrabi andO. Fahmy, ‘Palestinian Rivals Fatah, HamasSignReconciliation Accord’, Reuters, HRC, Report of theIndependentInternational Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate theImplications M. Lubell, ‘Israeli Cabinet Approves First West Bank Settlement in 20 Years’, According to the Israeli government, approximately 100 local companies have received warning Ibid. OHCHR,‘HumanRightsCouncil Adopts SixResolutions andCloses itsThirty-First Regular Session’, Y. Berger, ‘Israeli CabinetApproves Resumption of Work onNew West BankSettlement’, Haaretz, 3 D. Walsh andD. Halbfinger, ‘UnityDeal Offers Hopefor Palestinians andaRespite for Gaza’, The New 134 138 Althoughexistingsettlementshavegrowninsize(andillegaloutposts Throughout2017,theUScriticizedHRCforthisinitiativeandexerted 137 Article117ofthereportrequiredthatprivate 139 140 Egyptbrokeredthereconciliationtalksin 136 Thebasisforthisinitia- 135 Reuters, 30 March 2017,

141

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 45 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 46 tions happen tothe25,000membersofHamas’militarywingandotherPalestinianfac- 147 2017, https://www.timesofisrael.com/key-points-of-the-hamas-fatah-palestinian-reconciliation-deal/. 146 145 “Aims to Soften Image”’,BBC News, 1May 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39744551. world/2017/may/01/hamas-new-charter-palestine-israel-1967-borders; ‘New HamasPolicy Document Accepting aPalestine Based on1967 Borders’, The Guardian, 1May 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/ post/678/a-document-of-general-principles-and-policies; P. Wintour, ‘HamasPresents New Charter 144 aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/hamas-rift-qatar-fatah-reconciliation-171022152847114.html. 143 142 regional allieslikeSaudiArabia Hamas’ maindonor,hastakenastepbackasresultofitsdiplomaticdisputewith ration oflivingconditionsinGaza.Inaddition,Qatar,whichuntilrecentlywas against GazabythePA,haveledtocontinued–andunsustainabledeterio- Israeli andEgyptianblockadesofGaza,coupledwiththeharshmeasurestaken most promisingyetisthatHamashasneverbeenascorneredittoday.The refugee camp)agreement,allfailed.However,whatmakesthelatestattempt tably the2007Meccaagreement,2011Cairoagreementand2014al-Shati(Beach This isnotthefirstattemptatreunification;previousagreements,mostno- di Arabia,theUnitedArabEmiratesandevenIsrael. (with whom Hamas’ relations have improved in the past few months), the US, Sau- reconciliation processfromafar–reportedly,theagreementisbackedbyEgypt in Gaza,giventhe2006results.Successwillalsodependonthosesupporting many areskepticalthatFatahwillexposeitselftoapopularelection,especially significant obstacletoreconciliationistheelectionsthathavebeenpromised– happen tothetensofthousandscivilservantsemployedbyHamas. be adeterminant. and whennecessary,thewillingnesstoexertrighttypeofpressure–willalso was thefirsttimeHamasdidsoaspartofitspoliticalprogramme). number ofHamasleadershadalreadymadepublicstatementstothiseffect, in pre-1967boundaries,effectivelyrecognizingtheexistenceofIsrael.Althougha programme inMay2017statingthatitacceptedaninterimPalestinianstatewith- has insistedthatitwillnotlaydownitsarms.(Notably,Hamasunveiledapolitical tempts. First,initsstrongbeliefthatresistancetoIsraelmustcontinue,Hamas unresolved, anumberofwhichhaveledtothefailurepastreconciliationat- However, aspromisingthisreconciliationdealmayseem,severalissuesremain have pushedHamastothenegotiatingtable. tionship withQatarremainsunchanged Walsh andHalbfinger, ‘Unity Deal’, supra fn140. ‘Hamas:NoRiftWith Qatar Over Fatah Reconciliation’, AlJazeera, 22October 2017, http://www. See supra fn112 for Palestinian armed groups. Ibid. ‘Key Points on the Hamas–Fatah Palestinian Reconciliation Deal’, Hamas,‘A Documentof General PrinciplesandPolicies’, 1May 2017, http://hamas.ps/en/ 145 is also an open question. Similarly, there is seriousconcern about what will 142 (despiteHamas’reportsclaimingthatitsrela- 143 ). Thesefactors,andinternalconflicts, 147 Thecontinuedsupport– The Times of Israel, 12 October 144 Whatwould 146 Another resolutions’. a finalstatusissuetoberesolvedthroughnegotiationsinlinewithrelevantUN ‘character, statusordemographiccomposition’,andstatingthattheHolyCity‘is ing majoritydeclaring‘nullandvoid’anyactionsintendedtoalterJerusalem’s ber 2017,theUNGeneralAssembly(UNGA)passedaresolutionbyanoverwhelm- Further, thedecisionresultedinanimmediateinternationaloutcry.On21Decem- develop intoamoreextensivesurgeofviolence. led to some casualties and injuries, there is no indication yet that these acts will and Gaza,clashesbetweenprotesterstheIsraelimilitaryinWestBank tinians. AlthoughprotestsanddemonstrationswereorganizedintheWestBank military respondedbylaunchingairstrikesonGazaandkillingatleasttwoPales- Palestinian factionsinprotestatPresidentTrump’sannouncement.TheIsraeli Israeli townsclosetotheGazaborder,followingadeclarationof‘dayrage’by December 2017anddeclaredEastJerusalemthecapitalofPalestine. traordinary summitoftheOrganizationIslamicCooperation,whichmeton14 Tayyip Erdogan,alsotookstepstoorganizeArabandMuslimcountriesinanex- Saudi Arabia decision. cronesia, Nauru,PalauandTogo),with35abstentions. US (Guatemala,Honduras,Israel,theMarshallIslands,FederatedStatesofMi- lem-talk-shows.html. York Times, 6January2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/world/middleeast/egypt-jerusa 153 www.alaraby.co.uk/english/News/2017/12/7/Trumps-Jerusalem-move-coordinated-with-Arab-leaders. 152 aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/oic-leaders-reject-trump-decision-jerusalem-171213095417995.html. 151 150 WlD61LbMxBw (last accessed 5March 2018). UNGADraft Res A/ES-10/L.22, 19December 2017. Status December of Jerusalem’,21 2017, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=58330#. 149 world-trump-east-jerusalem. December 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/13/recep-tayyip-erdogan-unite-muslim- 148 in thepeacenegotiations. nouncement bystatingthatPalestinenolongerrecognizedtheUSasamediator Palestinian President,MahmoudAbbas,respondedtoPresidentTrump’san- ate impactiswell-known. and anylegaldiplomaticconsequences,arenotyetclear.Yet,itsmostimmedi- recognize Jerusalemasthe capital ofIsrael. The long-term impactofthisdecision, The latestdevelopmentin2017wasPresidentTrump’sdecisionon6Decemberto 3. Jerusalem ‘OIC Declares East JerusalemasPalestinian Capital’, AlJazeera, 14December 2017, http://www. D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Tapes Reveal Egyptian Leaders’ Tacit Acceptance of JerusalemMove’, The New ‘Trump’s JerusalemMove “Coordinated With Arab Leaders”’, The New Arab, 7December 2017, https:// Ibid. P. Beaumont, ‘Palestinians NoLonger Accept USAsMediator, Abbas Tells Summit’, The Guardian, 13 UNNews, ‘General Assembly DemandsAllStates Comply With UNResolutions Regarding 149 152 Thevotelineupwassignificant,asonly8countriessupportedthe andEgypt 148 153 Hamasquicklyrespondedwithrocketattacksagainst werebothpreviouslyinformedofPresidentTrump’s 150 TurkishPresident,Recep 151 Reportedly,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 47 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 48 and Palestinianofficialsreceivedapproximately100communications. has made numerous visits to Israel and the West Bank, held meetings with Israeli civilian buildingsandinfrastructure,massivedisplacement’. ed in‘ahighnumberofciviliancasualties,significantdamagetoordestruction displacement ofPalestinianresidents;and(2)the2014Gazaconflict,whichresult- activities intheWestBankandEastJerusalem,particularastheyrelateto focus ofitspreliminaryexaminationinPalestineistwofold:(1)settlement-related cording to its December 2017 Report on PreliminaryExamination Activities, the 158 157 156 155 154 investigation intocrimescommittedinandfromPalestine. same month to determine whether the criteria have been met to pursue a formal cutor (OTP)openedapreliminaryexaminationintothesituationinPalestinethat Rome Statute,becominganICCStatePartyinApril.TheOfficeoftheProse- including East Jerusalem, since June 2014. It subsequently acceded to the 1998 Court (ICC)overallegedcrimescommittedintheoccupiedPalestinianterritory, In January2015,PalestineacceptedthejurisdictionofInternationalCriminal UNGA, considertheWestBanktobeoccupied. governmental andinternationaljudicialbodies,includingtheICJ,UNSC West Bankisadisputed,ratherthanoccupied,territory,butrecognizesthatinter- characterization oftheGazaconflict.First,ICCnotesIsrael’spositionthat issues: thelegalregimeapplicabletoterritoryofWestBankand The OTPhasalsosignalledthatitwillhavetodecidetwothornyjurisdictional and manneroftheallegedcrimestheirimpact,respectively. unable’ toinvestigateorpunishtheaccused;andanassessmentofscale,nature complementarity and gravity – a determination of whether Israel is ‘unwilling or uation inPalestinemustsatisfytheRomeStatute’sadmissibilityrequirementsof allegations will take, to move beyond the ‘preliminary examination’ stage, the sit- Although itisunclearhowlong the preliminaryexaminationof Palestinian were tobeconsiderednon-international. international armedconflictsonly,andthuswouldnotapplyto Gazaiftheconflict certain warcrimesprovisionsundertheRomeStatuteappear tobeapplicable parallel, remains subject to debate anddiverging views. Thisis significant because flict asoneofaninternationalornon-internationalcharacter, orbothexistingin armed conflictexistsinGaza,theOTPbelievesthatclassification ofthecon- D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

Ibid., §69. Ibid., §64. Ibid., §52. OTP, ICC, Report onPreliminary Examination Activities 2017, supra fn70, §11. Ibid., §70. 158 157 Second,whilemostagreethatan 154 Sincethen,theOTP 156

155 Ac- world-asia-39819123. does Afghan Warlord Hekmatyar’s Return Mean?’, BBC News, 6May 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/ mous Haqqani network, al-Qaeda and recently the so-called Islamic State (IS) group.” W. Massoud, ‘What main insurgent groups fightingtheAfghan andNATO-led forces are theTaliban anditssemi-autono - iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-pe_eng.pdf (last accessed 28 February 2018). According to ‘the theBBC, Report onPreliminary ExaminationActivities 2016, 14November 2016, §196,https://www.icc-cpi.int/ groups whichmainlyinclude the Taliban, the HaqqaniNetwork, andHezb-e-IslamiGulbuddin’. OTP, ICC, considered that‘[t]hearmed conflict hasopposed theGovernment of Aghanistan forces andarmed 161 160 armed_conflict_midyear_report_2017_july_2017.pdf (last accessed 28February 2018). Report 2017, July2017, p3,https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/protection_of_civilians_in_ 159 are notconsideredasbeingpartytotheconflict. ment ofUzbekistan,IslamicJihadUnion,LashkariTayyibaandJayshMuhammad A varietyofactorsareactiveinAfghanistan.However,thegroupsIslamicMove- vilians acrossAfghanistan’. uring the first half of 2017, armed conflict continued to cause severe harm to ci- According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ‘[d] branch). TheUnitedStatesalsocontinuestobeapartytheNIACinAfghanistan. work and the armed group known as the Islamic State in Afghanistan (IS Khorasan tional ProtocolII.Inaddition,therearetwoseparateNIACswiththeHaqqaniNet- the Taliban.Thisconflictmeetsthresholdforapplicationof1977Addi- in which the armedforces of the Government of Afghanistan are fighting against Afghanistan wasinvolvedinanon-internationalarmedconflict(NIAC)2017, Classification oftheConficts 1. AFGHANISTAN: INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED by Anti-GovernmentElements’. across thecountrycoincidedwithasymmetricattacksinvillages,towns,andcities Anti-Government ElementsandPro-GovernmentForcesinnumerousprovinces The group’slastbigattacktookplacein2013,andnoattacks havebeenreported Afghan Governmentin2016,whichfollowedseveralyearsof relativeinactivity. being apartytotheconflictpursuantpeaceagreementit concludedwiththe STATES IN COMBAT OPERATIONS ARMED CONFLICTS SELECTED NON-INTERNATIONAL InNovember 2016, theOffice of theProsecutor (OTP) of theInternational CriminalCourt (ICC) UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Ibid.,p13. 159 Itrecordedthat‘sustainedgroundfightingbetween 160 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Midyear 161 ThegroupHezb-e-Islamiceased aoie Siewert Caroline

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 49 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 50 ritory. operations inAfghanistanandestablishedcontroloverpartofthecountry’ster- IS Khorasanbranch(IS-K)causedlargenumbersofcasualtiesinitsfirstyear 162 extend itseffectiveauthoritybeyondthecapital. southeast and east of the country, while theAfghanGovernment has struggled to groups. TheTalibanareconductingawidespreadinsurgency,particularlyinthe and otherMujahideenfightershaveregroupedintoanumberofdifferentarmed to drivetheTalibanfrompower.Butsincefallofregimein2001, paign inOctober2001,enablingoppositiongroups,namelytheNorthernAlliance, hand overbinLaden.ThisledtotheUSinitiatinganaerialbombardmentcam- by OsamabinLadenfromAfghanistan,theTalibanrefusedUSdemandsthatthey attacks byal-QaedaintheUSon11September2001,whichweremasterminded three states (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Following the nized asthelegitimategovernmentof‘IslamicEmirateAfghanistan’byonly about 90percentofthecountryuntillate2001,althoughTalibanwererecog- ars drawnfromthelargestethnicgroupinAfghanistan,Pasthuns–controlled Emerging asaforceinthe1990s,Taliban–originallygroupofIslamicschol- invasion in1979. Afghanistan hasbeenengulfedinalmostperpetualarmedconflictsincetheSoviet matyar, returnedtoKabulafteryearsofself-imposedexileinMay. since theconclusionofpeaceagreement.Thegroup’sleader,GulbuddinHek- aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/2001-2017-intervention-afghanistan-170822035036797.html. 166 Threat, UN doc S/2017/467, 31May 2017, §§28–29. and Security andtheRangeof United NationsEfforts inSupportof MemberStates inCountering the FifthReportUNSC, of theSecretary-General intheThreat Posed by ISIL(Da’esh)to International Peace (Da’esh), Al-QaidaandAssociated IndividualsandEntities,UNdocS/2016/629, 19July2016, §§18–20; Team Submitted Pursuantto Resolution 2253 (2015) Concerning IslamicState in Iraq andtheLevant 165 (last accessed 28February 2018). 3 November 2016, G.Johnson, TheC. Rise andStall of theIslamicState inAfghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/ (last accessed 28February 2018); Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state- 164 BBC News, 8March 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12024253. istan-long-hard-road-2014-transition (last accessed 28February 2018); ‘Afghanistan Profile –Timeline’, Report no236,8October 2012, p 16,https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan//afghan 163 ‘What DoesAfghan Warlord Hekmatyar’s Return Mean?’, supra fn161. ra.com/news/2017/05/hekmatyar-returns-kabul-20-years-hiding-170504145123325.html; Massoud, Additionally, since2015,theIslamicState(IS)hasemergedinAfghanistan. A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT See, e.g., International CrisisGroup, Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the2014 Transition, Asia UNSecurity Council (UNSC),Eigtheenth Report of the Analytical Supportand Sanctions Monitoring ‘Timeline: US Intervention in Afghanistan 2001 to 2017’, AlJazeera, 22 August 2017, https://www. B.Osman,‘The IslamicState in‘Khorasan’: How itBegan andWhere itStands Now inNangarhar’, ‘Hekmatyar Returns to Kabul After 20 Years inHiding’,AlJazeera, 4May 2017, https://www.aljazee 165 InApril2017,USforcesusedthe‘MotherofAllBombs’againstIS-K. https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/11/rise-and-stall-islamic-state-afghanistan 163

162 164 166 The

number hasdecreasedsince2014. operations, classifiedascounter-terrorismbytheUS, fighting roleforoftheUS,makingitapartytoconflict. ance in April 2017, calling on the Taliban to start negotiations. The UShas been engagedinfightingAfghanistansince 2001. 2. TheUnitedStatesArmedForces military personnel. February 2018). https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/08/09/what-us-doing-afghanistan.html 177 senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nicholson_02-09-17.pdf (last accessed 28February 2018). Committee onArmed Services United States Senate, 9February 2017, p2,https://www.armed-services. the Senate Armed Services Committee ontheSituation inAfghanistan, Stenographic Transcript Before the 176 175 174 173 172 last updated 3January2017 (last accessed 7September 2017). 171 military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=afghanistan (last accessed 7March 2018). 170 news/world-asia-39802833. Warlord Hekmatyar Returns to Kabul After Peace Deal’, BBC News, 4May 2017, http//www.bbc.com/ jazeera.com/news/2017/05/hekmatyar-returns-kabul-20-years-hiding-170504145123325.html; ‘Afghan 169 www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/hezb-islami-hekmatyar-taliban-lay-arms-170429082441681.html. 168 www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/lifts-sanctions-gulbuddin-hekmatyar-170204125508334.html?xif=. 167 In September 2017, 1. AfghanForces Taliban and,inseparateconflicts,theHaqqaniNetworkandIS-K. In 2017,AfghanGovernmentforces,supportedbyUSopposedthe buddin Hekmatyar,inFebruary2017. ghan Governmentin2016,theUNliftedsanctionsagainstgroup’sleader,Gul- After thearmedgroupHezb-e-IslamiconcludedapeaceagreementwithAf- partnered operationswithAfghanforces,aswellunilateraloperations.’ rupt anddegradeal-Qa’edaIslamicStateactivitiesinAfghanistan,through advise andassistacertainnumberofUStroopsareinvolvedin‘continuingtodis- US involvement,around100,000troopswerestationedinthecountry. Kabul afteryearsofself-imposedexileinMay2017. Afghanistan. B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS U.S.Department of State, ‘U.S.Relations withAfghanistan’, http://state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm, Ibid. Ibid.;N.Bobkin,‘What istheUSDoing inAfghanistan?’, Strategic Culture Foundation, 9 August 2016, Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. S. Qazi,‘UNLifts Sanctions Against Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’, Statement for theRecord by Genral JohnW. Nicholson, Commander U.S.Forces Afghanistan, Before Global Firepower, ‘2017 Afghanistan Military Strength’, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country- ‘Hekmatyar Returns to Kabul After 20 Years inHiding’,AlJazeera, 4May 2017, https://www.al S.Qazi,‘Hezb-i-Islami’sHekmatyar to Taliban: Lay Down Arms’, AlJazeera, 29April2017, https:// 174 ApartfromservinginNATO’sResoluteSupportMissiontotrain, 170 Afghanistan was estimated to have 200,000 active frontline 173 InJanuary2017,7,400UStroopsremainedin 167 Hekmatyarmadehisfirstpublicappear- 169 Al Jazeera, 4 February 2017, https:// 176 constituteacontinuing 177 171 168

At theheightof He returned to (last accessed 28 175 172 These This

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 51 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 52 the HaqqaniNetworkfiveyearsbeforeinAfghanistan. 2017, anAmerican-Canadiancouplewasrescuedafterhavingbeenkidnappedby out alarge-scalebombattackinKabul,anallegationPakistandenied. Pakistani intelligenceserviceshadsupportedtheHaqqaniNetworkincarrying have connectionswithIS-K. engaged intheAfghanconflictalongsideTalibanandhavebeensuspectedto currently ledbyHaibatullahAkhunzada. Threat, Haqqani_Network_0.pdf (last accessed 28February 2018); J. Dressler, The HaqqaniNetwork: AStrategic 6 Institute for theStudy of War, October 2010, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ 182 12 November 2013, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/afghan_taliban_conde.php. 181 taliban-afghanistan-supreme-leader-son-suicide-attack.html. Suicide Attack’, The New York Times , 22July2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/world/asia/ out-suicide-attack-idUSKBN1A707K; M. Mashal and T. Shah, ‘Taliban Say Top Leader’s Son Carried Out a www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-son/son-of-afghan-taliban-leader-dies-carrying- 180 www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/afghan-taliban-haibatullah-akhunzada-leader-160525045301080.html. 179 Mullah Omar’,BBC News , 31August 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34105565. 178 there’. been described by US military leaders as ‘the most resilient enemy network out fighters thantheTaliban,withwhomtheyarecloselyallied. families inAfghanistan’sKhostregion,theHaqqaniNetworkcommandsfarfewer A formeranti-Sovietgroupinthe1980sandledbyoneofmostprominent 4. TheHaqqaniNetwork was killedin2015. lage clergymanwholosthisrighteyefightingSovietforcesinthe1980s,but in Afghanistan(QuettaShuraTaliban)wasledbyMullahOmar,anerstwhilevil- The largestarmednon-stateactorfightingagainsttheAfghanregime,Taliban 3. TheTaliban find shelterandasafehaveninPakistan. States DepartmentofStatereportshaveclaimedthatHaqqaniNetworkfighters have beentargetedbyanescalatingcampaign,includingdronestrikes.United carried outasuicideattackinJuly2017. com/news/2017/10/family-freed-haqqani-captivity-pakistan-171012170422573.html. 186 aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/afghanistan-blames-pakistan-taliban-kabul-blast-170601151615042. 185 com/news/2017/10/afghan-officers-killed-erroneous-air-strike-171001155622258.html. html; ‘Afghan Officers Killed in“Erroneous” AirRaid’,AlJazeera, 2October 2017, https://www.aljazeera. aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/suicide-bombers-attack-afghan-police-training-centre-171017062036058. 184 to-find-safe-haven-in-pakistan-claims-us-report/. Tribune, 1May https://tribune.com.pk/story/702681/afghan-taliban-haqqani-network-continue- 2014, 183 org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf (last accessed 28February 2018). See, e.g., B.Roggio, ‘Afhan Taliban Condemn theKillingof NasiruddinHaqqani’, FDDsLong War, Journal S.Qazi,‘Afghan Taliban: Haibatullah Akhunzada Named New Leader’, AlJazeera, 26 May 2016, https:// There issome uncertainty asto theexact date of hisdeath. See, ‘Taliban Admit Covering UpDeath of ‘Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network Continue to Find Safe Haven inPakistan, Claims US Report’, The Express ‘Afghanistan BlamesPakistan andTaliban for Kabul Blast’, AlJazeera, 1June2017, https://www. See, e.g., Dressler, J. A. The HaqqaniNetwork: From Pakistan to Afghanistan, Afghanistan Report ‘Family Freed From “HaqqaniCaptivity” inPakistan, AlJazeera, 13October 2017, https://www.aljazeera. ‘Taliban KillsScores inAfghanistan’s Paktia andGhazni’,AlJazeera, 18October 2017, https://www. J. Ahmad, ‘Sonof Afghan Taliban Leader DiesCarryingOutSuicideAttack’, Reuters , 22July2017, https:// Afghanistan Report 9, 182 ThenetworkoperatesalongtheborderwithPakistan,whereitsfighters 178 Afterinitialinfightingandbreakawaysfromthegroup,itis Institute for theStudy of War, March 2012, http://www.understandingwar. 184

In June2017,theAfghanGovernmentclaimedthat 180 179 183 Haibatullah’ssonwasreportedtohave Theyareconsideredtobeactively 186

181 However,ithas 185

In October

Afghan Government. istan have been estimated to be around 700 by US officials, but 1,500 bythe 195 Afghanistan Operations After Six AidWorkers Killed’, supra fn193. 194 operations-after-six-aid-workers-killed-idUSKBN15N1BL. February 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack/red-cross-suspends-afghanistan- 193 com/news/2017/02/icrc-afghan-red-cross-workers-killed-missing-170208131532856.html. 192 icrc.org/en/document/afghanistan-two-abducted-icrc-staff-members-released. 191 2017, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/afghanistan-appeal-safe-and-unconditional-release-icrc-staff. attack; ICRC, ‘Afghanistan: AnAppeal For theSafe andUnconditional Release of 18February ICRC Staff’, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/afghanistan-six-icrc-staff-members-killed-and-two-unaccounted- 190 en/document/afghanistan-abducted-icrc-staff-member-released. 189 aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/drops-mother-bombs-isil-afghanistan-170413174730383.html. 188 state-consolidates-position-in-afpak-region/#.VSspbPmUe4Y 7, The Jamestown Foundation, 3April2015, https://jamestown.org/program/wilayat-khurasan-islamic- 187 separate US forces in Afghanistan, declared a need for more troops. In February2017,USGeneralJohnNicholson,whocontrolsboththeNATOand had beenkidnappedinDecember2016,wasreleased. a SpanishemployeeoftheInternationalCommitteeRedCross(ICRC),who A trendofaidworkerscomingunderattackcontinuedinearly2017.InJanuary, 2015 throughanISmediafoundation. announced byISCentral’sspokesperson,AbuMuhammadal-Adnani,inJanuary dation of a Khorasanprovince, covering parts of AfghanistanandPakistan,was The ISKhorasanbranch(IS-K)emergedinAfghanistanmid-2014.foun- 5. TheIslamicStateinAfghanistan(KhorasanBranch) abducted members oftheICRCwerekilledinAfghanistan,withtwofurtherbeing the ICRC to put its work in Afghanistanonhold. had notbeeninvolved. which theattackoccurredblamedIS-K,whileTalibanpubliclystatedthatthey the US announced an official plan to increase the number of its forces in Afghanistan, the USannouncedanofficialplantoincreasenumberofitsforcesinAfghanistan, delivering materialaid. OPERATIONS C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: INCREASED INVOLVEMENT OF THE US IN COMBAT ICRC, ‘Afghanistan: Two Abducted ICRC Staff MembersReleased’, 5September 2017, https://www. A. Roul, A. ‘“Wilayat Khurasan”: IslamicState Consolidates Position infAfPak Region’, 13Terrorism Monitor B.Ansari,‘Red Cross SuspendsAfghanistan Operations After SixAidWorkers Killed’, Reuters, 8 ‘Timeline: USintervention inAfghanistan 2001 to 2017’, supra fn166. ‘ICRC: Six Red Cross AidWorkers Killed inAfghanistan’, AlJazeera, 8February 2017, https://aljazeera. ‘USSays “Mother of AllBombs” HitsISILinAfghanistan’, AlJazeera , 14April2017, https://www. ICRC, ‘Afghanistan: Abducted ICRC Staff Member Released’, 15January2017, https://www.icrc.org/ ‘ICRC: SixRed Cross AidWorkers Killed inAfghanistan’, supra fn192; Ansari,‘Red Cross Suspends ICRC, ‘Afghanistan: SixICRC Staff MembersKilled andTwo Unaccounted For inAttack’, 8February 2017, 190

and releasedonlyinSeptember. 188 194 192

Itwasconductedbyunknownarmedmen.Thiscaused 187 ThenumberofIS-KforcesinAfghan- 191

The attackoccurredwhiletheywere (last accessed 28February 2018). 193

The governor of the region in 189

In February2017,sixstaff 195

In August,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 53 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 54

edly, theauthoritytodeployup3,900newUStroopshasbeengiven. aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/reveals-higher-number-troops-afghanistan-170831050000418.html. 206 205 204 taliban.html. 24 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/world/asia/afghanistan-troop-increase-trump- 203 202 201 news/394630-afghanistan-nato-troop-increase/. Presence inAfghanistan, May SendThousands More Troops’, RT 200 troop-increases-afghanistan/. Washington Times , 29June2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/29/nato-approves- 199 zeera.com/news/2017/05/nato-troop-increase-plan-draws-criticism-afghanistan-170525052520655.html. 198 197 donald-trump-address-nation-outline-new-afghanistan-strategy/. Britain to Follow Suit’, The Telegraph, 22August 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/21/ 196 cording tothe US Pentagon. At theendofAugust2017,UStrooplevelinAfghanistanreached11,000ac- – wererecordedbyUNAMA. In thesamespanoftime,5,243civiliancasualties–1,662deadand3,581injured to July2017,almostdoublethenumberofsameperiodin2016. The USAirForcereporteddropping1,250bombsandotherordnancefromJanuary fighters. – onnorthernAfghanistan’sNangarharprovince,allegedlykillingnearly100IS-K combat –‘MOAB’(‘MassiveOrdnanceAirBlast’,alsocalled‘MotherofAllBombs’) In April2017,theUSdroppedlargestnon-nuclearbombithaseverusedin New troopdeploymentswereagreedonbyNATOstatesinJune. year, butcriticizedbyAfghanofficials. A NATOtroopincreaseinAfghanistanwasdiscussedduringthefirsthalfof coupled withademanddirectedatotherNATOcountriestodothesame. kers andtunnelsystemsharbouringhundredsofIS-Kfightersinthearea. stressed that this wouldnotchangethenon-combatnatureof the operation. gust, withfurthertroopsannouncedtobearrivingoverthefollowingmonths. United States military personnel and air power began to be sent at the end of Au- represents a1percentdecreaseinoverallciviliancasualties. ‘Timeline: USintervention inAfghanistan 2001 to 2017’, supra fn166. ‘NATO Troop Increase PlanDraws CriticisminAfghanistan’, AlJazeera , 25May 2017, https://www.alja Ibid.; C. Muñoz, Ibid.;C. ‘NATO Approves Troop Increases for Afghanistan; U.S.Likely to Follow’, The B.Henderson andK.McCann,‘DonaldTrump Commits More USTroops to Afghanistan andCallson ‘Timeline: USintervention inAfghanistan 2001 to 2017’, supra fn166. M.Mashal,‘U.S.Troop Increase inAfghanistan IsUnderway, General Says’, The New York Times, Mashal,‘U.S. Troop Increase inAfghanistan IsUnderway, General Says’, supra fn203. ‘USSays “Mother of AllBombs” HitsISILinAfghanistan’, supra fn188. ‘USReveals HigherNumber of Troops inAfghanistan’, UNAMA, Protection UNAMA, of Civilians inArmed Conflict, suprfn159, p3. Muñoz, ‘NATO approves troop increases for Afghanistan’, supra fn199;‘NATO to Increase 201

The use of this GBU-43 bomb was explained by the need to destroy bun- 206 204

Afghans nevertheless fear that troop increases will Comparedtothesameperiodoftimein2016,this 198

However, NATOchief,JensStoltenberg, Al Jazeera, 31August 2017, https://www. , 29June2017, https://www.rt.com/ 200

203 197 196 202

Report-

205 199

increased by5percentfromthepreviousyear. 16,290 securityrelatedincidents.Ofthese,64percentwerearmedclashes,which 43955107.html. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/icc-prosecutor-seek-afghanistan-war-crimes-probe-1711031 February 2018); ‘ICC Prosecutor to Seek Afghanistan War CrimesProbe’, AlJazeera, 3November 2017, 210 afghanistan?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other. 4 November 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/04/us-airstrikes-kill-civilians-kunduz- 209 2017, §15. Implications for International Peace andSecurity, UN docA/72/651–S/2017/1056, 15September 208 207 lombia andcertainarmedgangs,knownas‘BACRIM’. In addition,therehasarguablybeenaNIACbetweenthestate armedforcesofCo- the National Liberation Army. Peace Talks with the ELN started in February 2017. In 2017,Colombiawasinvolvedinanon-internationalarmed conflict(NIAC)with Classification oftheConficts 2. COLOMBIA: ARMED GANG VIOLENCE SPOILS THE PEACE PROCESS 1 July2002. were committedontheterritoryofotherStatesPartiestoRomeStatutesince the armedconflictinAfghanistanandaresufficientlylinkedtosituation of Afghanistansince1May2003,aswellsimilarcrimesthathaveanexuswith crimes againsthumanityinrelationtothearmedconflictIslamicRepublic Pre-Trial ChamberIIItoinitiateaninvestigationintoallegedwarcrimesand On 20November2017,theProsecutorofICCrequestedauthorizationfrom 1 May2003. Statute crimescommittedintheterritoryofAfghanistanorbyitsnationalssince Criminal Court(ICC)sinceFebruary2003.TheICChashadjurisdictionoverRome Afghanistan hasbeenaStatePartytothe1998RomeStatuteofInternational children. sources havereportedbetween13and55civiliancasualties,includingwomen lages. WhileAfghanforcesclaimnocivilianswerekilledintheseattacks,local November, airstrikesinthenorthernKunduzregionreportedlytargetedthreevil- United StatesairstrikesinAfghanistanreportedlysurgedfromAugust2017.In only prolongthe conflict. D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ICC, Preliminary Investigation, Afghanistan, https://www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan (last accessed 28 ‘NATO Troop Increase PlanDraws CriticisminAfghanistan’, supra fn198. S. E. Rasmussen, ‘US Airstrikes Kill Scores of Civilians in Kunduz Province, Afghans Say’, UNGeneral Assembly, Report of theSecretary-General: The SituationinAfghanistan andits 209 210 207 In the first eight months of 2017, the UN recorded 208

Ana BeatrizBalcazarMoreno The Guardian,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 55 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 56 (ELN), ongoing negotiationsbetweenthegovernmentandNationalLiberationArmy the MissiontoSupportPeaceProcessinColombia(MAPP/OAS) In its23rdreporttotheOrganizationofAmericanStates,SecretaryGeneral 2017 focusesonarmedgangviolenceinColombia. mines olence andrecruitmentofminors,aswelltheuseweaponsanti-personnel has been subject to extortion, confinement, forced displacement, gender-based vi- while violencehasdecreasedinthecountry, fn 216, p2. fn 216, 219 http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12825863. 218 217 of 959 fieldmissions carried outfrom 1August 2016 to 31January2017. American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS). The report istheresult 216 colombia-articulo-688480. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/se-desactiva-la-guerra-pero-la-violencia-sigue-en- 215 peace-accord/ (last accessed 6December 2017). January 2017, https://www.wola.org/analysis/many-reasons-united-states-keep-supporting-colombias- of theMany Reasons Why theUnited States ShouldKeep SupportingColombia’s Peace Accord’, 27 WOLA, as combat –a46percent drop from 2015, anda93 percent drop from adecade Isacson, ‘Some earlier’. A. Colombian security forces, guerrilla groups, or paramilitary groups died in situations that could be defined 214 al-fuego-150110. 2017, en-choco-146142; ‘Gobierno dice queasesinato deindígenaviolacese alfuego con Eln’,ElTiempo, 10 November http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/eln-reconoce-asesinato-de-gobernador-indigena- asesinato degobernadorindígenaenChocó’, ElTiempo, 30October 2017, murder of AulioIsaramá Forastero, an indigenous governor intheDepartment of Chocó. ‘Elnreconoce October 2017, despite theceasefire agreed withtheGovernment, theELNclaimed responsibility for the 213 y-el-eln-143860. http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/se-inicia-cuarto-ciclo-de-dialogo-entre-el-gobierno- 212 html?utm_term=.469da44c032a. congress-approves-historic-peace-deal/2016/11/30/9b2fda92-b5a7-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story. Washington Post, 30November 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/colombian- J. Partlow andN.Miroff, ‘Colombia’s Congress Approves Historic Peace Deal withFARC Rebels’, The http://www.vanguardia.com/colombia/381508-congreso-refrendo-el-acuerdo-de-paz-con-las-farc; 211 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), With the2016PeaceagreementbetweenColombianGovernmentand ed bythedemobilizationofFARC-EP. nature, whichdisputethecontrolofilliciteconomiesandterritoriesvacat- expansion oftheELN’spowerandappearancenewarmedgroupsadiverse A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT ‘Congreso refrendó elacuerdo depaz con lasFarc’, Vanguardia Liberal, 30November 2016 Ibid,p2. See UNSCRes 2381, 5October 2017. However, there are still some outbursts. For instance, on30 ‘Sedesactiva laguerra, pero laviolenciasigueenColombia’, ElEspectador, 8April2017, ‘Seiniciacuarto ciclodediálogoGobierno-Elncon firme cese elfuego’, ElTiempo, 23October 2017, J. G.Mercado, ‘Bandascriminales siembran minasen varias zonas delpaís’, ElTiempo 27 May 2013,

According to the Washington Office onLatinAmerica (WOLA), membersof ‘[i]n2016, the only216 http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/gobierno-dice-que-el-eln-viola-el-cese- Twenty-Third Report of theSecretary General to thePermanent Council ontheOAS Mission, supra Twenty-Third Report of theSecretary General to thePermanent Council ontheOrganization of 218 212 andimprovisedexplosivedevices. thepanoramaofconflictswithincountryhasimproved. 217 219 Inthissetting,thecivilianpopulation

214 itstillpersists. 215

The

216 213 War Report depictsan 211 However, and the

15 helicopters,someofthemBlackHawk,weredeployed. them asorganizedarmedgroupsthatarepartiestotheconflict’. al CriminalCourt(ICC)underlinedinits2012InterimReport,did‘notconsider tains thattheywerenotpartoforganizedcrimestructuresand,astheInternation- del-dih-bombardeo-las-bacrim/. RCN Radio,6May 2016, http://www.rcnradio.com/nacional/politica/gobierno-garantiza-cumplimiento- 226 gobierno-cambia-estrategia-las-bacrim-las-califica-grupos-armados-organizados-ordena-bombardeos/. y ordena bombardeos en sucontra’, RCN Radio,5May 2016, http://www.rcnradio.com/nacional/ 225 224 http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/03/150318_colombia_otoniel_usuga_uraba_nc. Mundo, 24 March 2015, 223 narco_mas_buscado_lv. Mundo, 1 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/04/150401_colombia_caza_otoniel_ 222 Report, November 2012, p3. 221 Publicaciones/Documents/LibroBandasArmadoWEB.pdf (last accessed 1December 2017). 2005-mediados de2008, June2009, p18,http://historico.derechoshumanos.gov.co/Observatorio/ Dinámica delasbandas asociadas alnarcotráfico despuésdeladesmovilización delasautodefensas: 220 In 2016,theColombianMinistryofDefenceadoptedDirective015, er oftheGulfClan, ing thepoliceforcetocaptureDairoAntonioÚsugaDavid(aliasOtoniel),lead- In 2015,theColombianGovernmentlaunchedOperationAgamemnon,mandat- actors werepresentin179municipalitiesof28departments. In 2008,theColombianGovernmentdeterminedthatthesenewtypesofarmed high-value objectsis…authorized’. national humanitarianlaw,thepossibilityofourmilitaryforcesbombardingthose the Interioraddedthat‘ifnecessary,withfulfillmentofallnormsinter- juridical securityformembersofthePublicForces.Inthisregard,Minister criminality, whichaffectsthesecurityofColombiancitizens;andiii)guaranteeing es tofulfiltheirconstitutionalmandate;ii)actingontheevolutionoforganized ment aimsat:i)establishinganadequateprocedurethatenablesthePublicForc- ers, infantryoperationsandmilitaryintelligence. forces tofightthemwith‘allthestrengthofstate’,includingairforcebomb- Armed Groups’(OAGs).TheDirectiveallowsthepoliceandrestofpublic level ofhostilitiesandreachedasufficientorganization–as‘Organized the firsttime,qualifiedsomeofthesegroups–thathavebeenimplicatedinahigh

N.Cosoy, ‘Otoniel, elnarco colombiano alquebuscan máshombres queaPablo Escobar’, BBC ‘Gobierno cambia estrategia contra lasbacrim; lascalifica como GruposArmadosOrganizados República deColombia Ministerio deDefensa Nacional,Directiva Permanente no0015, 22April2016. N.Cosoy, ‘Así es elmegaoperativo para lacaptura deOtoniel, elnarco másbuscado deColombia’, BBC ‘Gobierno dice quegarantizará cumplimiento delDIHenbombardeos alasbacrim, ahora GAO’

Office of theProsecutor (OTP), International CriminalCourt (ICC), SituationinColombia: Interim República deColombia yObservatorio delPrograma Presidencial deDerechos HumanosyDIH, 222 andtodismantlethisgroup,forwhich1,200policemen 226

225 Furthermore, this legal instru- 223 220 However,itmain- 224 221 which,for

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 57 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 58 ‘Government failstokeepcivilianssafeasnewthreatsgounchallenged’. Yet, Amnesty International has exposed in its report of November 2017 that the The WarReport2016). to theconflict,butwillnotbedescribedinfollowingsection(seeonFARC, por-disidencia-de-farc-84348 (last accessed 7March 2018). http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/funcionario-de-la-onu-en-guaviare-fue-secuestrado- 232 ment-fails-to-keep-civilians-safe-as-new-threats-go-unchallenged/ (last accessed 1December 2017). challenged’, 22November 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/11/colombia-govern 231 dispuesto-a-someterse-a-la-justicia (last accessed 8November 2017). http://es.presidencia.gov.co/noticia/170905-Presidente-Santos-anuncia-que-el-Clan-del-Golfo-esta- dispuesto asometerse alajusticia’, 5September 2017, 230 antioquia/seguridad/el-reto-que-tendra-agamenon-ii-AC6576640. 229 clan-del-golfo-101708. http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/lanzan-operacion-agamenon-ii-contra-el- 228 December 2017). August 2015, http://www.verdadabierta.com/rearme/5933-los-secretos-del-clan-usuga (last accessed 1 del-clan-del-golfo (last accessed 1December 2017); Verdad Abierta, ‘Los secretos del“Clan Úsuga”’,24 Golfo”’, 8May 2017, https://www.policia.gov.co/noticia/agamenon-operacion-que-ya-desmantelo-mitad- 227 for illegalones. United Nationsofficialwhowasworkingonaprogrammetosubstitutelegalcrops It continuestofightthegovernmentand,forinstance,inMay2017itkidnappeda mentioning thatthe1stFrontofFARCisnotpart2016peaceagreement. ELN, aswellcertainarmedgangs,knownBACRIM.Inthiscontext,itisworth The partiestotheNIACsin2017wereColombiaanditsarmedforcesagainst tice’, head oftheUrabeñosthathewishestosubmithimselfandallhismenjus- September 2017thatthegovernmenthadreceiveda‘cleardeclarationfrom David, alias Otoniel, the Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, announcedin process withthegovernmentanddemobilize.ReferringtoDairoAntonioÚsuga As result of these actions, the Gulf Clan has expressed its desire to enter a peace Despite thepositiveresultsofOperationAgamemnon, emnon II, unable to dismantle the Gulf Clan. Hence, in 2017, it launched Operation Agam- B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS Amnesty International, ‘Colombia: Government fails to keep civilians safe as new threats go un- Policía NacionaldeColombia, ‘“Agamenón”, laoperación queya desmanteló lamitad del“Clan del ‘ONU realiza labores para liberar afuncionariosecuestrado enGuaviare’, ElTiempo, ‘Desmantelar el‘clan delGolfo’ orden perentoria delpresidente Santos’, ElTiempo, 22June2017, Presidencia de la República de Colombia, ‘Presidente Santos anuncia que el Clan del Golfo está ‘Elreto quetendrá Agamenón II’,ElColombiano May, 21 2017, http://www.elcolombiano.com/ 230 butthatthiswouldnotmeanapoliticalnegotiation. 228 whichincludesanestimated250membersofthemilitary. 232

These dissidentarmedfactionsoftheFARC,thusremainparties 227 thegovernmenthasbeen 229 231

al) wasconsiderablylessthanthatsuggestedbytotalstrengthfigures. claimed thattheeffectivecombatstrengthofNationalArmy(EjércitoNacion- are difficulttoidentify. and which,duetotheirconstanttransformationschangesindenomination, displacements. trafficking organizations past, ithasthepotentialtobeverydamaging’. gence ofcommonviolence.Althoughwithoutthepoliticalconnotations fn 216, p2. fn 216, 243 Alto%20Baudo.pdf (last accessed 2November 2017). https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/140513%20Flash%20Update%20No%201%20 242 www.insightcrime.org/investigations/inside-colombia-s-bacrim-murder/ (last accessed 2November 2017). 241 comunas-de-c-articulo-646031. https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/valle/bandas-criminales-trata-de-personas-operan- 240 8-PAEC_277190. http://www.elcolombiano.com/historico/homicidios_bajan_vacunas_suben_dicen_en_comuna_ 239 March 2013, p1, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/la-seguridad/09714.pdf (last accessed 6December 2017). 238 term-survival-of-civic-rectitude-in-the-public-arena/ (last accessed 7March 2018). www.coha.org/neo-paramilitary-gangs-ratchet-up-their-threat-to-colombian-civil-society-and-the-long- Society andtheLong Term Survival of CivicRectitude inthePublicArena’, 17November 2011, http:// 237 Dinámica delasbandas, supra fn220, p15. 236 accessed 1December 2017). Ideas para laPaz, 2015, p5,http://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/5617efbc18756.pdf (last 235 org/military/world/colombia/colombia_army.htm (last accessed 7March 2018). 234 strength-detail.asp?country_id=colombia (last accessed 7March 2018). 233 Colombia (AUC)followingitsdemobilizationin2005, Most ofthesenewactorshavereplacedtheformerUnitedSelf-DefenseForces personnel andafurther142,450inreserve. In 2017,Colombiawasestimatedtohavesome369,100activefrontlinemilitary 1. ColombianArmedForces es, ment toidentifythenewtypesofarmedactorsthathaveemergedsince2006, The term ‘criminal bands’ (BACRIM) has been used by the Colombian Govern- 2. Criminalbands(BACRIM) 239 C. A. Prieto, A. C. LasBACRIM yelcrimenorganizado enColombia, Friedrich EbertStiftung, Policy Paper 47, J. Bargent andM.Charles,‘InsideColombia’s BACRIM: Murder’, InSightCrime,13July2017, https:// Council on Hemispheric Affairs, ‘Neo-Paramilitary Gangs Ratchet Up Their Threat to Colombian Civil Global Firepower, ‘2017 Colombia Military Strength’, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-

D. vacunas R.Marín,‘Homicidiosbajan, suben,dicen encomuna 8’, ElColombiano, 9January2014, Twenty-Third Report of theSecretary General to thePermanent Council ontheOAS Mission, supra Globalsecurity.org ‘Colombia –Army (Ejercito Nacional)’,GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity. OCHA, Colombia OCHA, –Desplazamiento masivo enAlto Baudó(Chocó), FlashUpdate no1, 13May 2014, ‘Bandascriminalespara trata depersonas operan encomunas deCali’,ElEspectador, 28July2016, J. D. Restrepo, Autodefensas gaitanistas deColombia’ Cauca enelBajo antioqueño,Fundación República deColombia yObservatorio delPrograma Presidencial deDerechos HumanosyDIH, torture,kidnappings,humantrafficking, 242 InthewordsofMAPP/OASreport,‘therehasbeenaresur- 236 238 andallegedlybeeninvolvedinenforceddisappearanc- 233 243 240 Inthepast,however,ithasbeen

‘socialcleansing’ 237 joiningforceswithdrug 241 andinternal 234

235

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 59 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 60 capture ofmorethan1,000itsmembers. streets andnearlyparalyseddailyactivitiesin36municipalities, For instance,inMarch2016theGulfClandecreeda24-hour‘strike’,whichemptied Los PuntillosandPelusos were recognizedbythegovernment as OAGs, ly known as Los Urabeños, Clan Úsuga or Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia), However, accordingtotheguidelinesofDirective015, 250 249 pistola-del-clan-del-golfo-87814. http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/entrevista-a-general-de-la-policia-sobre-plan- 248 ganan-el-pulso-santos-55358. La SillaVacía, 11 April2016, http://lasillavacia.com/historia/las-cinco-razones-por-las-que-las-bacrim-le- 247 246 com/archivo/documento/CMS-16583590 245 244 partments, showingthegreatestpermanence(highintensity)in165municipali- first semesterof2017,theBACRIMhadoperationsin275municipalities28de- According totheColombiannon-governmentalorganization,INDEPAZ,in 252 p2. fn 216, 251 supra fn241. their more hiddennetworks of “sicarios,” orhitmen.’Bargent andCharles,‘Inside Colombia’s BACRIM’, are athrowback to theirparamilitary origins.Butintheurban centers, theircapacity for violence lieswith itary operationsandthecapacitytoprocure,transportdistributeweapons. disturbances and tensions; have a command structure; the ability to conduct mil- structure andgenerate a highlevelofarmedviolenceexceedingthelevelsinternal activities are of national and international scope; who have an organized armed The MAPPreportnotes: icize thegovernment’sstrategyfordealingwiththesearmedgroupsas deficient. Twenty-Third Report of theSecretary General to thePermanent Council ontheOAS Mission, supra República deColombia Ministerio deDefensa Nacional,Directiva Permanente no0015, supra fn224 ,p5. J. León and Juanita Vélez, ‘Las cinco razones por las que las bacrim le ganan el pulso a Santos’, Ibid,p8. ‘Víalibre para bombardear alastres bandas criminalesmásfuertes’, ElTiempo, http://www.eltiempo. República deColombia Ministerio deDefensa Nacional,Directiva Permanente no0015, supra fn224.

A. L.Méndez,‘Ataques A. alaPolicía prueban queestán desesperados’: Nieto, ElTiempo, 14May 2017, León andVélez, ‘Lascinco razones’, supra fn247. For instance, ‘[i]nrural sectors, uniformed BACRIM armed withassault riflesstill patrol inunitsthat trend hascontinuedin2017. Afro-Colombian leaderstosuchviolence.AccordingtheCommission,this with concernanincreaseinthevulnerabilityofcampesino,indigenous,and of membersthispopulationinthefinalmonths2016andhasnoted bilization toassertrights peding the consolidation of community organizational bases and social mo- to replaycoercivecontrolscenariosinruralandurbancommunities, response tospecificlocalandregionalcircumstancescontexts.Theyseek mogeneous structuresandareabletotakedifferentiated,flexibleactionin ing notorietyfortheirattacksonsecurityforces.Thesegroupshavenonho- [a]rmed groupssuchastheClandelGolfo[GulfClan]orLosPelusosaregain- 251 . …[T]heIACHRhaslamentedtheriseinmurders 252 248 Thisledsomesecurityexpertstocrit- 244 onlytheGulfClan(former- 247 inspiteofthe 245 whose 250 im- 249 246

staying outoftheillegaldrugstradeonideologicalgrounds. natural resources.ItwaslongseenasmorepoliticallymotivatedthantheFARC, country’s sovereigntyandforeigncompaniesareunfairlyexploitingColombia’s The groupbelievesforeigninvolvementinColombia’soilindustryviolatesthe United StatesandEuropeanlistsofterroristorganizations. the drugstrade,oftenformingallianceswithcriminalgangs.TheELNremainson not acompletelyspentforce.Inrecentyears,ELNunitshavebecomeinvolvedin rebels wereabletospringoneoftheirleadersfromjail,indicatingthatthey 259 curity.org/military/world/para/eln.htm (last accessed 7March 2018). 258 257 256 http://www.cfr.org/colombia/colombias-civil-conflict/p9272 (last accessed 7March 2018). 255 homicidios-vf1.pdf (last accessed 1December 2017). homicidios, Documento no3,2017, http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/wp-content/uploads/Drogas-y- 254 December 2017). content/uploads/2017/10/Sometimiento-del-Clan-del-Golfo-Camilo-Gonzalez-Posso.pdf (last accessed 1 ramilitares ygruposarmadosilegales enelposacuerdo. INDEPAZ, 2017, http://www.indepaz.org.co/wp- 253 hands ofthesecurityforcesandparamilitaries. since declinedfromaround4,000toanestimated1,500,sufferingdefeatsatthe kidnappings andhittinginfrastructuresuchasoilpipelines.TheELNrankshave The ELN reached the heightof its power in the late 1990s, carrying out hundreds of liberation movement,formedwiththegoalofoustingrulinggovernment. with a strong emphasis on social awareness and justice. The ELN considers itself a Leninism aswellLiberationtheology,apredominantlyCatholicphilosophy leftist rebel group in Colombia after the FARC. ELN ideology is based on Marxism– Founded in1964,theEjércitodeLiberaciónNacional(ELN)issecond-largest 3. NationalLiberationArmy(ELN) ties of23departments. groups fightoverterritoryforthecontrolofdrugroutes. at thesametime,andnowmostviolentplacesaremainlythosewherethese changed theirmodusoperandi,generatinglessviolencewhilebeenmoreprofitable rebels inthelate1990s. 3,000 activememberssincedecliningfromitsheydayofbetween4,000and5,000 resources andreducedoffensivecapability.By2017theELNhadbetween2,000 The ELNremainedactivewithapproximately2,000fightersbutdiminished Ibid.

D. Renwick Felter, andC. ‘Colombia’s CivilConflict’, Council onForeign Relations, 11 January 2017, Globalsecurity.org, ‘Ejército deLiberación Nacional(ELN),NationalLiberation Army’, www.globalse Globalsecurity.org, ‘Colombia ––Army (Ejercito Nacional)’,supra fn234. Ibid. Fiscalía General delaNación, Documentos delaPolítica Pública yPolítica Criminal:Drogas y C. G.Posso,C. delasarmasysometimiento ¿Hacialadejación delClanGolfo?: Panorama depa - 253 259 Thegovernmenthasdeterminedthatsomegroupshad 257 However,inOctober2009,ELN 254 258 256

255

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 61 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 62

and injuredfivemore over elevendays. muertas-segun-ejercito-156714. http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/ataque-en-maguei-payan,-deja-al-menos-cuatro-personas- 267 tumaco/543843. http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/procuraduria-investiga-a-36-policias-por-masacre-en- 266 Rights ontheSituationofHuman inColombia,UNdocA/HRC/34/3/Add.3, 23March 2017. 265 2017, http://caracol.com.co/emisora/2017/09/01/medellin/1504302009_298659.html. 264 el-clan-usuga-contra-la-policia-86976. http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/analisis-del-plan-pistola-adelantado-por- 263 Item/ArticleAsync/524813?nextId=524819. encontradas sobre supuesto “plan pistol” en Bogotá’, Semana, 5 November 2017, https://semana.com/ curity forces by offering a certain amount of money to hitmen for each police officer murdered. ‘Versiones 262 del-estado-incendian-el-sur-de-choco (last Accessed 1December 2017). http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimas-seccion/desplazados/6576-grupos-armados-ilegales-y-ausencia- 261 cember 2017). 26 October 2017, 260 ment ofNariño. clashes between armed groups resulted in the killing of 13 persons in the Depart- In November2017,accordingtotheinformationprovidedbylocalcommunity, for HumanRights. ting excessesthathavebeendocumentedinreportsoftheUNHighCommissioner For theirpart,membersofthepublicarmedforceshavebeenaccusedcommit- selective killings, an crisis,framedintorturesettingsforallegedcooperationwithenemygroupsand communities andindigenouspeoplesoftheDepartmentChocóinhumanitari- In March2017,clashesbetweentheGulfClanandELNleftAfro-Colombian (alias Gavilan),itssecond-in-command. nounced anewGunPlaninretaliationforthedeathofRobertoVargasGutiérrez forces –theso-called‘PlanPistola’(GunPlan) In May2017,theGulfClanlaunchedaplantoattackgovernmentalsecurity used toimpedecommunitymembers’searchforfoodinisolatedareas. 500 personsandconfinement,asexplosivedevices,i.e.,personallandmines,were pointed towardsthepublicforces. FARC dissidentswereresponsible,butwitnessesandsubsequentinvestigations of illicitcropsintheDepartmentNariño.Initially,publicforcesallegedthat of sevenpeasantsandtheinjury20moreduringprotestsagainsteradication Procurator investigated36policemenand14membersofthearmyforkilling C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: ARMED GANG VIOLENCE SPOILS THE PEACE PROCESS

‘Cuatro muertos, cifra preliminar deenfrentamientos enNariño’, ElTiempo, 29November 2017, Verdad Abierta, ‘Grupos armados ilegales yausencia delEstado incendian elsurdeChocó’, 8March 2017, ‘¿Qué busca el “clan del Golfo” con el plan pistola contra la Policía?’, UNHumanRightsCouncil,AnnualReport oftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerfor Human The GunPlanisastrategy used by theillicitarmed groups, and also by Pablo Escobar, to attack these - ‘Procuraduría investigaa36policías pormasacre enTumaco’, Semana,13 October2017, ‘Nuevo“PlanPistola”anunciaClandelGolfo pormuertedealias Gavilán’,Caracol Radio,1September

Amnesty International, Riskof Forced Displacement inChocó, AIIndex numberAMR23/7356/2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr23/7356/2017/en/ 267 260 265 andsubjectedtoboththeforceddisplacementofmorethan Forinstance,inOctober2017,the(Colombian)Officeof 266 263 264 Later,inSeptember,thesame group an- 262 – whichkilledeightpolicemen El Tiempo , 11 May 2017, (last accessed 1De- 261

completely disarticulated. according todeclarationsoftheMinistryDefense,organizationhasbeen Los Puntilleros,ArnulfoGuzmánHernández(aliasTigre)wascapturedandthat, fn 216, p6. fn 216, 274 subaltern groups’. Posso, delasarmasysometimiento ¿Hacialadejación delClan Golfo?, supra fn253. narco-paramilitary structures thathave activitiesinColombia andoperate withanetwork of alliesandlocal 273 December 2017). decomiso-mas-12-toneladas-de-cocaina-en-la-incautacion-mas-grande-en-la-historia tación másgrande enlahistoria’, 8November 2017, http://es.presidencia.gov.co/noticia/171108-Policia- killed. Presidencia delaRepública deColombia, ‘Policía decomisó más12toneladas decocaína enlaincau- 272 justicia/delitos/jefe-de-los-puntilleros-cayo-por-reunion-con-una-mujer-134240. 271 FE4996997. http://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/los-pelusos-se-quedan-sin-su-maximo-jefe-en-el-catatumbo- 270 269 November 2017). 268 or byitsnationalssince1November2002,incaseswherenationalcourtsareun- had jurisdictionoverRomeStatutecrimescommittedintheterritoryofColombia Colombia adheredtothe1998RomeStatuteofICCinAugust2002.Thehas sos werecapturedordead; This isallnotwithstandingthat,bytheendof2016,mainleadersLosPelu- had takenplaceuptoNovember2017. tims ofthearmedconflicthadbeenidentifiedand62,843‘casesvictimization’ According totheSingleRegisterofVictims(RUV),atotal49,699individualvic- caribbean/andes/colombia/63-colombias-armed-groups-battle-spoils-peace. Spoils ofPeace,Reportno63,19October2017,https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america- Further reading:InternationalCrisisGroup,Colombia’sArmedGroupsBattleforthe groups includingcriminalgroups,dissidentsoftheFARCandELN. enous leadersofValledelCaucahavebeenthreatenedin2017byillegalarmed Organization ofValledelCauca(ORIVAC)hasannouncedthatatotal17indig- even ‘compil[e]listsofpeoplewhomthegroupsconsidermilitarytargets’. of cooperation,whichhasallowedthemtoadmittheircriminalactivitiesand groups. We should also considerthefact that thesegroups have shownahighlevel too soontodeterminewhethertherewillbeanewmanifestationoftheprevious ized networks Taking intoaccountthatthesekindsofillegalarmedgroupsoperateasdecentral- major OAG. D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

‘Por unamujercayó aliasTigre, jefe de“losPuntilleros”’, ElTiempo , http://www.eltiempo.com/

According to the Colombian Government, four of the leaders of theGulfClan have been captured or ‘“Los Pelusos” se quedan sinsumáximojefe enelCatatumbo’, ElColombiano, 16September 2016, ‘Elnreconoce asesinato degobernadorindígenaenChocó’, supra fn213.

Twenty-Third Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the OAS Mission, supra For instance, according to INDEPAZ, in2017 theGulfClan‘concentrated more than70% of allthe Registro Único deVíctimas(RUV), https://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV (last accessed 30 273 andthattheyhaveconstantlyreconfiguredthemselves,itisstill 271 270 This,inprinciple, thatinSeptember2017,theprincipalringleaderof 268 Furthermore,theRegionalIndigenous 272 wouldleavetheGulfClanas (last accessed 6 269 274

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 63 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 64 stated inNovember2017: 3. EL SALVADOR: HIGH LEVEL OF ARMED GANG VIOLENCE, BUT int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf (last accessed 7March 2018). 277 276 ReportonPreliminaryExaminations22Nov2012.pdf (last accessed 7March 2018). www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C433C462-7C4E-4358-8A72-8D99FD00E8CD/285209/OTP2012 275 Office oftheProsecutor(OTP)sinceJune2004. The situationinColombiahasbeenunderpreliminaryexaminationbytheICC’s tion pursuanttoArticle124oftheRomeStatute. crimes committedsince1November2009,inaccordancewithColombia’sdeclara- willing orunabletoprosecute.However,theCourtonlyhasjurisdictionoverwar NOT AN ARMED CONFLICT UNDER IHL OTP, ICC, Report onPreliminary Examination Activities 2017, November 2017, https://www.icc-cpi. OTP, ICC, Report onPreliminary Examination Activities 2013, November 2013, §118. OTP, ICC, Report onPreliminary Examination Activities 2012, November 2012, §98,https:// armed violence. en theimportantimpactoncivilianpopulationofvery highlevelof 2017 neverthelessaddressesanddescribesthesituationincountry, giv- armed conflictin2017,whichisacontroversialposition.The not meettheTadić siders that thelevel of structuralorganization of the armed gangs there does Despite thehighlevelofviolenceinElSalvador,The the RomeStatute. children toparticipateactivelyinhostilitiesunderarticle8(2)(e)(vii)of olence underarticle8(2)(e)(vi);andconscripting,enlistingusing of hostagesunderarticle8(2)(c)(iii);rapeandotherformssexualvi- (c)(i); outragesuponpersonaldignityunderarticle8(2)(c))(ii);taking under article 8(2)(e)(i); torture and cruel treatment under article 8(2) vember 2009,murderunderarticle8(2)(c)(i);attacksagainstcivilians non-international armedconflictinColombia,including,since1No- der article8oftheStatutehavebeencommittedincontext 128. Thereisalsoareasonablebasistobelievethatwarcrimesun- (g) oftheStatute. article7(1)(f); rapeandotherformsofsexualviolenceunderarticle7(1) vere deprivationofphysicallibertyunderarticle7(1)(e);torture transfer ofpopulationunderarticle7(1)(d);imprisonmentorotherse- 1 November2002,includingmurderunderarticle7(1)(a);forcible been committedinthesituationColombiabydifferentactors,since that crimesagainsthumanityunderarticle7oftheRomeStatutehave 127. …theinformationavailableprovidesareasonablebasistobelieve criteria. Asaconsequence,ElSalvadorisnotlistedasan 277 276 Asinitspreviousreports,theOTP 275 Ximena Mercedes Galvez Lima War Report2017con- War Report

been reported. population (approx.5,278people)andsofarin2017,2,705violenthomicideshave across theglobe. fact moredeadlythanthemajorityofarmedconflictscurrentlytakingplace annual violentdeathsofanycountryin the world,andsituationthereis in In recentyears,ElSalvadorhasbeensecondonlytoSyriaintheoverallratesof the civilwar. within ElSalvador.The majority of the present-day gangs appeared by the endof States toElSalvador,gavewaytheinstallationandexpansionofgangculture disclosed to the Salvadorian authorities) combined withthefactthatSalvadoriangangmembers(withcriminalrecordsun- October 2017, https://psmag.com/news/political-corruption-and-gang-violence-in-central-america. 285 284 violento-del-2017-con-40-asesinatos-20170926-0001.html. September 2017, https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/El-Salvador-vivio-el-sabado-el-dia-mas- 283 282 281 280 Michigan Press, 2009, p164. 279 Triangle of Central America’, 23Agenda Internacional Año34(2016), 84. 278 initials ofthemarathatcontrolledneighbourhoodormunicipalityandbroad sisted ofarrestinggangmembers,theremovalgraffitithatusually portrayedthe was thefirsttoimplementManoDura(‘IronFist’) homicides carriedoutbygangmembers.PresidentFranciscoFlores(1999–2004) The needforanti-gangpoliciesbecameevidentwiththeriseinviolentcrimesand ters annualhomicideratesthatevencomeclosetothoseofElSalvadorin2015’. 103 per100,000populationin2015.Noothercountrytheworldpresentlyregis- country registered an extraordinarily high intentional homicide rate of around El Salvadorhasbeenandstillisextremelyaffectedbyitshighrateofviolence:‘The flict society. strong stateandtheyouthlackedeconomicopportunitiesinfragilepost-con- to demilitarizeanddisarm,thecountrywasinpoverty,thereanabsenceofa When theSalvadoriancivilarmedconflictendedin1992,militarywasforced gang members. around two-thirdsofthemanyhomicidesregisteredin2015werecommittedby indication oftheirroleinviolenceElSalvador,officialstatisticssuggestthat of theNorthernTrianglecountries(Guatemala,HondurasandElSalvador).Asan is drivenprimarilybyaparticularelementoforganizedcrime:thestreetgangs gans hasabigimpactonthegrowthandexpansionofgangsinElSalvador. A. HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE

Ibid,81.

T. Diaz, ‘NoBoundaries:Transnational LatinoGangsandAmerican Law Enforcement’, University of

J. M.Cruz,‘How Political Violence FuelsGangViolence inCentral America’ , Pacific Standard, 27 Ibid,82–83. Cantor, ‘As Deadly asArmed Conflict?’, supra fn278, 84. Cantor, ‘As Deadly asArmed Conflict?’, supra fn278, 84. D. J. Cantor, ‘As Deadly asArmed Conflict? GangViolence andForced Displacement in theNorthern ‘El Salvador vivio el sabado el “dia mas violento” del 2017 con 40 asesinatos’, La Prensa Gráfica, 26 278 280 Thisledtowidespreadlackofsecuritythroughoutthecountryand,

283 284 282 AsnotedbyDavidCantor,theovertincreaseinsocialviolence Allegedly,corruptionwithinthepolice,militaryandstateor- By2016,theviolenthomicideratewasaround81.7per100,000 279 were being deported from the United policy in2003,whichcon- 285 281

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 65 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 66 Government, andthecurrentSalvadorianPresident,Sanchez Cerén,createdthe dently awake-upcallforthecurrentFarabundoMartiNational LiberationFront resembling thatoftheFARCinColombia. with stateauthoritiesand assassinating policeand military personnelin a manner when thetrucewasnegotiated)andthatMS-13issporadicallyignitinghostilities ing increasinglypoliticalintheirvisions,languageanddemands(notedespecially also suggestedthattherearesignssomesectorswithinthegangsbecom- 287 Seguro’, Naval Postgraduate Schoolthesis,2015, p1. cited by Carballo, C. ‘ElSalvador’s CrimePrevention Policies –from ManoDura to ElSalvador 286 violent deathsperdayduringthebloodycivilwarof1980s. imately 18violentdeathsperdayinElSalvadorexceededthe averagerateof16 vador reacheditshighestpeakofviolenthomicides,theaverage rateofapprox- The SuperManoDurapolicywasactiveuntil2014.By2015,theyearwhenElSal- government canbeheldhostagewithviolenceandcriminalactivity’. a ‘dangerousmessagewasbeingsenttothegangsandothercriminalactors: spiked againaftersomemonths.Withtheformergovernment’sentryintoatruce, members injail.Unfortunately,thistrucedidnotlasttheyearandhomiciderates of civilians,inreturnforbetterandlessrepressiveprisonconditionsgang ment, thedealwasthatmarasshouldstopkillings,bothbetweengangsand sored by the Catholic Church and in collaboration with the Salvadorian Govern- In 2012,atrucewassignedbetweenthetworivalgangs,MS-13andMS-18.Spon- area sweepsinsearchofgangmembers. negotiation withcriminals. tempts tosigntruceswiththegovernment,butlattersaysitwillnotgivein whether therepresentativeshadpowertoenforceit.Therehavebeennewat- tween gangswassigned.However,duetothetruce’sfailure,itremainsuncertain and negotiateconcludeagreementswasclearlynoticeablewhenthetrucebe- in ElSalvadorwerenotonlybad,butspectacularlyineffective’. their families.SonjaWolfclaimsthat‘theSuperManoDurapoliciesimplemented as gangmemberswhowerefreehadtoprovideforimprisonedand started usinghigher-calibreweaponsandtherateofextortioncrimesintensified overcrowding wasunprecedented;thegangsadaptedtorepressivepoliciesand maras retaliated by killing more civilians, police and military members; prison Unfortunately, thesetwopoliciesexacerbatedviolenceinthecountry,where and allowedtheapprehensionofthosewhoappearedtobeaffiliatedwithmaras. stituted thispolicywiththeSuperManoDurapolicy,whichwasmorerepressive 291 algunos-digan-que-estamos-en-una-guerra-no-queda-otro-camino.htm. camino’, ElFaro, 7March 2016, https://elfaro.net/es/201603/el_salvador/18180/Sánchez-Cerén-Aunque- 290 289 November 2017). www.insightcrime.org/investigations/el-salvadors-gang-truce-positives-and-negatives (last accessed 11 288 Cantor, ‘As Deadly asArmed Conflict?’, supra fn278, 84.

S.Dudley ‘ElSalvador’s GangTruce: Positives andNegatives’, InSightCrime,10 June2013, http:// S.Wolf, ManoDura: The Politics of GangControl inElSalvador, University of Texas Press, 2016, p72, Cantor, ‘As Deadly asArmed Conflict?’, supra fn278, 87. N.RaudaZablah‘SanchezCerén: aunquealgunosdiganqueestamos enunaguerra, noqueda otro Wolf, Mano Dura, supra fn286,p72. 290 286 From2004,PresidentAntonioSacasub- 289 Theabilitytospeakwithonevoice 287 291 Thiswasevi- 288 Cantorhas units ofgangmembersoperatinginthebordershavebeenreported. among othercrimesintheregion.Thedetentionandextraditionbysecurity der areaandreducethelevelofdrugtrafficking,organizedcrimepettycrime, neutralize criminalgangs,impedethemovementofgroupsinbor- It seekstomaintaingovernmentcontrolandpublicorderinbordercommunities, under-equipped torespondthechallengestheyface’. ment deficitinElSalvador,itspoliceandinvestigationserviceisoverwhelmed man rightsofinternallydisplacedpersons,noted‘adeeplyworryinglawenforce- ditionally, inherlatestvisittoElSalvador,theUNSpecialRapporteuronhu- 296 dades-de-que-las-pandillas-se-debiliten-con-el-modelo-actual-de-prevención”.htm. vencion’, 295 294 293 6 December 2017). Summary, 15January2015, https://app.box.com/s/qk24npw6f2fqhti9p7hfdermto3kfvu7 (last accessed 292 have thebroadestmembership,possessmostterritorialinfluence MS-13 andMS-18arenottheonlygangsoperatinginElSalvador;however,they ney General,thejudicialsystemandotherinstitutionsofthreecountries. posed ofmilitarypersonnel,nationalpolice,memberstheOfficeAttor- Task Force,themainobjectiveofwhichistocreateatripartitesecurityunitcom- By 2016,ElSalvador,GuatemalaandHondurasdecidedtolaunchtheTri-national Salvador, guridad CiudadanayConvivencia–CNSCC).TheCNSCCcreatedthePlanSafeEl National CouncilonCitizenSecurityandCoexistence(ConsejoNacionaldeSe- 299 298 https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/northern-triangle-countries-create-trinational-force. 297 aspx?NewsID=21984&LangID=E (last accessed 7March 2018). Damary to El Salvador,14-18 August 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. Visit of theUNSpecial Rapporteur ontheHumanRightsof Internally Displaced Persons, Cecilia Jimenez- members andthosewhoarefreeorcontrollingprosecutingcrime. security inpublictransport,cuttingcommunicationbetweenimprisonedgang cation, increasingstatepresenceinthe50mostviolentmunicipalities,expanding pressive, towardstheproblembyprovidingyouthemployment,focusingonedu- with itscurrentstrategy,willeverweakengangs,muchlesseradicatethem. the programmescarriedoutinmunicipalities,andthereisnowaythatthisplan, that norealpositiveresulthasbeenperceivedbecauseofthelackconsistencyin of effectivenessandnottacklingtheproblematitsroot,whichispoverty.Hestates aid workerslikeJorgeCastañedaGutman B. MAIN ARMED GANGS J. Pelcastre, ‘Northern Triangle Countries Create Trinational Force’, Diálogo, 9 December 2016, Ibid.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Armed Conflict Survey 2017, pp331–332.

Ibid. President of theForever Foundation inElSalvador. UN Office of theHighCommissioner for HumanRights(OHCHR),Statement onthe Conclusion of the R. Valencia ‘Hay cero posibilidadesdequelaspandillas se debiliten con elmodeloactualdepre- Consejo NacionaldeSeguridad CiudadanayConvivencia, PlanElSalvador Seguro, Executive El Faro, 25October 2017, https://elfaro.net/es/201710/salanegra/21038/“Hay-cero-posibili 292 which tries to envision a holistic approach, both preventiveandre- 294 havequestionedthisplanforitslack 296 298 293 299 However, andare 295 Ad- 297

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 67 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 68 have createda rival factioncalledMS503. the management of finances within MS-13, some of its ringleaders and members Minister ofJusticeandPublicSecurityhasconfirmedthat,duetodiscrepanciesin members in ElSalvador by 2012.Recentinformationoffered by the Salvadorian and murder-for-hirepurposes. or fulfilling subcontracts, with Mexican cartels liketheZetas transportation werekilledfornotobeyingthegangs’orders. lysed activitiesthroughoutthecountry,andduringwhichsomeworkersinpublic – withtheobjective of forcingnegotiationswiththegovernment–whichpara- denced in 2015, when they were responsible for a national transportation strike 2017). cias-sobre-crimen-organizado-en-el-salvador/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-perfil (last accessed 12November 305 304 2017, http://tiempo.hn/mara-salvatrucha-se-separa-surge-ms503/. 303 nized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-profile/ (last accessed 1December 2017). 302 mundo/noticias/2015/07/150729_america_latina_el_salvador_maras_pandillas_paro_transporte_aw. 301 www.elheraldo.hn/pais/954755-466/conozca-los-códigos-y-reglas-del-barrio-18-y-la-mara-salvatrucha. 300 Organization: the USandCanada. Honduras. ThisganghasapresenceinElSalvador,Guatemala,Honduras,Mexico, les-style gang culture to the post-conflict societies of El Salvador, Guatemala and convicted ofcertainoffences.ThesedeporteeseffectivelyimportedaLosAnge- the Salvadoriancivilwar,USstarteddeportingCentralAmericanimmigrants munities, andotherCentralAmericanimmigrantsjoinedrapidly.Attheendof means ofprotectingtheSalvadoriancommunityfromothergangsandethniccom- il war(1980–1992)andsettledintheUS1980s.Thegangfirstappearedasa MS-13 wascreatedbySalvadorianimmigrantswhofledthecountryduringciv- 1. MaraSalvatrucha(MS-13) codes ofconductandrules. considered themostdangerousandlethal.Eachgangalsohasitsownhierarchy, recurrent, evenwithinprisonfacilities. ‘Elparo quedemuestra elpoderdelasmaras’, BBC Mundo,25July2015, http://www.bbc.com/

S. Velázquez, ‘MS13’, InSight Crime, 9 March 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-orga Ibid.

B. J., Argueta ‘Por diferencias, laMara Salvatrucha se separa ysurge laMS503’, Tiempo Digital, 2May ‘Conozca loscodigos yreglas delbarrio 18ylaMara Salvatrucha’ ElHeraldo, 29April2016, http:// ‘Mara Salvatrucha (MS13)’,InSightCrime, 11 January2017, • • • • • Sicarios orgatilleros:membersinchargeofkillings Novatos andsimpatizantes: Maras permanents:memberswiththelongestexperienceingang Cabecillas, Organized inclicas:cliquescontrolofasmallterritory-neighbourhoods palabreros orranfleros:localleadersofthegang 302 Therearesaidtohavebeen12,000MaraSalvatruchagang 300 305 Themagnitudeofthetwogangs’powerwasevi-

rookies withlesspower 304 Allegedly,thisgangisformingalliances, 303 Theattacks between the factions are http://es.insightcrime.org/noti 301 for drug trafficking

temala, Honduras,Mexico,theUSandCanada. in CentralAmerica.Presumably,thisganghasapresencetheElSalvador,Gua- Salvadorian active gang members, thus contributing to the spread of gang culture dents withcriminalchargesweredeportedtotheirhomecountries,manyofthem ian refugees.UndertheUSimmigrationpoliciesof1990s,foreign-bornresi- against otherethnicgangs,anditincorporatedLatinosincludingSalvador- Union districtofLos Angeles, California. It was created as a means of protection Unlike MS-13,MS-18wascreatedbyMexicanimmigrantsin1959thePico 306 Organization: established linkswithMexicancartelslikethe 311 310 309 308 organized-crime-news/barrio-18-profile/ (last accessed 12November 2017). 307 ysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf (last accessed 6 December 2017). Caribbean: AThreat Assessment, September 2012, p27, Salvador. Drugs andCrime,by2012MS-18hadbetween8,00010,000membersinEl 2. MaraBarrio18(MS-18) UNODC, Transnational UNODC, Organized Crime,supra fn306,p28. Ibid. H.S.Ávalos, ‘Barrio18’, InSightCrime,13January2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-

UNODC, Transnational UNODC, Organized Crime , supra fn306,p27. Ávalos, ‘Barrio18’, supra fn307. UNOffice onDrugsand Crime(UNODC),Transnational Organized CrimeinCentral America andthe • • • • • • • • • • 308 North andCentralAmerica A hierarchywithincliques,butnochainofcommandforallmembersacross Divided intoclicas:localsubdivisions,whicharemoreorlessindependentofeachother In 2005,itdivideditselfintotworivalfactions:theRevolucionariosandSureños country Rueda debarrio:bringstogethertheranflerosof15mostpowerful clicas inthe Chequeos: rookies Soldados: subordinatesofthellaveros Llaveros: closepartnersoftheleaders Ranfleros: cliqueleaders tions fromjails,communicatingwiththecabecillasbymobilephone onment ofgangmembers,incarceratedmembersnoworganizetheirmainopera- As aresultofManoDurapolicies,whichhavecontributedtothemassiveimpris- on amaramemberfoundguiltyofinsubordination may includetherighttoactivate‘luzverde’,agreenlightdeathsentence Comision: formedbythenineleadersofmostpowerfulclicas,whosefunctions Allegedly,ithasacloserelationshipwiththeMexicanMafiaand 311

310

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-anal Zetas andSinaloa. 307 AccordingtotheUNOfficeon 309 306

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 69 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 70

decided toextendthemuntilApril2018. these measuresweremeanttoexpirebyApril2017,buttheLegislativeAssembly suspended transfersofimprisonedgangmemberstojudicialhearings,etc. suspension of visits in prison, temporary detention centres in different places and are thecreationofaspecialregimeinternmentandisolationgangleaders, return ofanti-gangdeathsquads. tate, thelawistokillordie’. ing centre’smottoseemstobe:‘whencollidingwiththeenemy,killdonothesi- discriminate way,trainedassnipersandtaughthowtodeploytanks,etc.Thetrain- agents, eachcomprisedoftheSpecialReactionForces,whoaretaughttoshootina the SalvadorianPresidentorderedcreationofthreebattalions200military sures’ accessed 2December 2017). of theIACHR, 12October 2017, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2017/157.asp (last 319 DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22412&LangID=E. End of hisMission to ElSalvador’, 17November 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 318 of Internally Displaced Persons, supra fn296. 317 316 315 http://www.prensalibre.com/internacional/el-salvado-se-alista-para-una-guerra-contra-las-pandillas. 314 February 2017, https://es.panampost.com/adriana-peralta/2017/02/13/salvador-medidas-extraordinarias/. 313 312 ly displacedpersons Human RightsandtheUNSpecialRapporteuronhumanrightsofinternal- In theirrecentvisitstoElSalvadorin2017,boththeUNHighCommissionerfor International CriminalCourton3March2016. El Salvador deposited its instrument of ratification of the 1998RomeStatute of the speech in2016havebeenacknowledged. Allegations ofanimplicitrecognition‘war’duringPresidentSanchezCerén’s excessive use of force by state agents and that it deems a countryvisitnecessary. Rights hasalsostatedthatitisalmostcertainthereapatternofextremely D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS NOT AN ARMED CONFLICT UNDER IHL C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: HIGH LEVEL OF ARMED GANG VIOLENCE, BUT A. Peralta, A. ‘ElSalvador extiende medidas extraordinarias contra pandillas hasta 2018’, PanAm Post , 13

Peralta, ‘ElSalvador extiende medidas extraordinarias’, supra fn313. RaudaZablah,‘SanchezCerén’, supra fn290.

Inter-American Commission onHumanRights,‘Report onthe164thOrdinary Period of Sessions Ibid. Prensa Libre, ‘El Salvador alista a su ejercito para una “guerra” contra las pandillas’, Prensa Libre, OHCHR, Statement ontheConclusion of theVisit of theUNSpecial Rapporteur ontheHumanRights OHCHR, ‘Statement by UNHighCommissioner for HumanRightsZeid Ra’adAlHussein atthe 313 implementedtotackletheissueofgangsandasafollow-uphisspeech, 317 werealarmedbyreportsofextrajudicialkillingsandthe 314 Amongtheotherextraordinarymeasuresadopted 318 TheInter-AmericanCommissiononHuman 316

312 Aspartofthe‘extraordinarymea- 315 All 319 ing theuprisal. munity, itfailedtobuildcloserelationswithlocalcouncilsand armedgroupslead- While theTNCeventuallygainedwiderecognitionfrom internationalcom- leadership oftheuprisalandpoliticalrepresentative Libyanopposition. members oftheexiledoppositionandhigh-rankingdefectors, toactasthemilitary tion, theTransitionalNationalCouncil(TNC)wasestablished inFebruary2011by www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/libya-fault-lines-of-the-revolution/ (last accessed 7March 2018). Research Paper 2013/RP, German Institute for International andSecurity Affairs, 4 May 2013, p9,https:// 322 accessed 7March 2018). p 7, https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2014/12/20/libya-militias-tribes-and-islamists (last 321 February2015.pdf (last accessed 7March 2018). uploads/2015/02/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-Barr-Dignity-and-Dawn-Libyas-Escalating-Civil-War- Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper, February 2015, p17, https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/ 320 various localcouncilsandarmedmilitiagroupsonacity-by-citybasis. violent crackdownoftheformerregimeonprotestorsledtoemergence the 2011uprisal,whichledtoousterofGaddafiregimelaterthatyear.The The currentproliferationofarmedgroupsinLibyaisanchoredthesettings groups vyingforastakeinLibya’sfuture. try, theseconflictingallegiancesandidentitieshavefurtherintensifiedwitharmed with localidentitiesaswell.Withgrowingcompetitionoverresourcesinthecoun- in theirlocalcontext,whichmeansthatideologicalandpoliticalagendasintersect identified withtheolderregime.Moreover,armedgroupsarestronglyembedded Gaddafi regime,inadditiontoconflictsbetweenrevolutionaryforcesandactors which insomecasesdatebacktodiscriminatorypoliciespursuedtheeraof sions betweenthehistoricalprovincesofcountry;tribalandethnictensions, tention fromotherfactorsthatcomeintoplay.Theseincluderegionalten- and Islamistcampssuffersfromoversimplification,becauseittendstodetractat- tribal lines.Thetendencytodepicttheconflictasarivalrybetweennationalist actors whoaredividedacrossdifferentideological,national,regional,ethnicand The ongoingconflictinLibyaischaracterizedbyamyriadofarmedgroupsand national armedconflicts. in 2017andthesituationLibyaremainsoneofaseriesoverlappingnon-inter- lamic StateinLibyaandtheAnsaral-Shariaarmedgroup.Theviolencepersisted armed groups,includingatleastthe‘LibyaShield’,groupofknownasIs- Since 2014,Libyahasbeenmarredbyarmedviolencebetweenseveralnon-state Classification oftheConfict 4. LIBYA: CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY CONTINUE groups orincorporatingthemeffectivelyintothestatesecurity apparatus,which A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theNetherlands,Libya: Militias,Tribes andIslamists, 19December 2014, W. Lacher, Fault Linesof theRevolution: Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya, D. Gartenstein-Ross andN.Barr, 322

More importantly,itdidnotsucceedindisarmingthesearmed Dignity and Dawn: Libya’s Escalating Civil War , International 320

321 Sari Arraf

In addi-

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 71 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 72 these groupsandZintanimilitiasthatinitiallyoccurredon a limitedscale. behest ofpoliticalalliesintheCouncil.Thiswasfollowed byclashesbetween Following theraidofGNC,Misrata-basedmilitiasmoved tothecapitalat Consequently, newelectionswerescheduledon25June2014. ment buildings,demandingpoliticalconcessions. groups alliedwithvariouspoliticalfactionsstormedtheGNCandothergovern- in peril.Thiswasevidencedonnumerousoccasions2013–2014,whenarmed basic functioningofthegovernmentandputtingviabilitystateinstitutions control overtheworkofparliamentandstateinstitutions,thushindering ly duetoexpireonFebruary2014–hadbeenhighlycontentious, ed. Earlierthatyear,theGNC’sdecisiontoextenditsmandate–whichwasoriginal- militias alliedwithHaftarraidedtheGNCanddeclaredlegislativebodysuspend- with thepurposeoferadicatingIslamistmilitiasinBenghazi.Twodayslater,Zintani Prime Minister.On16May2014,GeneralKhalifaHaftarlaunchedOperationDignity perceived asbackedbyMisrata-basedIslamistgroups,wasappointedthenew The situationofviolencedeterioratedinmid-2014,when Ahmed Maiteeq,widely 329 328 www.mei.edu/content/libya-congress-extends-its-mandate-until-end-2014 (last accessed 7March 2018). 327 326 325 27 October 2015, https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2015/10/27/282761 (last accessed 7March 2018). 324 Staff andtheMinistry of Interior. Yet, these armed groups retained aconsiderable degree of autonomy. Security Committee, whichwere, respectively, undertheauthorityof theMinistry of Defence’s Chiefof groups were incorporated into umbrella coalitions, mainlytheLibya ShieldForces andtheSupreme 323 ed tobearound200,000atthebeginningof2014. der control,andthenumbersoffightersongovernmentpayrollwasrecord- Council managedto stop statefunding for these armed groups or bring them un- Council (GNC).Yet,noneofthesuccessivegovernmentsthatemergedfrom In August2012,theTNCtransferredpowertonewlyelectedGeneralNational the governmentbutretainedahighdegreeofautonomyfromstate. disarrayed processofintegration,manyarmedgroupswereputonthepayroll had almostentirelycollapsedafterthefallofGaddafiregime.Asaresult aligned themselveswithcertainmilitias. armed groupshadbolsteredtheirpower,andsomepoliticalpartiesfigures (the NationalForcesAlliance)andarivalcoalitioncomposedofIslamistfactions which wasnarrowlydividedbetweenacoalitiongenerallydescribedasnationalist The decisioncameafteranIslamist/Berber/MisratanblocgainedcontroloftheGNC, the GNC’sfailuretoaddresscountry’seconomic,politicalandsecurityproblems. to conductanabortivecoupd’état.Thisextensionwasallthemorecriticizedgiven MiddleEast Institute, Libya Congress Extends itsMandate UntilEnd-2014, 23December 2013, http:// Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theNetherlands,Libya, supra p 7. fn321, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theNetherlands,Libya, supra pp9–10. fn321, Alarge numberof armed Gartenstein-Ross andBarr, DignityandDawn , supra fn320, p16. Gartenstein-Ross andBarr, DignityandDawn , supra fn320, p10. Ibid,p23. H. Salah, ‘Libyan Militias and the Quest for National Unity’ (in Arabic), Human Rights Watch (HRW), 325 Asaresult,armedgroupscametoexert 326 324

Infact,bythattimemany 327 leading Haftar 323 329 In In .328

the eastofcountry. now calledtheHouseofRepresentatives(HoR),toretreatcityTobrukin mer regimein2011.Theintensityofclashesforcedthenewlyelectedparliament, the controlofal-Qa’qaandSawa’iqZintanimilitiassincefallfor- ital, including the strategic Tripoli InternationalAirport,which had been under in ordertodriveoutHaftar-alignedZintanimilitiasfromtheirpositionsthecap- take controlofthecapital.On13July2014,theylaunchedOperationLibyaDawn This shiftleadtotheemergenceofacoalitionIslamist/Misratanmilitias,set capital, andcontinuedtoholditssessions the decisionwasrenderedunderpressurefromIslamistmilitiascontrolling political situationinthecountry.TheHoRrejectedrulingbyclaimingthat ruling delegitimized the newly elected parliament and further complicated the lished. WhilethecourtrefrainedfromdecreeingdissolutionofHoR, grounds aconstitutionalamendmentonthebasisofwhichHoRwasestab- On 6November2014,theLibyanSupremeCourtinvalidatedonprocedural split inthepoliticalinstitutionsofcountry. nounced thereinstatementofGNC,thusmarkingbeginningaharsh Two dayslater,formerGNCmembersfromthelosingIslamist/Misratanblocan-

Army, Abd-al-Raziqal-Nazuri. Operation DignityasanoperationundertheGeneralChiefofStaffLibyan expense oftheIslamist/MistranblocthathadpreviouslydominatedGNC. the parliamentaryelectionsinJuneresultedgainsfornationalistblocat com/news/world-africa-31698755. 336 libyaherald.com/2014/11/17/hor-says-operation-dignity-under-national-army. 335 politics-judicial-review-constitutional-amendments-libya (last accessed 7March 2018).. ConstitutionNet, 28November http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/caught-between-law-and- 2014, 334 news/middleeast/2014/08/tripoli-airport-2014823183122249347.html. 333 of-moving-the-libyan-government-to-tobruk (last accessed 7March 2018). Democracy, 24 August http://arsenalfordemocracy.com/2014/08/24/theoretical-implications- 2014, 332 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/22/libyas-islamists-go-for-broke/. 331 330 Ansar al-ShariainLibya(ASL)andthe17FebruaryMartyrsBrigade. tionaries ShuraCouncil(BRSC),anumbrellagroupofIslamistmilitias,including es. On20June2014,theyannouncedtheestablishmentofBenghaziRevolu- Benghazi, IslamistfactionswerepromptedtouniteinorderrebuffHaftar’sforc- by theHoRasChiefofStaffLibyanArmy. seized by Libya Dawn forces, which had gained control over most of the capital. M.Eljarh,‘Libya’s Islamists Gofor Broke’, Foreign Policy , 22July2014, ‘Tripoli Airport “Seized by Islamist Militia”’, ‘HoRSays Operation DignityUnder NationalArmy’, Libya Herald, 17November https://www. 2014, B.Humphrey, ‘Theoretical Implications of Moving theLibyan Government to Tobruk’, Arsenal for ‘Libya Names Anti-Islamist GeneralBBC News, 2March Haftar asArmy Chief’ 2015, http://www.bbc. S.Ibrahim, ‘Caught Between Law andPolitics: JudicialReview of Constitutional AmendmentsinLibya’, Ibid,p22. 332 On23August2014,TripoliInternationalAirportwas 335 On 2March2015,Haftarwaseventuallyappointed Al Jazeera, 23 August http://www.aljazeera.com/2014, .334 Inthesamemonth,HoRendorsed 336

330 Meanwhile, 331

333

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 73 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 74 of state and Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army. of Ministers,knownasthePresidentialCouncil(PC),whichfunctionsahead of airstrikes on ISIL positions in the east of the country. tians who were captured earlier in Sirte, Egyptian warplanes conducted a series a videoon15Februaryshowingthemassbeheadingof21EgyptianCopticChris- cember 2015. to theadoptionofUN-brokeredLibyanPoliticalAgreement(LPA)on17De- for keypositions. into theconsultativeHighCouncilofState,anewbodywithsayinappointments mate parliamentofthecountry,whereasmembersGNCwouldbeintegrated HoR and GNC would be dissolved. Moreover, the HoR would remain as the legiti- 344 343 political-agreement (last accessed 7March 2018).. 342 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52845#.WT_ARmiGOUk (last accessed 7March 2018). 341 cal-agreement-time-reset (last accessed 7March 2018). November 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/libyan-politi- 340 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-libya-thinni-idUSKBN0LK0WE20150216. also U. Laessing, ‘Libya PrimeMinister Callsfor International Strikes onIslamists’, Reuters , 16February www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/egypt-copts-libya-islamic-state-military-action.html; see 339 stockpiles-libya. February 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/egypt-air-strikes-target-isis-weapons- 338 http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-establishes-stronghold-derna-libya-1721425.2014, 337 GNC, joinedlaterbyindependentparticipants. sentatives ofthetworivalparliaments,Tobruk-basedHoRandTripoli-based a power-sharingdealbetweentheconflictingparties.Negotiatorsincludedrepre- The yearof2015wasmarkedbyUnitedNations-brokerednegotiationstoreach city ofDernapledgedallegiancetotheIslamicState(IS) first emergedinLibyaearlyOctober2014,whenIslamistfactionstheeastern In mid-March2015,ISILwentontoseizethecoastaltownofSirte.Thegrouphad calling it‘anassaultagainstLibyansovereignty’. militants inthecountry.Conversely,GNCcondemnedEgypt’smilitaryaction, Abdullah al-Thinni,whocalledforwesternmilitaryinterventionagainstIslamist tion receivedtheapprovalofHoR-alignedgovernmentledbyPrimeMinister which hadtobeendorsedbytheHoR, to theagreement,SerrajwouldheadGovernment of NationalAccord(GNA), Tripoli constituency,whobecameCouncilPresidentuponsignature.According members andispresidedoverbyFaiezal-Serraj,aformerHoRmemberfromthe UNNews, ‘UNWelcomes “Historic” Signingof Libyan Political Agreement’, 17December 2015, E.Banco, ‘ISISEstablishes Stronghold inDerna,Libya’, International Business Times, 11 October J. Stephen, MalsinandC. ‘Egyptian AirStrikes inLibya KillDozens of IsisMilitants’, The Guardian, 17 M.Fetouri, ‘Could Libya’s ISSuckEgypt into Endless War?’, Al-Monitor, 17February 2015, http:// Ibid,Art3. Libyan Political Agreement, as signed on 17 December 2015, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/libyan- CrisisGroup, The Libyan Political Agreement, supra fn340, p3. International CrisisGroup, The Libyan Political Agreement: Time for aReset, Report no170, p1, 4 341 TheagreementestablishedthePresidencyCouncilof 344 343

andthetwogovernmentslinkedto 340 339 Thenegotiationseventuallyled .337 342 338 The PC consists of nine Followingthereleaseof The Egyptian interven- of Libyaandstoppedengagingwithal-Thinni’sgovernment, the latter to condemn themoveand threaten to resort to court. the GNCheadquartersundercontrolofPresidentAbuSahmain,leading https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/07/28/presidency-council-members-in-ras-lanuf-for-deal-with-jadhran/. 353 abu-sahmain-condemns-state-council-meeting-threatens-court-action/. Ghwell “Government” Gives up’, Libya Herald, 5April2016, https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/04/05/ 352 rules-of-lpa/article/462105. 2016, http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/politics/op-ed-libya-s-state-council-meets-in-tripoli-ignores- 351 350 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-politics-idUSKCN0WW1CG. 349 un-proposed-government. Observer, 22August 2016, https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/tobruk-based-hor-gives-no-confidence- 348 347 346 345 with the GNC leadership. PC arrivedinTripolion30March2016,defyingthreatsfromcitymilitiasaffiliated The GNAinitiallyoperatedfromTunisiauntilSerrajandsixothermembersofthe affiliates. the GNAinrespondingtosecuritythreatsposedbyISIL,ASLandotheral-Qaeda thority butareoutsideoftheagreement.Itfurtherurgedstatestoactivelysupport and officialcontactwithparallelinstitutionsthatclaimtobethelegitimateau- welcoming theformationofPCandcallinguponstatestoceasesupportfor On 23December2015,theUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)adoptedResolution2259, terminals inRa’sLanufandSidrahreinstatehim. leum FacilitiesGuards(PFG)forcentralLibya,IbrahimJadhran,toreopentheoil In lateJuly2016,thePCreachedanagreementwithformerheadofPetro- all themorecontentiousgiventhatHoRhadnotyetapprovedAgreement. the NationalOilCorporation,alsorecognizedauthorityofPC. ities aswellthemainfinancialinstitutionsincapital,CentralBankand several local militias declaredtheir support for the PC. Many western municipal- GNA avoteofnoconfidence. of theHighCouncilStateasitsreplacement. 2016, a number of members declared the GNC’s dissolution and the establishment well asseveralarmedgroupsinwesternLibya. Saleh, GeneralHaftarandforcesaffiliatedtotheLibyanNationalArmy(LNA),as the GNC’sPresident,NuriAbuSahmain,andhiscounterpartinHoR,Ageelah on keycomponentsinthenegotiatedagreementwereleftout.Theseincluded of theimportantstakeholdersincountry,asmajoropponentswhodisagreed of thepeacedealwasduetoamajordrawbackinLPA:itdidnotrepresentall the HoRdidnotendorseGNAasrequiredbyagreement.Thestumbling K.Hanly, ‘Op-Ed: Libya’s State Council Meets inTripoli Ignores Rules of LPA’, Digital Journal,5April

Ibid;see also S.Ayyub, ‘Abu SahmainCondemns State Council Meeting, Threatens Court Action as Ibid,pp1–4. UNSCRes 2259, 23December 2015. CrisisGroup, The Libyan Political Agreement, supra fn340, p10. A. Assad, ‘Tobruk-based A. HoRGives NoConfidence to UN-proposed Government’, The Libya H.Amara, ‘Libya’s U.N.-backed Presidential Council Reaches Tripoli by Ship’, Reuters , 30March CrisisGroup, The Libyan Political Agreement, supra fn340, p20. A. Mustafa,A. ‘Presidency Council MembersinRasLanuf for Deal withJadhran’, Libya Herald, 28July2016, 345 By January 2016, most states recognized the PC as the executive power 349 Yet, there was no substantial military opposition, and 348 351 347 Thesessionhadbeenheldoutside ByAugust2018,theHoRgave 353 Jadhranhadtakencontrol 346 despitethefactthat 352 This move was 350 On5April

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 75 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 76 areas inthesouthandsomecellsaroundcountry. control inLibya,andbytheendof2016,group’spresencewasreducedtodesert to assumethe management of the facilities. Oil exportsresumedshortlyaftertheLNAcalledonNationalCorporation Sidrah, Ra’sLanuf,BurayqahandZuwaytinahwiththesupportoftriballeaders. ber, LNAforcesattackedtheoilcrescentareaandseizedcontrolofportsin despite heftypaymentstoJadhran,oilexportsdidnotresume. toll inLibyafortheyear2016. sulting fromtheSirtecampaignwasreportedtobe720,approachinghalfdeath 358 357 S/2016/1011, 1December 2016. 356 355 Relations, p5. 354 lied militiasseizedthepremisesof High Council of State. of theNationalSalvationGovernment,Khalifaal-Ghweil,andsupportedbyal- On 14October2016,arumpofGNCmembersledbytheformerPrimeMinister oil. TheseizureoftheoilterminalscostLibyabillionsdollarsinrevenue. of themainoilterminalsineasternLibyaJuly2013andlaterattemptedtosell country. the oilterminalincreasedtensionsbetweentwomajorarmedcoalitionsin at therequestofGNA. al-Marsous (‘SolidFoundation’),wassupportedbyairstrikestheUSAirForce campaign ledbyarmedgroupsloyaltotheGNA. port. On5December2016,SirtewasliberatedfromISILafterasix-monthmilitary the GNC-alignedgovernment. buildings andvitalinstallations,turnedagainsttheLPAbackedreturnof Presidential Guard,aforcecreatedbythePCinMay2016toprotectgovernment were-reported-in-libya-in-2016-libyanbodycount/. Libya Herald, 5 January 2017, https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/01/05/a-total-of-1523-violent-deaths- 363 com/2016/12/29/bm-forces-hunt-is-encampments-near-bani-walid/. Hunt ISEncampments near BaniWalid’, Libya Herald, 29December 2016, https://www.libyaherald. 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-security-islamicstate-idUKKBN15P1H1; see also ‘BMForces 362 speech.org/mapping-libyas-jihadists/#fn-3327-1 (last accessed 7March 2018). 361 Sirte%20from%20ISIS. http://www.thearabweekly.com/article/7388/Libya%20officially%20declares%20liberation%20of%20 360 supports-libyan-political-agreement. Libya Observer, 17October 2016, https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/presidential-guard-says-no-longer- 359 2016, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/10/libya-al-ghwell-haftar-government-national-accord/. J. Pack, ‘MappingLibya’s Jihadists’, Hate Speech International, 7June2017, https://www.hate- CrisisGroup, The Libyan Political Agreement, supra fn340, p25. CrisisGroup, The Libyan Political Agreement , supra fn340, p16. S.Zaptia, ‘A Total of 1,523 Violent Deaths Were Reported inLibya in2016: Libyanbodycount’, L. Watanabe, ‘Libya’s Political Agreement Reaching a Breaking Point’, A. Ben-Ibrahim, A. ‘Presidential Guard Says NoLonger SupportsLibyan Political Agreement’, The UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General ontheUnited NationsSupportMission inLibya, UNdoc M.Toaldo andM.Fitzgerald, ‘A QuickGuide to Libya’s MainPlayers’, European Council onForeign A. Lewis, A. ‘IslamicState Shiftsto Libya’s Desert Valleys After Sirte Defeat’, Reuters, 10 February ‘Libya Officially Declares Liberation of Sirte from ISIS’, 357 361 Sirte wasthelastsignificanturbancentreunderIS 363 359

However,thischallengefailedtogainwidersup- 356 At the same time, the capture of 360 Theoperation,calledal-Bunyan The Arab Weekly, 18 December 2016, 362 Thenumberofdeathsre- Global Observatory, 27 October 358 Someunitsofthe 355 On11Septem- 354 Yet, of LibyabytheNationalSalvation Governmentinearly2015,ordertostabi- by Jamalal-Treki.TheThirdForce wasoriginallydeployedinthesouthernpart An armedgroupfallingunder the authorityofMisrata’sMilitaryCouncilandled 4. MisratanThirdForce Libya Dawncoalition. militias and,togetherwiththeWesternShield,wasakeycomponent oftheformer part of the BRSC. The Central Shield Force is predominantly composed of Misratan Central andWesternShields.Theeasternbranch(alsocalled LibyaShieldOne)is dependent divisionsthatarenamedaftertheirgeographicallocations: theEastern, nally undertheauthorityofMinistryDefense.Itcomprises threelargelyin- An umbrellacoalitionofarmedgroupsthatwasestablished in 2012andisnomi- 3. LibyaShieldForces(LSF) 2017. held Saifal-IslamincaptivityforoverfiveyearsuntilhisallegedreleaseJune 365 364 or regional-basedarmedgroups. of Libya,itisinfactamixturemilitaryunits,formerpoliceofficersandtribal Although proclaimedbyitsleader,GeneralKhalifaHaftar,tobethenationalarmy 1. LibyanNationalArmy(LNA) most importantones. the partiestoconflictisnotstraightforward.Thislistanattemptname Given themultiplicityofdifferentarmedactorsinLibya,determination sent, thenatureofarmedconflictremainsnon-international. the unitygovernmentbackedbyUN.Asinterventiontookplacewithcon- As in2016,theUSlaunchedairoperationsagainstIS2017atinvitationof the LibyanNationalArmy,Ansara-ShariaandISgroup. ternational armedconflictsinLibyainvolvingamyriadofgroups,notably The UN-backedunitygovernmentisinvolvedinmultipleandoverlappingnon-in- other tribalelementsfromwesternLibya–toconfrontDawnforces. the so-calledTribalArmy–comprisingfightersfromWarshefanaregionand They weredrivenoutofTripoliasaresultOperationDawn.Somelaterjoined Armed groupsfromthewesterncityofZintan,whoarealliedwithLNAforces. 2. TheZintaniMilitias the countrywithcontroloversomepartsinCentralLibya. Chief ofStafftheLibyanArmy.TheLNAhasastrongholdoneasternpart launch of Operation Dignity. In March 2015, Haftar was designated by the HoR as B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT Ibid,p5. Toaldo andFitzgerald, ‘A QuickGuideto Libya’s MainPlayers’, supra p4. fn354, 364

The LNAcametotheforeinMid-2014with 365 They

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 77 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 78 last keycentreineasternLibyathattheLNAhasbeenunable totake. launched severalairstrikesagainstDMSCpositionsinDerna. The cityremainsthe lowing theterroristattackonEgyptianCoptsinMay2017, EgyptianAirForce to oustISILfromthecity,whichhassinceremainedunderan LNAblockade.Fol- of affiliatesinthecitiesDerna,SirteandAjdabiya. plan toexpanditsactivitytherestofcountry,laterleadingemergence al-Sharia inBenghazitoAnsarLibya.Thischangereflectedthegroup’s went throughaprocessofrebranding,changingitsnamefromKatibatAnsar new-head-of-operations-against-it/. https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/01/17/new-lna-air-strikes-on-derna-after-hafter-appoints-another- 370 369 368 367 nance-challenges-in-southern-libya-pub-68451 (last accessed 7March 2018). International Peace, 30March 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/30/insecurity-and-gover 366 lize communalfightinginSabha. ISIL and the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna. A coalition of jihadist militias that was formed in December 2014 in opposition to 8. DernaMujahideenShuraCouncil(DMSC) ed todesertareasinthesouthandsomecellsaroundcountry. Operation al-Bunyanal-Marsous.Currently,thegroup’spresenceinLibyaislimit- to seize the coastal town of Sirte, which was only liberated in late 2016 following 2015 by the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC). In March 2015, IS went on city ofDernapledgedallegiancetoIS.itwas,however,oustedfromtheinmid- First emergedinLibyaearlyOctober2014,whenIslamistfactionstheeastern 7. IslamicStateinLibya(ISIL) losses thathavewipedoutitsleadership. leading forceintheBRSC.ItannounceditsdissolutionMay2017,citingheavy ber 2012attackontheUSConsulateinBenghazi. group isaffiliatedwithal-QaedaandconsideredtoberesponsiblefortheSeptem- A radicalIslamistgroupthatwasoriginallyestablishedinBenghazi2011.The 6. FormerAnsaral-ShariainLibya(ASL) is limitedtothedistrictsofSabriandSoukal-Houtincitycentre. the Rafallahal-SahatiBrigadeandLibyaShieldOne.ItspresenceinBenghazitoday forces inBenghazi.ItincludedtheformerASL,17FebruaryMartyrsBrigade, An umbrellagroupofIslamistmilitiasthatunitedinJune2014torebuffHaftar’s 5. BenghaziRevolutionariesShuraCouncil(BRSC) considered tobeloyaltheGNA. positions intheregionfollowingheavyclasheswithLNAforcesmid-2017.Itis Toaldo andFitzgerald, ‘A QuickGuideto Libya’s Main Players’, supra p7. fn354, ‘LNAAirStrikes onDernaAfter Hafter AppointsNew Head of Operations’, Libya Herald, 17January2017. Pack, ‘MappingLibya’s Jihadists’, supra fn361. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,Libya, supra p17. fn321, F. Wehrey, ‘Insecurity andGovernance ChallengesinSouthernLibya’, Carnegie Endowment for 366 Thegrouphadtowithdrewfromsomeofits 367 Following theattack,group 369 It managed, half a year later, 368 Untilrecently,itwasthe 370

occupying the district. hazi, afterhavingmademajorbreakthroughsinJanuaryagainstBRSCfighters On 18March,theLNAfullycaptureddistrictofGandoufainsouthwestBeng- loyal totheGNA. almost allofwesternTripoli,whiletherestcapitaliscontrolledbyforces a numberofAmazighmilitias,laterjoinedbytheLROR.Itisreportedtocontrol ment ofKhalifaal-Ghweil.TheLNGiscomposedlargelyMisratanmilitiaswith 10 February,theformationofLNG,whichsupportsGNC-linkedgovern- the districtsofSabriandSoukal-Houtincitycentre. 374 www.libyaherald.com/2017/02/11/washington-alarmed-at-new-military-formation-in-tripoli/. 373 article/484881. http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/misrata-military-council-brigades-will-join-the-libyan-army/ 372 islamic-state. Guardian, 19January2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/libya-us-airstrikes-isis- 371 western Libya,resultinginthekillingof80people. On 18January,theUSAirForceconductedairstrikesagainstISpositionsinsouth- ern Tripoli,whereastherestofcapitaliscontrolledbyforcesloyaltoGNA. tions Room(LROR).Thecoalitionisreportedtoexertcontroloveralmostallofwest- number ofAmazighmilitias,andalsoincludestheLibyanRevolutionariesOpera- ment ofKhalifaal-Ghweil.TheLNGiscomposedlargelyMisratanmilitiaswitha A coalition of militias formed in February 2017 in support of the GNC-linked govern- 10. LibyanNationalGuard(LNG) Third Force,inheavyclashesagainstLNAforcesSouthLibya. hardline Islamists.Thegroupwasrecentlyinvolved,togetherwiththeMisratan and policepersonnelaswellmilitiamenofvariouspoliticalstripes,including hazi fromHaftar-alignedforces.Itiscomprisedofanumberanti-Haftararmy Formed inMay2016withthepurposeofsupportingBRSCandretakingBeng- 9.BenghaziDefenseBrigades(BDB) loyal totheGNA. the CentralMilitaryZoneof‘theLibyanArmy’,inapparentreferencetoforces Military Council(MMC)announcedthatallbrigadesunderitscontrolwouldjoin Rights Watchreport,theseincludethekillingandbeatingof civilians,aswell war crimes committed by LNA forces emerged shortly after. According to a Human fr/planete/2017/04/03/en-libye-un-mois-de-combats-tous-azimuts_1560242. 375 com/2017/03/18/update-the-final-fall-of-ganfouda/. C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY CONTINUE S.Ackerman Stephen, andC. ‘USPlanesStrike IsisFighters inLibya “PlanningAttacks inEurope”’, The ‘Washington Alarmed atNew Military Formation inTripoli’, Libya Herald, 11 February 2017, https:// C. Macé, C. ‘EnLibye, unmoisdecombats tous azimuts’, Libération, 3April2017, http://www.liberation. ‘Update: The Final Fall of Ganfouda’, K.Hanly, ‘Misrata Military Council BrigadesWill Jointhe“Libyan Army”, Digital Journal,31January2017, 373 372

Ontheoppositeside,acoalitionofmilitiasannounced,on 374 The group’s presence in Benghazi was thus reduced to Libya Herald, 18 March 2017, https://www.libyaherald. 371 On31January,theMisrata 375 Reportsaboutalleged

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line Islamists. police personnelaswellmilitiamenofvariouspoliticalstripes,includinghard- for HaftartobethefutureSupremeCommanderofarmy. ing HoR-backedGeneralHaftar,anditsmodificationarguablyaimstopavetheway PC astheSupremeCommanderofarmy,hadstalledpeaceprocessbysidelin- ous demandtodoawaywithArticle8oftheLPA.Thearticle,whichdesignates for returningtotheUN-sponsoredLibyanpoliticaldialogue,andreiterateditsprevi- the oilterminalsinRa’sLanufandSidrah. 2017, https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/tobruk-parliament-sets-preconditions-political-talks. 383 com/2017/03/14/lna-lose-21-dead-in-retaking-oil-terminals/. 382 for-elections. www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/3/9/libya-escalation-feared-as-pro-haftar-parliament-calls- 381 and-ras-lanuf/. https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/03/07/pc-sends-petroleum-facilities-guards-to-take-over-sidra- 380 libya-a-background/. February 2017, http://international.minbarlibya.com/2017/02/09/libyas-political-stalemate-1-chaos-in- 379 2016, https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/libyan-revolutionary-factions-form-defend-benghazi-brigades. 378 army-forces/ (last accessed 7March 2018).. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/evidence-points-to-war-crimes-by-libyan-national- 377 news/2017/03/22/libya-war-crimes-benghazi-residents-flee (last accessed 7March 2018). 376 summary executionandthedesecrationofbodiesoppositionfighters. from Haftar-alignedforces. BDB wasformedinMay2016ordertosupporttheBRSCandretakeBenghazi the BDB,resultingincaptureofoilfacilitiesRa’sLanufandSidrah.The Earlier inMarch,anattackwaslaunchedontheLNA-controlledoilcrescentby tions tobeheldinearly2018. As aresultoftheattack,HoRwithdrewitssupportforLPA,andcalledelec- called the 13th Brigade) and the BDB on one side, and the LNA on the other side. tilities insouthwesternLibyabetweenthepro-GNAMisratanThirdForce(now On 15April,Serrajcalledforinternationalhelpconcerningtheescalationofhos- sent aninfantrybrigadetofightalongsidetheBDB. in theattack,reportsindicatethatGNAdefenceminister,MahdiAl-Bargathi,had terminals fromtheBDB.AlthoughSerrajinitiallydeniedGNA’sinvolvement and orderingthatthoseresponsiblebebroughttomilitarytrial. LNA hasissuedastatementdescribingtheunlawfulkillingsas‘isolated’incidents, ‘Libya: Escalation Feared asPro-Haftar Parliament Callsfor Elections’, The New Arab, 9March 2017, https:// Amnesty International, ‘Evidence Points to War Crimesby Libyan NationalArmy Forces’, 23March 2017, A. Assad, ‘Libyan A. Revolutionary Factions Form Defend BenghaziBrigades’, The Libya Observer, 2June HRW, ‘Libya: War CrimesasBenghaziResidents Flee’, 22March 2017, https://www.hrw.org/ N.Missaglia, ‘Libya’s Political Stalemate: (1)ChaosinLibya ..ABackground’, Libya Tribune, 9 A. Ben-Ibrahim, A. ‘Tobruk Parliament SetsPreconditions for Political Talks’, The Libya Observer, 3April ‘LNALose Dead 21 inRetaking Oil Terminals’, Libya Herald, 14March 2017, https://www.libyaherald. M.Ali,‘PCSendsPetroleum Facilities Guards to Take Over Libya Sidra andRasLanuf’, Herald, 7March 2017, 379 Shortlyaftertheattack,PCsentPFGtotakeoveroil 378 381 Itiscomprisedofanumberanti-Haftararmyand By14March,LNAforcessucceededinrecapturing 382 InearlyApril,theHoRsetpreconditions 380

383

377

376 The

agreed totheannulmentofArticle8LPAandrestructuringPC. on 2May,whenHaftarmetwithSerrajinAbuDhabi.Thetwosidesreportedly country. The statement is said to have provoked criticism among GNA supporters. the armyprovidedthatherecognizedGNAaslegitimategovernmentof The foreign minister of the GNA subsequently stated that Haftar would be head of sponsorship oftheItalianforeignminister. Saleh, andtheheadofHighCouncilState,AbudlrahmanSewehli,under On 22April,ameetingtookplaceinRomebetweenthePresidentofHoR,Ageelah terrorist attackbytheIslamicStateon26Maythatledtodeathof30Egyptian to beasignificantshiftinthepowerbalance,favourofLNA. April, theLNGannounceditwasjoiningfightagainstLNAinsouth. news/2017/05/rival-factions-clash-libya-tripoli-170526154255187.html. 393 +Jufra+and+Misratans+%26+BDB+Withdraw; see also ibid. 7 June 2017, http://www.libya-analysis.com/?s=Power+Balance+Shifts+Towards+Haftar+as+LNA+Seizes 392 lna-takes-key-jufra-airbase/. 391 https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/05/25/lna-takes-tamenhint-airbase-as-misratans-withdraw-north/. 390 May 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-toll-idUSKCN18F2KA. 389 com/news/2017/05/libya-foreign-minister-names-khalifa-haftar-army-chief-170509154020813.html. 388 rapprochement-prospects-resolution-libyan-crisis-170525101108118.html\ (last accessed 7March 2018). the Libyan Crisis,25May 2017, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2017/05/haftar-sarraj- 387 in-rome/article/491073. http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/politics/op-ed-rivals-from-competing-libyan-governments-meet- 386 www.libyaherald.com/2017/04/16/ghwells-libyan-national-guard-militia-joining-fighting-in-south/. 385 herald.com/2017/04/16/hor-condemns-serrajs-foreign-intervention-call/. 384 tigation intotheincident. porarily suspendthedefenceminister,MahdiAl-Barghathi,pendinganinves- offensive wascarriedoutwithouttheapprovalofPC,whichledSerrajtotem- LNA inBrakal-Shati’resultedthedeathof141people,mainlyfighters.The On 18May,anoffensiveledbytheMisratanThirdForceonairbaseheld This ledtheHoRtocondemnhismoveanddecryitasunconstitutional. Force anditsalliesaftertheydesertedit. Jufra. Sebha aftertheMisratanThirdForceanditsallieswithdrewfrombasetowards ers, 17ofwhomwerereportedlysummarilyexecuted. to theGNAandGNC.Theclashesresultedindeathof52pro-GNAfight- In parallel,Tripoliwitnessedheavyclasheson26–27Maybetweenmilitiasloyal ‘LNA Takes Key Jufra Airbase’, ‘Libya Foreign Minister NamesKhalifa AlJazeera Haftar Army Chief’, , 9May 2010, http://www.aljazeera. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, The Haftar-Sarraj Rapprochement andProspects for aResolution of ‘Rival Factions ClashinLibya’s Tripoli’, AlJazeera, 27 May 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/ ‘Ghwell’s Libyan NationalGuard MilitiaJoiningFightinginSouth’, Libya Herald, 16April2017, https:// Libya Analysis, ‘Power Balance ShiftsTowards Haftar asLNASeizes Jufra andMisratans &BDBWithdraw’, A. al-Warfalli, A. ‘Death Toll Rises inSouthernLibya Attack, Defense Minister Suspended’, Reuters, 19 K.Hanly, ‘Op-Ed: Rivals from Competing Libyan Governments Meet inRome’, Digital Journal , 24 April2017, ‘HoR Condemns Serraj’s Foreign Intervention Call’, M.Ellawati, ‘LNATakes Tamenhint Airbase asMisratans Withdraw North’,Libya Herald, 25May 2017, 390 On3June,theLNAalsotookstrategicJufraairbasefromThird 389 Libya Herald, 3 June 2017, https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/06/03/ On25May,theLNArecapturedTamenhintairbasein 391 386 Thiswasconsideredbycommentators Abreakthroughinthetalksoccurred Libya Herald , 16 April 2017, https://www.libya 393 Meanwhile,followinga 392

384 On16 388 387 385

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2011, hasbeenunderanarrestwarrantfromtheCourt. murder andpersecutionofciviliansascrimesagainsthumanity,since27June warm relationshipwithQatar. called onotherarmedgroupsinBenghazitouniteandcontinuefighting. lution on27May,citingheavylossesthathavewipedoutitsleadership.Thegroup (last accessed 7March 2018). 402 401 accessed 7March 2018). Gaddafi, Case Information Sheet, libya-final-icc-ruling-gaddafi (last accessed 7March 2018). See also ICC, The Prosecutor vSaifAl-Islam 400 399 398 https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/06/05/beida-government-cuts-off-diplomatic-relations-with-qatar/. 397 reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-idUSKBN18N0YR. 396 ald.com/2017/05/25/lnas-derna-blockade-to-be-eased-for-ramadan/. 395 islamist-threat/. https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/05/29/new-egyptian-derna-airstrikes-as-cairo-warns-of-libyan- 394 tor, theZintanimilitiaAbuBakral-SiddiqBrigade,whichhaddetainedhimfor On 9 June 2017, Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi was released from his detention. His cap- uation in Libya since 15 February 2011, with Resolution 1970 (2011), Following theUNSCreferraltoInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)ofsit- airstrikes onIslamistpositionsinDernaandJufra. Copts intheEgyptianprovinceofMinya,AirForcelaunchednew Qaddafi domestically for crimes against humanity. 2014 theICCissuedafinaldecisionrejectingLibya’srequesttotrySaifal-Islam ey andweapons’. cused Qatar of destabilizing the country by supporting terrorist groups with ‘mon- are consideredkeyalliesoftheeasternadministration.Inastatement,HoRac- relations with Qatar following a similar decision by theUAE and Egypt, which On 5June,theHoR-linkedgovernmentannouncedbreakingoffofdiplomatic to theUNSC. Qaddafi, theICCissuedafindingofnon-compliancebyLibyaandreferredissue ment failedtoupholditslegalobligationcooperateandsurrenderSaifal-Islam (DMSC) oustedISILfromthecity. blockaded bytheLNAsinceJune2015,whenDerna Mujahideen ShuraCouncil rons arethelasteasternareasnotundercontrolofLNA,andDernahasbeen D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS J. Prentis, ‘BeidaGovernment Cuts off DiplomaticRelations withQatar’, Libya Herald, 5July2017, ICC, Warrant of Arrest for SaifAl-IslamGaddafi,Pre-Trial Chamber I,ICC-01/11, 27 June2011. ‘LNA’s DernaBlockade to beEased for Ramadan’,Libya Herald, 25May 2017, https://www.libyaher Ibid. UNSCRes 1970, 26 February 2011. ‘Libyan Islamist Group Ansar al-Sharia Says itisDissolving’, Reuters , 27 May 2017, http://www. ‘New Egyptian DernaAirstrikes asCairo Warns of Libyan Islamist Threat’, Libya Herald, 29May 2017, HRW, ‘World Report 2015: Libya’, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/libya HRW, ‘Libya: Final ICC May Ruling onGaddafi’,21 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/21/ 2014, 402 397 However,theGNAisunlikelytoendorsethismovegivenits http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/GaddafiEng.pdf (last 398

395 Onarelevantnote,ASLannounceditsdisso- 394 400 ThecityofDernaanditsenvi- Saif al-Islam is accused of the 401

As theLibyanGovern- 399 on 21 May 396

court inJuly2015.Hiscurrentwhereaboutsareunknown. cartel leaders. nents: themilitarizationofpublicsecurityand‘kingpin’strategytargeting (last accessed 3December 2017); Open SocietyFoundations, UndeniableAtrocities, supra fn407, p28. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/mexicos-worsening-war-without-name 409 Para Resolverlos (2006-2012), Debate, 2013, pp27, 66. 408 tion-20160808.pdf (last accessed 6December 2017). 2016, p23,https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/undenialble-atrocities-2nd-edi 407 406 abstract&did=800584 (last accessed 3December 2017). R41576, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 25April2017, https://www.hsdl.org/? 405 (last accessed 3December 2017). 404 www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/11/gaddafi-son-saif-al-islam-freed-by-libyan-militia. 403 2006. Calderón steppedupthispolicybyinitiatinganaggressive‘warondrugs’in drug trafficking,withthesupportofUS,since1930s,PresidentFelipe Although theMexicanGovernmenthasimplementedrepressivepoliciesagainst violent organizedcriminalgroups”. Mexico isknownasthehomeof“thehemisphere’slargest,mostsophisticatedand tion. Itisimportanttonotethatthisclassificationcontroversial. armed conflicts with at least theSinaloaCartel and the Jalisco Cartel New Genera- In 2017,Mexico’ssecurityforceswerearguablyengagedinnon-international Classification oftheConfict 5. MEXICO: ARMED GANG VIOLENCE SLIDING INTO as thereasonforhisrelease. more thanfiveyears,citedanamnestylawpassedthepreviousyearbyHoR threat tonationalsecurity, the UnitedStates. the region. and traffickingactivitiescreatinglinkswithothercriminalorganizationsin operating inthecountryforoveracentury,originallydevelopingdrugproduction A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT ARMED CONFLICT? OpenSocietyFoundations, UndeniableAtrocities: Confronting Crimesagainst HumanityinMexico , C. Stephen, C. ‘Gaddafi SonSaifal-IslamFreed by Libyan Militia’,The Guardian, 11 June 2017, https:// J. S.Beittel, Mexico: Organized CrimeandDrugTrafficking Organizations, CRS Report for Congress InSightCrime,‘Mexico Profile’, https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/mexico/ F. Calderón Hinojosa,Los Retos QueEnfrentamos: F. Enciso, ‘Mexico’s Worsening War Without aName’,International CrisisGroup, 15June2017, InSightCrime,‘Mexico Profile’, supra fn404;Beittel, ‘Mexico’, supra fn405, p8. 407 The Calderón administrationidentifiedorganizedcrime as anexistential 405 Bythe1980s,Mexicohadbecomeamajordrugsmugglingrouteto 409 406 408 403 anditsstrategytocombatithadtwomaincompo-

He wassentencedtodeathinabsentiabyaTripoli 404 Organizedcriminalorganizationshavebeen Los Problemas deMéxico yLasPolíticas Públicas

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PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 83 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 84 failed andhecontinuedthemilitarizedsecuritystrategyofhispredecessors. shift inthegovernment’sapproachtoorganizedcrime.However,mostofhisreforms current President,EnriquePeñaNieto,tookofficein2013,hepromisedaparadigm ico’s criminal landscape was dominated by four major drug trafficking organizations ico’s criminallandscapewasdominatedbyfourmajordrugtraffickingorganizations performing tasks traditionally carried out by civilian forces in 2012. ly tookovercontrolofthepolice,resultinginatotal32,000militarypersonnel theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/mexico-drug-cartels-sinaloa-jalisco-colima. Cartels Left”: Rivals ClashinMexico’s Murder Capital’, The Guardian , 28November 2016, http://www. gangs-get-smaller-and-diversify-why-murder-mexico-rising-again; D. Agren, ‘“The OnlyTwo Powerful Is RisingAgain’, The Economist, 11 May 2017, https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21721973- americas/as-mexico-arrests-kingpins-cartels-splinter-and-violence-spikes.html; ‘Why Murder inMexico Violence Surges’, The New York Times, 12August 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/world/ Undeniable Atrocities, supra fn407, p28;W. Neuman,‘As DrugKingpins Fall inMexico, Cartels Fracture and 416 (last accessed 3December 2017). https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/bloody-attack-police-mexico-raises-jalisco-cartel-profile/ ter; D. Gagne, ‘Bloody Attack on Police in Mexico Raises Jalisco Cartel’s Profile’, InSight Crime, 8 April 2015, theguardian.com/world/2015/may/04/mexico-declares-war-rising-drug-cartel-downs-military-helicop All-Out War After RisingDrugCartel Downs Military Helicopter’, The Guardian, 4May 2015, http://www. com/world/2017/feb/10/mexico-helicopter-gun-drug-cartel-leader-killed; J. Tuckman, ‘Mexico Declares Gunship to KillAlleged Cartel Leader andMembers’, The Guardian, 10 February 2017, http://www.theguardian. 415 allowing-army-to-act-as-police. 2017, https://apnews.com/df692c0bf88c449dada36616408d8e89/Mexican-congress-approves-law- 414 Armed Conflict Survey 2017, pp348–350. Foundations, 413 29 December 22. 2014, § Inhuman orDegrading Treatment orPunishmentonHisMission to Mexico, UNdocA/HRC/28/68/Add.3 412 411 410 sion wars or for control over territory or lucrative criminal activities. an ever-increasingnumberofsplintergroups,fightingamongsteachotherinsucces- increase inviolence.Astheirleaderswereeliminated,thelargecartelsfragmentedinto mid-level cartelleaders–alsohaddramaticconsequencesandresultedinageneralized The secondelementofCalderón’sstrategy–thetargetingandeliminationhigh- 45,000 overhistermofoffice. country, increasingthenumberoftroopsengagedincombatingdrugtraffickingto First, PresidentCalderóndeployedthearmedforcesonalargescalethroughout cartels andthearmedforces,includingseveralclashesin2017. tics. Thisledtoanarmsraceandincreasingclashesofhighintensitybetweenthe ment attacks,thecartelsresistedandexpandedtheirarmaments,trainingtac- led toageneralincreaseinviolence.Inresponsethegrowingnumberofgovern- and intelligenceequipment. were alsogreatlyincreased,includingupgradesinweapons,ammunitions,vehicles tarization ofthecountry. enforcement dutiesindefinitely,raisingseriousconcernsaboutthefurthermili- recently, theMexicanparliamentapprovedabillallowingarmytoperformlaw Ibid,pp57–58. InSightCrime,‘Mexico Profile’, supra fn404;Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p3;OpenSociety Enciso, ‘Mexico’s Worsening War Without aName’,supra fn409;‘Mexican MarinesUse Helicopter UNHumanRightsCouncil (HRC), Report of theSpecial Rapporteur onTorture andOtherCruel, Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p9;InSightCrime,‘Mexico Profile’, supra fn404;OpenSocietyFoundations, M.Stevenson, ‘Mexican Congress Approves Law Allowing Army to Act asPolice’, AP,30November OpenSocietyFoundations, UndeniableAtrocities, supra fn407, p58. Undeniable Atrocities, supra fn 407, p 57; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 414 However,insteadofreducingit,thismilitarizedstrategy 411 410 Militarycommandersandex-commanderswide- Thebudgetandresourcesdedicatedtothemilitary 415 416 Whereas Mex- 412 When the 413 Very

428 Society Foundations, UndeniableAtrocities, supra fn407, p33. flicts inAfghanistan(2,000)andIraq(4,000). (13,000), WorldWarI(53,000),theKoreanConflict(36,000)andcurrentcon- including theUSWarofIndependence(4,000),Mexican–American pass thetotaldeathtollofUScasualtiesinothermajorconflictsaroundworld, splintered gangsacrossthecountry. Indeed, therecentsurgeinviolenceisattributedtoincreasingbattlesbetween recent years:theJaliscoCartelNewGeneration(CJNG). va CartelandLaFamiliaMichoacana,oneorganizationhasrisentoprominencein tained prominenceovertheyears,includingSinaloaCartel,GulfBeltranLey- support of,corruptgovernmentofficialsormembersofthesecurityforces. spread corruption,mostofthesecartelsoperatewithoutinterferencefrom,orwiththe kidnapping, fueltheft,humansmugglingandarmstrafficking,etc. have diversifiedtheircriminalactivitiestogeneraterevenue,expandingextortion, do nothavetheresourcesandconnectionsrequiredforfull-scaledrugoperations,they 425 Atrocities, supra fn407, p36. 424 http://uk.businessinsider.com/mexicos-bloody-drug-related-violence-has-surged-to-a-new-record-2017-7. 423 justiceinmexico.org/drug-violence-mexico-data-analysis-2016/ (last accessed 4December 2017). 422 421 420 Name’, supra fn409. 419 418 417 2006 exceeds100,000,with23,000fatalitiesin2016alone. In absolutenumbers,thetotalnumberofkillingslinkedtowarondrugssince nearly 23,000murdersin2011. with theonsetofCalderón’s‘warondrugs’,risingtoanunprecedentedpeak ing homicideratesinthecountry.In2006,dramaticallyincreased The evolutionoftheviolencerelatedtoorganizedcrimecanbetracedbyexamin- nal groupsoperatingacrossthecountrytoday. dominant organizationslaterinthe2000s,thenintoaround60to80competingcrimi- in theearly2000s,theseorganizationsrepeatedlyfractured,fragmentingintoseven 427 426 Violence’, supra fn423. half ofallhomicidesinMexicoarerelatedtoorganizedcrime, strongest instatesthataremostaffectedbytheactivitiesofcriminalgroups. again in2016–2017. Mexico, withatotalof13,729murders. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p9. IISS, Armed Conflict Survey 2017 Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, Summary. ‘Why Murder inMexico IsRisingAgain’, supra fn416; Enciso, ‘Mexico’s Worsening War Without a C. Woody, C. ‘Mexico’s BloodyDrug-Related Violence HasSurged to aNew Record’ Business, 26 Insider July2017, Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, Summary;IISS, Armed IISS, Armed Justice inMexico, DrugViolence inMexico: Data andAnalysisThrough 2016, 2017, p2,https:// Justice inMexico, DrugViolence inMexico, supra p5. fn422, ‘Why Murder inMexico Is Rising Again’, supra fn416. Justice inMexico, DrugViolence inMexico, supra p5;OpenSocietyFoundations, fn422, Undeniable InSightCrime,‘Mexico Profile’, supra fn404;Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p6. Conflict Survey 422 Thefirsthalfof2017sawthehighesttolleverrecordedin 2017 , supra Beittel, fn413, Mexico p344; , supra fn405, 10. , supra fn413, Woody, pp344–345; ‘Mexico’s BloodyDrug-Related 421 Afteradeclinein2012–2014,theratespeaked 426 423 Itisestimatedthataroundone-thirdtoa 417 428 Conflict Survey Nevertheless,certaingroupshavere- 418 In addition, as smaller groups Inaddition,assmallergroups 2017 427 Thesenumberssur- , supra fn413, p5;Open 424 419 andtherisewas Relyingonwide- 420 425

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 85 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 86 fragmentation grenades,rocketsandanti-personnelmines. tels orwithsecurityforcesinvolveheavyweaponry,includinghigh-poweredrifles, to protectthemselves.Itdoesnothaveahierarchicalstructure, butratheroperates some ofthetopleadersMexicancriminalorganizationsthat operateinconcert news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/ (last accessed 4December 2017). 433 org/en/countries/americas/mexico/report-mexico/ (last accessed 3December 2017). 432 431 accessed 4December 2017). https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-weapons-seizures-map-out-cartel-firepower/ (last 430 429 organization intheWesternhemisphere’. The SinaloaCartelisconsidered‘thelargestandmostpowerful drugtrafficking 2. TheSinaloaCartel ized intheMinistryofInterior. ing wascreatedwithintheFederalPoliceandcontroloversecurityrecentral- rise in2017.Itisreportedthat a gendarmerieof5,000officerswith military train- The numberofsoldiersandmarinesengagedinsecurityoperationscontinuedto 1. MexicanSecurityForces parties totheconflictsinMexico. mentioned inthissectionforinformationpurposesandarenotconsideredtobe are partiestotheconflictwithMexicanarmedforces.Theothergroups is debated.The The qualificationofthesituationinMexicoasanarmedconflictregulatedbyIHL and thestate’sresponsetoorganizedcrime. ian population as ‘collateraldamage’ of boththe clashes between criminal groups armed forces,involving heavy weaponry on bothsides; a major impact on the civil- criminal activities; violent confrontationsbetween criminal groupsandthestate groups fighting over control of lucrative business opportunities from diverse as: violent battles between heavily armedandincreasinglyfragmentedcriminal In sum,theviolencerelatedtoorganizedcrimeinMexicocanbecharacterized lic hangingofmutilatedcorpses,tortureandcarbombs,etc. by thecartelsareparticularlybrutal,includingbeheadings,dismemberments,pub- terms ofnumberscasualties,butalsointheformviolence.Thetacticsused The violencerelatedtoorganizedcrimeinMexicoisunprecedentednotonly against governmentofficials,politicalcandidatesandthemedia. olence isnotlimitedtoprotectingtheircriminalactivities,butalsoincludesattacks B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p2;Justice inMexico, Drug Violence inMexico, supra p2. fn422, J. F. Gutiérrez, ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, InSightCrime,https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime- Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p3;Amnesty International, ‘Mexico 2016/2017’, https://www.amnesty. A. Angel,‘Mexico’s A. Weapons Seizures MapOutCartel Firepower’, InSightCrime,16October 2015, Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p1. War ReportsubmitsthatatleasttheSinaloaCartelandCJNG 432 433 Thiscartelconsistsofanalliance 430 429 Inaddition,cartelvi- Clashesbetweencar- 431 in May2015. forces, especiallyin2015,includingtheshootingdownofamilitaryhelicopter The CJNGhasconductedseveralhigh-intensityattacksagainstthestatesecurity provide arms to self-defence groups. ing machinegunsandrocket-propelledgrenadelaunchers,itisbelievedto jor battlesinColima. cially challengedtheSinaloaCartelforcontroloverstrategicareas,leadingtoma- growing rapidly,havingexpandeditsoperationsto14statesin2016.Ithasespe- operations. es andinternalalliances,ratherthanresortingtoarmedforce. tends torelyonconnectionsatthehighestlevels,corruptionofsecurityforc- ising toridareasunderits‘control’ofcompetingcriminalgroups. relations campaignandappealtocitizensthroughidealisticpropaganda,prom- sive groups,willingtoconfrontbothrivalsintheunderworldandfederalforces’. established itsreputationas‘oneofthecountry’sfastestgrowingandmostaggres- accessed 4December 2017). https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/mexico-selects-army-general-to-lead-operation-jalisco/ (last 447 446 445 bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40480405. 444 443 nized-crime-news/jalisco-cartel-new-generation/ (last accessed 4December 2017). 442 441 440 439 438 437 436 435 434 The CJNGemergedin2010asasplintergroupoftheSinaloaCartel. 3. TheJaliscoCartelNewGeneration(CJNG) like afederationofseparatebutcooperatingorganizations. continues toexpandandremains‘themostnotoriousMexicancartel’. the governmentrecentlylaunched‘OperationJalisco’todismantlegroup. trafficking andothercriminalactivities. control ofcertainregions. recent yearsithasbeeninvolvedinviolentturfwarswithothercartelsoverthe world andhasdominatedtheconflictsinwhichitwasinvolved. lenges fromothergroups,butitremainsthedominantforceinMexico’sunder- Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p13. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p24. Gutiérrez, ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, supra fn433. Gutiérrez, ‘Sinaloa Cartel’, supra fn433. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, pp10, 22. Agren, ‘«The OnlyTwo Powerful Cartels Left»’, supra fn416. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p10. Ibid. M.Lohmuller, ‘“Operation Jalisco” inMexico: New General, SamePolice’, InSightCrime,6May 2015, Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p23. InSightCrime,‘Jalisco Cartel -New Generation https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-orga (CJNG)’, Ibid,10. D. Tucker, ‘Mexico’s Most-Wanted: AGuideto theDrugCartels’, BBC News, 5July2017, http://www. Agren ‘«The OnlyTwo Powerful Cartels Left»’, supra fn416. 445 441 Currently,despitethecaptureofsomeitstopleaders,cartel Thegrouphasaccesstohighlysophisticatedarmaments,includ- 444 Italsohascontactsacrosstheworldforitsdrugtrafficking 436 Ithaswideinternationalreachandcontactsfordrug 442 The CJNG is also notorious for its public 437 Currently,thecartelfacesseriouschal- 434 TheSinaloaCartel 435 438 Nevertheless,in 443 Thegroupis 439 446 Itrapidly However, 447 440

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 87 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 88 gic planningofoperations. weapons andcommunicationstechnologies,strictmilitarydisciplinestrate- by itsstronglogisticalsophisticationandmilitarytraining,includingcutting-edge Sinaloa Cartel.Constitutedbyformerarmymembers,thegroupischaracterized They alsobecameinvolvedinnumerousothercartelwars,includingwiththe terror ratherthancorruptionandalliances. of theseparamilitaryenforcementgroups’. Agency as‘perhapsthemosttechnologicallyadvanced,sophisticatedandviolent inal activities. contacts foritsdrugtraffickingactivities,andwasinvolvedinawiderangeofcrim- country andacrossCentralAmerica,especiallyinGuatemala. group toexpandtheir‘territorialcontrol’andcriminalactivitiesthroughoutthe 457 familia-michoacana-mexico-profile/ (last accessed 4December 2017). 456 Wanted’, supra fn444. 455 454 453 452 451 450 449 (last accessed 4December 2017); Beittel, Mexico , supra fn405, p10. 448 while adoptingtheirtactics. ly 2000sagainsttheviolencecommittedbyZetasinstateofMichoacán, La FamiliaMichoacanafirstemergedasa‘self-styledvigilantegroup’intheear- La FamiliaMichoacana dent cartel,andtheyinitiatedaconstantbattleagainsttheirformeremployees. the GulfCartel.TheythenseparatedfromCarteltobecomeanindepen- The Zetas emerged as a group of former Special Forces members at the service of The Zetas Michoana isnotoriousforitsbrutaltactics,especiallythedumping ofdecapitated group hasbeenabletorecruithundredsofpeopleinashorttimespan.LaFamilia times, ithasusedalanguageofpoliticalinsurgencyor‘evangelicalcrusade’. through thedrugtradeanddoingsocialworkbybuildingschoolsroads.At Western Michoacán,includingbyresolvinglocaldisputes,providingemployment regionalist ideology.Itclaimsstrongpublicsupportandactedasadefactostatein fragmented forcefocusingonlocalcriminalactivities. to seriousinfightingandthelossofitsleadersZetasarenowaweakened in Mexico. of itstactics,ithasbeencharacterizedasareal‘gamechanger’fororganizedcrime Ibid. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p20; Ávalos, ‘Familia Michoacana’, supra fn456. InSightCrime,‘Zetas’, supra fn448. InSightCrime,‘Zetas’, supra ;Beittel, Mexico fn448 , supra fn405, p19;Tucker, ‘Mexico’s Most- Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p18. H. Silva Ávalos, ‘Familia Michoacana’, https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/ Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p18. InSightCrime,‘Zetas’, supra fn448. InSightCrime,‘Zetas’, https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/zetas-profile/ OpenSocietyFoundations ,UndeniableAtrocities, supra fn407, pp88–89. 451 TheZetasuseparticularlybrutalandviolentmethods,relyingon 454 OnceoneofthemostpowerfulandfearedcartelsinMexico,due 449 456 IthasbeendescribedbytheUSDrugEnforcement Thegroupstandsoutforits‘pseudo-religious’and 450 452 Asothercartelsbegantoadoptsome Thesemethodshaveallowedthe 455 453 Ithadworldwide 457 The 448

with theirrivalsforcontrolovertheseactivitiesindifferentregions. erate asbusiness-likeentities,seekingprofitsfromcriminalactivitiesandfighting lenges fromaggressiveorganizationsthatemergeandfightthem.Thecartelsop- Some dominantorganizationsretaintheirpresence,buttheyfaceincreasingchal- which hasalsobeenseriouslyweakenedrecently. to beextinctin2011.Itwassupplantedbyasplintergroup,the‘KnightsTemplar’, blows andthekillingofitsmainleader,Mexicanauthoritiesconsideredgroup ing drugtrafficking,kidnapping,extortionandracketeering.Afterseriousheavy height ofitspower,thegroupoperatedawiderangecriminalactivities,includ- ensure thesmoothfunctioningoftheiroperations. ally relyonadualstrategyofviolenceandbriberytocoercetheir competitorsand 466 465 464 463 462 organization-profile/ (last accessed 4December 2017). 461 460 459 458 replaced byflatterandsmallerorganizationsthataremorelooselyconnected. suffered serious blowsfrom the loss of their leaders, they have been succeeded or al characteristicscanbeidentified.Aslargeandhierarchicalorganizationshave make itdifficulttoanalysethemaingroupsinvolved.Nevertheless,somegener- The constantevolutionandfragmentationofthecriminallandscapeinMexico bloody warin2008. The BLOemergedasasplintergroupoftheSinaloaCartel,withwhichitbegan The BeltranLyvaOrganization(BLO) heads onthedancefloorofaclubin2006toannounceitsemergence. highest levelsofgovernment. torious forsuccessfullyinfiltratingsecurityandpoliticalforces,includingatthe cluding Morelos,GuerreroandSinaloa. leaders), butitremainsinfluentialandisregaininginfluenceinsomestates,- arrests andmurders,includingofalltheBeltranLeyvabrothers(itsfounders City. influence roseintheearly2000s,groupoperatedtenstatesandMexico CONFLICT? C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: ARMED GANG VIOLENCE SLIDING INTO ARMED InSightCrime,‘BLO’, https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/beltran-leyva- Ibid. Ibid,p6. Ávalos, ‘Familia Michoacana’,supra fn456. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p20; Ávalos, ‘Familia Michoacana’, supra fn456. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p20. Ibid,pp6–7; Tuckman, ‘Mexico Declares All-OutWar’, supra fn415. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p5. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p19. 461 Itsactivitiesmainlyfocusedondrugtrafficking.TheBLOisespeciallyno- 460 ItalsoengagedinabrutalwarwiththeGulfCartel.Asits 462 Thegroupwasseriouslyweakenedbynumerous 463 459 466 465 Theygener- 458 Atthe 464

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 89 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 90

trol’, The cartelsareoftensaidto‘controlterritories’or‘competeoverterritorialcon- access tonumerousrecruits,especiallyinthepoorerregionsofMexico. use ofpropagandaandtheprospectlucrativeopportunities,thesegroupshave ers maybeadoptinginsurgentorterroristtechniques’. criminal organizations‘continuetoraiseconcernsthatsomeMexicandrugtraffick- tions. Therepeateduseofcarbombs,grenadesandrocket-propelledlaunchersby other cartelssuchastheCJNGhaveadoptedtheirtacticsandmilitary-styleopera- zational structureandinternationalreachoftheirpredecessors. more looselyconnectedandrelyonacellularstructure,theylacktheorgani- 476 Responses Routledge, p122. 2014, Martin, S.Weerasinghe Taylor andA. (eds), Humanitarian Crises andMigration: Causes, Consequences and 475 the-us-2016-12?r=US&IR=T. Business Insider , 15 December 2016, http://uk.businessinsider.com/dea-maps-of-mexican-cartels-in- 474 473 nations-and-infantry-tactics/ (last accessed 8March 2018). Terrorist, 24 November 2010, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-zetas-massacres-assassi 472 supra fn416. 471 470 469 468 467 grenade, anditwasinvolvedinseveralshootoutswithrivalcartels2017. instance, theCJNGshotdownamilitaryhelicopterin2015withrocket-propelled to conduct high-intensity attacks against their rivals and the state security forces. For Mexican cartelshaveaccesstohighlysophisticatedarmaments,whichallowsthem their members. the group at hand.Cartelsgenerally rely onviolenceto instil fearanddiscipline in The degreeofcommandstructureanddisciplinewithinthecartelsdependson ries innorthernstatesandthestatefearedlosingcontrolovertheseregions. stances in past yearswhere some dominant cartels effectively controlled territo- for criminalactivitiesratherthanactualterritorialcontrol.Therehavebeenin- cal commandstructureandmaintainedstrictmilitarydiscipline. and aremoresusceptibletointernalconflicts. hierarchical anddisciplinedgroupshavebeensplinteredbygovernmentattacks positions andsmall-unitstactics’. tas employedclearmilitarytacticsandoperations,including‘ambushes,defensive their presenceandoperationsacrossthecountry. that arelessabletoestablishcontroloverentireareas–eventhoughtheyexpand ertheless, theselargeandcoherentcartelshavebeenreplacedbysmallergroups Tuckman, ‘Mexico Declares All-Out War’, supra fn415; Agren, ‘“The OnlyTwo Powerful Cartels Left”’, Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p4. S.Albuja,‘Criminal Violence, Displacement andMigration inMexico andCentral America’, inS.F. See, e.g., Woody, C. ‘These Maps Show How Mexican Cartels Dominate theUSDrug Market’, J. P. Sullivan andS.Logan, ‘Los Zetas: Massacres, Assassinations and Infantry Tactics’, The Counter Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p7. Agren, ‘“The OnlyTwo Powerful Cartels Left”’, supra fn416. Ibid,p5. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405 p10. OpenSocietyFoundations, UndeniableAtrocities, supra fn407, pp88–89. 474 butthisgenerallyreferstodominanceovertraffickingroutesandmarkets 467 Someorganizations,especiallytheZetas,hadaclearhierarchi- 472 Althoughthisgroupisnowseriouslyweakened, 469 476 Recentlyemerginggroupsare 473 Inaddition,throughtheir 470 468 However,such 471 TheZe- 475 Nev-

organized crime. on drugs,whichtargetsanypersonthatisperceivedtobesomewhatconnectedwith 311,000 peoplearecurrentlyinternallydisplacedthroughoutthecountry. the situationtoattentionofICC. countries/mexico/ (last accessed 4December 2017). 483 military-human-rights-abuses-war-on-drugs-report. Report’, 482 481 480 huila-de-zaragoza-are (last accessed 4December 2017). https://www.fidh.org/en/region/americas/mexico/mexico-murders-disappearances-and-torture-in-coa Murders, Disappearances, andTorture inCoahuila deZaragoza Are CrimesAgainst Humanity’,5July2017, war-crimes-drug; for the 2017 complaint, see International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), ‘Mexico: The Guardian, 26 November 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/26/mexican-president- 479 caciones/ (last accessed 6December 2017). mexico (last accessed 4December 2017); see generally, CMDPDHpublications, http://cmdpdh.org/publi ‘Mexico: Events of 2016’ World Report 2017, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/ or Degrading Treatment orPunishment onHisMission to Mexico, supra fn412; HumanRightsWatch, accessed 6December 2017); HRC, Report of theSpecial Rapporteur onTorture andOtherCruel,Inhuman 31DecemberII. doc44/15, 2015, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Mexico2016-en.pdf (last 478 477 about the‘humanrightscrisis’inMexico. tion, severalnationalandinternationalorganizationshavevoicedtheirconcerns ment’s responsetoit,whichhashadadramaticimpactontheMexicanpopula- Court (ICC).Asaresultoftheviolencecarriedoutbycartelsandgovern- Mexico isaStatePartytothe1998RomeStatuteofInternationalCriminal crime’. violence hasbeenconsidered‘exceptionalbythetypicalstandardsoforganized government officials,politicalcandidates,judgesandnewsmedia.Thisformof the violenceisnotlimitedtocriminalactivities,ascartelshavealsotargeted Cartels aremainlydrivenbyprofitandcommercialinterests.However,inMexico mexicos-worsening-war-without-name. sis Group,15June2017,https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/mexico/ Further reading: F. Enciso, ‘Mexico’s Worsening War without a Name’, International Cri- paigns towinthesupportofpopulation. judicial killings. ated withdramaticincreasesincasesoftorture,enforceddisappearancesandextra- tage. between cartels,whichincreasinglyresorttotacticsthattakethepopulationhos- Mexicans are oftencollateral, and insome instances direct, victims in thebattles D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS OpenSocietyFoundations, UndeniableAtrocities, supra fn407, p38. Beittel, Mexico, supra fn405, p2. Inter-American Commission onHumanRights,Situationof HumanRightsinMexico, OEA/Ser.L/V/ For the2011 complaint, see ‘Activists Accuse Mexican President of War CrimesinDrugCrackdown’, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC),‘Mexico’, http://www.internal-displacement.org/ Ibid.See also, ‘Mexican Troops Waging War onDrugGangsNot Punished for RightsAbuses – ‘Why Murder inMexico Is RisingAgain’, supra fn416. 480 477 Thepopulationisalsovictimtothesecurityforces’useofforceinwar The Guardian , 7November 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/07/mexican- Inaddition,severalgroupsusepropagandaandpublicrelationscam- 482 481 Asaresultofthegeneralizedclimateviolence,anestimated Thedeploymentofthearmedforceshasallegedlybeenassoci- 479 478

Someorganizationshavealsobrought 483

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 91 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 92 (or divisions)andoneunionterritory. Myanmar iscomposedofsevenstates,regions,sixself-administeredzones and stillpersistingin2017. ongoing sincebeforethecolonialperiod,intensifyingafterindependencein1948 tonomy alongwiththerecognitionofidentityandrights.Theseclaimshavebeen as ethnicarmedorganizations(EAOs),haveprimarilypursuedahighlevelofau- ing from tremendous distinctive dynamics. The majority ofsuch actors, known which havesplinteredandmorphedovertime,hassubnationaltensionsaris- mar has witnessed the emergence of a myriad of armed non-state actors (ANSAs), fact, someareasinMyanmarhaveneverbeenundercentralstate controlsince1948. local populationintheconflict-affectedarea’ regions wherethey‘shareacommonethnic,cultural,orreligious identitywiththe in whichthecentralgovernmentopposesaplethoraofANSAs locatedinspecific torial challenges.Thesetensionscanbeunderstoodasasymmetric armedviolence Myanmar isknownforitssubnationaltensions,whichencompasscolossalterri- spiral, withthelastmilitarycrackdownon25August2017. calated sharplyfromOctober2016,whenARSAfirstattacked,andcontinuedto mar ArmedForcesandtheArakanRohingyaSalvationArmy(ARSA).Violencees- on thewestcoastofcountry),issiteongoingtensionsbetweenMyan- uploads/2017/10/ContestedAreasMyanmarReport.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). Conflict, Aid,and Development The AsiaFoundation, 2017, https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/ p14, 486 (last accessed 28November 2017). tion.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/State-and-Region-Governments-in-Myanmar_2015Forward.pdf M. Arnold,State andRegion Governments inMyanmar, The AsiaFoundation, 2013, p9,https://asiafounda to distinguish ethnicstates from theBamarregions. See H.Nixon, Joelene,K.P. C. ChitSaw, T. Lynn A. and 485 Myanmar-TStateofConflictandViolence.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). of Conflict and Violence in Asia, 2017, p 106, https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ together account for one-third of Myanmar’s population.See The AsiaFoundation, ‘Myanmar’, The State 484 With avastethnicandculturaldiversity, vation ArmyorHarakahal-YaqinandtheDemocraticKarenBuddhistArmy. mar NationalDemocraticAllianceArmy,theArakanRohingyaSal- with theKachinIndependenceArmy,Ta’angNationalLiberationMyan- armed conflicts(NIACs)withseveralnon-stategroups,inparticulararguably In 2017,Myanmaranditsarmedforceswereinvolvedinaseriesofnon-international Classification oftheConfict 6. MYANMAR: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ROHINGYA INSURGENCY A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN RAKHINE A state is equivalent here to a region. This terminology has been used since the 2008 Constitution A. Burke, A. N.Williams, P. Barron, K.Jolliffe andT. Carr, The Contested Areas of Myanmar: Subnational Intotal, 135ethnicgroups are recognized. They each have theirown languageandculture and 485 Oneofthesevenstates,Rakhine(situated 484 aswellhighlevelsofpoverty,Myan- 486 and seekitsgreaterautonomy.In Laura Baron Mendoza November 2017). de paz, p169, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/alerta/alerta/17/alerta17e.pdf (last accessed 28 492 of bilateral ceasefires withtheMyanmar military. political-dialogue.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). Oneof several reasons for thisisthenon-existence 149, pp2,7, 10, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b149-myanmar-s-peace-process-getting-to-a- 491 Report-Myanmar-Elections-2015-English.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). Myanmar Elections, 2015, p31, https://pacemyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PACE-Final- illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. See ibid; People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE) 490 Asia Foundation, ‘Myanmar’, supra p105. fn484, 489 488 Upload_1_0.pdf (last accessed 8March 2018). in Burma’sKachin State, pp25–26, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0312For burnt. See Human Rights Watch (HRW), cleared, mass arrests, torture andextrajudicial killingswere carried outandcrops andfarmland were local populationin order to get food, money, intelligence and potential recruits. To this end, villageswere 487 Furthermore, while ethnic factors originally shaped these skirmishes, issues related allowed tosignit However, theagreementhastwocrucialflaws:1)someoflargestEAOswerenot tion (PNLO);AllBurmaStudents’DemocraticFront(ABSDF). Council (KPC);ArakanLiberationParty(ALP);Pa-ONationalOrganiza- Front (CNF);KarenNationalUnion(KNU);LiberationArmyPeace Army (DKBA); Restoration CouncilofShanStatesRCSS/SSA-South;Chin National tween thegovernmentandfollowingeightEAOs:DemocraticKarenBuddhist On 15October2015,theNationwideCeasefireAgreement(NCA)wassignedbe- ratization andpeace. elections, thatMyanmarwasconsideredtohavestartedpavingthewaydemoc- not until2015,whentheNationalLeagueforDemocracy(NLD)wongeneral ments withEAOs,allofwhichhavefailedtogeneratealastingsettlement.Itwas government in2010,havebeenfollowedbyseveraleffortstoreachpeaceagree- Iconic events,liketheSaffronRevolutionin2007andcreationoffirstcivil (i.e. the‘FourCuts’strategyarticulatedin1960s). cratic movements,strugglesforethnicautonomyandcounterinsurgencytactics Violence in independent Myanmar commenceddue to the suppression of demo- armed violenceagainsttheTatmadaw(MyanmarArmedForces). states. ThesefourcreatedtheNorthernAlliance:acoalitionthatconductsopen many EAOsremainskeptical;notably,fourthatoperateinKachinandShan a result, military action and armed clashes continue in various contested areas and gimes followingthemilitarycoupin1962. played acentralroleinnationalpolitics,withsuccessiveauthoritarianmilitaryre- different ministries. the 2008Constitutionconcededtoitparliamentaryseatsandcontrolofthree International CrisisGroup, Myanmar’s Peace Process: Gettingto aPolitical Dialogue,AsiaBriefingno The ‘Four Cuts’ strategy sought to cutoff insurgent groups from thesupportthey received from the Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2017! Informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanosyconstrucción Burke etal,The Contested Areas of Myanmar, supra p28. fn486, The military was given control of thedefence, home affairs andborder affairs ministries. See The However, theRohingya community was disenfranchised from these elections duetheirstatus of 491 and 2)theadvancementtowardsitsimplementationisslow.As 489 490 ‘Untold Miseries’: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement 488 Itmaintainedsucharolein2017,as 487 Themilitaryhassince 492 Final Report:

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 93 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 94 which keptattackingpoliceoutposts. Myanmar NationalDemocraticAllianceArmy(MNDAA)andArakan(AA)), ern AllianceinShanstate(theKIA,Ta’angNationalLiberationArmy(TNLA), madaw. Inparallel,centralstateforceswerealsoheavilyconfrontingtheNorth- to regaincontrol.BothsidesusedartilleryandairstrikeswerelaunchedbytheTat- the KachinIndependenceArmy(KIA)postsinmountainsoforder 40 percent were civilians. In 2016 and 2017, the Tatmadaw attacked, for months, nic armedorganizationsandtheconfrontationsarelessintense. central stateforcesinKayin.However,theopposesmallereth- tween the breakaway group, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and ent. over thelasttwoyearsin40of94townshipswhereEAOsignatoriesarepres- lighted the achievement of peace as apriority,armedencountershave continued Although thecurrentgovernment,underNLD,andTatmadawhavehigh- situation isthemainjustificationformilitary’sstrongpoliticalrole. what constitutesthenationstateandhowitcanbeadministrated.Thisprotracted national violence due to the repeated failure to reach a unanimous perspective on Thus, atleastone-thirdofMyanmar(118out330townships)isaffectedbysub- Accordingly, theactorsandlevelsofviolencedivergefromoneanother. Bearing thisinmind,Myanmar’ssubnationaltensionsdonotshareacommoncause. 498 cessed 28November 2017). see also theofficial website of theNorthernAlliance, http://northernalliance.today/about-us/ (last ac www.mmtimes.com/national-news/24414-tatmadaw-northern-alliance-continue-to-clash-in-2017.html; 497 496 495 494 Survey_2015_web.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2015/Southeast_Asia_Opium_ um trade. See UNOffice onDrugsandCrime(UNODC),‘Myanmar’, Southeast AsiaOpiumSurvey 2015, jade mines,goldandtimber, whichhave enriched both parties, and Shanstate isthecentre of theopi- 493 the continuedescalationofviolenceinstateRakhinesince October2016has 2016 and2017,theregionhaswitnessedgraveinternational lawviolations, Although the level of violence in Kachin and Northern Shan states increased in projects and the narcotics trade also play a role in Myanmar’s intricate context. to theexploitationofnaturalresources,landuse,developmentinfrastructure 600 peoplewerekilled and 700injuredbetween2014mid-2017. Conversely, inKachinandNorthernShanstatesnorthernMyanmar,morethan 2013, violencehasdecreasedtheresinceitjoinedtheNCA. Karen NationalUnion(KNU) known forthelongest-runningarmedviolence–betweencentralstateand Mon, Kayah,Kayin(orKaren),ShanandKachin.Surprisingly,whilestateis 494 ‘Tatmadaw, NorthernAlliance Continue to Clashin2017’, Myanmar Times, 5January2017, https:// HRW, ‘Untold Miseries’, supra fn487, pp29–33. The armed branch of theKNUisknown astheKaren NationalLiberation Army (KNLA). Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2017!, supra fn492, p73. Nixon etal,State andRegion Governments inMyanmar , supra p9. fn485, Nixon etal,State andRegion Governments inMyanmar, supra p15. fn485, ThestatesthathavetraditionallywitnessedtheseclashesareChin,Rakhine, 495 –whichleftatleast18,000deadbetween1949and 497 Finally,therewerealsosomeclashesbe- For instance, Kachin state hasthemost lucrative 498 496 Ofthese, 493 -

National Organization(WNSO);21.ArakanRohingyaSalvation Army(ARSA). Shan StateArmy-North(SSPP/SSA-N)19.UnitedWaArmy (UWSA);20.Wa Shan State/ShanStateArmy-South(RCSS/SSA-S);18. ProgressParty/ Fron /Ta’angNationalLiberationArmy(PSLF/TNLA)17.Restoration Councilof National LiberationOrganization/Army(PNLO/A);16.Palaung StateLiberation (NMSP); 14.NationalSocialistCouncilofNagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K);15.Pa-Oh ocratic AllianceArmy/EasternShanState(NDAA/ESS);13.New MonStateParty 11. MyanmarNationalDemocraticAllianceArmy(MN-DAA); 12.NationalDem- tional LiberationArmyPeaceCouncil(KPC);10.LahuDemocraticUnion(LDU); (KA/KNPP); 8.KarenNationalUnion(KNU);9.Union/KarenNa- Organization/Army (KIO/A);7.KarenniArmy/KarenniNationalProgressiveParty (CNF); 5. Democratic KarinBuddhistArmy(DKBA-5); 6. Kachin Independence ocratic Front(ABSDF);3.ArakanLiberationParty(ALP);4.ChinNational Ethnic-Armed-Actors-and-Justice-Provision-in-Myanmar_EN.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). The AsiaFoundation, October 2016, pp 34–36, https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ 501 500 accessed 28November 2017). in Bangladesh,19December 2016, 499 EAOs atpresent. dissolution andinconsistentrelationswiththeTatmadaw,therearemorethan21 wide-ranging agendas.Despitethesedifferences,duetoconstantdisintegration, the otherhand,smallerEAOscanbeapartnershipofdiversecommanderswith operate asstate-likeentitiesinregionswherethestatehasnevergoverned.On strongest canhavemorethan5,000members,behighlycentralizedandableto ty andterritory.Thus,notallofthemcanbeconsideredANSAs.Forinstance,the of politicalmovementsanddifferintermssize,organization,militarycapaci- These areANSAsaffiliatedtoethnicgroups.Theytypicallythemilitarywings 2. EthnicArmedOrganizations(EAOs) to thegovernmentandBorderGuardForces. than 350,000membersandisbackedupbyparamilitaryforces:militiasaffiliated Tatmadaw, i.e.the 1. MyanmarArmedForces(Tatmadaw) the AA,ARSAorHarakahal-Yaqin(HaY)andDKBA. the KIA,TNLA,MyanmarNationalDemocraticAllianceArmy(MN-DAA), against severalarmednon-stateactors,affiliatedtoEAOs,inparticulararguably The partiestotheNIACsin2017wereMyanmaranditsarmedforces(Tatmadaw) ‘Key Developmentsin2017’). given rise to one of the most critical situations in 2017 (See the section below on B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS Ibid,pp15,28;B.McCartan andK.Jolliffe, EthnicArmed Actors and Justice Provision inMyanmar , See Amnesty International ‘We Are atBreaking Point’ –Rohingya: Persecuted inMyanmar, Neglected Burke etal,The Contested Areas of Myanmar, supra p24. fn486, 501 Thoseare:1.ArakanArmy(AA);2.AllBurmaStudent’sDem- official nameoftheMyanmarArmedForcescomprisesmore https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/5362/2016/en/ (last 499

500

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of Rohingyacitizenship,thereforeexcludingthecommunity fromthe135ethnic when theBurmaCitizenshipLawwasenacted.Thislawenabled therevocation and theMuslimpopulation,whichself-identifiesasRohingya, datebackto1982 504 503 accessed 28November 2017). 2016, pp13–14, https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Militias-in-Myanmar.pdf (last 502 ANSAs andcommunalviolence. Rakhine state,locatedinwesternMyanmar,isthesettingofan interplaybetween ent. termined. Forinstance,inShanstatealone,396militiasareestimatedtobepres- The numberofmilitias,aswelltheirinteractionsandaffiliations,arestillunde- Tatmadaw. Mostofthemhavetheirowneconomicandpoliticalagenda. In Myanmar,militiashaveoftenbeenneglected,astheyrespondeithertoEAOsorthe paramilitary. Yet, ‘militia’ is understoodhere to be anarmedactor that assistsanother. This termisfrequentlyusedtodenoteawiderangeofarmedactors,predominantly 3. Militias 505 and Justice Provision inMyanmar, supra fn501. IN NORTHERN RAKHINE C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ROHINGYA INSURGENCY 504 McCartan andJolliffe, EthnicArmed Actors andJustice Provision inMyanmar, supra fn501. Burke etal, The Contested Areas of Myanmar, supra p 26. fn486, For full information anddescriptions, see J. Buchanan, MilitiasinMyanmar, AsiaFoundation, July Buchanan,MilitiasinMyanmar , supra Accordingly,therearetwomaincategoriesofmilitias: • • gration levelsamongthesefluctuate: Militias underTatmadawsupervision.Thecommandstructureandinte- EAO militias,affiliatedtoEAOs 502 • • • supervised bylocalTatmadawunits. other groups,lightlyarmedornotatallandtrained the localcommunity.Thesemilitiasareusuallysmallerthan Tatmadaw-supported communitymilitias:memberscomefrom ed, stillrespondtotheTatmadaw’scommandandsupervision. breakaway factions,which,despitenotbeingdirectlyintegrat- Tatmadaw non-integratedmilitias:commonlyEAOsortheir Military Commands. of theStateArmedForces.TheyrespondtoordersRegional which arecomprisedofbothformerEAOsandmembers command structure.TheseareknownasBorderGuardForces, Tatmadaw-integrated militias:incorporatedintotheTatmadaw’s 505 fn 502, pp 14–15. McCartan andJolliffe, EthnicArmed Actors Tensionsbetweenthecentralgovernment 503

violence betweenthetwocommunities; by threeRohingyameninmid-2012.Thisincreasedtensionsandcreatedsporadic different triggerssince2012:1)TherapeandmurderofaRakhineBuddhistwoman less, theethnictensionsandsubsequentmilitarycrackdownshavehadfour 25 August.Theintensityoftheviolenceisfarfromdeclining. engagements betweentheTatmadawandARSAtookplaceduringweekafter mented bytheofficeofMyanmar’smilitarycommander-in-chief,atleast90armed 513 www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-killed-370-rohingya-fighters-170901104820077.html. 512 MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1 (last accessed 28November 2017). February 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Countries/ Bangladesh: Interviews With Rohingyas Fleeing From Myanmar Since 9October 2016, FlashReport, 3 511 state.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). 283, 2016, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/283-myanmar-a-new-muslim-insurgency-in-rakhine- 510 509 info/category/asia-pacific/bangladesh/ (last accessed 29November 2017). Report -Undocumented Myanmar NationalsinTeknaf andUkhia.Round 6,p1-7, http://www.globaldtm. 508 Collaborative Learning Projects, April2017, pp4–16. 507 tions/678a34097a581ca9403c8eaf2d86b5ee.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). Groups?, The 2008 Constitution andEthnicIssues: To What Extent DidItSatisfytheAspirations of Various Ethnic aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/locating-rohingya-time-space-170927100542729.html; L.H.Sakhong, 506 ing since2012. qin (HaY),meaning‘faithmovement’.Yet,HaYhadbeenoperatingandorganiz- ly organized resistance movement in late 2016, which calls itself Harakah al-Ya- As aresultoftheaboveevents,northernRakhinesawemergencenew- groups thatwereandstillarerecognizedinMyanmar. ities started during2012 anditsrecruitment intensified in 2013. CrisisGroup, Myanmar supra fn510, p15. claims bytheRohingyaSolidarityOrganization(RSO)toattackandsubse- camps inBangladesh’sCox’sBazar. ings, rape,thesuspensionofhumanitarianaidandamasswavemigrationto ya population,whichhasledtothedestructionofprivateproperty,beatings,kill- These fourtriggershaveresultedinaseveremilitaryresponseagainsttheRohing- for Migration,massmigrationhasalwaysbeenanissueinthestate. them and theRakhine Buddhists. been asystematicdenialofRohingyarightsandanasymmetricrelationbetween from Bangladeshhavesincebeenseverelypersecuted.Inotherwords,therehas Consequently, RohingyareferredtoasBengaliandconsideredillegalimmigrants 2016; during the2015elections;3)ARSAclaimingresponsibilityforattacksinOctober UNOffice of theHighCommissioner for HumanRights(OHCHR),Report of OHCHRMission to International CrisisGroup hasdocumented information thatsays HaY’s planningand formation activ P. Heijmans,‘Myanmar Says itKilled 370 Rohingya Fighters’, AlJazeera, 1September 2017, http:// See International CrisisGroup, Myanmar: ANew MuslimInsurgency inRakhineState. AsiaReport no G.Aron andD. Gilmore, Navigating Change:CrisisandCrossroads intheRakhineState Context, International Organization for Migration (IOM)(2017). Bangladesh:Needs andPopulation Monitoring The AsiaFoundation, ‘Myanmar’, supra p108. fn484, I.Iqbal, ‘Locating theRohingya inTime andSpace’, AlJazeera, 27 September 2017, http://www. 510 Burma Centre for EthnicStudies, Analysis Paper no 5, 2012, p 33, https://cdes.org.mm/publica 4)ThelatestattackbyARSAonmilitaryposts25August2017. 513 Whatmadeitrevealitsidentitylastyear,says,werethefalse 507 511 According to the International Organization Inaddition,basedontheinformationdocu- 509 2)ThedisenfranchisementofRohingya 506

512 508 Nonethe- -

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514 means ofarson. and thedeploymentofgroundtroopstosurroundand,interalia,attackvillagesby ations through high-level violence, using military helicopters to launch airstrikes townships nearthenorthwestborderwithBangladesh. ARSA launched an attack targeting the Border Guard Police’s headquarters in two level ofplanning,organizationandviolentresistance.Thatday,400members first militaryoperationbyARSA(aimedatlootingweapons),itembodiedanew The attackson9October2016markashiftintheregion’sdynamics.Being other transnationaljihadistgroup. of linkseitherwithal-Qaeda,theIslamicStateIraqandLevant(ISIL)orany On 14September2017,ARSAreleasedastatementconfirmingthenon-existence quent collectionofdonationsfortheRSO. Crisis Group, Myanmar, supra fn510, p10. 520 Myanmar, 10 October 2016, pp1, 3,cited inCrisisGroup, Myanmar , supra fn510, p6. 519 518 www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-arakan-rohingya-salvation-army-170912060700394.html. 517 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/arsa-group-denies-links-al-qaeda-isil-170914094048024.html. 516 515 Insurgency’, AsiaTimes, http://www.atimes.com/article/truth-behind-myanmars-rohingya-insurgency/. operations’. ued duringthefollowingmonths,aftergovernmentdeployedits‘clearance ARSA demonstratedahighlevelofpreparation.Subsequently,skirmishescontin- improvised explosivedevicesandpreparinganambushneartheheadquarters, than 10,000roundsofammunition.Itshouldalsobehighlightedthatbyplanting tured. Onthisoccasion,thenon-statearmedgroupemployed62firearmsandmore men aswelleightARSAmemberswerekilledandtwoofthelattercap- is toendofthepersecutionRohingya. es, whichareperceivedasathreattothecommunity,anditsstatedprimepurpose mation aboutthepresenceofforeignfighters.Conversely,ARSAtargetsarmyforc- gious targetsanddoesnotaimtoimposeSharialaw.Inaddition,thereisnoinfor- Despite beingaMuslimgroup,ARSAdoesnotfollowjihadistagenda,hasnoreli- English nameArakanRohingyaSalvationArmy(ARSA). gence ofradicalideology. to be governed by umma (Islamic community) solidarity rather than any conver- nels fortraining,fundingandweaponsprovisionindifferentcountries,theseseem F. Edroos, ‘ARSA: Who are theArakan Rohingya Salvation Army, AlJazeera, 13September 2017, http:// CrisisGroup, Myanmar, supra fn510, p14. F. Edroos, ‘ARSA Group DeniesLinks With al-Qaeda, ISIL andOthers’, AlJazeera, 14September 2017, CrisisGroup, Myanmar, supra fn510, p6. Government press conference, Nay PyiTaw, 9October 2016, reported inGlobal New Lightof Crisis Group , International CrisisGroup interview by Arakan Project researcher, Yangon, November 2016, cited in 519 ThisreactionbytheTatmadawindicatedescalationofitsoper- 520 Myanmar, supra 517 fn 510, p 12; B. Lintner, ‘The Truth Behind Myanmar’s Rohingya 516 Whileitdoeshavevariouscooperationchan- 515 514 Recently,HaYhasstartedtousethe 518 Asaresult,ninepolice-

mand structure,headquartersanddisciplinaryrulesisunquestionable. di-based leadersinselectingtargets,dates,placesandmethods. informers regardingtrainingprogrammesaswelltheinvolvementofSau- military operationsisundeniable.Proofofthisliesintheinformationleakedby 528 world-asia-41521268. Finding out the Truth about Arsa Militants’, 527 526 525 524 523 the security forces islegal inIslam.CrisisGroup, Myanmar, supra fn510, p13. 522 World-Is-Finished-Myanmar-18.10.20171.pdf (last accessed 28November 2017). Myanmar, October 2017, p6,https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Amnesty-My- 521 recruits. funding, alongwithitsabilitytogainaccessweapons,militaryequipmentand of weapons suggest that the group possessesa certain level of militarytraining and On theotherhand,ARSA’stacticsofguerrillawarfareandusedifferentkinds rulings) asreligiousbackupforitscause. communities’ support,whichhasbeenratifiedandenforcedbyfatwas(religious modern guerrilla wartactics.At the sametime, it undeniablycounts on the local is underthecommandofRohingyawithinternationaltrainingandexperiencein ARSA isledbyacommitteeofRohingyainSaudiArabia.However,Rakhine,it tematic, organizedandruthless,targetingciviliansnotARSAmembers. hingya locals.Thiscampaignhasbeenclassifiedbyvariousorganizationsassys- security forceposts,whichgeneratedseverecounter-attacksmainlyaffectingRo- On 25August,ARSAmembersattackedatleast30violence. other escalationof Recent attacksandsubsequentresponsesattheendofAugust2017markedan- Last butnotleast,thenumberofmembersisunclear. headquarters inSaudiArabia. diaspora (in Bangladesh, Pakistan and other countries such as India)through its clerics and scholars). villagers, organizedinvillage-levelcellsandtrainedbymullahsorhafizes(Islamic has ledallthegroundoperations. the leadershipgroupinMecca,AtaUllah,alongsideotherRohingyaRakhine, Amar Jununi),identifiedasHafizToharbytheMyanmarGovernment.Aswell Its leaderandmainspeakerisknownasAtaUllah(aliasAmeerAbuAmaror Amnesty International, ‘MyWorld isFinished’: Rohingya Targeted inCrimesAgainst Humanityin Lintner, ‘The Truth Behind Myanmar’s Rohingya Insurgency’, supra Ibid,pp1, 12–13. Ibid. Several clericshave stated thatgiven thepersecution of MuslimsinRakhine,thecampaign against CrisisGroup, Myanmar, supra fn510, pp1, 16. Edroos, ‘ARSA Group DeniesLinksWith al-Qaeda, ISIL andOthers’, supra fn516. ICTY, Prosecutor vHaradinaj, Trial Chamber, Judgment,IT-04-84-T, 3April2008, §63-89. 525 Infact,ithasbeenallegedthatiswell-connectedwiththeRohingya 527 Moreover, ARSA’s ability to plan, coordinate and carry out 523 BBC News, 11 October 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/ Bearingthisinmind,theexistenceofacom- 522

526 ThemajorityareMuslim fn 514; J. Head, ‘Rohingya Crisis: 528

524 521

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 99 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 100 order toimpedethereturnofRohingyarefugees. laying anti-personnelminesatdifferentpointsontheborderwithBangladesh,in on humanitarianaid. son, aerialattacksreportedlyperpetratedagainsttheRohingyaandrestrictions Rakhine state,killings,torture,sexualviolence,thedestructionofvillagesbyar- ed tobe‘deeplydisturbed’byaccountsofmorethan600,000Rohingyafleeingfrom inal Court. of the UNSecurityCouncil to potentially refer the case to the InternationalCrim- news/2017/11/03/un-security-council-refer-burma-icc (last accessed 8March 2018). 533 171004083223963.html. Jazeera, 4October 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/myanmar-violence-crimes-humanity- manity-in-myanmar-against-rohingya; ‘UN:Myanmar Violence May BeCrimesAgainst Humanity, Al 18 October 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/amnesty-alleges-crimes-against-hu 532 170906014211124.html. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/myanmar-laying-landmines-bangladesh-border-reports- 531 NewsID=22320&LangID=E, (last accessed 14November 2017). Visit to Bangladesh’,27 October 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? 530 529 as aNIAC. port oftheNigeriaarmedforces,thuscontinuingqualification ofthesituation 2014, Cameroon,NigerandChadwerealsoinvolvedinthearmed conflict,insup- conflict (NIAC)withBokoHaram,whichbeganinthemiddleofMay2013.By In 2017, Nigeria and its armed forces were involved in a non-international armed Classification oftheConfict violations carriedoutbymilitaryandsecurityforces. which wasdispatchedon24March2017duetotheaccusationsofhumanrights Council announcedtheconclusionoffirstfact-findingmissiononMyanmar, launched bytheTatmadaw.InOctober2017,UnitedNationsHumanRights what hashappenedsincethecrisisbeganandresultsofmilitarycampaign zations havebeenworkinginthefield2016and2017,ordertodocument Due to theframework of violenceoutlinedabove,various human rights organi- against humanityand/orwarcrimes, human rightorganizationshavedenouncedthepossiblecommissionofcrimes lowing themilitaryviolenceafterattacksofOctober2016andAugust2017, The MyanmarGovernmenthasyettoratifymostinternationallawtreaties.Fol- D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS NIGERIA: A FOCUS ON THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ‘Myanmar Laying LandminesonBangladesh Border: Reports’, AlJazeera, 6September 2017, HRW, ‘UNSecurity Council: Refer Burmato theICC’, 3November 2017, https://www.hrw.org/ O. Holmes,‘Rohingya Crisis:Amnesty Accuses Myanmar of CrimesAgainst Humanity, The Guardian , OHCHR,‘Expertsof theIndependentInternational Fact-Finding Mission onMyanmar Conclude UNHumanRightsCouncil Res A/HRC/RES/34/22, 7April2017. 533 530 Myanmar’scentralgovernmenthasalsobeenaccusedof 532 someofthemcallingfortheintervention 531

529 Expertshavebeenreport- Sari Arraf

ply incasesofterriblecrimesandtheideamulti-partydemocracy. and privilegesforwomen,consumptionofalcohol,thetypesanctionsthatap- eral. Thisincludes,accordingtothegroup,constitutionalprovisionofrights the West,grouptendstohighlightarejectionofWesterncivilisationingen- ethnic, religious or community-based). tions thatfacilitatedtheriseofgroupsseekingtochallengestate authority(bethey ed inahighlyfertileenvironmentofunfavourableeconomic andpoliticalcondi- the insurgency,emergenceofBokoHaraminNortheastNigeriawasalsoseed- Without underestimatingtheroleoffundamentalistideologiesineruption itself somewhatvague. sacrilege’, doesnotsucceedincapturingthefullideologyofgroup,whichis by-name, whichisoftenlooselytranslatedfromHausaas‘Westerneducation biggest economy,atleast122millionNigerians(accountingfor 67.1percentofthe accessed 31January2018). www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/curbing-violence-nigeria-ii-boko-haram-insurgency (last 538 cultural values. British colonial rulewas analiendominationthatdisrupted oreroded theregion’s legal, political and 537 com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-jihad/. 536 31 January2018). https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/northern-nigeria-background-conflict (last accessed 535 refer to thegroup asBoko Haram. 534 of its sympathizers dismiss this label as offensive and derogatory. popularly dubbedBokoHaram,thegrouphasneveridentifiedassuchandmany (the Association of the People of the Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad). Although The groupisformallyknownasJamaʿatAhlal-Sunnalil-Daʿawahwaal-Jihad carry outviolentattacksintheregion. of theinsurgencyandputitonbackfoot,groupmaintainscapacityto early 2015hasreversedmanyofthegainsmadebyBokoHaraminyears later. Whileacoordinatedmilitaryforcethatwasestablishedbythesecountriesin Chad Basin,startingwithCameroonin2014andreachingNigeroneyear on aregionaldimensionwhenhostilitiesspreadtotheothercountriesinLake and wideneditsrangeoftargetstoincludecivilians.Moreover,theviolencetook lions ofpeopleasBokoHaramhasincreasedtheintensityitsbrutalcampaign least 2013.Overthecourseofconflict,violencehasaffectedlivesmil- ist IslamicgroupthathasbeeninoutrightconflictwiththeNigerianstatesinceat Originally seededinthenorthernregionofNigeria,BokoHaramisafundamental- through schooling. a longstandingmistrustinnorthernNigeriaofcolonialandChristianinfluence Western educationstillattractsparticularcriticismfromBokoHaramasitechoes A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT Crisis Group, International CrisisGroup, NorthernNigeria:Background to Conflict, 20 December 2010, p37, CrisisGroup, Curbing Violence inNigeria(II):The Boko Haram Insurgency pI,https:// , 3April2014, ‘Boko Haram Resurrects, Declares Total Jihad’, For simplicity, and given thepopularacceptance thattheterm hasacquired, thispaper willalso Northern Nigeria,supra fn 535, p 37. This fits with a widerfeeling in the north that 537

535 Ratherthanmerelyopposingeducationcomingfrom 538 Vanguard, 14 August 2009, https://www.vanguardngr. While Nigeria is considered to be Africa’s 534 Moreover,this 536 However,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 101 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 102 implementation of Sharia law. the groupadvocatedforestablishmentofanIslamicstateinnorthwithastrict Sharia lawwouldaddresstheillsofsociety,includingcorruptionandbadgovernance, of thegroup’sfollowersanddestroyingitsprincipal mosque. Nigerian Army took things in hand and quashed the insurrection by killing hundreds rebellion thatlastedfivedays. tions betweenthegroupandpoliceforcesculminatedby26July2009inanoutright Haram adoptedamoreconfrontationalstance.Consequently,seriesofconfronta- through localpoliticianswhobecameperceivedasfalseandcorruptMuslims,Boko disenchanted bytheimprobabilityofachievingfullimplementationSharialaw power betweenthesetwogroups,thuscontributingtotheongoingunrest. Muslims, thepoliticalsceneischaracterizedbyacontinuousbickeringover country being almost equally – albeitnottotally – dividedbetween Christians and 2011/11/08/nigeria-boko-haram-attacks-indefensible (last accessed 7March 2018). (HRW), ‘Nigeria:Boko Haram Attacks Indefensible’, 8November 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/ org/news/2009/08/05/displaced-go-home-calm-settles-over-maiduguri; see also Human Rights Watch see ‘Displaced GoHomeasCalmSettlesOver Maiduguri’,IRIN,5August 2009, http://www.irinnews. to theInternational Committee of theRed Cross (ICRC), theharshintervention left780 people dead, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boko-Haram#ref326098 (last accessed 7March 2018); 547 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/01/201012314018187505.html. and Johnson, ‘Boko Haram’, supra see also fn542; ‘Timeline: Tensions inNigeria’,AlJazeera, 26 December 546 inciting therage of thegroup. For more details, see ibid,pp11–12. some senior government appointmentswhenelected. However, Sherifflater reneged onhispromises, toral campaign inexchange for hisintroducing measures to implementSharialaw andgivingthegroup deal with politicianAliModuSherifffrom Maiduguri,according to whichhewould back thelatter’s elec 545 544 Curbing Violence inNigeria(II),supra fn538, pp7–8. the beginning of Boko Haram to 2002, whenitbegan to attract official attention, see CrisisGroup, 543 March 2015, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/boko-haram (last accessed 7March 2018). 542 541 540 https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/10/poverty-112m-nigerians-live-poverty-line/. 539 population) livebelowthepovertyline. in Maiduguri,thecapitalofstateBornoNortheastNigeria. Boko Haramwasfoundedin2002bytheradicalyoungpreacherMohammedYusuf It wasagainstthebackdropofthisenvironmentfrustrationandalienationthat ty, transportation,water,healthservices,powerandeducation. declining capacityoftheNigerianstatetodeliverpublicgoods,includingsecuri- of amixbadgovernance,corruptionandunderdevelopment,underscoredby in officialeffortstoimplementSharialawacrossthenorthernstates. worst povertyrateamongthesixofficialzonesofcountry. even bleakerinpredominantlyMuslimNortheastNigeria,whichsuffersfromthe er, was captured and later extrajudicially executed while in police custody. er, wascapturedandlaterextrajudiciallyexecutedwhileinpolicecustody. Ibid,p3. V. Ahiuma-Young, ‘Poverty: 112M NigeriansLive below Poverty Line’,Vanguard, 18October 2016, ‘Boko Haram’, Encyclopaedia Britannica , 6March 2014, Someanalysts contend thatBoko Haram started operating in1995.However, most accounts date Having many young followers who constituted a significant electoral bloc, Yusuf allegedly struck a M. A. Sergie M.A. and T. Johnson, ‘Boko Haram: Backgrounder’, Council onForeign Relations (CFR),5 The uprisingstarted inthestate of Bauchibutquicklyspread to Borno, Yobe andKano, see Sergie Ibid,p9. CrisisGroup, Curbing Violence inNigeria(II),supra fn538, p1. 546 544 As the police forces could not contain the violence, the Asthepoliceforcescouldnotcontainviolence, Initially, Yusuf took a non-violent line by engaging Initially, Yusuf took a non-violent line by engaging 539 Viewedinawiderframe,thisistheresult 547 Yusuf,thegroup’slead- 541 Moreover,withthe 540 545 Thesituationis 543 However, soon However,soon Believing that Believingthat 542 according

- in thereleaseofover700inmatesand,ultimately,replenishing their force. militants orchestratedaspectacularprisonbreakinthestateofBauchi,resulting sonnel, politicians,criticalreligiousclericsandothers.On7September,BokoHaram group wenton an assassinationcampaigntargeting mainly policemen,militaryper- police-headquarters-%E2%80%93-our-nation%E2%80%99s-moral-dilemma. Sahara Reporters, 23 June 2011, http://saharareporters.com/2011/06/23/suicide-bomb-blast-abuja- 553 March 2018). 2014) 73, http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/jesr/article/download/4395/4298 (last accessed 7 Rights Abuses inNorthernNigeria,2011–2013’, 4Journalof Educational andSocialResearch 5(July 552 Central, andCentral states, see ‘Boko Haram’, supra fn547. html#ZLBhWhVFI8h3xcwS.99; afrique/article/2010/12/25/le-nigeria-endeuille-par-deux-attaques-a-la-veille-de-noel_1457714_3212. contre deséglises auNigeria,àlaveille deNoël’,Le Monde , 25December 2010, http://www.lemonde.fr/ city of Jos,located inthecentre of Nigeria,whichclaimed thelives of 32people, see ‘Plusieursattaques in northNigerialeading to the death of six people. In parallel, it carried outaseries of bombings in the 551 boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html. 550 549 548 thereby embarrassingtheNigeriansecurityforcesandagencies. the NigeriancapitalofAbujawithavehicle-borneimprovisedexplosivedevice, ing inthehistoryofcountrybyattackingnationalpoliceheadquarters Shortly after,BokoHaramstagedwhatwasdeemedtobethefirstsuicidebomb- reorganized, whilethosewhostayedinNigeriakeptalowprofile. Many BokoHarammembersreportedlyfledtoneighbouringcountrieswherethey The heavy-handedresponsedidnotmanagetoputanendthegroup’sactivities. Service andtheDefenceIntelligenceAgency. the DepartmentofStateSecurity,NigerianCustomsService,NigeriaImmigration force comprisespersonnelfromtheNigerianArmedForces,NigeriaPoliceForce, ‘restore law and order’to Northeastern Nigeria and Borno State in particular. The ment announcedtheestablishmentofaJointTaskForce(JTF)withmandateto elements of the state apparatus was needed more than ever. On 12 June, the govern- forces overwhelmedbythelevelofviolence,cooperationbetweendifferent cities aroundthecountry,resultingindeathofmanycivilians.Withpolice ration ofGoodluckJonathanasNigeria’sPresidenton29May,severalbombshit the grouphadconcentrateditsattacksinbeginning. clude Christians,criticalMuslimsandschools,notonlystateagentsonwhom tude, leadingtomorecivilianfatalities.Thecircleofvictimswaswidenedin- Over the course of 2011, Boko Haram’s attacks increased in frequency and magni- 2011, thegroupcarriedoutanotherstartlingattackbystrikingitsfirsthigh-pro- to avengethedeathofYusufandotherBokoHarammembers. of Yusuf’ssecond-in-command,AbubakarShekau,whovowedinareleasedvideo a periodofreorganization,thegroupremergedinJuly2010underleadership For example, on Christmas Eve 2010, Boko Haram conducted a series of attacks against churches C. K.Ekeke, C. ‘SuicideBombBlast at Abuja Police Headquarters –OurNation’sMoral Dilemma’, P. Nwangwu, Mbah andC. ‘The Counter-Insurgence Operations of theJointTask Force andHuman ‘Boko Haram Fast Facts’, CNN,18September 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/ CrisisGroup, NorthernNigeria,supra fn535, p37. ‘Boko Haram’, supra fn547. Boko Haram attacks occurred primarilyinNigeria’sNortheast, North- 552 551 Followingtheinaugu- 549 Shortlyafter,the 553 On 26August On 548 Following 550

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 103 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 104 central statesofPlateauandNiger. state ofemergencyinpartsthenorthernstatesYobeandBornoaswell continuing deterioration of the conflict, President Jonathan declared in late 2011 a es. the stateofBorno–butwasalsomarredbywell-documentedhumanrightsabus- ly 2013, Boko Haram arguably reached its apex when it controlled large swathes in mistrust of the Nigerian military whose campaign was notonly defective – by ear- These groupsemergedasaresponsebothtoattacksbyBokoHaramandwide of Lake Chad,supra fn557, pI. 561 struggles witharmed groups andbecause ithasnot needed themasmuch.See ibid. 560 559 accountability-security-nigeria-html/#fn15 (last accessed 31January2018). Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June2016, https://africacenter.org/publication/governance- 21 suffer from widepublicmistrust. See O. Okenyodo, Governance, Accountability, andSecurity inNigeria , nigeria-baga-les-soldats-ont-mis-le-feu-maison-par-maison/. Like thearmy, Nigeria’spolice forces also le feu maison JeuneAfrique par maison »’, , 2May 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/171007/politique/ rate targeting of civiliansandburningof houses). See T. soldats Kibangula, ontmis ‘Nigeria:àBaga,« les troops were accused of burninghouses (althoughtheNigerianGovernment denied accusations of delibe- At least 200 people, includingmany civilians,were reported to have been killed duringthehostilities and of committing amassacre against civiliansinthecityof BagawhileengaginginfightswithBoko Haram. 558 boko-haram (last accessed 31January2018). www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting- 557 idUSTRE80L0A020120122. www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence/islamist-insurgents-kill-over-178-in-nigerias-kano- 556 of_emergency_after_deadly_communal_clashes.html. December 2011, https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2011/12/31/nigerian_president_declares_state_ 555 August 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/world/africa/27nigeria.html. 554 178 people. the deadliest strikes everconducted by thegroup,leading to thedeathofatleast shooting spreesinthehomonymouscapitalofstateKano.Thiswasone ple ofwhichwasaseriescoordinatedbombblastsatgovernmentofficesand However, violentattackscontinuedintothefollowingyear,aremarkableexam- eral floors of the buildingin a blastthat left atleast 18 peopledead. with explosivesoutsidetheUnitedNationsheadquartersinAbuja,destroyingsev- file internationaltargetinNigeria–anothersuicidebomberdetonatedacarfilled along itsownlinesofcommand. Force (CJTF) and were put under the supervision of the JTF who organized them comités devigilance. replicated inCameroon2014andChad2015,wheresuchgroupsareknownas members outofMaiduguri,theCJTFmodelspreadfurtherinNigeria,andwaslater Boko Haram,itwasalsoreportedtohavecommittedhumanrightsabuses. Borno StatewiththeaimofprotectinglocalcommunitiesfromBokoHaram. to takeplacefromearly2013onwardsasvigilantegroupsbeganspringupin 558 CrisisGroup, Curbing Violence inNigeria(II) , supra fn538, pp34–35; see also CrisisGroup, Watchmen CrisisGroup, Watchmen of Lake Chad:Vigilante Groups FightingBoko Haram, 23February 2017, https:// p4, B. Adigun, ‘Nigerian President Declares State of Emergency after Deadly Communal Clashes’, Ibid,pp4–5. Inahighlycontested incidentdatingfrom April2013, theNigerianArmy was suspected CrisisGroup, Watchmen of Lake Chad,supra fn557, p5. M.Oboh,‘Islamist Insurgents Kill Over 178 inNigeria’sKano’, Reuters, 22January2012, https:// S.Murray Nossiter, andA. ‘SuicideBomberAttacks U.N. BuildinginNigeria’,The New York Times, 26 Ibid,pi.Niger, ontheother hand, hasbeen more cautious onthisissue, partly because of past ByJune2013,thesevigilantegroupsbecameknownastheCivilianJointTask 556 However,asignificantshiftinthefightagainstBokoHaramstarted 560 AlthoughtheCJTFwashelpfultomilitaryeffortsagainst 559 555 FollowingitssuccessindrivingBokoHaram 554 With the The Star, 31 557 561

built itslogisticnetwork. attacks occurred,particularlyintheFarNorthregionofCameroonwhereithas Haram, itshouldbenoted,hadbeenpresentinthecountrywellbeforeinitial thereby confirming itsabilitytocarry out attacks beyond Nigeria’s borders. Boko Cameroon. Sincethen,thegrouphasmultiplieditsattacksinnorthernCameroon, regional dimensioninMarch2014whenBokoHaramcarriedoutitsfirstattacks concentrated in northern Nigeria during its initial years, the conflict acquired a the UNSecurityCouncil’sAl-QaidaSanctionsCommitteeaddedBokoHaramtoits manifested bythe‘BringBackourGirls’campaignonsocialmedia.Inthiscontext, not thefirstofitskind,incidentspurredinternationaloutrageandmobilization, the livesofhundredspeopleacrossNigeria. Northeastern region.Thegroupalsopursueditsbombingattacks,whichclaimed villages and murdering civilianswith increasing frequency, particularly in the sequently, BokoHaramcontinueditsbrutalcampaignthroughout2014,raiding CNN, 6May http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/05/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/index.html. 2014, 567 by-boko-haram-are-still-missing/?utm_term=.1156fcbe239c. worldviews/wp/2017/05/07/some-chibok-schoolgirls-are-now-free-but-hundreds-more-abducted- Boko Haram Are Still Missing’, The Washington Post, 7May 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 566 ethnic andcultural terms. For more details, see ibid,pp3–7. Cameroon’s Far Northregion isclosely related to Northeastern Nigeriainhistorical, religious, commercial, ities thattheregion shares withNortheastern Nigeria.Apart from shared socio-economic vulnerabilities, 2018). Indoingso, Boko Haram benefited from anetwork of local collaborators andexploited vulnerabil- group.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/cameroon-confronting-boko-haram (last accessed 31January 565 564 563 emergency-set-back-nigeria%E2%80%99s-democracy. Democracy’, Nigerian states. See also N.Ekujumi, ‘Declaration of States of Emergency asaSetBackfor Nigeria’s a state of emergency inDecember 2011, whichhadapartial scope of application insome of the borno-yobe-and-adamawa-state. May 2013, http://saharareporters.com/2013/05/14/breaking-news-jonathan-declares-state-emergency- 562 the entiretyofBorno,YobeandAdamawaStates. Meanwhile, on14May2013,PresidentJonathandeclaredastateofemergencyin to sellthegirlsinmarketandsaidthatshouldbemarriedoff. ly aftertheabduction,Shekaureleasedavideoinwhichhedeclaredhisintentions local communities(ratherthanitsconcentratingmainlyonstatetargets). groups didmuchtoincreasethelevelofviolencebypittingBokoHaramagainst tively checking Boko Haram’s attacks. If anything, the deployment of vigilante Despite the creation of the CJTF, the anti-insurgency efforts fell short of effec- ter kidnappingmore276girlsfromapublicschoolinChibokBornoState. In April2014,BokoHaramgainedsignificantnotorietyintheinternationalarenaaf- following year. A. Abubakar and J. A. Levs, ‘“IWill SellThem,” Boko Haram Leader Says of Kidnapped NigerianGirls’, CrisisGroup, Watchmen of Lake Chad,supra fn557, pi. CrisisGroup, ‘Jonathan Declares State of Emergency inBorno, Yobe andAdamawa State’, Sahara Reporters, 14 K.PhillipsandSieff, ‘SomeChibokSchoolgirls Are Now Free –But Hundreds More Abducted by ‘Boko Haram’, supra fn547. Sahara Reporters, 17May 2013, http://saharareporters.com/2013/05/17/declaration-states- Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram, 16 November 2016, pp i, 10, https://www.crisis 565 This declaration followed onfrom theprevious declaration of TheconflictwouldextendtoNigerandChadbythe 564 Whatismore,afterbeingmainly 562

567 Although 566 563 Short- Con-

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 105 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 106 Task Force(MNJTF)wasputintoactioninlateJanuary2015. As aresponsetothegrowingregionalthreatofBokoHaram,MultinationalJoint tion amongNigeriantroopsandvariousincidentsofmutiny. large territoriestoBokoHaraminthenorth,leadingahighlevelofdemoraliza- the year2014provedtobedisastrousforNigerianGovernment,whichlost offensive that left around 2,000 people dead according to some reports. 2015, italsotookcontrolofthecityBagaonheelsaninfamouslybloody chad-beyond-military-measures (last accessed 31January 2018). 8 March 2017, p 16, (last accessed 31January2018); CrisisGroup, www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/niger/245-niger-and-boko-haram-beyond-counter-insurgency 573 com/site/uploads/war19.pdf (last accessed 31January2018). for Security Studies (ISS), West Africa Report 19,September 2016, p2,https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws. Abatan and W. Sawadogo, A. Assessing theMultinationalJointTask Force Against Boko Haram, Institute formal authorization for itsdeployment was given. For amore detailed account, see W. Assanvo, J. E.A. and Security Council fullyendorsed theactivation of theforce, butitwas not until29January2015 that order to enableitto respond to theBoko Haram threat. On25November theAfrican 2014, Union’sPeace 565, p27. On7October theLCBC 2014, MemberStates andBeninmodified thestructure of theMNJTFin Basin Commission (LCBC) in1998to fightbanditry intheregion. See CrisisGroup, Cameroon, supra fn 572 2015, https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-what-happened-in-baga/ (last accessed 7March 2018). 150, see J. Rademeyer andE.Whitehead, ‘Factsheet: What Happened inBaga?’,Africa Check, 16January 571 town would belater recaptured on17March 2015. org/news/2016/03/29/nigeria-year-no-word-300-abducted-children (last accessed 7March 2018). The 570 boko-haram-releases-dozens-of-kidnapped-chibok-schoolgirls. Nigerian Officials’, officials said83 schoolgirls were freed. See ‘Boko Haram Releases Dozens of ChibokSchoolgirls,Say 569 Ansaru to ItsSanctionsList’, 26 http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11455.doc.htm. June2014, See United Nations,‘Security Council Al-QaidaSanctionsCommittee Adds Abubakar Mohammed Shekau, Later, thecommittee added Shekau and Ansaru, asplinter group of Boko Harm,to its sanctions list. List’, 22 May http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11410.doc.htm2014, (last accessed 7 March 2018). 568 women andchildren,includingatleast300elementaryschoolstudents. city ofDamasakneartheNigerianborderon24November,andcapturedabout400 on tocapturemanytownsinNortheasternNigeria.Notably,thegroupseized From August2014onwards,BokoHarammadesubstantialmilitarygains,going sanctions liston22May,subjectingittoanarmsembargoandassetsfreeze. of chaosinLibya. as amainlyNigerianproblem,Chadwasmuchmoreoccupiedbytheconsequences reasons. WhilstNigerchosetoholdbackmilitaryaction,conceivingBokoHaram the LakeChadBasin.Initially,aseriousregionalresponsewaslackingforseveral of combatingBokoHaramandothergroupslabelledasterroristsoperatingaround Benin, theMNJTFisanoffensiveandstabilizationmechanismwithobjective from thecountriesofLakeChadBasin(Nigeria,Niger,andCameroon) have beenreleasedorfoundbysecurityforcesonseveraloccasions. present day,manyoftheabductedChibokgirlsremainincaptivityalthoughsome The numberof fatalities was contested by theNigerianGovernment, whichcapped thedeath toll at CrisisGroup, NigerandBoko Haram: Beyond Counter-Insurgency, 27 February 2017, pi,https:// The MNJTFisadescendant of theMultinational JointTask Force (MNJTF)created by theLake Chad HRW, ‘Nigeria:AYear On,NoWord on300Abducted Children’, 29March 2016, https://www.hrw. The most recent episode of arelease of some Chibokschoolgirls was on6May 2017, whenNigerian United Nations,‘Security Council Al-QaidaSanctionsCommittee Adds Boko Haram to ItsSanctions The Guardian , 6 May 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/06/ 573 https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/246-fighting-boko-haram- Ontheotherhand,cooperationbetweenNigeriaandCameroon Fighting Boko Haram inChad: Beyond Military Measures, 572 Comprisingunits 569 571 570 568 In sum, Inearly Tothe ed takingplacewhenMuhammaduBuhariassumedofficeasNigeria’snewlyelect- people intheregionofLakeChadBasin. February 2015, and the scope of hostilities became ever wider, affecting millions of effort againstBokoHaram,thegroupstartinglaunchingattacksontheirsoilfrom ever, shortlyafterthedecisionbyNigerandChadtodirectlyinterveneinwar previously fallenunderitscontrol. to reverse Boko Haram’s previous gains by recapturing many territories that had military campaignthatensuedinthecourseoffollowingmonthsmanaged Although regionalcooperationundertheMNJTFleftmuchtobedesired, jeopardized byBokoHaramactivitiesinnorthernCameroon. its capitalwithmaritimeoutletsinCameroon,whichwerebecomingincreasingly in itsbackyard,whereasChadsoughttosecurethevitaleconomicroutesconnecting in theconflictafteritbecameincreasinglyalarmedbyBokoHaram’sterritorialgains ments in2014,thissituationinevitablychanged.Nigerdecidedtoactivelyintervene afrique-contemporaine-2015-3-page-93.htm (last accessed 7March 2018). Tchad: Extension ousanctuarisation?’, Afrique Contemporaine 255(2015), http://www.cairn.info/revue- 580 weakness-not-strength. 9 March 2015, https://qz.com/358264/why-boko-harams-pledge-of-allegiance-to-isil-is-a-symptom-of- 579 archive/2015/03/boko-haram-pledges-allegiance-islamic-state/387235/. ‘The IslamicState of Boko Haram?’, The Atlantic, 9March 2015,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ com/news/2015/03/nigeria-boko-haram-pledges-allegiance-isil-150307201614660.html Chandler,; A. 578 the villageof Ngoubouaonthewestern shore of Lake Chad. Bosso inthesoutheast. On13February, thegroup carried itsfirst attack onChadianterritories by raiding 577 576 Assanvo, Abatan andSawadogo, Assessing theMultinational JointTask Force, supra fn572. national forces preferred nationalorbilateral actions.For amore detailed assessment of theMNJTF, see Crisis Group, Cameroon, supra fn565, p28.For alongtime,theforce was conceived asanempty shelland 575 574 its members’ morale and image and attract local support. being agamechanger,themovewasmoreanattemptbyBokoHaramtoboost was impededbytheirembroiledrelations. an advantage. strategy bytakingrefugeinLakeChad,thetopographicalfeaturesofwhichwere March, BokoHaramhadcometosuffermanylossesandwasforcedchangeits have moreroomtooperatearearbasesupportitsactivitiesinNigeria. these twocountries,itavoidedconductingmilitaryoperationstheresocould tain costforChadandNiger.WhileBokoHaramhadpreviouslybeenpresentin State’s WestAfricaProvince(ISWAP). pledged allegiancetoIslamicState(IS),andwasrenamedshortlyafteras On 7 March 2015, in a step perceived by many as a sign of weakening, Boko Haram Boko Haram carried outitsfirst attacks inNigeron6February by raiding thetowns of Diffa and Originallyconceived asanintegrated force, theMNJTFis infact more of acoordinated force. See Assanvo, Abatan andSawadogo, Assessing theMultinational JointTask Force, supra fn572, p6. ‘Boko Haram Pledges Allegiance to ISIL,Reports Say’, AlJazeera, 8March 2015, http://www.aljazeera. CrisisGroup, NigerandBoko Haram, supra fn573, pi. Y. Adegoke, ‘Boko Haram’s Pledge of Allegiance to ISILIsaSymptom of Weakness, Not Strength’, Quartz, For adetailed account of thetopography of Lake Chad,seeSeignobos,‘Boko C. Haram etlelac 580 Later, another notable shift in the fight against Boko Haram start- 575 578 Theintervention,however,cameatacer- Commentatorsindicatedthat,ratherthan 574 577 However,withthesecuritydevelop-

579 Indeed, by the end of 576 How-

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 107 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 108 former leaderMohammedYusuf,wouldbethenewwali surface whenISannouncedthatAbuMusabal-Barnawi,identifiedasthesonof On 3August2016,aninternalsplitintheleadershipofBokoHaramcameto Boko Haram’sthreatwasstillimminent. military gainsandensureprotectionforreconqueredterritories,provedthat early June2016broughtintoquestiontheabilityofengagedstatestosustain However, thesubsequenttakeoveroftownBossoinNigerforashorttime ing cooperationwiththeneighbouringcountries. inability toeffectivelycombatthegroup,Buhariimmediatelybeganstrengthen- Haram thanhispredecessor,whowascriticizedearlierforweakleadershipand paign becamemorereliantonguerrillawarfarestrategiesandsuicidebombings. (last accessed 31January 2018). studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2016/10/split-isis-aligned-boko-haram-group-161027113247008.html 588 587 Habib Yusuf. islamic-state/. AbuMusabal-Barnawi isapseudonym, thereal nameof Mohammed Yusuf’s son being Rocks, 26 August 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/boko-harams-doomed-marriage-to-the- 586 reported-in-nigerian-city-where-boko-haram-was-founded.html. Times September, 21 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/world/africa/deadly-bombings-are- least 100 people. See N.Onishi,‘More than100 Killed by Boko Haram Bombings in Nigeria’,The New York has been hitby since thebeginning of theconflict, whencoordinated bombingsled to thedeath of at 585 jeuneafrique.com/mag/238229/politique/terrorisme-boko-haram-monstre-blesse/. 584 583 582 six weeks dueto theintensity of Boko Haram’s attacks. 581 as ontheislandsofLakeChad. the SambisaForestandMandaraMountainsonborderswithCameroon,aswell By theendofyear,BokoHaramlostmanyterritoriesbutremainedpresentin ed PresidentinlateMay2015. on attackingChristiansandWesterntargets. Consistent with their ideological leanings, their strategy places greater emphasis criminate attacksonMuslimswhodonotopenlyopposethosehecalls‘infidels’. ciate, MammanNur,areatoddswithShekauforhistakfiristapproachandindis- been driven by ideological and strategic differences: al-Barnawi and his close asso- erational byplacingthemunderthecommandofnon-corruptofficers. the Nigerianmilitary,replacingtopcommandersandmakingsomebattalionsop- cutting himofffromcorrespondingwithAbuBakral-Baghdadi. nawi’s faction had staged a coup against him by manipulating IS’s leadership and role asimamofJamaʿatAhlal-Sunnalil-Daʿawahwaal-Jihad,andsaidthatal-Bar- Shekau releasedanaudiomessageinwhichhedeclaredhisreturntoprevious General elections were heldinNigeriaon28and29March 2015, after having been postponed for Ibid. C. Seignobos,‘Boko C. Haram etlelacTchad’, supra fn580, 98. Inthiscontext, thecityof Maiduguriwitnessed, on20 September, oneof thedeadliest attacks it F. Onuoha,SplitinISIS-Aligned C. Boko Haram Group , AlJazeera Center for Studies, 27 October 2016, http:// Assanvo, Abatan andSawadogo, Assessing theMultinationalJointTask Force, supra fn572, pp 7–8. D. Gartenstein-Ross andJ. Zenn, ‘Boko Haram’s Doomed Marriageto theIslamic State’, War onthe R.Carayol, ‘Terrorisme: Boko Haram, monstre blessé’, JeuneAfrique, 22June2015, http://www. 581 584 TakingamoreproactivestanceinfightingBoko Thegroupwasputonthedefensiveanditscam- 588

582 Healsoundertooktoreform of ISWAP. 587 586 Thesplithas Inresponse, 583 585

to anattemptbyShekauasserttherelevanceofhisfaction. sification ofBokoHaram’sattacksinthelastquarter2016,whichwasattributed ress inthebattleagainstBokoHaram. as wellalongtheKomadougouRiver. Mountains, whileal-Barnawi’sbecamedominantinLakeChadandpartofitsshores Shekau’s factioncametoassertitspresenceintheSambisaForestandMandara 595 594 strength-detail.asp?country_id=nigeria (last accessed 7March 2018). 593 aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/buhari-boko-haram-base-retaken-sambisa-forest-161224125809113.html. 592 org/iss-today/boko-haram-in-2016-a-highly-adaptable-foe (last accessed 7March 2018). 591 clashed, see CrisisGroup, NigerandBoko Haram, supra fn573, p18. Borno State, close to theborder withNigerandonthelake, where thetwo factions have reportedly 590 vanguardngr.com/2016/09/shekaus-boko-haram-group-barnawi-camp-clash/. 589 Fi BiladisSudan). Mamaan NurandAnsaru(nowformallyknownasJama’atu Ansarul-Muslimina group offightersundertheleadershipShekau,anotherfactioncommandedby sis Group enumerated six different factions of Boko Haram,including notably a stronger groupsto avoid capture ordeath.Alreadyby 2014, International Cri- Many ofthesefactionswerelatereliminatedbysecurityforcesorco-optedinto tions followingthedeathofitsfoundingleader,MohammedYusuf,inJuly2009. and differentfactions.Thegroupreportedlybegansplinteringintomultiplefac- There isnosufficientlyclearandreliableinformationonBokoHaram’sstructure 2. BokoHaram reservists. The NigerianArmedForceshavebeenestimatedtobe181,000strong,with57,000 1. NigerianArmedForces of theMultinationalJointTaskForce(Cameroon,Chad,Niger)andBokoHaram. The partiestotheNIACin2017wereNigeriaanditsarmedforces,withsupport have takenplacebetweenthefactionsofShekauandal-Barnawi. Following thedeclarationinearlyAugust,severaldeadlyclasheswerereportedto enclave intheSambisaForest. hari declaredthattheremnantsofBokoHaramhadbeenfinallycrushedintheirlast Boko HarampositionsintheSambisaForest. By theendofDecember,PreisdentBu- October, theNigerianmilitarylaunchedOperationForestStorm,crackingdownon B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT O. S.Mahmood,‘Boko Haram in2016: AHighlyAdaptable Foe’, ISS, 7February 2017, https://issafrica. Global Firepower, ‘2017 Nigeria Military Strength’, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military- For more details, see CrisisGroup, Curbing Violence inNigeria,supra(II) fn538, p22. ‘Buhari:Last Boko Haram Base Taken inSambisaForest’, AlJazeera, 24 December 2016, http://www. ‘Shekau’s Boko Haram Group, Barnawi CampClash’,Vanguard, 8September 2016, https://www. ‘Boko Haram’, supra fn547. However, thedemarcation between thetwo factions isnot clear, especially inthenorthwest of 593 595 ItshouldbenuancedthoughthatAnsaruhasbeenconsid- 592 Overall,theyear2016witnessedsignificantprog- 590 Thesplitalsoarguablyentailedaninten- 591 Atthebeginningof 589 Subsequently, 594

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 109 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 110 of beliefsandideologytoal-QaedathanIS.Theparadoxhis alignmentwithIS their way into the hands of Boko Haram. pots werelootedandmanyweaponsoriginatingfromLibyasubsequentlyfound Muammar Gaddafi,todestabilizetheirhomegovernments.Afterhisfall,armsde- in theMaghrebandSahelweretrainedarmedbyformerLibyanleader, 601 7 March 2018). https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/shadowy-ties-between-isis-and-boko-haram (last accessed ‘The Shadowy Ties Between ISIS and Boko Haram’, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 30Jun2016, no-major-islamic-state-links-to-boko-haram-despite-claims-idUSKCN0YV0BW; see also Ryan Cummings, Claims’, 600 599 598 ozatp-sahara-bokoharam-qaeda-20120125-idAFJOE80O00K20120125. Got AlQaeda BombTraining, NigerSays’, Reuters, 25January2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/ 597 news/world-africa-35956301 also ‘Khalidal-Barnawi: NigeriaIslamist Group Head “Arrested”’, BBC, 596 publicly loyaltoIS. al-Barnawi’s factionretainsalatentaffinitywithal-Qaeda,eventhoughitisnow deposition ofShekau.Moreover,thereisreasontobelievethattheleadership headed byShekauand(AbuMusab)al-Barnawihasarguablyledtoaneffective The recentfracturingofBokoHaram’sleadershipintotwomajorfactionsspear- support toBokoHaram. fighting inMaliandal-Shabaab.AQIMhasgivenfinancial,arsenaltraining most notably with IS, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamist groups Boko HaramhastieswithseveralIslamistgroupsinsideaswelloutsideAfrica, al-Barnawi, in2016. became morepermissivebutwasdealtablowbythecaptureofitsleader,Khalid the French-ledinterventionin2013.Itlatertriedtoreassertitselfwhenconditions Nigerian militarycampaignandthedisruptionofAQIM’snetworksinMaliafter became largelydormantduetotheassassinationofitsmembersbyShekau, as staging attacks againststate agents and Christian civilians. Ansaru eventually ing Muslimcivilians.Thegroupfocusesinsteadoninternationaltargetsaswell (as aseparategroup)withviewtodistancingitselffromShekau’stacticsoftarget- ered as a splinter group since January 2012, when it first announced its formation communications channelsareopenbetweenthetwo. Haram hasreceivedsignificantoperationalsupportorfinancingfromIS,although to boostthecredentialsofgroup.ThereisnodiscernibleevidencethatBoko pledged allegiance to ISinMarch2015.Thiswasmore of atacticalmovedesigned they joinedotherIslamistfightersandreceivedguerrillatraining. through NigerandChadtoSomalia,Algeriaand,reportedly,Afghanistan,where ened afterthemilitarycrackdownin2009whensomesurvivingmembersescaped CrisisGroup, Curbing Violence inNigeria(II) , supra fn538, p24; see also L.Prieur, ‘Boko Haram Gartenstein-Ross andZenn, ‘Boko Haram’s Doomed Marriageto theIslamicState’, supra fn586. CrisisGroup, Curbing Violence inNigeria(II),supra fn538, p23. Ibid,pp24–25. Gartenstein-Ross andZenn, ‘Boko Haram’s Doomed Marriageto theIslamicState’, supra fn586;see J. Landay, W. Strobel andP. Stewart, IslamicState ‘U.S.Sees NoMajor Linksto Boko Haram, Despite Reuters, 9 June 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-usa-insight/u-s-sees- 601 596

Al-Barnawi, aswellhisallyMamaanNur,iscloserinterms

597 LinkswithIslamistgroupswereparticularlystrength- 599

As already mentioned, Boko Haram 600 3April2016, http://www.bbc.com/ 598

Some fighters

in 2014. forces, includingAuwalIsmaeela,wholedtheabductionofChibokschoolgirls has beenseverelydiminished.OtherBokoHaramfighterssurrenderedtothestate dispersed acrosstheregionandgroup’scapacitytoconductlarge-scaleattacks order tobecomethenewleaderofBokoHaram. him offfromcorrespondingwithal-BaghdadiandmanipulatedIS’sleadershipin idea isconsistentwithShekau’sownaccusationsthatBarnawihaddeliberatelycut cut Shekauleadingtohisdisposal.Whileitmightseemconspiratorialatfirst,this Boko Haram’scommunicationchannelswithIS,outofwhichhewouldeventually this view,mergingwithShekaumadeitpossibleforal-Barnawitobeincontrolof IS might have been motivated by his will to do away with Shekau. According to around 50peopleandabductingothers. ambushed anoilexplorationteamintheMagumerilocalityofBornoState,killing ambushes, suicidebombingsandabductions.Forinstance,on25Julythegroup African Political Violence, 604 603 factions/. 20 September 2016, http://africanarguments.org/2016/09/20/making-sense-of-boko-harams-different- 602 and yieldedmeasurableeffectsonthealreadydebilitatedgroup.Severalhigh-pro- Military offensivesduringthemonthsofSeptemberandOctoberwereextensive around LakeChad. erations concentratedonthedestructionofgroup’sremainingstrongholds Following thedislodgementofBokoHaramfromSambisaForest,militaryop- an ‘immediatecaliphate’. al-Barnawi’s ambitionfitsmorewithIS’smodusoperandianditsprioritizationof harder toachieveinashorttimeunderal-Qaeda’sgradualgrassrootsapproach, could beexplainedbyhisvisiontoestablishanIslamicstateinWestAfrica.Being casualties recordedinthepreviousfivemonths. least 381civiliansdeadbetweenAprilandSeptember2017,morethandoublethe International, theattacksbyBokoHaraminNigeriaandCameroonaloneleftat boko-harams-renewed-campaign-sparks-sharp-rise-in-civilian-deaths/. International, 5September 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/lake-chad-region- 607 January 2018). http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-09/lake_chad_basin.php (last accessed 31 606 confesses-leading-operation-kidnap-chibok-girls.html. 27 August 2017, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/241662-boko-haram-commander- 605 ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report_No.61-September-2017_pdf.pdf C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: A FOCUS ON THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ‘Lake ChadRegion: Boko Haram’s Renewed Campaign Sparks SharpRise inCivilian Deaths’, Amnesty Gartenstein-Ross andZenn, ‘Boko Haram’s Doomed Marriageto theIslamicState’, supra fn586. ‘Boko Haram Commander Confesses to Leading Operation to KidnapChibokGirls’, Premium Times, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Conflict Trends no Jacob Zenn, ‘MakingSense of Boko Haram’s Different Factions: Who, How andWhy?’, African Arguments, Security Council Report, ‘Lake ChadBasin’,September 2017 MonthlyForecast, 1September 2017, 605 However,BokoHaramstillretainstheabilitytoconductsmallraids,

604 September 2017, p 7, https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ Asaconsequence,manyBokoHarammembershavebeen 602

Some alsospeculatethatal-Barnawi’salignmentwith 606 AccordingtodatacollectedbyAmnesty 603 607 (last accessed 31January2018). 61, Real-time Analysisof 61,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 111 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 112

Nigeria (II),supra fn538, pp34–35. General onSituationintheLake ChadBasinRegion, supra fn610, §22;CrisisGroup, Curbing Violence in 613 612 610, §21. 611 6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_764.pdf (last accessed 7March 2018). UN docS/2017/7647, September 2017, §10, Security Council (UNSC),Report of theSecretary-General ontheSituationinLake Chad BasinRegion, Boko Haram and military operations in the Lake Chad Basin is estimated to be around 2.4 million, see UN p29483 (last accessed 7March 2018); theoverall numberof people displaced asaresult of attacks by Nigeria alone from May 2011 to November 2017, see https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/ cording to figures from CFR’s‘NigeriaSecurity Tracker’, theconflict claimed thelives of 31,184 people in 610 FINAL-1.pdf (last accessed 31January2018). https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report_November2017_ bitrary detentions,enforceddisappearances,extortionandforceddisplacement. in humanrightsabusessuchasextrajudicialkillings,tortureandill-treatment,ar- and lootingofproperty.NationalsecurityforcestheMNJTFwerealsoinvolved later marriedtomembersofthegrouporusedstagesuicideattacks),extortion of children,kidnappingcivilians(manywhomarewomenandgirlsthatwere tacking schools,marketsandreligiousplaces,sexualviolence,forcedrecruitment Haram’s violentcampaignhasinvolved,interalia,raidingandburningvillages,at- conflict haveallegedlycommittedseriousabusesinthecourseofhostilities.Boko 609 2017, http://saharareporters.com/2017/09/26/wanted-boko-haram-suspect-arrested-ondo-state. in OndoState, see ‘Wanted Boko Haram Suspect Arrested inOndoState’, Sahara Reporters, 26 September killed-military-strike. On24 September, IdrisIbrahim Babawo, atop level Shekau lieutenant, was arrested Reporters, 25October 2017, http://saharareporters.com/2017/10/25/wife-boko-haram-leader-shekau- Government Area on 19October. See ‘Wife of Boko Haram Leader, Shekau, Killed inMilitary Strike’, Sahara 608 cupation orincome. severe effect on local populations, leaving tensof thousands of people without oc- in ordertocutoffBokoHaram’sfinancialresources,notablyNiger,havehada Moreover, harshcounter-insurgencymeasuresthatwereimposedbysomestates ment ofthousandsciviliansaroundtheLakeChadBasin. The conflictwithBokoHaramhasresultedinthekilling,injuringanddisplace- file targetshavebeenkilledorcapturedbysecurityforces. involved inthewareconomy. effects inthefightagainstgroup. evolution ofthegroupinregion,militaryresponsescouldonlyhavetemporary pletely eradicated. Without addressing the structural problems that nourished the eyes ofearlysympathisers,itremainsuncertainwhetheritsthreatcanbecom- is now on the back foot and devoid of much of the appeal it previously had in the to AdamawaStateavoidthemilitarysaturationofBorno. gence reports have indicated that a large number of Boko Haram fighters have fled D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General ontheSituationinLake ChadBasinRegion, supra fn CrisisGroup, Watchmen of Lake Chad,supra fn557, pi;see Report also UNSC, of theSecretary- CrisisGroup, NigerandBoko Haram, supra fn573, p14. There are divergent reports onthenumberof fatalities caused by theconflict. Nonetheless, ac ACLED, The wife of Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, was targeted inanairstrike onKonduga Local Conflict Trends no 612

Vigilante groups,too,havecommittedabusesandbecome 63, Real-time Analysis of African Political Violence, 613

www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- 608 609 Anumberofintelli- Althoughthegroup 610

All partiestothe

November 2017, p 7, 611 - cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf (last accessed 7March 2018). Court (ICC), Report onPreliminary ExaminationActivities 2017, Nigeria,para. 204-229, https://www.icc- 614 investigation. TheOTPcontinuestofollowthesituation. Abuja. Thelasthearingreportedlytookplaceon8November 2017, concludingthe of itsmandate.From7Septemberto6October2017,thePIPheldapublichearingin public havebeeninvitedtosubmitinformationthePIPassistitindischarge gencies. Stakeholders, affected persons, institutions and interested members ofthe conduct anddisciplineintheNigerianArmedForceslocalconflictsinsur- violations ofinternationalhumanitarianlawandhumanrightsmatters SBI’s recommendations.ThePIPismandatedamongotherstoinvestigatealleged Acting PresidentYemiOsinbajoon11August2017,inaccordancewithoneofthe of itsoperationsagainstBokoHaraminNortheasternNigeria.ThePIPwassetupby man rightsviolationsagainsttheNigerianSecurityForces,includingincontext Nigerian Armyon8March2017andwasmandatedtoinvestigate allegations ofhu- of Engagement(thePIP).TheSBIwasconvenedbytheChiefArmyStaff Review ComplianceoftheArmedForceswithHumanRightsObligationsandRules (SBI), institutedbytheNigerianArmyandPresidentialInvestigationPanelto dition, theNigerianauthoritiesinitiatedtwoinquiries,SpecialBoardofInquiry suspects, currentlydetainedintwomilitarycampsNorthwesternNigeria.Inad- Several prosecutorswereassignedtobringcourtmorethan2,300BokoHaram ities, thusimpactingontheICCadmissibilityprocess(complementarityprinciple). In October2017,aseriesofnewproceedingswereinitiatedbytheNigerianauthor- conduct byBokoHaramandtwofortheNigeriansecurityforces. humanity andwarcrimesunderarticles78oftheStatute,includingsixfor fice identifiedeightpotentialcasesinvolvingthecommissionofcrimesagainst Article 15inrelationtothesituationNigeria.On12November2015,Of- The OfficeoftheProsecutor(OTP)receivedatotal131communicationsunder vember 2010. The preliminaryexaminationofthesituationinNigeriawasannouncedon18No- committed ontheterritoryofNigeriaorbyitsnationalsfrom1July2002onwards. 27 September2001.TheICCthereforehasjurisdictionovertheRomeStatutecrimes Nigeria ratified the 1998 Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court (ICC) on The following two paragraphs are drawn from Office of theProsecutor (OTP), International Criminal 614

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 113 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 114 peoples andMoros. crease inverticalinsurgency-relatedconflict. tween ANSAs(horizontalviolence).Since2014,therehasbeenaprominentin- by armednon-stateactors(ANSAs)againstthestate(verticalinsurgency)andbe- nourish theinstabilityunderRodrigoDuterte’spresidency. between clans,ethnicgroups,politicalpartiesorshadowauthoritiescontinuesto wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ConflictAnalysisARMM.pdf (last accessed 30January2018). 620 prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1373&type=publicationfile (last accessed 30January2018). Conflict, 1946–2016 , Peace Research Institute Oslo(PRIO)Policy Brief, February 2017, https://www. p4, 619 63bafa322d7da9.pdf (last accessed 30January2018). and CPP-NPA-NDF, NOREF, March 2015, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189990/6a4a521651243abd9d 618 WayNew ASEAN of Conflict Management,Springer, 2016, p46. Conflict anditsInternationalization’, in M. Oishi(ed), Contemporary Conflicts inSoutheast Asia:Towards a Bangsamoro describes theirterritory. Druce, See S.C. ‘Not the“ASEAN Way”: The SouthernPhilippines 617 and Maguindanaonethnicgroups. ARMM’s populationisapproximately 4.1 million,largely dominated by Muslimsfrom theMeranaw, Tausug of 616 group-committed-peace-170312162817804.html. Al Jazeera, 12March 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/03/philippines-milf-rebel- as long as historical injustices continue. J. Alindogan, ‘Philippines’ MILF Rebel Group “Committed to Peace”’ 615 Despite claimsofitsdecline, Mindanao (ARMM). istrative Mindanao isthesecondlargestislandinPhilippines,dividedintosixadmin- Front conflicts (NIAC) with dissident armed factions of the Moro National Liberation In 2017,thePhilippineArmedForceswereinvolvedinnon-internationalarmed Classification oftheConfict 8. THE PHILIPPINES: A LONG-RUNNING AND MULTIFACETED is stillaNIACwiththeNewPeople’sArmy. the BangsmoroIslamicFreedomFightersandMauteGroup.Inaddition,there tween ChristianandMuslimarmedmilitiasthatattainedanationalcharacter. nial eraandthedynamicsofexploitationresistanceshadowedbyclashesbe- gest-running situations of violence, with roots thatcanbetracedback to thecolo- A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT CONFLICT IN MINDANAO Maguindanao andLanaodelSuronthemainland MindanaoMuslimsare known as Moros, derived from theSpanish term Moor(Muslim),while A. Macapaar, A. known asCommander Bravo hasstated hewillnot give uptherebel group’s weapons R.J. Heydarian, The Quest for Peace: The Aquino Administration’s Peace Negotiations withtheMILF K.Dupuy, S.Gates, H.M.Nygard, I.Rodolfsen, Rustad, S.A. H.Strand andH.Urdal, Trends inArmed ARMMobtained special autonomous status in1990following aplebiscite. Itincludestheprovinces See A. L.Strachan, See A. Conflict Analysisof MuslimMindanao,GSDRC, 2015, p13,http://www.gsdrc.org/ 615 andtheMoroIslamicLiberationFront,namelywithAbuSayyafgroup, regions, includingtheMuslim-majorityAutonomousRegioninMuslim 617 616

This southernPhilippineislandisfacingoneofthelon- For centuries,ithasbeenhometoChristians,indigenous 619 therearestillmanyinstancesofarmedviolence island provinces like Basilan,SuluandTawi-Tawi. 620

In addition,horizontalviolence Laura Baron Mendoza 618 Peace Process’, Journalof HumanRights (2017) 11, DOI: 10.1080/14754835.2017.1382339. 625 Cases, United States Institute of Peace p59. (USIP),2004, Crocker,p 157; A. C. F. E.Hampson andP. Aall(eds), Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation intheHardest Conflict Resolution and Peace Education: Transformations Across Disciplines, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 624 placement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/philippines/figures-analysis (last accessed 23October 2016). 623 ca/pl_armedconflict/philippines-mindanao-1971-first-combat-deaths (last accessed 8November 2017). 622 DOI: 10.1080/1464937042000288732. 621 urban settings. recognition ofancestralheritage,drugdealingandadensedyouthpopulationin warfare and family feuds, the shadow economy, a culture of impunity and lack of poverty, unequaldistributionofresources,poorgovernance,abusepower,clan Causes ofviolencearenumerousandoverlapping,including,interalia,massive Since 1972,whenPresidentFerdinandMarcosdeclaredmartiallaw, far frombeingmilitarilydefeatedinthearea. with thesupportofagreatnumberforeignfighterswhoreachedMindanano,is the deathofmainleadersandathreatenedpeaceagreementdemonstratethatIS, Isnilon Hapilonfaction).Despiteareportedregainofcontrolbystatearmedforces, erupted betweensecurityforcesandIS-linkedgroups(theMautegroupthe After martiallawwasimposedontheislandofMindanaoinMay2017,fighting reasons whyMILFfightersmovetowardsradicalANSAs. ment hasbeenslow.Theslowenforcementofthepeaceagreementisone the current ARMM. However, progress on the implementation of the peace agree- way forthefoundationofanewBangsamoroAutonomousRegion(BAR)toreplace el group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), was signed in 2014, paving the ment, betweentheGovernmentofPhilippinesandPhilippines’largestreb- peace talks.Afternumerousattemptstoresolvedivergences,afinalagree- As aresult,theregionhasalsowitnesseddiverseandoftenprotractedseriesof tude ofactors,suchasclans,criminalgangsorpoliticalelites andismultifacet- At thesametime,situationofarmedviolenceinMindanao involvesamulti- played asignificantroleininfluencingthereligiousfacetof conflict. internally displacedpersons(IDPs)since2000. into anintractableconflict. Muslim minorityagainstthecentralgovernment,ithas,undoubtedly,evolved autonomous territorywithinthePhilippinesbytraditionallymarginalized Usually portrayedasanethno-nationaliststruggleforindependentstateor caused morethan120,000casualties, ANSAs thathavemorphedovertheyears.Today,armedconflictissaidto pine islandofMindanaohasbeenengagedinanarmedconflictbetweenvarious C. A. Abubakar, A. C. ‘Review of theMindanaoPeace Processes’, 5Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 3(2004), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘PhilippinesIDPFigures Analysis’, http://www.internal-dis R.Jeffery, ‘Amnesties andIntractable Conflicts: Managed ImpunityinthePhilippines’ Bangsamoro Project Ploughshares, ‘Philippines-Mindanao (1971 –First Combat Deaths)’ http://ploughshares. S.D. Russell andT. Rey, ‘Conflict Transformation Efforts intheSouthernPhilippines’, Carter inC. (ed), 625 Still,itmustbesaidthatMoro-Christiantensionshavealways 624 622 whichhasledtomorethan3.5million 623

621 thePhilip-

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 115 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 116 conflict-alert-2017-report-highlights/ (last accessed 30January2018). 633 and-the-philippine-peace-process.pdf (last accessed 30January2018). Policy Briefno176, 2015, pp1–3, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2015-abuza-politicking- 632 124b4ca3aa27b08d2740f1_100.pdf (last accessed 30January2018). Centre for Studies, 2017, p5,http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2017/8/6/b03ba3f98f be implementedoncethefederalismprojectbecomesareality. tions suchastheMamasapanoclash. tarily sincethesigningofagreement,ithasbeeninvolvedinsomeconfronta- the ceasefire agreement. However, eveniftheMILFhas not been very active mili- Despite thesewarningsandthelackofcompliance,bothpartieshaveprolonged was signedhasgeneratedgrowingpublicdistrustinthepeaceprocess. Congress topasstheBangsamoroBasicLaw(BBL)threeyearsafteragreement Fighters (BIFF)continues. dissident membersjoiningotheractorssuchastheBangsmoroIslamicFreedom legitimation ofthosewhoencourageamilitaryreaction.Infact,theriskMILF mistrust promotestheradicalizationofcertainsectorsMILF,aswell 631 com/peace-process/2016/07/federalism-first-bbl-if-it-fails/. 630 30 January2018). paz 629 uploads/2017/10/Philippines-StateofConflictandViolence.pdf (last accessed 30October 2017). 628 (last accessed 30January2018). Sites of Conflict 2011–2015 http://conflictalert.info/publication/conflict-alert-2011-2015/, 2016, p34, 627 asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/MindanaoCaseStudyFullReport.pdf (last accessed 30January2018). Development Assistance: The Case of Mindanao, Philippines,The AsiaFoundation, 2013, p26, https:// 626 shaped thesituationinMindanao2017. danao battle(seebelow).Verticalconflictandextremisthorizontalviolencethus in theMindanaoregionpersists,withvariousconcernsarising2017afterMin- Nevertheless, whileviolenceinvolvingcertainANSAshasdeclined,armed rated underanewfederalconstitutionalframework. made withtheMILFandthosepreviouslyMNLFwereincorpo- the peaceprocesswasunderway.Duterte’splanstodiscussbotharrangements Shortly afterPresidentRodrigoDutertetookofficeinJune2016,anewapproachto ed. major obstacletoachievingsustainablepeace, on drugs’,thedegreeofhorizontalandverticalviolenceinMindanaoembodiesa Front (MNLF). tiations withthetwolargestANSAs–MILFandMoroNationalLiberation , 2017, p237, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/alerta/alerta/17/alerta17e.pdf, (last accessed 626 See International Alert,Conflict Alert2017 Report Highlights,pp1–10, http://conflictalert.info/publication/ International Alert,Violence intheBangsamoro andSouthernMindanao:Emerging Actors andNew Z.Abuza, Politicking andthePhilippinePeace Process, Institute for Security andDevelopment Policy, Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2017! C. O. C. Arguillas, ‘Federalism First; BBL If It Fails’, The AsiaFoundation, PhilippinesatGlance, 2017, p146,https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/ A. Fermin andT. A. Parks, The Contested Corners of Asia:SubnationalConflict andInternational Forthisreason,whilethegovernmentisvigorouslytryingtowagea‘war R. J. Heydarian, 628 Crisis inMindanao:Duterte andtheIslamicState’s Pivot to Asia,AlJazeera 632 Informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanosyconstrucción de 631 Itshouldalsobenotedthatthecumulative 633 MindaNews, 9 July 2017, http://www.mindanews. ThelatestconcernsinMindanaoare 627 regardlessofthestop-startnego- 629 Thus,theagreementwill 630 Thefailureof to neutralizethethreatposedbyextremistANSAs. 22,500 troops–8,000inSuluwheretheAbuSayyafgroup(ASG)operates)order that hisregimehadlaunchedthelargestmilitarycampaigninMindanao(with of ANSAs in narco-trafficking activities and, at the beginning of 2017, confirmed during hisadministrationseparately.Infact,Dutertehasallegedtheinvolvement his warondrugsinhibitsthepossibilityofviewingaugmentationviolence The undeniableconnectionbetweenDuterte’scounter-insurgencycampaignand their allegiancetoISIL,interalia,AbuSayyef,theMautegroupand BIFF. expressed theirconcernoverthespreadofradicalismbyANSAsthathavepledged military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=philippines (last accessed 7March 2018). 639 June 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/06/25/asia/philippines-marawi-isis/index.html. 638 cessed 30January2018). de paz, pp224–225, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/alerta/alerta/16/alerta16e.pdf (last ac 637 com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/philippines-peace-process-tatters-160207103251669.html. 636 Press, 2007, 64. pp44, 635 634 personnel. In 2017,thePhilippineArmedForcescomprisedofatotal of498,250military 1. ThePhilippineArmedForces NIAC withthePhilippineArmedForces. Maute Group. In addition, the New People’s Army (NPA) remains a party to the dent factions of the MNLF and the MILF, namely with the ASG, the BIFF and the The partiestotheNIACsin2017werePhilippineArmedForcesagainstdissi- creased presenceofISIS, focused on:1)theincreasingproliferationandcoordinationofANSAswithin- the peaceprocess. to pass the BBL), Amid thisriseofviolenceandthedeadlockinpeaceprocess(therepeatedfailure crime butalsoincreasingthecomplexityofarmedconflicts. the siegeofMarawi to interactwithvarious ANSAs, venge), hasawide-ranginginfluenceontheANSAsofMindanao.Often,ridotends lence involvinghostilitiesbetweenfamiliesoverland,businessorpersonalre- With regardtothesecondpoint,itshouldbehighlightedthatrido(verticalvio- B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICTS Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2016! W. Torres III,Rido:ClanFeuding andConflict ManagementinMindanao, E.McKirdy andI.Watson, ‘Bloodied andBroken: RisingToll of Philippines’ War withISIS’,CNN,25 Global Firepower, ‘2017 PhilippinesMilitary Strength’, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country- R.J. Heydarian, ‘Philippines’ Peace Process inTatters’ AlJazeera, 7Feb 2016, http://www.aljazeera. Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2017! , supra fn629. 639

636 both the Philippine Government and the MILF leadership have 638 andclashesbetweendifferentANSAsthatriskjeopardizing 634 and2)rido(clanfeuding)urbancrime. 635 not only causing the intensificationofurban Informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanosyconstrucción 637 Asaresult,2017witnessed Ateneo deManilaUniversity -

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 117 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 118 longing thearmedstruggle. Nonetheless, just4ofthe13provincesvotedtojoin,creatingdiscomfortandpro- ministration, thatARMMwasfinallyproclaimedafteraplebiscitehadbeenheld. Consequently, conflictresumed.Itwasin1989,undertheCorazonAquinoad- dictatorship. collapsed not long after because of its unilateral implementation by the Marcos impunity fortheMuslimpopulationofMindanao. groups, whileresistingdiscriminationandmarginalization. ate anindependentMoronationinMindanaoforthe13Islamizedethno-linguistic for thefoundationin1969ofMNLFbyNurMisuari.Itoriginallyaimedtocre- 644 643 642 Age of Terror: National,Regional, andGlobal ChallengesinthePost-9/11 World , CRC Press, 2009, p53. 641 Asian Studies 2(2012) 227. 640 resistance movementinMuslimMindanao. co, thisembitteredtheconflictandtriggeredasplitinMNLF, creatinganew but onlythecityofMarawiandislandBasilanwereincorporated.Seenasafias- 1996 withtheMNLF.ThispostulatedanotherplebisciteforanexpandedARMM, Subsequently, PresidentFidelRamosreachedaFinalPeaceAgreement(FPA)in work foranautonomousregiontheMuslimsinMindanao. operation. Thisledtothecessationofarmedhostilitiesandestablishedframe- signed apeaceagreementinTripoli,brokeredbytheOrganizationofIslamicCo- In 1976,afterafive-yearperiodofhighlyintensivearmedhostilities,bothsides borne allthehallmarksofanintractableconflict’. action againstthegovernmenthasledtomorethan40yearsofviolencethat‘has and combatingthenewANSAs.TheMNLF’sunexpectedcapacitytotakemilitary Nevertheless, thiswasusedbyMarcosasjustificationforinstitutingmartiallaw massacres inJabidah Underlying grievancesandconflictdriverswereboostedbyepisodessuchasthe a. TheMNLF Bangsmoro IslamicFreedomFighters(BIFF)andForeignFighters. ration Front(MILF)DissidentFactions:AbuSayyaf,theMauteGroup, the 2. TheMoroNationalLiberationFront(MNLF)andIslamicLibe- on Ancestral DomainAspect 2008’, 1Dauliyah Journalof IslamicandInternational Studies 2(2016) 137. 646 worldbank.org/curated/en/701961468776746799/pdf/31822.pdf (last accessed 30January2018). Potential Peace Dividend,SocialDevelopment Paper no24, The World Bank,2005, p2,http://documents. 645 fn 629, pp 199–200. Jeffery, ‘Amnesties and Intractable Conflicts’, supra fn 625, 11; Banlaoi, Philippine Security inthe R. C. Strachan, Conflict Analysisof MuslimMindanao,supra fn620. See F. NurkhasanahTaufik, ‘Causal Factors for Conducting Peaceful Settlementbetween GRPan[sic]MILF C. Mackerras C. (ed), EthnicityinAsia.RoutledgeCurzon, p143. 2004, Asia Foundation, S. M. K. Aljunied and R. A. Curaming, S.M.K.Aljunied andR.A. ‘Mediating andConsuming Memoriesof Violence’, Critical 44 S. Schiavo-Campo and M. Judd,The Mindanao Conflict inthePhilippines:Roots, Costs, and Philippines at Glance, supra fn 628; Escola de Cultura de Pau, 640 andManili,whichrevealedthesystemicenvironmentof 645 646 643 641 Thiswasthefountainhead 642 644 However,thedeal Alerta 2017! supra one oftheMILFcommanders,foundedBIFF. inter-group clashesthatledtoitsrupture.InDecember2010,AmerilUmbraKato, danao. pletely self-governingregion–Bangsamoro,asopposedtosemi-autonomyinMin- danao, theMILFwasformallycreatedin1981afteroutliningitsvisionofacom- Originally ledbyHashimSalamat,andoperatingfundamentallyinCentralMin- tutional bytheSupremeCourtprovokedamilitaryretaliationMILF However, thedeclarationofsuchaMemorandumthatwasconsideredunconsti- Memorandum ofAgreementonAncestralDomain(MOA-AD)wassigned. Team wascreated,withMalaysiaastheleader,andfouryearslater,inmid2008, 653 Philippines. Springer, p22. 2014, 652 651 650 649 648 Fragile’, 73 Pacific Affairs 1(2000), 38. 647 bursed intosmallergroups,hidinginremoteareasoftheregion’. ‘all-out warpolicy,whichfailedtoneutralizetheMILF.Conversely,ANSAdis- cal challengeforthegovernment.In2000,PresidentJosephEstradadeclaredan Clashes augmentedafterthefailureofFPA,thistimewithMILFasfo- A breakawayfactionoftheMNLF,MILF b. TheMILF MILF: ChairmanAl-HajMuradEbrahim. Shortly after,theGFRPTwasrestoredbyaceasefirewithnewleaderof conflict toeruptagain. liok complexinNorthCotabatoandMaguindanaoon11February2003,causing attack, carriedoutbytheArmedForcesofPhilippines,against of PeaceTalks(GFRPT)inKualaLumpur.However,PresidentArroyolaunchedan March 2001whenbothpartiessignedtheGeneralFrameworkforResumption the MILF.Peacetalks,facilitatedbyMalaysianGovernment,concludedon24 capaga Arroyo,whoimplementedthecontrasting‘all-out-peace’policyregarding Armed strugglescontinuedintermittentlyuntiltheadministrationofGloriaMa- Ebrahim inTokyo2011.SuccessivetalksKualaLumpur,under theauspicesof formal negotiations,afterPresidentBenignoAquinoIIIheld talkswithMurad Amid thissporadicviolence,thePhilippineGovernmentand the MILFestablished guerilla forceinthePhilippines,withanestimated10,000to30,000members. Murad replaced HashimSalamatwhenhedied in2003. Strachan, Conflict Analysisof MuslimMindanao,supra fn620. A. Hernandez,Nation-BuildingandIdentityConflicts: A. Facilitating theMediation Process inSouthern J. Bertrand, ‘Peace andConflict intheSouthern Philippines:Why the1996Peace Agreement Is Schiavo-Campo andJudd,The Mindanao Conflict inthePhilippines,supra fn645,p3. AsiaFoundation PhilippinesatGlance , supra fn628, pp147–148. C. Bell,Peace C. Agreements andHumanRights,Oxford University Press, 2003, pp358–359. 649 651 In2004,theInternationalMonitoring 647 istodayconsideredtobethelargest 653

650

MILF inBu- 652 and 648

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 119 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 120 ating theBBL. ARMM. TurningtheseagreementsintolawisdependentontheCongressdeliber- autonomous regionwithmorepowersandterritory,thustheabolitionof cessed 30October 2017). Report no38,2017, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/07/IPAC_Report_38.pdf p 4, (last ac 660 659 658 657 656 com/news/asia-pacific/2014/03/philippines-sign-deal-with-muslim-rebels-2014327434188160.html. 655 Resources, The AsiaFoundation andMuhammadiyah. 654 Mashriq (IslamicState–EasternRegion)undertheoverallleadership ofIsnilon leadership, whichdesignatedthemastheportentsofaDaulahIslamiyahWilayatul IS leadership.Itwasnotuntil2016thattheyreceivedfullrecognition bytheIS Between JulyandAugust2014,variousgroupsinMindanaopledged Bay’ahtothe fare. well astheincreaseininsecurityregion,navigationrisksandurbanwar- recognized thepresenceofISandforeigngroupsfightersinterritory,as Although thisphenomenonhadbeenminimizedorevenignored,in2016Duterte ranging fromanal-QaedatoaJemaahIslamiyahpresence. of aradicalIslamicoutlookhasbeeninplacethePhilippinessince1990s, Asia, and the escalation of armedaction,became palpable. Nonetheless,thebasis solidation ofIS’spresenceinMindanaoasanepicentreitsprojectSoutheast In 2016,theriskofproliferationseveralIslamistANSAs,possiblecon- establishing awilayat(province)inSoutheastAsia. of thesegroupsbyISin2016,ledtheANSAstostepuptheiroperationsaimedat of allegiance–Bay’ah violent groupssuchas the ASG,theBIFFandMautegroup.Theirrecentpledges ippine Government,theirbreakawayfactionshaveevolvedintochallengingand While theMNLFandMILF,haveengagedinpeacenegotiationswithPhil- flict onthesouthernislandofMindanao. declarations, annexesandaddendumsthathadsoughttobringanendthecon- cades of fighting with more than 120,000 fatalities, twelve prior agreements and This ultimateagreementmarkedtheculminationof17yearsnegotiations,de- Malaysia andtheInternationalContactGroup, changes andmilitaryreversalsinIraqeasternSyria. Aquino III. prehensive AgreementontheBangsamoroinMarch2014withPresidentBenigno Framework AgreementontheBangsamoroinOctober2012,aswellCom- AsiaFoundation, PhilippinesatGlance, supra fn628, pp148–149. T. Regencia, ‘PhilippinesSignsDeal withMuslimRebels’, AlJazeera, 27 March http://www.aljazeera. 2014, Heydarian, CrisisinMindanao , supra fn631. Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2017!, supra fn629, pp255–256. Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2016! supra note 637, pp224–225. This includes:theUK,Turkey, Japan, SaudiArabia, theCentre for Humanitarian Dialogue,Conciliation Institute for Policy Analysisof Conflict (IPAC), Marawi, The ‘East AsiaWilayah’ andIndonesia,IPAC 659 ThismightrevealashiftinstrategyofIScommandasresultground 655 657 – totheIslamicState(IS),togetherwithacknowledgment 656 Itprecipitatedthecreationofanew 654 madeitpossibletoachievethe 660 658 -

operations in Butig. group’s notorietywasregainedin2016withitsunexpectedmilitaryactivityand is knowntobehighlydisciplinedfinanciallyandmilitarily. several ASGfactionsspreadacrossdifferentterritoriesintheSuluarchipelago),it com/news/2017/05/fighting-isil-linked-philippine-group-170526050310649.html. 668 iyCj (last accessed 30January2018). timony/ts170712_Sanderson_testimony_blackflag_mindanao.pdf?0KDtmMuU1WDsYYAFvWeS03hq0rxY Studies, Testimony, 12July2017, p3,https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/congressional_tes 667 www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/abu-sayyaf-blood-drugs-conspiracies-160724090604857.html. 666 665 zeera.com/news/2017/02/abu-sayyaf-video-shows-beheading-german-hostage-170227101245013.html. 664 p 7, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/10/IPAC_Report_33.pdf (last accessed 30October 2017). 663 Khalifa Philippines(AKP), cannot beignored. 662 661 Hapilon. black flaginApril 2015. in Mindanao,pledgedallegiancetoISILleaderal-Baghdadi,adoptingthegroup’s and itsMindanaopartners,theMautegroup. ings tokidnappingforransomsandevendrugsweaponssmuggling. The influenceofISisapparentinthetactics.ASGpracticesrangefrombehead- clans andethniclines,whodecidedtoputtheirdifferencesaside. across thePhilippines’. It isconsideredtohave‘thesmartest,besteducated,mostsophisticatedmembers led bybrothersAbdullahandOmarkhayamMauteuntilOctober2017. in LanaodelSur,includesseveralmembersofalargefamilyMindanao,andwas The Mautegroup,alsoknownasDaulahIslamiyah,orIslamicState,whichisbased d. TheMauteGroup official ISILwilayatdesignation. lan. In2016,HapilonwasnamedtheEmirofSoutheastAsiawithoutreceivingan ber oftheASG,officiallypledgedloyaltytoISandAbuBakral-BaghdadiinBasi- allegiance toal-Qaeda,inJuly2014itshiftedwhenIsnilonHapilon,aseniormem- an IslamicstateinMindanao.DespiteitsoriginaltiestoOsamabinLadenand away factionoftheMNLFin1991byAbdurajakJanjalaniwithaimcreating The ASGisconsideredtobeaPhilippinejihadistorganizationfoundedasbreak- c. TheAbuSayyafGroup–ASG where ithas been ableto recruit studentsandteachers.Thenationallocalad- Heydarian, CrisisinMindanao,supra fn631. IPAC, Pro-Isis Groups inMindanaoandtheirlinksto IndonesiaandMalaysia, IPAC Report no 33,2016, T. Sanderson, Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2016!, supra fn637, p224. ‘Abu Sayyaf Video “Shows Beheading of GermanHostage”’, AlJazeera, 27 Feb 2017, http://www.alja Also, thepresence of lesser-known groups, suchasKhilafa Islamiyah Mindanao(KIM)andAnshar ‘Foreigners FightingWith ISIL-Linked Philippine Group’, AlJazeera, 26 May 2017, http://www.aljazeera. J. Alindogan,‘InsideAbuSayyaf: Blood, DrugsandConspiracies’, AlJazeera, 24 Jul 2016, http:// 661 ThegreatestthreatsinthePhilippinestodayoriginatefromAbuSayyaf Black Flags over Mindanao: ISIS in the Philippines , Center for Strategic & International 665 Despite having no unifying force of leadership (there are 667 668 The group, also fighting for an independent Muslim state ItsstrongholdisMindanaoState University inMarawi, 663 Thishasfacilitatedthecollaborationbetween 662

666

664 The

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 121 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 122 AD unconstitutional. expressed theneedformilitaryactiononceSupremeCourtdeclaredMOA- The BIFForiginatedin2008,whenAmerilUmbraKato,amemberoftheMILF, e. TheBangsamoroIslamicFreedomFighters–BIFF than expected. nication andcertainfinancialpropagandasupport. pass adifferentcommandandcontrolorjustsymbolicrelation, basedoncommu- This said,furtherinformationisstillneededtocomprehendwhethertiesencom- pdf (last accessed 8November 2017). 13–14,18, http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/JSRP/downloads/JSRP18-AdametAl. Torn Mindanao, Philippines,JRSP Paper 18,The Justice andSecurity Research Programme, 2015, pp 676 com/news/2017/05/duterte-declares-martial-law-mindanao-attack-170523171932275.html. 675 news/2017/06/fighters-flee-raiding-philippine-village-170621181400955.html. 674 673 672 671 670 669 reveals theirvolatilenatureandacapacitytoadaptunforeseenconditions. have declaredallegiancetoISIL.However,theirrelationshipsremainfluid,which There aremoregroupsthantheabovementionedoperatinginMindanao,which allegiances isunclear, proved wrong.Whileitistruethatinformationaboutitsmilitarycapacityand in 2015 and the announcement of Sheik Ismail Abubakar as the new leader has The beliefthatthegroupwouldnot continue itsactivities after thedeathofKato siege ofMarawi. night-market bombingon2September2016,andplayedaleadroleintherecent The Mautegrouphasbeenresponsibleforseveralattacks,mostnotablytheDavao influencers are. of madrassas in country. Theymushroomed in Mindanao and itis unclear who the ministrations seemtohavelosttracksofthenumber,originsandfundingsources yet itrefusestolaydownitsarms. MILF, violentconflictsincreased,mainlyintheperiodbetween2011–2014. other groupsdidinJanuary2016. al-Baghdadi. However,itdidnotannounceaunificationunderIsnilonHapilon,as ter theCaliphatewasannouncedinmid-2014,BIFFalsopledgedallegianceto Cotabato andManguindanaoProvince. occupied aschool,keepinghostagesinretaliationformilitaryoffensivesNorth incidents; forinstance,thesituationinPigcawayanJune2017,whereBIFF Strachan, Conflict Analysisof MuslimMindanao,supra fn5. Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2016!, supra fn637, pp67–68. ‘Duterte Declares Martial Law After Mindanao Attack’, ‘Fighters Flee After RaidingPhilippineVillage’, AlJazeera Jun2017,, 21 http://www.aljazeera.com/ IPAC, Pro-Isis Groups inMindanao,supra fn663, p18. J. Adam, B.Verbrugge andD. Vanden Boer, Peacemaking andState-Society Interactions inConflict- Escola deCultura dePau, Alerta 2016!, supra fn637, pp67–68. IPAC, Marawi, The ‘East AsiaWilayah’ andIndonesia,supra fn660, p4. 669 Withtheseacts,thegrouphasprovedtobemoreorganized 670 673 Thus,withtheformationofthisbreakawayfaction theBIFFhassurvivedandisstillaconcernaftervarious 672 675 674 Itsleadershipacceptsitisoutnumbered, Al Jazeera, 24 May 2017, http://www.aljazeera.

671 Af- 676

Philippine law, suchadeclaration ispossible onthegrounds of theexistence of rebellion. 681 680 com/news/2017/07/philippines-freezes-peace-talks-communist-rebels-170721062205681.html. 679 678 677 security forces. group, whichcoalescedwithASGandotherminorgroupsto resistthePhilippine jority city).Theoperationprovokedawide-rangingconfrontation withtheMaute Hapilon inMarawi(thecapitalofLanaodelSurProvinceandthe largestMuslim-ma- olence escalatedradicallyafterthePhilippinemilitaryattempted toraidandcapture On 23May2017,whileRodrigoDuterte was onahigh-profilestate visit toRussia,vi- monitored bythePhilippinemilitaryin-country. the battle ofMarawi, there were already more than adozenforeignfighters being Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Chechnya andYemen. Yet, among thefightersthatparticipatedinbattleofMarawiwereindividualsfrom became availableforlocalbattlesalsorecognizedaspartofthe Caliphate. Thus, take uparms.AsnotallofthemwereabletomaketheirwayMiddleEast,they a vastnumberofaspiringjihadistsbegantravellingtoSyriaandIraqinorder Not longafter f. ForeignFighters inces, withmorethan4,000fighters. era. Nonetheless,itisstillthoughttobeoperationalinmostofthecountry’sprov- Army (NPA)initiatedthearmedstrugglein1969.The1980swereitsflourishing The armedbranchoftheCommunistPartyPhilippines,NewPeople’s 3. TheNewPeople’sArmy(NPA) Marawi, itwillmaintainthismagnetism. fighters, foreithertrainingorfighting.However,itistooearlytoconcludeif,after population and ISIL support,thePhilippinesbecome an attractive hub forforeign Without doubt,duetothedeep-seatedgrievancesamongMuslimminority off, ashavethemilitaryactionsofgroupagainstgovernmentforces in2017. ment attheendofAugust2016,truceremainsweak.Dialoguehasbeenonand especially aftertheceasefireagreementsignedbyRodrigoDuterte’snewgovern- Although thelevelsofviolencehavedroppeddrasticallycomparedto2015and2016, IN MINDANAO C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: A LONG-RUNNING AND MULTIFACETED CONFLICT Itwas furtherapproved andextended untiltheendof theyear by theSupreme Court. Based on T. Sanderson, BlackFlagsover Mindanao,supra fn667, p5. Ibid,p150. ‘PhilippinesFreezes Peace Talks withCommunist Rebels’, AlJazeera Jul2017,, 21 http://www.aljazeera. ‘Fighters Flee After Raiding PhilippineVillage’, supra fn674. 680 the emergenceofISin2013andCaliphatedeclaration2014, Thedayafter,martiallawwasdeclaredacrosstheisland. 678

677

681 prior to 679

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presence offoreignfighters, street warfare,byOctober2017thefive-monthclashesandbombingswith While governmentforcestriedtoregaincontroloverthecitythroughstreet-by- camps, andacityinruins. killed link Marawi revealsachainofcommandorissimplydisplayingsymbolicandfinancial planes anddronesChinacontributedanaidpackageof$12million. surveillance planesforintelligence-gatheringpurposes;Singaporedonatedcargo military ability,andaccesstoweapons,equipment,recruitstraining. ployed sniperstrategiesandimprovisedexplosivedevices,thusdemonstratingtheir news/2017/10/total-victory-declared-marawi-isil-171022092511749.html. 691 690 boost-ties-with-russia-and-china/?utm_term=.23878f86ebe0. ingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/27/with-mattis-in-manila-duterte-decides-its-time-to- It’s Time to Boost Ties withRussia andChina’, The Washington Post, 27 October 2017, https://www.wash 900 (2015) 1233,DOI:10.1017/S1816383116000448; V. Bevins, ‘With MattisinManila,Duterte Decides and onDetermining theIHLApplicable to This Type of Conflict’, 97 International Review of theRed Cross 689 688 687 net/marawi-death-toll-nears-700-military/342777/. 686 Rappler, 24 May 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/170744-timeline-marawi-city-martial-law. 685 indepth/opinion/2017/05/philippines-marital-law-rekindling-horrific-memories-170526131438289.html. 684 IPAC, Marawi, The ‘East AsiaWilayah’ andIndonesia,supra fn660, p8. 683 682 ture ofthearmedconflict. na pitchedin,withthegovernment’sconsentandthereforenotaffecting- drones andanewcacheofweapons.Shortlyafter,Australia,SingaporeChi- which deployedaSpecialForcesunit,providingreal-timeintelligencethrough Due tothemagnitudeofviolence,DutertesoughthelpfromUnitedStates, 7,000 troopsbyland,wagingamajorurbanwaragainstthealliance. The policeandarmywereinvolvedinairraidsthedeploymentofmorethan essary tosiegeandrampagethecity. According todifferentsources,theISleadershipinSyriaprovidedfundingnec- did, however,regaincontrolon23October2017. ed a major humanitarian crisis and several questions regarding ‘what next?’. It The inabilityofthePhilippineGovernmenttopreventalarge-scaleattackprompt- ‘Total Victory Declared in Marawi Over ISIL’, Al Jazeera, 23 October 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/ 683 Heydarian, CrisisinMindanao,supra fn631, p3. Fundscame both directly from ISIScentral aswell aslocal sources. ISISchanneled $600,000. See C. Fonbuena C. andM.Bueza, ‘Timeline: Marawi ClashesPrompt MartialLaw inallof Mindanao’, Heydarian, CrisisinMindanao,supra fn631, p4. Ibid,p6. T. Ferraro, ‘The ICRC’s Legal Position ontheNotion of Armed Conflict Involving Foreign Intervention ‘Marawi Death Toll Nears 700 – Military’, The ManilaTimes, 6August 2016, http://www.manilatimes. R.J. Heydarian, 2017, ‘MindanaoCrisis:ACityonFire’ AlJazeeraMay http://www.aljazeera.com/ 26 , ICTY, Prosecutor vHaradinaj, Trial Chamber, Judgment,IT-04-84-T, 3April2008, §360. as,tothisday,nowilayatofIslamicStatehasbeenacknowledgedinthearea. more than1,000peopleandleft600,000displacedforcedtoflee 686 689 Forinstance,AustraliadeployedP-3Orionmilitary 684 predominantlyfromMalaysiaandIndonesia, 682 Suchsupportraisesthequestionofwhether 691 Thedefeatwaspossibleafter 687 ANSAsem- 690

685 688

water, foodandshelterbecamehardereveryday. who remainedtrappedorchosetostayinthecity.Accessbasicnecessities,like wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CO17173.pdf (last accessed 30January2018). S. Rajaratnam Schoolof International Studies, September 21 2017, pp1–3, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/ 697 (last accessed 30January2018). Factsheet, updated December 2017, pp1–2, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/philippines_en 696 aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/05/philippines-military-fights-control-marawi-170527145017409.html. 695 694 171016072551985.html. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/marawi-siege-army-kills-abu-sayyaf-maute-commanders- 693 170906112401721.html. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/philippines-army-rebel-groups-join-forces-marawi- 692 tarian aid,forfearofbeingaccuseddivertingit. international organizationsreporteddifficultiesinnegotiatingaccessforhumani- of themassarreststhatweretakingplace.Bysametoken,neutrallocaland The majorityleftwithnodocumentsatall,whichintensifiedtheriskofbeingpart legal rightsitentailed.EvacueesfearedbeingarrestedforcomingfromMarawi. This impeded access was aggravated by martial law and the suspension of civil and ing oflocaleconomies.Italsoraisedmultiplehumanitarianconcerns residents fromnearbymunicipalities,duetoseverefoodshortagesandthenarrow- The battleofMarawidroveout98percentthepopulationcity,aswell a. TheHumanitarianCrisis seven oftheirfighters,werekilledbymilitaryforcesinbesiegedMarawi. Isnilon Hapilon,thetopcommanderofASGandOmarkhayamMaute,aswell the attackon16OctoberwasconsideredtobemajorblowISsympathizers,when ber 2017,AbdullahMauteandtwootherbrotherswerereporteddead.However, As a result, different members of the ASG and the Maute group werekilled. By Septem- group, whichwastrappedinthe500squaremetersunderitscontrol. the governmentteamedupwithMILFinearlySeptembertofightMaute last remainingfighterswhenstillresisting. Malaysian AminBacuandIndonesianIbnoKayiwerenamedastheleadersof ship with ISIL has evolved in order to reorganize and re-equip. For instance, the needstobeaskedishowthe relation- ability sinceitemergedinthe1990s. What weakening ofthemovement.Indeed,ASGhasexhibitedresilienceandadapt- and activities.However,ashistoryhasshown,itmightjustrepresentatemporary seem logicaltoconsiderthatkillingtheleaderswilleradicategroup’spresence Marawi hadturnedintoafocalpointofISactivityinSoutheastAsia.Itwould M.Searle, MartialLaw andTrust: Humanitarian Challengesin Marawi , RSIS Commentary no173, European Commission, European Civil Protection andHumanitarian AidOperations, Philippines T. Regencia, ‘Marawi Siege: Army KillsAbuSayyaf, Maute Commanders’, AlJazeera, 16October 2017, J. Alindogan,‘Philippine’sMilitary Fightsto Take Control of Marawi’ AlJazeera, 27 May 2017, http://www. ‘PhilippineArmy andArmed Groups JoinForces inMarawi’, AlJazeera, 6September 2017, ‘Total Victory Declared inMarawi Over ISIL’, supra fn691. 694 696 697 692 693 695

forthose

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 125 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 126 called These teenagers are born in disadvantaged environments. In Sulu, these boys are Philippines, UNdoc S/AC.51/2017/4, 11 September 2017. doc A/70/836-S/2016/360, 20 April2016;Conclusion UNSC, onChildren andArmed Conflict inthe 702 Philippines, UNdocS/2017/294, 5April2017. 701 170530193625476.html. http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/05/philippines-maute-armed-group-child-soldiers-marawi- 700 coming-of-age-in-conflict-child-soldiers-in-the-philippines/6207. Philippines’, fleeing-civilians/; R.J. Barrete andL.Lischin, ‘Coming of Age inConflict: ChildSoldiersinthe 29 May 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/29/child-soldiers-fighting-isil-philippines-say- 699 icc-claims-crimes-against-humanity-duterte-philippines. on Drugs’, The Guardian, 8February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/08/ 698 ippines and didnot cease during the battle of Marawi. The useofchildsoldiersbyarmedgroupshasbeenapersistentprobleminthePhil- b. ChildrenandArmedConflict tions sinceDutertebecamePresident. to official statistics, 4,000 people have been killed by the police in anti-drug opera- dent, RodrigoDuterte,inhisactionagainstdrugcartelsandtrafficking.According into allegationsofcrimesagainsthumanitycommittedbythePhilippinesPresi- al CriminalCourtsince2011.InFebruary2018,theICClaunchedaninitialinquiry The PhilippineshasbeenaStatePartytothe1998RomeStatuteofInternation- a. The‘WaronDrugs’Campaign Conflict, Persons Report,aswelltheUnitedNationsWorkingGrouponChildrenandArmed armed conflict.Thissaid,theUSDepartmentofStateinitsrecent2017Trafficking col totheConventiononRightsofChildinvolvementchildrenin This hasincreasedallegations of warcrimesand violations ofthe Optional Proto- aggravates thesituation. rejected for being either Moroor poor. Inaddition, the use of drugsbeforefighting vides themwithasenseofbelonging and identity after beinghistoricallyjudgedand persistent perpetratorsincludetheMILF,NPA,MNLF,ASGandBIFF. through force,forcombatandnon-combatroles.Thearmedgroupsreportedtobe Hafiz Quranicstudysessionsandrecruitingrebelorphansarethemainstrategies. but thereareinstancesofchildren,asyoungfour,usedsoldiersonthefrontline. for propagandapurposes.MostoftheMauteandASGfightersareintheirtwenties, using childrentofightassoldiersagainstthePhilippineArmyandarefilmingthem D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTIONS UNSecurity Council (UNSC),Report of theSecretary-General onChildren andArmed Conflict inthe UNGeneral Assembly, Children UNSC, andArmed Conflict. Report of theSecretary-General, UN HannahEllis-Petersen, ‘ICC LaunchesCrimesAgainst Humanity InquiryInto Duterte’s War N.Smith,‘Child SoldiersAre FightingWith ISILinPhilippines, Say Fleeing Civilians,The Telegraph, J. Alindogan,‘Philippines:ISIL-Linked Maute Group UsingChildren asFighters’, AlJazeera , 31May 2017, Anak Itu–orphansofwar. 701 have continued to report the ongoing recruitment and use of children, La Croix International, 26 October 2017, https://international.la-croix.com/news/

In theirwords,beingpartofanarmedgrouppro- 698 699 IS-linked armed groupsare 702 700

system onchildrenaffectedbyarmedconflict. mittee onChildreninArmedConflictandthemonitoring,reportingresponse cruitment and use by the MILF,including creation of the Inter-Agency Com- affirmed thestrongcommitmenttoactionplan for allchildrendetainedtheirassociationwitharmedgroups. lated charges,forinformation-gatheringpurposes,andtheviolationofdueprocess also beencriticizedinregardtothedetentionofchildrenonnationalsecurity-re- including kidnappingforransomandextortion.Ontheotherhand,statehas man shields.Inaddition,theASGhasbeencalledontostopabductionsofchildren, against schoolsandhospitals,aswelltherecruitmentuseofchildrenhu- Some ofthedirectaccusationsareaddressedtoBIFFandconcernattacks world-africa-14094503. 707 706 www.dw.com/en/ending-the-use-of-child-soldiers-in-the-philippines/a-35890128. 705 aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/hundreds-milf-child-soldiers-released-philippines-170311064133681.html. 704 703 In 1991,themilitaryregimeunderleadershipofSiadBarre wasoverthrown, Republic ofSomaliaandtookpower. Mohamed SiadBarrestagedacoupagainsttheelectedgovernment oftheUnited Somalia gained independence from the United Kingdom and Italy in 1961. In 1969, consent, makingitanotherpartytotheNIACwithal-Shabaab. conflict. InNovember2017,EthiopiasenttroopsintoSomalia,withthelatter’s drones intoSomaliatotargetal-Shabaabmembersandisthereforeapartythe conflict (NIAC)withal-Shabaabin2017.TheUnitedStateshasalsosentarmed in Somaliaarmedforces,continuedtobeinvolvedanon-international The FederalRepublicofSomalia,supportedbyKenyan,andAfricanUnionMission Classification oftheConfict 9. THE ARMED CONFLICT IN SOMALIA: ESCALATING FATALITIES aforementioned actors,butalsobyparamilitarygroups. schools andchildabduction,killing,maimingrecruitment,notonlybythe The UN hasreportedsexual abuse bysoldiers, incidents of the military use of A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT ‘SomaliaCountry Profile’, BBC News, last updated 4January2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/ Ibid,§§203–207. A. P. A. Santos, ‘EndingtheUse of ChildSoldiers inthePhilippines’, DW UNSC, Report UNSC, of theSecretary-General onChildren andArmed Conflict inthePhilippines,supra fn701. ‘Hundreds of MILFChildSoldiersReleased inPhilippines’, AlJazeera, 11 March 2017, http://www. 707

705

704 toendandpreventchildre- 703 Nevertheless,ithasalso , 26 September 2017, http:// 706 aoie Siewert Caroline

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 127 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 128 world-africa-15336689. 709 strength-detail.asp?country_id=somalia (last accessed 28February 2018). 708 gate Mallattackandthe2015GarissaUniversityattack. jor attacksbyal-Shabaabonitsownterritoryovertheyears,such asthe2013West- forces anindividualpartytotheconflict.Kenyahasbeen object ofseveralma- operations outsideofthisframework.Thesemake theKenyanarmed Kenya hasalsocontributedtroopstoAMISOMsince2012,itcontinues toconduct tween SomaliandKenyanforcesal-Shabaabinthesouth ofSomalia.While al-Shabaab intoKenyanterritory.By2012,heavyfightingwas beingreportedbe- Kenya hassent troops to Somalia since 2011, followingrepeatedincursions by 2. KenyanArmedForces currently number15,900. According tothelatestfigures,itisestimatedthatactiveSomalimilitarypersonnel 1. SomaliArmedForces conflict, andEthiopia,too,wasapartytotheconflictwithal-Shabaabin2017. al-Shabaab. Kenyan,AMISOMandUSArmedForcesarealsopartiestothearmed In 2017,thepartiestoNIACsinSomaliawereSomaliarmedforcesand as Farmajo. a newgovernmentunderPresidentMohamedAbdullahiMohamed,also known presidential electionssince1967tookplace.InFebruary2017,thecountryelected In 2012,thefirstformalparliamentinover20yearswasswornin,and of piracyin2017. rein inthisthreat.However,thehaltingofoperationledtorenewedincidents of Somalia around 2005. Only an international naval operation in 2015 managed to (AMISOM) –onSomalisoil.Duetothechaos,piratesbeganoperatingoffcoast tervention ofKenyantroops–independentAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia Al-Shabaab alsostagesattacksinneighbouringKenya,whichhasledtothe- ICU and,today,anindependentarmedgroup. government continuestofightagainstal-Shabaab,theformeryouthwingof led totheinterventionfirstofEthiopian,thenAfricanUniontroops.Thecurrent of thecapital,Mogadishu,frominternationallybackedgovernment.This Islamic CourtUnion(ICU),acoalitionofIslamistorganizations,tookovercontrol the breakawayoftwonorthernregionsSomalilandandPuntland.In2006, the vacuumheleftbehind,leadingtochaosthroughoutmostofcountryand instigating theongoinginternalarmedconflict.Rivalwarlordsbeganfightingin B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT Global Firepower, ‘2017 Somalia Military Strength’, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military- ‘Who Are Somalia’sAl-Shabab?’, BBC News, 9December 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/ 708 709

of humanitarianassistanceandtocreateconduciveconditions forlong-termstabi- in thecountryandadvancedialoguereconciliation;tofacilitateprovision provide supporttotheSomaliGovernmentinitseffortsstabilizesituation against al-Shabaabmilitants. troops crossedintoSomalia,reportedlytoassistaSomaligovernmentoffensive On November2017,it was reportedthathundredsof heavily armedEthiopian troops inSomalia. citing alackofinternationalsupportandnotablycutinEUfundingforforeign 715 2017, https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-troops-somalia-offensive-al-shabab/4095621.html. 714 com/news/world/africa/articles/2012/03/22/somali_ethiopian_troops_seize_town_fighters_flee/. 713 14094632 712 7155868.stm. 711 vestigates.com/drone-war/data/somalia-reported-us-covert-actions-2017 (last accessed 29August 2017). 710 country, butleavingtheoriginofthoseforcesunclear. an initialsix-monthmandatepavingthewayforsome8,000troopstoenter created bytheAfricanUnion’sPeaceandSecurityCouncilon19January2007with ing missionoperatedbytheAfricanUnionwithUnitedNationsapproval.Itwas The African Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM)is an active,regionalpeacekeep- 5. TheAfricanUnionMissioninSomalia(AMISOM) peacekeeping efforts. operations havebecomemorefrequentsince2014inordertosupportAMISOM attacks. Itbeganconductingairstrikesin2007,anddronestrikes2011.These a larger operation against al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in East Africa since the 9/11 The UShasbeenconductingclandestineoperationsagainstal-Shabaabaspartof 3. UnitedStatesArmedForces cessed 10 May 2013). the transitionalSomaligovernmentandmoderateIslamists. ported onbothsides. however, Ethiopiantroopsre-enteredSomaliaandfightingensued,withdeathsre- groups. lia. EthiopiantrooppresencewasviolentlyopposedbySomalinon-statearmed government ousttheICU,whichhadtakencontrolofmuchsouthernSoma- Ethiopian troopsenteredthecountryinDecember2006tohelpSomalia’sinterim 4. EthiopianArmedForces ‘EthiopiainSomalia:OneYear On’,28December 2007, BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ A. Guled, ‘Somali,EthiopianTroops A. Seize Town, Fighters Flee, Boston.com, 22March 2012, www.boston. AMISOM,‘AMISOM Background’, March 2007, amisom-au.org/about/amisom-background/ (last ac ‘SomaliaProfile Timeline’, 7January2018, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- The Bureau of Investigative Journalism,Somalia:Reported USActions 2017, https://www.thebureauin M.O. Hassan, ‘EthiopianTroops Enter Somalia, BackOffensive Against Al-Shabab’, VOA 711 Inearly2009,Ethiopiawithdrewitstroopsunderanagreementbetween 713 710 EthiopiawithdrewitsarmedtroopsfromSomaliain2016,

714 715

AMISOM’s mandateisto 712 InMarch2012, , 1November -

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laborating withthenewPresident. the withdrawalofitstroopsbyend2017. 14094632. 722 www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38904663. 721 ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/03/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss3.pdf (last accessed 28February 2018). Tactical andMedia Strategies intheWake of itsBattlefieldSetbacks’, 6CTC Sentinel3(March 2013), https:// type%3Dbackgrounder%26page%3D4 (last accessed 28February 2018); see Anzalone, also C. ‘Al-Shabab’s www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3F 720 5092586.stm. 719 bbc.com/news/world-africa-36606194. 718 February 2018). military-component/ and‘AMISOM Mandate’, http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/ (last accessed 28 717 agreement-soma/ (last accessed 28February 2018). 716 Farmajo, asPresident. In February2017,SomaliaelectedMohamedAbdullahiMohamed,alsoknownas yond Somalia’sborders,especiallyinKenya. also repeatedlythreatenedtheUSandhasdemonstrateditscapacitytostrikebe- Apart fromfightingtheSomaliGovernmentandAMISOMtroops,grouphas lization, reconstructionanddevelopmentinSomalia. by Uganda,Burundi,Djibouti,KenyaandEthiopia. came apowerfulactorintheconflict. in 2006–2007,leavingonlyitsmilitaryyouthwing,al-Shabaab,whichturnbe- while, gainingcontroloverMogadishuforsixmonthsin2006.TheICUfellapart of SiadBarre’sregime.ItbecamethemostpowerfulmilitaryactorinSomaliafora the 1990sasagrouptryingtorestorelawandorderinchaosfollowingfall indeed emergedasthemilitarizedyouthwingofICU.Thelatterappearedin Al-Shabaab, alsowrittenasal-Shabab,translates‘TheYouth’fromArabicand 6. Al-Shabaab tributing states,onlyAMISOM’smilitarycomponentisapartytotheconflict. mission appearstoliewiththeAfricanUnionandnotindividualtroop-con- al-Shabaab hassufferedaseriesofsignificantterritorialandstrategicsetbacks. In 2009–10,thegroupcontrolledmostofcentralandsouthernSomalia.Since2011, C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: ESCALATING FATALITIES For furtherinformation, see ‘AMISOM Military Component’, http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/ ‘Somalia’s Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo Chosen as President‘, ‘Ugandato Withdraw Troops From Somalia’sAmisom Force’, BBC News, 23June2016, http://www. ‘Somalia:Who Supports Who?’, BBC News, 28December 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ AMISOM,Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA),6March 2007, amisom-au.org/status-of-mission- ‘SomaliaProfile –Timeline’, C. Felter, C. J. Masters Sergie, andM.A. ‘Al-Shabab’, Council onForeign Relations, 5February 2013, 721 Al-Shabaab,inresponse,threatenedtotargetanyonecol- BBC News, 4January 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 722 719 Itbegananassassinationcampaignagainst

718 717

As theformalauthorityfor

However, Ugandaannounced 716 BBC News, 8 February 2017, http:// Troopswerecontributed 720

for theattack,butgroupdidnotconfirmitsresponsibility. carried outbyal-Shabaab. the group. double-car-bombing-strikes-mogadishu-171028152255706.html. Bombing Strikes Mogadishu’, Al Jazeera, 29 October 2017, com/news/2017/10/mogadishu-11-killed-week-deadliest-blast-171022104607855.html; ‘Deadly Double 733 com/news/2017/10/farmajo-blames-al-shabab-mogadishu-blast-171018073200556.html. 732 com/news/2017/10/mogadishu-bombing-death-toll-rises-358-171020223155870.html. 731 com/news/2017/10/massive-car-bomb-blast-rocks-somalia-mogadishu-171014142943624.html. 730 www.africanews.com/2017/08/14/al-shabaab-s-former-deputy-leader-defects-to-government-military/. 729 www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/farmajo-calls-arms-embargo-defeat-al-shabab-170511134001952.html. 728 com/2017/06/09/somalia-president-reiterates-pledge-to-defeat-al-shabaab/. 727 com/news/2017/04/somalia-leader-declares-country-war-zone-170406131513405.html. 726 president-wants-talks-with-al-shabaab/. Africa News, 12April2017, http://www.africanews.com/2017/04/12/days-after-war-declaration-somali- 725 news/2017/04/somali-pirates-hijack-indian-commercial-ship-170403102533248.html. 724 ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report_No.60-July-2017_pdf.pdf (last accessed 28February 2018). of African Political Violence, 723 nesses asthebiggestexplosiontheyhadeverexperienced. In October2017,Mogadishuwashitbyamassivecar-bombblast,describedwit- years. heavier weaponswouldallowtheSomaliarmytodefeatal-Shabaabwithinafew the UNonSomaliain1992,ordertodefeatal-Shabaab.Heclaimedthataccess In May,PresidentMohamedcalledfortheliftingofanarmsembargoimposedby gotiations. In April,PresidentMohamedreportedlyofferedal-Shabaabthepossibilityofne- Only weekslater,anIndiancommercialshipwashijacked. seizing ofatanker,thefirstmajorvesseltobecapturedinregionsince2012. In March,theproblemofpiracyoffSomalicoastbegantore-emergewith government ministersinthecapital,Mogadishu,atendofJune2017. inate themwithintwoyears, attacks tookplaceinOctober,claimingdozensmorelives. incident roseto358withinaweek. ‘MogadishuBombingDeath Toll Rises to 358’, AlJazeera October, 21 2017, http://www.aljazeera. ‘Mogadishu:11 Killed Week After Deadliest Blast’, AlJazeera, 22October 2017, http://www.aljazeera. H.Mohamed, ‘Farmajo Callsfor Arms’ Embargo Endto Defeat Al-Shabab’, AlJazeera, 11 May 2017, http:// ‘Somalia President Reiterates Pledge to Defeat Al-Shabaab’, ‘Farmajo Blames Al-Shabab for Mogadishu Blast’, Armed Conflict Location &Event Data Project (ACLED), Conflict Trends no60, Real-time Analysis A. R. A. Shaban, ‘Days R. A. After A. War Declaration: Somali President Wants Talks With Al-Shabaab’, ‘Al-Shabaab’s Former DeputyLeader Defects to Government –Military’, Africa News , 14August 2017, http:// ‘Massive CarBombBlast Rocks Somalia’sMogadishu’, AlJazeera, 14October 2017, http://www.aljazeera. ‘SomaliaLeader Declares Country a“War Zone”’, AlJazeera , 6April2017, http://www.aljazeera. ‘SomaliPirates HijackIndianCommercial Ship’, AlJazeera , 3April2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/ 728 In August,aformerdeputyleaderofal-Shabaabreportedlydefectedfrom 729 725 However,hehadpreviously‘declaredwar’onthem,vowingtoelim- July 2017, p2,https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ 727 726 andlatervowedtoretaliateavengeattacks 731 TheSomaliGovernmentblamedal-Shabaab Al Jazeera, 18October 2017, http://www.aljazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/ Africa News, 9 June 2017, http://africanews. 733 730 724 Thedeathtollofthe 732 Furthercar-bomb 723

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 131 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 132

over 2,500fatalitiesoccurred. remained highandfueledtheoverallconflictlevel.Infirstsixmonthsof2017, ing activitiesofanISfranchisegroup,theIslamicStateinSomalia(ISS),Puntland. military checkpoints. (IEDs) orexplosives-ladenvehiclesincrowdedplacessuchasmarkets,hotelsand However, italsousesthetacticofplacinglargeimprovisedexplosivedevices The crisisinSomaliawasthemostactive2016. which al-ShabaaboperatesareamongthemostdeadlyinwholeofAfrica. 746 745 744 743 aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/africa-command-conducts-air-strikes-somalia-171103202800400.html. 742 August 2017. Amongthepersons killed inUSoperations, nonewere civilians. 741 740 739 738 pdf (last accessed 28February 2018). www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report_No.58-May-2017_pdf. 737 736 735 2017-pdf.pdf (last accessed 28February 2018). https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ACLED_Conflict-Trends-Report-No.55-February- 734 handed outleafletstociviliansadvisingthemavoidgovernmentbuildings. Before conductingattacksagainstgovernmentofficialsinMogadishu,al-Shabaab spread northoncemore,operatinginPuntland. Al-Shabaab retainsaheavypresenceinsouthernregionsofSomalia,buthasstartedto ing al-Shabaabincreasedby48percent. In termsofcasualties,in2016,thenumberfatalitiesfromarmedclashesinvolv- State (IS)targetsinSomalia. US reportedhavingcarriedouttwomoredronestrikesagainstsuspectedIslamic ect (ACLED)classifiedSomalia’sconflicttrajectoryas‘escalating’. and 10peopleinjured, nine, as well as five additional attacks conducted by the US, resulting in 15–23 dead Until September2017,onlytwoUSdroneattacksinSomaliawerereported,killing 600 inJune. fatalities resultingfromtheseeventsrosenearly300inFebruaryto es ofconflictpeakedatover200inApril2017,withJune2017.Reported The Bureau of Investigative Journalism,USStrikes inSomalia,2007 to Present, last viewed 29 ACLED, Conflict Trends no58,Real-time Analysisof African Political Violence, May 2017, p1, https:// ACLED, Conflict Trends no60, supra fn723, p1. ACLED, Conflict Trends no60, supra fn723, p2. ACLED, Conflict Trends no60, supra fn723, p2. ACLED, Conflict Trends no55,supra fn734,p3. ACLED, Conflict Trends no60, supra fn723, p2. Ibid. ACLED, Conflict Trends no55,Real-time Analysisof African Political Violence, ‘USAfrica Command Conducts AirStrikes inSomalia’,AlJazeera, 3November 2017, http://www. ACLED, Conflict Trends no58,supra fn737, p3. ACLED, Conflict Trends no58,supra fn737, p4. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism,Somalia:Reported USActions 2017, supra fn710. 735 InJuly2017,theArmedConflictLocationandEventsDataProj- 746 740 allsuspectedal-Shabaabmembers. 742 739

734 From150inFebruary2017,occurrenc- 743 Thismaybeinresponsetoincreas- 738 Activitiesofinsurgentgroups 741 InOctober2017,the February 2017, p8, 736 Theareasin 737 745 744

749 748 747 in whichit‘ On 29 September 2017, the UN Human RightsCouncil adopted Resolution 36/27 Somalia is not party to the 1998 RomeStatuteoftheInternational Criminal Court. gun battles. roadside bombsplanted by al-Shabaab,attacksonvillages and police stations and 2016 and2017.Variousincidentsoccurred,includingthesettingoffofIEDs Al-Shabaab alsocausedahighnumberofcasualtiesinneighbouringKenyaduring and 5wereal-Shabaabmilitants. vilian casualties,69werepoliceorsecurityofficers,1wasamemberofthemilitary D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS ACLED, Conflict Trends no60, supra fn723, p9. Ibid. UNHumanRightsCouncil Res 36/27, 29September 2017, §4. accountability andjusticeforallsuchviolationsabuses. gender-based violence,andabductions,emphasizestheneedfor dren inarmedconflict,killingandmaiming,rapeothersexual including theunlawfulrecruitmentanduseofchildsoldierschil- es concernattheabusesandviolationscommittedagainstchildren, child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation, express - against girlsandwomen,includingsexualgender-basedviolence, expresses particularconcernattheabusesandviolationsperpetrated 747 Thiscaused120casualtiesupto3August2017.Ofthese,43wereci- 748

749

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 133 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 134 ics of themilitary Kurdish formations intheregion (includinginSyria andIraq). War Report focuses onaslightlydifferent but related question, addressing therelationships anddynam - 750 fence against the Russians. Kurdish tribesinwhatwascalledtheHamidiyeCavalry,againforborderlandde- tralizing drive, these policies were soonrevised.Sultan Abdul Hamid IIrearmed the OttomanEmpiredestroyedKurdishemiratesinitsmodernizingandcen- forces againsttheSafavidsandQajarsofIran.Eveninnineteenthcentury,when (1514), theypreservedKurdishautonomouspoliticalstructuresasbordermilitary mans incorporatedtheKurdishareasaftertheirvictoryinBattleofChaldiran division, weredisbandedinthecourseoftwentiethcentury.WhenOtto- ish emirates), which survived for centuries on both sides of the Ottoman–Iranian current dynamicsoftheKurdishquestion.First,autonomousstates(Kurd- Three factorsofKurdishhistorymustbeunderlinedinordertounderstandthe with theKurdishPeople’sProtectionUnitinnorthernSyria. country andtheKurdistanregionofIraqin2017.TurkeyisalsoinvolvedaNIAC armed conflict(NIAC)withtheKurdishWorkers’Partyinsoutheastof Turkey anditsarmedsecurityforceswereinvolvedinanon-international Classification oftheConfict 10. TURKEY IN 2017: A FOCUS ON THE KURDISH QUESTION AND an imaginedKurdishnationalistmythispotentiallymisleading. 2011; N.Fuccaro, The OtherKurds: Yazidis inColonial Iraq, I.B.Tauris, 1999. 752 751 War Report. in%20Middle%20Eastern%20Battlefields.pdf. It has been revised in accordance withtheformat of www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Kurdish%20Military%20Formations%20 version of anarticleby Vicken Cheterian published by theGeneva Academy andavailable athttps:// ities. (Kurmanji, Zazaki,Sorani,Palewani)oftenreflectsethnicand geographicspecific- etc. Tribalandregionaldifferencesareequallyimportant, linguisticdiversity Kurds (Feyli Kurds), Alevis, Yazidis, Ahl ul-Haq (also known as Yarsani or Kakai), ity ofKurdsareSunniMuslims,butotherreligiousgroupsalso exist,suchasShiite largely influenced by older social structures, identitiesand differences. The major- tities ofwhatwecametocallKurds.Kurdishnationalismis a newphenomenon, Second isthediversetribal,religious,ethnic,regional,socialandpoliticaliden- forces wouldcausemanyfrictions,uprisingsandwars. interventions tosuppress,modernize,assimilateorutilizeKurdishtribalmilitary der a new name:the Tribal Light Cavalry. Throughout thetwentieth century, state Hamidiye Cavalrywasinitiallydissolved,theoldstructuresoonrevivedun- A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT MILITARY FORMATIONS IN MIDDLE EASTERN BATTLEFIELDS J. Klein,The Margins of Empire: Kurdish MilitiasintheOttoman Tribal Zone, Stanford University Press, 2011. M. S. Kaya, The 752 Therefore,anyexpectationofuniformKurdishpoliticalbehaviour under

War Report 2016 described thehistory of theconflict between Turkey andthePKK.This year’s The Zaza Kurds of Turkey: A Middle Eastern Minority in a Globalised Society, I.B. Tauris, 751 Even after the 1908 Young Turk revolution, when the 750

This section isan edited ikn Cheterian Vicken The

ished. the chemicalattacksinHalabja(March1988)whereanestimated5,000peopleper- Anfal campaign of forced Arabization, the most notorious episode of which was of warsagainstBaghdad,thelastbeingSaddamHusseinininfamous revolted againstBritishoccupation;yet,afterindependencetheyfoughtaseries of MahabadquicklyfelltothearmiesShah(1946).InIraq,Kurdishtribes In Iran,afterthewithdrawalofSoviettroopsfromnorth,KurdishRepublic most exclusivelyKurdishterritory…Anationstatewasnowfeasible.’ ‘With thedisappearanceofArmenians,mosteasternAnatoliabecameal- tions hadcontinuityovervastareasofWestAsia,reinforcingKurdishnationalism: populations. Theoutcomewasthat,forthefirsttimeinhistory,Kurdishpopula- massacres, inwhichsomeKurdishtribesplayedanactiverole,exterminatedthose of theKurds.Yet,OttomanTurkishleadershipinaseriesdeportationsand whose numbersinwhatistodayconsideredtobeKurdistanweregreaterthanthat July 1993, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ (last accessed 6november 2017). the al-Anfal campaign, see HumanRightsWatch, GenocideinIraq: 756 conflits contemporains 151 (1988), 121–136. 755 Assyrians intheTwentieth Century, Edinburgh University Press, 2016. Oxford University Press, 2015, pp263–272; S.G.Donabed, Reforging aForgotten History: Iraq andthe Books, 1992, p277. See also V. Cheterian, OpenWounds: Armenians,Turks andaCentury of Genocide, 754 Syriacs (Jacobites) of Tur Abdin,hadnomadicandtribal social structures similarto those of tribal Kurds. 753 thousands ofcasualtiesandtheremainingcivilianpopulationbeingdeported. tribal sheikhs.ThelastsuchrevolttookplaceinDersim(1937–1938),resulting centralization, leadingtoaseriesofKurdishrevolts,oftenundertheleadership Turkey, withtheestablishmentof Republic, Kurdishareascameunderforced precedented pressureonthepoliticalautonomyandsocialfabricofKurds.In habited areasbyaseriesofnewandrigidinternationalborders,butalsotoun- The dissolution oftheOttoman Empire lednot only to the division of Kurdish-in- urban oragriculturalChristianpopulations,namelyArmeniansandAssyrians, Finally, Kurdishtribalconfederationslivedforcenturiesnexttolargelysedentary, Iraq in2003furtheracceleratedthosetrends,asKurdishguerrillas playedakey merga fromreprisalsbySaddamHussein’sarmies.TheUnited States’invasionof the impositionof‘no-flyzone’tonorth36thparallelprotected KurdishPesh- since thefallofOttomans,aglobalpowerestablishedan alliancewiththem: Middle East,andconstitutedahistoricopportunityfortheKurds. Forthefirsttime The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 changed the geopolitical equilibrium of the even Kurdishidentity. against thenation-statesystemofMiddleEastthatnegatedKurdishrightsand of aseriesKurdishguerrillagroupsinIraq,Iran,TurkeyandSyria,revolting were repressed.ThesetensionsinamodernizingMiddleEastledtotheemergence even themostbasicKurdishnationalrights,suchasspeakinginpublic, Insome cases, Assyrians, namelytheNestorians (Assyrian Church of theEast) of Hakkari andthe H.Bozarslan, ‘Les révoltes Kurdes enTurquie kémaliste (quelques aspects)’, Guerres mondiales et C. Tripp, C. AHistory of Iraq, 3rd edn, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2007 p236.For adetailed report on M.van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh andState: The SocialandPolitical Structures of Kurdistan, Zed 756 Atatimewhenmodernnation-stateswereemergingintheMiddleEast, The Anfal Campaign Against theKurds, 754 755 753

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 135 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 136 https://www.opendemocracy.net/nora-fisher-onar/turkey%27s-future-erdoğ-elections-and-kurds. 757 again, thusresolvingtheconflictofnationalcharacter. nations that were part of the Ottoman Empire), and that Islam could rally them once gued thatitwasnationalismdividedTurksandKurds(as well asotherMuslim and itsconservative-Islamistideologyopenednewpossibilities. Infact,theAKPar- Tayyip Erdogan’saccessiontopowerwiththeJusticeandDevelopment Party(AKP) ditionalist-Islamist, nationalist,third-worldist,etc.)andTurkishnationalism.Recep as a conflict between Kurds of various social strata and ideological convictions (tra- Yet, alloftheabove,fromSheikhSaidtoPKKrebellion,couldberepresented which ledtoover35,000deadandthedestructionofthousandsKurdishvillages. through ‘filtrationcamps’andtorture,thePKKarmedrebellionstartingin1984, coup of1980,inwhichoverhalfamillionpeople–includingmanyKurdswent members. Turkish–KurdishrelationsdeterioratedfurtheraftertheTurkishmilitary leaders, inthenameofIslam,andlargelyorchestratedbyformerHamidiyeCavalry liphate. TheinitialKurdishrevolts,suchasthatofSheikhSaid,wereledbyreligious promises of Kurdishautonomy and dissolved both the Ottoman Empire andtheCa- Turkish leaderswasfrustratedonlywhenMustafaKemalbetrayedhisprevious ing theireasternfrontiersagainsttheIraniansorRussians.Kurdishloyaltyto For 400years,KurdishtribeshavelargelybeenloyaltotheOttomansultans,guard- while thePKKcarriedoutanarmedstruggleinsideTurkey. is theallianceandclosecooperationbetweenIraqiKDPTurkishauthorities Iran theKurdishnationalmovementwascontinuouslyrepressed.Anotherexample Shah andafterthe1979revolution,tofightBaghdadgovernment,whileinside factions in Iraq allied in different periods with neighbouring Iran, both under the have contradictoryallianceswithregionalandglobalpowers.Forexample,Kurdish the KomalaPartyofIranianKurdistan.Thesegroupsrepresentdistinctinterestsand based in northern Iraq, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) and istan (PUK),withanumberofsmallerguerrillagroupsoriginatingfromIranbut Workers’ Party(PKK),KurdishDemocratic(KDP)andPatrioticUnionofKurd- the secondhalfoftwentiethcenturydominateKurdishspace:Kurdistan Today, threedistinctpolitical-militarygroupsthatemergedfromtheconflictsof exception ofinternationalrecognition. of aKurdishentityinnorthernIraqthathasalltheattributesstatehoodwith tary structureafterthedissolutionofIraqiarmy.Theoutcomewascreation role intheUSinvasionfromnorthandwereonlyrecognizednativemili- guerrillas werearrested,which endedthepeaceprocess.Guerrillaattacksonone sion againstKurdishpoliticalfigures continuedandthefirstgroupsofdisbanded for theirfighters,andatreaching aceasefireaccommodation.Yet,politicalrepres- reforms to give Kurds their cultural rights, localself-governanceandan amnesty official channelTRT6.Thepartiesbeganindirecttalksaimed atmajorpolitical including thebroadcastingofKurdish-languagetelevision programmes bythe was in2009,aftertheAKPmadesomegesturestowardsKurdish culturalrights, On twooccasions,theAKPandPKKtriedtonegotiateapeaceful solution.Thefirst N.FisherOnar, ‘Turkey’s Future: Erdoğan, Elections andtheKurds’, OpenDemocracy, 7April2015, 757

the IslamicState(IS). Ahrar al-ShamandJabhatal-Nusra,sustainedanambiguousstancetowards tions. of Turkishvoters.Thesecuritysituationdeterioratedimmediately aftertheelec- tor ininternalTurkishpoliticswasnotacceptabletotheAKP, nortothemajority parliamentary majoritytopassErdogan’sconstitutionalreforms.TheKurdishfac- success. ThisKurdishtriumphwasattheexpenseofAKP,whichfailedtogeta many more. The HDPaccused thegovernment of not providing thenecessary protection. 762 preliminary-results-erdogan-akp-party. Seats’, 761 http://time.com/3974399/turkey-kurds-isis/. 760 newsweek.com/isis-and-turkey-cooperate-destroy-kurds-former-isis-member-reveals-turkish-282920. Former IslamicState MemberReveals Turkish Army Cooperation’, Newsweek, 7November 2014 : http://www. com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-turkey-isi_b_8808024.html. B.Guiton, ‘“ISISSees Turkey asItsAlly’: 759 to introduce Islamiclaw. 758 strong sympathiestowardsSyrianIslamistgroups, of Raqqa.Erdogan,himselfbelongingtoapartyespousingpoliticalIslam,had fire and to the possible Turkish–Kurdish rapprochement. The first was the battle US hasdoneinthesameperiod.Yet,twodevelopmentsputanendtocease- succeeded increatinganalliancewiththePKK–PYDnorthSyria,muchlike to participateintheinternalTurkishpoliticalprocesses,thenTurkeycouldhave possible alliance.IfAnkarahadgivenbasicrightstotheKurdsandallowedthem the PKKwerebusywithdevelopmentsinsideSyriaandcontemplatinga 2013, thepartiesto conflict declaredyetanotherceasefire.BothTurkeyand The ArabSpringandthecollapseofSyriaopenedupnewperspectives.InJanuary 2010 and2012. side andrepressivemeasuresbygovernmentforcesontheotherescalatedbetween entering parliament. ceived over13percentofthevotesandthuspassed10thresholdfor The eventsinSyriagalvanizedtheKurdishelectoratearoundHDP,whichre- constitute thesecondturningpointforErdoganandTurkey’sKurdishelectorate. Kurdish People’sDemocraticParty(HDP).The2015electionsandtheiroutcomes vote fortherulingpartyinJune2015generalelections,insteadvoting Kurdish ethnicitywhotraditionallyvotedfortheAKPfeltbetrayedanddidnot same. Terroristsareevil.Theyallmustbeeradicated.’ say thatthisterroristorganizationisbetterbecauseit’sfightingISIS?Theyarethe equated ISISwiththePKK,whileTurkishforeignministersaid,‘Howcanyou Turkish positioncameasashocktomanyKurds.Erdogan,inpublicdeclaration, and greatanxietyamongKurdseverywhereincludinginTurkey,theambiguous when theISattackonKobanibeganinSeptember2014,creating300,000refugees were consideredapart,albeitexcessive,ofthe‘family’politicalIslam.Therefore, C. Letsch C. andI.Traynor, ‘Turkey Elections: Ruling Party Loses as Pro-Kurdish Majority HDP Gains Islamist isused inthesense of apolitical organization thatholdsanIslamicworldview andstrives D. L.Phillips,‘Turkey-ISIS OilTrade’, Huffington Post, 11 September http://www.huffingtonpost. 2014, On20 July2015, apro-Kurdish solidarity gathering was bombed by ISIS,killing33andwounding R.Collard, ‘Why Turkey Sees theKurdish People as a BiggerThreat thanISIS’,Time, 28July2015, 762 The Guardian , 7June2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/07/turkey-election- Soon,Kurdish-inhabitedtownsinsouthernTurkey,alongthe borderwith 761 759 Thiswasthefirsttimeapro-Kurdishpartyachievedsuch FormanyIslamists,includingErdogan,thejihadigroups 758 760 includingthesalafi-jihadi ManyTurkishcitizensof

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 137 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 138 training fromtheDFLP. Organization (PLO).From1980–1982,some300PKKactivistsreceivedmilitary Palestine (DFLP),oneofthePalestinianguerrillagroupsLiberation Bekaa Valley,incampscontrolledbytheDemocraticFrontforLiberationof state aswellpossiblerivals.TheinitiallogisticbaseofthePKKwasLebanese explanations for its radicalism and tendency to use violence against the Turkish founded in1978,wasalatecomertoTurkishleftistmovements,whichisoneofthe guerrilla movementsofthe1970s,especiallyPalestinianguerrillas.ThePKK, The rootsofthePKKlieinleftistmovementTurkeyitself,influencedby 2. TheKurdistanWorkers’Party(PKK) the growingKurdishdiaspora,especiallymigrantworkersand asylumseekersin cus, but developed two additional dimensions. One was the strong network among ish Kurds.Yet,thePKKdidnotlimititsassetstoareasunder controlofDamas- third ofPKKrecruitswereSyrianKurdsandthevastmajority therestwereTurk- return theseyoungmenwerefreedfromSyrianmilitaryservice. Asaresult,over Bekaa orSyriaitself.ThePKKcouldalsorecruitfromamong Syrian Kurds,andin within Turkeyin1984,mostofitstrainingbaseswereeither inSyriancontrolled ish guerrillasasleverageagainstAnkara.BythetimePKKlauncheditsattacks cies, theinfamousMukhabarat.TheSyrianBaathregimeintendedtouseKurd- PLO infrastructurethere,drivingthePKKintolapofSyriansecurityagen- servists. The TurkishArmed Forces have been estimatedto be 382,850 strong, with 360,565 re- 1. TurkishArmedForces Peshmerga. These,however,arenotapartytotheconflictwithTurkey. itary formationsintheregion,thissectionwillalsodescribeoriginsofIraqi Report 2017wishestoaddresstherelationshipsbetweendifferentKurdishmil- Press, 2009, p57. 766 english.pravda.ru/world/asia/31-01-2012/120376-turkey_defense_power-0/. 765 strength-detail.asp?country_id=turkey (last accessed 7March 2018). 764 Issue, Routledge, 2011, pp101–120. and J. Jongerden (eds), 763 and the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG/YPJ) in northern Syria. As The The partiestotheNIACin2017wereTurkeyanditsarmedforcesagainstPKK to provideasolution. tions werebackatthepreviouslevelofantagonism,andevenpoliticalIslamfailed including electedparliamentariansandmayorsoftheHDP.Turkish–Kurdishrela- Syria andIraq,becameconflictzones.HundredsofKurdishactivistswerearrested, B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT T. Bacheli andS.Noel,‘The Justice andDevelopment Party andtheKurdish Question’, inM.Casier Y. Mavashev, ‘Turkey’s Defense Power Grows atPace to beEnvied’, Pravda.Ru, 31January2012, A. Marcus, A. BloodandBelief:The PKKandtheKurdish Fightfor Independence, New York University Global Firepower, ‘2017 Turkey Military Strength’, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military- 764 TheTurkisharmyissaidtobethelargestinsizeafterUSwithinNATO. Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish 763

766 TheIsraeliinvasionofLebanonin1982destroyedthe War 765

state actor(ANSA)fromthere,therealityisthatstart ithashadstrong While thePKKoriginatesfromTurkeyandisperceivedasa Kurdish armednon- Ankara showingreadinesstonegotiate. 1995 and1998,calledforreformsratherthansecessionmadegesturestowards fact, evenOcalan,yearsbeforehisarrest,declareda‘unilateralceasefire’in1992, tions withtheTurkishauthorities,useofforceandfinalaimstruggle.In ‘civilian wing’thatdifferedwiththemilitaryactivistsonprincipleofnegotia- French Mandate. zira region(northeastSyria)wereestablishedinthetwentieth centuryduringthe became Syriaisrelativelyrecent:SyrianKurdishareas,especially thoseintheJa- planation forthisphenomenoncould be thatKurdishpresence in parts ofwhat either inneighbouringIraqorTurkeybutnotfortheirownrights.Onemajorex- ities. In other words, when mobilized, Syrian Kurds struggled for Kurdish rights as alogisticbasefortheiractivities,thuscuttingdealswiththeDamascusauthor- but also the two major Iraqi Kurdish Parties, the KDP and PUK, used Syrian Kurds there wasnoKurdishpoliticalactivismagainsttheSyrianstate.NotonlyPKK, 771 world-middle-east-12995174. 770 Ethno-Nationalism Versus Nation-BuildingStates , ISISPress, 2000, pp1–11. 769 768 Routledge, 2011, pp123–142. Jongerden (eds), NationalismsandPolitics inTurkey: Political Islam,Kemalism andtheKurdish Issue , 767 sive administrations,withupto300,000Kurdsdeprivedoftheircitizenship, In Syria,whileKurdishbasicpoliticalandculturalrightswereviolatedbysucces- 3. TheDemocraticUnionParty(PYD)/People’sProtectionUnits (YPG) midiye Cavalry. nanced ‘villageguards’–over50,000inthe1980sreminiscentoftribalHa- to counterguerrillaviolence,theTurkishGovernmentrecruited,armedandfi- fication, it also – indirectly – contributed to the revival oftribalism among Kurds: 1980s. WhilethePKKwaslargelysuccessfulinrecreatingKurdishnationalidenti- Kurdish nationalidentity,whichwaslargelyforgottenbetweenthe1930sand PKK violencecanalsobeexplainedbythefactthatitwasattemptingtorevive develop itsinfluenceamongIranianKurds. Lebanon’s BekaaValleyin1999.TheywouldalsopermitthePKKtooperateand authorities toexpelAbdullahOcalanandthePKKmilitantsfrombothSyria would proveextremelyimportantafterTurkishmilitarythreatsforcedtheSyrian Mountains, inthefrontiertrianglebetweenIraq,TurkeyandIran.ThebasesIraq second wasthemilitarycampsestablishedinnorthernIraqiKurdistan’sQandil followed. Thesenetworkswouldprovevaluableforfundingandlobbying.The Europe followingthe1980Turkishmilitarycoupandsevererepressionthat van Bruinessen, Agha, ShaikhandState , supra p95. fn754, J. Jongerden H.Akkaya, and A. ‘Born from theLeft: The Making of the PKK’, in M. Casier and J. ‘Syria’s Assad grants nationality to Hasaka Kurds’, BBC News, 7 April 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/ M.van Bruinessen, ‘Turkey, Kurdish Europe andtheKurds After theCapture of Abdullah Öcalan’, McDowell, AModernHistory of the Kurds, I.B.Tauris, 2005, pp423–425. 768 771 In spite of its use of violence, the PKK had from the beginning a

769 767 770

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 139 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 140 Council’, tried to create a Syrian-Kurdish force of 1,600 fighters by recruiting from through itsSyrianassociatesof16formationsalliedthe ‘KurdishNational PKK anditsassociatePYD/YPG,theIraqiKDPallies inSyria.TheKDP, ed apowervacuum,whichtwoseparateKurdishpoliticalforces triedtofill:the The withdrawalofSyriangovernmentaltroopsfromthearea inJuly2012creat- Since 2012,Kurdisharmedgroupshaveemergedasamajorforce innorthernSyria. fronts hashinderedsuchapossibility. have helpedtransformthemilitarywing,butcontinuousviolenceonmultiple gaged inalegal,politicalstruggleforreformanddemocratization,whichcould factors. InTurkey,thereisastrongKurdish-leftistpopularpoliticalmovementen- de facto Kurdish entity similar to the KRG in Iraq will largely depend on external rin. WhetherthePKK–YPGleadershipwillattempttodevelopanorthernSyrian the TurkishmilitaryinterventioninSyria aimed topreventthemlinkingwithAf- north centreandAfrininthenorthwest.WhileJazirawasunitedwithKobani, ic unitybetween the three Kurdish areas:Jazira in the northeast, Kobani in the The militarystrategyofthePKK–PYDinsideSyriawastotryandcreategeograph- level. There islittledoubtabouttheinfluenceofPKKoverPYDoncommand structure fromthePKK? logistic baseforthePKKarmedstruggleinsideTurkey?IsPYDanindependent project forself-rule,similartotheKurdishentityinnorthIraq,orwillitserveasa the PKKandPYDtoday?Second,isSyrianterritoryheldbyapriority Several questionsariseinthisregard:first,whatisthenatureofrelationsbetween ferocious armedstrugglesinceitsfoundation. remains a nationalist, military formation with hierarchical control, engaged in an changes arelargelyformalanddonottouchthecoreoforganization,which Party (PJAK),aPKK-relatedANSA,hasbeenactiveinIransince2004.Yet,these the People’sProtectionUnits(YPG)–wasformedin2004.TheKurdistanFreeLife atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-ypg-pkk-connection. 774 choice-northern-syria (last accessed 6November 2017). https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/176-pkk-s-fateful- Crisis Group, 773 772 so, the PYD (Democratic Union Party), [was] founded in 2003’. maintaining supportfromitsthousandsofmembersandsympathizers.Indoing to createnewpartieswiththedoubleobjectiveofescapingstaterepressionwhile tion through the creation of a number of institutions: ‘PKK militants attempted prise athirdofitscasualties.Intheearly2000s,PKKunderwenttransforma- bases inside Syria and has recruited heavily from among Syrian Kurds, who com- cent –morethanthenumberofSyrianKurdcasualtieswereTurkishKurds. 2013–January 2016,basedontheofficialYPGreleaseddata,showsthat49.24per- An International Crisis Group report describes the YPG as aPKK ‘affiliate’ in Syria. See International A. Stein A. andM.Foley, ‘The YPG-PKK Connection’, Atlantic Council, 26 January2016, http://www. J. Tejel, Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics andSociety,Routledge, 2011, p79. 773 Onestudy,lookingatKurdishcasualtiesinSyriatheperiodJanuary The PKK’s Fateful Choice in Northern Syria, Middle East Report no 176, 4 May 2017, p 1, 772 Its armed wing – 774

the recognizedlimitsofKRG,butdisputedterritoriesand mainlytheKirkuk with SyriaandIran. Suleymaniyah region. the PUK also had a more radical-left ideology andallied specificities, theKDPhavingitspowerbaseinErbilwhilePUK’sis and in-fightingbetweentheKDPPUKhasdeephistoric,socialregional bers, JalalTalabani,foundedtherivalPUK,withitsownmilitarywing.Therivalry ment withBaghdad,ledtointernaldivisionswithintheKDP,andoneofitsmem- The defeatofBarzaniin1975,largelycausedbytheShahIranreachinganagree- mainly hissuccessindevelopinganirregularmilitaryforceknownasPeshmerga. a strongleadershipamongKurdishtribesthankstohisnationalistdiscoursebut volt, theSecondIraqi–KurdishWar(1972–1975).MustafaBarzaniwouldestablish 1970 wasnotrespected,muchlikeearlieragreements,leadingtoyetanotherre- known astheFirst Iraqi–Kurdish War(1961–1970).A peace agreement signed in of theKDPand,afterrelationswithQasimdeteriorated,heledyetanotherrevolt throw oftheHashemitemonarchybyAbdelKarimQasim.Barzaniisfounder followers escapedtotheSovietUnion,onlyreturnIraqafter1958over- Muhammad inIran.WiththefallofMahabad,MustafaBarzaniandagrouphis of 1931,andin1945hejoinedtheshort-livedMahabadRepublicdeclaredbyQazi tionalism. Withhisbrother,AhmedBarzani,hetookpartintheanti-Britishrevolt young MustafaBarzani,whowouldlaterbecometheleadingfigureofKurdishna- against theBritishin1919andagain1922–1924.Oneofhisfollowerswas riya religiousfigureandmemberoftheBarzanjitribeinSuleymaniyah,revolted the establishmentofBritishMandate,SheikhMahmudBarzanji,asufiQadi- Iraq washometocontinuousKurdishrevolts.WiththeendofWorldWarIand 4. TheIraqiPeshmerga and wouldlater,withthehelpofUS-ledcoalition,rollbackISgains. that stopped the IS wave that spread through Syria and Iraq in the summer of 2014, pose theirmilitarydominanceovertheKurdishareasthereandbecomebarrier Yet, itwasthePKK–PYDwhowouldemergeasmastersofnorthernSyria,im- September, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/internal-view-kurdish-referendum-2142158935. 777 776 monde-diplomatique.fr/2013/05/CHETERIAN/49062. 775 of governanceremain; idea of independence. Yet, the challenges ahead remain immense. First, the problems bilizing thepopulationofKurdistanRegionalGovernment (KRG)aroundthe on 25September2017,whichwastheprojectofMassoudBarzani, succeededinmo- 51 percentofthevotesinSuleymaniyahprovince.Thereferendum onindependence new movementnamedGorran(MovementforChange),which managedtoreceive In the2009elections,adivisionappearedwithinPUKwith theemergenceofa Both theKDPandPUKleadershiphavebeenaccusedofnepotism andcorruption. among SyrianarmydeserterswhofoundrefugeinNorthernIraqmid-2012. C. Hardi, C. ‘The Kurdish Referendum: Dream of Independence andFear of Dictatorship’, MiddleEast Eye , 25 V. Cheterian, ‘Chance historique pourlesKurdes’, Le Mondediplomatique , May 2013, https://www. D. McDowell, AModernHistory of the Kurds, supra fn768, pp343-348. 776 777 second,theessentialchallengeofreferendumisnot 775

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 141 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 142 trol. homes intointernallydisplacedpeoplecampsinareasunderPeshmergacon- thousand Yazidis,Assyrians,Shabak,ShiasandKakai(ahlul-Haq)escapedtheir the localYazidipopulationwithoutprotection. forces werewithdrawninpanicwithoutfighting,forfearofencirclement,leaving On 3August,ISlaunchedanothersurpriseattackonSinjar,fromwherePeshmerga a townnorthwestofMosul,betweenDohukandSinjar,rapidlyoccupiedit. On 1August2014,ISlaunchedasurpriseattackonPeshmergapositionsinZumar, PUK, andPKKmilitantsstationedintheQandilSinjarMountains. itary influences:PeshmergaforcesloyaltotheKDP, ery, andforcedAssyrianChristianstoconvert,payjizya(tax)ordepart. men men,kidnappedthousandsofYazidigirlsandwomen,forcingthemintoslav- What followedcanbedescribedasgenocide:ISassassinatedYazidiandShia-Turk- ing days,ISfighterstookovertheAssyriantownQaraqoshinNinevehvalley. ing largequantitiesofarmsandammunitiontothejihadifighters.Infollow- after IS’blitzofMosul,whereIraqiarmypositionsfellinamatterhours,leav- www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/turkey-iraq-sinjar-what-is-happening-in-yazidi-land.html. 782 www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2017/01/CHETERIAN/56969. 781 syria/2017-06-08/isis-yazidi-genocide. of the KillingsandKidnappings’, Foreign Affairs, 8June2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 780 779 al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/09/kurdistan-independence-referendum-kirkuk.html#ixzz4thNF6lhd. 778 the PUKhascloserelationswithBaghdadaswellTehran. Althoughthere tations: whiletheKDPisclosetoAnkaraandhastenserelations withBaghdad, mand structures. The two parts of the KRG have equally different political orien- and thePUK,which,inspiteofbothbeingpartKRG, havedistinctcom- the postersofmartyredfighters.Thisisnon-officialborder betweentheKDP Halfway fromErbiltoSuleymaniyah,theflagschangeyellow togreen,asdo region anditsfate; hand andtheKDPPeshmergaonother. the town of Sinjar, are divided into two zonesof influence, betweenthe PKK on one fighters popularamongtheYazidis.TheYazidiareasliberatedfromIS,including neighbours tothesouth.Oncontrary,PKKmilitaryoperationhasmadeits tion, whosetrustintheKRGhasbeenshatteredasmuchtheirArab early hoursof3August2014hasengenderedbitternessamongtheYazidipopula- tween Kurdishpolitical-militaryformations.ThePeshmergawithdrawalinthe The ISattackandPKKcounter-attackheightenedalreadyexistingtensionsbe- opened asmallcorridortothenorthofmountain,evacuatingcivilians. water, foodormedication.AmilitaryoperationbyPKK–PYDfightersfromSyria arid SinjarMountain,wheremanyvulnerablepeopleperishedbecauseoflack V. Cheterian, ‘Les Yézidis, éternels boucsémissaires’, Le Mondediplomatique , January2017, http:// F. Hawramy, ‘Kirkuk Teetering ontheBrinkof War’, Al-Monitor, 24 September 2017, http://www. Onthehistory of theYazidis, see Fuccaro, The OtherKurds. I.B.Tauris, 1998. F. Tstekin, ‘How are Iraq’s Yazidis Faring AmidKurds’ Confrontations? Al-Monitor, 9May 2017, http:// See V. Cetorelli, I.Sasson, N.Shabila,andG.Burnham, ‘ISIS’Yazidi Genocide:Demographic Evidence 781 ThousandsofYazidiciviliansweretrappedandencircledatthetop 778 third,theKRGcontinuestoremaindividedbetweenthreemil- 782 779 Theseattackscametwomonths 780 Several

ianization? tionalism beashieldagainsttheMiddleEasterntrendofIslamization andsectar- ideology amongmarginalizedKurdishsectorsofIran.Willthe youngKurdishna- led occupationofIraq.RecentISattacksinsideIranrevealthe influenceofjihadi the fighters of Ansar al-Sunna, a radical armed group that fought against the US- first movedtoIraqwithahandfulofloyalists.Thegroupalso providedmanyof was thegroupthatprovidedlogisticsupporttoAbuMusi’b al-Zarqawiwhenhe https://news.vice.com/article/not-all-kurds-are-fighting-against-the-islamic-state-some-are-joining-it. ‘Not All Kurds are FightingAgainst theIslamicState –Someare Joiningit’, Vice News, 7November 2014, com/3679970/kurds-isis-recruits/. OnKurdish fighters who joined ISISinthebattle of Kobani, Speri, see A. ‘Kurdish ISIS Recruits Threaten Identity and Security of Kurdish State’, iran-tehran-isis-attacks-kurdistan-salafist-recruitment.html. OnISIS’influence intheKRG, see R.Collard, in Kurdish regions’, Al-Monitor, 9June2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2017/06/ 783 all fourareasofKurdishpoliticalreality. circumstantial evidenceconcerningtheimportantinfluence ofsalafi-jihadismin groups such as al-Qaeda andIS has largely been taboo, although there is enough spread, influencedbysalafi-jihadismandsectariandivides.Theinfluenceofjihadi in aregionwherethenation-stateiscollapsing,andneo-Islamismwide- ed bytribalalliances.Today,theKurdishnationalistphenomenonisananomaly divisions ledby feudal lords (aghas) and traditional religious sheikhs, and creat- formations andthepublicatlargewerestillunderinfluenceofformersocial Turkey, Iranand Arab states were enthusiastically nationalist, Kurdish political es operateonthebasisofnationalism,towhichKurdsarelatecomers.When ideological shiftinthelargerMiddleEasternenvironment.Kurdishpoliticalforc- Probably the most fundamental challenge for all Kurdish political forces is the with theIranianGovernment. Baghdad, thePUK is equallyclosetoTehranandthe PKK-affiliated PJAKisatwar against TurkeyandclosetoBaghdad–Damascus.WhilethePKK–PUKare global powers?TheKDPisclosetoAnkara,whilethePKKandPUKarestruggling inter-Kurdish violenceinspiteoftheircontradictoryallianceswithregionaland choice? Equallyimportant,willthevariousKurdishmilitaryforcesrefrainfrom new alliance between the US authorities and the PKK–PYD a tactical or strategic vive thedefeatofISandmarginalizational-Nusraotherforces?Is persist. WillthetacitalliancebetweenSyrianGovernmentandPKK–PYDsur- 2017, reshuffledthepoliticalcardsinMiddleEast,butlong-termchallenges The referendumonindependenceinKRGareasthattookplace29September in theMiddleEast. tan’s independence, which, should it take place, could see the birth of a new state posts includingtheKRGpresidency.MoreurgenttodayisquestionofKurdis- around questionssuchasbudgetaryallocationsandpoliticaladministrative of 1994–1997, which led to thousands of casualties. More recently, tensions rose are tensionstodaybetweenthetwosides,wefarfrombloodyinternalwar TARY FORMATIONS IN MIDDLE EASTERN BATTLEFIELDS C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: A FOCUS ON THE KURDISH QUESTION AND MILI- Ontherise of ISinfluence onIranian Kurds, see F. Hawramy, ‘Iran Wakes upto SalafiRecruitment 783

In fact,theIraqiKurdishAnsaral-Islam Time, 23 January 2015, http://time.

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 143 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 144

independently fromHadi. latter’s alleged support for secessionist groups inSouthYemen who operate quite in mountingtensionsbetweenHadiandtheUnitedArabEmirates (UAE)overthe Saudi-led coalitionseemtohavedifferentagendasinYemen,as evidencedrecently theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/27/over-92-of-iraqs-kurds-vote-for-independence. in IraqiKurdistanBackIndependence’,TheGuardian,28September2017,https://www. iterranean/syria/176-pkk-s-fateful-choice-northern-syria; M. Chulov, ‘More than 92% of voters May 2017, http://www.agsiw.org/shaping-south-uae-yemen (last accessed 8March 2018). 785 rise-of-chaos-state-salisbury.pdf. chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-05-25-yemen-stemming- 784 control ofHadiortheHouthi–Salehalliance. the north,therearesmallergroupsinYemenwhonotnecessarily underthe From secessionistsinthesouth,toSalafistsTaizandAden andtriballeadersin armed groupsorregionalplayerswithdivergentideologies andpoliticalgoals. tion –thisdescriptioncanbemisleading.Neithercampiscohesive asbothfeature nized President of Yemen, Abdrabbo Mansour Hadi, backed by a Saudi-led coali- blocs –aHouthi–Salehallianceagainstforcesloyaltotheinternationallyrecog- Although theconflictinYemeniswidelypresentedasbeingbetweentwodistinct al armedconflictbetweentheHouthiandAQAP. for applicabilityofthe1977AdditionalProtocolII.Thereisalsoanon-internation- Yemen, aswellwiththeSouthernMovement.Theconflicthasmetthreshold rebels intheNorthandal-QaedaArabianPeninsula(AQAP)Southof tinued tobeinvolvedinanon-internationalarmedconflict(NIAC)againstHouthi Kuwait, SaudiArabia,Sudan,theUnitedArabEmiratesandStates)con- Yemen and the consolidated forces led by Saudi Arabia (Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Classification oftheConficts 11. ARMED CONFLICTS IN YEMEN IN 2017: AN INCREASINGLY Turkey isnotpartytothe1998RomeStatuteofInternationalCriminalCourt. port no176,4May2017,https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-med Further reading:InternationalCrisisGroup,ThePKK’sFatefulChoiceinNorthernSyria,Re- A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS COMPLICATED MOSAIC S. A. Seche, ‘ShapingtheSouth:The S.A. UAE inYemen’, The Arab GulfStates Institute inWashington, 4 P. Salisbury, Yemen: Stemming theRise of aChaosState, ChathamHouse, 25May https://www. 2016, p4, 785 Inaddition,thepresenceofal-QaedainArabian 784 Evenstatesparticipatinginthe ai Arraf Sari

agreement was brokered by theformer UNSecretary-General’s Special Envoy to Yemen, JamalBenomar. 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/nov/24/yemen-ali-abdullah-saleh-resigns. The 790 s-military-security-reform-seeds-new-conflict (last accessed 8March 2018). p 12,https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen- 789 news/middleeast/2011/03/2011320180579476.html. 788 8 March 2018). 6 April2017, https://www.britannica.com/place/Yemen/Mounting-challenge-to-the-Salih-regime (last accessed by acoalitionofYemenioppositionparties(theJointMeetingParties,orJMP). sition andvowtodefendprotesters. zone, tobreakawayfromSalehtwodayslater,announcehissupportfortheoppo- er oftheFirstArmouredDivisionandcommandernorthwesternmilitary ing pointintheprotestsasitpromptedGeneralAliMohsinal-Ahmar,command- civilians firedonananti-governmentrallyinSana’a.Thisepisodemarkedashift- On 18March2011,atleast45personswerekilledafterSalehloyalistsdressedas reported asthesecurityforces’responsetoprotestswasheavy-handed. yet his moves did not succeed in placating the protests. Several casualties were Saleh was pushed to make several economic concessions and political promises, Security Forces. Guard –thebiggestandbest-equippedunitinYemeniarmyCentral devised tobeloyalSalehremainedlargelyintact,mostnotablythePresidential Ali Mohsin.Nevertheless,powerfulmilitary–securityforcesthatwerehistorically and airforcecommanders,includingtheeasternregioncommander,Mohammed northwestern militaryzone,healsobroughtwithhimmanyotherregulararmy military–security apparatus.InadditiontotheFirstArmouredDivisionand 787 Republic from 1990until2012. until 1990, whenunification withsouthern Yemen occurred. Hethenserved asPresident of theYemen 786 30 yearsinpower. on thethenPresident,AliAbdullahSaleh,tostepdownfromofficeaftermorethan In early 2011, Yemeni protesters took to the streets of major citiesin Yemen calling saic morecomplicated. Peninsula (AQAP)andIslamicState(IS)inYemenrendertheconflictmo- litical issuesandproducinganewconstitution;addressing oftransitional tasks: holdinganationaldialoguewiththegoalofaddressing thecountry’spo- tation mechanismforthetransitionperiod,whichrevolvedaroundthreeprincipal tion. TheagreementwassupplementedbyaUnitedNations-sponsoredimplemen- then deputy,AbdrabboMansourHadi,inexchangeforimmunityfromprosecu- step downfrompower. Saleh signedanagreementproposedbytheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)to On 23November,afterstallingandrenegingonhisannouncementsseveraltimes, R. Burrowes and M. Wenner, ‘Mounting Challenge to the Saleh Regime’, International CrisisGroup, Yemen’s Military–Security Reform: Seeds of New Conflict? , 4April2013, ‘Top Army Commanders Defect inYemen’, AlJazeera March, 21 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/ Salehserved as President of northernYemen (officially, theYemen Arab Republic, YAR) from 1978 B.Whitaker, ‘Yemen’s AliAbdullahSalehResigns –ButItChangesLittle’,The Guardian , 24 November 789

786 Theprotestsappearedtohavebeenorganizedanddirected 790 Undertheagreement,Salehwouldtransferpowertohis 788 Ineffect,Mohsin’sannouncementsplitthe Encyclopedia Britannica , 787

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 145 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 146 (Hirak) hadannouncedearlierthattheywouldbeboycottingtheelections. on toseizeandexertcontroloverterritoriesinsouthernYemen. extent IS,alsobenefitedfromthesecurityvoidincountry,andformerwent 99.6 percentofthevote. being theonlycandidateonballot,HadiwaselectedasPresidentofYemenwith 798 expanding-base (last accessed 8March 2018). crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemen-s-al-qaeda- 797 796 795 794 Movement-to-boycott-February-election.htm. Times, 30January2012, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1542/news/246/Houthis-and-Southern- 793 http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/21/world/meast/yemen-elections/index.html. 792 transition.pdf (last accessed 8March 2018).. files/YE_111205_Agreement%20on%20the%20implementation%20mechanism%20for%20the%20 Initiative of theGulfCooperation Council (GCC), see http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/ Agreement ontheImplementation Mechanism for theTransition Process inYemen inAccordance withthe 791 military, whereastheSalehnetworkwasstilloperativeandpowerful. presidency asafairlyweakfigurelackingwidesupportbase,eitherpoliticalor army. ThisstepwasinthenaturalorderofthingsgiventhatHadiarrivedathis Hadi during the transitional period wasthe reforming and restructuring of the loyalty ofpowerfulunitsinthearmy.Indeed,onemajorundertakings of Yemen’sleadingparty,theGeneralPeople’sCongress(GPC),andenjoyed ical scene.AlthoughhesteppeddownasPresident,continuedtoacthead On topofthis,theagreementdidnotmanagetodislodgeSalehfrompolit- glected to address the decrepit economic situation of the country. cal elites that ignored local dynamics and historically marginalized groups and ne- agreement wasperceivedbymanyasapower-sharingdealbetweenYemen’spoliti- The GCCinitiativedidnotsucceedinrestoringstabilitytothecountry.Infact, justice; andreforming the armedforcesintoaunifiedmilitary. turn ledtoaweakenedsenseofnationalidentity. in thesecurityvoidthatresultedfromfracturingofoldregime,andthis lapse insocialservicesandthescarcityofbasicgoods,localconflictscrystallized were abletoeffectivelychallengethecentralgovernment. groups suchastheHouthis,Hirakandtribesinresource-richpartsofcountry believed to bequietlyempoweringthelatter’s network andAli Mohsin retained his position as Commander of the First Armoured Division as well, he was still idential Guard and Special Security Forces. Although he removed Ali Mohsin from key positionsinthemilitary–securityapparatus,mainlycommandofPres- to curbSaleh’sinfluencebyfirstmovingSalehloyalistsandfamilymembersfrom CrisisGroup, Yemen’s Military-Security Reform, supra fn789, p1. For theEnglishversion of the International CrisisGroup, Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding theBase , 2February 2017, pi,https://www. A. Saeed and M.BinSallam,‘HouthisandSouthernMovement A. to Boycott February Election’, Yemen Ibid,p3. M.Jamjoom,‘Yemen HoldsPresidential Election withOneCandidate’, CNN,22February 2012, Whitaker, ‘Yemen’s AliAbdullahSalehResigns’, supra fn790. Ibid,p13. Salisbury, Yemen, supra fn784, p4. 792 TheHouthisandmembersoftheSouthernMovement 795 Consequently,marginalized 796 AQAP,andtoalesser 791 797 On21February, 794 With the col- 798 Haditried 793

First ArmouredDivision. 2014, HadiwouldorderthedisbandmentofbothPresidentialGuardand year inordertoallowforgovernmentreformsanddraftinganewconstitution. tentious pointinthedocumentwasextensionofHadi’stermofficebyone gions wasill-receivedbymembersofHirakaswelltheHouthis. recommendation toorganizethecountryaroundafederationcomposedofsixre- decision, hewouldcallforanuprisingtooverthrowit. forces, toissueapublicwarningthegovernmentthatifitdidnotgobackonits new constitution,theaccordwasneverimplemented. January 2014withafinaldocumentoutliningitsresultsandpavingthewayfor news/middleeast/2014/08/houthis-push-into-yemen-capital-amid-protests-2014820191016804628.html. 808 807 www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/aug/26/yemen-fuel-subsidy-cut-drives-poorest-poverty. 806 805 www.yementimes.com/en/1750/news/3398/National-Dialogue-Conference-concludes.htm. 804 dialogue-2014125152420400484.html. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/yemen-wraps-up-thorny-national-January 2014, hurdles-remain-idUSBREA1M05720140223. See also ‘Yemeni Factions HoldNationalDialogue’,AlJazeera, 26 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-politics-analysis/yemens-federal-plan-a-bold-idea-but-many- 803 2018). 802 801 com/news/middleeast/2012/12/2012122053621353659.html. 800 799 Sana’a after Mohsin’s troops stood down under instructions from the ministry of under thecommandofAliMohsin.On21September,Houthistookcontrolover broke out on the outskirts of the capital between Houthi forces and military units Tensions inSana’aroseoverthefollowingweeks,andon19Septemberfighting ongoing transition. of analliancebetweenHouthisandSalehloyalistswhofeltmarginalizedbythe Islamists andtribalopponentsinthecountry’snorth,aswellemergence The transitionperiodsawimportantmilitarygainsforHouthiforcesagainstSunni an influentialpositionasamilitaryadviserdespitehisformaldemotion. set offawaveofprotests. calling onthegovernmenttostepdown. of Houthi supporters flocked to the capital protesting the cut in fuel subsidies and infighting. By 2014,Yemen’spoliticaltransitionwasbucklingundertheweightof CrisisGroup, Yemen’s al-Qaeda, supra fn797, p8. Salisbury, Yemen, supra fn784, p25. ‘HouthisPushinto Yemeni Capital amidRallies’, Salisbury, Yemen, supra fn784, p21. Y. Bayoumy, ‘Yemen’s Federal PlanaBoldIdea, butMany Hurdles Remain’, Reuters , 23February 2014, CrisisGroup, Yemen’s al-Qaeda, supra fn797, p8. ‘Yemen FuelSubsidyCut Drives Poorest Deeper into Poverty’, The Guardian , 26 August https:// 2014, For theoriginaltext inArabic, see http://www.ndc.ye/ndc_document.pdf (last accessed 8March A. I.Al-Moshki, ‘NationalDialogueConference A. Concludes’, Yemen Times http:// , 28January2014, ‘Yemen’s President Shakes uptheArmy’, AlJazeera, 20 December 2012, http://www.aljazeera. 801

Although theNationalDialogueConference(NDC)concludedon25 805 InJune2014,thegovernment’sdecisiontocutfuelsubsidies 800 806

ThisledAbdulmalekal-Houthi,leaderoftheHouthi Al Jazeera, 20 August http://www.aljazeera.com/ 2014, 808

807 802 On18August,thousands Notably,thedocument’s 803 Anothercon- 799 Bylate 804

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 147 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 148 made sinceSeptemberinvalid. where heannouncedthatwasstillPresidentanddeclaredallpoliticaldecisions ing underpressure,HadimanagedtoescapehousearrestinSana’aandfledAden, their embassiestoAdeninorderbolsterHadi’sclaims. support frommilitary units loyaltoSaleh. Houthis wereaggravatedbytheproposalandoccupiedPresidentialPalacewith ber presidential council toreplaceHadi. be inchargeofforminganewparliamentthatwouldturnestablishfive-mem- up aninterimauthority,theSupremeRevolutionaryCommittee(SRC),whichwould their takeoverofpowerbyannouncingthedissolutionparliamentandsetting arrest.html. www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/world/middleeast/houthi-rebels-release-yemeni-officials-from-house- 817 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/22/world/yemen-unrest/index.html. 816 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/06/yemen-houthi-dissolves-parliament. 815 councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2015-02/yemen_13.php (last accessed 8March 2018). 814 813 the-crisis-in-yemen-the-primacy-of-stability-over-real-change. ‘The Primacy of Stability over Real Change’,Qantara.de , 30January2015, https://en.qantara.de/content/ the country’s northinto three different federal regions, whichthey seek to control. Heinze, See M.-C. 812 811 darp/dv/darp20141204_05_/darp20141204_05_en.pdf (last accessed 8March 2018). the translated text of the PNPA, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/ sisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-s-houthi-takeover. For Longley Alley, ‘Yemen’s HouthiTakeover’, International CrisisGroup, 22December https://www.cri 2014, October http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/57087 2014, (last accessed 8March 2018); see also A. 810 https://muftah.org/houthis-successful-yemen/#.WasnpdGx_IW.2014, 809 interior. statement offuelsubsidies. ment calledforreformsinthesecurityandeconomicsectors,includingrein- of Houthi and Hirak representatives as presidential advisers. In addition, the agree- – whichenvisagedtheformationofaninclusivegovernmentandappointment ment withtheHouthis–PeaceandNationalPartnershipAgreement(PNPA) Khaled Bahah,andtherestofhiscabinet. arrest, and on22January he submitted his resignation, along with Prime Minister, Houthis wereintegratedintothesecurityestablishment. Following thesigningofPNPA,stabilitywasinitiallyrestoredincapitaland Saleh loyalists,soundedthedeathknellfortransitionperiod. military unitsloyaltoSalehandHadi-alignedforcesinAden,Hadi’sresidence On 19March2015,thesituationofviolenceescalatedasfightingeruptedbetween stitution thatenvisagedtheintroductionofafederalsystemwithsixregions. quickly deterioratedon17January2015followingthepresentationofadraftcon- Salisbury, Yemen, supra fn784, p24. K.Fahim, ‘HouthiRebels Release Detained Yemeni Ministers’, The New York Times,16 March 2015, https:// Ibid. H.Hägglund,‘Yemen’s HouthiRebels Announce Government Takeover’, The Guardian, 6February The Houthisdonot reject theintroduction of afederal system perse, butrather thedivisionof H.Almasmari,‘Protests SupportYemeni President After HeEscapes House Arrest’, CNN,23February Security Council Report, ‘February 2015 MonthlyForecast’, 30January2015, http://www.security M.Transfeld, ‘Houthis on the Rise inYemen’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 31 M.Transfeld, ‘Capturing Sanaa:Why theHouthisWere Successful inYemen’, Muftah , 27 September 809 Onthesameday,governmentsignedaUN-brokeredpeaceagree- 810 TheseizureofSana’abyHouthiforces,backed 816 SeveralGulfstatesannouncedtherelocationof 814 815 InearlyFebruary,theHouthiscompleted On21February,onemonthafterresign- 813 Hadiwasvirtuallyputunderhouse 817 811

However,thesituation 812 The

marginal andmostlypoliticalwithminimalfinancialmilitaryassistance. gerated. WhiletheHouthisdoreceivesomesupportfromIran,thishasremained proxy intheArabPeninsula,criticspointoutthattheseallegationshavebeenexag- at counteringaperceivedIranianinfluencebyportrayingthegroupasan intervention oftheSaudi-ledcoalitionagainstHouthiswassupposedlyaimed cisive Storm to counter the Houthis and restore Hadi to power. Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar and Sudan) announced the beginning of Operation De- coalition ofnineArabcountries(SaudiArabia,theUAE,Bahrain,Egypt,Jordan, menis. mid-November 2014, and unlike AQAP, it members are largely drawn from non-Ye- presidential-site-idUSKBN0MT0G820150403. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-aden/yemens-houthis-seize-central-aden-district- 827 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988 (last accessed 8March 2018). 826 825 yemeni-leader-hadi-leaves-country-as-saudi-arabia-keeps-up-air-strikes-idUSKBN0ML0YC20150326. Arabia Keeps upAirStrikes’, Reuters, 26 March 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/ rebels-near-officials-say.html; see also K.AbdallahandS.Aboudi,‘Yemeni Leader HadiLeaves Country asSaudi https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/03/25/yemen-president-hadi-flees-aden-palace-as-houthi- 824 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/un-brokered-yemen-talks-begin-doha-1864580777. 823 www.dw.com/en/yemens-president-hadi-declares-new-temporary-capital/a-18332197. 822 news/4994/Southerners-prepare-for-Houthi-invasion.htm. Prepare for HouthiInvasion’, Yemen Times , 23March 2015, http://www.yementimes.com/en/1870/ 821 820 monthly-forecast/2015-05/yemen_16.php (last accessed 8March 2018). 819 www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/19/soldiers-loyal-former-yemen-president-aden-airport-dead. 818 Crater neighbourhood. Houthi–Saleh alliancemademajorgainsinAden,notablybyseizingAden’scentral Despite theairstrikesconductedbySaudi-ledcoalition,earlyApril from theHouthiincursion. ernment askedtheGCCforamilitaryinterventioninordertoprotectcountry As theHouthi–Salehallianceadvancedfurthersouth,on24MarchHadigov- in thecitywasbombed. guise offightingAQAPanditsaffiliates–amongwhomhecountsHadi. the mobilizationofarmedforcesforacampaigninYemen’ssouthunder Aden thenextday,HadifledtoSaudiArabia. by the group in Yemen. State claimed responsibility for the attack, which was the first to be carried out at twoZaydimosquesinthecapital,whichreportedlykilled137people.Islamic same day,HadideclaredAdenthetemporarycapitalofcountry. Security Council Report, ‘May 2015 MonthlyForecast’, supra fn819;see also K.Al-Karimi, ‘Southerners ‘SoldiersLoyal to Yemen’s Former President Storm Aden Airport’, The Guardian, 19March 2015, https:// Security Council Report, ‘May 2015 MonthlyForecast’, 1May 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ M. Mukhashaf, ‘Yemen’s Houthis Seize Central Aden District, Presidential Site’, ‘UN-led Talks on Yemen to Begin inDohaasSaudiArabia BacksHadi’,MiddleEast Eye , 24 March Security Council Report, ‘May 2015 MonthlyForecast’, supra fn819. ‘Yemen’s President HadiDeclares New “Temporary Capital”’, Deutsche Welle March, 21 2015, http:// M.Transfeld, ‘Iran’s SmallHandinYemen’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14February A. Al-Haj and M. Michael, ‘Yemen’s Al-Haj A. President Flees Aden as Rebels Close in’, CrisisGroup, Yemen’s al-Qaeda , supra fn797, pp17–19. 820 Followingtheattack,Abdulmalekal-Houthiannounced,on21March, 827 819 818

The IS branch in Yemen had been announced earlier in Onthenextday,Sana’awitnessedsuicidebombings 823 WhenHouthi–Salehforcesreachedtheoutskirtsof 824 Shortlyafterwards,theSaudi-led The Star, 25 March 2015, 825 Reuters, 3 April 2015, 822 Although the 821 Onthe 826

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 149 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 150 and thepeaceprocesseventuallycollapsedinAugustasfightingintensified. arate southernYemenfromSana’a. Arabia. Subsequently, Hadi forces turned their eyes towards other cities that sep- retake Aden, aided by the deployment of ground troops from the UAE and Saudi By July,thewarscenechangedasHadiloyalistsandsouthernforcesmanagedto dulmalek al-Houthiandtheformerpresident’sson,AhmedAliAbdullahSaleh. the HouthisandforcesloyaltoSaleh,aswellimposingsanctionsagainstAb- all theareastheyhadseized.Importantly,itestablishedanarmsembargoagainst support forthelegitimacyofHadianddemandedthatHouthiswithdrawfrom On 14April2015,theUNSecurityCounciladoptedaresolutionthatreaffirmedits was largelyconcentratedagainsttheHouthis. com/news/2016/08/yemen-peace-talks-collapse-fighting-intensifies-160807042106210.html. 835 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53750#.Waw2fNGx_IU. 834 stronghold-in-port-city-of-mukalla-yemen.php. Journal, 25April2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/04/arab-coalition-enters-aqap- 833 832 saudi-uae-war-effort-in-yemen-part-1-operation-golden-arrow-in-aden The Washington Institute, 10 August 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the- 831 4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2216.pdf. 830 al-mukalla-yemen.html. The New York Times, 3April2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/world/middleeast/al-qaeda- 829 fn 784, p27. 828 ground troops. the groupinitiallyseizedcity,athandsofHadi-alignedforcesaidedbyUAE Al-Qaeda fightersweredrivenoutofMukallainlateApril2016,almostoneyearafter AQAP. fend hishomegovernorateAbyan–southernsecessionists,localtribesmenand so-called ‘PopularCommittees’–militiasmobilizedbyHadibeforethewartode- ideologies foughtagainsttheHouthiincursionsinsouth.Theseincluded Besides militaryunitsunderthecommandofHadi,othergroupswithdifferent of theHadhramautgovernorate. April in seizing the port city Mukalla, the fifth largest city in Yemen and the capital violence. Kuwait betweenYemenipartieswiththeaimofreachinganagreementtoend maut, Shabwa and Abyan. In the same month, UN-brokered peace talks started in control over certain territories in southern Yemen, in the governorates of Hadhra- the cityafteritsrecapture. and thewidersouthremainedfragile,asevidencedbyseveralISattacksthathit M. Knights and A. Mello, ‘The M.KnightsandA. Saudi–UAE War Effort inYemen (Part 1):Operation GoldenArrow inAden’, T. Joscelyn, ‘Arab Coalition Enters AQAP Stronghold inPort Cityof Mukalla, Yemen’, FDD’s Long War ‘Yemen Peace Talks Collapse asFighting Intensifies’, AlJazeera, 7August 2016, http://www.aljazeera. Salisbury, Yemen, supra fn784, pp33–34. UNNews, ‘“Make Peace Your Choice” Urges UNEnvoy, asYemen Talks Begin inKuwait’, April 21 UNSCRes 14April2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27- 2216, Security Council Report, ‘May 2015 MonthlyForecast’, supra fn819;see also Salisbury, Yemen , supra S.Al-Batati andK.Fahim, ‘Affiliate of AlQaeda Seizes Yemeni Major City, DrivingOuttheMilitary’, 828 834 In the midst of this chaos and power vacuum, AQAP succeeded in early Throughoutthetalkstherewereseveralbreachesofagreedceasefires, 833 Yet, AQAP is far from defeated and continues until today to exert 832 829 Thiswasalsoduetothefactthatfighting 831 However,thesecuritysituationincity (last accessed 8March 2018). 835

830

Salah al-Sammad. tionary CommitteehandedpowertotheSPCwhichcamebepresidedoverby Sana’a, therehasbeenanintensificationofsectarianrhetoric, whichtendstode- grip onYemen’sairandmaritimespaces. large-scale supplyofarmsfromtheIranianGovernmentgivencoalition’stight Panel ofExpertsonYemen,thereisnosufficientevidencetoconfirmanydirect with theHouthi–Salehalliance. bling economicsystemandcomplicatingtheprocessofanegotiatedsettlement announced the relocation of the bankto Aden, thus destabilizingan already crum- 843 publications/analysis/4348 (last accessed 8March 2018). Exaggerated, but Destructive’, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 29 May 2017, http://sanaacenter.org/ 842 841 840 839 famine-yemen. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/central-bank-crisis-risks- 838 023.htm. 837 January 2017, §20. 836 do. not shapetheirdecision-makingasmuchlocalalliancesandconflictdynamics Houthis doreceivesomesupportfromIran,thishasremainedmarginalanddoes At thisstageitisnotpossibletoconsiderIranasapartytheNIAC.While the SouthernMovement,aswellbetweenarmedgroups. bia, Sudan,theUAEandUS)Houthis;governmentAQAP, consolidated forcesledbySaudiArabia(Bahrain,Jordan,Egypt,Kuwait,Ara- conflicts takingplaceinYemen,mostnotablybetweenthegovernmentand There arecurrentlymultipleparallelandoverlappingnon-internationalarmed with equal representation for both camps. ment thatsawtheestablishmentofaten-memberSupremePoliticalCouncil(SPC) On 28July2016,SalehandAbdulmalekal-Houthireachedapower-sharingagree- limited totraining,mostlychannelledthroughHezbollah. Congress (GPC)memberaffiliatedtoSaleh. mation ofagovernmentunderAbdelazizBinHabtour,anactiveGeneralPeople’s endure untiltheendofconflict. two campsisoftendescribedasan‘allianceofconvenience’whichunlikelyto loyal toSalehandHouthiforcesremainlargelydistinct.Thealliancebetweenthe ening oftheHouthi–Salehallianceonpoliticallevel,althoughmilitaryunits B. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 841 Transfeld, ‘Iran’s SmallHand’,supra fn826. ‘SRC Hands Over Authorityto Saba News SPC’, , 15August 2016, http://sabanews.net/en/news437 International CrisisGroup, ‘Central Bank CrisisRisksFamine inYemen’, 29September 2016, https://www. UNSC, FinalReport UNSC, of thePanel of Experts,supra fn836, §21. UN Security Council (UNSC), Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, UN doc S/2017/81, 31 UNSC, Report UNSC, of thePanel of Experts,supra fn 836, §62. Ibid.For a detailed analysis of Iran’s role in Yemen, see F. Al-Muslimi, ‘Iran’s Role in Yemen Ibid,§47. ThemilitarysupportprovidedtotheHouthissince2011haslargelybeen 837 On19September,HadifiredtheCentralBankgovernorand 838 On28November,theSPCannouncedfor- 840

836 843 839 Subsequently,the Supreme Revolu-

Following theHouthistakeoverof Thiseventmarkedafurthertight- 842

According totheUN

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 151 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 152 an law(IHL)inYemen. is believedtobeimplicatedinwidespreadviolationsof international humanitari- national andprofessionalleadershipcommandbasedontheruleoflaw’. sector, inparticularthearmedforces‘withaviewtointegratingthemunderunified, Ban Ki-moonwelcomedPresidentHadi’seffortstorestructurethenation’ssecurity ground operationsinAdenandthevicinityofMukalla. Saudi ArabiaretainsoperationalcontrolinMaribwhiletheUAEhasover https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/middleeast/yemen-special-operations-missions.html. Antiterror Ground Missions’, The New York Times, 7February 2017, intelligence-actionable-a7607181.html; D. Sanger andE.Schmitt,‘Yemen Withdraws Permission for U.S. world/americas/uspolitics/yemen-raid-us-navy-seal-30-civlians-killed-donald-trump-first-operation-no- Intelligence”, Officials Say’, The Independent , 2March 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 851 850 (last accessed 8March 2018); see also ibid,paras 119–134. 8 August 2017, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/yemen-airstrikes-against-civilians-are-alarming-trend 849 848 847 www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44638#.UZCwtxZBvX4 (last accessed 8March 2018). 846 strength-detail.asp?country_id=yemen (last accessed 8March 2018). 845 844 headquarters led by Saudi Arabia and based in Riyadh. in Yemen.Thecoalition’sairoperationsareundertheoperationalcontrolofajoint di ArabiaandtheUAE,althoughthesetwostatesseemtohavedivergentagendas diplomatic crisis.The military operations of the coalition are spearheaded by Sau- ever thelatterwascastoutfromcoalitioninJune2017followingQatari Arabia, theUAE,Bahrain,Egypt,Jordan,Kuwait,Morocco,SudanandQatar);how- restoring Haditopower.ItwasoriginallymadeupofnineArabcountries(Saudi Formed inlateMarch2015withthedeclaredgoalofcounteringHouthiforcesand 2. TheSaudi-LedCoalition The YemeniArmedForces are estimatedtobe 43,500 strong. 1. YemeniArmedForces tion predominantinIran,andisactuallymuchcloserpracticetoSunniIslam faith followedbyHouthimembers–isverydifferentfromtheTwelverShiatradi- scribe theHouthisasIranian-backedShiasinYemen.However,ZaydiShiism– the UStorungroundmissionsagainstsuspectedterroristsin thecountry. ly 2017,theHadigovernmentwasreportedtohavewithdrawnitspermissionfor back toSaleh’sera. pursue itsairanddronecampaignagainstAQAPtargetsinYemen,whichdates With avirtualcarteblanchefromtheHadigovernment,UShascontinuedto 3. TheUnitedStates See S. Osborne, ‘Yemen Raid that Killed 30 Civilians and USNavy Uncovered SEAL “No Actionable UNSC, FinalReport UNSC, of thePanel of Experts,supra fn836, §30. Global Firepower, ‘2017 Yemen Military Strength’, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military- CrisisGroup, Yemen’s al-Qaeda, supra fn797, p 7. Ibid. International Committee of theRed Cross, ‘Yemen: Airstrikes Against CiviliansAre anAlarmingTrend’, UNNews, ‘Yemen: Ban,Security Council Welcome Efforts to Reform Armed Forces’, 12April2013, Transfeld, ‘Iran’s SmallHandinYemen’, supra fn826. 850 FollowingacontroversialgroundoperationinYemenear- 849

847 848 As for ground operations, 845 TheSaudi-ledcoalition UNSecretary-General 846 851 The . 844

the coalition’sfighterjetsthatconductairstrikesinYemen. ing logisticandintelligencesupporttotheSaudi-ledcoalition,aswellrefueling 856 855 854 up-refueling-saudi-jets.html (last accessed 8March 2018). com, 15February 2017, http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/02/15/2-years-yemen-war-us-ramps- 853 4b026a89a7a2913. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-ongoing-us-role-in-the-decimation-of-yemen_us_58a65d82e 852 Mohsin, Saleh’sformerally,asDeputySupremeCommander ofthearmedforces ident orhavedefectedtojointheHouthis.InFebruary2016, HadiappointedAli Since March 2015, several military units have remained loyal to the former pres- 6. TheSouthernMovementorTransitionalCouncil bombs whichposeaparticularthreattocivilians. US hasbeensupplyingweaponsonalargescaletoSaudiArabia,includingcluster during hispresidency. enjoys thepersonalloyaltyofseveralhigh-rankingofficerswhomheappointed most importantforSaleh’scontinuedinfluenceonthepoliticalscene,ashestill volves aroundtheGPC,whichhestillheadstoday.Themilitarycomponentis tribal elementiscentredonhisSanhantribe,whereasthepoliticalcomponentre- The Salehnetworkhasthreemaincomponents:tribal,politicalandmilitary. 4. Saleh-AlignedForces though certainlynotall,oftheseofficersareZaydisfromSayyidfamilies. military unitswhobrokeawayfromHadiandjoinedtheHouthimovement.Many, tias, which rotate frequently through areas under Houthi control, as well as former forces remainlargelydistinct. tightened over thecourseoflastyear,militaryunitsloyaltoSalehandHouthi tal inSeptember2014.AlthoughtheirpoliticalalliancewithSalehseemstohave Later, theHouthisstruckanalliancewiththeiroldfoeandtookholdofcapi- transitional periodhasdrawnmoresupporterstotheHouthis. that calledforhimtostepdown.ThepowervacuumcreatedbyYemen’suncertain monly referredtoastheSixWars),andparticipatedinuprisingsearly2011 in six rounds of conflict against the Saleh regime between 2004 and 2010 (com- ported killedbyYemeniarmyforcesinSeptember2004.TheHouthiswereengaged its namefromHusseinBadreddinal-Houthi,theirformercommander,whowasre- The HouthisareaZaydiShiainsurgentgroupoperatinginYemen.takes 5. TheHouthis(alsocalledAnsarAllah) sitional period,manymilitaryunitshaveremainedloyaltoSaleh. J. Mechanic, ‘The OngoingU.S.Role intheDecimation of Yemen’, The Huffington Post, 18February 2017, Ibid;see also O. Pawlyk, Years ‘2 Into Yemen War, USRampsUpRefueling of SaudiJets’, Military. Ibid,§47. Ibid,§50. UNSC, FinalReport UNSC, of thePanel of Experts,supra fn836, §42. 854

Despite Hadi’seffortstoreformthearmyduringtran- 855 Militarily,theHouthisrelyonanetworkofmili- 852 In addition,ithasbeenprovid- 853

856

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 153 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 154 which hefoughtonthesideofnorthernarmy. ers aredistrustfulofhiminviewhisrolethe1994YemeniCivilWar,during that althoughHadihailsfromthesoutherngovernorateofAbyan,many- are actuallyundertheoperationalcontrolofUAE. Elite forces,whicharenominallyunderthecontrolofYemeniGovernmentbut or securityforces.ThisisarguablythecaseforSecurityBeltforcesandHadrami enjoy thefullallegianceofforcesfightingunderbannerYemenimilitary also havestrongtieswiththeIslamistIslahparty.Onotherhand,Hadidoesnot an influentialfigure in Yemenwith a wide network of allies, and he is reported to the southandstarteditsownexperimentinlocalgovernance. ing onthesecurityvacuum,during2011grouptookcontroloverterritoriesin 858 supreme-commander. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/2/23/yemen-president-appoints-ali-mohsin-as-deputy- 857 863 862 861 860 (last accessed 8March 2018). Democracy, May 2017, http://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PolicyBrief_Nadwa_170505b-1.pdf 859 https://www.justsecurity.org/40978/uae-key-partner-yemen-implicated-detainee-abuse. Moorehead, ‘UAE, aKey USPartner inYemen, Implicated inDetainee Abuse’, Just Security, 15May 2017, branches of al-Qaedain the Arab Peninsula. The groupemergedinJanuary2009throughaunionoftheSaudiandYemeni 7. Al-QaedaintheArabPeninsula(AQAP) in anattempttogathersupportfromlocaltribesandmilitaryleaders. appeal andseparateitslocalcomponentfrominternationalbrand. sequently, in2011itcreatedaparallelgroup,Ansaral-Sharia,towidenitsdomestic icant localinsurgencycomponentthatseekstoestablishterritorialcontrol.Con- from aprimarilyinternationallyfocusedjihadistorganizationtoonewithsignif- the governoratesofHadhramaut,ShabwaandAbyan. was drivenoutfromMukallain2016,itisfardefeatedandstillpresent Ibid,p6. ‘Yemen President AppointsAliMohsinasDeputySupreme Commander’, The New Arab, 23February 2016, N.Al-Dawsari, Breaking theCycle of Failed Negotiations inYemen, POMED–Project onMiddleEast CrisisGroup, Yemen’s al-Qaeda, supra fn797, p19. UNSC, FinalReport UNSC, of thePanel of Experts,supra fn836, §132;see also R.GoodmanandA. Salisbury, Yemen, supra fn784, p13. CrisisGroup, Yemen’s al-Qaeda, supra fn797, p4. 860 Duringthe uprising, AQAP evolved 859

863 858

Here, itshouldbenoted 862 AlthoughAQAP 861 857 Capitaliz-

Mohsin is

raid. the UStorungroundmissionsagainstsuspectedterroristsinYemenfollowing strategic port of Mocha. commands theSecurityBeltforces. ernor ofAden,Aidarousal-Zubaidi,andMinisterStateHaniBinBraikwhoalso dismissing anumberofUAE-linkedofficialsinthesouth,mostnotablygov- represent the South’, Almasdar Online, 4 May 2017 http://www.almasdaronline.com/article/90915 (in Arabic). 871 870 Elite forces. See Seche, ‘ShapingtheSouth’,supra fn785. was convened withthesponsorship of BinBraik andundertheprotection of theUAE-aligned Hadrami http://sanaacenter.org/publications/yemen-at-the-un/99 (last accessed 8March 2018). The conference 869 death-for-treason-idUSKBN16W0UF. www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-court/pro-houthi-court-sentences-yemen-president-to- 868 867 866 article/uk-yemen-security/gulf-backed-yemeni-forces-capture-red-sea-coast-city-agency-idUKKBN15M2LU. 865 March 2018). Golden_Arrow_the_Prospects_for_a_Resolution_to_the_Yemeni_Conflict_in_2017.aspx (last accessed 8 Yemeni Conflict in2017, 8March 2017, https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Operation_ 864 ing a leadership for governing and representing southern Yemen. ration’, which denounced Hadi’sdecisionandentrustedal-Zubaidi with establish- southern Yemen.On4May,thefactionsofHirakreleased‘AdenHistoricDecla- Hadi’s decisiontodismissal-ZubaidiandBinBraiksparkedwideprotestsacross autonomy fortheprovince. nor, AhmadBinBraik,undertheimplicitpatronageofUAE,callingforgreater so-called InclusiveHadramoutConferencewasheldbypro-secessionlocalgover- UAE-backed SecurityBeltforcesandloyaltoHadiinAden,on22Aprilthe internationally recognized president. After an earlier armed standoff between port tosouthernpro-secessiongroupsthatseekadifferentagendaofthe By lateApril,tensionsintensifiedbetweenHadiandtheUAEoverlatter’ssup- ance supplyline. row aimedatretakingthewesterncoastandcuttingoffakeyHouthi–Salehalli- In January,theSaudi-ledcoalitionannouncedlaunchofOperationGoldenAr- officials todeathinabsentiaforhightreason. on 11Mayal-ZubaidiannouncedtheformationofSouthernTransitionalCoun- its declaredgoals. criticism asitledtothedeathofaround30civiliansandfellshortachieving for thepurposeofintelligencegatheringagainstAQAP.Theoperationdrewstrong a groundoperationintheYaklaareaofAl-BaydagovernorateCentralYemen C. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2017: AN INCREASINGLY COMPLICATED MOSAIC ’Adan’s Historic Declaration authorizes Al-Zobaidi to declare apolitical leadership led by himto run and ‘Gulf-Backed Yemeni Forces Capture Red Sea Coast City’,Reuters , 7February 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/ SangerandSchmitt,‘Yemen Withdraws Permission for U.S.Antiterror Ground Missions’, supra fn85. Seche, ‘ShapingtheSouth’,supra fn785. Sana’aCenter for Strategic Studies, ‘Yemen attheUN–April 2017 Review’, 7May 2017, ‘Pro-Houthi Court Sentences Yemen President to Death for Treason’, Reuters, 25 March 2017, http:// Arab Center for Research andPolicy Studies, Operation GoldenArrow: The Prospects for aResolution to the Osborne,‘Yemen RaidthatKilled 30CiviliansandUSNavy SEAL’, supra fn851. 867 On25March,acourtinSana’asentencedHadiandsixothergovernment 864 866 Bythenextmonth,pro-Hadiforcesmanagedtocapture Reportedly,theYemeniGovernmentwithdrewpermissionfor 865 Meanwhile, in late January US special forces conducted 869 ThisaggravatedHadiwhorespondedon27Aprilby 870 868 871 Consequently,

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 155 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 156

ated emiratewasexpelledfromtheSaudi-ledmilitarycoalition. In thewakeofQataridiplomaticcrisisthatbrokeoutinearlyJune,repudi- as well. august-31-2017 (last accessed 8March 2018).. 2017 https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/gulf-of-aden-security-review/gulf-of-aden-security-review- 881 two-dead-idUSKCN1B60OG. www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/houthis-and-saleh-forces-clash-in-sanaa-at-least- 880 allies-in-sanaa-1.623118. August 2017, https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/pro-saleh-colonel-killed-in-fighting-with-houthi- 879 org/monthly-forecast/2017-07/yemen_29.php (last accessed 8March 2018). 878 877 876 ‘Shalal’’, Mareb Press, 31May 2017, http://marebpress.net/mobile/news_details.php?sid=128573 (inArabic). 875 874 zeera.com/news/2017/05/gcc-rejects-formation-yemen-transitional-council-170513141733873.html. 873 www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/5/11/Yemens-third-government-emerges-in-southern-Yemen. 872 ident. presided overbyal-ZubaidihimselfwhereasHaniBinBraikservesashisVice-Pres- cil, effectivelycreatingathirdgovernmentinYemen.TheTransitionalCouncilis and socialfabric’. the formation of the council an act that ‘targets the country’s interests, its future goods importedintothecountry. outbreak asthecity’sportreceives70percentofhumanitarianaidandcommercial raising fearsofcatastrophichumanitarianconsequencesfamineandacholera the backdropofSaudi-ledcoalitionplanstolaunchanoffensiveonHodeida, as ‘evil’forhavingearlierdescribedthema‘militia’. in Sana’aon24AugustashowofforcedayafterHouthifightersdecriedhim tensions intheHouthi–Salehalliance.Salehhadralliedthousandsofsupporters left atleasttwopeopledeadandtookplaceagainstthebackgroundofmounting Saleh supportersandmaintainaunitedallianceagainsttheiropponents. released astatementthatstressedtheneedtohealriftbetweenHouthisand Hadi government. curity director,Salehal-Amri, and his deputy, al-Khader Kurdah, who supports the International Airportafterclasheseruptedbetweentheairport’sUAE-backedse- rying Saleh’ssonandHouthiforcesthatstoppeditatacheckpoint. On August2017,fightingbrokeoutinSana’aon26betweenaconvoycar- humanitarian supportandotheressentialsupplies. ing allYemen’sportsfunctioning,includingHodeidaport,asacriticallifelinefor UN SecurityCounciladoptedapresidentialstatementontheimportanceofkeep- ‘UAE tightens itscontrol onAden airportafter incidentsdescribed as“aplay” andhandsitover to B. Carpowich, C. Neafsey B.Carpowich, C. andM.Morton, ‘Gulf of Aden Security Review’, Critical Threats, 31August ‘GCC Rejects Formation of Yemen Transitional Council’, AlJazeera, 13May 2017, http://www.alja UNSC, Statement UNSC, by thePresident of theSecurity Council, UNdocS/PRST/2017/7, 15June2017. Ibid. S. Uqba, ‘Yemen’s “Third Government” Emerges in Southern Yemen’, Security Council Report, ‘July 2017 Monthly Forecast’, 30June2017, http://www.securitycouncilreport. Sana’aCenter for Strategic Studies, ‘Yemen attheUN’,supra fn869. M. Al Qalisi, ‘Pro-Saleh Colonel Killed in Fighting with Houthi Allies in Sanaa’, ‘HouthisandSalehForces ClashinSanaa,atLeast Two Dead’, Reuters, 26 August 2017, https:// 872 874 Challenged by the announcement, Hadi rejected the move and considered By31May,theUAEreportedlycametoexertindirectcontroloverAden 873 875 TheGCCbackedHadionhispositionandrejectedthemove

878

877 Thestatementcameagainst The New Arab , 11 May 2017, https:// 880 On31August,theGPC 876 On15June,the 879 The National, 26 Theincident 881

people nothavingaccesstoadequate water,sanitationorhygiene. Cholera flourishedamidstacollapsinghealthcaresystemand around16million famine. are estimatedtobeseverelyfoodinsecure,amongwhom7 millionarecloseto reached criticallevelsas17millionpeople(aroundtwo-thirds ofthepopulation) 885 884 883 EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21444&LangID=E (last accessed 8March 2018). Fishermen, Refugees, asYemen Conflict Reaches Two-Year Mark’,24 March 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/ 882 have beenkilledandanother8,272injuredbytheviolence. since thebeginningofYemeniconflictinMarch2015,at least4,773civilians The UNHighCommissionerforHumanRightsreportedon March2017,that Criminal Court. Yemen hassignedbutnotratifiedthe1998RomeStatute of theInternational flicts/non-international-armed-conflicts-in-yemen (lastaccessed23April2018). flicts inYemen’,lastupdated22March2018,http://www.rulac.org/browse/con key (last accessed 23 April 2018). See also RULAC, ‘Non-international Armed Con- news/rulac-updates-on-the-armed-conflicts-in-iraq-libya-syria-south-sudan-tur- ia, SouthSudan,Turkey,andYemen’,18February2018,http://www.rulac.org/ Updates ontheArmedConflictsinIraq,Libya, Syr- RULAC, ‘RULAC : Further reading : al-Qaeda intheArabianPeninsulamembers2017.’ In parallel,theUnitedStatessignificantlyexpandeditsairstrikesagainstsuspected Transitional Council/SouthernMovement. supported theHadigovernmentwhileUnitedArabEmiratesbackedSouthern consent oftheHadigovernmentsince2015.Duringrecentinfighting,SaudiArabia alition. TheSaudi-ledinternationalcoalitionhasbeeninterveninginYemenwiththe Movement brought to the forefront divergences within the Saudi-led international co- forces loyaltotheHadigovernmentandSouthernTransitionalCouncil/ had emergedin2007andallieditselfwiththeHadigovernment.Thefightingbetween and theSouthernTransitionalCouncil/Movement,aseparatistgroupthat January 2018, fighting erupted in Aden between forces loyal to the Hadi government Saleh waskilledduringthefightingbetweenformeralliesinSana’a.Second, First, inDecember2017,theHouthi-SalehalliancebrokedownandformerPresident the HouthisandinternationallyrecognizedgovernmentofPresidentHadi. of complexitytotheongoingnon-internationalarmedconflictsinYemenbetween tween alliestowardstheendof2017andbeginning2018addedadditionallayers According to the Rulac update in Februrary 2018,‘[d]ivisions and infighting be- since ledtoatleast1,740deathswithafurther320,000suspected choleracases. D. WAR CRIMES ALLEGATIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS UNSC, Security Council UNSC, Meeting, UNdoc S/PV.7999, 12July2017. Ibid. UNOffice of theHighCommissioner for HumanRights, ‘Over 100 CiviliansKilled inaMonth,Including Ibid,p4. 883 ThecountrywitnessedacholeraoutbreakinOctober2016, which has 882 Foodinsecurityhas 885 884

PART 2 : KEY DEVELOPMENTS OF SELECTED ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 157 THE WAR REPORT : ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2017 158 sees thecoalition’sairoperationsinYemen. France, aswellothercountries,arepresentatthejointheadquartersthatover- detainees are subjected to torture. The UAEwasalsoallegedtoberunningsecretdetentionfacilitiesinYemenwhere Houthi–Saleh allianceisalsobelievedtobeimplicatedinviolationsofIHL. 892 arms-dealers-making-a-killing-in-yemen. Arab, 19September 2017, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/9/19/exposed-frances- 891 sales-to-saudi-arabia-a-deadly-blow-to-yemeni-civilians/ (last accessed 8March 2018).. Civilians’, 10 July2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/court-ruling-over-uk-arms- 890 org.uk/campaigns/stop-arming-saudi/arms-sales (last accessed 8March 2018). 889 888 2017, https://apnews.com/4925f7f0fa654853bd6f2f57174179fe. 887 hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/yemen-no-accountability-war-crimes (last accessed 8March 2018). 886 mosques, inviolationofinternationalIHLrulesontheconducthostilities. unlawfully attackedhomes,markets,hospitals,schools,civilianbusinessesand aligned forcessinceMarch2015mightamounttowarcrimes,asthecoalitionhas men, supported by the US and UnitedKingdom,against Houthi forces and Saleh- According toHumanRightsWatch,Saudi-ledcoalitionmilitaryoperationsinYe- ment salestotheSaudi-ledcoalitionafterMarch2015. ing toSaudifighterpilotsinadditionsteppingupitsarmsandmilitaryequip- equipment despiteevidenceofrepeatedbreachesIHLbythecoalition. began inMarch2015,theUKhaslicensedover£3.3billionofarmsandmilitary to theSaudi-ledcoalitiononalargescale.Sincecoalition’smilitarycampaign The UK and France have also been supplying weapons and military equipment the HighCourtinLondonJuly2017. challenge totheUKGovernment’sarmssalesSaudiArabiawasdismissedby W. Mohamed and T. Fortin, ‘Exposed: France’s Arms Dealers Making a Killing in Yemen’, M.Michael,‘InYemen’s Secret Prisons, UAE Tortures andUSInterrogates’, Associated Press, 22June UNSC, Report UNSC, of thePanel of Experts,supra fn836, §30, fn836. UNSC, FinalReport UNSC, of thePanel of Experts,supra fn836, p3. Campaign Against ArmsTrade, ‘UKArmsSalesto Saudi Arabia’, 3February 2017, https://www.caat. Human Rights Watch, ‘Yemen: No Accountability for War Crimes’, 12 January 2017, https://www. Amnesty International, ‘Court Ruling over UK ArmsSalesto SaudiArabia a“Deadly Blow” to Yemeni 887 Similarly to the Saudi-led coalition, the 890 Francehasreportedlyprovidedtrain- 892 891 OfficersfromtheUKand 889 Alegal The New 888

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