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Home , Boko Haram, Boko Haram insurgency, Chibok, Damaturu, Maiduguri, Nigerian Armed Forces

Lessons From For Curtailing The Boko In

BY AFEIKHENA JEROME

igeria is a highly complex and ethnically diverse country, with over 400 ethnic groups. This diversity is played out in the way the country is bifurcated along the lines of reli- Ngion, language, culture, ethnicity and regional identity. The population of about 178.5 million people in 2014 is made up of and in equal measures of about 50 percent each, but including many who embrace traditional religions as well. The country has continued to experience serious and violent ethno-communal conflicts since independence in 1960, including the bloody and deadly thirty month fratricidal Civil (also known as the Nigerian-Biafran war, 1967-70) when the eastern region of declared its seces- sion and which claimed more than one million lives. The most prominent of these conflicts recently pitch Muslims against Christians in a dangerous convergence of religion, ethnicity and politics. The first and most dramatic eruption in a series of recent religious disturbances was the uprising in in December 1980, in which about 4,177 died. While the exact number of conflicts in Nigeria is unknown, because of a lack of reliable sta- tistical data, it is estimated that about 40 percent of all conflicts have taken place since the coun- try’s return to rule in 1999.1 The increasing wave of violent conflicts across Nigeria under the current democratic regime is no doubt partly a direct consequence of the activities of ethno- communal groups seeking self-determination in their “homelands,” and of their surrogate ethnic militias that have assumed prominence since the last quarter of 2000. Their grievances have typically found expression in bitter political complaints, sectarian crises stoked by political elites and incendiary media rhetoric, and violent . The latest among these violent and decimating sectarian grievances is the insur- gency. Boko Haram, a violent but diffuse Islamist sect, has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in recent years. It feeds on a narrative of historically

Afeikhena Jerome is Coordinator, State Peer Review Mechanism, Nigeria Governors Forum. The editorial assistance of Wendy Trott is gratefully acknowledged.

PRISM 5, no. 2 FEATURES | 95 JEROME deep-rooted resentment against, and ven- its most vulnerable state in decades. The geance for state in order to recruit numerical strength of FARC declined between members and sympathizers. With increasing 2002 and 2010 from 16,000 fighters to 8,000, regularity since 2009, the sect has attacked and 967 municipalities representing 88 per- Nigeria’s and , rival clerics, pol- cent of the country registered no terrorist iticians, schools, religious buildings, public attacks from FARC or other insurgent groups institutions, and . The brutal insurgent in 2013. have dropped by more activities of Boko Haram have included the than 90 percent since 2002, and the country bombing of the national police headquarters has been able to rein in narcotics trafficking to in June 2011; a attack on a United some extent. There are other successes too: in Nations building in in August 2011; the October 2012, the authorities began peace destruction of the Air Force Base in talks with FARC, which, if eventually success- in December 2013; and innumerable other ful, will put an end to one of the world’s lon- repeated attacks that have killed dozens of stu- gest conflicts; trade and the GDP are up; dents, burnt and devastated villages, and Medellín, the nation’s second-largest city, is destroyed infrastructure. Their grievances lauded as the “most innovative city in the against the police are particularly deep-seated world;” and Colombia is popping up on tour- as many of their followers are locked up in ist “top 10” lists everywhere. The country also police cells, and their late leader, Mohammad even made the final round at the 2014 Soccer Yusuf, was killed in police custody in 2009. World Cup. Boko Haram’s April 2014 abduction of This study investigates the useful lessons 276 schoolgirls from has attracted from Colombia’s experience in dealing with extensive international attention, thanks to the insurgency, especially with FARC, for Nigeria’s on-going global mobilization in this regard by on-going strategy to curtail the Boko Haram the #BringBackOurGirls social media campaign. insurgency, based on field study conducted in An ocean away, Colombia has come a the summer of 2014. long way in its half-century fight against insur- The of Boko Haram gency, drug trafficking, , and mur- der. The country entered the on The beginnings of the insurgent activities of the brink of becoming a failed state. By 2000, Boko Haram – often translated as “Western the Government of Colombia no longer had a education is forbidden” or, using its monopoly on the exercise of authority in a name Jama’atu Ahlis Lidda’awati wal- considerable area of Colombian territory, (People Committed to the Propagation where guerrillas and drug traffickers ruled of the ’s Teachings and Jihad)– in instead. After decades of bloody conflict, Nigeria date back to the early . It Colombia has begun in recent years to make emerged as a small, radical Sunni Islamic sect unprecedented strides in its war against insur- in the that worshipped at the al-Haji gency. The strength of the major insurgency Muhammadu Ndimi in Maiduguri, group, the 50-year-old Revolutionary Armed capital of . The group advocated a Forces of Colombia (FARC), once considered strict interpretation and implementation of the best-funded insurgency in the world, is at Islamic law for Nigeria. Its leader, Mohammed

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Yusuf, was a charismatic and popular Qur’anic political support for Sheriff if, upon becoming scholar who not only proselytized widely Governor, Sheriff would implement . throughout northern Nigeria but also assisted In fulfilment of this agreement, the state in the implementation of Sharia (Islamic law) government allegedly provided funds to Yusuf in several northern states in the early 2000s. through Buji Foi, a disciple of Yusuf whom The failure to achieve the expected full imple- Sheriff made religious affairs commissioner mentation of Sharia in northern Nigeria helps when he became Governor in 2003. Yusuf used explain some of the deep-rooted resentment the money to organize an informal micro- and anger of a considerable number of Muslim credit scheme that gave his disciples capital to youths at what they perceived as the govern- set up businesses. They in turn gave part of ment’s “deception” and “insincerity.” This their profits as alms to the group, which began resentment fueled their call for an authentic amassing arms, mostly Kalashnikovs from Islamist revolution.2 neighbouring . While the sect’s leadership did not ini- Cracks appeared in the purported Yusuf- tially engage in violence, its followers were Sheriff alliance, however, after the latter involved in periodic skirmishes with police reneged on his promise to implement Sharia during its formative years.3 At that time, the fully in the state. Yusuf began to direct ser- group’s activities were limited in scope and mons against Sheriff and his government, ulti- were contained within several highly impover- mately branding him an apostate. In 2007, ished states in the predominately Muslim Buji Foi resigned as religious affairs commis- North. sioner in protest. In 2003, Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia, osten- The year 2009 marked a turning point in sibly to study, but in reality to escape arrest Boko Haram’s transformation. In July 2009 at after the police had declared him wanted fol- least 700 people were killed during an attempt lowing incessant attacks and the burning down by Nigerian security forces to suppress the of some police stations by a more radical group. In the aftermath of the attempt, their splinter group of about 200 members led by leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in police and Aminu Tashen-Ilimi. custody. The group subsequently appeared to This group had split from the mainstream dissipate, but re-emerged a year later under movement in 2012 and settled in neighbour- new leadership. It orchestrated a large prison ing . Then Borno state deputy gover- break in September 2010 that freed hundreds, nor, Adamu Dibal, reportedly met Yusuf while including many of its members. Some Boko on and used contacts with the security Haram may have fled to insurgent agencies to obtain permission for him to training camps in the in 2009-2010. The return to Maiduguri. group has built ties with transnational extrem- Yusuf rose to much greater prominence ist groups in the region, which have reportedly when he reportedly formed an alliance with provided Boko Haram with insurgency train- , a politician and wealthy ing and increasingly sophisticated weaponry. businessman who became Governor of Borno Since 2011 Boko Haram attacks have featured State. Yusuf allegedly promised to deploy his improvised devices (IEDs), car influence and religious authority to provide , and, periodically, suicide attacks, but

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fighters also continue to inflict a heavy toll sustained . They are reported to be using using small arms and . armored vehicles, including tanks and heavy Boko Haram is not a monolithic organiza- , some stolen from the demoralized tion.4 It has several splinter groups, some of . which have formed alliances with foreign Boko Haram has erected flags over the Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the towns it has invaded, forcing any remaining Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab in residents to follow its strict version of sharia or , which have helped in bringing about be killed in what appears to be an imitation of the of its leadership. The num- the proclaimed in parts of and ber of Boko Haram fighters is estimated in the Syria by the . hundreds to low thousands and its organiza- More than 5,000 people are estimated to tional structure is often described as diffuse, have been killed in Boko Haram-related vio- and increasingly so since the of Yusuf. lence since 2009, including at least 2,000 in Boko Haram’s attacks have increased sub- the first half of 2014, making Boko Haram one stantially in frequency, reach, and lethality of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. since 2010, occurring almost daily in parts of Borno State has largely borne the brunt: it northeast Nigeria, and periodically beyond. accounts for 3,136 between 2006 and Their attacks were directed initially and pri- 2013, as shown in figure 1, followed by Yobe marily against state and federal targets, such as and Adamawa respectively. police stations, but they have also targeted and Nigerian officials report that more than six civilians in schools, churches, , mar- million Nigerians have been affected by the kets, bars, and villages. Cell phone towers and conflict between Boko Haram and Nigerian media outlets have also been attacked, for state authorities. By another account, more both tactical and ideological reasons. The than 650,000 people had fled the conflict zone group has assassinated local political leaders by August 2014, an increase of 200,000 since and moderate Muslim clerics. Its deadliest May 2014. Nigeria’s heavy-handed response to attacks include a coordinated series of - Boko Haram’s insurgent and terrorist opera- ings in Kano, northern Nigeria’s largest city tions has also taken a toll on civilians. that killed more than 180 people in January Responses to the Insurgency: Military 2012; an attack on the village of Benisheikh in September 2013 that killed more than 160 The has 130,000 civilians; and an assault on another north- active frontline personnel and 32,000 eastern village, , that may have killed reserve personnel, ranking it 47th in the more than 300 people in early May 2014. world in terms of conventional potential Since July 2014 the Boko Haram insur- strength.6 It is reputed to be well-versed gency has entered a dangerous new phase in in due to its wealth which the insurgents are beginning to operate of experience in operating in insurgency like a conventional army. In Borno, Adamawa, environments such as , and Yobe states the insurgents are now aggres- and the recent operations in , as well as sively challenging the Nigerian military successive participation in both the United through direct confrontation in open and Nations (UN) and (AU) led

98 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 LESSONS FROM COLOMBIA FOR FIGHTING THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA operations across the world. coordination and unity of direction, which are Since the in 1960, Nigeria considered essential for any counterinsurgency has contributed both military and police operation, although this has been limited. The personnel to more than 40 peacekeeping Nigerian parliament passed anti- leg- operations worldwide. By June 2013, about islation, originally introduced in 2011, in 2013. 5,000 officers and men of the Nigerian The law was designed, in part, to facilitate Armed Forces were serving in nine UN greater counterterrorism coordination, but PeacekeepingNigeria’s Interminable missions Insurgency?within and outsideAddressing theinteragency Boko Haram cooperation Crisis and information shar- Africa. ing remains limited by Nigeria’s federal struc- Nigeria’s major response to the insurgency ture, which has caused confusion between since 2010 has been the deployment of its Joint chief state security officers and federally-con- Task Force (JTF), consisting of the Army, Air trolled security forces. Force, Navy, State Security Services, and Police Nigerian JTF counterinsurgency opera- under unified command structures. It encour- tions in the northeast have been “generally agesMap 2:increased Boko Haram intelligence-sharing, attacks and violent deathsforce (2006–13)repressive,” relying heavily on military-led Chatham House CHAD 4 19 Sokoto YOBE 6

Birnin Kebbi KATSINA JIGAWA 295 3136 ZAMFARA 59 909 2 9 KANO 2 4 1 1 Kano KEBBI 36 445 Maiduguri

BORNO GOMBE Kaduna 12 316 Gombe Kainji Reservoir NIGER Bauchi ADAMAWA 19 55 6 41 4 76 14 129 CHAD

3 627 ABUJA Yola KWARA 7 67 PLATEAU FCT OYO NASSARAWA KOGI 2 7 EKITI Ado-Ekiti OSUN 2 14 TARABA 1 6 BENUE OGUN ONDO EDO Enugu Benin City Bight of Benin Asaba ANAMBRA EBONYI CROSS IMO ABIA DELTA RIVER Number of Number of deadly events 5 36 violent deaths Gulf of Guinea Yenagoa RIVERS AKWA National capital BAYELSA IBOM State capital

Bight of Bonny

5 FigureSource: Modified 1: Boko from Haram map by attacks Institut français and Violentde géopolitique; Deaths Nigeria (2006 Watch - data2013) (June 2006–October 2013).

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operations to kill and capture “scores” of Boko peacekeepers in the 1990s, who were effective Haram insurgents since the movement was in curbing ethnic bloodshed in Sierra Leone first brutally crushed in 2009.7 While this use and Liberia, those in Mali in 2013 lacked the of force has clearly enabled the JTF to pressure equipment and training needed to be of much Boko Haram strongholds in Borno, Yobe and help against al-Qaeda-linked forces. A recent Adamawa and reduce the scope of its activity, report by Chatham House points out that sol- it has also produced large-scale extrajudicial diers in the northeast are suffering from mal- killings, mass arrests and intimidation of civil- functioning equipment, low morale, deser- ians, who are treated as insurgent sympathiz- tions, and . Despite a large increase in ers. government spending on the army from a security budget totaling almost $5.8 billion, The JTF, augmented by “civilian vigilantes,” little of it has found its way to the front lines. has been implicated in extrajudicial killings Four hundred-eighty Nigerian soldiers were of militants and civilians, which may have alleged to have fled to Cameroon in August galvanized support for the insurgents. Such 2014, when they were confronted with supe- excesses have further alienated both the rior weapons in the hands of Boko Haram population and international observers. insurgents. In June 2014, ten generals and five other senior security were reportedly court martialed for arming and providing intelli- The JTF, augmented by “civilian vigilan- gence to the group, with 12 of them sentenced tes,” has been implicated in extrajudicial kill- to death in September 2014. ings of militants and civilians, which may have Civilians/Local Peoples galvanized support for the insurgents. Such excesses have further alienated both the popu- In response to escalated attacks, “Civilian lation and international observers. JTFs,” or Yan Gora (“those who hold the cane”) Several factors have constrained the comprising local militia, have also been Nigerian security force response, most notably formed by local communities in the areas security sector corruption and mismanage- affected by and under of the insurgency. ment. The $470 million Public Security Since June 2013, they have supported opera- Communications System (PSCS) project, initi- tions in Maiduguri and also serve as a source ated by the late President Umaru Yar’Adua’s of intelligence and a proxy force to avoid direct administration and handled by the Chinese confrontation with the sect. contractor ZTE Corporation for the installation Armed with machetes, axes, bows and of CCTV cameras in Abuja to detect or prevent arrows, clubs, swords and daggers, these crime, was poorly executed and has been aban- “Civilian JTFs” (CJTF) usually invade the doned. Nigerian troops are also not adequately homes of known and suspected Boko Haram resourced or equipped to counter the insur- members, hacking them to death or manhan- gency. A lack of investment in training, failure dling and then handing them over to the mil- to maintain equipment and dwindling coop- itary. eration with Western forces has damaged With their assistance, the security situation Nigeria’s armed services. Unlike Nigerian around Maiduguri has improved significantly.

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Their success in helping to drive many insur- approach was taken in the with the gents out of Maiduguri and largely stopping Niger Delta Amnesty Program that was used to Boko Haram killings and bombings in the city douse the insurgency in that region. is said to be at the cost of a proliferation of Recent presentations from the National violations. Security Adviser, , suggest that a shift may be taking place towards recognizing Political, Socio-Economic, and Diplomatic Response this, with the unveiling of a “soft approach” in the form of the March 2014 “Countering Since 2012, Nigeria has tried to address the ” program that outlined Boko Haram challenge on multiple fronts, plans for capacity-building and economic though these efforts have so far met with little development in the northeast, as well as for success. The first effort was an increase in the developing partnerships with faith groups and defense budget from N396.5 billion ($2.56 local stakeholders in a bid to co-opt these billion) in 2012 to N968.127 billion ($5.69 groups in a de-radicalization campaign. Not billion) in 2014. The justification for much of much has been heard in terms of its imple- this increase was to combat Boko Haram. In mentation. September 2014, the National Assembly International Response approved a $1bn external loan for the Federal Government to upgrade the equipment, train- The June 2014 Paris Conference deepened ing and logistics of the Armed Forces and secu- international support for Nigeria’s counterin- rity services in order to enable them to con- surgency campaign through an agreement by front the insurgents more forcefully. Other regional powers such as Cameroon, Chad, measures include strengthening anti-terrorism Niger, and Benin to share intelligence with legislation, boosting the capacities of the mil- Nigeria. The , , itary and other security agencies, exploring , and , having already provided dialogue with the insurgents, declaring a state counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, logistical of emergency in the Northeast and launching and capacity-building assistance in recent military offensives against the group. years, have increased support as part of the Political negotiations with Boko Haram effort to find the Chibok girls. It remains have largely been unsuccessful despite rap- unclear to what extent Nigerian officials are prochement overtures towards the Government cooperating with foreign advisers and experts. in 2011 and 2012. A major factor has been the The government has been criticized in domes- group’s unreasonable demands, including, for tic and international press reports for what has example, calls for the Islamization of Nigeria been widely perceived as a slow response to and President ’s conversion the abduction of the schoolgirls in April 2014, to . and to offers of international assistance in sup- The consensus among analysts is that the port of the investigation and possible rescue Government must attack the root causes of dis- efforts. Nigeria’s record of human rights affection that push unemployed youths abuses, combined with suspicions of mali- towards radicalization by Boko Haram, such cious Western intentions, has limited the scope as poverty and unemployment. A similar

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of future Western counterinsurgency support (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or beyond the Chibok search operation. FARC), and to a lesser degree, the National Liberation Army (ELN). This was a reaction to Colombia: A History of Violence factors such as the exclusion of political move- The deep divisions in Colombian politics that ments outside of the National Front, the mar- were to shape the country’s modern history ginalization of the rural poor, the influence of and development emerged shortly after inde- communist and socialist , and the pendence from in 1810, precipitating a ineffectiveness of the judicial system. These battle between the two dominant political par- groups took control of significant areas of the ties, the Conservatives (Partido Conservador country and ultimately fused with much of the Colombiano, or PCC) and the Liberals narco-trafficking community in widespread (Partido Liberal Colombiano, or PL). drug related violence that undermined the This intense rivalry between the conserva- legitimacy of state power, while pursuing their tives and the liberals continued throughout original vision of political revolution. the 19th and early 20th centuries and came to These problems mutated in various ways, a head in “La Violencia” (1948-1958), sparked but persisted for three decades such that by by the of a presidential hopeful, 1999 Colombia was a country in deep trouble Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a period during which an and on the precipice of being a failed state– its estimated 250,000 people lost their lives. This , kidnapping, and rates were marked the beginning of the current violent among the highest in the world and travel and internal armed conflict that has lasted for tourism were unsafe. The resultant insecurity more than half a century. had pushed the Colombian economy into Following bipartisan support of a blood- recession, and unemployment was moving less military coup in 1953 and the signing of above 15 percent. The “brain drain” and capi- a power sharing agreement in 1957, the tal flight that followed took a heavy toll on the National Front system emerged. Liberals and country’s stability. On the military side, whole conservatives agreed to alternate the presi- battalions of the Colombian army were being dency and apportion government positions.8 decimated in open combat. The military was The agreement excluded other political parties demoralized and, despite some very talented and was elite-controlled, catalyzing a new leadership, headed in the wrong direction. phase of violence where the state perpetrated Meanwhile, illegal right-wing armed groups massive atrocities against peasant farmers. The were committing and country then entered into a long period of with the same intensity as FARC had done, and intense crime and mayhem, characterized by very powerful international trafficking organi- drug lords controlling large swaths of the state, zations, such as the Medellin and Cali Cartels, and kidnapping and assassination on a scale penetrated and corrupted many government unprecedented anywhere else in the world. institutions and contributed to the overall cli- In the mid-1960s there was a blossoming mate of lawlessness. of insurgencies with the emergence of multiple Since then, however, the situation has dra- armed guerilla groups, most notably the matically improved. The major turning point Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Colombia was “Plan Colombia” that began

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during the presidency of Bill Clinton but was criminality and drug trafficking. Nonetheless, sustained and built upon by President George Colombia has several lessons for Nigeria in the W. Bush, followed by the election of President management of insurgency. Alvaro Uribe in 2002. Uribe also brought a level of focus to the Lessons from the Colombian Experience conflict that had never been previously seen, for Nigeria using his personality and energy to infuse a more intense and committed effort into the Strong, effective leadership is essential to security forces as well. He also expanded the success in asymmetric conflict size of the armed forces and tightened their links with local communities, which contrib- The tipping point between muddling through uted to the building of intelligence about the and moving toward victory in Colombia was enemy to make attacks more precise and effec- the election of leaders who translated bold tive. By the end of his tenure in 2010, war- vision into action since the beginning of related civilian death rates were down by half. Uribe’s administration in 2002. There is little Colombia was beginning to enjoy an eco- doubt that much of the progress in Colombia nomic renaissance made possible by greater is the direct product of exceptional leadership foreign investment and the return of many from 2002 to 2013. The philosophy of having businessmen and other economic leaders who a clear, , then holding people had fled the country.9 accountable down to the lowest level, has had Uribe’s defense minister, Juan Manuel a major impact in the current positive situa- Santos, became Colombia’s president in 2010. tion in Colombia. He continued many of his predecessor’s poli- Fixing the Army cies, but sought to change the narrative at a political level. He began to emphasize possible Colombia has been able to transform its army peace talks with the FARC and a post-conflict from an ineffective, garrison-bound band into vision for the country in general. This apparent an aggressive force that has crippled the FARC softening of the political leadership’s approach and ELN. Reform of Colombia’s army began to the war brought criticism from Uribe, but during Andrés Pastrana’s term as president did not lead to a diminution of the military (1998–2002) and accelerated during President effort by the Colombian Armed Forces under Álvaro Uribe’s tenure (2002–2010). In 1998, at the leadership of defense minister Juan Carlos the urging of U.S. officials, Pastrana replaced Pinzon, who continued to take the fight to the the top three leaders in the army with new enemy. Precise, intelligence-based attacks generals who were trained at U.S. military against high-value targets, implemented largely schools and who had extensive combat experi- by skilled commandos, have continued to be ence at the battalion and brigade levels. This the hallmarks of the recent approach. new trio then replaced subordinate command- However the job is not yet done. ers who lacked aggressiveness in the field. Colombia is still violent, and there is no peace Colombia also reorganized its army into deal yet with either the FARC or ELN. Large a mobile and highly skilled professional com- parts of the country remain vipers’ nests of ponent, and a conscript component formed

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for local security. The professional component balanced with a population-centric approach of the army established numerous air-mobile, for maximum effect and legitimacy.10 ranger, mountain warfare, counter-drug, and Wage war on corruption as a priority Special Forces battalions. These units improved the army’s overall effectiveness by specializing In Colombia, frustration with inequality and in specific tasks. To overcome Colombia’s corruption created the spark that set off larger mountainous and forested terrain, the army anti-government movements such as the FARC. also invested heavily in equipment such that To be legitimate in the eyes of the people, gov- the Colombian army currently operates the ernance has to be even-handed, relatively world’s third-largest fleet of UH-60 Blackhawk transparent, oriented toward human rights, assault helicopters. and free of corruption. The military, under its reform-minded Over the past few years, the apprehension, leadership, is also adapting to new changes prosecution, and conviction of military mem- such as respect for human rights. It has consis- bers for human rights abuses and reporting tently emerged in Colombian polls as one of “false guerrillas” in order to cover up extraju- the most respected institutions in the country. dicial killings also showed the public that offi- cials would be held accountable. The philosophy of having a clear, grand Financing Counter-Insurgency strategy, then holding people accountable down Colombia has no doubt shown the way for- to the lowest level, has had a major impact in ward with regard to the financing of counter- the current positive situation in Colombia. insurgencies. It successfully put the burden of expanding the state presence of security opera- tions across the territory on the shoulders of Abandon the conventional military-centric the wealthiest members of society. This was approach accomplished by using special powers granted to the government during an emergency situa- There are no purely military solutions to pull- tion to establish a wealth tax (Impuesto al ing a nation or region out of the death spiral Patrimonio), popularly known as the War Tax. of violent extremism. As the Colombian expe- The first of such taxes was collected on a one- rience demonstrates, there is a need to aban- off basis in 2002 and yielded five percent of don the conventional military-centric government revenue or one percent of GDP. A approach as the one and only option for insur- total of 420,000 taxpayers contributed in that gency and other asymmetric conflicts. While year, of which 120,000 were high-income indi- not ignoring the importance of using military viduals.11 Started in 2004, the War Tax was force, stability, political-economic-social devel- extended through 2011, however payments will opment, rule of law, popular well-being, and continue through 2014 in the form of a surtax sustainable peace all depend on effective and on the tax due in 2011. legitimate control of the national territory. The proceeds were entirely earmarked for Thus, a military-centric approach must be security and managed by an Ethics and Transparency Commission, including 12

104 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 LESSONS FROM COLOMBIA FOR FIGHTING THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA members from the private sector. It is esti- Notes mated that the tax raked in over $800 million a year, allowing Colombia to modernize its * In the print version of this issue the material at military. endnotes 9 and 10 was inadvertently not attributed to the appropriate sources. The Editor regrets this oversight. Conclusion 1 Salawu, B. “Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New The Boko Haram insurgency has no doubt Management Strategies”, European Journal of Social become Nigeria’s albatross. Unless it is skill- Sciences – Volume 13, Number 3 (2010) pp. 345-353. 2 fully managed, it may become an indetermi- International Crisis Group, ‘‘Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency’’. Africa nate war and a threat to Nigeria’s fragile Report N°216, 3 April 2014. democracy. Disparate as the two countries may 3 Blanchard, L. P., ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram: seem to be on the surface, Nigeria has much to frequently asked questions’, Congressional Research Service, June 2014. http://fas.org. learn from Colombia in dealing with the Boko 4 Pérouse de Montclos, A. ‘’Nigeria’s Haram insurgency. In a globalized world, Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram surely lessons on governance and peace-build- Crisis’’. Chatham House, 02 September 2014. 5 ing should find no barriers.PRISM Pérouse de Montclos, A. ‘’Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis’’. Op. Cited. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140901BokoHaramPero usedeMontclos_0.pdf 6 A total of 106 Countries were evaluated. For more details, see Global Firepower, Available at http:// www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail. asp?country_id=nigeria, Accessed 13th September 2014. 7 See Alam Waterman, “Unravel the scourge of this evil:” Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram, Discussion Paper, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, August 2014 for an excellent account of Nigeria’s response to Boko Haram. 8 Metelits, C. Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behaviour. (New York University Press, New York), 2000. 9 O’Hanlon, Michael E. and Petraeus, David, “The Success Story in Colombia,” The Brookings Institution, 24 September 2015. http://www.brookings. edu/research/opinions/2013/09/24-colombia-success-ohanlon- petraeus 10 Manwaring, Max, “Translating Lessons Learned in Colombia and Other Among the People: Confronting the Spectrum of 21st Century Conflict,” Small Wars Journal, 27 August 2013. http:// smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/translating-lessons-learned-in- colombia-and-other-wars-among-the-people-confronting-the- spe 11 Flores-Macias, G.A. “Financing Security through Elite Taxation: The Case of Colombia’s Soldier transporting munitions during the ‘Democratic Security Taxes’.” Working Paper No. Nigerian-Biafran War 3.Brighton: International Center for Tax and Development (ICTD), 2012.

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Villagers collecting firewood in Basankusu, DRC

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