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Breaking Boko Haram and Ramping up Recovery: US-Lake Chad Region 2013-2016

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Breaking Boko Haram and Ramping up Recovery: US-Lake Chad Region 2013-2016 From Pariah to Partner: The US Integrated Reform Mission in Burma, 2009 to 2015 Breaking Boko Haram and Ramping Up Recovery Making Peace Possible US Engagement in the Lake Chad Region 2301 Constitution Avenue NW 2013 to 2016 Washington, DC 20037 202.457.1700 Beth Ellen Cole, Alexa Courtney, www.USIP.org Making Peace Possible Erica Kaster, and Noah Sheinbaum @usip 2 Looking for Justice ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This case study is the product of an extensive nine- month study that included a detailed literature review, stakeholder consultations in and outside of government, workshops, and a senior validation session. The project team is humbled by the commitment and sacrifices made by the men and women who serve the United States and its interests at home and abroad in some of the most challenging environments imaginable, furthering the national security objectives discussed herein. This project owes a significant debt of gratitude to all those who contributed to the case study process by recommending literature, participating in workshops, sharing reflections in interviews, and offering feedback on drafts of this docu- ment. The stories and lessons described in this document are dedicated to them. Thank you to the leadership of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and its Center for Applied Conflict Transformation for supporting this study. Special thanks also to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) for assisting with the production of various maps and graphics within this report. Any errors or omis- sions are the responsibility of the authors alone. ABOUT THE AUTHORS This case study was produced by a team led by Beth ABOUT THE INSTITUTE Ellen Cole, special adviser for violent extremism, conflict, and fragility at USIP, with Alexa Courtney, Erica Kaster, The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan and Noah Sheinbaum of Frontier Design Group. Alexa institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to and Noah previously directed the USIP-supported Fragility help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict Study Group. Alexa has worked in USAID’s Office of peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and Conflict Mitigation and Management, and Erica formerly intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering served with USAID/OTI and the State Department’s others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Noah’s involvement in conflict zones around the globe. work in the private sector brought additional insight into Chairman of the Board: Steven J. Hadley the project. Vice Chairman: George E. Moose President: Nancy Lindborg Chief Financial Officer: Joe Lataille BOARD OF DIRECTORS Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, D.C.• George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • Cover map: USAID/OTI Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, Former The views expressed in this report are those of the Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the N.Y. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, views of the United States Institute of Peace. Fairfax, Va. • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil United States Institute of Peace and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 MEMBERS EX OFFICIO Fax: 202.429.6063 Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State • James Mattis, Secretary of Defense E-mail: [email protected] • Frederick M. Padilla, Major General, Marine Corps; President, National Web: www.usip.org Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, © 2017 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 5 CONTENTS SEPTEMBER 2017 Executive Summary ... 3 Glossary of Terms ... 5 Foreword: Who Should Read This Case Study and Why? ... 6 About This rojectP ... 7 Methodology ... 8 BREAKING BOKO HARAM AND RAMPING UP RECOVERY: US ENGAGEMENT IN THE LCR, 2013 TO 2016 ... 9 Lake Chad Region: Understanding the Complex Crisis The Backdrop of Complexity ... 9 Complex Environment in the Lake Chad Region ... 11 Water Crisis and Related Human Insecurity ... 11 State Fragility: A Frayed Relationship Between State and Citizen ... 11 Violent Conflict Fueled by Violent Extremist Organizations and Regional Upheaval ... 13 Displacement and Refugee Populations ... 14 Poor Regional Problem Solving: The Absence of Political Will, Capability, and Regional Cooperation ... 14 ... 14 The United States in the LCR: Key Objectives and Accomplishments Introduction: The Fight Against Boko Haram ... 14 The Case for Engagement ... 15 Goals for Engagement ... 17 Early Days: Nigeria Fails to Stem BH Alone, 2011 ... 17 Pivot Point: BH Abducts Schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria, April 2014 ... 21 Pivot Point: Regional Coordination Begins in Earnest, October 2014 ... 22 Pivot Point: Nigeria Elects President Muhammadu Buhari and Gets Serious in the Fight Against BH, March 2015 ... 23 Pivot Point: Multinational Joint Task Force Launches Offensive Against BH, March 2016 ... 26 Unpacking the “How”: ... 29 Differentiating Elements of US Efforts in the LCR Bilateral Approaches to Meeting Country-Specific Challenges to Stemming Crisis ... 30 Overview ... 30 Key Bilateral Elements of the Effort to Stem the LCR Crisis ... 30 Stitching Together Bilateral Approaches to Stem a Regional Crisis Holistically ... 35 Overview ... 35 Elements of the Holistic Approach to Stemming Crisis in the LCR ... 36 Crosscutting Lessons in 3D Engagement: ... Reflections and Conclusions 40 ... 43 Annex: Active US Programs for the LCB Response (USAID) ... Notes 44 2 USIP.ORG EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary This is one of three case studies that the US Institute of Peace (USIP) developed to explore how the US Defense, Development, and Diplomatic (3D) communities can effectively collaborate and coordinate to respond to complex crises in fragile states. The case studies document efforts and draw lessons from where US government leaders believe deepening crises were staved off through collaborative inter-agency engagement. Case Background The Lake Chad region (LCR) is an example of a region in which violent extremist activity has arisen from and exacerbated an environment of resource shortage and underlying state fragility. The extremist activity spurred a cross-border security and humanitarian crisis that existing regional cooperation mechanisms were unprepared to address. Originally an Islamist criminal group in northeastern Nigeria, Boko Haram (BH) acquired new leadership that began in 2009 to take the group down a violent extremist path. BH rapidly amplified the lethality and frequency of its attacks on govern- ment and civilian targets in Nigeria, while recruiting from marginalized, exploited, and impoverished populations across the region. BH withstood the Nigerian authorities’ poorly planned, poorly resourced, and half-hearted attempts to beat it back. By 2013, BH had conducted hundreds of attacks and killed thousands. Hundreds of thousands of civilians fled to safer communi- ties within Nigeria and to nearby Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, even though BH mounted cross-border attacks. LCR countries’ security forces played a cross-border cat-and-mouse game that kept BH on the run but failed to degrade the group until regional cooperation drove BH from captured territory in 2015. The Complex Crisis US Objectives Applicability of Lessons The crisis was shaped by the following The United States focused on three Lessons from the LCR may best apply to interacting challenges: objectives: circumstances in which: • Water crisis and related human • Degrade and defeat BH so that it is • A subnational VEO is growing in one insecurity no longer a threat to the region or more fragile states • State fragility: a frayed relationship • Mitigate BH’s impact on the people • A crisis in one country threatens to between government and citizens of the region destabilize a region • Violent conflict fueled by violent • Address the underlying conditions • The region has the will to address a extremist organizations (VEOs) and that gave rise to BH cross-border threat regional upheaval • Military action alone cannot • Displacement and refugee definitively end a security crisis populations • Mutually reinforcing regional and • Poor regional problem-solving bilateral approaches are necessary to capabilities stem a crisis The US Defense, Development, and Diplomatic Response The United States took special note of BH in 2011, concerned that the group would converge or cooperate with al-Qaeda
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