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and Security in West and the

Towards Peaceful Coexistence

UNOWAS STUDY

1 2 Pastoralism and Security in and the Sahel

Towards Peaceful Coexistence

UNOWAS STUDY August 2018

3 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations p.8 Chapter 3: THE REPUBLIC OF p.39-48 Acknowledgements p.9 Introduction Foreword p.10 a. Pastoralism and UNOWAS Mandate p.11 Pastoral Transhumance Methodology and Unit of Analysis of the b. Challenges facing pastoralists Study p.11 A weak state with institutional constraints Executive Summaryp.12 Reduced access to pasture and water Introductionp.19 c. Security challenges and the causes and Pastoralism and Transhumance p.21 drivers of conflict Rebellion, terrorism, and the Malian state Chapter 1: p.23-30 Communal violence and farmer-herder Introduction conflicts a. Pastoralism, transhumance and d. Conflict prevention and resolution migration Recommendations b. Challenges facing pastoralists Loss of pasture land and blockage of Chapter 4: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF transhumance routes p.49-57 Political (under-)representation and Introduction passivity a. Pastoralism and transhumance in Climate change and adaptation Mauritania Veterinary services b. Challenges facing pastoralists Water scarcity c. Security challenges and the causes and Shortages of pasture and animal feed in the drivers of conflict dry season Farmer-herder relations Challenges relating to cross-border rustling transhumance: The spread of terrorism to Burkina Faso Mauritania-Mali d. Conflict prevention and resolution Pastoralists and guards in Mali Recommendations Mauritania- c. Security challenges and the causes and Chapter 2: THE REPUBLIC OF p.31- drivers of conflict 38 The terrorist threat Introduction Armed robbery a. Pastoralism and transhumance in Guinea Farmer-herder relations b. Challenges facing pastoralists in Guinea d. Conflict prevention and resolution Blockage of transhumance routes Recommendations Water shortages Cattle theft Chapter 5: THE REPUBLIC OF p.58- Veterinary services in Guinea 66 Dairy production Introduction c. Security challenges and the causes and a. Pastoralism and transhumance drivers of conflict b. Challenges facing pastoralists Farmer-herder relations Loss of pasture and blockage of d. Conflict prevention and resolution transhumance routes Conflict management committees Depletion of Recommendations Insufficient animal feed in the dry season

5 Access to education and health services c. Security challenges and the causes and drivers of conflict Insurgency and cross-border attacks Cattle rustling, banditry and conflicts between pastoralists Farmer-herder conflicts in Niger and during international transhumance d. Conflict prevention and resolution Recommendations

Chapter 6: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF p.67-83 Introduction a. Pastoralism and transhumance in Nigeria Fulani and non-Fulani pastoralists Migratory trends Pastoral lifestyles Transhumance patterns b. Challenges facing pastoralists Blocked transhumance routes and loss of grazing reserves Banditry and cattle rustling The Boko Haram insurgency and the Lake Basin Social problems c. Security challenges and causes and drivers of conflict d. Conflict prevention and resolution Responses to herder-farmer conflicts at the federal and state levels: Federal responses State responses UN Responses Recommendations

Overall Recommendations p.85 Bibliography and Further Reading p.88

6 List of Maps

Figure 1: Transhumance Patterns in West Africa and the Sahel Figure 2: Map of Burkina Faso Figure 3: Map of Guinea Figure 4: Map of Mali Figure 5: Eco-climatic zones in Mali and area of the Inner Figure 6: Map of Mauritania Figure 7: Map of Niger Figure 8: The main eco-climatic zones in Niger Figure 9: Map of Nigeria

7 ABBREVIATIONS

APESS - Association pour la promotion de l’Élevage au Sahel et en Savane CFA – West African Franc (XOF); (30/1/2018: US$1 = CFA 529 / EUR1 = CFA 655) CVD - Conseil Villageois de Développement (Village Development Council) CILSS - Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States FAO – United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation FARS - Forces armées révolutionnaires du FDR - Front démocratique révolutionnaire FDS – Forces de Défense et de Sécurité GDP – Gross Domestic Product GNAP - Federation of Cooperative Pastoral Associations in Mauritania IDP – Internally Displaced Person LGA – Local Government Area DFID – UK Department for International Development MNLA – The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MUJAO - The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa PRAPS - Projet Régional d’Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel (Regional Project to Support Pastoralism in the Sahel) - World Bank-funded, ECOWAS-WAEMU led project with CILSS coordination. RECOPA - Communication Network on Pastoralism UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNOWAS – United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This Study has been prepared by UNOWAS’ Research and Analysis Unit based on field work conducted by Dr. Adam Higazi (affiliated with the University of Amsterdam and MAUTECH, Yola, Nigeria) together with Mr. Shidiki Abubakar Ali (University of , ). For the six countries covered in this Study, UNOWAS wishes to thank national and local administrations and ministries; national pastoralists’ and farmers’ associations; UN Country Teams in West Africa; civil society organizations, think tanks and other external partners. We are grateful for the in-depth knowledge and guidance shared by FAO, MINUSMA’s Joint Mission Analysis Centre, UN Country Team/Nigeria, UNDSS, UNESCO, UNOWAS’ Liaison Cell in , UN Women, the World Bank, Le Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), the regional center of AGRHYMET (a specialized agency of CILSS), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the International Crisis Group (ICG). Special thanks to the ECOWAS Commission, particularly the Department of , Environment and Water Resources, and the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security. The following colleagues reviewed and commented on several drafts of the Study. We are especially grateful for their insights and support. Dr. Vivian Iwar (ECOWAS Commission) Dr. Roger Blench (Cambridge University) Dr. Philippe Frowd (University of York) Dr. Penda Diallo (Exeter University) Mr. Christian Berger and Ms. Catalina Quintero (PRAPS-World Bank) Mr. Koffi Alinon (CILSS-Ouagadougou) Mr. Abdourahmane Ndiaye and Mr. Patrick Smith (USAID-Dakar) Dr. Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni (ISS-Dakar) Mr. Malick Faye (FAO-Dakar) Mr. Philippe Prevost (JMAC MINUSMA) Ms. Akemi Yonemura (UNESCO – Dakar) Ms. Salamatu Kemokai (UN Women – Abuja) UNOWAS, Dakar

9 FOREWORD Recent years have witnessed an increase in violent conflicts involving pastoralists in parts of West Africa and the Sahel. They often take the form of clashes between herders and farmers, impacting human, national and regional security. As such, they are of increasing concern to ECOWAS and its Member States. UNOWAS has been working closely with ECOWAS during the past year to examine the causes and possible solutions to pastoralism-related conflicts. UNOWAS Study on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel confirms that growing competition between herders and farmers over access to water and pasture is a primary driver of these conflicts. This tension is often aggravated by a weak enforcement of the rule of law, political manipulation, demographic pressure, climate change, and the prevalence of weapons in the region. The Study recognizes two main areas of response. First, urgent action is needed to resolve conflict in countries currently experiencing high levels of violence between herders and farmers. Secondly, sustained conflict prevention efforts are needed to stop violence from taking root elsewhere in region. Some ECOWAS countries have developed strong pastoral codes and local mechanisms to resolve disputes through dialogue and mutual arrangements. There is therefore good practice to draw from in terms of conflict prevention and peaceful coexistence, and we must capitalize on these lessons. The Study emphasizes the importance of engaging affected communities, including women and youth, in finding sustainable solutions. It stresses the need to review, amend and implement national and regional laws relating to transhumance - and to support initiatives that promote peaceful co-existence among all populations: pastoralists and farmers and other groups throughout the region. At the regional level, ECOWAS is an essential partner for this purpose. UNOWAS is committed, together with the UN system in the region, to support ECOWAS and national governments in these efforts.

Mohamed Ibn Chambas UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel

10 UNOWAS MANDATE The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) works to enhance the contributions of the United Nations towards the achievement of peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, promoting an integrated regional approach to addressing issues that impact stability in the region. METHODOLOGY AND UNIT OF ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY UNOWAS Study on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel is based on field research in six countries: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria. In each country, interviews were conducted with pastoralists, farmers, other members of communities, government and non-government officials, at both the local and national level. The Study focuses on pastoralism as the main unit of analysis, attempting to understand why conflicts involving pastoralists appear to have escalated in the region in recent years. What are the causes and drivers of these conflicts and how can they be resolved?

11 Executive Summary

UNOWAS Study on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel

Violent conflicts involving pastoralists1 have increased in West Africa and the Sahel, but not uniformly

1. Violent conflicts involving pastoralists scale and frequency of farmer-herder have escalated in parts of West Africa conflicts varies greatly between and and the Sahel in recent years, claiming within West African states. Violent con- thousands of lives across the region. flicts often occur at known flashpoints, These conflicts are primarily driven by a in zones of insecurity (e.g. parts of Ni- competition for land, water and forage, geria and Mali). However, in many other but there are also political and socio- areas, farmers and pastoralists manage economic factors involved. The main is- their relationship peacefully and mutu- sue is about how these natural resourc- ally benefit from economic exchange es are managed and allocated. Pastoral- and cooperation. ists are both victims and actors in these conflicts. These conflicts mainly occur between farmers and pastoralists, but they can also occur between pastoralist Addressing pastoralist-related conflicts groups themselves, or involve other ac- from a prevention perspective tors such as fishermen and illegal min- 3. The main aim of this UNOWAS Study ers. As pastoralists are mobile, these on Pastoralism and Security in West conflicts can be difficult to contain and Africa and the Sahel is to assess the spill across borders. causes and drivers of conflicts involving 2. Although the general trend is of in- pastoralists, and to recommend conflict creasing violence, especially between prevention strategies. A clear under- pastoralists and farmers, this does not standing of issues surrounding pasto- apply to all ECOWAS countries. The ralism and security at the national and

1 Pastoralism refers to extensive livestock breeding, which in West Africa means different breeds of cattle, , , and camels, depending on the ecological zone. Pastoralism generally requires some form of mobility of herders and their animals, often on a seasonal basis between dry and rainy seasons, and day-to-day between pastures and water points. The migration of pastoralists and their livestock between seasonal pastures is called transhumance. There is a diversity of pastoralists in West Africa; they are not homogeneous. Patterns of life among pastoralists range from nomadic and transhumant pastoralism to settled or semi-settled agro-pastoralism. Agro-pastoralism combines farm- ing and livestock breeding and requires settlement to cultivate crops, but the mobility of livestock for transhumance is maintained.

12 regional levels is needed to promote sible poaching of wildlife, is another is- effective public policies and impartial sue identified. In agro-pastoral areas – media reporting. where pastoralism and farming co-exist - transhumance is meant to occur along routes or cattle tracks defined decades Pastoralism and transhumance ago. However, maintenance of these traditional routes is now challenged by 4. Pastoralists rear livestock not only land use and population growth. Where as a main economic activity but also transhumance routes are blocked, the as an intrinsic part of their culture.2 movement of livestock is curtailed and In West Africa, the largest pastoralist encroachment onto farms often results, group are the Fulani, a diverse popula- triggering conflict. tion that is spread across the savanna and Sahel and increasingly the humid zone. The contribution of pastoralism Causes and drivers of pastoralist- to West African economies and to the related conflicts agrarian sector is considerable. Pastoral lifestyles vary, from who have 6. Growing demographic and ecologi- no permanent abode and migrate with cal pressures are regional phenomena. their families and herds, to settled agro- The area of land under cultivation in pastoralists who have houses and farms West Africa and the Sahel has dramati- but move their herds between grazing cally increased over time, while avail- areas to access patchy resources. able grazing land has decreased. This is partly because pastoralists rarely own 5. Transhumance - the movement of land on an individual or collective basis, herders and their livestock from areas but instead rely on access to pasture of scarcity to available pasture and wa- and water as common resources, in ter, usually on a seasonal basis - is par- agreement with local communities. As ticularly important for those with larger demographic pressure increases, and herds of livestock. In West Africa, cross- without good management of these re- border transhumance is regulated by sources, competition between herders the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance and farmers over access to water and (1998). This Protocol recognizes the pasture has intensified. The ability of importance of cross-border pastoral pastoralists to adapt to these challeng- mobility and aims to reduce problems es is also compromised by weak state that can arise when livestock are on the engagement, insecurity, and often lim- move, including farmer-herder conflicts ited rights to access natural resources. and the spread of animal diseases (epi- zootics). Encroachment into protected 7. Climate change and acute variability areas such as national parks, and pos- and unpredictability in rainfall patterns also exerts pressure on pastoralists in 2 They rear different breeds of cattle, sheep, West Africa and the Sahel. In most of goats, and camels, depending on the ecological the countries under review, pastoral- zone, and own much of the region’s livestock.

13 ists and farmers reported that climatic Refugees (UNHCR) notes increasing conditions have become more adverse. and significant population displace- Typically, this equates with a longer dry ment in the region caused by herder- season and a shorter rainy season. Even farmer clashes, including refugees and where the total volume of rainfall has internally displaced persons (IDPs).3 not decreased, it fluctuates more year Boko Haram has been attacking and on year and can come in short bursts raiding pastoralists and farmers in the (which can cause flash floods) rather Basin, stealing livestock and than steadily throughout the season. crops, killing and displacing people. The The fluctuation in rainfall, with greater relationship between pastoralists and annual variability over the past decade, terrorist groups in Mali and some bor- is confirmed by scientific data on the dering areas of Burkina Faso and Niger Sahel. Pastoralists and farmers need varies depending on the group. There support to maximize adaptation and has been some recruitment among resilience. pastoralists into jihadi groups in Mali, allegedly for self-defense against other 8. Increased use of firearms has inten- armed groups. sified rural conflicts. This is particularly the case where farmer-herder conflicts 10. Local and national politics have a occur on top of other conflicts, where strong influence on the frequency and they are compounded by the prevail- scale of conflicts involving pastoralists. ing insecurity. This has happened in Where the state tries to accommodate rural areas that have been destabilized the interests and needs of both farmers by insurgency, war, political or ethnic and pastoralists, conflict is less likely violence, or banditry. In such situations to occur. If the state shows a strong state authority is usually weak, dis- bias towards one group and fails to pute resolution mechanisms may have be inclusive, or if it neglects all or broken down, and weapons are read- one section of the rural population, ily available. Examples are central and conflicts are more likely to emerge. northern Mali, where armed groups ‘Land grabs’ by powerful political have gained access to Libyan weaponry or business elites often negatively after the overthrow of President Gad- impact both pastoralists and farmers. dafi in 2011, and in parts of central and The introduction of national pastoral northern Nigeria. The proliferation of codes has helped address this small arms is a regional issue, which has challenge in some countries in the made traditional conflicts deadlier, fu- region (e.g. enshrining the rights and eling cycles of revenge killings between responsibilities of pastoralists in law). communities. 3 According to information received from 9. Violent extremists and other armed UNHCR’s regional office based in Dakar (August groups operating in parts of the Sahel 2018): it is estimated that 62,000 persons were and West Africa have added to the dis- internally displaced in Nigeria in 2017 as a result of farmer-herder conflicts, and 3000 persons in ruption of traditional pastoralism. The the northern part of (country) in June/July United Nations High Commissioner for 2018 for the same reasons.

14 11. Over the last years, Nigeria has 12. In Mali, insurgency and lawless- had more fatalities in farmer-herder ness have pushed more pastoralists conflicts than the rest of the ECOWAS south of the , and conflicts region combined. However, not all in northern Mali and the Inner Niger states are affected, and there are sharp Delta have increased tensions between contrasts even between neighboring farmers and herders. Pastoralists are states (eg. Sokoto and Zamfara, Gombe both affected by and implicated in and Taraba). In the most affected armed groups, with potential regional areas, violence often extends beyond outreach. Cross-border attacks and clashes between individual herders banditry are common from the and crop farmers and engulfs whole region, northern Mali, into Tillabéri in settlements and communities. The Niger. In the Lake Chad Basin, farmer- proliferation of small arms and light herder conflicts have been aggravated weapons has amplified the number by population displacements due the of casualties. Their cumulative death Boko Haram insurgency. There are also toll currently runs into thousands each seasonal conflicts between farmers and year in Nigeria, and curbing widespread pastoralists in different parts of the impunity remains a challenge. Beyond agro-pastoral zone in Niger and cases heightened competition for rural of disputes between pastoralist groups resources and space, the situation is in dryland areas. aggravated by local politics, frequently along ethno-religious lines. Increased 13. Conversely, in Mauritania, Guinea southward movement of pastoralists and most of Burkina Faso, violent con- from northern Nigeria to the southeast flicts between farmers and herders are and southwest of the country has less pronounced, but tensions do exist. fueled new waves of clashes between In these countries, and also in Niger, predominantly Muslim pastoralists and there are local conflict management Christian farmers.4 committees comprised of pastoralists and farmers, traditional leaders, and sometimes state authorities. Such com- 4 In recent years, pastoralists in Nigeria have mittees do exist in parts of Nigeria but increasingly been migrating permanently or on seem less frequent. Niger and Burkina seasonal transhumance southward from north- local conven- ern states in search of more favourable grazing Faso have also drawn up conditions. This has increased pressure on farm- tions, which stipulate the rights and ers not only in the but also in places responsibilities of farmers and pasto- in southeast and southwest Nigeria, which previ- ralists and establish mutually-agreed ously had low populations of pastoralists. Deadly confrontations have ensued between herdsmen enforcement procedures, that are sanc- and farmers when animals trespass on farmland. tioned by local state authorities. All this Tensions are further reinforced by differences in is helping to promote conflict preven- ethnicity, culture and religion: the Fulani herders tion, mediation and resolution,- ensur are Muslim while the populations in the South and in the Middle Belt are majority Christian. ing that farmland and pastureland are States and judicial authorities have been slow both protected. in mediating and resolving disputes before they spiral out of control.

15 national transhumance protocols, should be reviewed, updated and Towards peaceful coexistence and enforced. A regional communications conflict prevention strategy is needed to raise awareness about herder-farmer relations 14. Conflicts between herders and and ways to promote peaceful co- farmers are of increasing concern to existence. Concrete actions to prevent ECOWAS Member States. They have a human rights abuses and promote devastating impact on human, national justice should be taken. The role and and regional security. They destroy participation of women and youth as the economic and social fabric of peacebuilders should be strengthened. rural communities - and compromise Finally, longer-term strategies should traditional governance and dispute be devised to address the effects of resolution mechanisms. Coupled with climate change on pastoralists and other phenomena such as violent farmers. Conflict resolution committees extremism, traditional ways of life are could be formalized and supported being threatened. The fate of farmers at local levels in all ECOWAS Member and herders who have fled violence States. Lessons learned could be drawn as refugees or displaced people is from those countries, such as Guinea, also a cause for concern, in the Lake Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal, which Chad Basin and Mali among other already have such committees in place. places. Food insecurity on the heels of new droughts in the Sahel further 16. Above all, conflict prevention aggravates the situation. In response to measures should be developed in the latter, the UN System is scaling up close consultation with pastoralists its effort to cover food needs and build and farmers and strive to protect the 5 resilience for those most affected. livelihoods of both. UN and non-UN Conflicts between pastoralists and partners have an important role to play farmers are thus closely intertwined to accompany ECOWAS and national with multiple other security, economic, governments in these efforts. environmental and political factors that impact both groups.

15. Going forward, more attention is needed on issues relating to land rights and natural resource management. The 1998 ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance, along with existing

5 https://www.devex.com/news/nexus-of- climate-and-conflict-exacerbates-sahel-food- security-crisis-93160 http://www.fao.org/africa/news/detail-news/ en/c/1128039/

16 Figure 1: Transhumance Patterns in West Africa

17 18 INTRODUCTION

West Africa and the Sahel region is ex- Although the general trend is of in- periencing a surge in violent conflicts creased conflict, between pastoralists between pastoralists and farmers. and farmers, this does not apply in all These conflicts are primarily driven by ECOWAS countries. The scale and fre- competition for land, water, and- for quency of farmer-herder conflicts var- age, but there are also political and ies greatly between and within West socio-economic factors involved, as the African states. Nigeria and Mali are main issue is about how these essential currently the most severely affected, natural resources are managed and al- due to ongoing instability in both coun- located. Conflicts between pastoralists tries. However, in other countries (e.g. and farmers are often triggered by and Guinea and Mauritania), farmer-pasto- contributing to communal tensions; ralist cooperation has been reinforced they are often instrumentalized along through the adoption of local pastoral ethnic and religious lines. Pastoralists codes, dispute resolution mechanisms are both victims and actors, in conflicts and good management of natural re- between pastoralist groups themselves sources. and between pastoralists and farmers. Sometimes there are also conflicts with The aim of this Study is to examine the fishermen, illegal miners and others. As causes and drivers of pastoralist-relat- pastoralists are mobile, tensions can be ed conflicts in six countries in West Af- difficult to contain and can spill across rica and the Sahel: Mauritania, Guinea, borders. In agro-pastoral areas this in- Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. security also negatively affects farmers These countries were selected as they and agricultural production. Banditry form an interconnected transhumance and cattle rustling are also part of the belt across the region. They were also problem, especially in areas where the chosen for comparative purposes. Pas- state is weak or where state officials toralism is important in each of these are linked to armed groups. In conflict countries, but the scale and dynamics hotspots, there has been heavy loss of conflict involving pastoralists vary. of life and displacement among both There are variations in state policies farmers and pastoralists. Conversely, towards pastoralists across these cases, where there is peace and good natural and in local conflict prevention practic- resource management, there are mutu- es. One of the aims of the comparison al benefits to productivity and trade in is to identify examples of good practice the region, as the two sectors reinforce and, conversely, to highlight factors and complement each other. that contribute to violent conflict.

19 While addressing the specific challeng- es relating to pastoralism in each coun- try, the Study underscores the need to prioritize responses that could lead to sustainable and inclusive solutions for both farmers and herders and other groups in the region, from both nation- al and regional perspectives.

UNOWAS is committed, together with the United Nations system in the- re gion, to support ECOWAS and national governments in these efforts.

20 PASTORALISM AND TRANSHUMANCE

Pastoralism refers to extensive live- cially in the dry season, without heavy stock breeding, which in West Africa investment in infrastructure, water and and the Sahel means different breeds animal feed. of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, de- pending on the ecological zone. Pasto- The actual number of pastoralists, farm- ralism generally requires some form of ers and livestock in the six countries mobility of herders and their animals, covered in this Study, and more widely often on a seasonal basis between dry in the ECOWAS region, is not clear due and rainy seasons, and day-to-day be- to lack of reliable data. However, keep- tween pastures and water points. Pas- ing these caveats in mind, FAO statistics toralists have different herding prac- for 2016 give approximations of 62 mil- tices and different types of migration.6 cattle, 227 million small ruminants The migration of pastoralists and their (sheep and goats), and 4.6 million cam- livestock between seasonal pastures is els in the six countries concerned. For called transhumance. the ECOWAS region, plus Mauritania, FAO statistics approximate a total of 73 There is a diversity of pastoralists in million cattle, 4.6 million camels, 110 West Africa; they are not a homoge- million sheep, 157 million goats (a total neous group. Patterns of life among of 267 million small ruminants).7 The pastoralists range from nomadic and number of pastoralists is likely to be in transhumant pastoralism to settled or the tens of millions. semi-settled agro-pastoralism. Agro- pastoralism combines farming and live- There are different types of routes to stock breeding and requires settlement facilitate the movement of cattle be- 8 to cultivate crops, but the mobility of tween pastures and water points. Pas- livestock for transhumance is main- toralism works best as a part of a regu- tained. Transhumance is necessary, es- lated system, where space for livestock pecially in the savannah and Sahel, be- and pastoralists is demarcated and cause unless the herd size is very small 7 FAOSTAT, Food and Agricultural Organisation of or rainfall is plenty, no one area of land the United Nations. Data on Live Animals in Wes- can support the livestock all year, espe- tern Africa, 2016. Data accessed at http://www. fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QA, 22 March 2018.

6 In some cases, when herders move their lives- 8 These routes include: principal routes, inclu- tock on transhumance they are accompanied ding international routes; national routes, which by their wives and children, while the aged and may link up to the international routes; daily young children stay in a permanent settlement herding routes that connect camps and villages or camp. In other cases, the livestock are taken to grazing areas; routes down from the on transhumance by men and teenage boys only, daily herding routes or larger routes to rivers and without any women, girls or elderly people. streams.

21 protected from encroachment (herd- ing routes, grazing areas, access to water), while farmers’ fields and crops are also protected from herders and their livestock, according to pastoral codes. Farmer-herder conflicts may be reduced if sufficient infrastructure and regulations are put in place to assist farming and pastoralist communities, and if their rights and responsibilities are enshrined at the community level, according to agreed legislation or tradi- tions, and implemented through local authorities.

22 CHAPTER 1: BURKINA FASO

In Burkina Faso, pastoralism, agro- pastoralism and transhumance are not Introduction limited to one . Pastoral- Despite challenges and frequent dis- ism forms a significant part of the rural putes in some areas, violent conflicts economy, and there are estimated to between farmers and pastoralists in be 9.3 million cattle, 9.8 million sheep, Burkina Faso9 are at a relatively low 14.7 million goats, and some 19,000 11 level. There are however acute pres- camels. The Fulani (Peul) are the sures on land, water, and livelihoods dominant pastoralist group in the coun- in rural areas. As a result, many pas- try, but the Mossi (the majority ethnic toralists have left Burkina Faso for group in Burkina) and several other neighbouring countries further south, groups also rear livestock, often as increasing pressures and tensions in agro-pastoralists. In Burkina Faso there other parts of West Africa.10 The main is cross-border transhumance and in- challenge throughout Burkina Faso is ternal transhumance between different natural resource access. Security in the regions and provinces. In the dry sea- northern part of the country – espe- son pastoralists tend to move south- cially in Soum, Oudalan, and Séno prov- wards from semi-arid northern areas inces – is complicated by the conflict in of the Sahel into the savanna zone, or Mali (with refugees and armed groups to more humid zones of neighbouring spilling over from Douentza and Gao) countries. They return northwards at and the presence of Ansarul Islam, a the start of the rainy season, but it ap- militant organisation linked to the Mali- pears the length of the transhumance based terrorist group Katibat Macina. period is increasing in many cases, due to the scarcity of pasture and water in the Sahel. Transhumance in Burkina Faso is determined by the availability of a. Pastoralism, Transhumance, and pasture and water, but also by access to Migration it, which is a function of local politics, economics, and social relations con- 9 Fieldwork in Burkina Faso was carried out in nected to land tenure and land use, as the following regions: Central-North, Sahel, and much as local ecology. Hauts-Bassins, in addition to meetings in Ouaga- dougou which gave a national perspective. In Burkina Faso there is private, com- 10 There is no available data on the actual num- ber of pastoralists who have left Burkina Faso 11 According to FAOSTAT approximations for for neighbouring countries, but it was widely 2016. Data accessed at http://www.fao.org/ acknowledged to be a significant trend. faostat/en/#data/QA, 22 March 2018.

23 4°W 2°W 0° 2°E

BURKINA FASO Markoy N ig er !P Gorom-Gorom SAHEL BURKINA Aribinda !P Djibo FASO Dori Tillabéri iger !P 14°N 14°N N M A L I Thiou Titao Seytanga NORD Bouroum !P Sebba !^o Ouahigouya Kongoussi i Séguénega Ban CENTRE-NORD Djibasso Goursi Tougan !P Yako Mané Kaya Bogandé N I G E R

Nouna Toma Foutouri Boulsa Gayéri BOUCLE Ziniaré !P DU MOUHOUN Samba Boussé Kantchari Balavé !P Matiakoali Dédougou Réo CENTo RE !^ Zorgo Solenzo !P Ouagadougou Koupéla Ouarkoye EST Diapaga ) Koudougou a t PLATEAU- !P l 12°N 12°N o V Tiou CENTRAL k Kombissiri Fada N’Gourma Morolaba c la !P (B Boromo Manga un CENTRE-OUEST o !P Tenkodogo h Boni Ouargay a Houndé Madjoari Samorogouan M Sili Kassou Sikasso Sapoui CENTRE- CENTRE-EST !P Koumbia Pama HAUTS-BASSINS Dano SUD Zabré !P Naz !P Léo in Pô o Orodaro Bobo-Dioulasso Ouessa n ( R e Diébougou d !P B E N I N V !P o l Banfora Bolgatanga t Dapaong SUD- a !P ) ) Sidéradougou lta Sindou OUEST Vo i !^ National capital te t anbé (Wh i O ak !P CASCADES Gaoua !P N !P Administrative capital Kampti NatitinTgoowun, village

Niangoloko o !P Airport 10°N 10°N K Batié om Wa o T O G O International boundary é G H A N A !PProvincial boundary Lama-Kara !P MDajionu rogaodu !P C Ô T E D ' I V O I R E !P Secondary road Tamale 0 50 100 Km The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map 0 25 50Mi do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. !P 4°W 2°W 0° Sokodé 2°E

Map No. 4230 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support August 2018 Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Figure 2: Map of Burkina Faso. Source: United Nations. munal, and state land. The state desig- water points such as rivers and dams, nated areas of land for specific activi- but many of these have been blocked ties, including agriculture, forestry, pas- or narrowed by crop fields. Pressures toralism, and wildlife conservation. This on pastoral livelihoods and on farmers system was reported to have worked have therefore increased. quite effectively during the administra- These constraints in Burkina Faso are tion of Thomas Sankara, but in the past pushing many pastoralists southwards three decades enforcement has been into neighbouring countries, particu- weak. Much land that was allocated larly to Côte d’Ivoire, , for pastoralists has been cultivated or and Benin. Pastoralists in Burkina Faso taken over by other developments, confirmed this trend of ‘migratory including agriculture and plantations. drift’ from the drylands to (sub-)hu- Population growth combined with ad- mid areas, resulting in permanent- re verse environmental and climatic con- location.12 Most pastoralists with large ditions have also reduced the area of usable land. There is a system of tran- 12 The term ‘migratory drift’ was formulated by anthropologist Derrick Stenning in the 1950s: shumance routes and access routes to ‘Migratory drift may be said to have occurred

24 herds were reported to have already As more pastoralists and their animals left Burkina. Togo was cited as having move permanently from the Sahel and formulated policies to benefit from savannah into sub-humid and humid this influx, with a quota of 50,000 ani- areas towards the West African coast, mals per year permitted to enter from it is also creating pressures on natural other West African countries, and a tax resources in those areas and therefore, of 5,000 FCFA per head of cattle when a risk of conflict. Most of these south- pastoralists cross the border. Report- ern fringes of West Africa were histori- edly, local authorities in Togo and Benin cally beyond the range of transhumant also impose charges in the communes pastoralists.15 It is the combination of pastoralists pass through while on tran- ecological/vegetation change due to shumance.13 Charges reportedly exist in deforestation in the humid zone and Ghana as well, where chiefs sometimes improvement in veterinary medicine, demand payment in livestock for pass- protecting cattle against trypano- ing through or staying in their territory. somiasis, that enables migration and/or Government officials in Ouagadougou transhumance that far south. emphasised that the permanent move- ment of so much livestock southwards Many pastoralists in northern Burkina out of the country is having negative re- Faso have national and international percussions on Burkina Faso’s livestock ECOWAS certificates of transhumance industry, resulting in lost revenue for and are aware of the regulations. They the state.14 obtain the certificates by presenting livestock vaccination cards and proof when a stated range of seasonal grazing grounds of identity. They present their ECOWAS has given way piecemeal to a completely new transhumance certificates at inter- range. This may occur within the lifetime of a herdowner, or within two or more generations, national borders and, when on tran- depending upon the urgency of the environmen- shumance, forest guards and veterinar- tal factors involved.’ (Stenning, 1957: 67-68). It ians often ask to see their documents. can for example mean a lengthening or change in the direction of the dry season or wet season transhumance track, in a southerly or northerly direction, in response to political or environmen- tal conditions. See ‘Stenning, D. J. (1957), ‘Trans- b. Challenges facing pastoralists humance, Migratory Drift, Migration: Patterns of Pastoral Fulani Nomadism’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain 15 Tensions are already apparent in southern and Ireland, 87 (1): 57-73. Nigeria, for example, as a new wave of pasto- ralists has moved in with their cattle into agri- 13 Interview with the Directeur Provincial des cultural areas, destroying crops and disrupting Ressources Animales et Halieutiques du Seno, 14 the relationship between farmers and longer- April 2017. established pastoral groups. The migration has occurred from northern Nigeria and across the 14 Discussions at the Ministère des Ressources border from Benin. Communication with Dr. Animales et Halieutiques, Ouagadougou, 12 April Roger Blench, during his fieldwork in south-west 2017. Nigeria, November 2017.

25 Loss of pasture land and blockage of tions in Burkina Faso is to give pastoral- transhumance routes ists a voice in civil society and politics, so they can influence decision-making Pastoral land in Burkina Faso is not on issues that affect them. This is also protected: much has been cultivated a stated aim of the World Bank-funded by small-scale farmers, taken for plan- projects and other programmes.17 tation agriculture, acquired by elites, or built on. Transhumance routes and Climate change and adaptation access routes to water are frequently blocked or narrowed by farms and set- There is heavy pressure on water and tlements, constraining pastoral mobility pasture in Burkina Faso, especially dur- and leading to the destruction of crops ing the dry season. The late dry season, by cattle. The laws governing the rural around March to June, is the most dif- space, including Burkina Faso’s 2002 ficult period for pastoralists, as water is Pastoral Policy Act, are not widely en- scarce, especially in the Sahel Region. forced. Awareness of this legal frame- This necessitates transhumance and work, even among local authorities, is underlines the need to sustain dry sea- often lacking. son grazing areas and watering points for pastoralists (especially dams/ponds According to some farmers in Burkina and bore holes). As rainfall patterns in Faso, the challenges facing pastoral- the Sahel have become more unpre- ists also affects them, for two main dictable, adaptation to annual fluctua- reasons. First, the blockage of tran- tions in rainfall and therefore pasture is shumance routes and reduction in pas- important. toral land increases the encroachment of livestock onto farmland. Second, In northern Burkina Faso, “Forage some farmers in Burkina Faso buy live- Christine” is frequently cited as being stock with the profits from their farm- 17 Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project (Projet Régional d'Appui au Pastoralisme au ing activities. This is the case among Sahel, PRAPS) (the World Bank-funded, ECOWAS- farmers around Bobo Dioulasso, WAEMU led project with CILSS coordination). A for example.16 regional pastoralist organisation headquartered in Ouagadougou and with a strong presence in northern Burkina Faso is APESS, l’Association Political representation pour la promotion de l’Élevage au Sahel et en Savane, founded in 1989. A pastoralist civil In Burkina Faso, pastoralists’ political society network with good links in other areas of representation is weak or non-existent. Burkina Faso is RECOPA, le Réseau de Communi- cation sur le Pastoralisme – Burkina Faso. APESS One of the aims of pastoralist associa- and RECOPA partner with development agencies and are involved in implementing projects rela- 16 Group interview with leaders and represen- ted to pastoralism. They are active but there is a tatives of the Cotton Producers Union of Burkina need to support such organisations to imple- Faso, national headquarters, Bobo Dioulasso, 18 ment projects and deepen their outreach among April 2017. pastoralists.

26 a vital dry season water resource (with bore holes and water points). This is a major hydraulic system in northern c. Security challenges and the causes Oudalan Province that was opened in and drivers of conflict 1972 to provide pastoralists and their Farmer-herder relations herds with water during the dry season. Pastoralists from a wide area, including There are farmers and pastoralists in Mali and Niger, congregate there during most regions of Burkina Faso, and due the dry season. Forage Christine there- to the multiple pressures they face, dis- fore enables some of the pastoralists in putes frequently occur. The main cause northern Burkina and surroundings to of conflict is the destruction of crops by stay in the Sahel Region throughout the pastoralists’ livestock and the cultiva- year rather than migrating southwards. tion of transhumance routes or grazing areas by farmers. These are common Veterinary services problems across West Africa, but in There are veterinary personnel and Burkina Faso it is less common for such services in Burkina Faso, but they are conflicts to lead to heavy loss of life. under-resourced, often lacking the Violence does occur, but generally not equipment and materials they need on the large scale seen in neighbouring for work. Furthermore, pastoralists and countries. For example, government agro-pastoralists are not sufficiently records indicate that from 2005-2011 trained or sensitized on the importance there were 12,071 conflicts in -Bur of animal sanitary care. kina Faso involving pastoralists, with 55 deaths.18 Conflicts range from rela- Education tively minor cases to violent scenarios with fatalities. Eighteen of those killed Pastoralist youth in Burkina Faso, as in the recorded period were in Poni elsewhere in the Sahel, tend to have Province, South-, in 2008. low levels of school attendance. The There is no indication of an increase main pastoralist associations view this in violence since 2011, and some re- as a problem. There are few govern- spondents thought the level of violence ment policies with regard to nomadic between farmers and herders may have and semi-nomadic culture. In addition, decreased. schools that used to be available for pastoralists, for example in Oudalan Part of the reason for the lower level and Soum Provinces, have been closed. of violence compared to other West

18 Government statistics viewed at the regional livestock department for North-Central Region, Kaya, 13 April 2017. This record was not disag- gregated by age or gender.

27 African countries is that pastoralism women and children.20 Some were resi- and agro-pastoralism are not activi- dent in Bouna, while others were there ties of one ethnic group; even though on seasonal transhumance. Tensions the Fulani are the dominant pastoral had built up over time and were report- group, the Mossi and others also rear edly linked to local chieftaincy politics livestock. Moreover, it is believed that between Lobi and Koulango communi- many pastoralists with large herds of ties, with the Lobi disputing the right cattle have left Burkina Faso due to lim- of the Koulango to grant Fulani pas- ited availability of pasture and water toralists access to land in Bouna.21 Ac- and the constraints on pastoral space cumulated grievances of Lobi farmers and transhumance routes. This has pos- towards migrant Fulani herders were sibly reduced some of the pressure on therefore entangled in local politics. farmland. Another factor is that there This was likely a factor in pushing dozo are organised conflict management hunters from the Lobi to launch attacks committees in place in most villages. on Fulani communities. The Fulani in Conflicts are usually addressed at the southern Burkina Faso indicated that local level, before they become violent. smaller conflicts existed most months in border areas between Burkina Faso The more recent violent pastoralist-re- and Côte d’Ivoire. lated conflicts reported in Burkina Faso were external and involved pastoralists Cattle rustling who were caught up in violence after crossing borders into neighbouring Pastoralists in Burkina Faso frequently countries. There was mass violence in cite livestock theft (especially of cattle) March 2016 at Bouna, north-east Côte as a security challenge, particularly in d’Ivoire, near the border with Burkina the border areas when they go on tran- Faso. At least 33 people were killed, shumance. The border area between with more than 50 injured and more Burkina Faso and Ghana is known for than 3000 displaced.19 Many people cattle rustling. Most of the gangs are were also reported missing and it is un- reported to be Burkinabé, operating on likely all the victims were accounted for. the Ghanaian side of the border, alleg- Pastoralists in Bobo Dioulasso stated edly in complicity with local officials. that more than 100 Fulani were killed Cattle theft is also a problem in parts in the Bouna violence, including men, of Burkina Faso itself, including in the

20 Group interview with pastoralists from south- 19 ‘Côte d’Ivoire: le conflit à Bouna fait 33 west Burkina Faso in Bobo Dioulasso, 17 April morts’, Le Figaro with AFP, 21 April 2016. 2017. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash- actu/2016/04/21/97001-20160421FI- 21 ‘Au Burkina Faso, avec les déplacés du conflit LWWW00332-cote-d-ivoire-le-conflit-a-bouna- entre Peul et Lobi’, Le Monde Afrique, 6 April fait-33-morts.php, accessed 27 November 2017. 2016.

28 Sahel Region where armed robbers op- keep such conflicts at a low level. In the erate. An official in Kaya in the Centre field, the Village Development Councils North region of Burkina Faso claimed (CVDs) were cited as playing the main that cattle rustling had considerably role in conflict mediation and resolu- reduced in most parts of Burkina due tion and in addressing land tenure to the mobilisation of local vigilante disputes. In the case of Firka village groups against the rustlers. These are (Central-North Region), the CVD was self-defence committees such as “Kogl- said to consist of 12 representatives, Wéeogo” (a Mossi name), which work including traditional leaders, local ad- against cattle theft and other crimes. ministration, a women’s leader, and However, cattle rustling continues to representatives from traders, farmers be a problem, including for pastoralists and pastoralists.22 Most farmer-herder passing through Burkina Faso on tran- disputes are resolved between the par- shumance. ties themselves, without going to the CVD, but if the dispute needs formal The spread of terrorism to Burkina mediation they take it to the CVD. In Faso Dori, in the Sahel Region of northern Throughout West Africa and the Sa- Burkina, more informal types of media- hel, terrorism represents an increas- tion are also used, involving religious ingly acute challenge for pastoralists, authorities (the local imam) and other farmers and other groups. In Burkina local leaders – mainly men; women are 23 Faso, the terrorist group Ansarul Islam rarely involved. The CVDs are linked emerged in 2016 in the Djibo area of to the 2004 Decentralization Code, the Soum Province, Sahel Region of north- Code General des Collectivites Territori- ern Burkina Faso. Established by a Mali- ales, which sought to give local bodies a 24 trained local preacher, Malam Ibrahim larger role in land management. There Dicko, Ansar Islam has close links to are also village-level representative Katibat Macina, a terrorist group oper- committees responsible for land man- ating in central Mali, led by Hamadoun agement (Commissions Villageoises de Kouffa. Gestion des Terroirs, CVGTs). However,

22 Group interviews with farmers and pastora- lists in Firka village, Pissila Commune, Sanma- d. Conflict prevention and resolution tenga Province, Central-North Region. 23 Interviews in Dori, Séno Province, Sahel There are formal and informal conflict Region, 14 April 2017. prevention and resolution mechanisms 24 Oliver Hughes, Catholic Relief Services Niger, at the local level in Burkina Faso. These Literature Review of Land Tenure in Niger, Bur- help to minimise violent conflicts -be kina Faso, and Mali: Context and Opportunities. tween pastoralists and farmers and March 2014. Accessed online, 28 November 2017.

29 these government and donor linked • To encourage rotational systems of committees appear to be superseded by land use between farmers and pasto- more customary forms of land manage- ralists – rotating land between seasons ment.25 Nonetheless, the law in Burkina or years – for the benefit of all; Faso stipulates that all untitled land is owned by the state. This is according to • To increase investments in both the the 1984 law, Reorganisation Agraire et livestock and agricultural sectors in Foncière, amended in 1991 and 1996. Burkina Faso, to assist the national There is also a national Commission du economy and reduce the number of Conciliation Foncier,charged with regu- livestock being moved southwards into lating conflicts in pastoral zones. coastal West African States;

The relative integration of pastoral and • To protect and preserve local vegeta- 28 agricultural systems in Burkina Faso is tion and soil ecologies; a key reason for lower levels of violent • To protect and maintain the existing conflict there. There seems to be more pastoral areas; sharing of land and more accommo- dation between groups compared to • To invest in rural education, for all countries where populations exercise children, particularly targeting under- more exclusive systems of territorial represented pastoralists, including in control.26 In Burkina Faso, many farm- northern Burkina Faso. This would help ers not only discuss their own chal- pastoralists and farmers diversify their lenges, but also the problems faced by livelihoods and become more politi- pastoralists to find mutually beneficial cally engaged; solutions. 27 • To promote community conflict reso- lution mechanisms and support the participation of women and youth. Recommendations

• To sensitize populations regarding legal texts governing land, including pastoral land and transhumance;

25 Ibid.

26 See Dafinger, Andreas, and Michaela Pelican (2006), ‘Sharing or Dividing the Land? Land Rights and Farmer-Herder Relations in Burkina Faso and Northwest Cameroon’, Canadian Jour- nal of African Studies, 40 (1): 127-151.

27 Group Interview with Union of cotton far- mers, national headquarters, Bobo Dioulasso, 19 28 Interview with Modibo Oumarou, APESS, Dori April 2017 (Séno Province, Sahel Region), 14 April 2017.

30 CHAPTER 2: THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

pastoralists-farmers conflicts which may increase in the coming years over Introduction access to water. When disputes arise, Guinea has relatively low levels of conflict management committees have violent conflict between farmers and played an important role by bringing pastoralists.29 There is competition for community leaders together for dia- increasingly scarce land and water and logue alongside state officials. These disputes occur in some places, such as committees include elders from the in Beyla in the forest region and Boké/ affected communities, religious lead- Boffa areas in the maritime region, but ers, and representatives from pastoral- violent farmer-herder clashes that re- ist and farmer associations. There are sult in heavy loss of life are rare.30 How- women’s cooperatives among pasto- ever there is a growing concern about ralists in Guinea, but women are still the impact of climate change and sub- unrepresented or under-represented in sequent additional hydric stress31 on conflict management committees. While the Government of Guinea has 29 Guinea has however known recent cases of serious inter-ethnic violence in which hundreds publicly sought to rebuild state institu- were killed. See McGovern, Mike and Alexis tions after years of neglect, the legacy Arieff. 2013. “History is stubborn”: Talking about of colonial and post-colonial state poli- Truth, Justice, and National Reconciliation in the Republic of Guinea’, Comparative Studies in cies that fostered ethnic divisions can Society and History: 50 (1): 198-225; Posthumus, still be felt.32 This is particularly the case Bram. 2016. Guinea: , Music and Minerals. between the two largest ethnic groups London: Hurst & Company. in the country: the Fulani and Maninké, 30 Fieldwork for this study was carried out in five which together make up two-thirds of of Guinea’s eight administrative regions: Kindia, Mamou, Labé, Boké, and . No fieldwork the population. However, such ethnic was carried out in , , and Nzé- divisions do not appear to have trans- rékoré administrative regions. The focus was the- lated into conflicts between Fulani pas- refore on the western half of Guinea: the regions of Moyenne Guinée and Guinée Maritime. toralists and the Maninké, or farmers This is a major transhumance zone, but there of other ethnic groups. In Guinea, most are pastoral activities throughout the country. Information on transhumance and farmer-herder pastoralists are Fulani, and farmers relations in Haute Guinée and Guinée Forestière (outside of Moyenne Guinée) are most was gathered from secondary sources and from likely to be of another ethnic group. veterinarians and other government officials in neighbouring regions and in Conakry.

31 Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat Focus Groups 32 McGovern, Mike and Alexis Arieff. 2013. held in Tougué, Koubia, Dinguiraye, Siguiri, Man- “History is stubborn”, op. cit. diana, March-April 2018

31 ricultural production. National livestock estimates in 2012 included 5.5 million a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in 33 Guinea cattle. These are projections and not based on a comprehensive recent sur- Pastoralism is the fourth largest sec- vey. FAOSTAT, also using imputed fig- tor in the economy of Guinea and is crucial for local livelihoods. Economic ures, give approximations of 6.4 million data on pastoralism is not compre- cattle, 2.6 million sheep, and 2.8 mil- hensive, partly because it contributes lion goats for 2016.34

SENEGAL g MALI n GUINEA i K Koundra o f u a l Kédougou a o B b u Sibi e n G Gab tou Bafat G a Kali m Foulamôri T Mali b o ie GUINEA- m Kourémalé y in o é k a r Yambéring B e BISSAU Kounsitél Doko ig l N i ba LABÉLABÉ n Coru Gaoual g a Buba in r Koubia f a a k n B n o Wéndou-Mbôrou Lélouma a g Tougué Siguiri S o K Labé Dinguiraye Kalinko Tinkisso Dabiss Yanfolila

Sangarédi Sélouma O

Sansalé Pita u

a

s Boké s Bissikrima o Télimélé K Niantanina u Cisséla l a o lé k MAMOU KANK AN u u r o B i a

Îles Tristao m

Dalaba a B a l

Balato Mandiana é Kamsar BOKÉ r Kégnéko Nige Fria Tougnifili r u Konkouré Mamou FARANAH Kankan o Saladou k KINDIA Sabadou Boffa n o Ouré Kaba Baranama S

K an n k ara a ni Kindia t Kolntn Maréla Faranah M n il Madina Woula a o u i Falaba o N f GUINEA Dubréka a D Tiro Moribaya io Coyah ongo M n M N Kabala i g Conakry e Forécariah Kamakwie r Odienné Îles de Los Kérouané Pamalap Kissidougou Sokourala

tle it Kambia L Sibiribaro National capital i l

e A Regional capital Makeni S r Snko T Port Loko l o Ynd Milimou Prefectural capital Lunsar oke L Lungi R Koidu-Sefadu Beyla Town, village Pepel Guékédou Macenta A Dougbla Major airport Freetown N NZÉRÉKORÉ International boundary oinjama Boola T Touba Regional boundary I Kailahun Foya Main road C Secondary road g Bo O n Koulé o Kenema J Railroad Daru a C a ff Nzérékoré Lola w o Zorzor e a a L S o y E Momaligi be A M G Yomou N Yekepa CÔTE no a Diéké M 0 25 50 5 100 125 150 km D'IVOIRE The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or l Danané au Gahnpa 0 25 50 5 100 mi acceptance by the United Nations. . P St Gbarnga Sulima

Map No. 414 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support August 2014 Cartographic Section

Figure 3: Map of Guinea. Source: United Nations.

to what may be termed the ‘informal economy’ as well as to official GDP. -Ac 33 And 1.8 million sheep, 2.2 million goats, 105,000 pigs, and 24 million chickens. cording to the Ministry of Livestock’s 2012 figures, pastoralism accounted for 34 FAOSTAT, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. Data on Live Animals in 4.5% of Guinea’s GDP and 20.9% of ag- Guinea, 2016. Data accessed at http://www.fao. org/faostat/en/#data/QA, 22 March 2018.

32 Pastoralism is spread across all four ge- highlands, south-west Futa Jallon). Re- ographical . There are portedly, due to pressure on dry season different types of pastoralism and tran- pastures around Boké and Boffa, fewer shumance, and differences in the level pastoralists now go on transhumance of conflict between farmers and herd- to the maritime areas and more go to ers in the four regions. According to the Gaoual and Koundara or across the Ministry of Livestock, Moyenne Guinée border into Guinea Bissau. However, has the highest number of pastoral- fieldwork in Boké and Boffa confirmed ists and livestock, followed by Haute there are still large numbers of pasto- Guinée.35 There is transhumance on a ralists there with their trypano-tolerant north-south basis between these re- N’Dama cattle. gions and Guinée Maritime to the west and Guinée Forestière to the south. Not all pastoralists in Guinea go on Not all transhumance in Guinea is on a transhumance. In general, this is only north-south basis, as there is also tran- necessary for those with larger herds. shumance on a highland-lowland basis In the Futa Jallon, for example, which and along rivers. is predominantly Fulani, most of the population is sedentary and in the ru- The main transhumance zone in Guinea ral areas agro-pastoralism is the norm. in terms of the number of cattle moved A distinctive feature of their system is during the dry season is from the high- that the livestock are left to roam freely, lands of the central Plateau (adjoining without herders. As per Guinea’s pasto- the Futa Jallon) to surrounding lowland ral code, it is the responsibility of farm- areas. Transhumance occurs westwards ers to fence their fields (using natural from Middle Guinea to Guinea Maritime fencing) so that cattle cannot enter and and eastwards from Middle Guinea to to survey their farms during the day to Upper Guinea. On the western side of ensure livestock do not encroach. Simi- the highlands there are two main tran- larly, it is the responsibility of herders shumance zones: south-west down to to put their livestock in paddocks at Boké and Boffa, near the Atlantic coast, night if they are near farms.36 Land is and north-west to Gaoual and Kound- allocated for farming and pastoralism ara, towards the borders with Senegal and may be rotated from year to year. and Guinea Bissau. There is significant This is made easier because the Futa cross-border transhumance into Guin- Jallon has a large Fulani majority and ea-Bissau and to a lesser extent across such arrangements over land use may the northern border into Senegal. This even take place within the same fam- transhumance occurs to and from the ily. For pastoralists with larger herds area around Télimélé (in the central who do need to retain their mobility, 35 Group interview with senior officials at the 36 LOI L/95/51/CTRN du 29 août 1995, portant Ministère d’Élevage, Conakry, 28/2/2017. Code Pastoral. Republic of Guinea.

33 especially between the dry and rainy Cross-border transhumance into Guin- seasons, Guinea has both internal tran- ea-Bissau is partly to avoid cotton shumance and external, cross-border farms in bordering lowland areas of the transhumance. Internal transhumance Republic of Guinea. Pastoralists report can be for only 20-30 kilometres within that the cotton farmers often cultivate one locality, or longer distances of 100 their transhumance routes while they kilometres or more between regions. are in Guinea-Bissau, preventing them Cross-border transhumance occurs from returning before the harvest. In in both directions between Guinea, other areas, pastoralists claim they Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Sierra Leone, have trouble herding their livestock Liberia, Mali, and Côte d’Ivoire. Both to streams and waterways during the are critical for pastoral production and dry season because the access routes resilience, but in some parts of Guinea have been cultivated with vegetables, (e.g. along the border with Guinea- by farmers doing irrigated farming. Re- Bissau) cross-border transhumance is duced or loss of access to water points driven by land scarcity, with insufficient and riverine grazing areas due to cul- protection of grazing land. tivation by dry season farmers has be- come a common problem for pastoral- ists throughout West Africa. b. Challenges facing pastoralists in Water shortages Guinea There are acute water shortages in the Blockage of transhumance routes dry season, both in grazing areas and There are widespread complaints by along the routes. Villages, whether pastoralists in Guinea of transhumance they are farming and/or rearing live- routes being blocked by farms. This stock, also face acute water shortages. happens most often because the routes Women sometimes walk miles to ac- are not properly demarcated. There are cess clean pumped water, or more of- some initiatives to protect the routes, ten communities drink untreated water including donor projects to locate and from local sources. Water scarcity is demarcate them with beacons.37 The also one of the main factors encourag- more routes are blocked, the greater ing transhumance during the dry sea- the risk of cattle encroaching onto son in Guinea. The cattle need water farms and destroying crops. and herders have to rear the animals close to water sources, whether natural 37 Gestion de la Transhumance: une approche communautaire de gestion des parcours à bétail. or man-made. 2014/15. Projet Régional de Gestion Durable du Bétail Ruminant Endémique en Afrique de l'Ouest PROGEBE-Guinée. Conakry: Ministère d'Élevage et des Productions Animales.

34 Cattle theft only about a litre of milk a day (com- pared to more than 20 litres in - Cattle theft is a problem in some parts an dairy farms, where they use special of Guinea but it is relatively low inten- breeds that are difficult to rear in the sity, with between 1-5 cows stolen at a Tropics). Although the quantity of milk time, not the large-scale organised rus- produced is low, a key problem faced is tling seen in other parts of West Africa, the lack of refrigeration and other pro- such as in Nigeria and parts of Niger duction facilities for a functioning dairy and Mali. Cattle thieves are of different industry. Dairy production in Guinea is types - at times they are described as mainly the preserve of women, some of opportunists who steal cows that are whom have formed dairy cooperatives. unattended (as in the Futa Jallon- dur ing the dry season), while others are labelled as bandits, armed with guns, c. Security challenges and the causes who shoot cattle along transhumance and drivers of conflict routes and then sell the meat. Guinea has a well-developed system of mark- Farmer-herder relations ing animals for security purposes, so Violent conflicts involving pastoralists that the owners can be easily traced. are less pronounced in Guinea com- Veterinary services in Guinea pared to other countries in West Africa and the Sahel (such as Mali, Niger, and There are qualified veterinary doctors Nigeria). However, violent conflicts do working in many prefectures. However, sometimes occur, and non-violent dis- a constraint expressed by them is the putes between farmers and pastoralists relatively limited support they receive are relatively frequent. There are sig- from the state. In the sous-prefectures nificant pressures on the livelihoods of (sub-divisions), the chefs des postes pastoralists in most parts of the coun- and veterinarians working for the Min- try, mainly due to shortages of water istry of Livestock – who are responsible and pasture in the dry season and inad- for treatment and livestock production equate access to veterinary drugs and – are not usually supplied with vehicles, services in rural areas. office equipment, or veterinary instru- There are several flashpoints where ments and drugs. The limited mobility farmer-herder conflicts have occurred. makes it difficult for veterinarians to One is in the Forest region around access pastoralists in dispersed rural Beyla, where Fulani herders move with areas. their zebu cattle from Mali, often with Dairy production the intention of permanent relocation. The farmers in the forest zone are of dif- N’Dama cattle produce a maximum of ferent ethnicities and view Fulani pas-

35 toralists as non-autochthonous without itual beliefs of forest peoples in rela- land rights. Where provisions for tran- tion to the natural environment may shumance are absent or if routes are not always be known to or respected blocked, the destruction of crops by by pastoralists who are predominantly cattle can easily occur. The response of Muslim, for example. The role of the ju- farmers in Beyla and in the forest zone diciary and local administration in man- has often been to shoot cattle that aging farmer-herder relations may also enter their fields, or to cut them with be contentious in circumstances where machetes38. Pastoralists are reported to community trust in the state is limited. have retaliated by burning houses and with physical violence against farmers. In the area between Boffa and Boké, This has led to some loss of life in the near the Atlantic coast, there was com- past and significant loss of assets on munal violence around 2002 that led to both sides, in terms of livestock killed loss of life in two districts: Mankountan 40 and farms destroyed. It appears such and Diogoya. These two communities conflicts around Beyla have reduced in are mainly Baga by ethnicity, belonging Baga Sitemu recent years but the issue has not been to different subgroups: Baga Monchon fully resolved. and respectively, who speak different dialects that local- re In general, it is in Guinée Forestière spondents said were hardly mutually where farmer-herder conflicts appear intelligible. The Baga Sitemu in Mank- to be most recurrent in Guinea, with ountan are mainly Catholic, while the clashes reported in 2016 and 2017 Baga Monchon are mainly Muslim. The resulting in significant material- dam two Baga communities came into con- age and human casualties.39 The dis- flict with each other over the issue of putes are not simply caused by tran- granting access rights to their land for shumance; some of the problems arise Fulani pastoralists. It appears there due to cultural differences in resource was conflict between the Fulani and management. The religious and spir- Baga at Mankountan. Subsequently, the Baga Sitemu stopped the Fulani 38 Even if generally limited, the killing of herders from entering Mankountan, livestock has become frequent in Guinée while the Baga Monchon in Diogoya forestière (Beyla, Lola, Gueckédou). From 2014 to 2015 at least 2,533 cattle were reportedly allowed transhumance and cattle rear- killed in conflicts between farmers and herders. ing to continue in their area. The peo- Sources: http://afrique.le360.ma/guinee/ ple of Diogoya claim that in reaction societe/2017/05/16/11852-guinee-au-sud- les-eleveurs-ne-sont-toujours-pas-les-bienve- they were attacked by the inhabitants nus-11852. of Mankountan, necessitating an inter- http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140218-guinee- vention by the military. Nevertheless, conflit-chasseurs-eleveurs-lele-guekedou-

39 United Nations Country Office, Conakry. June 40 Group interview with local leaders in Diogoya, 2018. 17 March 2017.

36 local respondents deny religion was a of chieftaincy does not formally exist factor in the conflict. To date, the Baga in Guinea, having been abolished dur- farmers in Mankountan refuse to al- ing the period of Sekou Touré, officials low any Fulani pastoralists into their from the local administration preside district with livestock (but Fulani can over the conflict management commit- go and stay there without cattle). It is tees. As well as farmers’ and pastoral- claimed the Mankountan people are ists’ associations, religious leaders may split over the issue; the other side ar- be involved in arbitration – notably the gues that their farms have suffered, as local imam wherever the dispute oc- the absence of cattle has led to grasses curs – to give an Islamic solution to the becoming overgrown, lack of manure, problem. Women appear to be under- and an infestation of snakes and rats. represented. For other farming communities in Boké and Boffa, organised systems are in Pastoralist and farming unions or place where farmers are paid by pasto- groupings in Guinea are their official ralists for access to their land after the organisational structures. For exam- harvest.41 This includes compensation, ple, in Mali prefecture (part of the Futa so they can rebuild the ridges of Jallon of Guinea), there are 58 pasto- paddies after the residues have been ralist groupings covering different vil- 42 grazed by cattle. lages. Above the village level there are sub-prefectures and these have coordination committees that oversee the activities of groups in the villages. d. Conflict prevention and resolution At the level of the prefecture there is Conflict management committees a pastoralist union, and at the regional level there is a federation of pastoral- Local conflict management commit- ists that brings together unions from tees exist in most prefectural, sub-pre- different prefectures. At the national fectural, and village levels in areas of level there is a confederation intended Guinea where pastoralists and farmers to represent pastoralists’ interests at cohabit, and they are instrumental in the national level. Comparable struc- preventing and resolving conflicts- be tures exist for farmers, in different sec- tween farmers and pastoralists. These tors.43 These groups form a line of com- committees are generally made up of munication between communities and representatives from the communities state officials and are used as a basis for themselves, either local leaders and/ 42 Fieldwork in Mali prefecture, Futa Djallon, 7 or union members from pastoralist or March 2017. farming associations. As the institution 43 In Mali prefecture, for example, there were 41 This was reported by farmers and pastoralists also said to be 23 village groupings for bee- to be 500 CFA per month, per cow. keepers.

37 conflict management committees. In • To strengthen the provision of es- Koundara, meetings are convened be- sential services to farmers and pasto- tween farmers and pastoralists through ralists, with contributions from each Conflict Management Committees 2-3 group, and from partners; times a year, just before the planting season and just before the harvest, to • To provide continuous technical and coordinate their activities. Cattle are financial support for women’s income- restricted to certain areas while farm- generating activities such as dairy pro- ing activities take place and owners duction cooperatives; may be fined if they break these rules. • To support and strengthen inclusive Crops also have to be harvested by an dialogue processes and conflict pre- agreed time, after which restrictions vention and resolution structures in on the movement of livestock are lift- places where farmer-herder disputes 44 ed. In general in Guinea, when cattle are most frequent – including in Gui- encroach onto farms and destroy crops, née Maritime and Guinée Forestière. the owners can easily be traced be- cause the livestock are marked.45

Recommendations

• To increase support to the Min- istry of Livestock and the Ministry of Agriculture, to improve livestock production systems and protection of the ecosystem in which pastoralism takes place, including by marking tran- shumance routes;

44 Fieldwork in Koundara, 13-14 March 2017.

45 If the owner is from within Guinea and not on international transhumance, the markings on the cattle indicate the village of origin and the specific owner. Otherwise, transhumance docu- ments may be demanded, according to ECOWAS regulations.

38 CHAPTER 3: THE REPUBLIC OF MALI

ures suggest Mali has among the larg- est livestock sectors in West Africa.48 Introduction The figures do not consider the impact Continuous instability has afflicted Mali of war and continuing insecurity in Mali since the January 2012 secessionist or the increased pressures on rural re- rebellion in the northern part of the sources and livestock holdings. country. The number of terrorist at- The main areas of conflict in northern tacks and armed groups has increased and central Mali are important pastoral and the threat has spread from north- zones with large numbers of livestock. ern to central Mali and spilled over The figures indicate that of Mali’s nine into bordering regions of Burkina Faso regions, Mopti has by far the highest and Niger. Pastoralists are allegedly the number of cattle, with 28% of the total. main constituencies of the resurgence There are substantial numbers of cattle of terrorist activity in central Mali. The in all except Kidal, which feeling of abandonment among the due to its aridity has an estimated 52% Fulani people, and more generally the of Mali’s camels. Sheep and goats are population residing in the Mopti- re present in all regions, but Gao was es- 46 gion , has contributed to this worri- timated to have the highest number, some phenomenon. with over 20% of sheep and over 19% of goats, followed by Mopti with 18% and 19% respectively.49 In the north, a. Pastoralism and Transhumance cattle are concentrated around the rivers, while camels and to some ex- Pastoralism is a crucial economic sector tent sheep and goats also survive from in Mali. The 2015 Annual Report of the wells and bore holes in the arid interior. Ministry of Livestock Breeding and Fish- Cattle rustling, banditry, and resulting eries estimated that pastoralism and inter-communal tensions existed prior the related livestock trade and prod- to 2012, and the collapse of state au- ucts made up 15.2% of Mali’s GDP – be- thority and the proliferation of armed hind agriculture at 16.2%, but ahead of gold at 7.2%.47 Government fig- Mali. January 2016. 46 The was not involved in the peace talks in which led to the signing 48 The 2015 Annual Report estimated the of the Peace Agreement in May and June 2015. number of livestock in Mali at 10.6 million heads Exchange with JMAC/MINUSMA May 2018. of cattle, 15.1 million sheep, 21.1 million goats, 538,500 , 979,600 donkeys, 1.0 million 47 Rapport Annuel 2015. Direction Nationale des camels, 82,425 pigs, and 38.6 million poultry. Productions et des Industries Animales, Minis- tère de l’Élevage et Pêche. Bamako, Republic of 49 Ibid., p.25.

39 MALI MALI

National capital ALGERIA Regional capital Town, village Taoudenni Poste Maurice Cortier Major airport International boundary Regional boundary Main road Bordj Mokhtar Other road MAURITANIA Track Railroad Timéiaouîne Ti-n-Zaouâtene 0 100 200 300 km Tessalit sî In Guezaam m le Aguelhok i

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a i OuagadougouV é Balaki B r DISTRICT é o e l o Diapaga u N Koudougou l ig t Fada- o a Gaoual a Kamba N a é t l Kombissiri B N'gourma B o l GUINEA- g o a L. de a V n Tenkodogo BISSAU Labé Dinguiraye Siguiri Bougouni B c Koko Sélingué Sikasso h TTiinnkkiissssoo e SIKASSO Pô Bobo- Diébougou Léo NIGERIA GUINEA Yanfolila V Kolondiéba Dioulasso o T BENIN The boundaries and names shown and the designations l t a Navrongo O Kontagora

used on this map do not imply official endorsement or N Kainji Banfora G Djougou acceptance by the United Nations. o Reservoir Kankan i SIERRA r GHANA e O LEONE Gaoua h Wawa e CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Map No. 4231 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support March 2013 Cartographic Section

Figure 4: Map of Mali. Source: United Nations.

groups since then have exacerbated extending laterally across the country50: these problems in many parts of cen- tral and northern Mali. During the Tu- • Saharan zone () in the north, areg rebellion, there was a southwards with mean annual rainfall of less than displacement of pastoralists from the 200mm; Timbuktu and Gao regions into the • Sahelian zone across the centre, Mopti area and the Inner Delta of the with mean annual rainfall of 200mm - River Niger. This has increased pressure 600mm; on natural resources in central Mali and triggered conflict with agricultural com- • or northern savanna zone, munities. with mean annual rainfall of 600mm- 1000mm; Pastoralism and transhumance in Mali are strongly influenced by the country’s 50 The eco-climatic zones and rainfall data are cited in Programme d’Action National d’Adap- topography and the distribution of rain- tation au changement climatique (PANA), fall across its different ecological zones. Ministère de l’Equipement et des transports – Direction Nationale de la Météorologie. Republic There are four main ecological zones, of Mali, July 2007.

40 Figure 5: Eco-climatic zones in Mali and area of the . Source: Programme d’Action National d’Adaptation au changement climatique (PANA), 2007, p.7.

• Sudan-Guinea savanna in the south, rainfall. Geology is also key as this af- with mean annual rainfall above fects the hydrology and determines soil 1000mm. types, which in turn affects the distri- bution of grasses and therefore tran- There are many microclimates within shumance patterns. Pastoralists in Mali each zone: rainfall patterns are not uni- use and manage the natural resources form across any one zone, and the level of this varied and unstable ecological of rainfall varies from year to year. Lo- situation by being mobile and flexible.51 cal climate is affected by topography, such as by the many plateaux in Mali. The availability of water and pasture 51 Van Dijk, Han. 1999. ‘Ecological Insecurity is also determined by other hydrologi- and Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend’, in V. Azarya, A. Breedveld, M. de Bruijn, H. Van cal conditions – the presence of rivers Dijk (Eds.) Pastoralists under Pressure? Fulbe and depth of groundwater as well as Societies Confronting Change in West Africa, Leiden: Brill.

41 Rivers and streams support cattle and from former slaves), Fulani and others, other livestock in northern Mali, but while agro-pastoral zones in central also agricultural activities. Access to Mali and along the Niger Bend include pasture and water are determined cultivators from different parts of the not just by environmental conditions country. In Mopti region, Fulani pas- but also by political, social and demo- toralism exists alongside a productive graphic factors. The specific issues of fishing economy and farming activities access vary depending on the ecologi- of Dogon, Bambara, Songhai, and Fu- cal pressure exerted by people and live- lani farmers (and others); in Segou re- stock, inter- and intra-community rela- gion, which is predominantly Bambara, tions, social hierarchies and power, and farming is the dominant activity and whether it is an agro-pastoral zone or pastoralism is more constrained but a purely pastoral zone. Competition for still an important part of the economy pasture is greatest along the River Ni- there. ger and in the Inner Niger Delta. Cen- Pastoral Transhumance tral and southern Mali, corresponding with the Sahel and savanna zones, are Mali borders seven different coun- the most densely populated parts of tries and there is international tran- the country, with farming and pastoral- shumance across all its borders, though ism. The spread of violent conflict from in the vast desert areas bordering Mau- northern to central Mali since January ritania, Algeria and north Niger tran- 2015 therefore has implications for pas- shumance is severely circumscribed. toralism and agriculture and potentially In the main pastoral zones of the Sahel affects a larger number of people than and savanna there are strong cross-bor- the more sparsely populated north. der links and two-way movements, in dry and rainy seasons, with pastoralists There is variation in the distribution of moving into Mali as well. Cross-border pastoralist groups in Mali between re- transhumance into northern regions of gions and eco-climatic zones. Pastoral- Mali has been interrupted by the pre- ists in Timbuktu and Gao regions con- vailing insecurity, but in southern Mali sist mainly of Tuareg, Bella, Arab, and it still occurs without much interruption Fulani (all of whom are internally varie- – as research findings in Mauritania gated in different groups and lineages). demonstrate. Internal transhumance is predominantly Tuareg within Mali is especially important and and Arab, while most pastoralists in happens on a north-south axis between Mopti region are Fulani. Even the areas dry and rainy seasons, between high- claimed as Azawad by Tuareg separa- lands and lowlands, and along the Niger tists are ethnically diverse, with Song- Bend. The Inner Niger Delta is the key hai, Bella (‘black’ Tuaregs, descended dry season transhumance zone in Mali,

42 covering an area of some 50,000 km2, authorities.53 The Diina encompassed from Ke Macina circle in Segou region the Inner Delta and the adjacent dry- to Mopti and the circles of Niafunké, lands, which form part of the tran- Diré, and Goundam in Tombouktou re- shumance orbit of pastoralists when gion. The Delta is a regional resource, the river floods. Nineteenth century especially during the dry season, but Fulani hegemony and ‘arrangements transhumance there has been inter- with respect to resource tenure, live- rupted by conflict. The Delta is of vital stock movements, and economic or- importance for rice cultivation, pasto- ganisation’54 was brought to an end by ralism, and fishing. French colonial rule. It is still referred back to by some Fulani pastoralists as a Transhumance movements in the In- model system which regulated the use ner Niger Delta have historically been of land and water between different determined by the advance and retreat user groups.55 of flood waters, with as many as 40% of Mali’s cattle taken there each year on transhumance, as well as some cat- tle from neighbouring countries.52 Of particular importance are the alluvial flood plains of the Inner Niger Delta on which a nutritious aquatic grass known as bourgoutière (burgu or Echinolchloa stagnina) grows. Large tracts of burgu 53 See Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk (1995) Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings of Insecurity emerge and become accessible to live- in Fulbe Society, Central Mali, Amsterdam: Thela stock as the River Niger’s flood waters Publishers (online); pp. 52-63 are on the Diina of Seeku Aamadu. A classic text on the Diina is retreat at the end of the rainy sea- Bâ, Amadou Hampaté and Jean Daget (1984) son. L'empire peul du Macina (1818-1853). , les Nouvelles Éditions Africaines, (first edition Historically, social contracts and politi- 1962). cal hierarchies determined pastoralists’ 54 Van Dijk, Han. 1999. ‘Ecological Insecurity and access to the burgu. During the period Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend’, op. cit., of the Diina – the Islamic state also p. 246. known as the Maasina Empire estab- 55 Hamadoun Kouffa – presumed leader of lished during the nineteenth century Ansar Dine Katibat Macina (see below) - referred back to the period of the Diina and Seeku (from around 1818) by Seeku Aamadu, Amadou as a model for Islamic government in with its capital at Hamdallaye - access central Mali. Some pastoralists are attracted to to burgu was regulated by the Islamic a message which says natural resource access (pasture and water) should be regulated accor- ding to Islamic rules. Where the Malian state has failed to secure pastoralists’ livelihoods, local 52 Fieldwork interviews in Mopti region, 3-4 history can be called upon for alternative models April 2017. of governance.

43 rivers has decreased as the area under cultivation has expanded, including for b. Challenges facing pastoralists irrigated dry season farming. A weak state with institutional con- It was perceived that since the 1984 straints drought, the number of livestock in the Investment in pastoralism and rural Timbuktu region has diminished, a situ- areas has generally been weak in Mali ation worsened by the lack of education and further complicated by the conflict and professional training for nomads in the central and northern regions. (whether men or women) and limited Farming and pastoralist communities state support for pastoralism. Conse- are affected, with the impacts of this quently, a large number of pastoralists insecurity cutting across gender lines. have left the Timbuktu region (70% ac- 56 According to Mali’s pastoral code, the cording to informal estimates). authorities are meant to have a role in In the Inner Niger Delta the system managing natural resources to prevent regulating access to burgu has broken competition and conflict. Yet, efforts down or traditional authorities restrict seem to have been lacking in this area. such access. There is currently acute There is limited provision of basic infra- competition between groups of pasto- structure and services to rural areas, ralists and between pastoralists, rice including the livestock sector, limited farmers and fishermen. As the condi- technical expertise available and few tions for pastoralism have deteriorated policy interventions promoted. Corrup- in surrounding regions (on the plateaux tion is also perceived to be part of the and in drylands of the Seeno, Gurma, problem with negative impacts on both and Mema) more pastoralists now farmers and pastoralists. move to the Inner Delta during the 57 Reduced access to pasture and water dry season than can support them. As the demands on natural resources Many pastoralists report difficulties in have increased, available pasture has accessing pasture and water in the re- decreased and conflicts over land and gions of Mopti and Timbuktu, in addi- political authority have ensued. tion to the blockage of transhumance routes by farmers. In the Timbuktu The pastoral system in the Inner Delta region, tensions often arise between depends on interconnections in the farmers and pastoralists along the River region as a whole – between areas of Niger. The majority of farmers are Song- 56 Interview with a pastoralist representative in hai and sedentary Tuareg, while the Timbuktu, 5 April 2017. pastoralists are Tuareg, Arab and Fula- 57 See Van Dijk, Han. 1999. ‘Ecological Insecurity ni. The availability of grazing land along and Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend’, op. cit.

44 central Mali that surround the Delta two droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, and the wetlands of the Delta itself.58 underpinned Tuareg rebellions in Mali Access to pasture and water in all these from 1990 and Niger from 1992. areas is now constrained: due to a re- duction in the land area that the river The foundations for the rebellions of floods, increased rice cultivation, po- the 1990s and the renewed rebellions teshumara litical and economic restrictions on from 2012 were laid by the , pastoralists including privatisation of a movement of unemployed intellectu- ishumar bourgoutières, and increased competi- als ( ) many of whom had been tion among pastoralists (the majority affected by drought and became urban 59 of whom are Fulani) for remaining pas- migrants in the Maghreb. They sought ture. Many pastoralists in central Mali revolutionary alternatives (through an are reported to have lost their herds, independent Tuareg nation state to or at least some of their livestock, as a be called Azawad) from the traditional result of these adverse conditions. This pastoral life that had to a large extent has contributed to the spread of violent collapsed. Especially among the small conflict into central Mali. Some have group of contemporaneous Western- left pastoralism and others see no fu- educated Tuareg intellectuals, the ture in pastoralism. droughts led to a rethinking of pastoral life. Many reached the conclusion that a pastoral existence had no future.60 c. Security challenges and the causes From 2012 up to the present there and drivers of conflict have been different groups and factions of rebels in northern Mali, affecting Rebellion, terrorism pastoralism and patterns of security in 61 Pastoral livelihoods in Mali have be- the region. Throughout the conflict, come precarious and insecure for po- pastoralists themselves have had shift- litical, demographic, and ecological ing alliances. Much of the revenue of reasons. This applies to all the pasto- 59 One of the ishumar was Iyad Ag Ghali, who ralist groups (including Fulani, Tuareg later became an Islamist and then leader of Ansar Dine. and Arab), particularly in central and northern Mali which are the areas 60 Lecocq, Baz. 2004. ‘Unemployed Intellec- most affected by armed conflict. Socio- tuals in the Sahara: The Teshumara Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg political and economic transformations Society’, International Review of Social History, in Tuareg society brought about by the 49: 87-109. p. 94. 58 The most detailed study of pastoralism in this 61 An important overview of the different armed area is: de Bruijn, Mirjam, and van Dijk, Han. groups is given by Ibrahim Maiga (June 2016). 1995. Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings of Armed Groups in Mali: Beyond the Labels. West Insecurity in Fulbe Society, Central Mali. Amster- Africa Report, Issue 17, Institute of Security dam: Thela Publishers (openly accessible online). Studies (ISS), Dakar (Online).

45 terrorist groups and of some of the or joined Ansar Dine or other armed armed groups comes from smuggling groups. With the formation of Ansar across the Sahara. These networks Dine’s Katibat Macina, some former compete against each other to control MUJAO fighters joined (MUJAO had smuggling routes, or otherwise have recruited among the Fulani). Many defined routes where they control the combatants joined for reasons of self- illicit traffic.62 In this context, pastoral- defence – in the case of MUJAO, against ists have formed alliances or cooper- the Tuareg-dominated National Move- ated with those groups controlling the ment for the Liberation of Azawad areas they reside in or pass through on (MNLA), who were raiding Fulani cattle transhumance. and looting from the local population in areas they captured in 2012. One of the In parts of central Mali, Ansar Dine motivations for pastoralists to join or Katibat Macina (or Katibat Macina, the cooperate with the Katibat Macina is to Macina Battalions), a group preach- protect their cattle, due to threats from ing violent jihad, has gained followers banditry and communal violence.65 But mainly among the Fulani from Mopti this rebellion against the state goes region and to a lesser extent Segou and beyond the immediate insecurity and Koulikoro regions. (The Katibat Macina includes a struggle, according to them, was declared in a video in May 2016 as to change a situation where pastoralists 63 the Macina extension of Ansar Dine). feel they have been undermined by lo- The reasons for joining the movement cal power dynamics and state neglect. are diverse and have been well inves- tigated. 64 Some Fulani had participat- Banditry, cattle rustling ed as combatants in The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa Banditry and cattle rustling are a prob- (MUJAO), but then either demobilised lem in parts of central and northern Mali. The terrorist groups, however, 62 The smuggling draws on a longer history of were rarely accused of stealing cattle Saharan trade networks. See Scheele, Judith (2012) Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: or other livestock. In some cases, they Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century. actively pursued the bandits and recov- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ered livestock for pastoralists.66 Cattle 63 Thiam, Adam (March 2017), Centre du rustlers in Mopti region are called Nté- Mali: Enjeux Et Dangers D’Une Crise Négligée, réré; they are mainly Fulani and raid the Bamako: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; ICG (July 2016), Central Mali…op. cit. 65 See Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne, and William 64 See Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne, and William Assanvo. 2016 (August). Mali’s Young Jihadists, Assanvo. 2016 (August). Mali’s Young Jihadists: op. cit. p. 4 and p. 7 (footnote 13). This was Fuelled by Faith or Circumstance? Policy Brief, also stated during our fieldwork in Mopti and Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), Dakar; and Bamako, March-April 2017. Thiam, Adam (March 2017), Centre du Mali: Enjeux Et Dangers... op. cit. 66 Interviews in Mopti, 4 April 2017.

46 cattle of other Fulani pastoralists. Some In the past, however, Fulani, Bambara, Ntéréré were recruited into armed and Dogon communities had a good groups and possibly terrorist groups relationship. Inter-ethnic violence in the region, but former Ntéréré have between Fulani-Bambara and Fulani- also had a role in protecting Fulani Dogon was not on a large scale prior to camps during communal violence with the spread of the war to Douentza cir- Dogon and Bambara militias dozos ( , cle in 2012. Trust that previously exist- traditional hunting fraternities).67 With ed between communities has been un- armed conflict in central and northern dermined. With the withdrawal of the Mali, rural banditry appeared to be state from many areas, communities set more closely linked to the proliferation up self-defence militias, generally along of different non-state armed groups ethnic lines. Dozo hunters have acted than to terrorist groups specifically. as a militia to protect the Bambara and Dogon against armed bandits and ter- Communal violence and farmer-herder rorists, but they also stand accused of conflicts attacking Fulani civilians. Inevitably Attacks by terrorist groups in central this communal violence has also made Mali, targeting state officials and- re farmer-herder relations more conflict- ligious and civilian opponents, have ual and difficult to manage. In many led to an increase in inter-communal cases they are directly related to land violence. These deadly conflicts are issues and the management of rural relatively localised and run along ethnic resources. An important development, lines, mainly between Fulani and Bam- however, as reported by the Centre for bara and Fulani and Dogon. The gen- Humanitarian Dialogue, is the signing eral pattern is of Bambara and Dogon on 28 August 2018 of an intercommu- militias launching retaliatory attacks nal peace agreement between Fulani against Fulani pastoralist communities and Dogon communities from the area in response to the wave of attacks on (‘circle’) of Koro in Sevare, in the region local authorities by Katibat Macina fol- of Mopti. The accord was signed by 30 lowers, most of whom are Fulani. Ter- Dogon and Fulani village leaders from rorist attacks led to a retreat of state the municipalities of the area affected 68 authority from parts of central Mali by the conflict. (Mopti region being the worst affect- ed), notably from rural areas where the state was already weak.

68 https://www.hdcentre.org/fr/updates/fula- 67 International Crisis Group (July 2016), Central ni-and-dogon-communities-from-koro-sign-a- Mali: An Uprising in the Making? Africa Report peace-agreement-in-the-mopti-region-of-mali no. 238.

47 • To address the root causes of the recruitment of pastoralists into d. Conflict prevention and resolution insurgent groups, including cross- Given the magnitude of threats facing border dynamics of this phenomenon; the Malian state, particularly in the • To double efforts to support and central and northern regions, the Mali- preserve local conflict resolution an authorities are severely constrained mechanisms and promote dialogue in their ability to address growing pres- between those groups most affected sures facing pastoralists. Yet, an essen- by conflict, including farmers and tial part of restoring state authority on herders; the Malian territory involves address- ing the grievances of communities that • The conflicts in Mali have gender- have taken up arms. Local authorities specific impacts, therefore gender- need to rebuild their legitimacy and responsive policy interventions in restore a social contract with alienated the livestock and farming sectors are sections of the population if the mul- needed for conflict prevention and titude of conflicts are to be resolved. resolution processes to be effective This will require dialogue and targeted and to preserve human rights; development interventions, not least in pastoral and farming communities. • To undertake concrete actions to prevent and address human rights abuses and violations relating to conflicts between farmers and herders Recommendations and other groups; to strengthen efforts • To increase investments in both the to identify and hold accountable agricultural and livestock sectors in perpetrators of such crimes. Mali to support the livelihoods of local populations – and boost the national economy;

• To restore state authority and strengthen the provision of basic infrastructure and social services to rural areas, addressing long-term grievances of communities that have taken up arms;

48 CHAPTER 4: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

While terrorism has not been a regular threat to them, some pastoralists, in Introduction their cross-border transhumance into Pastoralism is a fundamental aspect Mali, are affected by banditry. Mauri- of life and culture in Mauritania, both tania’s pastoral code regulates pastoral historically and in the present day. The activities and conflict prevention be- rearing of domestic livestock on a sed- tween farmers and pastoralists and be- entary basis or larger herds through tween different groups of pastoralists. transhumance is practised by a major- ity of the rural population. Agriculture accounts for about a quarter of the a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in Mauritanian economy, and about 70% Mauritania of this involves livestock rearing of one Pastoralism in Mauritania is deter- type or another. 69 mined by rainfall patterns and the dis- Presently, Mauritania generally has tribution of water and pasture, which low levels of violent conflict between vary seasonally and between differ- farmers and herders and between pas- ent regions of the country. The aridity toralists. At times tensions arise due increases moving northwards where, to competition for pasture and water, except in scattered oases, agriculture blockage of transhumance routes, and is impossible; the only livestock that the destruction of crops by livestock. survive in the desert are camels and, There are problems with natural re- in some areas, a few domestic sheep source management and the allocation and goats. The main pastoral zone in of space for pastoralists and farmers Mauritania, with the highest number in the agro-pastoral zone. In areas too of livestock, is in the south.70 The river- arid for agriculture, challenges involve ine areas are especially important, but how to manage rangeland and relation- this is an agro-pastoral zone and that is ships between pastoralist groups. where conflicts between farmers and pastoralists can arise. Mauritania’s long southern border is also its most impor- 69 Fieldwork for this study was carried out both in northern and southern Mauritania, with more 70 FAOSTAT imputes that in 2016 there were focus on the south, as that is where the majority 18.4 million cattle, 9.6 million sheep, 6.2 million of pastoralists and livestock are, including large goats, and 1.5 million camels in Mauritania. herds of cattle, which cannot survive further Data retrieved from http://www.fao.org/faostat/ north due to the greater aridity. en/#data/QL, 22 March 2018.

49 tant transhumance zone, with nomadic tic coast (across the border from Saint groups moving their cattle, sheep, goats Louis, Senegal). and camels between Mauritania, Sen- The Senegal valley, including the Futa egal and Mali, on a seasonal basis. The Toro, is the most fertile part of Mauri- Mauritania-Senegal border is marked tania and is a key water and agro-pas- by the (the right bank toral resource for both Mauritania and belongs to Mauritania, the left bank to Senegal. Meanwhile the eastern half of Senegal). On the Mauritanian side, the Mauritania’s southern frontier, border- Senegal River flows approximately 600 ing Mali and stretching across Assaba, kilometres from Gouray (near Sélibabi, Hodh El-Gharbi, and Hodh El-Chargui ), to Rosso and be- regions, has less water but fewer farms. yond in , near the Atlan- This is a key pastoral zone, with a large

Figure 6: Map of Mauritania. Source: https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/mauritania_ rel95.jpg.

50 number of livestock and predominantly ers with their origins in Senegal. The Moor pastoralists. They have perma- Haalpulaar and living near the nent settlements on the Mauritanian river are generally agro-pastoralists but side of the border but the herders are moving northwards or east away from highly mobile, moving on cross-border the agricultural areas they are only con- transhumance into the Kayes, Kou- centrated on pastoralism, often with likoro, and Segou regions of Mali dur- large herds. ing the dry season and then returning northwards with the rains. The rearing of camels and goats is important for people in Mauritania’s All the large towns in southern Mauri- desert areas, but if disputes arise it is tania are mixed in population. Smaller between pastoralists themselves, com- dispersed villages, hamlets and pas- peting for available water or pasture. toralist camps are often more homog- Central and northern Mauritania are enous. The majority of pastoralists in well beyond the limit of agriculture, Mauritania are Moor (white and black) except in oases where irrigated farming and Haalpulaar (also referred to as Peul in palmeries is a valuable economic ac- or Fulani/Fulbe).71 The Haalpulaaren tivity. Some camels are owned by pas- are concentrated in the Futa Toro – toralists, but the larger herds usually where they tend to be sedentary or belong to elites living in town (usually semi-sedentary; while the Mbororo or white Moors). Herders are then em- nomadic Fulbe are also present further ployed to look after them. Their tran- east along the southern border with shumance tracks can range from south- Mali. ern Mauritania all the way across long desert routes to , Another major group in the Senegal val- near the Algerian border in the north. ley is the Soninké, particularly around Sometimes good pasture for camels is Sélibabi, and they are predominantly also found around Zouérat (near the farmers. There are also Wolof farm- border with , see map). The mobility of transhumant pastoral- 71 Leservoisier (2012: 159) notes that Haalpu- laaren is the self-ascribed name of the Fulbe ists only has the potential to trigger in this region. It means “Pulaar-speakers”. conflict in agro-pastoral zones where See Leservoisier, Olivier (2012), ‘Ethnicity and there are farming activities. Till now, Interdependence: Moors and Haalpulaaren in the Senegal Valley’, in James McDougall and no large-scale violent conflicts between Judith Scheele (eds.), Saharan Frontiers: Space farmers and herders were reported in and Mobility in Northwest Africa. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Pulaar Mauritania, but smaller disputes occur exhibits marked dialectical differences to the on a regular basis. Fulfulde spoken further east: they are essentially variants of the same language, with the same linguistic roots, but now they are hardly mutually intelligible.

51 Pastoralism and the livestock trade Mauritania is a highly arid country between Mauritania, Mali and Sen- where pasture does not tend to last egal are vital economic activities, in throughout the dry season. And in ar- which mobility is fundamental. It was eas where there is good pasture (from claimed that 400,000 sheep are sent grasses and trees) there tends to be annually from Kiffa to Senegal for the more pressure from large numbers of Tabaski festival (Eid el-Adha or ‘Festi- livestock. Shortage of pasture (or wa- val of Sacrifice’).72 There is more tran- ter) necessitates transhumance, but shumance of pastoralists from Mau- the conditions could be improved if ani- ritania to Senegal than the other way mal feed distribution was better organ- around.73 ised, especially in the late dry season.

Challenges relating to cross-border transhumance b. Challenges facing pastoralists Mauritania-Mali Water scarcity There is a high level of pastoral mobil- Access to water is a challenge for pas- ity across Mauritania’s southern border toralists throughout Mauritania, due to with Mali. There is also trade across the country’s low rainfall. This can lead the border. The movement is two-way to competition around water points but cross-border transhumance of pas- (wells or bore holes). Water points can toralists based in Mauritania outpaces be community run or privately owned that of Malians moving north. As com- and access usually has to be paid for. pared to Mauritania, pasture and water A general demand in Mauritania is for are more accessible further south in more wells and bore holes to be con- Mali. When the rains come in Maurita- structed in villages and along tran- nia, pastoralists spend the grazing pe- shumance routes. The bore holes work riod there; conversely, during the dry well with solar panels, and some have season, they walk with their livestock already been built in this way, variously to Mali. funded via DFID and World Bank pro- grammes, for example. Water retention Until 2016, pastoralists from Maurita- and storage could also be improved. nia could graze their animals freely in Mali; since then, some limits seem to Shortages of pasture and animal feed in have been placed on their movements. the dry season Today, Mauritanian pastoralists herd 72 Interview with GNAP representative in Kiffa, alongside Malian pastoralists (most of 19 February 2017. whom are Fulani, whereas a majority

73 Interview at the Ministry of Livestock, Kaédi, of the Mauritanians on the same tran- , 14 February 2017. shumance route are Moor, with some

52 Fulani). They appear to have a recipro- feed their livestock. Some Mauritanian cal relationship: when Malian pastoral- pastoralists reportedly cut down whole ists go on transhumance to Mauritania trees or uprooted them, triggering ten- at the end of the dry season, they mi- sions with forest guards. grate together with the Mauritanians, who then look after them on the other The relationship between forest guards side of the border. There is inter-mar- and pastoralists seems to be difficult in riage between Fulani communities on other parts of Mali as well. Significantly, each side of the border.74 non-state armed groups (assumed to be linked to the Katibat Macina) operat- There is no state support for security ing in Mopti and Segou regions of cen- cooperation between pastoralists on tral Mali have reportedly assassinated the Malian and Mauritanian sides of several forest guards, singling them out the border, so pastoralists rely on their as targets along with the local admin- vigilante groups for surveillance and to istration and security agencies, such as prevent theft and other crimes around the police and army. No such violent the livestock trade. Overall, the Mali- incidents have been recorded in Kayes ans and Mauritanians seem to have a and Koulikoro regions, which to date good relationship. Yet, pastoral mobil- have been less affected by the insur- ity between Mauritania and Mali pre- gencies in central and northern Mali.76 sents particular challenges for farmers Incidents of cattle theft are also report- in the Kayes and Koulikoro regions of edly rare in Kayes and Koulikoro, unlike Mali. Problems arise when pastoralists in Senegal where cattle theft is said move their herds southwards in the to be more common. For pastoralists dry season before the crops have been crossing Mauritania’s southern border harvested. This can cause substantial with Mali from Hodh El-Gharbi, they damage to farmland and trigger local seem not to be affected by the conflict conflicts.75 in northern Mali or Mopti and Segou in central Mali. Pastoralists and forest guards in Mali Mauritania-Senegal Mauritanians in Hodh El-Gharbi (mainly Moor and Haalpulaar’en (Fulani) pasto- Transhumance between Mauritania ralists) who cross into Mali have report- and Senegal occurs on a large scale but ed that Malian forest guards impose is seasonal. Pastoralists need to ob- heavy fines on them for using trees to tain transhumance permits certifying

74 This was evident in the village of Goupou Modi, a Fulani village 9km from Sélibabi. 15 76 The town of Nara, Koulikoro region, is an February 2017. exception, as the KatibatMacina has attacked Malian security forces there (as in June 2016). 75 Conversation with livestock specialists at the However, the generalised insecurity in Mopti has PRAPS office in Bamako, 23 March 2017. not reached Koulikoro.

53 that their livestock are vaccinated, pay Mauritania’s eastern border with Mali is customs duty on their livestock when mainly desert, with few pastoralists. It is they cross the border, and declare their a militarised zone and according to the length of stay in Senegal. Fulani pasto- former governor of Hodh El Charghi77, ralists in Senegal tend to stay in villages pastoralists are forbidden from coming at night, not with their livestock in the close to it. Large stretches of the bor- bush. Herders crossing from Mauritania der between Hodh El-Chargui and the are made to do the same, which is fa- Timbuktu region of Mali are not navi- cilitated by social connections between gable by vehicle due to soft sand and families and communities of pastoral- rolling dunes, but there are entry points ists from each side of the border and used by smugglers. As the border is not contact with the local administration a large transhumance zone, its official in Senegal. They bring their livestock closure has not seriously affected pas- to fields near the villages to watch over toralism in either Mauritania or Mali. them there. There is no reported block- age of transhumance routes between The long borders between Mauritania Mauritania and Senegal. Water scarcity and Mali have received the most inter- is the main challenge, and sometimes national concern, with fears that - ter herders are prevented from access- rorist groups from Mali could penetrate ing privately owned bore holes (often into Mauritania. The main risk in south- owned by other pastoralists). ern Mauritania is from the area around the Wagadou forest in Mali and around Nampala, which are known militant hotspots bordering south-east Hodh c. Security challenges and the causes El-Chargui region. The M’Bera refugee and drivers of conflicts camp near Bassikounou, also south- Terrorism east Mauritania, is close to volatile ar- eas of Segou and Timbuktu regions in With terrorist groups operating in Mali, Mali. There are an estimated 50,000 there is concern that they could cross refugees in the camp, mainly from Tim- the border either to launch attacks or buktu region, assisted by UNHCR. The to use Mauritania as a rear base. The Malian refugees move in and out of the Mauritanian security forces are mo- camp but it remains open, as condi- bilised in strategic border areas to try tions for the refugees in their places of and prevent this, and security along the origin are still insecure. Presently, dis- roads is tight. Mobility across the east- putes over water and grazing land are ern border with the Timbuktu region of at a low level between the refugees and Mali is curtailed, but this hardly affects host communities. pastoralism as the main pastoral zone is to the south. 77 Who during fieldwork for this study in February 2017 was governor of .

54 Armed robbery the gendarmerie brought in. According to the Ministry of Livestock in Brakna, A main security concern appears to be pastoralists face serious pressures in the frequent armed robbery around the riverine areas. Access to water can the town of Nara, in the Koulikoro re- be a problem because the river banks 78 gion of Mali. Timbedra is 200 km from are heavily cultivated, blocking routes Nara, which is a major regional livestock for livestock, and pasture land along market attracting traders from different the river is often not respected. That is ECOWAS countries (it is estimated a a trigger for conflict, as it means cattle minimum of 10,000 cattle and 100,000 are more likely to encroach onto farms. small ruminants are sold at Nara eve- The Haalpulaar (Peul/Fulani) were re- ry week). The robbers are reportedly portedly the majority in Brakna, fol- armed with Kalashnikovs and attack lowed by the Moors. Disputes can take traders on the roads to or from Nara an inter-ethnic dimension or be within market, every 2-4 weeks. It is thought the same group that is engaged in both those involved are Moors, from both farming and pastoralism. sides of the border. The economy of Timbedra and its estimated 80,000 in- Prominent pastoralists in Kaédi, capital habitants depend on pastoralism and of the Gorgol region, report that if there the livestock trade. is drought or low rainfall in the north, large numbers of animals come down, Farmer-herder relations and if the crops have not yet been har- 80 The main area in Mauritania where vested there can be damage to farms. tensions between farmers and herd- This is inter-regional transhumance and ers arise is in the Senegal Valley. It was the southward movement can include reported in Aleg, at the Ministry of camel herders from the Adrar region or Livestock in the Regional Delegation of Tagant, as well as cattle from adjoining Brakna, that conflicts between herders regions. It can be a source of conflict if and cultivators mainly occur in the rainy such transhumance is not coordinated season. These conflicts can be violent with farmers or local authorities, as the and people are sometimes injured, but village authorities would be expected no fatalities were reported.79 Disputes to determine a corridor for the livestock are generally settled by community to use. In cases of conflict, traditional leaders (generally older men); only for leaders and local authorities intervene. serious cases are local authorities and According to officials at the Ministry of Livestock, pastoralists do not usually 78 This problem was discussed during research at Timbedra cattle market in Hodh El-Chargui. let their cattle or other livestock wan-

79 Fieldwork interviews in Aleg, 14 February 80 Interview with Ba Alhassan Amadou and 2017. BachirBellal Diallo, Kaédi, 14 February 2017.

55 der onto farms and violent conflicts routes between Mauritania and Mali between farmers and pastoralists are being blocked, as these are rangelands. rare. One of the reasons given was the Blockage of transhumance routes oc- prevalence of agro-pastoralism, where curs primarily in agro-pastoral zones much of the local population is involved and this was reported to be a problem in both activities (farming and rearing in the Senegal valley. livestock). Farming communities in Gor- Outside the agro-pastoral zone, the gol include Wolof, Soninké, Moor, and competition is not between farmers Haalpulaar, while pastoralism is mainly and herders, but between pastoralists practised by Moors and Haalpulaar. themselves. There is a great deal of These are not homogenous groups – cooperation and not always competi- they are internally variegated by line- tion, but in some circumstances- pres age, social background, and in some sure on pasture and water creates ten- cases inter-marriage – but latent inter- sion between user groups over access ethnic tensions are also weakened by rights. This is an issue in different pas- overlaps in economic activities. This is toral zones – among Moor and Fulani particularly the case with sedentarised cattle herders in southern Mauritania Haalpulaar and Moor agro-pastoralists and Moor camel herders further north. and potentially less so with Soninké However, there are established tradi- and Wolof, who tend to farm more than tions and practises of natural resource herd. But Pulaar-speakers reportedly management, many of which have form a substantial majority in Gorgol been enshrined in Mauritania’s Pasto- and they tend to be agro-pastoralists. ral Code.

The Pastoral Code (July 2000) in Mau- d. Conflict prevention and resolution ritania is an important tool for con- flict prevention and natural resource Some of the reasons given for the management. In agro-pastoral zones peaceful resolution of conflicts- be (notably the Senegal River valley) the tween farmers and pastoralists in Mau- challenge is to manage the relation- ritania include: i) agro-pastoralism, ship between mobile pastoralists and in which farmers and pastoralists do sedentary farmers. In parts of the not necessarily pursue exclusive liveli- country that are beyond the limit of hoods – many people farm and have agriculture (about 400mm isohyets livestock, creating interconnections; ii) for rain fed crops) the challenge is to common religious affiliation, as most effectively manage the rangeland en- of the population is Muslim; iii) inter- vironment and the use of available marriage between groups. There were water and pasture among pastoralists no reported problems of transhumance themselves. The relationship between

56 nomadic pastoralist groups themselves • To construct more water points and between pastoralists and farmers along transhumance routes, both in is addressed in the Pastoral Code, pri- Mauritania and in Mali and northern oritising local conflict prevention and Senegal. As well as providing water management as the first stage, before wherever possible in areas of scarcity, involving state authorities or courts.81 the sustainable consumption of water should also be encouraged;

• To establish or strengthen existing Recommendations operations of customary courts and • To establish permanent cross border reinforce traditional and administrative commissions between Mauritania mechanisms for non-violent dispute and Senegal, and Mauritania and resolution; Mali, to help co-ordinate and facilitate • To enforce Mauritania’s Pastoral cross-border transhumance. Inter- Code and raise awareness within civil state cooperation could focus on society, at the grassroots, and among issues such as rights of passage, the farmers and herders on their rights and timing of transhumance and, where duties in relation to the pastoral code. necessary, an official identification of the transhumance routes – to prevent damage to farmers’ crops and to address the needs of pastoralists;

81 Wabnitz, Hans-Werner (2009) “Return to the Sources: Revival of Traditional Nomads’ Rights to Common Property Resources in the Code Pastoral of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania”, Natural Resources Journal, 49: 191-218.

57 CHAPTER 5: THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER

Introduction

Pastoralism forms an essential part of of the country. Niger, while relatively Niger’s economy and is adapted to the politically stable, is surrounded by different climatic and ecological condi- countries with ongoing insurgencies or tions in the country, most of which falls other forms of insecurity (Nigeria, Mali, within the Sahara and Sahel. Niger faces Chad, , Burkina Faso, and Benin). difficult environmental challenges that In analysing pastoralism and security in affect pastoralists. These challenges are Niger, it is therefore necessary to look in turn compounded by the civil inse- closely at the cross-border impacts of curity that is prevalent in some parts wider regional security challenges.

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CHAD Yatakala l Tahoua Tânout lo Ayorou l a Keïta Bankilaré D Bankilaré Illéla Filingué Tillabéri Nguigmi Mao Téra TILLABÉRI Madaoua MARADI Gouré Baléyara Birnin Konni Zinder Bol Niamey ima R be DOSSO Maradi Diffa u Yo Sirba g oubi Say Birnin Gaouré du Lake Chad Gar Sokoto Maïné Soroa a om Dosso Katsina Komadugu K a Nguru BURKINA to o So C k k a La Tapoa o o Kaura Namoda ana d A FASO N S to G d M gu a Kantchari i Birnin Kebbi g N'Djamena g du E e NIGERIA N r Zam a R fara Gusau ejia m Fada- ad o The boundaries and names shown and the designations O C Kano H K Diapaga Gaya h used on this map do not imply official endorsement or O Ngourma a

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Map No. 4234 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support January 2018 Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Figure 7: Map of Niger. Source: United Nations.

58 4. In part of south-west of Niger, the ecology marks an intersection between a. Pastoralism and Transhumance Sahel and savanna environments and Pastoral systems in Niger are deter- accommodates both farmers and pas- mined by the country’s climate and toralists. ecology, and by political factors, includ- Pastoralists in Niger are mobile, moving ing patterns of insecurity. There are four their herds on a seasonal basis in search broad eco-climatic zones in Niger that of available pasture and water. There heavily influence the pattern of pasto- is internal transhumance within Niger 82 ral production (see Figure 8 below): and cross-border transhumance into 1. The largest and most sparsely popu- neighbouring countries: Benin, Burkina lated is the Saharan zone, where pasto- Faso, and Mali to the west, Nigeria to ralism exists at oases and around wells, the south, and northern Cameroon and and is mostly limited to camels and Chad to the east. some goats; The main ethno-linguistic groups - as 2. The second eco-climatic zone is Sa- sociated with pastoralism in Niger are helo-Saharan, which is also arid but on the Fulani, Tuareg, Arab, Tubu (Teda), average receives slightly more rainfall and Buduma (Yedina). There are clan and can therefore support more pasto- differences within each group, and land ralists. Limited rainfall means this zone tenure and access to pasture vary be- is largely above the limit of agriculture, tween them and can be locally specific, except where there are ground water defined by family, lineage and history sources, such as around Lake Chad in rather than ethnicity per se. There are the south-east. differences in the distribution and spe- cialisation of pastoral groups, as well as 3. Third is the Sahelian zone, much of some overlaps. Fulani and Tuareg com- which is agro-pastoral, with a presence munities have the widest distribution of farmers and pastoralists. There are in Niger; the Tubu are more limited to indications that in some areas farmers desert areas bordering Chad and Libya, have moved northwards, to cultivate while the Buduma are concentrated in areas for rainfed agriculture that some the Lake Chad area. There is interaction years ago were the preserve of pasto- between groups, and for example mixed ralists. Fulani and Tuareg villages in central Ni- ger. Traditionally, Tuareg and Tubu are more specialised in camels and occupy 82 Ministère de l‘Élevage, Direction des Statis- more arid areas, while the various Fu- tiques, SIM Bétail. Atlas Sur L’élevage au Niger. lani clans own most of the cattle stock Tome 1: L‘Élevage au Niger, une richesse sans fin. 2014. and are in more semi-arid areas. There

59 Figure 8: The main eco-climatic zones in Niger. Source: Ministère de l‘Élevage, Niamey, 2014. is however considerable contact and Loss of pasture and blockage of tran- they interact and sometimes compete shumance routes and fight for common resources. One of the main difficulties pastoralists report in Niger is insufficient pasture, especially during the long dry season. b. Challenges facing pastoralists This is possibly linked to diminish- Pastoral livelihoods in Niger have be- ing rainfall – with reportedly shorter come insecure due to adverse political, rainy seasons – and increased popula- economic and ecological conditions, tion pressure. The pressure on pasture and due to physical insecurity caused comes from pastoralists themselves by insurgency, inter-group conflict, and and from farmers. There has been banditry. There are regionally specific some movement of pastoralists away forms of insecurity in Niger and general from arid areas where pasture is lack- problems affecting pastoral livelihoods ing, to parts of the Sahelian zone where in the country as a whole. at least some pasture is available. This

60 has increased the burden on pastoralist Depletion of livestock communities in southern Niger, in what are already strained ecological condi- Some pastoralists in Tillaberi region tions. Where there is land with high and around Dakoro in potential for farming, migrant farmers report that they have fewer cattle now have also moved in and increased the than a decade ago because of insuffi- area of land under cultivation, compet- cient pasture, caused by the expansion ing with pastoralists and agro-pastoral- of agriculture, overgrazing, and shorter ists. rainy seasons. In most of Niger there is no longer enough pasture to sustain Another trend in the pastoral zone has the livestock, so during the dry season been for farmers (men and women) part of the herds must either be taken to collect and store forage (including out of the country on transhumance or grasses), reducing what is available for they must be given animal feed. Pasto- resident and transhumant herders dur- ralists often have to sell some of their ing the dry season. They may then sell livestock to buy animal feed, gradually such fodder to pastoralists, whereas depleting their wealth. There are con- previously pastoralists would graze cerns over whether pastoralism can be their animals on it directly. Competi- sustained for the next generation. tion among pastoralists and between Insufficient animal feed in the dry sea- pastoralists and farmers around water son sources is also an issue in some areas.

In Niger, pressure on pasture is a more As pasture land is not well protected serious concern than the blockage of and is affected by erratic rainfall, ani- transhumance routes. In some areas, mal feed is necessary to sustain the the transhumance routes are reported- pastoral economy, especially in the late ly kept open, but in other areas animal dry season. There is, however, a large grazing areas and transhumant routes discrepancy between supply and de- are reportedly blocked or narrowed mand. The shortage of animal feed also by farms. This constitutes a source of pushes the price up above the govern- farmer-herder conflicts in agro-pastoral ment subsidised rate. The market is tak- areas. The other challenge is the timing en over by middle men in many cases, of transhumance: if there is scarcity of who sell subsidised feed to pastoralists pasture further north, pastoralists will at a profit. sometimes move southwards into agri- Access to education and health services cultural areas before the harvest. This can lead to the destruction of crops if With ecological, political, and demo- transhumance routes and grazing land graphic constraints on pastoralists and are inadequate. the livestock sector in Niger, some of

61 the younger generation are seeking and civil insecurity, the spill-over effects opportunities outside pastoralism. Yet of the conflict in Libya, and of terrorism one challenge in the rural areas of Ni- in Mali and Nigeria, are evident along ger is the lack of educational, health Niger’s borders. and other services. This is also a gender issue, as currently many women from Militant groups operating in border pastoralist families in Niger migrate to areas of Niger tend to emanate from towns and cities in other West African neighbouring countries, but they draw countries during the long dry season, to on some local support. There are cur- supplement household incomes. Elders rently two main zones of insurgent in their communities complain that the violence affecting pastoralists in Niger. women usually return with very few The first zone spans northern Tillaberi savings, even after six months away. and parts of western Tahoua region in Some can be seen begging in Niamey south-west Niger, where there have and other towns. been periodic cross-border attacks and raids from in Mali. This zone includes part of the Liptako-Gourma area (broadly, where the borders of Ni- c. Security challenges and the causes ger, Mali, and Burkina Faso meet) and and drivers of conflict extends to areas of Mali and Niger to In some parts of Niger, the pressures on the east and north-east. The second pastoral livelihoods outlined above are zone affected by insurgency is the Lake accentuated by various kinds of physi- Chad Basin, south-east Niger, where cal insecurity. The security situation for Boko Haram attacks and the military pastoralists is generally better in Niger campaign to counter Boko Haram have than in neighbouring Nigeria, central/ had severe impacts on the Diffa region. northern Mali, and even parts of Bur- The Boko Haram insurgency has had kina Faso and Benin. There are however destructive impacts on many of the zones of insecurity and locally specific pastoralist communities around Lake problems that have severely disrupted Chad and south-east Diffa. The lake is a pastoral production and uprooted peo- vital resource for pastoralism, farming, ple. The dynamics of these particular and fishing, and the combination of in- conflicts and threats are outlined be- surgency and government measures to low. combat it has severely compromised Insurgency and cross-border attacks food security and the economy of the Lake Chad Basin.83 There has been In most violent conflict is at a low level, but since the overthrow 83 Attacks by Boko Haram spread from Borno of Gaddafi in 2011 and the ensuing war and Yobe States in north-east Nigeria – where the sect originates – across the border into Diffa

62 large-scale displacement within and the mid-1970s, when drought depleted into Diffa and a major humanitarian pastoralists’ herds and pushed some crisis that persists today. In both these to raid the cattle of their neighbours. zones of insecurity there has been a Violent conflict between the Daoussa- degree of local recruitment and col- hak and Fulani resurfaced with the Tu- laboration with terrorist groups – out areg rebellions in Mali and Niger from of necessity, opportunistically, or due 1990, when many Daoussahak joined to ideological commitment – and some the rebellions and again started raid- opposition. The areas of Niger affected ing Fulani cattle. This led the Fulani to by cross-border attacks and insurgency form a self-defence militia in 1997 to have been put under a state of emer- protect themselves against Tuareg, and gency. In Tillaberi region, the affect- especially Daoussahak, raiders.86 The ed departments are Abala, Ouallam, attacks continued even after the Tuareg Bankilaré, and Ayorou.84 The Nigerien rebellions of the early to mid-1990s in military is deployed in these areas and Mali and Niger had ended. According a curfew and restrictions on mobility to the International Institute for Secu- have been imposed, including a ban on rity Studies (ISS), the fighters in -“mé motorcycles. harist” units (“nomadic brigades”) of the Malian army deployed in the area, Cross-border attacks escalated after the “often recruited from the ranks of for- start of the civil war in Mali in January mer rebels integrated into the army 2012, between Daoussahak (part of following the peace accords, [and] Tuareg society) and Fulani communi- have been accused of either ignoring ties on both sides of the porous Mali- the criminal activities plaguing the -re 85 Niger border. This conflict dates to gion, including cattle theft, or collud- in 2013, then escalated in 2014-16. ing with the criminals.”87 The Pastoral-

84 Interviews in the prefecture of Tillaberi, 26 The Daoussahak have participated in most of the April 2017, and Ouallam, 27 April 2017. Tuareg rebellions. See: Christiansen-Bolli, Regula (2010), A grammar of Tadaksahak, a northern 85 The Daoussahak, or Idaksahak (their self- Songhay language of Mali, doctoral thesis, ascribed name), are nomadic pastoralists living Leiden University Centre for Linguistics (LUCL), mainly in the administrative circles of Menaka Leiden University. Online. and northern Ansongo, Gao region of Mali. Their language is called Tadaksahak, a Songhay 86 Interview with Boubacar Diallo at GAJEL language that has completely different origins to offices, Niamey, 25 April 2017. The formation of Tamasheq but which exhibits heavy lexical bor- a Fulani self-defence militia in March 1997 is also rowings. The Daoussahak have different geogra- noted in ‘Liptako-Gourma: epicentre of the Sahel phical and linguistic origins to the Kel Tamasheq, crisis?’ Institute for Security Studies. Peace and and they are regarded as a ‘distinct ethnic group Security Council Report, Dakar, 30 June 2017. and a dependent social community’ within Tuareg society, specifically part of the Kel-Ataram 87 ‘Liptako-Gourma: epicentre of the Sahel (“people of the west”). They were herdsmen for crisis?’ Institute for Security Studies. Peace and the nobility of the Iwellemmedan Tuareg and Security Council Report, Dakar, 30 June 2017. performed religious duties as a Maraboutic tribe. Online.

63 ists’ Association of North Tillaberi has perpetrated by militant groups along documented many attacks carried out the borders of Tillaberi and Tahoua. The by Tuareg (mainly Daoussahak) raiders violence in both regions has adversely on pastoral Fulani camps from 1990 affected pastoralists; it has also to some to 2016, with their records indicating extent involved them. There is some that cumulatively, for the period 1990- level of recruitment of Fulani pasto- 2007, the Tuareg and the Malian secu- ralists in the Liptako-Gourma area and rity forces killed 316 Fulani pastoralists along the Niger-Mali border, whereas in and stole thousands of livestock.88 The the Lake Chad Basin the pastoral Fulani attacks occurred in Gao region of Mali have not tended to join Boko Haram. and as cross-border raids into northern In eastern Diffa region, certain Fulani Tillaberi region of Niger.89 A 2007 agree- clans have collaborated with the insur- ment reached to stop fighting lasted gents to gain access to pasture, after only three years, until April 2010.90 It other Fulani (notably the ) is in this zone that reports are made were forcibly displaced by Boko Haram. about the recruitment of pastoral Fu- Raiding between pastoralists – report- lanis into terrorist groups.91 edly Tubu raiding camels owned by the Fulani in eastern Diffa – is also -occur Boko Haram’s violence in south-east ring, as the Boko Haram insurgency has Diffa is on a larger scale to that being encouraged an illicit livestock trade.92

88 ‘Bilan non-exhaustive des attaques Toua- Cattle rustling, banditry and conflicts regs et des FDS maliens sur les éleveurs Peulhs between pastoralists nigériens de 1990 à 2007, du 21 avril 2010 au 10 aout 2016’, Conseil des Éleveurs Nord Tillabéri. List obtained from Boubacar Diallo at GAJEL For pastoralists in Niger, banditry and offices, Niamey, 25 April 2017. livestock theft pose risks along sections of the borders with Mali, Burkina Faso, 89 The reality of cross-border attacks by the Daoussahaq Tuareg was confirmed by pastora- Nigeria and Chad. Fulani pastoralists lists who were directly affected. For example, in – southern Tillaberi region – Hauwa Aliou, a Bodejo (Wodaabe) woman which is relatively peaceful, stated that interviewed in Niamey, was from Abala (north Tillaberi) and her family had been impoverished banditry was a significant problem to by Daoussahaq raids in the 1990s. She was beg- them during their transhumance be- ging for alms in Niamey with her niece. Niamey, 29 April 2017. tween Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin, more so than the narrowing of tran- 90 Fulani representatives list the names of 13 shumance routes.93 In other contexts, people killed in a Tuareg attack on a Fulani camp in Innabaguel, Niger, on 21 April 2010. It is unclear what triggered this attack. 92 Interview with Abdou Nino, a leader of the National Federation of Agro-Pastoralism in Niger, 91 Cocks, Tim and David Lewis, ‘Why Niger and Niamey, 29 April 2017. Mali’s cattle herders turned to jihad’,Reuters , 12 November 2017. Accessed online, 13 November 93 The majority of Fulani in Tamou are agro- 2017. pastoralists, from different clans (lenyi), the

64 raiding occurs between pastoral groups the clashes. The level of farmer-herder (or between farmers and pastoralists) violence is much lower than in neigh- during armed conflicts over control of bouring northern Nigeria, but it is still land and water, or over local or regional a major security concern in Niger.96 The politics. As discussed above, the Tuareg trigger for conflict is usually the de- rebellions in Niger and Mali in the 1990s struction of crops by livestock, some- led to raids on Fulani cattle. Rebellions times due to cattle and small ruminants by groups of Tubu in eastern Niger also moving southwards on transhumance led to clashes with the Fulani, in Diffa into agro-pastoral areas before crops region. 94 This conflict was partially -re have been harvested or just after they solved through a peace accord, but the have been planted. Most conflicts Boko Haram insurgency precipitated re- are seasonal in nature and therefore newed violence between the Tubu and somewhat predictable. They usually Fulani. Armed groups of Tubu are re- stem from disputes over land rights ported to have been raiding Fulani cat- and natural resource access. The most tle and even to have clashed with the common herder-farmer conflicts in Fulani in Kabelawa IDP camp (a UNHCR- Niger are between Fulani pastoralists run camp in south-east Niger, near the and farmers from different ethnic back- border with Chad).95 grounds, especially Zarma, Hausa, and Mawri. All of them are Muslim. Serious Farmer-herder conflicts in Niger and disputes sometimes occur within Fulani during international transhumance agro-pastoral communities in Niger as Violence between farmers and pasto- well, between farmers and herders. ralists in Niger is relatively common, These rarely become violent but occa- with loss of life reported in many of sionally cases have to be taken to the local authorities for resolution.97 Bariɓe and Soneɓe reportedly the largest. Most have cross-border kinship links into neighbouring countries (lenyol such as Gao’oɓe and Jelgoɓe, with a strong presence in northern Mali and northern Burkina Faso respectively were also present). Interviews in Tamou, 29 April 2017. 96 Farmer-herder conflicts have been reported 94 Interview with a leader of the National as a significant issue in Niger for at least three Federation of Agro-Pastoralism in Niger, Niamey, decades. See Gado, Boureima Alpha (2002), 29 April 2017. ‘Arbitration & Resolving Tenure Conflict in Boboye, Niger’, pp. 157-169, in Toulin, C., P. L. 95 Discussions with a senior UN official who had Delville, & S. Traouré (eds.), The Dynamics of been on mission in Diffa region during a major Resource Tenure in West Africa. International Boko Haram attack on Bosso on 3 June 2016. Institute for Environment and Development This displaced an estimated 50,000 people from (IIED, London) in association with James Currey Bosso to Diffa town. He also reported on the publishers, Oxford. Tubu-Fulani conflict. Niamey, 21 April 2017. The information on the Tubu raids was confirmed by 97 Interviews with Fulani agro-pastoralists in pastoralist associations. Tamou, Tillaberi region, 29 April 2017.

65 d. Conflict prevention and Recommendations resolution • To secure the remaining pasture land Although periodic farmer-herder clash- and transhumance routes, and secure es exist – some of them very violent – pastoralists’ tenure rights; most disputes of this type in Niger are resolved peacefully through mediation • To review and support the commit- between the communities involved. tees that manage natural resource There are also land commissions, which access for farmers and herders, with intervene where there are disputes to the aim to reduce conflict; establish who owns a certain land and • To promote women’s participation in for natural resource management. conflict resolution; These are meant to be community based, chaired by the mayor and with • To produce and better distribute representatives from concerned parties animal feed for pastoralists during the – including farmers, pastoralists, and dry season, at an affordable rate; traditional leaders.98 In cases of crop • To construct more watering points damage caused by livestock, the com- (small dams, ponds or reservoirs) and mission will ask the conflicting parties wells and bore holes in pastoral and to provide evidence of the value of the agro-pastoral areas, and address water crops that were destroyed. Disputes storage problems; are usually settled with the payment of compensation by the herder. • To formulate policies, with farmers, pastoralists and local communities, to Conflicts between pastoral groups can combat banditry and cattle rustling. be particularly difficult to mediate, especially where these involve cross- border attacks and there is a need to identify leaders from each side who are representative of those involved in the fighting (for example, Fulani and Daoussahak). Third party mediation is often required (e.g. pastoralist associa- tions and/or the state authorities). Fair judicial processes and access to justice are other important elements.

98 Interview at the Mayor’s office in Ouallam, northern Tillaberi region, 27 April 2017.

66 CHAPTER 6: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Note: Field research for this Chapter The violence extends beyond clashes was carried out at intervals between between individual herders and crop July and September 2017 in the farmers and engulfs whole settlements following states: Plateau, Kaduna, and communities. The proliferation of Kebbi, Katsina, Zamfara, Kwara, small arms and light weapons have ren- Niger, Bauchi and Gombe. Additional dered these conflicts deadlier in recent field research was conducted years99. Their cumulative death toll cur- in February 2018 in Taraba and rently runs into thousands each year Adamawa. Developments that took in Nigeria, often with hundreds killed place in these and other states after in single episodes of violence. At the February 2018 are not covered. The root of these conflicts is increased com- Chapter, however, makes some petition for rural resources and space. reference to federal and state Pressure on land has increased mainly initiatives that have been introduced due to exponential population growth since February 2018 to address in Nigeria. With demographic increase, conflicts between herders and farmers. there is less land available to people These references draw on consultations even as more land is being brought into with government and non-government cultivation throughout the country, in- officials in Nigeria, with ECOWAS, UN cluding in the far North. The Govern- and non-UN partners in Nigeria. As ment’s presence is not felt in many ru- with the overall Study, field research ral areas and there is limited accounta- in Nigeria focused on pastoralism as bility in the management of rural space. the main unit of analysis, with the aim Moreover, states have often failed to to understand why conflicts involving address the needs of the population in pastoralists have escalated in Nigeria an inclusive way, and conflicts between in recent years. herders and farmers are often mixed up with local politics, frequently along ethno-religious lines. Land grabs – of Introduction communal land, farmland and what had been grazing land – by elites and The relationship between farmers and agrobusiness also cause problems for pastoralists has deteriorated in most of Nigeria. Farmer-herder conflicts are 99 Presentation by the ECOWAS Commission at claiming more lives in Nigeria than the ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting on Herders- in the rest of West Africa combined. Farmers Conflicts in West Africa held in Abuja on 26 April 2018.

67 small farmers and pastoralists in some resources.100 Proponents of this stand- states. In central and northern Nigeria, point argue that the alienation of indig- pastoralists have lost access to much enous land for open and unregulated land they previously used for grazing. grazing may constitute a violation of in- In addition, transhumance routes are digenous rights to property and culture, frequently blocked by the expansion especially in areas where pastoralism is of farmland. But even with the general not a major traditional occupation.As is increase in farmer-herder conflicts in the case in many other ECOWAS coun- Nigeria, the situation varies between tries, the debate around access to land states. In some areas the relationship and free movement is one of the most is peaceful, usually due to local efforts contentious issues in Nigeria. to manage access to land and water, ecological and demographic conditions Given that animal movement across and the history of pastoralism in spe- states is a central feature of farmer- cific states. In recent years, pastoral- herder conflicts in Nigeria, addressing ists in Nigeria have increasingly been these conflicts will require construc- migrating permanently or on seasonal tive responses and policies at both transhumance southward from north- federal and state levels. In some states ern states in search of more favourable urgent conflict resolution measures are grazing conditions. This has increased needed; in other states, initiatives to pressure on farmers not only in the prevent the emergence of conflict are Middle Belt but also in places in south- essential. Overall, robust efforts are east and southwest Nigeria, which pre- needed to address the rampant impu- viously had low populations of pastoral- nity of herder-farmer conflicts in the ists. Deadly confrontations have ensued country. Despite years of attacks and between herdsmen and farmers when widespread carnage, few perpetrators animals trespass on farmland. Tensions have been arrested and brought to ac- are further reinforced by differences in count. Moreover, the United Nations ethnicity, culture and religion: the Fula- High Commissioner for Refugees (UN- ni herders are Muslim while the popu- HCR) notes increasing and significant lations in the South and in the Middle population displacements caused by Belt are majority Christian. States and herder-farmer clashes, including refu- judicial authorities have been slow in gees and internally displaced persons mediating and resolving disputes- be (IDPs). It estimates that over 62,000 fore they spiral out of control. persons were internally displaced in Ni- geria in 2017 as a result of such clashes. In this context, human rights advocates are increasingly emphasizing the right of indigenous people to land and its 100 Information provided to UNOWAS by the UNCT/Nigeria.

68 information about the carrying capaci- ties of their destination areas. As a- re a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in sult, it is difficult to recognize when the Nigeria carrying capacities of these areas have According to available data, Nigeria has been reached or overstretched. the highest number of livestock in West Fulani and non-Fulani pastoralists Africa, with the number of cattle esti- mated at 20.5 million101. It is also likely While the majority of pastoralists in that Nigeria has the highest number of Nigeria are Fulani, there are variations pastoralists in West Africa, as colonial- within the Fulani population. There era census data indicates102. Most Nige- are different herding practices, such as rian pastoralists are Fulani by ethnicity, between family-based pastoralists and but Fulani pastoralists are not a homog- hired herders who rear other people’s enous group. In Nigeria there are many cattle. Pastoral mobility involving small different Fulani clans, sub-clans, local family units centred on the rearing and Fulani cultures and dialects, and varia- reproduction of the family herd may tions in herding practices. be less conflict-prone, as relations are maintained with local agricultural com- There is lack of documentation regard- munities across family lines. In contrast, ing nomadic pastoralism and transhu- where young men are given control of mance in Nigeria. Consequently, there livestock and they migrate without are no adequate records of nomadic their families or supervision from el- pastoralists or of those involved in cross ders, they are more prone to destroy- border transhumance. There is lack of ing crops without seeking redress. They 101 Accurate data on current livestock numbers often fail to negotiate access to pasture in Nigeria does not exist. It has been decades since a comprehensive livestock survey was with agricultural communities or even carried out in the country. FAOSTAT figures are with local Fulani populations. These are imputed from old surveys. However, the approxi- challenges that have dramatically in- mation is that in 2016 there were 20.5 million 103 cattle, 42 million sheep, 74 million goats, and creased in recent years . 279,802 camels in Nigeria. http://www.fao.org/ faostat/en/#data/QL, accessed 22 March 2018. It is not only the Fulani who rear ani- mals on an extensive basis. In different 102 The Nigerian census no longer records data on ethnicity or religion, but population censuses parts of Nigeria there are non-Fulani in 1951-3 recorded 3.6 million Fulani in Nigeria communities that keep cattle and other and British Cameroon. Not all these were pastoralists but they accounted for more than livestock. Some have their own tradi- half the Fulani population in West Africa at that tions of livestock rearing, notably the time. See Stenning, Derrick (1959), Savannah diverse pastoralist groups in Borno and Nomads: A Study of the Wodaabe Pastoral Fulani of Western Bornu Province, Northern Region, Nigeria. International African Institute, London: 103 Yet family-based pastoralism and transhu- Oxford University Press. mance still exist in Nigeria.

69 i Nkonni Birn GoureGouré Zinder Bosso CHAD NIGERIA Illela Maradi Wurno NIGER Diffa Bol Dosso Sokoto Baga Daura Magaria Damasak Lake Chad gu to Nguru Komadu o SOKOTO Katsina ok ana S Gumel G Kaura u g Namoda KATSINA Hadejia u N jia ad ig Birnin ade Kom e H BORNO N'Djamena r Zamfa Kebbi ra S Gusau o JIGAWA YOBE Gummi k o Kano ZAMFARA t Maiduguri Dikwa Kamba o Wudil m Dutse Damaturu a Gaya Gulbin r Ka Azare e ds Funtua KANO Potiskum Ye BamaBama KEBBI Dan BackiBacki Gulbi Kari Kandi Damboa Kandi Koko Limani

la Mora YelwaYelwaYelwa Benin o Chibok Zaria g Bajoga Gwari n Mokolo o Biu Kainj KADUNA G Kontagora BAUCHI Reservoir Kaduna GOMBE BENIN K Bauchi a d Mubi u Gombe Gombi Wawa NIGER na os Ndali Biliri Kajama ADAMAWA Minna Kanfanchan Léré Parakou Pala Pankshin Numan Amper Lau é CHAD Ni Bida PLATEAU Bénou ger Badeggi Abuja Yola Kisi KWARA Kwolla alingo FEDERAL Baro CAPITAL Q Shaki NASARAWA Ganye NIGERIA u TERRITORY é

m OYO Ilorin Lafia é Ogbomosho TARABA Tungo Benue Ibi Oyo Kontcha Iseyin EKITI Wukari Iwo Osogbo Makurdi Ibadan Ife Ado-Ekiti KOGI Gboko Bohicon Akure BENUE Ngaoundéré OSUN r Ankpa Owo e Auchi Takum Abong g Oturkpo Katsina Ala Ondo ONDO i National capital N

Ilaro OGUN A Gembu Banyo State capital Nkambe Ore N ENUGU EDO Ogoja Town, village A Enugu Cotonou L LAGOS a Abakaliki M m Major airport Porto- g ba os Benin City Asaba B Awka EBONYI M International boundary Novo R Ikom Lake a A Bamenda Bamendjing h State boundary C.A.R. Bight of Benin Sapele Onits CROSS IMO ABIA RIVER Highway Warri DELTA Owerri Umuahia Yoko Main road CAMEROON Railroad Aba Nikongsamba a RIVERS Calabar nag N Uyo Sa0 50 100 150 200 km Gulf of Guinea i Yenagoa g Port AKWA Kumba e Oron The boundaries and names shown and the designations r BAYELSA Harcourt IBOM 0 50 100 mi D used on this map do not imply official endorsement or e acceptance by the United Nations. l t a Bight of Biafra

Map No. 4228 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support August 2014 Cartographic Section Figure 9: Map of Nigeria. Source: United Nations.

Yobe States – while others acquired cat- torically, pastoralism was more con- tle through association with the pasto- centrated in northern Nigeria, in the ral Fulani usually by working as herds- savannah zones, but there has been a men of boys and getting paid in cattle. growing ‘migratory drift’ of pastoral- ists southwards into sub-humid and Migratory trends humid zones of central and southern Nigeria’s sizeable livestock economy Nigeria. This process has been going on can be explained by the country’s for decades, with pastoralists reaching large population - currently estimated tropical parts of the country along the at about 190 million (and expected to Atlantic seaboard at least half a century 105 double by 2050)104 - and its ecologi- ago . However, this trend has accel- cal conditions, as most of the country erated over the past decade, and with is suitable for livestock rearing. His- the southward extension of pastoral- ism, new pressures have emerged in 104 Census data in Nigeria has a high margin of error. Hence, population estimates and projec- 105 Blench, Roger (1994) ‘The expansion and tions for Nigeria need to be treated with caution. adaptation of Fulbe Pastoralism to subhumid and UN World Population Prospects 2017, https:// humid conditions in Nigeria’. Cahiers d'Études esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/. africaines, 133-135: 197-212.

70 the South. Consequently, pastoralism Transhumance patterns has become a national issue. It tends to be more recent Fulani migrants into Most of the transhumance occurs the South collectively labelled Mbororo within Nigeria’s borders, but there is that are associated with the upsurge in also cross-border transhumance. Pas- conflict. toralists tend to move southwards during the dry season and northwards Pastoral lifestyles during the rainy season, often within an orbit of about 100-200 kilometres. In Nigeria, as elsewhere in West Af- Most transhumance occurs within rica, pastoral lifestyles vary, from no- northern Nigeria - it is not necessar- madic pastoralists to settled or semi ily between northern and southern settled agro-pastoralists. Those with Nigeria – but transhumance and per- purely nomadic lifestyle are now a mi- manent migration from the far North nority among pastoralists in Nigeria. to the far South has increased in the Nomadic pastoralists typically have no past few years. There are exceptions permanent settlement and do not own to this north-south movement, notably land, although some are now starting when transhumance is towards rivers to buy land. More common in Nigeria or other water points, which are dry are semi-settled, transhumant pastoral- season resources that attract pastoral- ists. They tend to have settlements or ists from different directions. The River camps on the edge of villages or their Benue and River Niger and their vari- own houses in villages, but they retain a ous tributaries are key water sources, level of mobility and move the livestock and, alongside the rivers, there is good between pastures for daily grazing and pasture. The Hadejia-Nguru wetlands in on seasonal transhumance. Even for Jigawa and Yobe States and Lake Chad agro-pastoralists who combine farming in Borno State are also important water and livestock rearing, part of the fam- resources for farmers and pastoralists ily remains in a permanent camp or vil- in northern Nigeria. The desiccation of lage, while herdsmen or boys take the Lake Chad over the past half-century cattle and sheep out for grazing. In gen- has had an adverse effect on pastoral eral, pastoralism depends on good rela- livelihoods in northeast Nigeria and for tions with farming communities, upon pastoralists in other countries border- whom they rely for access to land and ing the lake including Niger, Chad, and water. In Nigeria, however, this has be- Cameroon. come more difficult due to demograph- ic pressures, more land being brought There is cross-border transhumance into cultivation and increased civil in- between Nigeria and neighbouring security (communal violence, banditry, countries. In the ECOWAS region, there insurgency). is significant pastoral mobility from the

71 western axis of Nigeria into the Repub- border, which runs all the way from the lic of Benin and to Togo, Ghana and be- Atlantic seaboard to Lake Chad. Came- yond. In some cases, this is a permanent roon is part of the Economic Communi- move due to pressures in Nigeria rather ty of Central African States (ECCAS) and than seasonal transhumance, but there therefore the ECOWAS Transhumance is reportedly migration into south-west Protocol does not govern this move- Nigeria106. There is pastoral mobility ment. in both directions across the northern border between Nigeria and Niger, usu- ally between dry and rainy seasons. b. Challenges facing pastoralists However, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that at least some pastoral- Note: Field research for this Chapter ists in Niger are no longer crossing the on Nigeria does not cover the southern border because of the widespread inse- part of Nigeria and Benue State in the curity in Nigeria and the devaluation of North Central/Middle Belt, which has the Naira. The latter has reduced the at- witnessed significant violence in the tractiveness of Nigerian livestock mar- first half of 2018; fieldwork was car- kets for pastoralists from the Republic ried out at intervals between July and of Niger seeking to sell livestock in Ni- September 2017 in Plateau, Kaduna, geria. Cross-border transhumance from Kebbi, Katsina, Zamfara, Kwara, Niger, Niger now appears to be more limited Bauchi and Gombe states. Additional to certain states and routes, depending field research was conducted in Febru- on security, and therefore avoiding the ary 2018 in Taraba and Adamawa. insurgency in Borno State and the ram- Blocked transhumance routes and loss pant banditry in Zamfara State. of grazing reserves Some pastoralists do still move south- There are many challenges facing pasto- wards from Niger into northern Nigeria ralists in Nigeria. Transhumance routes during the dry season. There is some are in practice not well protected and coordination between specific states are often cultivated or blocked. This in- like Katsina and their counterparts in cludes the cattle routes used by herd- Niger regarding transhumance move- ers on a day-to-day basis when they ments, which run in both directions. are taking the animals for grazing in the There is also transhumance between morning and returning to the camp or Nigeria and Cameroon, but patterns village in the evening. In the South, the vary depending on the security situa- infrastructure to regulate the relation- tion (see below) and the section of the ship between pastoralists and farmers 106 This movement was recorded during field- does not exist. work for this study in Kwara and Kebbi States, for example.

72 The 1965 law establishing grazing re- allegedly goes back to the early 1990s, serves in the then Northern Region as armed bandits from Chad entered was ‘inherited’ by individual states in the country across the north-eastern northern Nigeria after the regions were border109. The Nigerian government divided into states in 1967. The grazing played a vital role in controlling the reserves are therefore under the juris- flow of banditry from Chad, as- Nige diction of northern states, not of the rian security agencies tightened -se Federal Government. Most grazing re- curity along the border in the mid- to serves in northern Nigeria now only ex- late 1990s. After the Chadian banditry ist on paper107. An example, which has declined, some locals stepped into regional implications for south-west this space and took up banditry, cattle Nigeria, is the loss of much of the Bobi rustling and robbery. The local bandits Grazing Reserve in Niger State, which and victims were mainly Fulani, and in was a major grazing area108. While the response Fulani pastoralists set up vigi- Bobi Grazing Reserve was equipped lante groups. These groups have been by the Federal Government with facili- combatting rural banditry in Taraba and ties for pastoralists, part of it has been Adamawa States, often working with turned into farmland. The UNCT/Nige- local authorities. They reduced the in- ria notes that this happened as pasto- cidents of banditry in much of Taraba ralists abandoned the Reserve because and Adamawa, but banditry persists of deteriorating infrastructure. The loss in other parts of northern Nigeria. The of grazing reserves and other pastoral North-West is now the worst affected land in northern Nigeria partly explains zone, notably Zamfara and Kaduna why more pastoralists have moved to States. In Katsina State, the govern- southern parts of the country where ment managed to contain the problem. grazing reserves never existed. The state government is also reported to have re-opened and secured some of Banditry and cattle rustling the transhumance routes and grazing Banditry is a serious form of insecurity areas for pastoralists and to be seeking in parts of central and northern Nigeria to increase nomadic education for boys 110 that has cost many lives. The modern and girls . Consequently, violence is history of banditry in northern Nigeria now relatively low in Katsina. 107 The Grazing Reserves Law, 1965. Enacted by the Legislature of Northern Nigeria. The 109 Interviews with a Fulani (Wodaabe) leader document is reproduced in Journal of Nomadic residing in Mubi, northern Adamawa State, and Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Migrant with a senior leader of the vigilante group Tabital Groups, No. 4, 2001, pp. 85–91. National Com- Pulaaku, Adamawa State, September 2017. mission for Nomadic Education, Kaduna, Nigeria. 110 In nomadic communities, parents are some- 108 Fieldwork was carried in Niger State, inclu- times more reluctant to send their boys than ding in Bobi Grazing Reserve, for this study in girls to school, because boys of school age are August 2017. expected to help rear the cattle and/or sheep.

73 In contrast, there has been endemic, scattering ‘innocent’ and ‘criminal’ ele- large-scale violence in Zamfara State ments from within the Fulani popula- that forced the pastoralist popula- tion; thus, the problem of banditry ex- tion to leave large areas of the state. panded beyond Zamfara. Subsequently, Gangs of armed bandits have occupied pastoralists who were displaced by the swathes of southern Zamfara. The vio- conflict and then returned to Zamfara lence reached a high level in 2012-2013 discovered their grazing land being and has persisted intermittently since cultivated by farmers and their homes then, with frequent large-scale attacks destroyed. This became a source of ten- on villages. The number of fatalities in sion. Some pastoralists were accommo- the Zamfara violence is likely to run into dated as internally displaced persons the thousands. The violence also spread around Gusau. The government of to Kaduna State, with bandits occupy- Zamfara State has directed that land ing part of bordering Birnin Gwari LGA. belonging to pastoralists who fled be The bandits are organised and heavily returned to them. armed; their criminal activities include The Boko Haram insurgency and the the stealing of cattle, kidnapping for Lake Chad Basin ransom, and armed robbery. Many of the bandits were identified as being Unlike armed groups in Mali, Boko Fulani while victims were Fulani and Haram does not have a strong social Hausa. Some of the political elites in base among pastoralists. Boko Haram Zamfara sponsored vigilante groups to is ethnically mixed, but the main so- confront the bandits but they mobilised cial base of the sect is Kanuri, who are these groups against the local Fulani often rivals to the pastoralist Shuwa population, creating generalised vio- Arab and Fulani communities. How- lence between Fulani pastoralists and ever, there are Kanuri subgroups that Hausa farmers that has claimed many are pastoralists, many of whom have 111 lives .Fulani pastoralists claim they been raided by Boko Haram. Borno do not support the bandits, as they are State has the highest ethno-linguistic also victims of such banditry, provoking diversity among pastoralist groups in their exodus from southern Zamfara to Nigeria, including Shuwa Arab, Fulani, other parts of Nigeria, especially to cen- Buduma (Yedina), Koyam (or Kwayam), tral and northern states. The stirring up Badawi, and Tubu. In Borno, the two of inter-ethnic, farmer-herder violence largest of these, in terms of the human in reaction to the banditry ended up population and cattle ownership, are 111 Presentation by Senator Saidu Mohammed the Shuwa and pastoral Fulani: Dansadau, who explained how he sponsored and they speak different languages (Shuwa mobilised the vigilantes. Conference on Rural Banditry organised by the Centre for Democratic Arabic and Fulfulde) but have a close Development and Training (CEDDERT), Ahmadu relationship, with intermarriage and Bello University, Zaria, 14 September 2017.

74 mixed settlements in some areas112. In eroon or nearby states in Nigeria such the waters and marshes around Lake as Gombe, Adamawa, and Taraba, thus Chad the Buduma (Yedina) are substan- generating pressures on resources in tial in number and rear a type of cattle those areas and elsewhere. While most adapted to the lacustrine environment, pastoralists in the conflict zone were the Kuri breed. affected adversely by the Boko Haram insurgency, a minority did profit from Northeast Nigeria, including the Lake it. Pastureland that became available Chad Basin, is an important agricultur- as other pastoralists left was seized by al and pastoral zone, and farmers and groups willing to cooperate with Boko pastoralists have been badly affected Haram, particularly in the Lake Chad by the violence. Fighting between Boko wetlands. Some pastoralists allegedly Haram and the Nigerian and regional collaborated with Boko Haram for armed forces rendered many farming protection and unhindered access to and grazing areas unsafe. Boko Haram pastures, while also paying for this ac- became predatory, raiding pastoralists cess with livestock. While Boko Haram for cattle and sheep and farmers for has been weakened in most areas of grains and other food supplies. Ethnic northeastern Nigeria, serious insecurity groups such as the Shuwa Arabs and persists in rural areas of Borno State. some Fulani clans were in direct con- Pastoralists and farmers have been re- flict with Boko Haram and sustained turning to areas liberated from Boko casualties while fighting the insurgents. Haram (notably in Adamawa and Yobe, Reportedly, several thousand pasto- and parts of southern Borno) but the ralists have been killed in the conflict, displacement crisis continues as many tens of thousands have been displaced, rural areas of Borno are still too danger- many losing their livestock and end- ous to return to. ing up destitute, often as IDPs or refu- gees. Those who were attacked by Boko Social problems Haram tended to lose their wealth, but others were able to move out of the There are also social problems facing conflict zone with their livestock into pastoralists in Nigeria. The behaviour of neighbouring countries, including Cam- herdsmen has been noted as a problem in some areas, particularly where young 112 Census data in Nigeria no longer captures men or children are given responsibil- ethnicity or religion, so the exact pastoralist population is difficult to estimate. In 1996 ity for rearing large herds of cattle that Braukämper estimated the Shuwa Arabs at half a they cannot properly control. Report- million in Nigeria in an informative study of their edly, there are challenges with drug history and mode of life: Braukämper, Ulrich “Strategies of Environmental Adaptation and and alcohol abuse by some of the herd- Patterns of Transhumance of the Shuwa Arabs in ers when they go into town, particularly the Nigerian Chad Basin”, Nomadic Peoples 39 (1996): 53-68. in southern and central Nigeria. This of-

75 ten happens when the young men are to wider ethnic or ethno-religious con- migrating individually, without their flagrations. Severe pressure on tradi- families or community leaders. When tional grazing lands in northern Nigeria the herdsmen are in town they may and insecurity across large areas of the leave the livestock with young boys, of- North have encouraged more pastoral- ten leading to the destruction of crops, ists to move southwards113. There are as the animals are not properly tended now acute tensions between pastoral- and therefore encroach onto farms. Re- ists and farmers in southern Nigeria ports of rape by migratory herdsmen and low-level violence is widespread. of female farmers in their fields have This is generally caused by herdsmen also become common. In some cases, driving their cattle onto farms and de- these young men are rearing their fam- stroying crops, often deliberately. It ily herds, taking the livestock on long seems to be migratory Fulani who are distance transhumance, while in other doing this, generally young men, not cases they are hired herdsmen. the Fulani pastoralists already resident in the South. At times the problem is caused by the blockage of national c. Security challenges and causes and transhumance routes and lack of graz- drivers of conflict ing land, but in non-traditional grazing areas where the population is agricul- Most farmer-herder conflicts in Nige- tural, these may not exist. In such cases ria are two-way: both pastoralists and access to pasture has to be negotiated farmers have been adversely affected. with local communities, who the new The large-scale violence that is now waves of pastoralists to the South have prevalent between the two commu- no prior connection or contact with. As nities is the result of a more complex already discussed, there are reportedly dynamic with variations in each case. social problems among some of the Understanding local histories and po- litical and social contexts is vital if these 113 The expansion of pastoralism from the savanna into humid zones towards the coast has conflicts are to be resolved. Farmer- occurred even in areas that were previously un- herder conflicts in contemporary- Ni favourable to pastoralists due to the prevalence geria often merge into inter-ethnic of trypanosomiases, a disease carried by the tsetse fly that kills zebu cattle. The southward or ethno-religious violence, as in Ad- movement of pastoralists had also been constrai- amawa, Benue, Kwara, Kaduna, Nas- ned because tropical vegetation, particularly sarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba, Zam- tropical forest, was largely unsuitable for cattle that were adapted to savanna environments. fara, and other states. This generalises These conditions have changed because there is the violence between communities, now easy access to veterinary drugs – nearly all pastoralists in Nigeria now self-medicate their taking it beyond clashes between cattle cattle, including against trypanosomiases – and herders and crop farmers in the fields large-scale deforestation has degraded the vege- tation cover in much of southern Nigeria.

76 herdsmen involved in these conflicts, In the North-West, the highest levels including alcohol and drug consump- of farmer-herder violence are in Zam- tion in town when they are supposed fara and Kaduna States, areas that have to be caring for the livestock. been devastated by extremely vicious clashes between communities and by The recent wave of Fulani herdsmen banditry, and ensuing loss of life. There into southern Nigeria are collectively are currently lower levels of violence called ‘Mbororo’, but that is a general in other parts of the North-West (e.g. term for transhumant Fulani pastoral- Sokoto, Katsina, Kebbi, Kano, Jigawa). ists. They come from different clans in Nonetheless, tensions are present, pas- the North, but they generally migrate if toral livelihoods are under pressure, pasture is limited in their areas of ori- and violence does occur. The difference gin or if they are denied access due to is that local authorities may be more insecurity or local politics. In the case proactive in conflict prevention and of south-western Nigeria, the origins of less divided along sectional lines. The the Mbororo tend to be in the North- Katsina State government, for example, West. Their movement into the South- is attempting to regulate pastoralism by West in significant numbers began only identifying grazing land and maintain- about a decade ago, but they were pre- ing transhumance routes. It has also ceded by earlier waves of Fulani pasto- clamped down on banditry. In contrast, ralists, beginning in the mid-twentieth banditry, cattle rustling, and farmer- century, who successfully integrated herder conflicts are still causing serious with local communities. In southwest problems in neighbouring Zamfara. Nigeria (including Kwara State) the ear- lier groups of Fulani pastoralists are In the North-East, the highest levels widely referred to as Borgu’en, and of violence between pastoralists and they are by now socially integrated and farmers are in Adamawa and Taraba speak Yoruba and other local languages. States. There are lower levels of vio- There is therefore a need to recognise lence in Gombe, Bauchi, and Yobe, but the diversity of pastoralists in Nigeria pressures on pastoral livelihoods are and identify different patterns of mobil- still acute in these states. The situation ity. The level of herder-farmer violence in Borno is somewhat distinct; although in the South is still at a much lower level there have been farmer-herder clashes than in northern Nigeria. More field in the past, the main problem is the research is needed on the situation in destructive impacts of the Boko Haram the southern part of Nigeria and recent insurgency, which has devastated herd- clashes recorded there between herd- ing and farming activities in Borno and ers and farmers. the Lake Chad Basin. Parts of northern Adamawa and Yobe have also been af-

77 fected by Boko Haram, with knock-on heavy casualties. Sexual and gender- effects in other parts of the North-East based violence has become frequent as pastoralists and farmers are blocked and more extreme on both sides, with a from the conflict zone or displaced. high death toll among women and chil- dren in some of the attacks on pastoral- Government policies make a difference ists and farmers alike. and clearly affect community relations on the ground, as the cases of neigh- There has already been serious dev- bouring Gombe and Taraba States sug- astating violence in Benue State since gest. In Gombe, the state government 2013. When the Benue State gov- and local authorities are more inclined ernement passed legislation to ban to dialogue with pastoralists and farm- open grazing, pastoralists opposed to it ers. Traditional leaders attempt to co- threatened to attack Benue State and in ordinate farming and pastoralism, such one case in January 2018 killed over 73 as by announcing dates for when tran- persons114. There have also been clash- shumance may begin and when crops es in other parts of Benue State, no- have to be harvested by. Violence is at tably in Agatu between Agutu farmers a low level in Gombe and traditional and Fulani pastoralists. Heavily armed leaders and some state officials are -ac militia associated with Fulani herds- tively involved in conflict prevention. men attacked farming communities in This contrasts with the situation in Agatu in February 2016 and committed Taraba State, where there is more po- atrocities, killing over 300 and displac- larisation along ethnic lines, with high ing whole villages some of which are levels of violence. There is an ethno- now occupied by pastoralists. religious aspect to conflicts in south- ern Taraba, between Tiv, Jukun, Fulani, In November and December 2017 there and Kuteb, with farmer-herder conflicts was also mass violence in villages near intertwined with local politics. In -gen Numan, Adamawa State. It report- eral, both farmers and pastoralists are edly started with a homicide in which severely affected by violent conflict. In a Bachama farmer was murdered, al- conflict flashpoints, villages are vulner- legedly during a dispute with a Fulani able to attack by herdsmen during sus- herdsman. The case was reportedly not tained periods of violence. At the same resolved by the police or state authori- time, it is not uncommon for pastoral- ties. Several Bachama villages then mo- en masse ists to be killed by hostile farmers and bilised against the resident their livestock either stolen or shot. Fulani population in the area, attacking Furthermore, where farmer-herder dis- camps and settlements and killing more putes escalate, pastoralist camps have than 70 Fulani people, most of them been attacked by villagers resulting in 114 UN Country Team Nigeria,2018.

78 children115. Two weeks later the Fulani prevented or resolved in other coun- launched a reprisal attack on Bachama tries in the region, and across Africa, villages and killed scores of people. could inform Nigeria’s response. This can also include lessons from how oth- In northcentral Nigeria, the highest lev- er countries have modernized, trans- els of farmer-herder violence are in Pla- formed and regulated their livestock teau and Benue States, but high levels sector and animal movement for the of violence have also been recorded in benefit of both pastoralist and farming parts of Nassarawa, Niger, and Kwara communities (e.g. Brazil). States. In parts of central Nigeria mass violence has become endemic, leading While a security approach is essential to social dislocation and widespread at first to stop the violence and restore instability. The areas worst affected by rule of law, significant attention needs farmer-herder violence are among the to be placed on understanding the polit- most violent parts of Nigeria. However, ical, historical, economic, human rights, even in zones of conflict there are ex- ethnic, religious, and demographic driv- amples of peaceful coexistence be- ers and dynamics of conflicts between tween farmers and pastoralists, due to herders and farmers. proactive conflict prevention measures in specific communities. In other areas, efforts at conflict resolution have failed Responses to herder-farmer conflicts or not existed. Providing more effec- at the federal and state levels tive and structured avenues for conflict prevention at the local level would be Federal responses important, but fundamentally the liveli- Over the years, the Federal Govern- hoods of farmers and pastoralists need ment of Nigeria has taken several to be supported in a more constructive measures to address the escalating sit- and balanced way. uation between farmers and herders in the country. In 2014, the Government established an inter-ministerial com- d. Conflict prevention and resolution mittee to recommend measures for the Urgent efforts are needed at the federal restoration of grazing reserves. In 2015, and state levels, in close coordination a committee set up by the Federal Min- with local populations, to respond to istry of Agriculture to formulate a com- heightened conflicts between pasto- prehensive livestock development plan ralists and farmers in Nigeria. Lessons recommended, among other things, from how similar conflicts have been the development of grazing reserves as a means of reducing the conflicts -be 115 Documentary records and photographic tween herders and farmers. In 2016, evidence, November 2017.

79 the Government announced plans to State responses appropriate land across states for the grazing of cattle. However, these plans Since 2016, there have been legislative did not materialize due to fierce opposi- initiatives by some Nigerian states to tion from some interest groups. In May enact laws preventing open grazing to 2018, in addition to security-focused address the farmer-herder conflicts and measures, the Federal Government an- curb violence. Four Nigerian states – 117 nounced a support package for recon- Benue, Edo, Ekiti and Taraba – have structing destroyed infrastructures and so far enacted laws or are in the process a ten-year National Livestock Transfor- of finalizing bills for this purpose. There mation Plan in 10 pilot states116. is however disagreement between the Federal Government and the states Yet, the impact of the Government’s concerned in terms of the implementa- efforts to address herder-farmer con- tion of such legislation. flicts is yet to be felt. Moreover, im- punity remains rampant: few of the In 2017, the Benue State parliament perpetrators of these conflicts, and the passed the Open Grazing Prohibition massive killings recorded, have been and Establishment of Ranching Bill, prosecuted or punished. This general signed into law by the Governor on 22 118 impunity has made both the farmers May 2017 . The Law was operation- and pastoralists lose faith in the legal alized on 1 November 2017. The Law system and take the law into their own was resisted by the Fulani-dominated hands. Government committees set up Cattle Breeders Socio-Cultural Associa- Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore to address the conflict, as well as inde- tion , which pendent researchers and experts, have demanded its suspension. Some civil put forward various recommendations. society organizations criticized some These recommendations focus on the clauses of the Law that limited or com- re-establishment of security in the rural promised access to land for livestock areas through more effective control of 117 Benue State: A Law to Prohibit Open Rearing and Grazing of Livestock and Provide for the arms circulation; the establishment of Establishment of Ranches and Livestock Admi- pastures and/or grazing reserves and nistration, Regulation and Control and for Other the enhancement of conflict resolution Matters Connected Therewith, 2017’; Edo State: A Bill for A Law to Establish the Edo State Control measures. of Nomadic Cattle Rearing/Grazing Law and for Other Purposes; Ekiti State: The Prohibition of Cattel and Other Ruminants Grazing in Ekiti 2016 Law; Taraba State: Anti-Open Grazing Prohibition 116 According to the Federal Government, Naira and Ranches Establishment Bill 2017. 10 billion has been allocated for rehabilitation in states affected by the herders-farmers conflict, 118 According to the Benue State Government, while about Naira 180 billion will be devoted to the law to prohibit open rearing and grazing of the ten-year National Livestock Transformation livestock also makes provision for the establish- Plan. ment of ranches and livestock administration.

80 purposes. The Benue Law prompted and analysis are needed with regard to violent attacks by herdsmen on farming these laws. While some commentators communities along the Benue Valley argue that the enactment of regula- on 1 January 2018, resulting in loss of tions against open-grazing prevent vio- lives and property. Continued clashes lence, others underscore the opposite. continued in Benue State throughout United Nations responses the months of January and February of 2018. According to the Governor of In late February 2018, a UN inter-agen- Benue State, the crisis has resulted in cy rapid assessment mission deployed the displacement of about 200 000 in- to some of the affected areas in Benue 119 dividuals . The implication of this and and Nasarawa states. The mission broader responses to the crisis are cur- found that the humanitarian response rently being assessed. across all sites was inadequate. Beyond The Taraba State government an- longer-term development concerns, nouncement of its own anti-open graz- it identified sexual and gender-based ing law was followed by mass violence violence (SGBV) and food insecurity as on the Mambilla Plateau in June 2017, serious issues. Women and children in south-east Taraba State, near the represent about 80% of the internally border with Cameroon. Ethnic Mambil- displaced (IDP) population, with many la farmers attacked Fulani settlements female-headed households devoid of in an attempt to expel them from the any form of income- generating activity. area after more than a century of resi- Sexual violence, transactional sex, early dence, killing hundreds of people and marriages and physical violence were forcing many across the border into identified as some of the threats faced Cameroon as refugees. The violence by displaced women and girls. was allegedly politically motivated, to Drawing on the February 2018 mission, seize land, and occurred along ethnic the UN Country Team in Nigeria (UNDP, rather than religious lines (there were UNHCR and FAO) has solicited funding reportedly and Christians in- to support the Government’s efforts to volved in the attacks on the predomi- design and implement measures that nantly Muslim Fulani). promote peace and development in As fieldwork for this Chapter on Ni- conflict affected communities in Benue geria was only carried out in one of and Nasarawa States, primarily in four the four states concerned with the anti- areas: protection, monitoring and- re grazing laws (Taraba), more research sponse; economic empowerment; peacebuilding; regional dimension. 119 Presentation to UNCT and International Partners by Governor Ortom of Benue in Abuja, Conflicts between herders and farmers February 2018. in Nigeria raise questions about the ap-

81 plicability of national, regional and in- ternational instruments relating to hu- man rights and the rule of law; about Recommendations state versus federal powers; and about All the recommendations listed should the extent to which certain national take into consideration gender issues responses are consistent with regional and women’s representation in terms instruments. of policy-making and practical inter- ventions on herder-farmer conflicts in One recommendation of this Study is Nigeria. Women and girls face related for in-depth analysis to be conducted but also specific challenges within their on the legal and constitutional issues communities; they can sometimes have linked to herder-farmer conflicts and influence over the youths who are the the applicability in Nigeria of the ECO- main protagonists of the conflicts. WAS Protocol on Transhumance, as well as other relevant instruments. There is Short to medium term great attention placed on these issues in Nigeria now, with increased pressure • To support efforts at the federal and on the Federal Government to enforce state levels to stop the violence as- the rule of law, stop violence and bring sociated with herders-farmers clashes, perpetrators to justice. by reinforcing security, community dialogue and accountability, while One question that has been tabled by respecting national and international the Nigerian Government is whether human rights obligations; transhumance, in its current form, is sustainable in a country like Nigeria • To undertake further field-research where the population is set to double on security and human rights issues by 2050. The Government has pro- in affected states in the Middle posed ranching as a response to stop Belt, South-East and South-West, transhumance.120 documenting current challenges and proposing immediate and long-term Farmers and pastoralists alike suffer options for addressing them; from the lack of enforcement of exist- ing laws. Without clear directives regu- • To establish capacity for early lating the management of land, water, warning analysis and human rights and transhumance, disputes and vio- risk assessment to better understand lence between herders and farmers in- the trends and dynamics of conflict tensify. and to inform policy development and responses; 120 Presentation by the Nigerian Government at the ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting on Herders- Farmers Conflicts in West Africa held in Abuja on • To establish or reinforce conflict 26 April 2018. management committees in all Local

82 Government Areas (LGAs) where assess what technical, financial and tensions or disputes arise between infrastructure needs and partnerships pastoralists and farmers. These are required for each option, in the committees should include male and short, medium and long-term; to draw female representatives of farmers lessons from other countries that have and pastoralists and be tasked with experience in this area (e.g. Brazil). preventing, mediating, and resolving The study should also consider best conflicts. Federal oversight, or some practice from managing pastoralists- type of neutral arbitration, may be farmers relations in some Nigerian beneficial at the state level; states (e.g. Gombe, Katsina) as well as in other ECOWAS Member States; • To analyze the legal and constitutional issues linked to herders- • To study the impact of conflicts farmers conflicts and the applicability between herders and farmers in to Nigeria of the ECOWAS Protocol Nigeria on (i) women and their on Transhumance, and other relevant economic empowerment, and (ii) on instruments. indigenous communities’ rights to land and culture; to propose actions and Long-term options;

• To study and propose different • To support the Nigerian authorities options for modernizing, transforming in organizing consultations with and regulating the livestock sector government and non-governmental and animal production movement stakeholders, and external actors as in Nigeria that are beneficial to needed, to deliberate on the options both farmers and herders and emanating from the studies mentioned other communities concerned; to in the previous two recommendations.

83 84 OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Review, implement, and update as 6. Facilitate the coordination of necessary, the 1998 ECOWAS Protocol pastoralist activities with those of on Transhumance and the 2013 crop farmers to mitigate conflicts Nouakchott Declaration on Pastoralism by establishing or strengthening (Member States that are signatories local community committees on to it). conflict prevention and resolution as provided for in the ECOWAS Protocol 2. Sensitize populations to existing on Transhumance; provide training transhumance regulation in ECOWAS and education for these committees Member States for the purpose of on conflict resolution and natural national implementation. resources governance.

3. Support ECOWAS in developing a 7. Undertake concrete actions to regional communications strategy prevent and address the human rights to raise awareness about herders- abuses and violations occurring within farmers relations and ways to promote the context of herders-farmers conflict peaceful co-existence, including through the use of a human rights- training for journalists in ECOWAS based approach in all preventive and Member States on fair reporting of response efforts. Ensure systematic these issues. accountability for perpetrators of crimes and reparations to victims in 4. Review and/or adjust existing line with national and international national and regional transhumance human rights standards. routes. Identify and demarcate transhumance routes with beacons 8. Strengthen the role and and legally protect them, utilizing participation of women and youth as technology (such as GPS) and peacebuilders for community-driven deploying rangers or security development; strengthen the roles of personnel to secure the routes, when women in agricultural and pastoral feasible. production.

5. Promote cross-border cooperation 9. Strengthen national livestock among security services in countries in movement governance, including West Africa and the Sahel to promote identification and traceability synergy, intelligence-sharing and joint mechanisms, and establish or re- action. energize local and national networks or

85 committees to manage, monitor and largest pastoralist population and appraise transhumance. the highest number of farmer-herder conflicts in West Africa. 10. Identify, develop and implement cross-border regional programs on 14. Encourage ECOWAS Member States transhumance infrastructure along to allocate 3% of the 10% agreement identified transhumance corridors on agriculture budgeting of the (e.g. bore holes and transhumance Maputo Declaration to the livestock cluster parks to provide animal feed, sector. water, resting points, veterinary and observatory services). 15. Within the framework of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms 11. Explore partnerships with the and Light Weapons, undertake an international community and the analysis of the impact of weapons private sector to drill more bore circulation in the region on farmer- holes (solar powered) in strategic herder conflicts and recommendations locations in West Africa and the Sahel, for addressing this challenge. to improve the dry season resilience of pastoralists, thereby coordinating 16. Make available to and encourage transhumance movements with the UN Country Teams to translate the farming cycle to avoid damaging crops. findings of UNOWAS’ Study into their programmatic work in support of the 12. Devise a long-term strategy for UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel addressing the effects of climate (UNISS), relating to cross-border change - including water scarcity, issues. deforestation and soil erosion - on the livelihoods and peaceful coexistence 17. Facilitate, in collaboration with of pastoralists and farmers in ECOWAS, Member States, civil society West Africa and the Sahel; review and concerned partners, experience- existing studies on this topic and/or sharing exercises between ECOWAS produce an updated assessment with countries with the aim to share good recommended action. practice from one country to another on the prevention of farmer-herder 13. Boost and extend the reach of the conflicts. Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project (Projet Régional d’Appui au 18. Raise awareness about the need Pastoralisme au Sahel, PRAPS, the for livelihood assistance for farmers World Bank-funded, ECOWAS-WAEMU- and pastoralists affected by conflict, led project with CILSS coordination) especially in areas of insurgency, and comparable pastoralism support including in central and northern Mali projects to Nigeria, which has the and the Lake Chad Basin.

86 19. Explore private sector development of ICT coverage in rural areas to facilitate distance learning (e.g. literacy, numeracy, general education) and for further inclusion of pastoralist communities in the overall regional economic framework.

20. In collaboration with ECOWAS, undertake an assessment and feasibility study of rural schools and nomadic education for both children and adults in the region (e.g. the creation of boarding schools and virtual educational courses via radio and mobile phones).

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94 95 NOTES

96 97 98 99 Research and Analysis Unit

100