INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Côte d’Ivoire Risk Assessment 2014 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report assesses some of the key security threats that Côte d’Ivoire—a West African coastal nation— faces. Once a model for development among West African states, Côte d’Ivoire has struggled with economic challenges, political issues, and ethnic conflict since 1993, following the death of its first president. As the home of several ethnic groups, Côte d’Ivoire also has struggled to maintain a peaceful balance among its tribes. Tribal tensions have reemerged along with political tensions, creating an air of instability and distrust. This issue raises the possibility that the nation could deteriorate and collapse around ethnic lines.1 Nonetheless, Côte d’Ivoire has potential, and its agricultural sector—along with its mineral resources, improving infrastructure, and revived tourism trade— may hold the promise of future economic development. The country is the world’s largest producer of cocoa, and a major producer of other cash crops, such as cashews. Furthermore, if specific FIGURE 1: Map of Côte d’Ivoire (University of Texas). tensions that were fueled by the election crisis of 2010 and 2011 begin to settle, some measure of stability and security is likely to return. To provide an overview of security issues in Côte d’Ivoire, this report examines four key areas: ! The 2010 election crisis and recovery. ! Security Threats, including exogenous threats (such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb) and endogenous threats (such as a partisan military, unofficial militias, corruption, and impunity). ! The Economy and Infrastructure, including human security, the black market, agriculture, mining, new infrastructure projects, and tourism. ! Prospects for Future Security, and for a return of Côte d’Ivoire to the relative economic prosperity it enjoyed during the presidency of Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960 to 1993).

1 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html

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OVERVIEW

Côte d’Ivoire is a republic, with a multiparty, presidential regime that was established after the nation’s independence from France in 1960. The legislature is made up of 255 representatives, elected by popular vote.2 The Ivorian constitution draws heavily from that of France, and outlines the framework of the government, its separation of powers, and civil rights afforded the people.3 Côte d’Ivoire maintains fairly close ties with the West, especially the US and France, its former colonizer. As a nation emerging from a serious political crisis, the government faces many challenges to becoming a respected, legitimate entity, and government corruption and impunity are two key challenges that threaten to undermine Ivorian growth and stability. Resolving these concerns will create a more stable platform upon which Côte d’Ivoire can re-establish itself. In a parallel effort to strengthen its economy, Côte d’Ivoire has become more open to investment, implementing a new tax code, for instance, that provides incentives for investors (see below for an overview of the Ivorian economy).4 2010 ELECTION CRISIS Following the 2010 presidential elections, Côte d’Ivoire slipped into a deep political crisis as a result of the outcomes. After the first round of votes yielded inconclusive results, a second round of voting was held between candidates Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. The predominantly Christian south aligned with Gbagbo, a member of the Bété tribe, and much of the Muslim north aligned with Muslim candidate Ouattara, a member of the Dioula tribe.5 Ouattara won the second vote, but former president Gbagbo refused to step down. As a result, political violence erupted. Political fault lines mirrored ethnic lines of identity, and some ethnic groups became targets of violence because of their perceived political affiliations.6 This crisis has created a tenuous political backdrop and colored the national security landscape.

SECURITY THREATS

Following its independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire became the economic and political powerhouse of West Africa, but a civil war that began in 2002, and the political crisis of recent years, has since destabilized the country, leaving it fragile and susceptible to security threats. Despite this situation, Côte d’Ivoire has maintained fruitful partnerships with countries of the European Union, the US, and the United Nations.7 For instance, Côte d’Ivoire has been supportive of US counterterrorism efforts, and maintaining this stance may be crucial in the near future, as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), while not currently operating in Côte d’Ivoire, has developed an increased presence and influence in other West African countries.8 Some of the most serious threats to national security come from within the country. Widespread poverty, ethnic conflict, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and deeply engrained practices of corruption and extortion are

2 Ibid. 3 Mongabay. “Ivory Coast- Government and Politics. April 28, 2014. http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/ivory-coast/GOVERNMENT.html 4 Embassy of the United States. Abidjan-Côte d’Ivoire. April 28, 2014. http://abidjan.usembassy.gov/civestpg2013.html 5 Geo Currents. Ethnic Dimensions of the Conflict in Ivory Coast. April 13, 2014. http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/ethnic-dimensions-of-the-conflict-in- ivory-coast 6 Amnesty International. Annual Report: Côte d’Ivoire 2013. April 13, 2014 http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-cote-d-ivoire- 2013?page=2 7 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page=3 8 United State Department of State- Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Côte d’Ivoire Crime and Safety Report 2013. April 13, 2014. https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13919

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often-intertwined challenges that undermine development and security.9 The recent election crisis—which led to economic and political turbulence and ethnic conflict—also saw significant human dislocation, particularly of targeted Guéré peoples, who returned home to find they had been dispossessed of their land, a situation which exacerbated the effects of poverty.10 The aftermath of the election crisis and its conflict adds a new dimension of complexity to endogenous security issues. Demilitarization has been slow, and the impunity of officials implicated in the violence has fomented distrust of the government.11 Militarization: Regular & Irregular Forces Ultimately, the internal issue of armed militants and heavy circulation of arms is possibly the largest national security threat Côte d’Ivoire faces. In the wake of the election crisis, several armed groups emerged, and still-armed ex-fighters and military entities have continued a culture of violence. Estimates suggest there are as many as one to three million weapons in unregulated distribution.12 Demilitarization of armed groups has been slow, and combatants continue to launch attacks on military outposts and villages presumed to support the Ouattara regime.13 FIGURE 2: A member of the paramilitary Dozo brotherhood The government’s slow reaction in addressing the (Inter Press). issues of ex-combatants and unregulated arms distribution undermines the competency of the regime and adds to the distrust of the government, further inhibiting reconciliation and security prospects. Nevertheless, it can be argued that mitigating this endogenous threat is an easier task than coping with a similar exogenous threat, such as an incursion by AQIM, offering Côte d’Ivoire a regional advantage if it can successfully de-militarize its internal armed actors. However, an example of the difficulty of this task is seen in the case of the Dozo. Occupying a unique position in the indeterminate sphere between militant groups and the sanctioned Ivorian military, the Dozo are an ancient hunting brotherhood, rooted primarily in West African countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Dozo currently back the Ouattara regime, and in a manifestation of their support, the group has adopted the role of a quasi-military entity, or unofficial militia. Armed typically with AK-47s, Dozo members have been implicated in roadblocks, security checks, arbitrary arrests, and killings. While the Dozo have denied these accusations—pointing to the strict moral code members adhere to that forbids them from engaging in such acts—there appears to be a general understanding that the brotherhood has, in fact, been involved in these actions. The government of Côte d’Ivoire has attempted to quell this internal threat by passing cabinet-level resolutions that forbid Dozo members from bearing arms and calling on them to cease roadblocks and

9 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 10 Human Rights Watch. “People Displaced by Conflict Face Land Theft.” April 18, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/09/cote-d-ivoire-people-displaced- conflict-face-land-theft 11 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page=3 12 Defence Web. “Côte d’Ivoire.” April 17, 2014. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30175:cote- divoire&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255 13 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page=3

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security checks, but these attempts have been futile, thus far. These resolutions may not be considered entirely credible because the current government also acknowledges that the Dozo help the Ouattara regime. Undoubtedly, the government has created a situation that seems to be simultaneously affirming the Dozo while trying to quell the instability and threat the group foments.14 The military under the Ouattara regime is called the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), and it operates as a traditional military (i.e., defense force) and as the police force for civil law enforcement.15 While recognized as the official Ivorian military apparatus, this FRCI is also a security threat. As an Ouattara supporter, it has been implicated in many human rights violations. Allegedly, rape and killings are among the human rights abuses employed by the FRCI as tools for suppressing Gbagbo supporters, which undoubtedly undermines the reconciliation process and challenges the legitimacy of the government. Extortion by the FRCI is also a rampant issue. The military allegedly makes arbitrary arrests and demands payment for the release of the detainees, yet for these human rights and corruption abuses, members of the military have not been subject to punishment.16 Corruption: The Prevalence of Bribery Côte d’Ivoire struggles with widespread corruption. Petty bribery is a deeply entrenched bureaucratic practice, so much so that such bribery is recognized as one of the only ways to conduct day-to-day governmental activities, a fact that seriously challenges the legitimacy of the government and its ability to govern effectively.17 For example, 30% of businesses responded that they would have to pay bribes in order to obtain government contracts, according to a World Bank survey. Bribes paid to the military are commonplace, and they are demanded in exchange for the performance of various routine actions (such as the release of arbitrarily detained persons—see above). While the prospect of dismantling such deeply ingrained corruption may seem difficult or unlikely, it is important to note that the government has taken steps toward its reduction. For instance, in 2012 Côte d’Ivoire became a member of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNAC), and the nation’s penal code does technically criminalize bribery by public officials. These are positive steps, and indicators of the possibility of weeding out the firmly rooted culture of corruption. The challenge is a lack of genuine investigations and prosecutions. Anti-corruption efforts will need non-corrupt enforcement if they are to be effective, and without a legitimate civil law enforcement entity, the goal of reducing petty bribery and worse may be difficult to achieve. Impunity: The Legacy of Civil War During the political crisis of 2010 and 2011, the nation was embroiled in a conflict in which members of both political camps (those of Ouattara and Gbagbo) committed serious human rights abuses and general crimes. Unfortunately, many of the perpetrators have not been brought to justice, inciting deep distrust of the government. The government’s military arm still seeks out those who do not support the Ouattara regime, using rape, extra-judicial killings, and arrests as tools of suppression. Detention conditions are often atrocious, and some survivors report being held in extremely small rooms with many other detainees, without

14 IRIN Africa. “Ivoirian Hunters Accused of Abuses.” April 18, 2014. http://www.irinnews.org/report/99418/ivoirian-hunters-accused-of-abuses 15 US Passports and International Travel: Côte d’Ivoire. April 18, 2014 http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/country/cote-divoire.html 16 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page= 17 Transparency International. “An Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Côte d’Ivoire http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_cote_divoire

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sanitation, and with very little food or water. Along with the official military, the paramilitary, pro-Ouattara Dozo continue to carry out arrests, roadblocks, killings, and other abuses with impunity, despite government calls to cease such activities.18 After the election crisis, the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) was established, but it was ultimately unsuccessful in promoting a genuine, sustainable reconciliation process.19 It is believed that there simply cannot be reconciliation, or even the legitimizing of the government, in the absence of punishment for the egregious crimes that took place and that continue into the present.20 The lack of acknowledgement of recent atrocities underlies much of the country’s sense of distrust and discord and threatens the fragile de-escalation of the post-election violence.

ECONOMY & INFRASTRUCTURE

Once an economic powerhouse in West Africa, Côte d’Ivoire had a flourishing economy and enjoyed relative stability and peace until around 1993, when the first and only president until that point, Félix Houphouët- Boigny, died. In the years since Houphouët- Boigny’s death, the nation has suffered from the effects of crippling poverty; rising debt; high HIV/AIDS rates; endemic tropical diseases (such as yellow fever, malaria, and typhoid); low literacy rates; and deteriorating infrastructure. Nevertheless, Côte d’Ivoire does have many natural resources, including fertile farmland and minerals. If developed properly, these resources may help to revive the economy and the nation’s infrastructure, which could in turn remedy some of the country’s endemic challenges.21 The Economy & Human Security Two primary issues Côte d’Ivoire must confront when addressing its economic situation are the amount of debt that encumbers the nation and FIGURE 3: Côte d’Ivoire cocoa production 1995-2012 (International Cocoa an informal economy that makes genuine Organization). economic development difficult. Côte d’Ivoire has roughly US$8.959 billion dollars of external debt, and therefore little public money is allocated toward education and public health. Indeed, only around 4.6% of the country’s roughly US$43.67 billion gross

18 Amnesty International. “Côte d’Ivoire: Revenge and Repression under the Pretense of Ensuring Security. April 18, 2014 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/c-te- d-ivoire-revenge-and-repression-under-pretence-ensuring-security-2013-02- 19 IRIN Africa. “Côte d’Ivoire Truth Panel Seen Faltering.” April 18, 2014 http://www.irinnews.org/report/99456/c%C3%B4te-d-ivoire-truth-panel-seen-faltering 20 Amnesty International. “Côte d’Ivoire: Revenge and Repression Under the Pretense of Ensuring Security. April 18, 2014 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/c-te- d-ivoire-revenge-and-repression-under-pretence-ensuring-security-2013-02- 21 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html

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domestic product (GDP) is spent on education (in Tunisia, the rate is 6.2% of GDP22). As a result, only around 56% of the population is literate. Lack of access to health care, education, and food are behind low levels of human security, and exacerbating this situation are high levels of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment (the unemployment rate may have soared to 50% during the recent election crisis); a high poverty rate (42% of the population lives in poverty); an average life expectancy of just 56 years for men and 59 for women; and an alarming 3.2% of the population infected with HIV/AIDS, a percentage roughly double that of any of Côte d’Ivoire’s West Africa neighbors.23 The black market in Côte d’Ivoire is robust, and the culture of bribery plays an important role in the alternative economy. Around US$300 million a year is estimated to be paid in bribes at checkpoints in Côte d’Ivoire each year, says Ivorian Chamber of Commerce President Jean-Louis Billon. Among illegal activities that make up the black market are diamond smuggling, oil smuggling, counterfeiting of medicine, online scams, and prostitution.24 While the current economic and human security situation raises concerns, as the world’s largest producer of cocoa—as well as a producer of other cash crops, such as palm oil, coffee, and cashews—Côte d’Ivoire commands a large agricultural sector, one that, with funding, could ably support the economy.25 However, the country is very dependent on world agricultural markets, and in particular fluctuations in the cocoa market. The price of cocoa has largely increased over the decade starting in 2003, but it has gone through several peaks and troughs in that time (for instance, an average daily high of US$3,167 per tonne in June 2011 fell to US$2,196 per tonne in December 2011).26 Investment in the processing capacity of the agricultural sector would likely yield positive results because Côte d’Ivoire currently lacks the necessary capacity to process its cash crops domestically; even its cocoa must be processed abroad.27 It’s important to note that in April 2014, the United Nations lifted the ban on diamond exports from Côte d’Ivoire. In November 2013, the Kimberley Process—which certifies that diamond exports are not “blood diamonds” (that fund violent activities)—acknowledged FIGURE 4: Gold mining in Amara (Daily Express). that Côte d’Ivoire’s diamonds were ready to be reintegrated into the export market. Despite the Kimberley Process certification, some members of the UN are concerned that Ivorian diamonds could easily become blood diamonds again. UN experts reported that a senior army officer was breaking the current UN diamond embargo and that there was “strong evidence” he

22 Public spending on education. The World Bank, May 20, 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS 23 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 24 “Ivory Coast checkpoint bribes cost '$300m.’” BBC News, May 4, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8660679.stm 25 African Economic Outlook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 18, 2014 http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/west-africa/cote-divoire/ 26 Monthly averages of cocoa prices. International Cocoa Organization, May 20, 2014. http://www.icco.org/statistics/cocoa-prices/monthly-averages.html 27 Business Council for Africa. “Restoring Cote d’Ivoire Status as the sub-Region’s Development Hub.” April 18, 2014. http://www.bcafrica.co.uk/news/510- restoring-cote-divoire-status-as-the-sub-regions-development-hub

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was using the profits to support soldiers loyal to him. The UN Security Council has requested that Côte d’Ivoire update the council on its action plan for diamonds “including … any enforcement activities involving illegal smuggling, development of its customs regime, and reporting of financial flows from diamonds.” It is likely that diamonds will represent an important aspect of Côte d’Ivoire’s export economy in the future. Before the embargo, Côte d’Ivoire produced about 300,000 carats a year, valued at around US$25 million.28 Among other mineral resources (including iron, nickel, and manganese—see below), Côte d’Ivoire also has begun to mine gold, pursuant to one of President Ouattara’s promises to “diversify the economy.”29 Currently, the government holds all rights to gold and minerals in the state, pursuant to the Mining Code. Therefore, anyone who prospects must have authorization from the government.30 Several companies are now authorized to explore for gold—including the Taruga Gold and Endeavour Mining Corporation—which view Côte d’Ivoire’s gold as an underused resource and an opportunity for financial gain.31 Initial exploration suggests that Côte d’Ivoire may have the same gold belts that its neighboring countries, such as Mali and Burkina Faso, are situated on.32 Currently, the sector does not substantially contribute to the economy, and it is subject to unauthorized prospecting and mining, which opens the sector up to corruption and unbridled competition. These issues could shake the fragile economy and undermine the process of creating a sound government.33

Infrastructure: Diversifying the Economy From 1993 to the present, little attention has been given to the development of Ivorian infrastructure.34 Much of the deterioration of roads, bridges, potable running water, and other critical infrastructure occurred in the years following the death of Côte d’Ivoire’s first president, and currently there is little infrastructure connecting Côte d’Ivoire to surrounding countries, which isolates the nation and limits development. Nevertheless, plans are in place to begin developing or restoring road, rail, sea, and air routes and water supplies.35 The Plan National de Développement (PND) has been established with the FIGURE 5: A World Food Programme Food for Assets infrastructure goal of investing $20 billion dollars in energy and project (World Food Programme). industrial development, transport, agriculture, and health and education.36

28 Reuters. “Exclusive: U.N. set to lift Ivory Coast diamond ban, tweak arms embargo.” May 1, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/25/us-ivorycoast- un-diamonds-idUSBREA3O1ND20140425?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&rpc=69 29 The Economist. “Didier for Gold.” April 18, 2014. http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/06/mining-c-te-d-ivoire-0 30 Taruga Gold. Côte d’Ivoire. April 28, 2014. http://www.tarugagold.com.au/cote-divoire/ 31 Endeavour Mining. “Operations.” April 28, 2014. http://www.endeavourmining.com/s/CotedIvoire.asp 32 Ibid. 33 IRIN Africa. “Authorities Move to Curb Illegal Gold Mining.” April 18, 2014. http://www.irinnews.org/report/94723/cote-d-ivoire-authorities-move-to-curb-illegal- gold-mining 34 World Politics Review. “Côte d’Ivoire Elections: Avoirding a ‘Danse Macabre.’” Apri18, 2014. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6930/cote-divoire- elections-avoiding-a-danse-macabre 35 Forbes. “Côte d’Ivoire’s economy is down, but not out.” April 18, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/peteguest/2013/11/11/cote-divoire-roads-to-recovery/ 36 Africa Business Initiative. “Investment Climate Update: Côte d’Ivoire.” April 18, 2014. https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/international/africa/files/Cote%20d'Ivoire%20ICU.pdf

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In the aftermath of the PND, Côte d’Ivoire has undertaken several major projects, including the building of the Bouaflé Bridge over the Marahoué River, to facilitate the movement of goods and people from the north, and a project to increase access to potable water in Abidjan, the nation’s economic center.37 Another significant infrastructure project is the Abidjan port project. The Abidjan port serves as a primary gateway to and from Côte d’Ivoire, and already it is West Africa’s largest container port. The new port is expected to be complete in 2020 and will boast an expanded capacity. Furthermore, Côte d’Ivoire plans to build a new railway linking the west of the country with the deep-water port at San Pedro as it seeks to boost production of nickel, manganese, and iron from mines in the region. Construction of the railway is meant to begin in 2014, and the government is “looking to transport about 22 million metric tons of minerals a year,” according to Mines and Energy Minister Augustin Comoe.38 Lastly, tourism—and especially eco-tourism—has the potential to help diversify the Ivorian economy. For instance, between 8,000 and 10,000 chimpanzees (out of an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 remaining in the wild) call Côte d’Ivoire home, and these animals and other wildlife could become a significant tourist attraction—the nation has three wildlife parks on the World Heritage List. But the tourism industry must overcome the challenges of environmental degradation, continued militant violence, and underdeveloped infrastructure. However, there are signs of new tourism investment by the Ivorian government and outside entities: a new flag air carrier, Air Côte d’Ivoire, has commenced services; the Radisson Blu Abidjan Airport Hotel, with 252 rooms, will open in 2015; the government has relaxed visa regimes; and another large infrastructure project will see a 6.4 kilometer-long highway built in Abidjan, to carry more than 200,000 vehicles a day (financing was secured from the African Development Bank, the West African Development Bank, and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development).39

THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE SECURITY

Ultimately, Côte d’Ivoire has significant potential to become a more secure and stable nation, given its strong agricultural sector; the renewed attention to infrastructure, mineral exploration, and tourism; and the small steps taken by the government to engage with the United Nations, to create resolutions aimed at quelling ethnic violence and reducing corruption. Côte d’Ivoire has demonstrated in the past that it can sustain a healthy economy, modern infrastructure, and relative peace and stability40, albeit under dictator Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who was seen as a skillful and pragmatic politician whose long one-party rule (1960 to 1993) was achieved through cooperation, consensus, and compromise and who was noted for his progressive economic policies and investment in agricultural resources41. While some of Côte d’Ivoire’s challenges are deeply entrenched, others are relatively new. The election crisis of 2010-2011 not only exacerbated existing issues, such as ethnic and tribal tensions, it saw a rise in unregulated arms distribution and quasi-military entities, a growing security issue that must be addressed in the near future. Careful attention should be paid to how the government copes with the impunity of those responsible for abuses during the crisis. If this issue continues without resolution and begins to pervade

37 Republique de Côte d’Ivoire: Ministeres des Infrastructures Economique. April 18, 2014. http://www.infrastructures.gouv.ci/principal.php?page=13 38 “Ivory Coast to Build Railway to Boost Output From Western Mines.” Bloomberg News, Oct. 5, 2010. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-05/ivory- coast-plans-to-build-railway-to-boost-output-from-its-western-mines.html 39 “Travel and Tourism in Côte d'Ivoire.” Euromonitor International, November 2012. http://www.euromonitor.com/travel-and-tourism-in-cote-divoire/report 40 “A very short history of Côte d’Ivoire.” African History, May 1, 2014. http://africanhistory.about.com/od/ctedivoir1/a/def-Cote-d-Ivoire.htm 41 “Félix Houphouët-Boigny.” Encyclopedia Britannica, May 20, 2014. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/272996/Felix-Houphouet-Boigny

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Ivoirian society, instability could exist for a long time. The peace process will be greatly affected by the human security and economic situations that have been destabilizing since the 1990s. The Ivorian government has a lot on its plate, in other words. If, at the same time as legitimizing itself, it can address the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, poverty, and illiteracy; diversify the economy (away from agriculture and toward minerals and tourism); and improve critical infrastructure, then it is possible that Côte d’Ivoire will re-emerge as one of the strongest and most stable West African nations.

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KEY FIGURES

President & Defense Minister: Alassane Ouattara Ouattara is highly educated, with a B.Sc. in business administration from the Drexel Institute of Technology and an M.A. and Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania. Ouattara worked as an economist for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington before moving to Paris in 1973 to work for the Central Bank of West African States. In the 1980s and 1990s, he held senior positions at both the bank and the IMF. He assumed office as IMF Deputy Managing Director on July 1, 1994. 4243

Prime Minister: Daniel Kablan Duncan Duncan has been prime minister of Côte d'Ivoire since November 2012. He previously served as prime minister from December 1993 to December 1999 and as minister of foreign affairs from June 2011 to November 2012. In the 2012 government, Duncan also took the finance and economy portfolio. 44 Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces: Soumaila Bakayo

Bakayo currently is also chief of defence staff for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). FIGURE 6: Alassane Ouatarra (UNESCO). Minister of Foreign Affairs: Charles Koffi Diby Diby was previously the minister of finance and economy, before Daniel Kablan Duncan took that portfolio in the 2012 government.

42 International Monetary Fund http://web.archive.org/web/20051221095339/http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/Ado.htm 43 “A Tale of Two Presidents.” CBS News, Jan. 6, 2011. http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/a-tale-of-2-presidents-1.987162 44 “New Ivory Coast prime minister takes finance post too.” Reuters, Nov. 22, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/22/us-ivorycoast-government- idUSBRE8AL0GM20121122

10 CONTRIBUTORS: Ashley Repp, J.D. Candidate, Syracuse University College of Law, and Isaac Kfir, Visiting Professor of International Relations and Law, Syracuse University.

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