Côte D'ivoire Risk Assessment 2014

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Côte D'ivoire Risk Assessment 2014 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM Côte d’Ivoire Risk Assessment 2014 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report assesses some of the key security threats that Côte d’Ivoire—a West African coastal nation— faces. Once a model for development among West African states, Côte d’Ivoire has struggled with economic challenges, political issues, and ethnic conflict since 1993, following the death of its first president. As the home of several ethnic groups, Côte d’Ivoire also has struggled to maintain a peaceful balance among its tribes. Tribal tensions have reemerged along with political tensions, creating an air of instability and distrust. This issue raises the possibility that the nation could deteriorate and collapse around ethnic lines.1 Nonetheless, Côte d’Ivoire has potential, and its agricultural sector—along with its mineral resources, improving infrastructure, and revived tourism trade— may hold the promise of future economic development. The country is the world’s largest producer of cocoa, and a major producer of other cash crops, such as cashews. Furthermore, if specific FIGURE 1: Map of Côte d’Ivoire (University of Texas). tensions that were fueled by the election crisis of 2010 and 2011 begin to settle, some measure of stability and security is likely to return. To provide an overview of security issues in Côte d’Ivoire, this report examines four key areas: ! The 2010 election crisis and recovery. ! Security Threats, including exogenous threats (such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb) and endogenous threats (such as a partisan military, unofficial militias, corruption, and impunity). ! The Economy and Infrastructure, including human security, the black market, agriculture, mining, new infrastructure projects, and tourism. ! Prospects for Future Security, and for a return of Côte d’Ivoire to the relative economic prosperity it enjoyed during the presidency of Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960 to 1993). 1 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 1 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE OVERVIEW Côte d’Ivoire is a republic, with a multiparty, presidential regime that was established after the nation’s independence from France in 1960. The legislature is made up of 255 representatives, elected by popular vote.2 The Ivorian constitution draws heavily from that of France, and outlines the framework of the government, its separation of powers, and civil rights afforded the people.3 Côte d’Ivoire maintains fairly close ties with the West, especially the US and France, its former colonizer. As a nation emerging from a serious political crisis, the government faces many challenges to becoming a respected, legitimate entity, and government corruption and impunity are two key challenges that threaten to undermine Ivorian growth and stability. Resolving these concerns will create a more stable platform upon which Côte d’Ivoire can re-establish itself. In a parallel effort to strengthen its economy, Côte d’Ivoire has become more open to investment, implementing a new tax code, for instance, that provides incentives for investors (see below for an overview of the Ivorian economy).4 2010 ELECTION CRISIS Following the 2010 presidential elections, Côte d’Ivoire slipped into a deep political crisis as a result of the outcomes. After the first round of votes yielded inconclusive results, a second round of voting was held between candidates Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. The predominantly Christian south aligned with Gbagbo, a member of the Bété tribe, and much of the Muslim north aligned with Muslim candidate Ouattara, a member of the Dioula tribe.5 Ouattara won the second vote, but former president Gbagbo refused to step down. As a result, political violence erupted. Political fault lines mirrored ethnic lines of identity, and some ethnic groups became targets of violence because of their perceived political affiliations.6 This crisis has created a tenuous political backdrop and colored the national security landscape. SECURITY THREATS Following its independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire became the economic and political powerhouse of West Africa, but a civil war that began in 2002, and the political crisis of recent years, has since destabilized the country, leaving it fragile and susceptible to security threats. Despite this situation, Côte d’Ivoire has maintained fruitful partnerships with countries of the European Union, the US, and the United Nations.7 For instance, Côte d’Ivoire has been supportive of US counterterrorism efforts, and maintaining this stance may be crucial in the near future, as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), while not currently operating in Côte d’Ivoire, has developed an increased presence and influence in other West African countries.8 Some of the most serious threats to national security come from within the country. Widespread poverty, ethnic conflict, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and deeply engrained practices of corruption and extortion are 2 Ibid. 3 Mongabay. “Ivory Coast- Government and Politics. April 28, 2014. http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/ivory-coast/GOVERNMENT.html 4 Embassy of the United States. Abidjan-Côte d’Ivoire. April 28, 2014. http://abidjan.usembassy.gov/civestpg2013.html 5 Geo Currents. Ethnic Dimensions of the Conflict in Ivory Coast. April 13, 2014. http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/ethnic-dimensions-of-the-conflict-in- ivory-coast 6 Amnesty International. Annual Report: Côte d’Ivoire 2013. April 13, 2014 http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-cote-d-ivoire- 2013?page=2 7 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page=3 8 United State Department of State- Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Côte d’Ivoire Crime and Safety Report 2013. April 13, 2014. https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13919 2 INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE often-intertwined challenges that undermine development and security.9 The recent election crisis—which led to economic and political turbulence and ethnic conflict—also saw significant human dislocation, particularly of targeted Guéré peoples, who returned home to find they had been dispossessed of their land, a situation which exacerbated the effects of poverty.10 The aftermath of the election crisis and its conflict adds a new dimension of complexity to endogenous security issues. Demilitarization has been slow, and the impunity of officials implicated in the violence has fomented distrust of the government.11 Militarization: Regular & Irregular Forces Ultimately, the internal issue of armed militants and heavy circulation of arms is possibly the largest national security threat Côte d’Ivoire faces. In the wake of the election crisis, several armed groups emerged, and still-armed ex-fighters and military entities have continued a culture of violence. Estimates suggest there are as many as one to three million weapons in unregulated distribution.12 Demilitarization of armed groups has been slow, and combatants continue to launch attacks on military outposts and villages presumed to support the Ouattara regime.13 FIGURE 2: A member of the paramilitary Dozo brotherhood The government’s slow reaction in addressing the (Inter Press). issues of ex-combatants and unregulated arms distribution undermines the competency of the regime and adds to the distrust of the government, further inhibiting reconciliation and security prospects. Nevertheless, it can be argued that mitigating this endogenous threat is an easier task than coping with a similar exogenous threat, such as an incursion by AQIM, offering Côte d’Ivoire a regional advantage if it can successfully de-militarize its internal armed actors. However, an example of the difficulty of this task is seen in the case of the Dozo. Occupying a unique position in the indeterminate sphere between militant groups and the sanctioned Ivorian military, the Dozo are an ancient hunting brotherhood, rooted primarily in West African countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Dozo currently back the Ouattara regime, and in a manifestation of their support, the group has adopted the role of a quasi-military entity, or unofficial militia. Armed typically with AK-47s, Dozo members have been implicated in roadblocks, security checks, arbitrary arrests, and killings. While the Dozo have denied these accusations—pointing to the strict moral code members adhere to that forbids them from engaging in such acts—there appears to be a general understanding that the brotherhood has, in fact, been involved in these actions. The government of Côte d’Ivoire has attempted to quell this internal threat by passing cabinet-level resolutions that forbid Dozo members from bearing arms and calling on them to cease roadblocks and 9 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 10 Human Rights Watch. “People Displaced by Conflict Face Land Theft.” April 18, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/09/cote-d-ivoire-people-displaced- conflict-face-land-theft 11 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page=3 12 Defence Web. “Côte d’Ivoire.” April 17, 2014. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30175:cote- divoire&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255
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