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INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Côte d’Ivoire Risk Assessment 2014

INSCT MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report assesses some of the key security threats that Côte d’Ivoire—a West African coastal nation— faces. Once a model for development among West African states, Côte d’Ivoire has struggled with economic challenges, political issues, and ethnic conflict since 1993, following the death of its first president. As the home of several ethnic groups, Côte d’Ivoire also has struggled to maintain a peaceful balance among its tribes. Tribal tensions have reemerged along with political tensions, creating an air of instability and distrust. This issue raises the possibility that the nation could deteriorate and collapse around ethnic lines.1

Nonetheless, Côte d’Ivoire has potential, and its agricultural sector—along with its mineral resources, improving infrastructure, and revived tourism trade— may hold the promise of future economic development. The country is the world’s largest producer of cocoa, and a major producer of other cash crops, such as cashews. Furthermore, if specific tensions that were fueled by the election crisis of 2010

FIGURE 1: Map of Côte d’Ivoire (University of Texas).

and 2011 begin to settle, some measure of stability and security is likely to return. To provide an overview of security issues in Côte d’Ivoire, this report examines four key areas:
! The 2010 election crisis and recovery. ! Security Threats, including exogenous threats (such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb) and endogenous threats (such as a partisan military, unofficial militias, corruption, and impunity).
! The Economy and Infrastructure, including human security, the black market, agriculture, mining, new infrastructure projects, and tourism.
! Prospects for Future Security, and for a return of Côte d’Ivoire to the relative economic prosperity it enjoyed during the presidency of Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960 to 1993).

1 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html

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OVERVIEW

Côte d’Ivoire is a republic, with a multiparty, presidential regime that was established after the nation’s independence from France in 1960. The legislature is made up of 255 representatives, elected by popular vote.2 The Ivorian constitution draws heavily from that of France, and outlines the framework of the government, its separation of powers, and civil rights afforded the people.3 Côte d’Ivoire maintains fairly close ties with the West, especially the US and France, its former colonizer. As a nation emerging from a serious political crisis, the government faces many challenges to becoming a respected, legitimate entity, and government corruption and impunity are two key challenges that threaten to undermine Ivorian growth and stability. Resolving these concerns will create a more stable platform upon which Côte d’Ivoire can re-establish itself. In a parallel effort to strengthen its economy, Côte d’Ivoire has become more open to investment, implementing a new tax code, for instance, that provides incentives for investors (see below for an overview of the Ivorian economy).4

2010 ELECTION CRISIS

Following the 2010 presidential elections, Côte d’Ivoire slipped into a deep political crisis as a result of the outcomes. After the first round of votes yielded inconclusive results, a second round of voting was held between candidates Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. The predominantly Christian south aligned with Gbagbo, a member of the Bété tribe, and much of the Muslim north aligned with Muslim candidate Ouattara, a member of the Dioula tribe.5 Ouattara won the second vote, but former president Gbagbo refused to step down. As a result, political violence erupted. Political fault lines mirrored ethnic lines of identity, and some ethnic groups became targets of violence because of their perceived political affiliations.6 This crisis has created a tenuous political backdrop and colored the national security landscape.

SECURITY THREATS

Following its independence in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire became the economic and political powerhouse of West Africa, but a civil war that began in 2002, and the political crisis of recent years, has since destabilized the country, leaving it fragile and susceptible to security threats. Despite this situation, Côte d’Ivoire has maintained fruitful partnerships with countries of the European Union, the US, and the United Nations.7 For instance, Côte d’Ivoire has been supportive of US counterterrorism efforts, and maintaining this stance may be crucial in the near future, as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), while not currently operating in Côte d’Ivoire, has developed an increased presence and influence in other West African countries.8

Some of the most serious threats to national security come from within the country. Widespread poverty, ethnic conflict, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and deeply engrained practices of corruption and extortion are

2 Ibid. 3 Mongabay. “Ivory Coast- Government and Politics. April 28, 2014. http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/ivory-coast/GOVERNMENT.html 4 Embassy of the United States. Abidjan-Côte d’Ivoire. April 28, 2014. http://abidjan.usembassy.gov/civestpg2013.html 5 Geo Currents. Ethnic Dimensions of the Conflict in Ivory Coast. April 13, 2014. http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/ethnic-dimensions-of-the-conflict-inivory-coast 6 Amnesty International. Annual Report: Côte d’Ivoire 2013. April 13, 2014 http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-cote-d-ivoire2013?page=2 7 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page=3 8 United State Department of State- Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Côte d’Ivoire Crime and Safety Report 2013. April 13, 2014. https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13919

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often-intertwined challenges that undermine development and security.9 The recent election crisis—which led to economic and political turbulence and ethnic conflict—also saw significant human dislocation, particularly of targeted Guéré peoples, who returned home to find they had been dispossessed of their land, a situation which exacerbated the effects of poverty.10 The aftermath of the election crisis and its conflict adds a new dimension of complexity to endogenous security issues. Demilitarization has been slow, and the impunity of officials implicated in the violence has fomented distrust of the government.11

Militarization: Regular & Irregular Forces

Ultimately, the internal issue of armed militants and heavy circulation of arms is possibly the largest national security threat Côte d’Ivoire faces. In the wake of the election crisis, several armed groups emerged, and still-armed ex-fighters and military entities have continued a culture of violence. Estimates suggest there are as many as one to three million weapons in unregulated distribution.12 Demilitarization of armed groups has been slow, and combatants continue to launch attacks on military outposts and villages presumed to support the Ouattara regime.13

FIGURE 2: A member of the paramilitary Dozo brotherhood (Inter Press).

The government’s slow reaction in addressing the issues of ex-combatants and unregulated arms distribution undermines the competency of the regime and adds to the distrust of the government, further inhibiting reconciliation and security prospects. Nevertheless, it can be argued that mitigating this endogenous threat is an easier task than coping with a similar exogenous threat, such as an incursion by AQIM, offering Côte d’Ivoire a regional advantage if it can successfully de-militarize its internal armed actors.

However, an example of the difficulty of this task is seen in the case of the Dozo. Occupying a unique position in the indeterminate sphere between militant groups and the sanctioned Ivorian military, the Dozo are an ancient hunting brotherhood, rooted primarily in West African countries. In Côte d’Ivoire, the Dozo currently back the Ouattara regime, and in a manifestation of their support, the group has adopted the role of a quasi-military entity, or unofficial militia. Armed typically with AK-47s, Dozo members have been implicated in roadblocks, security checks, arbitrary arrests, and killings. While the Dozo have denied these accusations—pointing to the strict moral code members adhere to that forbids them from engaging in such acts—there appears to be a general understanding that the brotherhood has, in fact, been involved in these actions. The government of Côte d’Ivoire has attempted to quell this internal threat by passing cabinet-level resolutions that forbid Dozo members from bearing arms and calling on them to cease roadblocks and

9 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 10 Human Rights Watch. “People Displaced by Conflict Face Land Theft.” April 18, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/09/cote-d-ivoire-people-displacedconflict-face-land-theft 11 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page=3 12 Defence Web. “Côte d’Ivoire.” April 17, 2014. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30175:cotedivoire&catid=119:african-militaries&Itemid=255 13 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page=3

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security checks, but these attempts have been futile, thus far. These resolutions may not be considered entirely credible because the current government also acknowledges that the Dozo help the Ouattara regime. Undoubtedly, the government has created a situation that seems to be simultaneously affirming the Dozo while trying to quell the instability and threat the group foments.14

The military under the Ouattara regime is called the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), and it operates as a traditional military (i.e., defense force) and as the police force for civil law enforcement.15 While recognized as the official Ivorian military apparatus, this FRCI is also a security threat. As an Ouattara supporter, it has been implicated in many human rights violations. Allegedly, rape and killings are among the human rights abuses employed by the FRCI as tools for suppressing Gbagbo supporters, which undoubtedly undermines the reconciliation process and challenges the legitimacy of the government. Extortion by the FRCI is also a rampant issue. The military allegedly makes arbitrary arrests and demands payment for the release of the detainees, yet for these human rights and corruption abuses, members of the military have not been subject to punishment.16

Corruption: The Prevalence of Bribery

Côte d’Ivoire struggles with widespread corruption. Petty bribery is a deeply entrenched bureaucratic practice, so much so that such bribery is recognized as one of the only ways to conduct day-to-day governmental activities, a fact that seriously challenges the legitimacy of the government and its ability to govern effectively.17 For example, 30% of businesses responded that they would have to pay bribes in order to obtain government contracts, according to a World Bank survey. Bribes paid to the military are commonplace, and they are demanded in exchange for the performance of various routine actions (such as the release of arbitrarily detained persons—see above).

While the prospect of dismantling such deeply ingrained corruption may seem difficult or unlikely, it is important to note that the government has taken steps toward its reduction. For instance, in 2012 Côte d’Ivoire became a member of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNAC), and the nation’s penal code does technically criminalize bribery by public officials. These are positive steps, and indicators of the possibility of weeding out the firmly rooted culture of corruption. The challenge is a lack of genuine investigations and prosecutions. Anti-corruption efforts will need non-corrupt enforcement if they are to be effective, and without a legitimate civil law enforcement entity, the goal of reducing petty bribery and worse may be difficult to achieve.

Impunity: The Legacy of Civil War

During the political crisis of 2010 and 2011, the nation was embroiled in a conflict in which members of both political camps (those of Ouattara and Gbagbo) committed serious human rights abuses and general crimes. Unfortunately, many of the perpetrators have not been brought to justice, inciting deep distrust of the government. The government’s military arm still seeks out those who do not support the Ouattara regime, using rape, extra-judicial killings, and arrests as tools of suppression. Detention conditions are often atrocious, and some survivors report being held in extremely small rooms with many other detainees, without

14 IRIN Africa. “Ivoirian Hunters Accused of Abuses.” April 18, 2014. http://www.irinnews.org/report/99418/ivoirian-hunters-accused-of-abuses 15 US Passports and International Travel: Côte d’Ivoire. April 18, 2014 http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/country/cote-divoire.html 16 Human Rights Watch World Report 2013: Côte d’Ivoire. April 13, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/cote-d-ivoire?page= 17 Transparency International. “An Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Côte d’Ivoire http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_cote_divoire

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sanitation, and with very little food or water. Along with the official military, the paramilitary, pro-Ouattara Dozo continue to carry out arrests, roadblocks, killings, and other abuses with impunity, despite government calls to cease such activities.18

After the election crisis, the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) was established, but it

was ultimately unsuccessful in promoting a genuine, sustainable reconciliation process.19 It is believed that

there simply cannot be reconciliation, or even the legitimizing of the government, in the absence of punishment for the egregious crimes that took place and that continue into the present.20 The lack of acknowledgement of recent atrocities underlies much of the country’s sense of distrust and discord and threatens the fragile de-escalation of the post-election violence.

ECONOMY & INFRASTRUCTURE

Once an economic powerhouse in West Africa, Côte d’Ivoire had a flourishing economy and enjoyed relative stability and peace until around 1993, when the first and only president until that point, Félix HouphouëtBoigny, died. In the years since HouphouëtBoigny’s death, the nation has suffered from the effects of crippling poverty; rising debt; high HIV/AIDS rates; endemic tropical diseases (such as yellow fever, malaria, and typhoid); low literacy rates; and deteriorating infrastructure. Nevertheless, Côte d’Ivoire does have many natural resources, including fertile farmland and minerals. If developed properly, these resources may help to revive the economy and the nation’s infrastructure, which could in turn remedy some of the country’s endemic challenges.21

The Economy & Human Security

Two primary issues Côte d’Ivoire must confront when addressing its economic situation are the amount of debt that encumbers the nation and an informal economy that makes genuine economic development difficult. Côte d’Ivoire

FIGURE 3: Côte d’Ivoire cocoa production 1995-2012 (International Cocoa Organization).

has roughly US$8.959 billion dollars of external debt, and therefore little public money is allocated toward education and public health. Indeed, only around 4.6% of the country’s roughly US$43.67 billion gross

18 Amnesty International. “Côte d’Ivoire: Revenge and Repression under the Pretense of Ensuring Security. April 18, 2014 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/c-ted-ivoire-revenge-and-repression-under-pretence-ensuring-security-2013-02- 19 IRIN Africa. “Côte d’Ivoire Truth Panel Seen Faltering.” April 18, 2014 http://www.irinnews.org/report/99456/c%C3%B4te-d-ivoire-truth-panel-seen-faltering 20 Amnesty International. “Côte d’Ivoire: Revenge and Repression Under the Pretense of Ensuring Security. April 18, 2014 http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/c-ted-ivoire-revenge-and-repression-under-pretence-ensuring-security-2013-02- 21 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html

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domestic product (GDP) is spent on education (in Tunisia, the rate is 6.2% of GDP22). As a result, only around 56% of the population is literate.

Lack of access to health care, education, and food are behind low levels of human security, and exacerbating this situation are high levels of unemployment, particularly youth unemployment (the unemployment rate may have soared to 50% during the recent election crisis); a high poverty rate (42% of the population lives in poverty); an average life expectancy of just 56 years for men and 59 for women; and an alarming 3.2% of the population infected with HIV/AIDS, a percentage roughly double that of any of Côte d’Ivoire’s West Africa neighbors.23

The black market in Côte d’Ivoire is robust, and the culture of bribery plays an important role in the alternative economy. Around US$300 million a year is estimated to be paid in bribes at checkpoints in Côte d’Ivoire each year, says Ivorian Chamber of Commerce President Jean-Louis Billon. Among illegal activities that make up the black market are diamond smuggling, oil smuggling, counterfeiting of medicine, online scams, and prostitution.24

While the current economic and human security situation raises concerns, as the world’s largest producer of cocoa—as well as a producer of other cash crops, such as palm oil, coffee, and cashews—Côte d’Ivoire commands a large agricultural sector, one that, with funding, could ably support the economy.25 However, the country is very dependent on world agricultural markets, and in particular fluctuations in the cocoa market. The price of cocoa has largely increased over the decade starting in 2003, but it has gone through several peaks and troughs in that time (for instance, an average daily high of US$3,167 per tonne in June 2011 fell to US$2,196 per tonne in December 2011).26 Investment in the processing capacity of the agricultural sector would likely yield positive results because Côte d’Ivoire currently lacks the necessary capacity to process its cash crops domestically; even its cocoa must be processed abroad.27

It’s important to note that in April 2014, the United Nations lifted the ban on diamond exports from Côte d’Ivoire. In November 2013, the Kimberley Process—which certifies that diamond exports are not “blood diamonds” (that fund violent activities)—acknowledged that Côte d’Ivoire’s diamonds were ready to be

FIGURE 4: Gold mining in Amara (Daily Express).

reintegrated into the export market. Despite the Kimberley Process certification, some members of the UN are concerned that Ivorian diamonds could easily become blood diamonds again. UN experts reported that a senior army officer was breaking the current UN diamond embargo and that there was “strong evidence” he

22 Public spending on education. The World Bank, May 20, 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS 23 CIA World Factbook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 14, 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html 24 “Ivory Coast checkpoint bribes cost '$300m.’” BBC News, May 4, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8660679.stm 25 African Economic Outlook: Côte d’Ivoire. April 18, 2014 http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/west-africa/cote-divoire/ 26 Monthly averages of cocoa prices. International Cocoa Organization, May 20, 2014. http://www.icco.org/statistics/cocoa-prices/monthly-averages.html 27 Business Council for Africa. “Restoring Cote d’Ivoire Status as the sub-Region’s Development Hub.” April 18, 2014. http://www.bcafrica.co.uk/news/510- restoring-cote-divoire-status-as-the-sub-regions-development-hub

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was using the profits to support soldiers loyal to him. The UN Security Council has requested that Côte d’Ivoire update the council on its action plan for diamonds “including … any enforcement activities involving illegal smuggling, development of its customs regime, and reporting of financial flows from diamonds.” It is likely that diamonds will represent an important aspect of Côte d’Ivoire’s export economy in the future.

28

Before the embargo, Côte d’Ivoire produced about 300,000 carats a year, valued at around US$25 million. Among other mineral resources (including iron, nickel, and manganese—see below), Côte d’Ivoire also has begun to mine gold, pursuant to one of President Ouattara’s promises to “diversify the economy.”29 Currently, the government holds all rights to gold and minerals in the state, pursuant to the Mining Code. Therefore, anyone who prospects must have authorization from the government.30 Several companies are now authorized to explore for gold—including the Taruga Gold and Endeavour Mining Corporation—which view Côte d’Ivoire’s gold as an underused resource and an opportunity for financial gain.31 Initial exploration suggests that Côte d’Ivoire may have the same gold belts that its neighboring countries, such as Mali and Burkina Faso, are situated on.32 Currently, the sector does not substantially contribute to the economy, and it is subject to unauthorized prospecting and mining, which opens the sector up to corruption and unbridled competition. These issues could shake the fragile economy and undermine the process of creating a sound government.33

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