CÔTE D’IVOIRE: DEFUSING TENSIONS Africa Report N°193 – 26 November 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. INTERNAL TENSION, EXTERNAL THREATS ......................................................... 1 A. A DISORGANISED SECURITY SYSTEM ........................................................................................... 2 1. Too many hunters, too few gendarmes ........................................................................................ 3 2. The challenge of reintegrating ex-combatants ............................................................................. 4 B. MONROVIA, ACCRA, ABIDJAN ..................................................................................................... 6 1. Agitation in the east ..................................................................................................................... 6 2. The west: a devastated region ...................................................................................................... 8 III.A STALLED POLITICAL DIALOGUE ...................................................................... 10 A. MARGINALISATION OF THE FORMER REGIME’S SUPPORTERS ..................................................... 11 B. DANGEROUS POLITICAL POLARISATION ..................................................................................... 12 IV.JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION: A WORRYING DRIFT ................................ 13 A. ONE-WAY JUSTICE ..................................................................................................................... 14 B. RECONCILIATION AT A STANDSTILL ........................................................................................... 15 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 17 APPENDICES A. MAP OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE ................................................................................................................... 18 B. ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................................... 19 Africa Report N°193 26 November 2012 COTE D’IVOIRE: DEFUSING TENSIONS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS A volatile security situation and mounting political ten- skills to do so. This military and militia apparatus working sions are threatening Côte d’Ivoire’s recovery. In the last for the government is unpopular, especially among sup- few months the country has been subjected to a series of porters of former President Laurent Gbagbo, who is now deadly attacks, whose targets have included: a police sta- in detention at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in tion, an important military base, several army positions and The Hague, the Netherlands and who could soon be joined a power station, in addition to an outbreak of violence in by his spouse, Simone Gbagbo, against whom the ICC the west. Although these incidents do not pose a direct unsealed an arrest warrant on 22 November. This config- threat to stability, they reveal that for some groups the war uration of the security sector aggravates tensions, partic- is not yet over. Other signs are also worrying: security ularly in the west, where intercommunal land issues are sector reform has been slow, political dialogue is stalled, adding up. Furthermore the slow progress in reintegrating the ruling coalition appears weak, violent discourses have the tens of thousands of youths who participated in the returned, coup plots have been devised and uncovered conflict back into civilian life causes yet more security- and there is a clear lack of political will to promote na- related problems through increasing the frustration of this tional reconciliation. Given this state of affairs, President section of the population and encouraging them to keep Alassane Ouattara and his new government should not their weapons as a guarantee of their economic survival. solely be relying on economic recovery and the tightening of security measures to consolidate peace. International Dialogue between the government and the opposition – a attention should not be diverted away from Côte d’Ivoire’s vital component of reconciliation – is stalled and does not stabilisation, which has become all the more crucial given go beyond statements of intent. The Front populaire ivoir- the decent of its neighbour, Mali, into a deep and lasting ien (FPI), former President Gbagbo’s party, has chosen crisis. isolation by withdrawing from the electoral process and basing its return to the political game on unrealistic con- Eighteen months after the end of a post-election conflict ditions. The FPI’s moderate wing has not been able to dis- which caused over 3,000 deaths and which was merely tance itself from the exiled hardliners who nourish hope the epilogue of a decade-long political and military crisis, of regaining military power. Political dialogue and recon- no one could have expected a complete return to normalcy. ciliation prospects have been paralysed since the uncover- Côte d’Ivoire has to cope with the numerous challenges ing in June, September and October 2012 of a number of commonly faced by post-war countries. For one, the secu- coup plots orchestrated by Ghana-based former ministers rity apparatus is struggling to get back in order and, despite of Gbagbo, his family members and close associates. These some progress, the Ivorian forces remain unstable and plots have convinced hardliners from the other side of the divided between the former members of the Gbagbo-era political sphere – members of the Rassemblement des ré- Forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS) and the former re- publicains (RDR), the presidential party, and the Forces bels of the Forces armées des forces nouvelles (FAFN). nouvelles (FN), the former rebellion – of the need to con- Both attitudes surrounding, and the modalities of, their solidate their military victory and maintain a repressive expected integration within the Forces républicaines de stance toward all representatives of the old regime, includ- Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), are posing an impediment to rec- ing the moderates. onciliation. Moreover, the former FAFN still remain the dominant force, with the police and gendarmerie continu- This political turmoil is accompanied by a return of hate- ing to be sidelined. ful and dangerous discourses relayed by the partisan press. In this climate of polarisation, the government is making A further security issue lies in the over 18,000 traditional decisions that are gradually moving it away from its cam- hunters, known as Dozos, deployed across the territory, paign promises of better governance and a break with the who helped secure the country but now continue to play a past, which was key to Ouattara’s victory in the November security role for which they have neither the legitimacy nor 2010 presidential election. Côte d’Ivoire: Defusing Tensions Crisis Group Africa Report N°193, 26 November 2012 Page ii The judicial system is also adding to tensions, due to its RECOMMENDATIONS biased stance: not a single FRCI member has been charged, either for crimes committed during the post-election crisis To improve security of the state and the populations or for those committed since. Arbitrary arrests have been taking place in the pro-Gbagbo media and have been To the Government of Côte d’Ivoire: widely carried out by the powerful Direction de la sur- 1. Encourage and increase initiatives to promote coex- veillance du territoire (DST) and military police. istence between former members of the Forces de dé- In the administration and public companies, some appoint- fense et de sécurité (FDS) and the Forces armées des ments have been made on regional or political criteria, in forces nouvelles (FAFN), including training, public the name of an “adjustment policy” – a form of reverse utility work or joint exercises. discrimination – that contradicts promises of improving 2. Speed up the redeployment of the police and gendar- governance. The Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation merie, and provide them with a significant budget for Commission (CDVR) is still struggling to start its work. equipment, focused on transport, communications and The establishment of its local committees is proving diffi- working conditions, as well as with the weapons nec- cult. More worrying is that the commission does not seem essary to perform their tasks. to be supported by the political power that established it 3. Organise a nationwide conference, which would in- last year, amid wide media coverage. The government has clude the main Dozo leaders, in order to define their still not provided it with the necessary financial resources, role within society and the security apparatus, as well and the personalised management style of its president, as the type of weapons they are allowed to have; and Charles Konan Banny, remains under sharp criticism. start identifying, disarming and reinserting into civilian In this context, the ruling coalition has been showing signs life the “fake Dozos”. of fragility, which culminated in the dissolution of the gov- 4. Declare publicly a deadline for the Autorité pour le dés- ernment on 14 November, a decision which exposed the armement, la démobilisation et la réinsertion (ADDR) cleavages between the RDR and its main ally, the Parti to identify