« Ils Les Ont Tués Comme Si De Rien N'était »

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

« Ils Les Ont Tués Comme Si De Rien N'était » Côte d’Ivoire « Ils les ont tués comme si HUMAN RIGHTS de rien n’était » WATCH Le besoin de justice pour les crimes post-électoraux en Côte d’Ivoire « Ils les ont tués comme si de rien n’était » Le besoin de justice pour les crimes post-électoraux en Côte d’Ivoire Copyright © 2011 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-820-1 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 51, Avenue Blanc 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org OCTOBRE 2011 1-56432-820-1 « Ils les ont tués comme si de rien n’était » Le besoin de justice pour les crimes post-électoraux en Côte d’Ivoire Cartes ................................................................................................................................ 1 Résumé .............................................................................................................................. 4 Recommandations............................................................................................................. 11 Au Président Alassane Ouattara, au ministre de la Justice Jeannot Kouadio Ahoussou et au ministre de l’Intérieur Hamed Bakayoko .................................................................................. 11 À Charles Konan Banny, président de la Commission dialogue, vérité et réconciliation ............ 13 À l’Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) ........................................................ 13 Au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies................................................................................ 13 Au bureau du Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’homme ........................................................ 14 Au procureur de la Cour pénale internationale ........................................................................ 14 À l’Union africaine et à la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest ............. 14 Au gouvernement du Libéria ................................................................................................... 15 Aux pays voisins dans lesquels des auteurs présumés de crimes graves sont susceptibles d’avoir trouvé refuge ............................................................................................................... 15 Aux bailleurs de fonds internationaux, notamment l’Union européenne, la France et les États-Unis ....................................................................................................... 15 Méthodologie ................................................................................................................... 16 Aperçu historique ............................................................................................................. 18 De l’indépendance aux élections de 2000 ............................................................................... 18 Conflit armé et impasse politico-militaire ................................................................................ 22 Accords de paix et force de maintien de la paix ....................................................................... 25 Élections de 2010 et conséquences immédiates .................................................................... 26 I. Premières violences post-électorales : novembre 2010—janvier 2011 ............................. 30 Forces pro-Gbagbo ................................................................................................................. 31 Recours excessif à la force contre les manifestants ........................................................... 31 Assassinats ciblés et disparitions forcées d’activistes pro-Ouattara ................................. 36 Assassinats d’opposants présumés par les milices pro-Gbagbo ....................................... 38 Violences sexuelles .......................................................................................................... 41 Forces pro-Ouattara dans le nord du pays ............................................................................... 43 II. Vers un conflit armé : février à mi-mars 2010 ................................................................. 47 Les forces pro-Gbagbo ........................................................................................................... 48 Incitations à la violence par le camp Gbagbo ................................................................... 48 Violence ciblée contre les immigrés ouest-africains à Abidjan .......................................... 51 Attaques de mosquées, de musulmans et d’imams .......................................................... 55 Viols ciblés et disparitions forcées de partisans d’Alassane Ouattara .............................. 60 Violente répression des manifestations ........................................................................... 62 Forces pro-Ouattara ................................................................................................................ 65 Meurtres de civils dans le village d’Anonkoua .................................................................. 65 Exécutions sommaires de membres détenus des forces de Gbagbo .................................. 67 III. Un conflit armé généralisé : mi-mars à mai 2011 .......................................................... 69 Forces pro-Gbagbo ................................................................................................................ 69 Meurtres et massacres dans l’extrême ouest du pays ...................................................... 69 Tirs aveugles d’obus à Abidjan ......................................................................................... 75 Viols et meurtres ethniques généralisés à Abidjan ............................................................ 78 Offensive militaire des Forces républicaines ........................................................................... 87 Meurtres, viols et pillages dans l’extrême ouest du pays .................................................. 88 Exécutions sommaires de civils détenus, essentiellement des personnes âgées ............... 93 Viols et autres violences sexuelles .................................................................................. 96 Massacre de Duékoué impliquant les Forces républicaines ............................................. 101 Bataille finale pour Abidjan et les semaines qui ont suivi................................................ 105 IV. Principaux acteurs impliqués ..................................................................................... 120 Camp Gbagbo ....................................................................................................................... 120 Camp Ouattara ..................................................................................................................... 124 Forces non officiellement alignées ........................................................................................ 126 V. Initiatives relatives à l’obligation de rendre des comptes ............................................. 127 Commissions d’enquête ....................................................................................................... 127 Poursuites nationales contre le camp Gbagbo ........................................................................131 Aucune poursuite au niveau national visant des soldats des Forces républicaines ................ 133 Cour pénale internationale ................................................................................................... 135 Commission dialogue, vérité et réconciliation ....................................................................... 137 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................140 Annexe – Lettres adressées à la Cour pénale internationale ............................................. 143 Remerciements .............................................................................................................. 148 Glossaire des acronymes ................................................................................................ 149 Cartes Côte d’Ivoire. © 2010 John Emerson / Human Rights Watch 1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | OCTOBRE 2011 Extrême ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire. © 2011 Human Rights Watch « ILS LES ONT TUÉS COMME SI DE RIEN N’ÉTAIT » 2 Abidjan. © 2011 John Emerson/Human Rights Watch. Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors, CC-BY-SA 3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | OCTOBRE 2011 Résumé Le 28 novembre 2010, le peuple ivoirien se rend aux urnes pour élire un Président dans l’espoir de mettre fin à dix années de crise marquée par la division militaire et politique du pays entre le Nord et le Sud. Dans la semaine qui suit le deuxième tour de cette élection, et malgré un large consensus international
Recommended publications
  • Côte D'ivoire
    CÔTE D’IVOIRE COI Compilation August 2017 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Regional Representation for West Africa - RSD Unit UNHCR Côte d’Ivoire UNHCR Regional Representation for West Africa - RSD Unit UNHCR Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire COI Compilation August 2017 This report collates country of origin information (COI) on Côte d’Ivoire up to 15 August 2017 on issues of relevance in refugee status determination for Ivorian nationals. The report is based on publicly available information, studies and commentaries. It is illustrative, but is neither exhaustive of information available in the public domain nor intended to be a general report on human-rights conditions. The report is not conclusive as to the merits of any individual refugee claim. All sources are cited and fully referenced. Users should refer to the full text of documents cited and assess the credibility, relevance and timeliness of source material with reference to the specific research concerns arising from individual applications. UNHCR Regional Representation for West Africa Immeuble FAALO Almadies, Route du King Fahd Palace Dakar, Senegal - BP 3125 Phone: +221 33 867 62 07 Kora.unhcr.org - www.unhcr.org Table of Contents List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 4 1 General Information ....................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Historical background ............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Country Risk Overview
    Côte d’IvoIre Country Risk Overview Côte d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara is expected to remain in power until 2020 when his two term limit expires. This provides a solid foundation for current investment prospects, which is particularly impressive against the backdrop of the 2010 political unrest. However, various factors developing in the run-up to the next elections have the potential to impact investment in the country. When Ouattara was inaugurated in 2011, his immediate mandate was to bring stability and a safer security environment following the electoral crisis resulting from the 2010 election. A close second was economic reform. Ouattara led major investments in infrastructure, education, health, transportation as well as Côte d’Ivoire’s restoration as the world’s leading producer of cocoa and cashew nuts. In October 2016, a new constitution was approved following a referendum which allowed the consolidation of executive power. A legislative election was held in December that year which saw the RDR-led ruling coalition retain power by securing 167 of the 255 seats. Ouattara used the successful election to reduce Côte d’Ivoire has the cabinet and appoint longstanding allies into key positions, as permitted by maintained steady the new constitution. Notably, Ouattara placed Daniel Kablan Duncan in the economic growth over newly formed Vice President role and Amadou Gon Coulibaly as Prime Minister. These appointees reinforce Ouattara’s strong control over the country, and the last 5 years and support his continued hold on power until the next election in three years. boasts strong agriculture, mining, oil and gas and Opportunities Côte d’Ivoire is an economic and transportation hub for French-speaking West infrastructure sectors.
    [Show full text]
  • KAS International Reports 09/2015
    9|2015 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 89 ON THE OTHER SIDE OF CRISIS OR BACK ON THE BRINK? OUTLOOK ON THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN IVORY COAST Valentin Katzer INTRODUCTION West Africa is currently running a veritable election marathon: Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Niger, Ghana – the cards in the region are being reshuffled in the 2015 and 2016 electoral period.1 Past experience indicates that polls always prove to be a test for security, as well as social and political stability in the electoral democracies between Sahel and the Gulf Dr. Valentin Katzer of Guinea. The presidential and semi-presidential systems of the is a trainee in the Promotion region have repeatedly given rise to tension and conflict in the of Democr acy in past, and even more so where the newly elected head of state the West Africa is endowed with extensive powers. The “Présidentielles” in Ivory program of the Konrad-Adenauer- Coaste fiv years ago resulted in a particularly dramatic escalation. Stiftung. Due to the Civil War (2002/2007), the elections, which had been originally scheduled for 2005, were postponed several times, and were finally held against the backdrop of a deeply divided country. The first ballot of the belated 2010 presidential elections initially put southern incumbent Laurent Gbagbo ahead, but during the run-off, northern challenger Alassane Ouattara was certified to have received the highest number of votes by the Independent Electoral Commission (Commission Électorale Independente de Côte d’Ivoire). The Constitutional Council, however, declared Gbagbo the victor. Both candidates took their oath, resulting in two Ivorian presidents being in office at the same time.
    [Show full text]
  • Côte D'ivoire Country Focus
    European Asylum Support Office Côte d’Ivoire Country Focus Country of Origin Information Report June 2019 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Côte d’Ivoire Country Focus Country of Origin Information Report June 2019 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9476-993-0 doi: 10.2847/055205 © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2019 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © Mariam Dembélé, Abidjan (December 2016) CÔTE D’IVOIRE: COUNTRY FOCUS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 3 Acknowledgements EASO acknowledges as the co-drafters of this report: Italy, Ministry of the Interior, National Commission for the Right of Asylum, International and EU Affairs, COI unit Switzerland, State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), Division Analysis The following departments reviewed this report, together with EASO: France, Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA), Division de l'Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches (DIDR) Norway, Landinfo The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Office for Country of Origin Information and Language Analysis (OCILA) Dr Marie Miran-Guyon, Lecturer at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), researcher, and author of numerous publications on the country reviewed this report. It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO.
    [Show full text]
  • Rapport CI ENG.Indd
    CÔTE D’IVOIRE Time to “disarm minds, pens and microphones” May 2005 Reporters Without Borders International Secrétariat Africa Desk 5, rue Geoffroy Marie 75009 Paris-France Tél. (33) 1 44 83 84 76 Fax (33) 1 45 23 11 51 Email: [email protected] Web: www.rsf.org The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, the cause for the country’s partition since September 2002, has entered a decisive phase. A last chance for a negotiated settlement is offered by the Pretoria accord, concluded on 6 April 2005 under a UN threat of targeted sanctions and thanks to mediation by South African President Thabo Mbeki on behalf of the African Union. On 14 May, the warring parties agreed on a timetable for the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of their combatants – the rebel forces in the north and government militias in the south. All sights are now fixed on general elections under UN control, even if the Following an investigation in the field from 7 to date currently set for the presidential election 14 May, Reporters Without Borders advocates – 30 October 2005 – seems improbable for lack a number of urgent measures as an alternative of preparations for a “free, fair and transparent” to ineffective outrage and letting the media poll. criminals go unpunished on the grounds that and microphones” “they are part of the problem and therefore The Ivorian news media have a crucial role to must be part of the solution.” Reporters play. In an unprecedented move last November, Without Borders believes the international the UN Security Council (in resolution 1572) community has a duty to come to the help of condemned Côte d’Ivoire’s “hate media” and Ivorians who, for a long time and despite all the put journalists who have openly called for dangers, have been fighting for journalism to murder or incited violence on a blacklist along be practised both freely and responsibly.
    [Show full text]
  • Pdf | 162.29 Kb
    2 April 2007 No. 1 CÔTE D’IVOIRE Expected Council Action Following the agreement signed on 26 March between Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and Forces nouvelles leader Guillaume Soro providing for Soro’s appointment as interim prime minister, the Council is expected to adopt a new resolution amending its previous resolutions on the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire (and especially resolution 1721) to bring them into conformity with the Ouagadougou agreement signed between the parties on 4 March. In particular, it would: • postpone elections and extend President Gbagbo’s mandate until early January 2008; and • accept Soro as new interim prime minister and transfer to him the mandate previously given to Charles Konan Banny. Key Recent Developments After a month of “direct dialogue” in Ouagadougou between representatives of the two sides, face-to-face talks between President Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro produced the Ouagadougou agreement. It established a new framework for the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire, in which the international community would have a smaller role to play. The parties committed themselves to: • re-launch national hearings to identify the population with security guarantees from both sides and, after the completion of the electoral list, distribute electoral cards to electors under the supervision of the Ivorian Electoral Commission; • merge armed forces from both sides and create an Integrated Command Center, jointly headed and responsible for defence and security, including disarmament, securing the national hearings sites
    [Show full text]
  • 193 Cote D-Ivoire
    CÔTE D’IVOIRE: DEFUSING TENSIONS Africa Report N°193 – 26 November 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. INTERNAL TENSION, EXTERNAL THREATS ......................................................... 1 A. A DISORGANISED SECURITY SYSTEM ........................................................................................... 2 1. Too many hunters, too few gendarmes ........................................................................................ 3 2. The challenge of reintegrating ex-combatants ............................................................................. 4 B. MONROVIA, ACCRA, ABIDJAN ..................................................................................................... 6 1. Agitation in the east ..................................................................................................................... 6 2. The west: a devastated region ...................................................................................................... 8 III.A STALLED POLITICAL DIALOGUE ...................................................................... 10 A. MARGINALISATION OF THE FORMER REGIME’S SUPPORTERS ..................................................... 11 B. DANGEROUS POLITICAL POLARISATION ..................................................................................... 12 IV.JUSTICE
    [Show full text]
  • Ivory Coast: “The Fight Against Impunity at a Crossroad”
    IVORY COAST: “THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY AT A CROSSROAD” Article 1: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4: No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. Article 5: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, October 2013/617a - © AFP/SIA KAMBOU 2 / Titre du rapport – FIDH Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 I - A political situation still highly polarised ----------------------------------------------------------6 II - The fight against impunity: between political manipulation and genuine efforts ------------9 III - National reconciliation and the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission ------- 20 Conclusions ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    [Show full text]
  • Costa D'avorio Notizie Sul Paese
    European Asylum Support Office Costa d’Avorio Notizie sul Paese Informazioni sui Paesi di origine Giugno 2019 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Costa d’Avorio Notizie sul Paese Informazioni sui Paesi di origine Giugno 2019 Altre informazioni sull’Unione europea sono disponibili su Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9476-993-0 doi: 10.2847/055205 © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2019 La riproduzione è autorizzata con citazione della fonte, tranne quando diversamente indicato. Per i materiali di terze parti riprodotti in questa pubblicazione, si fa riferimento alle dichiarazioni dei diritti d’autore delle rispettive terze parti. Foto di copertina: © Mariam Dembélé, Abidjan (dicembre 2016) COSTA D’AVORIO: NOTIZIE SUL PAESE - EASO, INFORMAZIONI SUI PAESI DI ORIGINE — 3 Ringraziamenti L’EASO desidera ringraziare i seguenti co-autori della presente relazione: Italia, Ministero dell’Interno, Commissione Nazionale per il Diritto di Asilo, Affari Internazionali e Comunitari, Unità COI Svizzera, Segretariato di Stato per la Migrazione (SEM), Divisione Analisi La presente relazione è stata riveduta dai seguenti Enti, insieme all’EASO: Francia, Ufficio Francese di Protezione dei Rifugiati e degli Apolidi (OFPRA), Divisione Informazione, Documentazione e Ricerche (DIDR) Norvegia, Landinfo Paesi Bassi, Servizio Immigrazione e Naturalizzazione, Ufficio Informazioni sui Paesi di Origine e Analisi delle Lingue (OCILA) La presente relazione è stata riveduta da Marie Miran-Guyon, docente presso l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), ricercatrice e autrice di numerose pubblicazioni sul Paese. Si fa notare che la revisione effettuata dagli Enti , dalle organizzazioni o dagli esperti menzionati contribuisce alla qualità complessiva della relazione ma non implica necessariamente una loro approvazione formale del contenuto finale del documento, per il quale l’EASO ha piena responsabilità.
    [Show full text]
  • Tracking Conflict Worldwide
    4/2/2021 CrisisWatch Print | Crisis Group CRISISWATCH Tracking Conflict Worldwide CrisisWatch is our global conict tracker, a tool designed to help decision- makers prevent deadly violence by keeping them up-to-date with developments in over 70 conicts and crises, identifying trends and alerting them to risks of escalation and opportunities to advance peace. Learn more about CrisisWatch March 2021 Global Overview MARCH 2021 Trends for Last Month March 2021 DETERIORATED Outlook for This Month SITUATIONS April 2021 Niger, Mozambique, Senegal, CONFLICT RISK ALERTS Taiwan Strait, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Ukraine, Brazil, None Paraguay RESOLUTION IMPROVED SITUATIONS OPPORTUNITIES Kashmir, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, None Libya https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/print?t=Crisiswatch+March+2021&crisiswatch=16714&date=March+2021 1/50 4/2/2021 CrisisWatch Print | Crisis Group CrisisWatch highlights deteriorations in nine countries and conict areas in March. In Mozambique, Islamist insurgents launched a major attack on the strategic port town of Palma in the far north, leaving scores dead and triggering a mass exodus. A spate of jihadist attacks in Niger killed over 200 civilians, while authorities foiled a coup attempt ahead of President-elect Mohamed Bazoum’s inauguration on 2 April. Mass protests continued against the military coup in Myanmar as security forces ramped up their deadly crackdown on demonstrators. More than 500 civilians have been killed since 1 February. In Brazil, political tensions peaked as the rift deepened between President Jair Bolsonaro and the military, while the COVID-19 pandemic spiralled out of control. The conict escalated in Ukraine’s east as the Donbas ceasere faced growing strains with over twenty killed.
    [Show full text]
  • Rapport Sur L'afrique De L'ouest
    NUMÉRO 14 | OCTOBRE 2015 Rapport sur l’Afrique de l’Ouest Côte d’Ivoire 2015 : une élection pour consolider la paix ? Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni Résumé Le scrutin présidentiel de 2010 avait plongé la Côte d’Ivoire dans un conflit armé entrainant la mort de plus de 3 000 personnes. Il est peu probable que celui de 2015 déclenche des violences à grande échelle. Cela ne suffira toutefois pas à en faire un succès démocratique et un gage de stabilité pour l’avenir. Alors que toute l’attention est actuellement tournée vers le vote du 25 octobre, il importe de lier les questions électorales immédiates aux enjeux de stabilité à moyen et long terme pour le pays. Si des réponses efficaces ne sont pas apportées aux questions fondamentales, nouvelles et anciennes, de la crise ivoirienne, le risque d’une régression dans la dynamique de normalisation politique et sécuritaire demeurera réel. Introduction Les Ivoiriens se rendront aux urnes le 25 octobre 2015 pour l’élection présidentielle. Dix candidats figureront sur le bulletin de vote, dont Alassane Ouattara, le président sortant. Depuis la crise postélectorale de 2010-2011 qui s’est soldée par plus de 3 000 morts, la scène politique de la Côte d’Ivoire a subi de profondes transformations. Elle demeure cependant fortement polarisée. À quelques jours du vote, de nombreux partis d’opposition continuent de remettre en cause les conditions d’organisation du scrutin. Début octobre, deux des candidats de l’opposition suspendaient leur participation au processus, estimant que les conditions d’une élection libre, démocratique et transparente n’étaient pas réunies.
    [Show full text]
  • Rapport De Mission En République De Côte D'ivoire
    Rapport de mission en République de Côte d’Ivoire du 25 novembre au 7 décembre 2019 Mission organisée par l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA) avec la participation de la Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA) Rapport de mission en République de Côte d’Ivoire - novembre/décembre 2019 Remerciements : La délégation remercie tous les interlocuteurs ayant bien voulu la rencontrer lors de la mission, ainsi que toutes les personnes ayant concouru à sa réalisation. Elaboration du rapport : Ce rapport a été élaboré par l’équipe de la mission : Julien MASSIP (chef de mission, chef de la section de recherches Afrique à la Division de l’information, de la documentation et des recherches (DIDR) de l’OFPRA, Paul BIER (officier de protection instructeur à la division Afrique - Geoffrey Oryema de l’OFPRA), et Laura SCHÜLKE (rapporteur à la CNDA). Les photographies figurant dans ce rapport ont été prises lors de la mission, y compris celle figurant sur la couverture, prise à Yamoussoukro. La rédaction du rapport a été finalisée en mars 2020. Les évènements survenus ultérieurement à cette date ne sont pas pris en compte. Avertissement : Le présent rapport ne prétend pas être une étude exhaustive de tous les phénomènes liés à la problématique de l’asile, et n’a pas vocation à apporter de preuves concluantes quant au fondement de demandes d’asile particulières. Ce rapport ne reflète pas la position de l’OFPRA, mais uniquement celle des interlocuteurs rencontrés lors de cette mission, lesquels ont été sélectionnés avec le souci de recouper les informations en accord avec les lignes directrices communes européennes sur les missions de recueil d’informations.
    [Show full text]