The UN Operation in Côte D'ivoire
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JUNE 2018 The Many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission: The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire ALEXANDRA NOVOSSELOFF Cover Photo: Peacekeepers of the UN ABOUT THE AUTHOR Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) provide security as legislative by- ALEXANDRA NOVOSSELOFF is a Senior Visiting Fellow at elections take place in Grand Laho, the International Peace Institute’s Brian Urquhart Center for February 26, 2012. UN Photo/Hien Peace Operations. Macline. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS and not necessarily those of the International Peace Institute. IPI The author is particularly grateful to the colleagues and welcomes consideration of a wide friends who provided input and feedback on various drafts range of perspectives in the pursuit of of this report: Caroline Allibert, Arthur Boutellis, Bruno a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international Charbonneau, Alan Doss, Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, Lea affairs. Koudjou, Herbert Loret, and Jake Sherman. IPI Publications This report has been written in memory of the late Adam Lupel, Vice President permanent representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the United Albert Trithart, Editor Nations, Bernard Tanoh-Boutchoué. May he rest in peace. Madeline Brennan, Associate Editor Suggested Citation: Alexandra Novosseloff, “The Many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission: The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire,” New York: International Peace Institute, June 2018. © by International Peace Institute, 2018 All Rights Reserved www.ipinst.org CONTENTS Abbreviations . iii Executive Summary . 1 Introduction . 2 The Origins of the Ivorian Crisis. 3 A Historical Account (2002–2017) . 4 EARLY DAYS OF THE CIVIL WAR FROM THE LINAS-MARCOUSSIS AGREEMENT TO THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 2004 THE PRETORIA AGREEMENT AND UNOCI’S MANDATE FROM THE OUAGADOUGOU PEACE AGREEMENT TO THE ELECTIONS FROM THE POST-ELECTION CRISIS TO A NEW PHASE FOR CÔTE D’IVOIRE AND UNOCI DOWNSIZING OF UNOCI AND THE TRANSITION TO THE UN COUNTRY TEAM UNOCI’s Achievements and Limitations in the Implementation of Its Mandate . 20 SUCCESSES IN RESOLVING THE CRISIS AND ACHIEVING STABILITY FRAGILE CONSENT OF THE HOST STATE HEAVY PRESENCE AND SUPPORT OF FRANCE THE UN’S ROLE IN CERTIFYING THE ELECTION RESULTS: A RELEVANT MANDATE? A ROBUST APPROACH TO THE POST-ELECTION CRISIS: PARTIAL IMPARTIALITY? INCOMPLETE DDR AND SSR PROCESSES SANCTIONS AND THE ARMS EMBARGO: AN INAPPLICABLE INSTRUMENT Conclusion: The Continued Political Fragility of Côte d’Ivoire . 35 iii Abbreviations AU African Union DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration DFS UN Department of Field Support DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations ECOFORCE ECOWAS Peace Force for Côte d’Ivoire ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations LMA Linas-Marcoussis Agreement MINUCI UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire OPA Ouagadougou Peace Agreement PDCI-RDA Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire–Rassemblement démocratique africain SRSG Special representative of the secretary-general SSR Security sector reform UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia UNOCI UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 1 Executive Summary faced numerous challenges, however, and its evolution offers lessons that could be applied to The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) other peacekeeping operations: completed its mandate on June 30, 2017, after more • Consent of the host state: UNOCI illustrated the than thirteen years. In the presidential statement difficulty of operating with the fragile consent, marking the mission’s completion, the Security and at time even the hostility, of the host govern- Council requested “the Secretary-General to ment. It was caught in the unique position where undertake within a year…a comprehensive study achieving its mandate required the removal of of the role of UNOCI in the settlement of the the head of state. situation in Côte d’Ivoire since its establishment.” • Support of a permanent member of the Security This request presents an opportunity to examine Council: France influenced UNOCI in many the many stages or “lives” of a peacekeeping ways: it initiated the debate in the Security operation, something often overlooked. Council on its creation, was the penholder on all UNOCI was created following a failed coup in Security Council resolutions, and deployed 2002, when soldiers of the Ivorian armed forces troops. While it was hard for the mission to tried to topple then-President Laurent Gbagbo. escape this influence, the Security Council The insurgency developed into a rebellion, with generally showed unity behind France. rebel forces taking control of the northern half of • Mandate of certification: UNOCI had an almost the country. In response, both France and regional unique mandate: the certification of election actors intervened militarily and launched a series of results. While the UN’s certification role was mediation efforts. It was in this context that the UN controversial, and it contributed to making Security Council created UNOCI as an ambitious armed confrontation inevitable, it also bound all and full-fledged multidimensional peacekeeping stakeholders to the results, helping preserve the operation in 2004. unity of the country and of the Security Council. In the wake of the contested 2010 presidential • Robust peacekeeping: The robust approach elections, UNOCI entered a second phase. These UNOCI took in the post-election crisis was elections prompted a crisis that tested the mission’s controversial, with some accusing the UN of cooperation with French forces, the unity of the taking sides. Nonetheless, because UNOCI took Security Council, the mission’s cooperation with this militarily robust approach in parallel with regional actors, and the mission’s capacity to deal the Secretariat’s politically robust approach and with a sudden deterioration in the security in coordination with the French Operation situation. Ultimately, UNOCI adopted a robust Licorne, it was successful. approach, and the crisis was resolved by force with the ouster of Gbagbo. • DDR/SSR processes: The “deal” between the government and the rebels was to hold elections With the ascension of President Alassane in return for proper disarmament, demobiliza- Ouattara in 2011, UNOCI entered the third and tion, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector final phase of its deployment. During this phase it reform (SSR) in the north. However, progress on tried to support a democratically elected govern- SSR was delayed and remained incomplete when ment that had reached power through violence. the mission left. The mission began its drawdown in 2013, and in 2017 it handed over to the UN country team with • Sanctions and arms embargoes: The Security no follow-on mission in place. Council imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on individuals in Côte d’Ivoire. In the end, UNOCI was able to lift Côte d’Ivoire However, this sanctions regime did not play a out of its most serious crisis since independence. It significant role in putting pressure on the parties. 2 Alexandra Novosseloff “On ne sort pas d’une guerre comme d’un uals, the use of force, referral to the International dîner-gala.” Criminal Court, and a peacekeeping operation. In Laurent Gbagbo the end, UNOCI was able to lift Côte d’Ivoire out of its most serious crisis since independence. Since Introduction1 then, the country has been making progress, though numerous challenges remain. The creation of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire In its presidential statement on June 30, 2017, the (UNOCI) traces back to a failed coup in September Security Council requested “the Secretary-General 2002, when soldiers of the Ivorian armed forces to undertake within a year, and within existing tried to topple then-President Laurent Gbagbo, who resources, a comprehensive study of the role of had been in office since October 2000. Although the UNOCI in the settlement of the situation in Côte insurgents did not succeed, their movement d’Ivoire since its establishment” and “look[ed] developed into a rebellion. The rebels, who later forward to the results of this study, including coalesced under the name Forces Nouvelles, took further lessons learned and recommendations…in control of the northern half of the country, splitting the context of its ongoing work to enhance the Côte d’Ivoire in two: the government-run south and overall effectiveness of United Nations peace - the rebel-held north. Their demands included keeping.”2 This request presents an opportunity to inclusive elections, recognition of issues of citizen- examine the many stages or “lives” of a peace - ship and nationality, and the resignation of the head keeping operation, something often over looked. of state. In this context, both France and the This paper intends not only to contribute to this Economic Community of West African States important learning process but also to go beyond (ECOWAS) intervened militarily. The French the scope of the study requested by the UN intervention contributed to the establishment of a secretary-general to examine the trajectory of buffer zone that created a situation of “neither war UNOCI over the years. It provides a historical nor peace” (“ni guerre ni paix”) until the conflict account of the various phases of the Ivorian crisis, that broke out during the 2010–2011 post-election from 2002 and the early days of the rebellion crisis. After 2011, UNOCI entered another period through to the signature of the various peace in which it tried to support a democratically elected agreements and the aftermath of the post-election government that had reached power through crisis. It examines how throughout this period violence. That period ended in 2017 with the UNOCI evolved and adapted to the circumstances closure of the mission and its handover to the UN and cooperated with regional actors and the French country team with no follow-on mission in place. force on the ground, and how the Security Council The Security Council passed fifty-one resolutions dealt with the central elements of the Ivorian on UNOCI during its thirteen years of existence.