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Foreign Affairs and Economic Relations Foreign Affairs and Economic Relations with Southern Africa Non-Alignment Through diplomacy and pragmatism-but also a mix of compliance and fortune- Sweden managed to stay outside the armed conflicts during both the First and the Second World Wars. As a result, Sweden has enjoyed unbroken peace since 1814, a unique situation in modern world history. Although the roots of neutrality go back to the early 19th century,1 it was with the division of Europe into two blocs after the Second World War that the guiding foreign policy principles of non- alignment were laid down, commonly expressed as 'non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war'. Once established, they were supported by the traditional parliamentary parties and followed during the period covered in the study. It was not until the demise of the Soviet Union and Sweden's membership of the European Union-effective from 1 January 1995-that the basic tenets were questioned and altered.2 Determining Sweden's post-war policy of non-alignment was its geographical and strategic position as a medium-sized country in northern Europe. From an economic point of view, Sweden was closely integrated with the West. Geo- politically, it was at the same time situated at the crossroads between major strategic super-power interests and in the immediate proximity of areas of vital demographic, economic and military importance to both the West and the East. As stated by the Swedish diplomat Sverker Astrtm, being so situated, it stands to reason that Sweden should have two aims, [namely] to avoid coming under the influence of the nearby super-power [and] avoid becoming the menacing outpost of the other.3 1 KristerWallbick: The Roots of Swedish Neutrality, The Swedish Institute, Stockholm, 1986. 2 In a speech to the congress of the Swedish Metal Workers' Federation in August 1961, Prime Minister Erlander rejected proposals for Swedish membership of the European Economic Community-the I orenmner of the European Union-on the grounds that it was incompatible with a credible Swedish policy of neutrality. The speech set the tone for the following three decades. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the parliament endorsed a proposal in December 1990 that Sweden should apply for full membership of the EC/EU. After a referendum in November 1994-in which 52.3% voted in favour and 46.8% against-the newly elected Social Democratic government led Sweden into the European Union from 1 January 1995. 3 Sverker Astram: Sweden's Policy of Neutrality, The Swedish Institute, Stockholm, 1987, p. 7. Tor Sellstr6m In turn, Sweden's strategic position was a consequence of different Nordic experiences during the Second World War and of separate post-war realities. In 1948, Finland signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Sweden took the initiative to a defensive alliance with Denmark and Norway. However, whereas Sweden insisted that the alliance should be independent of the super-powers, Norway-which like Denmark had been occupied by Nazi-Germany during the war and had fought on the side of the Western powers--desired a formal link with the West. The initiative fell through when Denmark and Norway in 1949 opted to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Sweden decided to remain outside. Iceland also became a member of NATO. As a result, Sweden was formally1 the only alliance-free state in the Nordic area. Consequently, it also had more room-or fewer limitations-than the other Nordic countries when going its own way or following others, for example visA-vis Southern Africa. Sweden's non-alignment-in contrast to Switzerland's strict neutrality-did not preclude active participation in the United Nations or clear stands on divisive issues in the Cold War. The bounds of activism would, however, be interpreted differently, both within the Social Democratic Party and, in particular, by the Social Democrats on the one hand and the Moderate Party on the other. Questions relating to the activation of the foreign policy and the permissible degree of activism will be illustrated in the narrative sections and discussed in the concluding parts below. At a lecture in 1976, Sverker Astrom, ambassador to the United Nations from 1964 to 1970, summarized a broadly shared opinion as follows: "We refuse to relinquish [...] the right to [...] criticize phenomena that are contrary to our democratic principles and to basic human rights [and our right] to demand respect for international law, [including] the interests of small nations." He added: [W]e obviously have no reason for nervously weighing the force and frequency of our criticism of phenomena in different foreign countries in the East and in the West. From the neutrality point of view, [what is] essential is that we act with consistency and according to firm principles over a long period of time.2 The Foreign Service In the 1950s, Sweden would under Foreign Minister Osten Unddn3 follow a cautious and conservative course in international matters. Until the end of the 1 'Formally', because Sweden was always part of the Western community. During the post-war period, Sweden developed dose ties with the NATO countries and "Swedish and Western intelligence services cooperated in ways hardly reconcilable with strict neutrality" (Hadenius op. cit., p. 162). 2 Astrbm op. cit., p. 12. 3 Undfn, a professor in law and former vice-chancellor of the University of Uppsala, served as Minister for Foreign Affairs as early as in 1924-26. His second term covered the critical post-war period from 1945 to 1962. Foreign Affairs and Economic Relations with Southern Africa decade, foreign policy questions did not play an important part in the political debate outside the student and youth movements. The Swedes were, in general, little concerned or involved with global issues and the traditional political parties only occasionally discussed foreign questions in the riksdag.1 Sweden was largely insulated from the world and Und~n "managed [...] foreign policy almost as a one-man business".2 Questions that in the 1960s deeply engaged the public were settled without major objections or debates. For example, when the Swedish government in 1953 refused to allow resident members of an Estonian government in exile-set up in the Norwegian capital Oslo-to carry out political activities, this was criticized by the Liberal Party leader Bertil Ohlin, but did not otherwise provoke indignation or protests. Explaining the position taken by the Social Democratic government, Undhn stated in February 1953: It is, in fact, an old rule that political refugees, arriving in the country of asylum laden with political preoccupations, political resentment and political complaints against the country from which they have had to flee, should not air their complaints in the country of asylum. They arrive here and asylum is granted to them, but we do not wish to have all their political problems thrown in as issues amongst [the] Swedish public opinion".3 Ten years later, Olof Palme, Sten Andersson and other Social Democrats of a new generation were to share public platforms with resident political refugees from Southern Africa. By demanding sanctions against the Pretoria regime, the exiles used the occasions to raise issues which the Swedish government was not yet ready to tackle, but the public opinion forcefully embraced.4 A more active interpretation of the policy of non-alignment was for many years opposed by the traditionally conservative, largely aristocratic,5 corps of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At the beginning of the 1950s, a more or less open campaign against the Social Democratic government had been conducted 1 Onforeign questions in the Swedish parliament, see Ulf Bjereld and Marie Demker: Utrikespolitiken so Slagfiilt: De Svenska Partierna och Utrikesfrigorna ('Foreign Policy as a Battlefield: The Swedish Parties and Foreign Policy Questions'), Nerenius & Sant6rus Firlag, Stockholm, 1995. 2 M611er op. cit, p. 22. 3' Speechby the Foreign Minister in the Second Chamber of the Riksdag', 14 February 1953 in The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy: 1953, Stockholm, 1957, pp. 88S-89. 4 During the latter part of the 1960s, Sweden granted asylum to both Portuguese and US deserters refusing to participate in the wars in Africa and Vietnam. Sweden received around 800 US deserters between 1967 and 1975 (Ingvar Svanberg & Mattias Tydln: Tsen Ar av Invandring: En Svensk Ksiturhistoria ('A Thousand Years of Immigration: A Swedish Cultural History'), Gidlunds Bokf6rlag, Stockholm, 1992, p. 342). 5 "No ministry, no organization, no company can display as many more or less famous families as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Enskilda Banken is beaten by a very broad margin" (Ake Ortmark: Maktspelet i Sverige: Eft Samhiillsreportage ('The Swedish Power Game: A Social Report'), Wahlstrbm & Widstrand, Stockholm, 1968, p. 90). See also interview with Bengt Save-Siderbergh, Stockholm 14 January 1997. Tor Sellstrbm at the ministry.1 Almost twenty years later, the political commentator Ake Ortmark concluded that "the darkest reactionary attitude to social issues may not be represented at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as often as in the past, but it is still evident that an overwhelming majority of [its] civil servants have other fundamental value opinions than those of the [ruling] Social Democratic Party".2 This situation-of increasing concern to a new Social Democratic generation-will be illustrated below. The conservative atmosphere in the foreign service was in the mid-1960s echoed by people who later represented more radical positions. For example, in May 1965-during the build-up to the crisis in Rhodesia-the Swedish embassy in Dar es Salaam forwarded a request by the Zimbabwean liberation movement ZAPU to visit Sweden.

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