The Politics of Executive Constraints Across Sub-Saharan Africa

REINING IN THE BIG MEN: THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS ACROSS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Kristin Alisa McKie January 2012 © 2012 Kristin Alisa McKie REINING IN THE BIG MEN: THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS ACROSS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA Kristin Alisa McKie, Ph. D. Cornell University 2012 Under what conditions does the rule of law, especially with regards to the constraining of executive power, become institutionalized in newly liberalized countries where presidential authority has historically been greatly unchecked? This dissertation explores this puzzle by exploring two inter-related questions: first, why would a longtime ruling party acquiesce to institutional constraints being placed on the executive in the first place, and second, once implemented, why are these institutional rules able to successfully constrain leaders in some sub-Saharan states but not others? To address both questions, my dissertation investigates variation in the adoption of, and later adherence to, executive term limit laws and other constraints on presidential power across Africa. Based on both a medium-n quantitative analysis and extensive qualitative interview and archival data collected during eleven months of fieldwork in Uganda and Zambia, I construct an explanation that challenges previous assumptions about the development of constitutionalism in liberalizing countries. I argue that, due to the rarity of divided governments across sub-Saharan Africa, members of parliament from the ruling party ultimately choose whether or not to restrain executive tenure based on their perceptions of their party’s (and, therefore, their own) electoral competitiveness. To support this argument, I develop an explanation of actor decision making that probabilistically links the relative strength of the incumbent party vis-à-vis the opposition to the outcome of term limit choice due to elite perceptions of electoral competition and its twin mechanisms of the threat of turnover and the probability of winning re-election under the banner of another party. Ruling party MPs vote to adopt and later uphold executive tenure limits in times of electoral uncertainty in order to ensure their party’s ability to compete for power in the medium-term should they lose it in the short-term by removing incumbency advantage from the opposition. However, if the incumbent party is not threatened with replacement in the foreseeable future by an opposition party, ruling party MPs will not have the same incentives to favor constitutional provisions that check the executive’s power and will, in fact, forgo or abolish term limits in order to increase their chances of riding the incumbent president’s coattails to their own re-election. By locating the impetus for both institutional choice and strength in the micro-foundations of elite decision-making, I demonstrate that conventional understandings of conditions that lead to the compliance with constitutional rules in the developing world, such international donor pressures and demonstration effects, vertical accountability, pact-making, and levels of democracy in general, fail to adequately explain the variation in the ability of constitutions to regulate executive tenure across Africa. In this way, I argue that formal rules are often endogenous to the political environment in which they are created. I further test this theory to see if it also holds for 1) the choice of other executive constraints by African governments and 2) executive term limit adherence in other liberalizing regions of the world, notably Latin America and the Former Soviet Republics. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Originally from Audubon, PA, Kristin A. McKie received a B.A. in Political Science from Haverford College in Haverford, PA in 2002. She was subsequently employed by the U.S. Department of Justice before beginning her graduate studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University in Ithaca, NY in 2004. She received her M.A. in 2008 and her Ph.D. in 2011. Following her Ph.D., she served as a Post-doctoral Associate with the Program on Democracy at the MacMillan Center for International & Area Studies at Yale University during the 2011-2012 academic year. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS As much as dissertation writing may seem like solitary work to the casual observer, I have been fortunate to learn that it is truly a collective endeavor. A great many people have contributed in both big and small ways to the development of this project, from my search for a research question to the filing of the final document. I am deeply grateful to all of the Ugandans and Zambians who shared their knowledge, experiences, stories, homes and friendship with me while I conducted fieldwork for this project. First, I must thank Benson Masereka at the Parliament of Uganda and Jimmy Sabi at the Parliament of Zambia who both assisted me greatly in gaining access to people and archival documents that were key for my research. I am also truly indebted to the many parliamentarians, civil society leaders, journalist, clergy people, regular citizens and even a former president who were willing to answer my many questions and teach me about their political realities. In addition, the personal friends I made in Uganda and Zambia, both African and Western, made being in the field so much fun. In Uganda, Karis, Ester, Emily, Meredith, Annette, Agnes, Prossy, the other Esther and the Lorenzen family helped make Plot 90 Kira Road in Kampala feel like home. In Zambia, Karla, Jen, In’untu, Adaobi, Christine, Helen and Mr. Arnold all aided in my transition to Lusaka and provided good spirits along the way. Second, at number of people in Department of Government at Cornell University deserve special thanks for helping me see this project through to fruition. Nic van de Walle, my committee chair, was both patient yet encouraging throughout my entire dissertation “journey.” His reminders that the research had yielded some interesting findings helped keep me going during periods in which I was skeptical of my contributions. Devra Moehler was the consummate mentor introducing me to Uganda, sharing research contacts and tips, teaching me iv new statistical analysis techniques over email and sending extensive comments on each chapter. I appreciate immensely the time she has invested in me and all of the advice, both professional and personal she has given me over the years. Valerie Bunce’s excitement about my project helped me stay excited about it myself. I always had fun comparing notes with her about how Former Soviet Republic leaders use some of the same tricks as African presidents. Although Ken Roberts joined the committee in the later stages of the project, his clear and on-point feedback was extremely helpful in clarifying some of my key concepts and solidifying the framing of the project. In addition to my committee, much gratitude also goes to the members of the Government Department dissertation colloquium, some of whom have, by now, read almost every chapter of this dissertation in some iteration (especially Alison McQueen, Tsveta Petrova, Jennifer Erickson and Jennifer Hadden). A heartfelt thank you also goes to the real brains behind the Government Department operation- Tina Slater, Laurie Coon, Judy Virgilio and Stacy Kesselring- for adeptly administering NSF funds, guiding me through the labyrinth of Graduate School requirements and, most of all, being a constant source of cheer around White Hall. Generous financial support for this research was provided by a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant (#0720148), the Einaudi Center for International Studies at Cornell University and a Mellon Foundation Dissertation Fellowship. Last but not least, the support I received from my family throughout this entire project has been immense. To my Dad, who always said I’d be a writer, and my Mom, who proof-read much for this manuscript- thank you for giving me the opportunity and space to find my own life journey. Finally, to Sean- the fact that you never stopped believing in me made it possible to keep going even when things got rough. I have learned so much from you about life, love and being. You are my person of substance. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Biographical Sketch iii Acknowledgements iv List of Figures vi List of Tables vii Chapter 1 1 Party Competition and Limits on Executive Tenure across Sub-Saharan Africa Chapter 2 32 Developing a Probabilistic Model of Executive Constraint Choice Chapter 3 77 Adopting or Rejecting Constraints on Executive Power Chapter 4 135 Enforcing Institutions of Constraint: Assessing Explanations Chapter 5 174 Term Limit Abrogation: The Case of Uganda Chapter 6 209 Term Limit Adherence: The Case of Zambia Chapter 7 258 Conclusion Appendix A 278 References 281 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: The Status of Executive Term Limit Laws across Sub-Saharan Africa 9 Figure 2.1: Levels of Uncertainty as the Link between Time Periods 1 and 2 77 Figure 4.1: Trends in Term Limit Adherence Across Sub-Saharan Africa 141 Figure 4.2: Proportional Occurrence of Term Limit Contravention by Party System Type 169 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Categorizing Country Cases Regarding Threat of Replacement 75 and Ease of Switching Parties Table 3.1: Term Limit Adoption by Country, Year and Leader 82-83 Table 3.2: Relative Party Strength (as Indicated by Electoral Results) and 102 Term Limit Adoption Table 4.1:

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