Authoritarian Regime Types, Political and Socio-Economic Outcomes, and Democratic Survival Huang-Ting Yan A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Government University of Essex Year of Award: 2020 1 Summary This dissertation addresses the question of which factors shape outcomes in autocratic regimes, and, in turn, what influences the survival of democratic regimes in light of their authoritarian legacies. I argue that regimes which are able to curtail the dictator’s powers, compared to uncontested autocracies, are associated with better institutional and socio-economic outcomes during the authoritarian rule as well as a higher survival rate upon transition to democracy. The first two papers of this dissertation provide evidence that regimes where the leader’s power is constrained either by an organised opposition or by a strong regime party are more likely to have an independent judiciary and experience higher levels of health expenditure. A third paper provides evidence that the mechanisms which protect contested autocracies also lay the foundation for an institutional framework in which the subsequent democratic regimes are more likely to survive. This dissertation offers a mixed-methods approach to confirm the three arguments. In conclusion, only with checks and balances in place, those in power can stay humble, take care of people, and promote good governance, compared to the ruler with unlimited power. 2 1. INTRODUCTION This dissertation addresses the question of which factors shape outcomes in autocratic regimes, which, in turn, influence the survival of democratic regimes in light of their authoritarian legacies. To explain the difference in the lifespan of young democracies, scholars have compiled a list of causal factors and their mechanisms that affect these democracies. These seminal works, however, ignored the influence of antecedent authoritarian rule on these explanatory factors. Although many studies have explored the lasting effects of preceding authoritarian regimes on political dynamics in new democracies, little is known about their effect on the survival of these democracies. To fill this research gap, the present dissertation combines two dimensions of research and explores how the legacy of the previous authoritarian regime influences the survival of subsequent democracies. Many nascent democracies have emerged from authoritarian regimes, the influence of which shapes their institutions, party politics, and social structure. It is thus reasonable to infer that political outcomes during the period of autocratic rule affect the survival of ensuing democracies. Furthermore, scholars have analysed how the political outcomes, shaped by distinct dictatorships, affect autocratic survival (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Levitsky and Way 2012; Magaloni 2008; Roberts 2015; Slater and Wong 2013; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012). We consider that after the democratisation of an authoritarian regime, these political outcomes become divergent legacies, which, in turn, determine the longevity of ensuing democracies. Figure 1 presents the framework of my basic ideas. 3 Figure 1 Framework for Analysing the Survival of Nascent Democracies Distinct Political Legacies The Survival of dictatorships Outcomes Nascent Democracies Source: the author. Existing research has explored the lasting effects of preceding authoritarian regimes on new democracies in terms of party politics (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Frantz and Geddes 2016; Grzymala-Busse 2002, 2006, 2007; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011; Kitschelt 1995; Riedl 2014), which relates to democratic survival. Scholars have associated post-authoritarian party politics with the following: (1) how preceding dictators shape party politics, and how these party configurations are inherited by subsequent democracies (Frantz and Geddes 2016; Hicken and Kuhonta 2011), and (2) how dictators dominate or develop distinct strategies for political transition (Grzymala-Busse 2006; Kitschelt 1995; Riedl 2014). Here, two points merit further discussion. First, no comparative study other than Grzymala-Busse (2007) has examined the interplay between authoritarian successor parties (ASPs), defined as former ruling parties or parties newly created by high-level authoritarian incumbents in preceding ruling parties in response to democratic transitions (Loxton 2015: 158-159), and their opponents. For example, when a dictator seeks to co-opt local elites, dominating transitional politics and limiting electoral competition, the high barrier to entry during the transition period causes the opposition to cooperate, which leads to higher party system institutionalisation (Riedl 2014). This argument, however, fails to explain why these ‘anti-incumbent alliances’ 4 do not lose the incentive to remain united even after winning the battle. A possible explanation is that there is no room for new ruling parties to be divided because ASPs are still veto players. In other words, ASPs achieving significant success in post-authoritarian politics can prevent fragmentation of the new ruling parties, thus reducing the likelihood of an unstable party system. Second, these seminal works introduce the concept of the hegemonic status of a dictator during democratic transitions into the study of the determinants of post-authoritarian party politics. The origin of the dictator’s dominant status, however, remains unclear. This is likely to be attributed to the fact that the dictator and his party possess and inherit substantial antecedent political strengths and resources. Therefore, this dissertation argues that the resources that old regime elites inherit determine the performance of the ASPs, which affects the post-authoritarian party system. Beyond the scope of party politics, alternative causal relationships are also possible. An independent judiciary, for example, aims to solve the incumbent leader’s commitment problems, thus laying a solid foundation for democratic durability (Reenock et al. 2013). That is, an independent judiciary has a monitoring function, helping the masses in the absence of information to observe the defection of leaders from agreements (Carrubba 2005), and a coordination function, allowing individuals to mobilise and challenge government action, raising the cost of transgression (Weingast 1997). An independent judiciary is also likely to deter executives from using a crisis situation as an opportunity to gain power by buttressing the political power of other regime elites and the opposition against executive incursions (Gibler 5 and Randazzo 2011). Thus, independent judiciaries decrease the likelihood of regime reversions toward authoritarianism. Since a democracy inherits legal institutions from its preceding authoritarian regime, this dissertation examines the origin of judicial independence in authoritarian regimes. This topic, except for a few seminal works (Epperly 2017; Ríos-Figueroa and Aguilar 2018), has not been considered comparatively. Democratic stability is enhanced when the government is held accountable to popular demands, especially through the provision of economic opportunities and public goods (Graham et al. 2017), partly because greater public goods provision leads to a more engaged and supportive civil society. Existing research has argued that expenditure on healthcare provision significantly improves population health status (Alisa et al. 2014; Nixon and Ulmann 2006; Novignon et al. 2012), which encourages political participation of citizens (Burden et al. 2017; Mattila and Papageorgiou 2017; Mattila et al. 2013). Participation in democratic decision-making processes, in turn, helps citizens strengthen their democratic political attitudes (Quintelier and van Deth 2014). Similar to the judicial institution, the current level of health expenditure (and thus the provision of health care) in democracies depends on the past levels in an authoritarian regime. To my knowledge, although recent research has examined the determinants of health expenditure from the perspective of political economy, such as political regime types, characteristics, and transitions (Bousmah et al. 2016; Kotera and Okada 2017); the ideology of governing parties, opposition parties, and the electorate (Bellido et al. 2019; 6 Datta 2020); fiscal decentralisation or regions with particular fiscal arrangements (Arends 2017; Prieto and Lago-Peñas 2014); women’s political representation (Clayton and Zetterberg 2018; Mavisakalyan 2014), there is a lack of comparative studies on how governance types influence health expenditure and cross-national analyses of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, this dissertation examines the determinants of health expenditure in dictatorships. In sum, this dissertation examines the determinants of judicial independence and health spending in dictatorships, both of which affect the longevity of succeeding democracies, and revisits the pathway that links preceding authoritarian regimes and post-authoritarian party politics to the survival of subsequent democracies. Figure 2 presents the research question. Figure 2 The Research Question Judicial independence Distinct Post The Survival of dictatorships -authoritarian Nascent party politics Democracies Health expenditure Note: thick line: known relationship and not the primary focus of the dissertation; thin line: unknown relationship and the core research question. Source: the author. 7 2. CONTESTED AND UNCONTESTED AUTOCRACIES To analyse the dynamics of dictatorships,