Observing the 2010 Presidential Elections in Guinea Final Report Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope. Map of Guinea1 1 For the purposes of this report, we will be using the following names for the regions of Guinea: Upper Guinea, Middle Guinea, Lower Guinea, and the Forest Region. Observing the 2010 Presidential Elections in Guinea Final Report One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5188 Fax (404) 420-5196 www.cartercenter.org The Carter Center Contents Foreword ..................................1 Proxy Voting and Participation of Executive Summary .........................2 Marginalized Groups ......................43 The Carter Center Election Access for Domestic Observers and Observation Mission in Guinea ...............5 Party Representatives ......................44 The Story of the Guinean Security ................................45 Presidential Elections ........................8 Closing and Counting ......................46 Electoral History and Political Background Tabulation .............................48 Before 2008 ..............................8 Election Dispute Resolution and the From the CNDD Regime to the Results Process ...........................51 Transition Period ..........................9 Disputes Regarding First-Round Results ........53 Chronology of the First and Disputes Regarding Second-Round Results ......54 Second Rounds ...........................10 Conclusion and Recommendations for Electoral Institutions and the Framework for the Future Elections ...........................57 Guinean Presidential Elections . 16 Appendix A: Acknowledgments . 62 Legal Framework ........................16 Appendix B: List of Election Observation Election Management .....................19 Mission Delegates, Rounds 1 and 2, 2010 ......64 Pre-election Developments ..................24 Appendix C: List of Terms and Translations ...66 Voter Registration .........................24 Appendix D: List of Acronyms Voter Education ..........................26 and Abbreviations..........................68 Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns ..........28 Appendix E: Statements and Press Releases ....70 Campaign Finance .......................30 Appendix F: Deployment Teams.............133 The Media .............................32 Appendix G: Ad Hoc Committee’s 26 Civil Society and Domestic Observation ........34 Recommendations for Election Improvements..135 Participation of Women ....................35 Appendix H: Summary of 2010 Events .......139 Election Day ..............................37 Appendix I: Observer Checklists ............140 Opening ...............................38 Appendix J: Ouagadougou Peace Agreement...156 Polling and Polling Preparations ..............38 Appendix K: Letters of Invitation ...........158 Derogation Votes .........................42 The Carter Center at a Glance ..............162 Voting Cards ............................42 The Carter Center Foreword By John Stremlau and problematic election preparations. We were Vice President for Peace Programs, The Carter Center pleased to observe both rounds of elections, which, Co-leader of Election Observation Mission to Guinea despite the shortcomings noted in this report and n Dec. 21, 2010, Alpha Condé was sworn the unexpected delays in holding the second round, in as president of Guinea following the first we found to have been credible and fair overall. The Oopen and competitive national election patience, good will, and civility of the Guinean peo- process since the country’s independence from ple were matched by their evident strong determina- France in 1958. tion to cast meaningful ballots and choose their new The election marked the end of a difficult and president. volatile transition that began over eight years before. The Center is grateful for the generous support of Increasing domestic and international pressure for the Bright Horizon Foundation, the U.S. Agency for democratization had been accompanied by offers of International Development, and the Irish government support from regional and international organizations for enabling the project to continue, especially given and donor countries. the unanticipated delays that characterized this elec- Until 2008, only two autocrats had ruled post- tion observation mission. colonial Guinea, and both died in office of natural I would like personally to thank U.S. Ambassador causes. The third was incapacitated in December Patricia Moller and her team, particularly Glenn 2009 when shot by a disgruntled aide. He was suc- Slocum and Anna Diallo, for the extraordinary cour- ceeded by Gen. Sékouba Konaté, who agreed to serve tesies and assistance extended to our office. The hard as interim president and to implement a transition to work of multilateral diplomacy by the Economic a democratically elected government in accordance Community of West African States, by the United with an internationally brokered agreement among Nations and African Union envoys, and by the key military and civilian leaders, signed in Ouagadougou embassies in the country was crucial to supporting on Jan. 15, 2010. That agreement and its implemen- and sustaining the transitional process in Guinea. tation provide the context for this report. Their efforts made our observation easier and the The Carter Center responded quickly to the inter- results of our work more salient to advancing the final im government’s invitation to observe the planned confirmation of a duly elected president and accep- elections, opening a field office and sending out long- tance of this result by his opponents. term observers in May 2010 to monitor complicated 1 The Carter Center Executive Summary his is the Carter Center’s final report cover- The elections were the first in Guinea to be ing the entirety of its observation mission for organized by an election commission, the National Tthe 2010 electoral processes in Guinea. While Independent Electoral Commission (CENI). The many of the contained findings were made public in Carter Center recognizes the challenges faced by the the various statements published throughout the mis- CENI, including: a compressed electoral calendar, sion’s time on the ground, this report is intended to uncertainty regarding the legal framework, and a encapsulate the Center’s involvement in the Guinean poorly developed national infrastructure. The CENI presidential election. introduced several complex technological innova- The first portion of the report tells chronologically tions, such as biometric voter cards and a system of the compelling story of the context, background, tamper-proof envelopes for transferring poll results, and unfolding events of the Guinean presidential that were well-conceived overall but required more elections of 2010. This is followed by a step-by-step attention and planning in their application and man- review of the various essential elements that consti- agement. Although it lacked electoral administration tute the electoral process, in experience, faced challenges accordance with Guinea’s inter- of poor infrastructure, and was national and regional human riven by internal divisions, rights obligations, accompanied which led to a damaging leader- by a systematic account of The presidential elections ship struggle prior to the runoff the findings of Carter Center represented an important political election, the CENI ultimately observers regarding the two evolution for the people of Guinea. persevered and exhibited good presidential election rounds. faith efforts to deliver the two The Center’s recommendations electoral events. for future elections in Guinea The first-round election, are discussed throughout and summarized at the end in which 24 presidential candidates competed, took of the report. place on June 27, 2010. In a statement released on The presidential elections represented an impor- June 29, The Carter Center expressed its concern that tant political evolution for the people of Guinea. an uneven delivery of services (delay in allocation of These were the first elections to be held in Guinea polling stations, poor poll worker training, and late without an incumbent candidate since independence delivery of essential voting materials) to voters in dif- in 1958, which increased political space and the ferent parts of the country, along with confusion over opportunity for participation by all sectors of society. proper procedures, had the potential to undermine Interim President Gen. Sékouba Konaté held fast to the principles of universal and equal suffrage. the spirit of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement2 and In a second statement of July 24, the Carter Center during critical moments stepped in to keep the elec- observer mission noted with serious concern the many toral process on track. The transitional government procedural flaws and logistical challenges as well as of Guinea adhered to the agreement — in particular the stipulation that no member of government could be a candidate in the elections — and constructively 2 The agreement signed Jan. 15, 2010, by Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré, Gen. Konaté, and Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara promised a contributed to the transition process. return of order and civilian rule and called for elections to be held within six months. 2 The Carter Center Observing the 2010 Presidential Elections in Guinea the disorderly management of the vote count and for political and technical reasons. The CENI was electoral-results tabulation processes, which culmi- paralyzed for weeks by political infighting between