An Explosive Cocktail Counter-Terrorism, Militarisation and Authoritarianism in the Philippines

An explosive cocktail Counter-terrorism, militarisation and authoritarianism in the Philippines June 2021 An explosive cocktail Counter-terrorism, militarisation and authoritarianism in the Philippines Aries A Arugay Marc Batac Jordan Street June 2021 Acknowledgements Glossary This discussion paper was written by Aries A Arugay, AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines Professor of Political Science at the University of the ATA 2020 Anti-Terrorism Act Philippines Diliman, Marc Batac, Programmes ATC Anti-Terrorism Council Manager at the Initiatives for International Dialogue, and Jordan Street, Policy Advocacy Adviser at CPP Communist Party of the Philippines Saferworld. It was edited by Gus Miclat and Larry CSO Civil society organisation Attree. Invaluable advice and suggestions were CVE Countering violent extremism provided by Abigail Watson, Alastair Carr, Beverly DILG Department of Interior and Local Orozco, Jeremy Simons, Louise Lampon, Lyndee Government Prieto, Tirmizy Abdullah and Judge Soliman Santos. Generous input was also provided by a number of HSA 2007 Human Security Act professionals working on conflict, peacebuilding ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and human rights in the Philippines. The paper was MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front copyedited by Rachel Campbell and designed by NAP P/CVE National Action Plan on Preventing Jane Stevenson, and publications support was and Countering Violent Extremism provided by Scott Yearsley and Martha Crowley. This discussion paper does not necessarily reflect NPA New People’s Army the position of the University of the Philippines NTF-ELCAC National Task Force to End Local Diliman. Errors that remain are the authors’ own. Communist Armed Conflict P/CVE Preventing or countering violent Cover photo: Displaced residents pass by a destroyed extremism mosque on 10 May 2018 in Marawi, Philippines. PVE Preventing violent extremism © Jes Aznar/Getty Images UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme © Saferworld, June 2021. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material included in this publication. Contents Executive summary i 1 Introduction 1 2 Fertile ground for embedding counter-terrorism 7 2.1 Disrupting a fragile path to peace and entrenching the hard security approach 8 2.2 Fanning the flames of conflict and the resurgence of violence 9 2.3 Militarisation of governance structures 11 3 New approaches, same results – the preventing and countering violent 15 extremism agenda 3.1 A new discourse 15 3.2 National Action Plan – overstretched, disjointed and disconnected from society 16 i. Lack of buy-in, ownership and civil society engagement 16 ii. Porous conceptual borders 17 iii. The failure to offer a clear, practical framework to reduce violence 17 3.3 A missed opportunity? 19 4 The impact of preventing or countering violent extremism in the Philippines 23 4.1 Reshaping priorities and co-opting civil society 23 4.2 Aiding a crackdown on opposition and dissent 24 4.3 Securitising communities while failing to provide security 24 4.4 Dividing society and discriminating against minorities 25 5 A dangerous new chapter – the 2020 anti-terror law 29 5.1 The National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and the Anti-Terrorism Act 30 5.2 Peace processes 30 i. Bangsamoro tradition 30 ii. The communist armed conflict 31 5.3 Impact on civic space 34 6 Reframing engagement – towards a new approach in the Philippines 37 Recommendations 39 Lessons at the national level 39 Implications at global level 40 Anti-riot policemen block protesters wearing face masks and face shields against COVID-19, during a protest outside the Supreme Court in Manila on 2 February 2021, as it prepares to hear a case asking the court to declare the new law unconstitutional. © TED ALJIBE/AFP via Getty Images i Executive summary Violent groups committing terror attacks Our paper maps how the renewed global drive to have existed in the Philippines since the counter terrorism, combined with the election of a populist government in the Philippines with early 1990s, often posing security threats autocratic instincts and violent tendencies, has to the state and the population. Today, it produced an explosive cocktail; one that is having seems that President Rodrigo Duterte’s damaging effects on conflict dynamics, civic space administration is taking advantage of and the democratic freedoms of Filipino citizens. their existence to justify a counter- Since the global war on terror was initiated in 2001, terrorism agenda which is used to counter-terror approaches have fuelled devastating, legitimise an ongoing brutal crackdown unending wars in a host of countries, not least in on segments of opposition groups, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Syria and across the Sahel. As many as 800,000 people have political movements, civil society, human been directly killed, including at least 335,000 rights defenders, and Indigenous and civilians. A further 21 million have been displaced.1 minority populations. Despite the mobilisation of enormous political, financial and military resources worldwide, similar patterns of failure have meant that violent groups remain resilient in many contexts, while civilians continue to bear the brunt of the violence. Even with the well evidenced harms and limited results brought about by counter-terror methods throughout the world, the Philippine government and international partners have embraced counter- terrorism in the Western Pacific. Our paper charts how counter-terrorism has been a core framework influencing security decisions since 2001 under the Macapagal Arroyo administration, and how it worsened significantly following the election of President Duterte in 2016. Through the dramatic militarisation of civilian governance structures, President Duterte has weaponised counter-terrorism to pursue a narrow, securitised political agenda that is having widespread impacts on peace and human rights. ii an explosive cocktail – counter-terrorism, militarisation and authoritarianism in the philippines In the Philippines, as elsewhere, international Funding given through this securitised lens moves partners and multilaterals touted the preventing or these organisations and groups away from their vital countering violent extremism (P/CVE) agenda as a role in championing community priorities in the way to change violent, repressive and ultimately context of an increasingly authoritarian governance ineffective war on terror approaches into a more approach. principled, comprehensive and effective response. n Aiding a crackdown on opposition and dissent – This led to the creation of the Philippine National the adoption of an overbroad definition of what Action Plan on P/CVE (NAP P/CVE). Ostensibly, it was constitutes ‘extremism’ and radicalisation is leading designed to elicit a new ‘whole-of-society’ approach to significant harms. The criteria used for assessing to tackling the threat posed by violent groups. ‘radicalisation’ include an individual’s political Yet this agenda and action plan did not transform persuasion, religious belief, or education the government’s response to violent groups, and institutions where they study. Combined with instead allowed for further securitisation of government efforts to label ‘terrorists’, radicals, development, rights and peace efforts in the country. religious ‘extremists’, insurgents, rebels, and Our paper details how the NAP P/CVE has created a separatists as ‘enemies of the state’, this has led to perception among civil society that United Nations many counter-terrorism and P/CVE interventions (UN) funds and agencies have prioritised an external targeting student groups, dissenting movements policy framework over the needs and demands of and certain minority groups. communities across the country. n Securitising communities while failing to provide This is not a dynamic unique to the Philippines – security – national and subnational CSOs leading it is part of an observable trend around the world.2 peacebuilding, development and good governance Nonetheless, in the Philippines, it has helped to efforts are experiencing increased pressure to conceal and maintain the same counterproductive connect their efforts to the wider counter-terrorism macro-strategy. This is exemplified by and P/CVE agenda. In a country with a long history of the Siege of Marawi in 2017, and recent internal violent conflict, the push to treat political By framing security illiberal, repressive steps which target insurgencies as “terrorism” is closing the space for approaches under the individuals who are perceived to be many developmental and peacebuilding-based global rubric of counter- sympathetic to political opponents and responses. Authorities are securitising engagement communist rebel groups. with many communities in the country, tackling terrorism and P/CVE, the perceived threats through hard security narratives, By framing security approaches under Duterte government has policies, interventions and partnerships. This is not the global rubric of counter-terrorism found a convenient cover providing security, but instead driving and enabling and P/CVE, the Duterte government has to legitimise its pursuit of rising levels of conflict and repression. found a convenient cover

Load more