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The Arab Spring: triggers, dynamics and prospects Rosiny, Stephan
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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Rosiny, S. (2012). The Arab Spring: triggers, dynamics and prospects. (GIGA Focus International Edition, 1). Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. https://nbn- resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-288759
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2012
ISSN 1862-3581 INTERNATIONAL The Arab Spring: Triggers, Dynamics and Prospects Stephan Rosiny
On 17 December 2010, the self-immolation of Tunisian vegetable vendor Mohammed Bouazizi sparked the Arab Spring. Within a few months, a wave of protest had swept away the despots of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Since then protests have been keeping the region, which has until recently been viewed as having stable authoritarian regimes and as being largely resistant to democratization, on edge.
Analysis Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, parliamentary elections and constitutional de- bates have been taking place in North Africa and the Middle East and the public dis- course has been defined by open criticism of the remaining autocracies. How fundamen- tal and sustainable these changes will prove to be cannot yet be judged with certainty. However, some striking commonalities can be noted.
The initial spontaneity and lightness with which the opposition movements called
the regimes into question stunned not only Western observers but also the Arab rul- EDITION ers themselves. After the initial surprise, the remaining autocracies returned – with only limited success to date – to their former methods of stabilizing their rule. The triggers, progression and intensity of the protests have varied from country to country. The reactions of the regimes have also ranged from cautious concessions to violent repression. Most Arab regimes suffer from massive legitimacy deficits, and the citizens are de- manding to finally be able to participate more fairly in political, economic and soci- etal events. Their protests exhibit similar symbols and reciprocal references. These parallels make the Arab Spring a momentous and novel event that will have a last- ing impact on the region. Numerous Arab countries have seen a strengthening of moderate Islamist parties, which many people now view as competent and reliable alternatives to the exist- ing regimes.
Keywords: Arab Spring, social movements, democratization, Islamism
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus The Outbreak of the Arab Spring hardships and despotism for years; since 2000, these protests have increasingly developed into The Arab Spring actually began in the middle transnational movements. The outbreak of the of winter. On 17 December 2010 a municipal in- Second Intifada in the Palestinian territories spector in the provincial Tunisian city of Sidi in 2000, the US-led war in Iraq in 2003, and the Bouzid confiscated vegetable seller Mohammed Muhammad caricatures in 2005 and 2006 led to Bouazizi’s cart because he did not have a vending protests against Western and Israeli “aggressions” license. The inspector followed the typical rou- and to solidarity rallies for the victims of those ac- tine, meaning that the young merchant probably tions. These demonstrations focused only second- needed either stronger connections to an influen- arily on the inactivity of their own governments. tial person or enough money for a bribe more than Criticism of Israel’s conduct in both the Lebanon he needed a license. His appeals to the powers that War with Hezbollah (2006) and the Gaza War be were denied. This mixture of humiliation and (2008–09) was combined with rage at the regimes powerlessness was apparently what drove him to of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, who more or the desperate act of publicly self-immolating in less openly sided with Israel. front of the local government building.1 In the following hours and days, spontaneous solidarity rallies cropped up, during which pro- The Dynamics of the Arab Spring Protests testors were killed by security forces and thus be- came “martyrs” to be mourned at later rallies. Depending on political preference, either the Arab news channel Al-Jazeera, which eventual- Islamic Revolution of 1978–79 in Iran or the Cedar ly developed into the most important emotion- Revolution of March 2005 in Lebanon is cited as provoking and mobilizing medium of the Arab the role model for the Arab Spring’s opposition- Spring, showed clips of the self-immolation and of al mobilization. The former has until recently the related demonstrations that were filmed using been the only fundamental system transforma- cell phone cameras. The protests quickly reached tion in the Middle East caused by a revolution- the capital city of Tunis and spread to neighbor- ary mass movement; the latter led nonetheless to ing countries. They expanded not only regional- the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Iran’s 2009 Green ly but also in terms of social composition within Revolution, following the fraudulent presidential individual countries. Soon, the protests includ- election, is also often cited as a model. ed people from all walks of life: while the partic- Nevertheless, the border-transcending nature ipants were mostly youth, protestors also includ- of its protests has marked the Arab Spring as a ed children, adults, the elderly, women and men, one-of-a-kind and monumental event. New are Muslims and Christians, the religious and the sec- the protests’ wave-like expansion, their cross- ular. In less than two months, the two supposed- country interplay, and the astoundingly ideolo- ly most stable autocrats in the Middle East were gy-free discourse of the participants. The regional overthrown: Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidin Ben Ali on mobilization is no longer directed primarily at ex- 14 January 2011, and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak on ternal enemies such as the U.S. or Israel, but rath- 11 February 2011. er advocates for an authentic Arab concern: the At the beginning of 2011, protests and unrest overthrow or the reform of authoritarian systems broke out in almost every Arab country. The only of rule. Cumulatively, the demonstrations have countries that have thus far managed to avoid reached the level necessary to attract the attention such problems are the Gulf monarchies of Qatar of the global media; this has made it more difficult and, experiencing only marginal protests, the for the rulers to simply wait them out or to resort U.A.E., both of which guarantee their populations to sheer repression. a worry-free life bankrolled by oil income. The broad solidarity within all segments of so- The Arab Spring did not come out of left field. ciety as well as the movement’s spontaneity and In most of the region’s countries there have been largely leaderless nature initially surprised the demonstrations and strikes protesting social regimes and undermined suppression strategies they had formerly employed, such as arresting 1 Following his example, around the New Year dozens of other political leaders and villainizing protesters as for- people self-immolated as well, though these acts did not have eign agents. The violent repression – thousands of a similar mobilizing effect.
GIGA Focus International Edition 1/2012 - 2 - demonstrators died – and the mobilization across March 2011. Yemen followed suit, with 2,000 dead all social classes gave the protesters a moral supe- to date; in Libya the corresponding number is ap- riority and legitimacy that was lost in inverse pro- proximately 30,000. In Syria the number of victims portion by the repressive regimes. The wall of si- is approaching 10,000 – more than 7,000 civilians lence regarding the abuse of power – scandalous and over 2,000 security personnel have been killed revelations on WikiLeaks about corruption and so far. In all three countries, however, parts of the the political hypocrisy of the rulers started the ball opposition also took up arms. In Libya an inter- rolling here – and the fear of state repression col- national military coalition under NATO command lapsed. The hope that the autocratic rulers would – supported by U.N. Resolution 1973, which was fall one after the other due to a domino effect has, passed on 17 March 2011 – intervened in the con- however, not been realized so far. Since March flict on the side of the insurgents. 2011 they have increasingly been adapting to the The despots’ contradictory signals and fre- new situation and have fallen back – with vary- quent changes in tactic between accommodation ing degrees of success – on time-tested tools for and repression led to the escalation of the rebel- stabilizing their rule: They partially met the dem- lions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. Their onstrators’ demands by scapegoating and replac- pledges of reform during ongoing violent re- ing unpopular ministers or entire governments, pression rendered these promises hollow. Hosni or by promising constitutional reforms. They Mubarak’s disappointing speech on 10 February tried to secure support by reversing cutbacks to 2011 could have been a warning for other rulers. state subsidies for staple foods and energy sourc- He demonstrated absolutely no readiness to give es, introducing new subsidies, rapidly creating up power, even though rumors that he would re- new jobs in the state bureaucracy and the secu- sign had been circulating. This furthered the de- rity apparatus, and promising wage increases. In termination of the demonstrators in Tahrir Square Saudi Arabia King Abdullah announced two pro- and sealed Mubarak’s downfall – the military re- grams totaling 130 billion USD through which he moved him from power the following day. would pay additional salary to civil servants, in- The monarchs, in contrast, conducted them- troduce support for the unemployed, create more selves much more cleverly – for example, King than 60,000 new jobs, renovate mosques, and fi- Mohammed VI of Morocco, who essentially po- nance a building project for more than 500,000 sitioned himself at the peak of the domestic re- apartments (Gause 2011). Saudi Arabia and oth- form movement by initiating a constitutional er Gulf monarchies took the endangered regimes reform, thereby stabilizing his monarchy. The in Bahrain, Oman, Morocco and Jordan, as well as emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, even Egypt’s weak transitional military council (SCAF), played the part of champion of the revolutionary under their wing with billions of dollars of sup- transformation by financing the Al-Jazeera satel- port. Jordan and Morocco were offered admission lite station, participating in the military operation to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the rich against the Qaddafi regime, and taking a leading oil monarchies’ club. role in preparing the sanctions against the Syrian The autocrats continued to focus on divid- regime. ing and discrediting the opposition. They bad- mouthed the protesters as “agents” of foreign powers (Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia), as “sab- Protest Demands oteurs” and “terrorists” (Syria), and as “rats and cockroaches” (Qaddafi in Libya), or they drew a At the beginning, there were two different con- fearsome picture of impending civil war along stellations at work in sparking the protests. In ethnic and religious lines (Bahrain, Syria). Political some countries, the educated youth were us- liberalization, they warned the West, would lead ing social networking platforms such as Twitter to increased power for Islamist fundamentalists and Facebook to call on people to demonstrate in and to jihadist terrorism (Yemen, Libya, Syria). the urban centers for more freedom and against When nothing else worked, they resorted to sheer despotism. These “happenings” had already oc- repression. Bahrain set the precedent with the curred now and then in Egypt, Bahrain, Lebanon crushing of the occupation of Pearl Square, with and Tunisia. This time, though, things took a dif- the help of Saudi Arabian and U.A.E. troops, on 14 ferent form because unexpectedly large numbers
GIGA Focus International Edition 1/2012 - 3 - of protestors showed up, and state repression led −− that the authorities respect their rights as citi- not to the end of the protests but instead to their zens rather than arrogantly infantilizing them increasing mobilization and escalation. In other as subordinates; countries – for instance, Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, −− a life of dignity rather than one defined by hu- Syria and Oman – rallies were initially started on miliating condescension and oppression by the the periphery by marginalized groups (whether security forces and public authorities; along social, sectarian, ethnic or provincial lines). −− equality in access to resources and opportunities In some countries, the protests remained re- instead of clientelistic rewards for compliance; stricted to individual groups, meaning that no −− rule of law in place of both despotic rule and broader, nationwide resistance was able to build special privileges for the elites; and finally, up. In Saudi Arabia, the opposition splintered into −− the right to participate in the global trend to- the following groups: Shiites, who for decades had ward prosperity, progress, education and dem- been demanding equal rights as citizens; women, ocratic participation. who demonstrated publicly for their emancipa- tion (symbolized by the right to drive); liberals, The most far-reaching demand, the overthrow who demanded a loosening of rigid religious and of the current regime, was made only in coun- social norms; and Salafists, for whom the- mor tries where escalations of violence on the part of al looseness in the conservative kingdom had al- the respective regime took place, when incremen- ready gone too far. tal reforms under the existing elite thus no longer The resistance spread particularly within coun- seemed possible. So far, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, tries where localized and urban protests tended to Libya and Syria are the only countries whose pro- become national movements: above all in Tunisia, testers have demanded regime change, although Bahrain and Libya. The demands of these nation- individual actors in Bahrain and Jordan have also al movements were accordingly extensive and in- levied demands to the tune of “al-Sha’b yurid isqat cluded material improvements in the provision al-nizam” (“The people want to bring down the of food, housing and energy; improved servic- regime”). es and better employment opportunities; and fi- nally, reforms of the political system: democracy, the separation of powers, and reliable institutions. The Symbolism of the Arab Spring The demands were a reflection of the local- con ditions. In Egypt, Algeria and Syria, protestors During the Arab Spring a similar symbolism be- called for the repeal of emergency legislation; in came evident across borders; this connected the Iraq, the withdrawal of American occupying forc- otherwise heterogeneous protest movements and es. Palestinians demanded that the West Bank’s led to a reciprocal wave of increasing mobilization Fatah and the Gaza Strip’s Hamas enter into a within the region. The symbols and slogans gener- government of national unity to end the fragmen- ated a culture of protest with a shared resonance tation of the Palestinian Authority. In Lebanon, a which in turn led to its amplification. Social media civil society movement demonstrated for the abo- such as Facebook and Twitter played a crucial role, lition of confessionalism, whereby family law and as did cell phones; all of these were initially the the division of political offices are determined by most important means of communication and mo- religious affiliation. Due to concerns over both -in bilization. Music also played a decisive role in dis- trasocietal polarization and the escalation of vio- seminating the messages via pop culture.2 Satellite lence, the demands voiced by protesters in coun- TV stations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya tries with histories of civil war like Lebanon, Iraq, rapidly joined in; they reached a much broader Sudan, Algeria and Palestine were generally more audience, generated more emotion, helped mo- moderate. bilize populations, and made the connection to The unifying and overriding element of the Western media, occasionally creating multi-link socially heterogeneous protests was neverthe- chains of communication: demonstrators’ English less moral and ethical principles, above all jus- and Arabic placards – filmed with cell phones and tice (adalah), freedom (hurriyah), dignity (karamah), and respect (ihtiram). The protesters’ demands 2 The Tunisian rapper El Général (
GIGA Focus International Edition 1/2012 - 4 - posted on the Internet, then shown on Arab satel- had been shot on 17 February 2006. A gathering of lite TV channels’ footage, which was then broad- the victims’ relatives on the anniversary of their cast by Western TV stations – were directed at a murder escalated into violence and marked the be- national, regional and global public. ginning of the Libyan revolution. The opposition The names Jasmine Revolution for Tunisia and movements named themselves after special dates Lotus Flower Revolution for Egypt, both coined by – for instance, the “14 January Front” in Tunisia, the West, did not stick.3 They alluded to predeces- named after the day that Ben Ali left the country. sors such as Portugal’s Clove Revolution in 1974, The “14 February Movement” in Bahrain, the “20 Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, and Lebanon’s February Movement” in Morocco, the “15 March Cedar Revolution in 2005. The botanical names in- Movement” in the Palestinian territories, and the dicated a connection with the color revolutions.4 “Youth of 24 March” in Jordan named themselves All these revolutions were fought from the center after the initial, taboo-breaking mass demonstra- of their societies against archaic and rigid ruler- tions in their respective countries. ship structures. The term Arab Spring, prevalent Demonstration days were given proper names. in the Western media, connotes a thawing that has The Day of Anger (Yaum al-Ghadab) marked the be- caused the authoritarian structures to melt away, ginning of the wave of protests in Egypt, Palestine, as it were, instead of being replaced through Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, Yemen and Saudi coups, political assassinations or externally driven Arabia. The repetition of the same name generat- “regime changes” – such as that in Iraq in 2003 – ed immediate connections between protests. The as they have been to date. Skepticism regarding creation of further named days mobilized and the spring metaphor is evident in some Arab com- escalated the protests: there was thus the Day of mentaries, as it implies democratization accord- Dignity, the Day of Regret (on 7 March 2011 in Iraq) ing to a Western-biased model. Some thus refer and the Day of the Country’s Protectors (27 May instead to the “January 14th Revolution” in Tunisia 2011), which was directed at the Syrian soldiers to and the “Egyptian Revolution” or, generally, the motivate them to change sides. In Syria local coor- “Arab Revolution” (al-Thaura al-Arabiyya).5 dination committees develop names and slogans The revolutions did not present themselves as for demonstrations that suit the situation; these socialist, liberal or Islamist, but rather as upris- are an important element of the staging and dra- ings against the system with a broad social basis maturgy of the protest movements. of support. There was no elite avant-garde at the An additional border-transcending hallmark forefront; they were supported far more by social of the protests was the occupation of central networks with flat hierarchies. Instead of charis- streets and squares. In Tunisia it was at the Place matic leaders, it was “heroes” such as Bouazizi or de la Kasbah in Tunis that protesters camped out the blogger Khalid Said, who was beaten to death and raised their demands. Before the Arab Spring, by Egyptian police in summer 2010, who deter- demonstrations had already occasionally taken mined their image. place on the Boulevard Habib Bourguiba. In Rabat In some countries, the demonstrations began rallies took place at the Avenue Mohamed V. on deeply symbolic days. In Egypt, 25 January is However, it was Cairo’s Liberation Square (Midan “Police Day”; it was violent attacks by the police al-Tahrir), where numerous demonstrations and that the young protesters came together to pro- occupations have taken place since 25 January test on that day. In Bahrain 14 February was the 2011, that became the common symbol of the Arab anniversary of the 2001 referendum on a nation- Spring. From the heart of Cairo and in close prox- al reform charter, the implementation of which imity to symbolic buildings such as the secret ser- the demonstrators urged. In Libya several people vice headquarters, the Interior Ministry, the head demonstrating against the Muhammad caricatures office of the National Democratic Party (NDP) (in power at the time), and the Egyptian National Museum, images of the protesters were beamed 3 Zine el-Abidin Ben Ali called his 1987 seizure of power the “Jasmine Revolution,” which is why the name is not viewed over Al-Jazeera and many other media outlets to positively in Tunisia. the whole world. The brutal attacks carried out 4 The Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the Green Revolution in Iran in 2009. by the former regime’s security forces and by vi- 5 North African Berbers and Syrian Kurds who have participat- olent thugs took place before running cameras – ed in the revolts reject this term because it excludes them as non-Arab ethnic groups.
GIGA Focus International Edition 1/2012 - 5 - possibly preventing worse excesses and complete- Prospects for the Future ly discrediting Hosni Mubarak’s regime. In Bahrain demonstrators copied the success- At the beginning of 2011, a transnational wave of ful Egyptian example and tried to continuously protest – later to be referred to (in the West) as occupy Manama’s Pearl Roundabout (Dawwar al- the Arab Spring – gripped North Africa and the Lu’lu’ah) from 14 February 2011 on, despite the se- Middle East. The process of change is irreversible, curity forces’ violent course of action. The square although its future course cannot be predicted at is named after a gigantic statue that was erect- this time. Its outcome will depend greatly on how ed in 1982 and symbolized the unity of the Gulf successful the democratic transitions of the repub- Cooperation Council. The regime feared that the lics of Tunisia and Egypt turn out to be, on wheth- square could become the emblem of a national er a way out of the spiraling violence in Syria and uprising and had the distinctive statue torn down Yemen is found, and finally on whether the re- on 18 March 2011 after the square was forcibly maining, only partially reformed autocracies have cleared. In Yemen the regime used Sanaa’s sym- learned their lessons. What was the strength of the bolic Liberation Square, which was occupied by Arab Spring early on – namely, the largely leader- Saleh loyalists, for its own purposes, while the op- less, ideologically unbiased challenging of the re- position erected its tents on the square in front pressive machine – is increasingly proving to be a of the university and renamed it the Square of weak point in the political autumn. Change (Sahat al-Taghyir). Given the delegitimization of the previous re- With the occupation of the squares, each popu- gimes, the transitioning countries face the chal- lation took possession of the geographical center – lenge of erecting state institutions and rules and the heart of the nation, as it were – and “cleaned” regulations that have a wider legitimacy and re- it of the “corrupt” regime.6 The national flags be- flect the participation of the broadest swath of came a mobile part of this symbolism. In Libya society possible. In the wake of their respective the protesters and insurgents used the flag of the revolutions, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have start- monarchy (1951–69) to link their movement to ed building new institutions; in other countries the pre-Qaddafi era. In Syria the opposition forc- (Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait), the differing es have replaced the current flag with the one demands of the various opposition groups for in- used before the Ba’ath party came to power. The stitutional reforms and concessions on the part of Salafi Islamists in Egypt, who used the Saudi flag, the regime have defined the post-revolution peri- were an exception. Berbers in Tunisia, Algeria and ods. Crisis management policies like those of the Morocco used their own flags – not, however, as GCC states that are centered on the royalty giving an expression of separatism but rather of their gifts to their populations will not yield sustain- common identity. The protests on Puerta del Sol able development and lasting stability; on the con- in Madrid and on Rothschild Boulevard in Israel trary, the gap between paternalistic rulers and in- as well as the Occupy Movement in the U.S. and creasingly self-confident populations will widen. Europe drew upon the symbolism of the Arab The path to reform is rocky, as ideological pref- Spring. The demonstrators adopted the action of erences and contradictory interests clash at every occupying squares, the catchy names for demon- decision. The institutions that reciprocally support stration days, and the ambitious claim of repre- the legitimacy of the other institutions – the par- senting “the people” or “the 99 percent” against a liament, administration, judiciary, constitution- small elite enriching itself excessively. al convention, president and security forces – first have to be reintroduced step by step: Should the institutional design begin with the rules and the constitution, or with democratically legitimized representation? Who will be authorized to set the electoral rules and monitor the elections, to deter- mine which parties can participate and how to di- vide up the constituencies? A more transparent 6 Following Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow, the demonstrators not only symbolically but also physically cleaned “their” lib- and participatory process of negotiation, mutu- erated square and made it the symbol of a new beginning. al recognition and collaboration can lead to long- Since then protest demonstrations to defend the collectively term legitimacy and sustainable stability. One won revolution have taken place there regularly.
GIGA Focus International Edition 1/2012 - 6 - possible danger is that parts of the population So far, the moderate Islamists have proven might view this process as dragging on too long themselves successful, especially in unisectarian and thus lose interest, resulting in a loss of cred- countries. However, in multisectarian countries ibility for the new institutions. The high expecta- like Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi tions on all sides for a more just division of the na- Arabia, Sunni and Shiite actors compete against tional wealth and for a quick economic recovery each other: the Islamists seem to be reaching the following the overthrow of the corrupt rulers have limits of their inclusionary policies when it comes not been fulfilled. Instead, the socioeconomic sit- to the Sunni–Shiite divide. The strong showing uation has worsened because many tourists have of fundamentalist Salafists, who strive for a strict stayed away and businesses have suffered losses Islamicization of society and politics, has also been due to strikes and protests. surprising. The Salafists could prove to be the big- Moderate Islamists and radical Salafists are gest challenge for the moderate Islamists, as the profiting in particular from this uncertain- situ former bring the latters’ devotion to Islam in ques- ation. Their religious ethos distinguishes them tion. But in Egypt, it is already becoming clear that from other groups and enables them to soften the even the Salafists are subject to pressure to adapt frustrations of the population regarding disap- to civilized political interactions and that they are pointments and material losses by encouraging starting to moderate their demands (Brown 2011). patience (as suggested by God) and reminding be- The citizens of Arab countries are demanding lievers of the promise of rewards they can hope to the right to participate in politics, business and gain in the hereafter. Their worldview is flexible society, along with the freedom to decide which enough to address a wide social spectrum of so- worldview they want to follow in designing their ciety, but they are also authoritative and possess own lives. Instead of engaging militarily, the West a strong ethical mandate. They address rural and should participate in the changes in the Middle urban citizens, uneducated people as well as intel- East as a nonpaternalistic partner and take part in lectuals, the young and old, and women and men dialogues with the new political actors. in equal measure. Even before the Arab Spring, moderate Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood had already enjoyed significant suc- References cesses in (relatively) free elections (Jordan 1989, Algeria 1991, Egypt 2005, Palestinian Territories Brown, Jonathan (2011), Salafis and Sufis in Egypt, 2006). Even though they were not always at the Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for vanguard, they played a meaningful role through- International Peace, online:
GIGA Focus International Edition 1/2012 - 7 - The Author Dr. Stephan Rosiny is a research fellow at the GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies. His research inter- ests include Islamism, violence and religion, Shi’a Islam, and the East Arab region. Email:
Related GIGA Research As part of GIGA’s Research Program 1: Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems, the “Persistence and Change in Non-Democratic Regimes” research team undertakes comparative analyses of politi- cal transformation processes, the importance of elections, and the interplay between government and opposition. GIGA’s research on political Islam is carried out within the framework of the “Religion, Conflict and Politics” research team, which is part of Research Program 2: Violence and Security.
Related GIGA Publications Bank, André (2011), Turkey and the Arab Revolt: Rise or Decline in Regional Politics?, GIGA Focus International Edition, 4, online:
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