PJD, ISLAM, AND GOVERNANCE IN POST-2011 MOROCCO A.KADIR YILDIRIM, EDITOR

CONTRIBUTORS

Sarah J. Feuer, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Lise Storm, University of Exeter, United Kingdom Driss Maghraoui, Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco Beatriz Tomé-Alonso, University Loyola Andalucía, Seville, Spain Amina Drhimeur, CARPO, Bonn, Germany

INTRODUCTION

The Arab Spring protests in Morocco led by the February 20 Movement ushered in a new political era. An Islamist party—the Party of Justice and Development (PJD)—found an opportunity to be part of the government due to a series of constitutional reforms implemented in 2011. This was a momentous change in Moroccan politics that not only granted the PJD a chance to govern but also potentially tested the king’s religious credentials.

Religion has always been a pillar of Morocco’s ruling Alaouite dynasty, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. The king uses the title Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful) in order to confer religious legitimacy on his rule over Moroccans.

The PJD derives part of its political identity from its Islamic orientation. This religious identity puts the party on a collision course with the king.

Before the Arab uprisings began in Morocco, the PJD was effectively excluded from government despite its popularity and electoral success. Yet since the country’s constitutional reforms in 2011, the PJD has been the major partner of coalition governments in Morocco following parliamentary election victories in 2012 and 2016.

The PJD’s ascent to government as a hitherto excluded political actor represents a step toward inclusionary politics in Morocco. As a political party with a significant electoral base, the PJD’s inclusion in the country’s political framework carries the promise of a more pluralistic political system.

This report analyzes the dynamics of the PJD’s inclusion in Morocco’s changing political landscape and examines whether the promise of inclusive politics is borne out by the evidence. In doing so, it pays attention to the PJD’s relationship with the monarchy, its strategy to address constraints posed by the king, and its engagement with the electorate.

Sarah Feuer’s brief, “Action and Reaction: Royal Rhetoric Responds to the PJD,” examines the monarchy’s response to the threat posed by the rise of the PJD as a major political actor by focusing on two distinct areas: political accountability and religion. The PJD’s self-identification as a party of reform with an Islamic orientation represents unique challenges to the monarchy’s traditional stance above the political fray and as the preeminent Islamic authority.

In her analysis of the PJD’s potential as the standard-bearer of democratic governance in Morocco, Lise Storm offers a close look at the possible implications of such a role for the country’s gradual political liberalization. Storm’s brief “The PJD: The Vanguard of Democracy in Morocco in the Age of Populism and Authoritarian Entrenchment?” identifies the party’s strong popular base and its organizational prowess—rather than its Islamic identity or democratic credentials—as crucial assets as it aims to develop into the latest incarnation of a Moroccan democratic reform party.

Driss Maghraoui’s brief “Working Under Constraints: The PJD in the aftermath of the 2016 Elections” examines the limits imposed on the PJD and its ability to govern. Maghraoui argues that such constraints are fundamentally very similar to those that held back political parties in previous governments and that aimed to thwart the prospects of reform in Morocco.

Beatriz Tomé-Alonso offers a thorough analysis of the PJD’s approach to dealing with the highly restrictive governmental environment it has operated in since 2012. In “Party of Justice and Development: A Strategy of Differentiation,” Tomé-Alonso highlights the PJD’s efforts to survive by paying respect to the monarchy while simultaneously striving for political relevance among the electorate by emphasizing the party’s expertise, moral values, intra-party democratic processes, and communication strategy.

Amina Drhimeur goes beyond the organizational and technical elements of the PJD’s strategy to remain relevant in the limited political framework allowed by the monarchy by detailing the policy initiatives employed by the party since its rise in government. In her brief “The Party of Justice and Development’s Pragmatic Politics,” Drhimeur argues that while the PJD’s appeal to voters beyond its core constituency— through a combination of neoliberal economic policies and social services—has helped the party at the polls and increased its popularity, such an appeal also carries the seeds of the party’s demise by weakening the king’s support.

This report is based on “PJD, Islam, and Governance in Post-2011 Morocco,” a workshop held in Ifrane, Morocco, on February 20, 2018. It is part of a broader research project on “Building Pluralistic and Inclusive States Post-Arab Spring” that is supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The workshop was hosted by Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane.

A.Kadir Yildirim, Ph.D. Fellow, Center for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute Principal Investigator, “Building Pluralistic and Inclusive States Post-Arab Spring” ISSUE BRIEF 05.25.18 Action and Reaction: Royal Rhetoric Responds to the PJD

Sarah J. Feuer, Ph.D., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

as mere instances of cosmetic change, INTRODUCTION Morocco’s contemporary history is replete In the heady days of early 2011, Morocco’s with examples of monarchs implementing King Mohammed VI responded to protests policy changes in an effort to fulfill their demanding jobs, political liberalization, and own rhetorical commitments or to fend an end to corruption by calling for a reform off opposition groups seeking to highlight process that would begin with revisions discrepancies between royal discourse and to the constitution and new elections. The action. Thus, the monarchy’s rhetorical resulting attenuation of the February 20 responses to the PJD’s rise are worth Movement, and the high participation examining, both for what they suggest rates in the ensuing July referendum and about the monarchy’s perception of its own November legislative elections, suggested vulnerabilities and because they ultimately the palace’s reaction to the initial unrest helped to frame the environment in which had convinced most Moroccans that the both the PJD and the regime could operate. monarchy understood the source of their This paper explores the monarchy’s grievances and intended to be a partner rhetorical responses to the PJD’s ascension in redressing them. By the winter of 2011, in two realms: political accountability and the regime appeared to have passed an religion. A concluding section considers important stress test. what these responses suggest about the The emergence But if the king had managed to evolving relationship between the monarchy of the Justice and puncture the protest movement and and Morocco’s leading Islamist party in the Development Party post-Arab Spring landscape. steer developments in a state-sanctioned (PJD) as the dominant direction, he soon faced another challenge player in parliament with the results of the November vote. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY The emergence of the Justice and implied the palace Development Party (PJD) as the dominant Consistent with a key change introduced now had a companion, player in parliament—a body that had by the new constitution, one of the king’s and perhaps even a been emboldened, if modestly, by the first responses to the PJD’s 2011 electoral competitor, in the new constitution—implied the palace now victory was to appoint a representative of reform process it had a companion, and perhaps even a the leading party in parliament—as it turned competitor, in the reform process it sought out, the PJD’s Abdelilah Benkirane—as prime sought to lead. to lead. Notwithstanding the regime’s minister. The constitutional innovation of ostensible stability, the PJD’s rise did elicit Article 47 had sought to make Moroccan intriguing rhetorical responses from the governments more representative of the monarchy on a range of issues. While it can voting public, so the fact that the PJD be tempting to write off discursive shifts came to be associated with this increased RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.25.18

representativeness was likely not lost on the of the Moroccan public following the monarchy. Following the PJD’s victory, royal 2011 protests. Still, the substantive rhetoric increasingly linked the matter of changes in royal rhetoric invoking popular political representation to accountability. representation and accountability suggest The king’s annual addresses to the a more targeted response to the PJD’s opening session of parliament have been ascension. For example, relative to their pre- revealing in this regard.1 In comparison 2011 variants, the annual speeches to the with the half-dozen years preceding the legislature since the PJD’s election victory PJD’s election victory, Mohammed VI’s have included more elaborate articulations speeches to the legislature since 2011 have of the need for a robust opposition in contained more elaborate references to parliament, implicitly conveying a desire to the responsibilities of parliamentarians— check the PJD’s power there. In 2006, the and especially of political parties—to the king briefly noted that elections citizenry, pointed critiques of the public require the forging of alliances in order to administration for failing to deliver services facilitate the emergence of a homogenous to the public, and repeated entreaties to majority and a constructive opposition. elected officials to prioritize the needs of citizens over their own partisan interests. In 2011, by contrast, he elaborated: The constitutional Compare, for example, the language of innovation of Article Mohammed VI’s speech to the newly elected We are convinced that if the democratic system is based on the power of the 47 had sought to make legislature in 2007 with the language of his 2011 speech to the newly elected, PJD- majority and the rule of law, it is equally Moroccan governments dominated parliament. In 2007, the king had based on the positive participation of the more representative merely noted that parliamentary opposition. As a result, the of the voting public, so implementation of the related provisions representation of the nation is neither [called for in the new constitution] is likely the fact that the PJD a privilege nor a renting of a position, to allow this opposition to constitute a came to be associated and even less a pledge of immunity responsible supervisory authority and a with this increased to preserve one’s personal interests. constructive force for proposing legislation. Representation means, on the contrary, representativeness assuming a considerable task, and it And whereas speeches before the Moroccan was likely not lost on implies an unwavering commitment to Spring had made no mention of elected the monarchy. work for the general interest. officials’ patriotism, in every speech from 2011 to 2016 the king noted at least once By contrast, in 2011, he singled out the role that patriotism constituted a required of parties in stressing that attribute of elected officials. The rhetorical the search for efficient [political innovation was likely not a coincidence, and and development-related] solutions would have served to implicitly question the depends … on the willingness of serious Islamists’ loyalty to the nation-state. national parties to assume their political responsibility by presenting clear and differentiated social projects. These must RELIGION be in the form of rigorous, efficient, and The constitutional reforms of 2011 left realistic programs, which must be in line untouched the king’s status as the country’s with the actual expectations of present chief religious authority and reinforced and future generations, so that the citizen the decades-old separation of religious has the freedom to choose freely qualified questions from the political sphere, while elites who are able to meet expressed retaining the close link between religion expectations. and state. As such, there was little reason to expect a shift in policies in the religious To be sure, such shifts in tone could have realm following the PJD’s ascension. On a resulted from the monarchy’s desire to policy level, that expectation has been borne demonstrate sensitivity to the demands 2 ACTION AND REACTION: ROYAL RHETORIC RESPONDS TO THE PJD

out. The monarchy has continued to solidify of affairs in the kingdom. For some, the its control over religious institutions and promising constitutional language and implement reforms to religious education royal discourse acknowledging deficiencies curricula, much as it was doing before in Morocco’s reform trajectory have been the Arab Spring. This has been reflected in cosmetic, whereas others see 2011 as having decrees bringing institutes of higher Islamic inaugurated a deeper, if incomplete, shift in learning under state supervision, continued the division of political authority between alterations to the curricula and textbooks the monarchy and elected governments at of Islamic studies classes, and ongoing the national and local levels.3 The debate investments in imam training.2 between skeptics and believers is not However, the emergence of an Islamist likely to find resolution anytime soon, but The substantive party in a dominant position did elicit some in the meantime, we should be cautious changes in royal intriguing rhetorical reactions from the about dismissing the import of rhetorical rhetoric invoking monarchy. For the first time, the king’s shifts brought about by the PJD’s rise. The popular representation Throne Speech of 2012 made reference to monarchy’s increasing discursive attention the “secular identity of Morocco,” phrasing to accountability and good governance, for and accountability that would reappear in 2013 and 2015. example, is a positive development, even if suggest a more The 2012 speech also highlighted the new it also partly reflects an effort to undercut targeted response to constitution’s provision identifying the the leading party’s claims to represent the PJD’s ascension. High Council of Ulama (a body chaired by a broad base of Moroccan society, and the king) as the sole organ responsible for even if such rhetoric has not always been consulting the palace on religious affairs. accompanied by immediate policy changes. These allusions would have been less Authority in government may have been remarkable had they appeared in the Throne a welcome development for the PJD, but it Speech of July 2011—i.e., shortly after the also increased the chances the party would relevant provisions had been enacted. But be held to account for its governance, a they emerged only after the PJD’s electoral liability the monarchy has deftly exploited. victory. Likewise, the 2013 Throne Speech How the PJD manages the challenge of Authority in cited royal initiatives aimed at increasing governing under constraints while avoiding the “religious security” of the kingdom to blame for unfulfilled promises will be a government may preserve its “Islamic identity”—language key determinant of the party’s success have been a welcome reflecting the regime’s drive to weed out in the coming years. But rhetorical shifts development for extremist ideologies and reassert the state’s also matter because discourse ultimately the PJD, but it also sponsorship of a religious identity revolving delineates the range of options available increased the chances around Sunni and Maleki rites and certain to the regime and provides potential Sufi practices—even though the relevant opportunities for opponents to seize in the party would be reforms had been launched a decade prior. holding the regime to account. In my held to account for its The timing of such statements suggests research into Morocco’s evolving regulations governance, a liability the monarchy may have believed the PJD’s implicating religious institutions and the monarchy has electoral success was reason enough to discourse over the years, I have found that remind citizens of the palace’s primacy in policy shifts often resulted from pressure deftly exploited. the religious realm. on the part of opposition groups urging the Alaouite monarchs to follow through on their stated policy commitments.4 Even in ACTION AND REACTION a non-democratic setting, Morocco’s rulers evidently knew they would be judged partly Two sets of broader observations flow from by how closely they adhered to their stated the royal responses highlighted above. policy preferences. Given the country’s The first concerns the matter of rhetoric reform trajectory in recent years, this trend versus policy. A prominent debate among is only likely to increase. Morocco-watchers has concerned the A second set of observations concerns extent to which the events and aftermath the PJD’s Islamism. The party’s rise in 2011 of 2011 fundamentally altered the state mirrored the fortuitous trend for Islamist 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.25.18

movements elsewhere in the region at the time, one that seemed to finally test the ENDNOTES long-debated hypothesis that Islamists in 1. All speeches cited herein, including power would “moderate” their positions on addresses before the opening session matters such as gender equality, religion in of parliament and the Throne Speeches, public life, and individual rights. That debate are available at https://bit.ly/297FF92. carried less potency in Morocco, where the Translations are my own. This issue brief is part PJD had largely given up its overt religious 2. For more on these reforms, see Sarah of a two-year research rhetoric by the time the 2011 protests broke J. Feuer, Regulating Islam: Religion and the project on pluralism in out, and where most analysts assumed State in Contemporary Morocco and Tunisia the enduring presence of the monarchy the Middle East after (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, would limit the PJD’s power anyway. If the 2018), chapter 6. the Arab uprisings. inclusion-moderation thesis had posited 3. An insightful reflection of this debate The project is generously that political inclusion would lead Islamist recently appeared in Intissar Fakir’s essay, supported by a grant parties to become less identifiably Islamist, “Morocco’s Islamist Party: Redefining Politics the Moroccan case suggested the reverse: from the Carnegie Under Pressure,” Carnegie Endowment for namely, that reducing one’s Islamism could Corporation of New York. International Peace, December 28, 2017, lead to greater political inclusion. But this available at http://carnegieendowment. has posed a dilemma for the PJD insofar org/2017/12/28/morocco-s-islamist- as preserving its presence in the political party-redefining-politics-under-pressure- arena risks the loss of supporters originally pub-75121. drawn to the party precisely for its Islamist 4. See Feuer, Regulating Islam. roots. Leaving overtly religious activities to 5. For more on the PJD’s relationship to its affiliated civil society organization, the its sister movement, see Avi Max Spiegel, Movement of Unity and Reform (al-tawhid Young Islam: The New Politics of Religion wa’l-islah), has mitigated that risk in Morocco and the Arab World (Princeton: 5 somewhat, but has not eliminated it. Princeton University Press, 2015), 50-54 See more issue briefs at: Meanwhile, the examples highlighted and 178-185. www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs here suggest the monarchy has continued to portray the PJD as an Islamist actor, even This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who if only implicitly. The palace may find it AUTHOR participated in a Baker Institute project. advantageous to define this Islamism as Wherever feasible, this research is inherently at odds with fealty to the nation, Sarah J. Feuer, Ph.D., is a Soref Fellow at the reviewed by outside experts before it is as the speeches before the legislature Washington Institute for Near East Policy released. However, the views expressed implied. But this tactic arguably presents in Washington, D.C. Her area of expertise herein are those of the individual something of a dilemma for the monarchy, is politics and religion in North Africa. She author(s), and do not necessarily is the author of Regulating Islam: Religion represent the views of Rice University’s because the more it continues to portray and the State in Contemporary Morocco and Baker Institute for Public Policy. the PJD as a party with religious roots and motivations, the more it risks bolstering Tunisia. Feuer holds a Ph.D. in politics from © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute the party’s popularity among conservative Brandeis University. for Public Policy segments of society that otherwise might This material may be quoted or have been inclined to look elsewhere for reproduced without prior permission, political representation. In the aftermath provided appropriate credit is given to of 2011, the PJD and the monarchy have the author and Rice University’s Baker evidently been competing not only for Institute for Public Policy. stewardship of the country’s reform process,

Cite as: but also for a monopoly on the right to Feuer, Sarah J. 2018. Action and define precisely what it means to be an Reaction: Royal Rhetoric Responds to Islamist party in post-Arab Spring Morocco. the PJD. Issue brief no. 05.25.18. That competition is likely to continue, with Rice University’s Baker Institute for implications not only for the future of Public Policy, Houston, Texas. Moroccan Islamism but for political Islam across the region. 4 ISSUE BRIEF 05.28.18 The PJD: The Vanguard of Democracy in Morocco in the Age of Populism and Authoritarian Entrenchment?

Lise Storm, Ph.D., University of Exeter, United Kingdom

makhzen parties (particularly the Party of INTRODUCTION Authenticity and Modernity, or PAM), and the The idea of an Islamist party as the vanguard Istiqlal (PI), which all have been reluctant to of democracy—whether in Morocco, push for further reforms in a direction away Tunisia, or elsewhere in the Muslim world— from the current “executive monarchy” in sounds hollow to many secular actors and which the king not only rules, but governs— commentators, who fear that such a party the PJD stands out as more progressive has simply adapted to its environment in the sense of its commitment to a push 1 without changing its core values. In other for further democratization. The reasons words, they suspect these parties have behind this may be neither highly altruistic made strategic calculations in their quest nor with the state of democracy in mind, but for power, effectively masquerading as rather result in a nice side effect (Ottaway wolves in sheep’s clothing (Wickham 2004; and Riley 2006; Storm 2007; Storm 2013; Ashour 2009; Schwedler 2006; Clark 2006; Sater 2016; Boukhars 2010). Tibi 2008; Baran 2008). That said, by now The PJD has always been a there are few who would argue—unless comparatively moderate actor within the politically motivated—that the Morocco’s Islamist political scene in Morocco, even Party of Justice and Development (PJD) is during the days when the Movement not a moderate political actor, regardless for Unity and Reform (MUR) was a much 2 of whether the party is compared to stronger force within the party. However, The PJD has always other Islamist parties and groups within in recent years, particularly since the been a comparatively Morocco or further afield, or to other Casablanca bombings of 2003, the PJD moderate actor within has clearly moderated further with a view political actors within the country. In this the Islamist political regard, the PJD can be characterized as to appease (a) the monarchy, i.e., the moderate if evaluated from the perspective gatekeeper to the formal political system, scene in Morocco, even of its religious discourse, and also in terms and (b) secular elements of society (Shehata during the days when 3 of its stance on the political process, as 2010; Ridgeon 2015; Wegner 2011). This the Movement for Unity the party displays moderate tendencies moderation began in earnest with the party’s so-called “pacted” entry into and Reform (MUR) was through its support of democratic progress a much stronger force in Morocco. The PJD is open and tolerant of parliamentary politics in the late 1990s, alternative perspectives (Schwedler 2006) gaining speed during the early years in within the party. and is willing to participate in the political parliament when the party sought to system and reject violence in the pursuit establish working partnerships with the of the party’s agenda (Asseburg 2007). In more established political actors inside and comparison to other central actors within outside of parliament, and finally, following the political system—some more established its ascent to the top after the party’s victory and powerful such as the monarchy, the in the November 25, 2011, elections and the RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.28.18

subsequent appointment of the Abdelilah with it the ability of the former to pressure Benkirane cabinets (2012-13 and 2013-16) the latter. This is not to say, by any means, and the cabinet of Saadeddine El Othmani that the PJD is an actor even remotely on (2017-present). par with the monarchy within the political The reality that the PJD is generally system. Rather, it is unthinkable that the considered to be a moderate Islamist monarchy can now simply eliminate the PJD party does not, however, imply that it from formal politics. The idea of a Moroccan is universally accepted as such. Foreign political scene without the PJD is unthinkable governments, particularly in Western Europe to many, except in the case of an enormous and North America, have been wary of the scandal relating to the party—but even party due to its Islamist credentials, and so then, it would be highly improbable. have members of the Moroccan population. Evidence of political corruption is rife in the These views are stoked by Western concerns, country (Boukhars 2010; Boussaid 2009; makhzen propaganda, and opposition to the Transparency International 2016), and fusion of religion and politics (Wolf 2018).4 putting a credible case together against the PJD based on radical, anti-systemic tendencies would be very difficult,6 even RECOGNIZING THE PJD: MODERATION though the party has ill-advisedly allowed VIA PARTICIPATION AND ATTEMPTED its platform to be used by ex-jihadi Salafis at CO-OPTATION election time.7 However, the PJD’s leadership has also demonstrated its professionalism Within Morocco, the monarchy—via the and commitment. For example, Moroccan makhzen—has long pushed the idea that Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane met the PJD is an actor in need of moderation. with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi At the same time, the party’s inclusion in 2015, despite the latter being a symbol The PJD has always in the formal political system is viewed of political oppression of Islamists in Egypt known that the party’s as a necessity to moderate the party and following the Arab uprisings. Benkirane was provide an avenue for those members of met with strong criticism from within the inclusion in formal the population who identify as Islamists and politics has depended Muslim community at home and abroad, but who would otherwise not have a dedicated argued that the meeting was politics, and upon not upsetting the vehicle for representation—a strategy of part of the job (Hamid and McCants 2017).8 monarchy, and there co-optation with a view to co-opt (Mekouar is no doubt that this 2010; Storm 2007, 2009; Wegner 2011; Boukhars 2010; Del Sarto 2006). Hence, LOOKING AHEAD: WHY THE PJD IS reality forced the party the PJD has always known that the party’s CRUCIAL FOR THE DEMOCRATIZATION to moderate its tone. inclusion in formal politics has depended PROCESS upon not upsetting the monarchy, and there is no doubt that this reality forced the party There is no arguing that today, the PJD is a to moderate its tone in order to first become political party led by figures whose primary officially recognized as a legal political party objective is the survival of the party, a and, later, to enter parliamentary politics. goal that is now largely determined at the During the early years, moderation polls. The PJD is hungry for power within referred both to the party’s stance on a political system whose ins and outs are religious issues (and the relationship now familiar, and which it does not seek between religion and politics, although to change. The PJD is no different from its the party was never an advocate of a counterparts on the Moroccan political return to the Caliphate)5 and its position scene. It plays by the rules of the game, on the executive monarchy. However, as and it does not actively seek to alter them the years passed and the party carved in any way. It is not anti-systemic in the out a solid position for itself in Moroccan sense of being anti-democratic. Rather, it politics, turning into the darling of the is one of the key actors keeping Morocco’s electorate, the balance of power between feeble democratic process alive, although the makhzen and the PJD changed, and the party’s commitment manifests in largely 2 THE PJD: THE VANGUARD OF DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO IN THE AGE OF POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIAN ENTRENCHMENT?

passive rhetoric, voiced when prompted in parliament—chiefly the Istiqlal and the or put under pressure. In this respect, it is Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)—and similar to Ennahdha in neighboring Tunisia, with powerful actors outside of parliament, which at times has also been vilified for its and by maintaining its comparatively strong Islamist credentials (Wolf 2018). links to society.11 For its part, the monarchy Parties like Ennahdha and the PJD are sought to create a new party to balance the vital actors in need of support (domestic and PJD: the PAM. At a time of an upward Islamist international) if democracy is viewed as the political trend (nationally and regionally), desired destination. This is not because they rising populism (globally and locally), and are Islamists or because they are inherently growing popular disaffection with the The PJD is no different more democratic than other parties on the established political parties, coupled with from its counterparts scene. Instead, they are important for the anti-establishment sentiments in general on the Moroccan following reasons: 1) they are not “flash” (nationally and globally), PAM was seen as political scene. It plays parties, but those that have managed to a savior of the executive monarchy and an survive a series of elections; 2) their popular antidote to the makhzen’s grip on power by the rules of the base is considerable, as evidenced by their (Storm 2013; Wolf 2018; Hamblin 2015; Eibl game, and it does not grassroots electoral mobilization;9 and 2011). The PAM, run by King Mohammed VI’s actively seek to alter (3) their ties to the establishment—the old school friend and long-time ally, Fouad them in any way. remnants of the Democratic Constitutional Ali el-Himma, is a party largely devoid of Rally (RCD) in Tunisia (largely in the form of ideological foundations, but has one forte: Nidaa Tounes) and the monarchy/makhzen connections, or “wasta.” This reality has in Morocco—are weaker than those of most made the party enormously popular with of the other Moroccan political parties of the electorate because it is more likely to substance (Storm and Cavatorta 2018). It deliver than most of its counterparts—even is not the case that Morocco, Tunisia, and among the makhzen parties. In other words, similar countries cannot do without the it can get things done in a society with a PJD or Ennahdha; however, they cannot murky, strictly top-down political system do without parties like them. Parties with where connections are everything. The PAM characteristics such as longevity, roots, does not have to pass any gatekeepers to be and relative independence are necessary heard by the country’s most powerful actor. if democratization is to stand a chance of It has direct access to the monarch. moving forward, rather than grinding to The PAM is the modern face of regime Parties like Ennahdha a halt. At present, the feeble Moroccan parties. It is a party evidently created by democratization process is threatened by those in the highest echelons of power who and the PJD are vital the events surrounding the Arab uprisings, are keen to maintain that power, but it is actors in need of which strengthened the monarchy also one that is extremely popular with support (domestic domestically and internationally. Critics voters—possibly for the wrong reasons and international) if were silenced and old opposition parties (i.e., its ties to the regime), but popular democracy is viewed as were used as scapegoats.10 The only genuine nonetheless. And this is the crux of the challenger of the makhzen parties at the matter. The PAM is not a flash party, and the desired destination. polls is the PJD. neither are its predecessors such as the That said, it is important to note that National Rally of Independents (RNI), the the Arab uprisings did not create this Constitutional Union (UC), and the Popular environment alone. The process had already Movement (MP). These parties represent a begun years earlier, but the uprisings significant segment of the electorate, as accelerated and cemented it. As the balance does the PJD and other opposition forces of power between the monarchy and the such as the USFP and the Istiqlal, which PJD began to shift and the battleground were tolerated and later co-opted into the moved to the electoral arena as it typically political system to keep it stable and ensure does under competitive authoritarianism, the survival of the executive monarchy. strategies on both sides were adapted. The These parties form the core of the Moroccan PJD responded by building alliances and party system. They have become the usual working partnerships with other parties suspects—the parties that voters expect 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.28.18

to see on the polling lists. Regardless of makhzen on their toes, and that is very their flaws, this nucleus—the USFP, the much needed if the democratization process Istiqlal, the PJD, the MP, the RNI, the UC, is not to halt entirely. and the PAM—guarantees choice and a certain degree of representativeness both at election time (as together they cover ENDNOTES most of the political spectrum, to the extent 1. The party’s relatively strong support that it applies in Morocco) and after, via the for the democratization of the political formation of coalition governments, which system is frequently viewed as a “radical” 12 most of the time tend to be oversized. stance by the regime, which is undeniably in They also guarantee a modicum of rotation favor of the status quo, i.e., the perpetuation of power in the government, even if real of the executive monarchy. power is vested in the monarch. These 2. Please note that while the factors—rotation of power and choice—are moderation of the PJD gained momentum 13 fundamental aspects of democracy. around the time that it formally separated The election campaign surrounding the from the MUR, most members of the PJD’s 2016 legislative contest and the cabinet- leadership remain members of the MUR; it formation process in its aftermath showed was not this separation that accelerated the worrying signs that the monarchy is seeking process, but rather factors external to the to change this situation by weakening party, most notably the monarchy. The PJD the opposition to such an extent that the was allowed entry into formal politics by the These parties represent makhzen parties—and particularly the monarchy as a means to counterbalance a significant segment PAM—will command a disproportionate other (less moderate, and potentially more of the electorate, as amount of power. This has been a strategy popular) Islamist forces. That said, the of the monarchy during the entire post- does the PJD and other monarchy might have looked less favorably independence period—but in the past, the at the PJD’s wish to become recognized opposition forces such campaigns usually took the form of divide as a political party in its own right had it as the USFP and the and conquer, while 2016 was much more not formally severed its ties with the MUR, Istiqlal, which were targeted, singling out the PJD in particular. something that the party’s leadership would And this is worrying, not only because have been very well aware of (Mekouar tolerated and later such moves are against the fundamental co-opted into the 2010; Zeghal 2008). democratic principle of reasonably free and 3. It is worth noting that virtually all political system to keep fair competitive elections, but also because Western news outlets, even those on the it stable and ensure it undermines the only party on the political right, including Fox News, routinely refer to scene that has a modicum of interest in the PJD as moderate. the survival of the pushing the stale democratization process executive monarchy. 4. Please note that according to in Morocco. As it stands, the established survey data, most Moroccans are primarily political parties all benefit from the status concerned with economic issues. See the quo; their interest lies in the survival of the Arab Barometer (www.arabbarometer.org) executive monarchy and, hence, they do and the World Values Surveys (www.wvs.org). very little to advance change. In fact, they 5. It is worth noting that very few often do exactly the opposite. That said, out highly ranked Islamists in Morocco, even of all the parties the PJD stands to gain the within Al Adl Wal Ihsane, could imagine least from the current system prevailing, a Morocco without the monarchy. What partly due to the party’s relative distance they are taking issue with is the extent of from the monarchy and to the latter’s the monarch’s political powers and his use constant vilification and belittling of the PJD of the religious title “commander of the and its leadership (Sakhtivel 2013a, 2013b). faithful” (Storm 2007). As a result, the PJD has threatened on more 6. The party has been accused by than one occasion to start rocking the boat, Salafis of not representing Islamic values. A rather than being such a good pupil. While frequent critic has been Sheikh Mohammed this is in all likelihood an empty threat, it al-Fizazi, who crucially is not against political nonetheless keeps the monarchy and the 4 THE PJD: THE VANGUARD OF DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO IN THE AGE OF POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIAN ENTRENCHMENT?

participation, being an admirer of Egypt’s 11. See Clark (2017); Pellicer and Wegner al-Nour. In fact, it is important to note that a (2014); Ciftci and Tekin (2009). significant segment of the Salafi community 12. Given the fragmentation of the party has moderated considerably in recent years, system—Sartori (1976) would describe it as and whereas they previously eschewed verging on atomized—coalition governments political participation, several prominent have been the order of the day since the figures are now engaging in formal politics. In opening up of the party system in the 1980s the October 2016 parliamentary elections, a (Storm 2007, 2013). number of ex-jihadi sheikhs ran on the slates 13. An institutionalized and relatively of established political parties, the majority strong and stable party landscape contesting under the banner of the PRV also makes for much less fraught and, (Party of Renaissance and Virtue), but some consequently, more peaceful transitions also on PJD lists, and on lists belonging to to democracy, as more actors have a smaller political entities such as the makhzen vested interest in a pacted rather than MSD (Democratic and Social Movement) and revolutionary transition. Furthermore, most the Party of New Democrats. A significant segments of the population are likely to feel number of Salafis have also joined the non- included in such a scenario, as the pact will makhzen/traditional opposition Istiqlal be more representative. party, and the main makhzen party at the moment, the PAM (Party of Authenticity and Modernity), is known to be aligned with REFERENCES Mohammed Maghraoui (Masbah 2017). Ashour, Omar. 2009. The De-Radicalization 7. A further example is that of Hammas of Jihadists: Transforming Armed al-Khabbaj, who, despite being put forward Islamist Movements. London: Routledge. by the PJD, was barred from contesting the Asseburg, Muriel, ed. 2007. “Moderate elections by the local governor of Marrakech Islamists as Reform Actors: Conditions on the grounds of his “anti-democratic and Programmatic Change.” Research tendencies.” paper 4, Stiftung Wissenschaft 8. For a discussion of PJD strategies und Politik, German Institute for and scope in the wake of the Arab uprisings, International and Security. Berlin. please also see Daadaoui (2014, 2017) and Masbah (2017). For data on the popular Baran, Zeyno. 2008. “Turkey Divided.” support base of the PJD, see Pellicer and Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1: 55-69. Wegner (2014) and Ciftci and Tekin (2009). Boukhars, Anouar. 2010. Politics in Morocco. 9. See also survey data from the Arab London: Routledge. Barometer (www.arabbarometer.org) and Boussaid, Farid. 2009. “The Rise of the supplementary data on Muslim opinions in PAM in Morocco: Trampling the the MENA from the Pew Research Center at Political Scene or Stumbling into It?” http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/ Mediterranean Politics 14, no. 3: 413-19. most-muslims-want-democracy-personal- Ciftci, Sabri and Yusuf Tekin. 2009. “Voter freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/. Preferences, Electoral Cleavages, and 10. This comment refers to the USFP, Support for Islamic Parties.” Paper the Istiqlal, and the then-leader of the prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Istiqlal, Abbas el-Fassi, in particular, and Meeting of the Midwest Political Science it is not to say that these actors were not Association, April 2-5, Chicago, IL. corrupt or power-hungry or, indeed, not Clark, Janine. 2017. “The Party of Justice and complicit in stalling the democratization Development and Municipal Elections in process, as all evidence points in the other Morocco.” Project on Middle East Political direction. Rather, it is to say that they were Science (POMEPS), September 22. not the main culprits given their position Clark, Janine. 2006. “The conditions of within the political system and, indeed, the Islamist moderation: Unpacking cross- party system. ideological cooperation in Jordan.” 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.28.18

International Journal of Middle East Ridgeon, Lloyd, ed. 2015. Sufis and Salafis Studies 38: 539-60. in the Contemporary Age. London: Daadaoui, Mohamed. 2017. “Of Monarchs Bloomsbury. and Islamists: The ‘Refo–lutionary’ Sakhtivel, Vish. 2013a. “Assessing Morocco’s Promise of the PJD Islamists and Regime New Cabinet.” The Washington Institute Control in Morocco.” Middle East for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Critique 26, no. 4: 355-71. October 16. Daadaoui, Mohamed. 2014. “Morocco’s Sakhtivel, Vish. 2013b. “Morocco’s Governing ‘Spring’: The Monarchical Advantage Islamists Remain Vulnerable.” The and Electoral Utility.” In Elections and Washington Institute for Near East Democratization in the Middle East, Policy, Washington, D.C., September 10. edited by Mahmoud Hamad and Khaled Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party al-Anani. London: Palgrave. Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge Del Sarto, Rafaella. 2006. Contested State University Press. Identities and Regional Security in the Sater, James. 2016. Morocco: Challenges Euro-Mediterranean Area. London: to tradition and modernity. London: Palgrave. Routledge. Eibl, Ferdinand. 2011. “The party of Schwedler, Jillian. 2006. Faith in Moderation: authenticity and modernity (PAM): Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Trajectory of a political deus ex Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. machina.” Journal of North African Shehata, Dina. 2010. Islamists and Studies 17, no. 1: 45-66. Secularists in Egypt. London: Routledge. Hamblin, Amy. 2015. “Morocco.” In Arab Storm, Lise. 2013. Prospects for Democracy Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the in North Africa: Parties and Party Intifadat, edited by I. William Zartman. System institutionalization in the Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Maghreb. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Press, 182-208. Storm, Lise. 2009. “The persistence Hamid, Shadi and William McCants, eds. of authoritarianism as a source 2017. Rethinking Political Islam. Oxford: of radicalization in North Africa.” Oxford University Press. International Affairs 85, no. 5: 997-1013. Masbah, Mohammed. 2017. “Morocco’s Salafi Storm, Lise. 2007. Democratization in Ex-Jihadis: Co-optation, Engagement, Morocco. London: Routledge. and the Limits of Inclusion.” Middle East Storm, Lise and Francesco Cavatorta. 2018. Brief 108, Brandeis University. “Do Arabs not do parties?” In Political Mekouar, Mohamed. 2010. “Moroccan Parties in the Arab World, edited Islamists: All the Taste, Half the Calories.” by Francesco Cavatorta and Lise Paper prepared for Midwest Political Storm, 1-20. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Science Association meeting, Chicago, University Press. Illinois, April 2010. Tibi, Bassam. 2008. “Why They Can’t Be Ottaway, Marina and Meredith Riley. 2006. Democratic.” Journal of Democracy 19, “Morocco: From Top-Down Reform no. 3: 43-8. to Democratic Transition?” Carnegie Transparency International Online. “Asset Endowment for International Peace. Declarations in Morocco: Illicit Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series, Enrichment and Conflicts on Interest of Number 71. Public Officials,” May 17, 2016, https:// Pellicer, Miquel and Eva Wegner. 2014. www.transparency.org/whatwedo/ “Socio-economic voter profile and publication/asset_declarations_in_ motives for Islamist support in Morocco.” morocco_illicit_enrichment_and_ Party Politics 20, no. 1: 116-33. conflicts_on_interest.

6 THE PJD: THE VANGUARD OF DEMOCRACY IN MOROCCO IN THE AGE OF POPULISM AND AUTHORITARIAN ENTRENCHMENT?

Wegner, Eva. 2011. Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Wickham, Carrie. 2004. “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in This issue brief is part the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party.” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2: 205-28. of a two-year research Wolf, Anne. 2018. Political Islam in Tunisia. project on pluralism in Oxford: Oxford University Press. the Middle East after Zeghal, Malika. 2008. Islam in Morocco: the Arab uprisings. Religion, authoritarianism and electoral The project is generously politics. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener. supported by a grant from the Carnegie AUTHOR Corporation of New York.

Lise Storm, Ph.D., is a senior lecturer in Middle East politics at the University of Exeter. Her core research interests are democracy, democratization, and party systems with a regional focus on North Africa. Storm is the author of Party Politics and the Prospects for Democracy in North See more issue briefs at: Africa. She holds a Ph.D. in political science www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs from the University of Exeter. This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who participated in a Baker Institute project. Wherever feasible, this research is reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

© 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Cover image credit: Morocco World News

Cite as: Storm, Lise. 2018. The PJD: The Vanguard of Democracy in Morocco in the Age of Populism and Authoritarian Entrenchment? Issue brief no. 05.28.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

7

ISSUE BRIEF 05.29.18 Working Under Constraints: The PJD in the Aftermath of the 2016 Elections

Driss Maghraoui, Ph.D., Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco

have had electoral success and popularity THE CURSE OF THE MULTI-PARTY among the electorate, but they have been SYSTEM IN MOROCCO unwilling or incapable of challenging the A fragmented multi-party system is a regime in ways that can significantly fundamental feature of the Moroccan advance democracy. The PJD is no exception. political system and is often considered Moroccan politics has been shaped by what a critical conduit for political reform and is known in Morocco as the makhzen, also 4 democratization in the long term. While referred to as the deep state, which is the a multi-party system could be seen as political authority that is associated with an opportunity to encourage the political the monarchy and its hegemonic state participation of different political forces, apparatus. In what follows, I argue that, in elections also carry the prospect of its relations with the makhzen, the PJD faces sustaining authoritarian rule.1 The latter constraints similar to those experienced is indeed the case in Morocco, where by other parties, and, as a result, is unable the monarchy has used elections as a to change the underlying dynamics of mechanism to structure and control the Moroccan politics. country’s political arena. The power of the monarchy is preserved by preventing the MONARCHICAL POWERS AND THE emergence of a strong party, maintaining a CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF THE balance among political parties, and further Via formal and PARTIES dividing an already fragmented political elite. informal institutions The Moroccan political landscape In order to evaluate the PJD’s status and practices, the comprises 33 parties. Some, like the PAM, within the Moroccan political system, we monarchy keeps were rapidly established and rose quickly must consider the following questions: in order to serve as a counterweight and constitutionally, what inhibits a greater political parties under a balancing political force against the political role for parties, and what obstacles its control, especially rising popularity of the Party of Justice and impede the growth of powerful parties in when it perceives that 2 Development (PJD). This development is Morocco? The first form of power that is part of the palace’s long-term strategy of one has gained more defined in the Moroccan constitution is that of strength or popularity. “segmentary politics,” which allows it to the “commander of the faithful.” Accordingly, 3 maintain control of the political field. In Sections 41 and 42 define the dual functions this regard, the monarchy has strategically of the king as “commander of the faithful” used elections within the multi-party and “head of state.” Article 46 states system to integrate popular parties and that “the person of the king is inviolable, subsequently curb their potential rise. Over and respect is due him,” adding that “the the years, a number of different parties integrity of the person of the king shall not RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.29.18

be violated.” The acts of the king also enjoy itself with El Othmani—and subsequently complete immunity. Constitutionally, the remaining part of the government—or siding king is unaccountable and, hence, remains with Benkirane, who had become persona above the law. Under these constitutional non grata in palace circles, and shift to the provisions, the role of Moroccan parties in opposition. The fact that the intraparty vote the country’s political system is significantly on party leadership favored El Othmani by a limited; they lack autonomy. In addition, the slim margin—51% for El Othmani and 49% majority of Moroccan parties are aligned with for the mayor of Fez, Driss el-Azami—further palace politics, which further constrains their pushed the PJD into a position of weakness independence and freedom of action. As a vis-à-vis the monarchy because, from the result, parties exist as instruments of the perspective of the voters, it showed the makhzen. Via formal and informal institutions party’s predisposition to be as acquiescent The PJD faces a dual and practices, the monarchy keeps political and submissive as other parties. The PJD’s dilemma: the factors parties under its control, especially when it compliance is therefore more likely to that might contribute perceives that one has gained more strength create a credibility gap and a sense of or popularity. disenchantment among its own electorate in to its popularity with future elections. the electorate can be Religion is also an important aspect of perceived as a threat THE PJD AND THE DIALECTICS OF these dialectics because both the monarchy POPULARITY AND VULNERABILITY to the Moroccan and the PJD can be viewed as direct competitors who use Islamic references in The PJD faces a dual dilemma that is inherent monarchy. And the their political discourse. The PJD has been in the Moroccan political context. On one factors that can able to establish a moral basis and religious hand, the factors that might contribute to legitimacy that resonate with many voters. contribute to the PJD’s the PJD’s popularity with the electorate can Although formally detached from the party, acceptance by the simultaneously be perceived as a threat to the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR)— the Moroccan monarchy. On the other hand, regime can undermine an Islamic movement—is an important the factors that can contribute to the PJD’s the party’s popularity factor in the PJD’s popularity; many PJD acceptance by the regime can undermine among voters. members and leaders are active in the the party’s popularity among the voters. MUR, and the separation between the two For example, the former secretary general organizations remains blurred.6 The MUR of the PJD, Abdelilah Benkirane, was able has moral standing among many Moroccans. to win a great following among Moroccans. In principle, the MUR exclusively focuses While his widespread popularity, open on da’wa (an Islamic call or missionary style, and implicit strategy of exposing the activism), but the relationship between contradictions of the Moroccan political politics and preaching is symbolically system5 made him more popular with important. However, regardless of the PJD’s the people, he was gradually perceived efforts to downplay its religious message as a nuisance to the regime and a clear and symbolism,7 from the perspective of justification for undercutting his efforts to makhzen, the party was gradually perceived form a coalition government after the as a potential threat. This perception was 2016 elections. largely based on the PJD’s use of religious However, when Benkirane’s charismatic “symbolic capital”—such as social work and leadership was replaced with that of the occasional references to religious codes and lackluster new secretary general of the principles—which has served the monarchy PJD, Saadeddine El Othmani, the PJD faced for ages and become its “special domain.” a different dilemma. El Othmani won the By the end of the 2015, it was evident blessing of the palace but thus far has that the palace did not want Abdelilah failed to gain popularity among the broader Benkirane to remain the head of government. electorate or even within his own party. In The palace sought a strategy that would the aftermath of the 2016 elections, party curb the popularity of the PJD in critical and members were torn between keeping the gradual ways, but would not necessarily blessing of the monarchy that clearly aligned require the removal of the party from power. 2 WORKING UNDER CONSTRAINTS: THE PJD IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS

Signs of this strategy began appearing during an election campaign that incited Moroccans CRACKS WITHIN THE PARTY against Benkirane and his party. This included Following the decision to remove Benkirane a well-orchestrated but surreptitiously from office in what was perceived as a organized rally against the so-called humiliating experience for many within the “Islamization of the state” by the PJD. PJD, it became clear that internal “cracks” might turn into long-lasting divisions. The AFTERMATH OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS party engaged in a heated debate over a proposal to change its internal bylaws Following the September 4, 2015, municipal to allow Abdelilah Benkirane to serve a and regional elections in which the PJD third term as the secretary general of the managed victories in major cities such as PJD. Those opposed to the bylaw change Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, and Tangier, believed that the party should not be based the party continued to be an important on the “personality cults” that characterize force in Morocco’s electoral landscape, as other parties in Morocco. This group also demonstrated by its success in the 2016 argued that the party should not embark parliamentary elections. Yet the party’s on a path of confrontation with the palace. growing popularity was not well received by Some in this group even referred to the those in the inner circles of power. In 2016, changing international context and the the PJD increased its number of seats in fate of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia. parliament from 107 to 125, while the Party of This group was primarily associated with Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) won only individuals integrated into the political and 102 seats—and this is a party created under administrative system. The MUR did not the auspices of the king’s advisor, Fouad Ali favor the extension of Benkirane’s term. The PJD’s use of Another group of PJD members supported El Himma, with the goal of undermining the religious “symbolic growing popularity of the PJD. the extension. They argued that the decision Benkirane’s charisma was an important to remove Benkirane countered democratic capital”—such as social factor for the party’s success in the October principles and contradicted the will of the work and occasional 2016 elections. However, because he lacked people. They also suggested that under references to religious current conditions, it would be much better a majority in the parliament, Benkirane had codes and principles— to search for partners to form a coalition for the party to be part of the opposition. This government. This was exactly the terrain group was associated with many parliament is perceived as a where the palace could engage in formal members and younger party members. potential threat and informal politics to make the task The cracks in the party’s cohesion because it has served impossible for Benkirane. The party’s former became obvious during the PJD’s National the monarchy for ages ally, the National Rally of Independents Assembly session in November 2017, (RNI), asked to include two other parties when 126 assembly members voted and become its in the coalition talks, a condition that against amending the party’s internal laws “special domain.” Benkirane refused. In the end, an electoral (articles 16 and 37) while only 101 members victory did not translate into a win during supported the amendment that would have the government formation process for paved the way for Benkirane’s third term. In the PJD, and for Benkirane in particular. the opening speech before this extraordinary Behind-the-scenes political maneuvering session, Benkirane acknowledged the and the utilization of other political parties existence of rifts within the party and tried by the palace were sufficient to block to reconcile the two opposing groups. He the formation of a coalition government hoped to calm the conflict by affirming that headed by Benkirane. This situation the party was established, able to withstand became popularly known as the “blockage” external pressures, and could reach (deadlock).8 After six months of deadlock, independent decisions through democratic Benkirane was replaced by El Othmani, who processes. After the vote, Benkirane stated, was finally appointed by the king to form a “The king has dismissed me, the party new coalition government. has put an end to my responsibilities.”9 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.29.18

While this situation was a testament to became the secretary general of the RNI the PJD’s democratic process, it did make and emerged as the key political figure in divisions within the party public, which the formation of the 2016 government. could cause further disunity. The divisions The new government follows a pattern set were still evident during the party vote on by those that preceded it: key ministries new leadership. Saadeddine El Othmani are kept under the control of technocrats barely won with 1,006 votes out of 1,943 and individuals associated with the PJD delegates against 912 delegates for the palace. In sharp contrast to Benkirane’s mayor of Fez, Driss el-Azami, who was candor and charisma, El Othmani’s clearly supported by Benkirane. uninspired leadership, acquiescence, and nonconfrontational style have exacerbated the party’s weakness. THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND THE For many Moroccans, El Othmani does SYMBOLIC WEAKNESS OF THE PJD not exude confidence and fails to give the impression of a strong leader who can Given the nature of the political system effectively manage the government. The in Morocco, the government is effectively government appears ineffective in the face powerless; Benkirane regularly made it clear of the Rif and Khribga protests. On October that the real power resides with the king10— 24, 2017, when the king dismissed four which is possibly another reason the former ministers and barred five former ministers PJD secretary general became persona non from assuming their official duties, the grata within palace circles. While at the structural deficiencies of the government beginning of his term, Benkirane made were on full display. These dismissals came Benkirane regularly every effort to denounce corruption and only a few months after a major speech by made it clear that the everyday problems associated with the the king in which he blamed the country’s makhzen, he regularly emphasized that his the real power resides political paralysis on parties and the hands were tied. The palace controlled the with the king—which political elite. In his speech, the king stated so-called “les ministères de souveraineté” is possibly another that “the evolution witnessed in Morocco (the ministries of sovereignty): the Ministry in the political domain and in the area of reason the former of Foreign Affairs under Salaheddine development has not led to the kind of PJD secretary general Mezouar, the leader of the National Rally positive reaction you would expect from of Independents; the Ministry of Education became persona political parties, leaders, and government under the technocrat Rachid Belmokhtar; non grata within officials.”11 Meanwhile, Benkirane and the Interior Ministry under another remains a presence in the party; his public palace circles. technocrat, Mohamed Hassad. These pronouncements still stir debates and ministers were known for their close highlight the differences between him and El relationships with palace circles. Othmani. Benkirane said in March 2018 that Under El Othmani, the weakness of “we want the monarchy but we don’t want the PJD has become even more evident, the makhzen.”12 especially in view of the difficulties related to the formation of the cabinet. For example, Moroccans regularly read the following WILL THE PJD OR MOROCCAN PARTIES phrase in newspapers: “El Othmani’s CONTRIBUTE TO DEMOCRACY? government, which is headed by Aziz Akhennouch.” Akhennouch is a billionaire, Extensive research on the democratization a friend of the king, and currently serves process documents a well-established as the minister of agriculture. Because the consensus about the crucial role of political PAM and its leader, Elyas Eloumari, fell out parties. Political parties are the link between of favor in palace circles due to the party’s society and policymaking and their role failure to serve as a political counterweight is essential to any polity that aspires to to the rise of the PJD, Akhennouch has democracy and democratic representation. seemingly replaced Eloumari in that Whether it is the PJD in the current context same mission. Akhennouch unexpectedly or other parties in Moroccan history, 4 WORKING UNDER CONSTRAINTS: THE PJD IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS

political parties have agreed, implicitly or 3. Rémy Leveau, Le fellah marocain explicitly, to operate in a politically inhibiting défenseur du trône (Paris: Presses de environment that gradually deprives them Sciences Po, 1985); and John Waterbury, The of their main political function, limits Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan their actions, and subsequently leads to Political Elite–A Study in Segmented Politics their demise. Moroccans’ perceptions of (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). these parties have also shifted; parties 4. The term makhzan means “storage” are increasingly viewed as spineless, and was used historically to refer to the opportunistic, able to be co-opted by the sultan’s court. The notion of “makhzan” palace, devoid of ideological consistency, has variously been used to refer to the and driven by personalities. The long-term state apparatus; the services that the state Morocco’s political policy of the palace to create the so-called provides to its citizens, such as education, parties have gradually “partis de l’administration” (parties of health care, and other forms of economic veered into irrelevance the administration) and its propensity to and social development; and all persons because there is no intervene in the parties’ internal affairs in the service of the central power (the further raises questions about the ability of monarchy) and with official and unofficial indication that a Moroccan political parties to constructively (religious, military, economic, or political) confrontation between contribute to the process of democratization. authority. See Rachida Chérifie, Le Makhzen the palace and the Morocco’s political parties have politique au Maroc: Hier et aujourd’hui political elite that could gradually veered into irrelevance because (Casablanca: Afrique Orient, 1988). advance democracy is a there is no indication that a confrontation 5. For example, Benkirane referenced between the palace and the political elite the practices of informal politics and the realistic possibility. that could advance democracy is a realistic dualism of rule, and spoke a little more possibility. In the long term, democratization openly about some of the obstacles he faced in Morocco depends on reducing the as the head of government. fragmentation of the party system and 6. Ashraf Nabih El Sherif, “Institutional establishing political parties that are and Ideological Re-construction of the ideologically coherent, aspire for democratic Justice and Development Party (PJD): governance, are independent of palace The Question of Democratic Islamism in politics, and have strong popular support. Morocco,” Middle East Journal 66, no. 4 In this regard, Europe and the United (Autumn 2012): 660-682. States can play a bigger role in promoting 7. Driss Maghraoui and Saloua Zerhouni, the growth of Moroccan political parties “Searching for Political Normalization: committed to democratic governance, The Party of Justice and Development instead of supporting authoritarian regimes in Morocco,” in Quin Mecham and Julie in the name of the “stability paradigm” that Chernov Hwang, Islamist Parties and has so far created further instability in the Political Normalization in the Muslim World Middle East and North Africa region. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 8. The idea of “blocage,” as it came ENDNOTES to be termed in the popular media in both 1. James N. Sater, “Parliamentary Arabic and French, was associated with the Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Morocco,” obstacles that Abdelilah Benkirane faced as Middle East Journal 63, no. 3 (Summer he sought to establish a new government 2009): 381-400. following the 2016 elections. 2. The PAM is often referred to the 9. The North Africa Post, “No Third Term new Front de la défense des institutions for Benkirane at Helm of PJD,” November 27, constitutionnelles (FDIC), which was 2017, http://northafricapost.com/20937- established by Hassan II in 1963 to counter no-third-term-benkirane-helm-pjd.html. the opposition. 10. He emphatically stated that “leading the government is not synonymous with holding power.”

5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.29.18

11. See “Maroc: Mohammed VI critique sévèrement l’administration et la classe politique,” Jeune Afrique, July 29, 2017, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/462066/ politique/maroc-mohammed-vi-critique- severement-ladministration-et-la-classe- This issue brief is part politique/. of a two-year research 12. See “Benkirane: le PJD est royaliste project on pluralism in mais pas ‘makhzénien,’” Le Site Info, the Middle East after February 4, 2018, http://www.lesiteinfo. the Arab uprisings. com/politique/benkirane-pjd-royaliste- makhzenien/. The project is generously supported by a grant AUTHOR from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Driss Maghraoui, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco. He received his Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Santa Cruz.

See more issue briefs at: www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs

This publication was written by a researcher (or researchers) who participated in a Baker Institute project. Wherever feasible, this research is reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

© 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Cover image credit: Fadel Senna/AFP/Getty Images

Cite as: Maghraoui, Driss. 2018. Working Under Constraints: The PJD in the Aftermath of the 2016 Elections. Issue brief no. 05.29.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

6 ISSUE BRIEF 05.30.18 Party of Justice and Development: A Strategy of Differentiation

Beatriz Tomé-Alonso, Ph.D., University Loyola Andalucía, Seville, Spain

that its authority is respected.3 Indeed, PJD INTRODUCTION leaders often reference the term “kingdom” After decades in the opposition, the Party in their public communications. Former of Justice and Development’s (PJD) rise party leader Abdelilah Benkirane’s statement in the Moroccan government brought a “le roi est le patron” (“the king is the boss”) 4 critical issue to forefront: in an extremely is a clear example of this strategy. On the restrictive political system, what would other hand, the PJD plays an electoral game the PJD do to maintain its popular support whereby it attempts to preserve its leading among the electorate? Many within the political position by setting itself apart from PJD were concerned about following in other political actors. In this brief, I will focus the footsteps of the Socialist Union of on this strategy, which I term “the strategy Popular Forces (USFP) and the so-called of differentiation.” In other words, the PJD government of alternance (1998-2002); presents itself as a different and alternative the USFP failed to pursue reforms, grew political party in a system where, according increasingly unpopular, and did not win a to the PJD, there is widespread corruption, second term in office.1 The national context lack of political commitment, and an was challenging. Abdelilah Benkirane had absence of moral values. become the head of a heterogeneous The PJD’s strategy of differentiation 5 coalition government in which the PJD relies on three core and interrelated ideas: The PJD pursues a dual (1) PJD officials and activists possess the was in the minority. Although some PJD strategy to maintain parliamentarians occupied Foreign Affairs, expertise, management skills, and moral 6 Justice, and other key ministries, the party values of its members and representatives; its popularity: It plays controlled only 8% of the government (2) the PJD is a role model for how intraparty the regime’s game by budget (Desrues 2017).2 In this highly and deliberative democracy should operate; assuring the monarchy restrictive context, it was particularly and (3) the PJD’s new political praxis seeks a direct and fluid communication with the that its authority is difficult for the PJD to enact promised respected. It plays reforms. Nonetheless, governing issues people. I will discuss each in turn. do not seem to have eroded Moroccans’ an electoral game by support for the PJD, which received setting itself apart from PJD REPRESENTATIVES: AT THE one-half million more votes in the 2016 FOREFRONT OF THE PARTY’S other political actors. legislative elections than it did in 2011, thereby consolidating itself as the country’s ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL STRATEGY leading political party. PJD officials have become fundamental The PJD pursues a dual strategy symbols and key political assets for the (Mainwaring 2003) to maintain its party. A new narrative that points out popularity. On one hand, the party plays the high-level management skills, a sense of regime’s game by assuring the monarchy RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.30.18

responsibility, and moral commitment has PJD officials are also presented as “good been incorporated into the PJD’s public Muslims.” According to Abdelhak El Arabi, discourse, which directly contrasts with who oversaw the party’s 2016 electoral the previous narrative that emphasized its campaign, the party’s candidates should “political virginity.” represent the party’s values, which are The PJD’s current narrative highlights inspired by Islam and “its moral capital party officials’ advanced education and good and values” (PJD 2016).9 In line with other governance capabilities. Its 2011 electoral Islamist parties in the region, the end of program, for example, underscored the ability the “revolutionary paradigm” brought an of party members to manage public affairs by emphasis on moral issues in the PJD’s official dedicating an entire section to a discussion of discourse in place of references to sharia or the officials and their backgrounds. a hypothetical Islamic state. With this move, As a matter of fact, while an average the PJD seeks, on one hand, to establish of only 23.06% of local representatives a dialectical relationship between its in 2011 completed college, one of every incorruptibility, transparency, commitment, two PJD representatives had a university and moral standing. On the other hand, by degree. This percentage was even higher presenting Muslimhood as one of its main among national PJD representatives: traits, the PJD links itself to a religious almost all were graduates of Moroccan Moroccan identity. or foreign universities.7 According to data that I gathered,8 the majority of the PJD’s parliamentary representatives are university INTRAPARTY DEMOCRACY, professors or civil servants, although they MERITOCRACY, AND SOCIAL hail from diverse professional backgrounds. ASCENSION Since the late 1990s, the PJD replaced the USFP as the “professors’ party” (Bennani- Beyond party officials’ profiles and skills, Chaïbi 2013), thereby unveiling a broader the PJD promotes the party’s image as social tendency: political socialization an ideologically consistent, nationally in Moroccan universities is increasingly well-established, and highly professional Islamist-oriented. organization. PJD statements often highlight the party’s internal democratic processes

TABLE 1 — EDUCATION LEVELS OF MOROCCAN LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS, BY PERCENT (2011)

Political party No formal education Primary school Secondary school University graduate

Party Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) 22.74 26.99 30.18 20.76 Party Istiqlal (PI) 21.75 26.07 31.62 20.83 Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) 17.40 24.49 31.46 26.63 National Rally of Independents (RNI) 4.28 27.08 29.54 9.36 Popular Movement (MP) 22.39 25.29 32.03 20.27

Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) 18.90 23.74 34.42 22.92

Party of Justice and Development (PJD) 6.16 12.00 28.71 53.11

Average 20.49 25.18 31.27 23.06

SOURCE National Bureau of Territorial Collectivities, 2011

2 PARTY OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: A STRATEGY OF DIFFERENTIATION

as one of its distinctive features. Although parties, which are increasingly constrained the general secretariat and the electoral by their traditional approach to politics committee have a specific role and and are rapidly losing influence and influence in the candidate selection process, parliamentary representation. regional and local PJD commissions can propose candidates for the party’s electoral list.10 However, the electoral committee A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE: DIRECT makes the ultimate decision on the COMMUNICATION WITH THE PEOPLE candidate and the placement on the party In its efforts to mitigate the potentially list.11 The electoral committee’s decision adverse effects of the shift from an The PJD seeks to takes into account both the candidate’s opposition party to a party of government, establish … its individual qualifications and the party’s the PJD has developed a political praxis that general strategy.12 incorruptibility, underlines its grassroots activism and a The candidate selection process transparency, dialectical proximity between the party and follows the “rules of the game” that the Moroccan citizens.13 commitment, and moral PJD established in its internal regulations First, PJD candidates and standing while linking (Wegner 2011). The party highlights representatives do not confine contact transparency and honesty as the pillars of itself to a religious with the electorate to electoral campaigns. its political discourse. Given the impossibility Moroccan identity. The party’s communication channels of criticizing the political system and calling are constantly open. According to PJD attention to its shortcomings, the PJD seeks parliamentarians, party directives clearly to present itself as an alternative model and require parliament members to meet with example of good governance. the electorate at least twice a month.14 In this sense, the PJD aims to transcend The “Al Misbah” caravan follows the same the image of an elitist party and to project, logic. Launched in 2007, the caravan allows instead, a grassroots image that highlights party members to explain the scope and the role and involvement of members. limits of their actions in government as well From this perspective, the party is defined as “maintain a dialogue with the citizens not by the prevalence of professional to examine their problems and find the politicians but how it functions as a appropriate solutions.”15 Moreover, PJD cohesive and coherent community. This officials can present themselves and their image is presented and promoted at every “PJD brand” beyond the urban centers where Because it is a growing national party congress, where the party the party’s presence and leadership are highlights its nationwide mobilization, and relatively young already well-established.16 discipline, and unity. party, the PJD offers In the search for a direct and fluid Moreover, the possibility of intraparty communication with the Moroccan new opportunities for promotion to and nomination for electoral electorate, the role of the party’s former political and social lists and party offices within the PJD leader and prime minister, Abdelilah is an important incentive for members ascension, in contrast Benkirane, was essential. His use of and potential recruits (Wegner 2011). to older Moroccan colloquial Arabic and plain and powerful The institutional growth and territorial language connected with many voters who parties, which are expansion of the PJD creates many felt directly addressed and represented increasingly constrained opportunities for party activists. In turn, by him. Moreover, Benkirane adopted a activists progressively gain management by their traditional populist discursive approach during the experience at the national and regional approach to politics. 2016 electoral campaign. In line with one levels. A national list that reserves 60 seats of the defining elements of populism, for women and 30 for young people opens Benkirane directed strong, forthright, and up new positions to some of the politically sometimes inflammatory words toward marginalized sectors of the population. his main political opponent, the Party for Because it is a growing and relatively Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) (Hawkins young party, the PJD offers new 2009, 1064). Indeed, he even referred to opportunities for political (and social) PAM’s members as “drug dealers.”17 By ascension, in contrast to older Moroccan 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.30.18

calling attention to PAM as the PJD’s main who demand that the PJD assert greater political antagonist, Benkirane tried to independence from outside pressure. This emphasize the distance between members problem could become particularly serious of his own party and the traditional if the party makes electoral gains in the Moroccan political elite. While the former near future. were average Moroccan citizens driven by serious and committed work, the latter used state institutions for their personal ENDNOTES benefit and, therefore, “subverted the 1. While the USFP won 14% of the system to its own interests, against those popular vote in the 1997 parliamentary of the good majority or the people,” he elections, it won only 11.9% of the vote in 18 said (Hawkins 2009, 1064). Indeed, 2002. The socialists lost 165,333 votes in Benkirane coined the term “Tahakum” to five years (López García 2010). For more refer to a kind of “deep state” that failed about the impact on the PJD of the so-called to be neutral during the electoral campaign government of alternance, see Willis (1999). and pulled strings from the shadows to 2. For an evaluation of the PJD’s undermine the PJD. government, see Desrues and Fernández Molina (2013). IMPLICATIONS 3. To learn more about the dual political system in Morocco, see Desrues and The main challenges Looking back, the PJD’s strategy of Hernando de Larramendi (2011). facing the PJD in the differentiation can be deemed successful. 4. See, for example, Bilal Mousjid, Today, the party is Morocco’s leading “Abdelilah Benkirane: Chef du gouvernement post-Benkirane era political force; it won 27% of the votes cherche majorité,’’ TelQuel, November are its ability to attract and obtained 125 seats in the parliament 10, 2017, http://telquel.ma/2016/11/10/ new voters and its in the 2016 elections. This strong showing gouvernement-benkirane-face-au- internal cohesion. A indicates that the PJD is able to attract the mur_1523028. 5. See the PJD’s construction of key question is how votes of those who do not favorably view the ability of other parties to represent dialectical opposition based on Islamic it will fare under them.19 One factor that has limited the concepts against the rest of the primary the less charismatic party’s electoral growth is its weak elites (opposition-instrumentalization) in leadership of the new presence in rural areas. This failure may Macías-Amoretti (2014). general secretary and negatively affect the party’s efforts to 6. See the PJD’s electoral programs for attract those interested in climbing the the 2016 and 2011 legislative elections (PJD head of government, social and political ladder. 2011 and 2016) and also Benkirane’s closing Saadeddine El Othmani. The main challenges facing the PJD in campaign speech in the city of Salé on the post-Benkirane era are its ability to October 6, 2016, available at pjd.ma. attract new voters and its internal cohesion. 7. According to data extracted from their A key question is how to continue the CVs, around 77% of PJD’s MPs had a university mobilization of party activists under the degree in 2011-2016; this percentage reached less charismatic leadership of the new 100% during the PJD’s first legislative period general secretary and head of government, in parliament (1997-2002) and has since been Saadeddine El Othmani. Although PJD above 90% (95.25% in 2002-2007; 91.30% politicians insist that “the party is in 2007-2011). open to debate, but final decisions are 8. This information is based on personal compulsory,”20 it may increasingly become research conducted in Morocco between a challenge to manage possible internal September and December 2017. dissent between those who are more 9. See Médias24 (2015). willing to make concessions (this group is 10. To learn more about the PJD’s led by the general secretary himself), and candidate selections process, see Wegner those (such as younger party members) (2011); also see Desrues (2017). 11. Author’s interview with a PJD MP in 4 Rabat, November 2017. PARTY OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT: A STRATEGY OF DIFFERENTIATION

12. To learn more about the PJD’s Marruecos. Las claves del proceso de electoral strategy, see Zaireg (2016) transformación que se opera en el país and Mejdoubi (2015) for interviews with vecino. Córdoba: Editorial Almuzara. Abdelhak El Arabi, who was in charge of the Hawkins, Kirk A. 2009. “Is Chávez Populist? PJD’s 2016 electoral campaign. Measuring Populist Discourse in 13. The OPEMAM electoral observation Comparative Perspective.” Comparative team (opemam.org) could observe in situ Political Studies 42, no. 8: 1040-1067. how the PJD electoral meetings were the López-García, Bernabé. 2010. Marruecos most numerous among the political parties’ político, cuarenta años de procesos electoral campaigns in Rabat. See López electorales. Madrid: Centro de García (2017) and López García and Hernando Investigaciones Sociológicas. de Larramendi (2017). López-García, Bernabé. 2016. “Análisis post 14. Author’s interview with a PJD MP in electoral Marruecos legislativas 2016.” Rabat, February 2018. OPEMAM, Análisis post-electoral. 15. Author’s interview with a PJD MP in www.opemam.org. Rabat, April 2013. 16. Author’s interviews with different López-García, Bernabé and Miguel members of the PJD in Rabat, September Hernando de Larramendi. 2017. “The 2014 and November 2017. 2016 parliamentary elections in 17. Benkirane’s electoral speech, Salé, Morocco: context and interpretations.” Morocco, September 24, 2016. Real Instituto Elcano. http://www. 18. Ibid. realinstitutoelcano.org. 19. According to Abdellah Bouanou in Macías-Amoretti, Juan A. 2014. “Seeking an interview with the author in April 2013, an ‘other’ desperately: the dialectical available data shows that three primary opposition of political Islam in Morocco.” reasons motivate people to vote for the PJD: The Journal of North African Studies 20, (a) they agree with its Islamic references; no. 3: 336-348. (b) PJD’s fight against corruption; and (c) as Mainwaring, Scott. 2003. “Party Objective in “punishment” toward other political forces. Authoritarian Regimes with Elections or 20. Author’s interviews with different Fragile Democracies: A Dual Game.” In PJD MPs in Rabat in April 2013 and Christian Democracy in Latin America: November 2017. Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford: REFERENCES Stanford University Press. Bennani-Chaïbi, Mounia. 2013. “L’espace Mejdoubi, Mohamed. 2015. “Communales partisan marocain: un microcosme et régionales: Le PJD table sur ses polarisé?” Revue française de science potentialités féminines et sa jeunesse politique 63, no. 6: 1163-1192. pour peser de tout son poids dans la Desrues, Thierry. 2017. “El Partido Justicia balance électorale.” MAP. http://www. y Desarrollo (PJD) en Marruecos (2011- pjd.ma/fr/actualites/communales- 2017). Teoría y praxis de gobierno.” et-régionales-le-pjd-table-sur- Documento de Trabajo de la Fundación ses-potentialités-féminines-et-sa- Alternativas, no. 85. jeunesse-pour. Desrues, Thierry and Irene Fernandez Molina. Médias24. 2015. “Comment le PJD prépare 2013. “L’expérience gouvernementale du les élections.’’ http://www.pjd.ma/fr/ Parti de la Justice et du Développement: actualites/médias-24comment-le-pjd- les islamistes au pouvoir?” L’Année du prépare-les-élections. Maghreb IX: 345-365. Party of Justice and Development. 2011. Desrues, Thierry and Miguel Hernando Programme électoral du Parti de la de Larramendi, eds. 2011. Mohamed Justice et du Développement. Elections VI. Política y cambio social en législatives du 25 novembre 2011: Pour 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.30.18

un Maroc nouveau. Le Maroc de la liberté, de la dignité, du développement et de la justice. http://pjd.ma. Party of Justice and Development. 2016. “Notre Voix, Notre Opportunité Pour Poursuivre les Réformes.” http://pjd.ma. This issue brief is part Wegner, Eva. 2011. Islamist Opposition of a two-year research in Authoritarian Regimes. New York: project on pluralism in Syracuse University Press. the Middle East after Willis, Michael. 1999. “Between alternance the Arab uprisings. and the Makhzen: At–Tawhid wa Al– Islah's entry into Moroccan politics.” The project is generously The Journal of North African Studies 4, supported by a grant no. 3: 45-80. from the Carnegie Zaireg, Reda. 2016. “Abdelhak El Arabi: ‘Le Corporation of New York. PJD fait campagne de manière propre et sérieuse.’” HuffPost Maroc. http://www. huffpostmaghreb.com/2016/10/04/ abdelhak-el-arabi_n_12326226.html.

AUTHOR

Beatriz Tomé-Alonso, Ph.D., is a professor of See more issue briefs at: international studies at the University Loyola www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs Andalucía in Seville, Spain, and a member of the Observatory on Politics and Elections in This publication was written by a the Arab and Muslim World (OPEMAM) and researcher (or researchers) who participated in a Baker Institute project. of the Research Group on Arab and Muslim Wherever feasible, this research is Societies (GRESAM). reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

© 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Cover image credit: Brahim Taougar/Le360

Cite as: Tomé-Alonso, Beatriz. 2018. Party of Justice and Development: A Strategy of Differentiation. Issue brief no. 05.30.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

6 ISSUE BRIEF 05.31.18 The Party of Justice and Development’s Pragmatic Politics

Amina Drhimeur, Ph.D., Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), Bonn, Germany

In response to anti-government protests initiate democratic reforms. However, did that swept across the Middle East and pragmatic politics grant the party leeway North Africa during the Arab uprisings, to implement such reforms? I argue that King Mohammed VI of Morocco announced such politics constrained the PJD and failed constitutional reforms in 2011 with a view to protect it from moves to weaken and to expand the powers of the country’s fragment the party. parliament and to grant the judiciary greater independence. Against this background of change, the Justice and Development Party PRAGMATIC POLITICS AND PARTY (PJD) rose as a major political party and SURVIVAL secured two successive electoral victories, in In order to survive in a highly constrained 2011 and 2016. The new constitution of 2011, political context, the PJD recognized the however, maintained the king’s executive necessity of gaining the monarchy’s trust. powers over strategic issues and preserved The party thus prioritized improved relations his religious and political prerogatives. The with the palace over confrontation. The PJD, king is “the commander of the faithful” and which had once called for a “democratic the head of the ministerial council, and has struggle,” began calling for “an effective the right to dissolve the parliament.1 Another partnership” to build a democracy.4 To this In order to survive in constraint in this context is Morocco’s highly end, it endorsed the king’s decisions and fragmented multi-party system, which a highly constrained showed clear support for the monarchy’s makes it difficult for powerful parties to political context, the political and religious roles.5 In his speeches, gain ground or become dominant. While former party leader Abdelilah Benkirane PJD recognized the Morocco’s party system preserves the king’s often positioned himself as the servant of necessity of gaining the role as the main political actor, it also serves the king and never openly challenged him.6 to fragment and weaken the political elite.2 monarchy’s trust. The By doing so, the party intended to win and Compounding the issue, elections have long party thus prioritized maintain the king’s support, and to survive. been characterized by low voter turnout, Survival also required the party’s ability improved relations reflecting Moroccans’ political disinterest to strengthen its popular base and appeal with the palace over and mistrust of politicians.3 to heterogeneous constituencies. Thus, the In this highly constrained political confrontation. PJD employed a pragmatic approach that environment, how did the PJD survive combined neoliberal economic policies and to win two elections? I argue that the social services. In its economic program, PJD applied pragmatic politics—first, to the party launched major construction maintain the king’s support, and second, to projects, engaged in privatization reforms, appeal to heterogeneous constituencies— and favored public-private partnerships for in order to remain standing. When the provision of public services. The PJD also campaigning in 2011, the PJD promised to RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.31.18

sought to reduce taxes for large companies For example, former party leader Abdelilah and to provide various tax credits and Benkirane is credited with creating a other incentives to small and medium-size new type of politics for the PJD based businesses.7 In addition, foreign enterprises on a simple, populist approach, which were encouraged to invest in Morocco.8 made him extremely popular. Benkirane In regard to social policies, the PJD also favored open, direct channels of aimed to support the most vulnerable communication with citizens by using Moroccans through cash transfers. Widows monthly parliamentary meetings to and divorced mothers were offered financial reassure them that the party was doing help. Poor families also received cash its best to fight corruption and implement assistance on the condition that they sent reforms.14 In another grassroots outreach The PJD’s politics their children to school. More scholarships measure, PJD members of the parliament were made available for students. The organized the “al-Misbah caravan” in 2013. constrained the party PJD also replaced Morocco’s system of In the years since, the caravan has travelled and failed to protect it subsidies with direct cash transfers to across the country and held meetings with from moves to weaken the poor. In addition, the party worked to local communities to share the party’s and fragment it. lower prescription drug prices and provided experiences and the obstacles it faces.15 a health insurance program to the most In the 2011 elections, the PJD principally needy through a system called RAMED, prevailed in large cities, as its core or Regime d’Assistance Médicale pour constituency was primarily composed of the les Économiquement Démunis (Medical urban, educated middle class—engineers, Assistance Plan for the Economically doctors, professors, and lawyers.16 Disadvantaged).9 Finally, party youth However, the PJD’s neoliberal economic groups often organized humanitarian aid policies helped the party to expand its campaigns for those living in rural and electoral base and gain the support of mountainous areas. These campaigns wealthy business owners as well.17 The provided help in the form of clothing and latter, who believed the PJD’s economic also offered educational and extracurricular liberalization plans would make the activities for children.10 Moroccan market more competitive, agreed The combination of neoliberal policies to finance the party’s social policies.18 Such and improved social services proceeded social programs consolidated the party’s In its efforts to survive, in tandem with the PJD’s de-emphasis of support among the poor and helped to the PJD became unable religious discourse and the adoption of portray the PJD as a “people’s party.”19 modern political terminology that primarily In addition, by downplaying its religious to carry through referenced human rights and democracy. and moral discourse, the PJD appealed reform policies, which During the party’s seventh national party to more secularists and technocrats.20 compromised its conference in July 2012, for instance, the The party’s humanitarian aid caravans political power and PJD defended the idea that religion should appealed to voters in rural areas who threatened to weaken function only as a guiding principle to were disappointed with the lack of social politics and included “freedom of belief” in policies from other parties.21 The strategy its popularity. the party program.11 The PJD also endorsed to develop a connection with voters, which a United Nations resolution on religious helped the party to maintain high approval freedom, marking a shift to a discourse ratings,22 projected an image of the PJD as based on policy rather than morality.12 a party that understood the people’s needs, In order to better connect with voters, and appealed to urban and rural voters the PJD implemented a communication disillusioned with other political parties.23 strategy that highlighted the personal The 2016 election results validated PJD’s qualities of party members and utilized approach, as evidenced by its higher vote populist speeches. PJD party members totals (from 22% to 27% of the vote) and were particularly keen on emphasizing seat shares (from 107 to 125) compared to their moral values and how little their the 2011 elections. new positions have changed them.13

2 THE PARTY OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT’S PRAGMATIC POLITICS

highly critical discourse toward the palace’s THE LIMITATIONS OF PRAGMATIC coterie of elites and their manipulation of POLITICS politics, Benkirane sought to maintain the Although the PJD managed to increase its party’s popularity by reassuring the people popularity in its first term in government, that the PJD was doing its best to implement the party’s decision to not challenge reforms. Calling the economic and political the monarchy’s powers left the party actors close to the palace “ghosts and constrained; its reforms were either crocodiles,” the PJD aimed to protect itself marginally effective or not carried out if from criticism and limit the government’s 29 they were deemed problematic by the accountability for any shortcomings. makhzen. Some reforms were primarily For a political party to survive in symbolic. For example, the reform of the Morocco, it needs to operate with the king’s National Body for Integrity, Prevention, consent. Though the PJD tried to build trust and the Fight Against Corruption in 2014 with the monarchy, there was no shortage did not grant the institution independence of attempts by the monarchy to undermine from the government or the right to pursue the PJD or subvert its internal cohesion. investigations.24 Similarly, the charter First, in order to weaken and contain the 30 introduced by the PJD in September 2013 to PJD, technocrats were appointed in 2011 reform the judiciary led to relatively minor to strategic government departments such changes related to the judges’ salaries as religious affairs, national defense, and and the modernization of courtrooms. the general secretariat, which drafts most Though the PJD tried of the country’s laws. Second, in 2013, the Transparency, accountability, and judicial to build trust with the 25 PJD was confronted with a crisis when the independence were not on the agenda. monarchy, there was Fighting corruption was one of the PJD’s nationalist, monarchist Istiqlal political party main policy stances; when the names decided to withdraw from the coalition no shortage of attempts of those who benefitted from state government. This situation—believed to be by the monarchy to transportation agreements were published, orchestrated by the king’s counselors—led to the nomination of more technocrats to undermine the PJD or no new legal measures were put in place subvert its internal as a result.26 Such agreements—granted important cabinet positions, thus allowing as royal favors to artists, notables, and the regime to maintain control over crucial cohesion. top officials—have largely served to create issue areas such as the ministries of the 31 a system of patronage and clientelism.27 interior and national education. Finally, Efforts to curb corruption and initiate despite its electoral victory in 2016, the reforms would have threatened the PJD had difficulty in forming a coalition makhzen’s interests. Typically, corruption government—a predicament also believed investigations of figures close to the to have been engineered by the king’s monarchy are quickly dismissed. When, coterie. After a months-long post-election for example, a former minister of justice, deadlock, the king dismissed Benkirane and Mustafa Ramid, opened a corruption nominated Saadeddine El Othmani as the investigation against a former minister of head of government. This was followed by finance, Salaheddine Mezouar, and the the formation of a coalition government current treasurer, Noureddine Bensouda, composed of actors that Benkirane had the case went nowhere; Benkirane was once rejected. El Othmani’s government quick to reassure the palace that “God has is weak and might be forced by coalition pardoned what is past,” and he rejected partners to accept governmental decisions criticisms from his own party.28 that would eventually undermine the 32 In its efforts to survive, the PJD reputation and the credibility of the party. became unable to carry through reform The PJD itself went through an episode policies, which compromised the party’s of internal polarization between those political power and threatened to weaken who refused to take part in the coalition 33 its popularity. However, by directing a government and those who accepted it.

3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.31.18

The latter were perceived to have been co-opted by the king and to be a threat to LOOKING AHEAD 34 the party’s independence. Cracks within To date, the PJD has managed to survive the party formed between Benkirane’s by appealing to voters beyond its core sympathizers and El Othmani’s supporters. constituency and transcending class, Indeed, in February 2018, a PJD member, geographical, and ideological divisions. Lahbib Choubani, filed an appeal against However, it is becoming increasingly clear an internal party regulation that bars that the party is “losing” the king’s support. regional party officials from simultaneously The self-described “party of reform” has holding the office of president of a regional, had to make major concessions on its 35 provincial, or communal council. The policies, even as its practical dealings with appeal, which stands to postpone PJD’s the monarchy create major problems within regional congresses, presumably serves the party. Some members, especially the to weaken Benkirane’s sympathizers and youth, fear that a cooperative approach will Some PJD members, thus prevent them from winning the party’s be ultimately detrimental to both the PJD’s 36 regional elections. Disunity within the credibility and the democratic process. especially the youth, PJD was on full display in parliament when fear that cooperation For now, the fissures within the party some PJD parliament members criticized the are less apparent and the PJD remains with the monarchy way El Othmani’s government is handling strong at the local level. However, the 37 will be ultimately unrest in the Rif. Because Benkirane’s palace’s attitude toward the PJD follows detrimental to the increasing popularity began to antagonize a long tradition of delegitimizing political the regime, the PJD made a practical choice party’s credibility and parties, which results not only in their to refuse to change the bylaws and elect marginalization but also in the citizens’ 38 the democratic process. him as secretary general for a third term. disenchantment with the election process. However, the way Benkirane was dismissed In this regard, the PJD is still facing a by his own party angered its popular base formidable threat to its popularity and long- and led to mass resignations among party term interests. 39 members who felt betrayed. The king’s speeches have also become more critical of the PJD and the coalition ENDNOTES government it leads. King Mohammed VI has expressed his disapproval of 1. Saloua Zerhouni, “‘Smartness’ without certain government actions related to vision: the Moroccan regime in the face educational system reforms and criticized of acquiescent elites and weak social the government for failing to address mobilization,” SWP Comments, German outstanding issues such as social inequality. Institute for International and Security “The current government should have Affairs, November 2014, https://www. capitalized on the positive experience swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ gained in the field of education and training” comments/2014C11_zhn.pdf. instead of implementing unsuccessful 2. Intissar Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist educational programs, he said in a Party Redefining Politics Under Pressure,” speech to the nation.40 The king has also Carnegie Endowment for International demanded that the disconnect between the Peace, December 28, 2017, http:// educational system and the demands of carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/28/ the job market be addressed; likewise, he morocco-s-islamist-party-redefining- has called for a resolution to address the politics-under-pressure-pub-75121. inconsistencies between the educational 3. Saloua Zerhouni, “Jeunes et language in primary and secondary levels participation politique au Maroc” [Youth (Arabic) and in higher education (foreign and political participation in Morocco], language). Such royal criticisms are Institute Royal des Etudes Strategique, June reminders that the monarchy remains the 2009, https://www.ires.ma/wp-content/ main political actor in Morocco. uploads/2015/11/jeunes_et_participation_ politique_au_maroc.pdf. 4 THE PARTY OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT’S PRAGMATIC POLITICS

4. Mohammed Masbah, “The Party Just 16. Masbah, “Morocco’s Slow Motion In (and Developing),” Carnegie Endowment Reform.” for International Peace, July 3, 2012, http:// 17. Mohammed Masbah, “His Majesty’s carnegieendowment.org/sada/48743. Islamists: The Moroccan Experience,” 5. Maâti Monjib, “The Islamists Ahead Carnegie Middle East Center, March 23, 2015, in Morocco,” Carnegie Endowment for http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/23/ International Peace, July 2014, http:// his-majesty-s-islamists-moroccan- carnegieendowment.org/sada/56279. experience-pub-59442. 6. Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist Party.” 18. Masbah, “The Party Just In.” 7. For more information on the 19. David Goeury, “Le pouvoir est- PJD’s economic policies, see 2012- il enfin dans les mains des villes?” [Is 2016 Governmental Report, August power finally in the hands of cities?], 2016, https://www.slideshare.net/ EspacesTemps.net, Travaux, December MustaphaKhalfi1/2012-2016-64610039. 5, 2014, http://www.espacestemps.net/ 8. “Renault investit 10 milliards de articles/le-pouvoir-est-il-enfin-dans-les- dirhams dans un nouvel écosystème au mains-des-villes/. Maroc” [Renault invests 10 billion dirhams in 20. Mohamed El-Ka, “Islamist Spring in a new ecosystem in Morocco], Telquel.ma, Morocco, or a Gattopardo’s Effect,” Notes April 2018, http://telquel.ma/2016/04/08/ internacionals CIDOB, no. 47, March 2012, renault-investit-10-milliards-dans-nouvel- https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/ ecosysteme-maroc_1491387. publication_series/notes_internacionals/ 9. For more information on PJD social n1_47/islamist_spring_in_morocco_or_a_ policies, see 2012-2016 Governmental Report, gattopardo_s_effect. August 2016, https://www.slideshare.net/ 21. Huffington Post Maroc, “4 clés MustaphaKhalfi1/2012-2016-64610039. pour comprendre la victoire du PJD” [4 10. “Le ministère de l’Intérieur interdit keys to understanding the victory of une caravane solidaire des jeunes du PJD the PJD], September 2015, http://www. à Azilal” [The Interior Ministry forbids a huffpostmaghreb.com/reda-zaireg/4- solidarity caravan by the PJD youth in Azilal], cles-pour-comprendre-la-victoire-du- Actu-maroc.com, January 2013, http:// pjd_b_8099454.html. www.actu-maroc.com/le-ministere-de- 22. Bernabé López García and Miguel linterieur-interdit-une-caravane-solidaire- Hernando de Larramendi, “The 2016 des-jeunes-du-pjd-a-azilal/. Parliamentary Elections in Morocco: Context 11. Mohammed Masbah, “Islamist and and Interpretations,” Elcano Royal Institute Secular Forces in Morocco Not a Zero-Sum Analyses, September 3, 2017. Game,” SWP Comment, German Institute for 23. Goeury, “Le pouvoir” [Is power]. International and Security, November 2014, 24. Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist Party.” https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 25. Ibid. contents/products/comments/2014C51_ 26. Zerhouni, “‘Smartness’ without msb.pdf. vision.” 12. Ibid. 27. Masbah, “Morocco’s Slow Motion.” 13. Mohammed Masbah, “Morocco’s Slow 28. Maâti Monjib, “All the King’s Motion Reform Process,” SWP Comment, Islamists,” Carnegie Endowment for German Institute for International and International Peace, September 2012, http:// Security, January 2014, http://www.swp- carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=49433. berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments- 29. Manjib, “The Islamists Ahead.” en/swp-aktuelle details/article/moroccos_ 30. The term “technocrat” refers to slow_motion_reform_process.html. decision-makers who are chosen to run 14. Mohammed Masbah, “The PJD’s government agencies because of their Balancing Act,” Carnegie Endowment for technical expertise rather than political International Peace, May 2013, http:// background. In the case of Morocco, loyalty carnegieendowment.org/sada/51671. to the king is also a requirement, as it is for 15. Ibid. all political actors. 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.31.18

31. Zerhouni, “‘Smartness’ without vision.” AUTHOR 32. Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist Party.” Amina Drhimeur, Ph.D., is an associate 33. Ibid. fellow at the Center for Applied Research 34. Ibid. in Partnership with the Orient in Bonn, 35. “La guerre des clans bat a nouveau This issue brief is part Germany. She is currently finishing her son plein au sein du PJD” [Clan war in full Ph.D. in Mohammed V University in Rabat, of a two-year research swing within the PJD], Le360.ma, February Morocco. Drhimeur’s research explores project on pluralism in 22, 2018, http://fr.le360.ma/politique/ democratization process and power the Middle East after la-guerre-des-clans-bat-a-nouveau-son- reconfigurations mainly in South America and plein-au-sein-du-pjd-157163. the Arab uprisings. North Africa. She received her M.A. degree 36. Ibid. from l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon. The project is generously 37. Youssef Lakhdar, “Al-Othmani supported by a grant yuwajih aghlabiyya barlimaniyya from the Carnegie mutasaddi’a bi-sabab barlimaniyyi al-masbah” [Othmani faces a brittle Corporation of New York. parliamentary majority because of the parliamentarians of the “lamp” party], Hespress, July 26, 2017, http://www. hespress.com/politique/359124.html. 38. Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist Party.” 39. Ibid. 40. “HM the King delivers speech to nation on occasion of 60th anniversary of revolution of king and people,” Agence See more issue briefs at: Marocaine de Presse, August 20, 2013, www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs http://www.mapnews.ma/en/activites- royales/hm-king-delivers-speech-nation- This publication was written by a occasion-60th-anniversary-revolution- researcher (or researchers) who king-and-peopl. participated in a Baker Institute project. Wherever feasible, this research is reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

© 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

Cover image credit: Getty

Cite as: Drhimeur, Amina. 2018. The Party of Justice and Development’s Pragmatic Politics. Issue brief no. 05.31.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.

6