The Party of Justice and Development's Pragmatic Politics

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The Party of Justice and Development's Pragmatic Politics ISSUE BRIEF 05.31.18 The Party of Justice and Development’s Pragmatic Politics Amina Drhimeur, Ph.D., Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), Bonn, Germany In response to anti-government protests initiate democratic reforms. However, did that swept across the Middle East and pragmatic politics grant the party leeway North Africa during the Arab uprisings, to implement such reforms? I argue that King Mohammed VI of Morocco announced such politics constrained the PJD and failed constitutional reforms in 2011 with a view to protect it from moves to weaken and to expand the powers of the country’s fragment the party. parliament and to grant the judiciary greater independence. Against this background of change, the Justice and Development Party PRAGMATIC POLITICS AND PARTY (PJD) rose as a major political party and SURVIVAL secured two successive electoral victories, in In order to survive in a highly constrained 2011 and 2016. The new constitution of 2011, political context, the PJD recognized the however, maintained the king’s executive necessity of gaining the monarchy’s trust. powers over strategic issues and preserved The party thus prioritized improved relations his religious and political prerogatives. The with the palace over confrontation. The PJD, king is “the commander of the faithful” and which had once called for a “democratic the head of the ministerial council, and has struggle,” began calling for “an effective the right to dissolve the parliament.1 Another partnership” to build a democracy.4 To this In order to survive in constraint in this context is Morocco’s highly end, it endorsed the king’s decisions and fragmented multi-party system, which a highly constrained showed clear support for the monarchy’s makes it difficult for powerful parties to political context, the political and religious roles.5 In his speeches, gain ground or become dominant. While former party leader Abdelilah Benkirane PJD recognized the Morocco’s party system preserves the king’s often positioned himself as the servant of necessity of gaining the role as the main political actor, it also serves the king and never openly challenged him.6 to fragment and weaken the political elite.2 monarchy’s trust. The By doing so, the party intended to win and Compounding the issue, elections have long party thus prioritized maintain the king’s support, and to survive. been characterized by low voter turnout, Survival also required the party’s ability improved relations reflecting Moroccans’ political disinterest to strengthen its popular base and appeal with the palace over and mistrust of politicians.3 to heterogeneous constituencies. Thus, the In this highly constrained political confrontation. PJD employed a pragmatic approach that environment, how did the PJD survive combined neoliberal economic policies and to win two elections? I argue that the social services. In its economic program, PJD applied pragmatic politics—first, to the party launched major construction maintain the king’s support, and second, to projects, engaged in privatization reforms, appeal to heterogeneous constituencies— and favored public-private partnerships for in order to remain standing. When the provision of public services. The PJD also campaigning in 2011, the PJD promised to RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.31.18 sought to reduce taxes for large companies For example, former party leader Abdelilah and to provide various tax credits and Benkirane is credited with creating a other incentives to small and medium-size new type of politics for the PJD based businesses.7 In addition, foreign enterprises on a simple, populist approach, which were encouraged to invest in Morocco.8 made him extremely popular. Benkirane In regard to social policies, the PJD also favored open, direct channels of aimed to support the most vulnerable communication with citizens by using Moroccans through cash transfers. Widows monthly parliamentary meetings to and divorced mothers were offered financial reassure them that the party was doing help. Poor families also received cash its best to fight corruption and implement assistance on the condition that they sent reforms.14 In another grassroots outreach The PJD’s politics their children to school. More scholarships measure, PJD members of the parliament were made available for students. The organized the “al-Misbah caravan” in 2013. constrained the party PJD also replaced Morocco’s system of In the years since, the caravan has travelled and failed to protect it subsidies with direct cash transfers to across the country and held meetings with from moves to weaken the poor. In addition, the party worked to local communities to share the party’s and fragment it. lower prescription drug prices and provided experiences and the obstacles it faces.15 a health insurance program to the most In the 2011 elections, the PJD principally needy through a system called RAMED, prevailed in large cities, as its core or Regime d’Assistance Médicale pour constituency was primarily composed of the les Économiquement Démunis (Medical urban, educated middle class—engineers, Assistance Plan for the Economically doctors, professors, and lawyers.16 Disadvantaged).9 Finally, party youth However, the PJD’s neoliberal economic groups often organized humanitarian aid policies helped the party to expand its campaigns for those living in rural and electoral base and gain the support of mountainous areas. These campaigns wealthy business owners as well.17 The provided help in the form of clothing and latter, who believed the PJD’s economic also offered educational and extracurricular liberalization plans would make the activities for children.10 Moroccan market more competitive, agreed The combination of neoliberal policies to finance the party’s social policies.18 Such and improved social services proceeded social programs consolidated the party’s In its efforts to survive, in tandem with the PJD’s de-emphasis of support among the poor and helped to the PJD became unable religious discourse and the adoption of portray the PJD as a “people’s party.”19 modern political terminology that primarily In addition, by downplaying its religious to carry through referenced human rights and democracy. and moral discourse, the PJD appealed reform policies, which During the party’s seventh national party to more secularists and technocrats.20 compromised its conference in July 2012, for instance, the The party’s humanitarian aid caravans political power and PJD defended the idea that religion should appealed to voters in rural areas who threatened to weaken function only as a guiding principle to were disappointed with the lack of social politics and included “freedom of belief” in policies from other parties.21 The strategy its popularity. the party program.11 The PJD also endorsed to develop a connection with voters, which a United Nations resolution on religious helped the party to maintain high approval freedom, marking a shift to a discourse ratings,22 projected an image of the PJD as based on policy rather than morality.12 a party that understood the people’s needs, In order to better connect with voters, and appealed to urban and rural voters the PJD implemented a communication disillusioned with other political parties.23 strategy that highlighted the personal The 2016 election results validated PJD’s qualities of party members and utilized approach, as evidenced by its higher vote populist speeches. PJD party members totals (from 22% to 27% of the vote) and were particularly keen on emphasizing seat shares (from 107 to 125) compared to their moral values and how little their the 2011 elections. new positions have changed them.13 2 THE PARTY OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT’S PRAGMATIC POLITICS highly critical discourse toward the palace’s THE LIMITATIONS OF PRAGMATIC coterie of elites and their manipulation of POLITICS politics, Benkirane sought to maintain the Although the PJD managed to increase its party’s popularity by reassuring the people popularity in its first term in government, that the PJD was doing its best to implement the party’s decision to not challenge reforms. Calling the economic and political the monarchy’s powers left the party actors close to the palace “ghosts and constrained; its reforms were either crocodiles,” the PJD aimed to protect itself marginally effective or not carried out if from criticism and limit the government’s 29 they were deemed problematic by the accountability for any shortcomings. makhzen. Some reforms were primarily For a political party to survive in symbolic. For example, the reform of the Morocco, it needs to operate with the king’s National Body for Integrity, Prevention, consent. Though the PJD tried to build trust and the Fight Against Corruption in 2014 with the monarchy, there was no shortage did not grant the institution independence of attempts by the monarchy to undermine from the government or the right to pursue the PJD or subvert its internal cohesion. investigations.24 Similarly, the charter First, in order to weaken and contain the 30 introduced by the PJD in September 2013 to PJD, technocrats were appointed in 2011 reform the judiciary led to relatively minor to strategic government departments such changes related to the judges’ salaries as religious affairs, national defense, and and the modernization of courtrooms. the general secretariat, which drafts most Though the PJD tried of the country’s laws. Second, in 2013, the Transparency, accountability, and
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