The Party of Justice and Development's Pragmatic Politics

ISSUE BRIEF 05.31.18 The Party of Justice and Development’s Pragmatic Politics

Amina Drhimeur, Ph.D., Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO), Bonn, Germany

In response to anti-government protests initiate democratic reforms. However, did that swept across the Middle East and pragmatic politics grant the party leeway North Africa during the Arab uprisings, to implement such reforms? I argue that King Mohammed VI of Morocco announced such politics constrained the PJD and failed constitutional reforms in 2011 with a view to protect it from moves to weaken and to expand the powers of the country’s fragment the party. parliament and to grant the judiciary greater independence. Against this background of change, the Justice and Development Party PRAGMATIC POLITICS AND PARTY (PJD) rose as a major political party and SURVIVAL secured two successive electoral victories, in In order to survive in a highly constrained 2011 and 2016. The new constitution of 2011, political context, the PJD recognized the however, maintained the king’s executive necessity of gaining the monarchy’s trust. powers over strategic issues and preserved The party thus prioritized improved relations his religious and political prerogatives. The with the palace over confrontation. The PJD, king is “the commander of the faithful” and which had once called for a “democratic the head of the ministerial council, and has struggle,” began calling for “an effective the right to dissolve the parliament.1 Another partnership” to build a democracy.4 To this In order to survive in constraint in this context is Morocco’s highly end, it endorsed the king’s decisions and fragmented multi-party system, which a highly constrained showed clear support for the monarchy’s makes it difficult for powerful parties to political context, the political and religious roles.5 In his speeches, gain ground or become dominant. While former party leader Abdelilah Benkirane PJD recognized the Morocco’s party system preserves the king’s often positioned himself as the servant of necessity of gaining the role as the main political actor, it also serves the king and never openly challenged him.6 to fragment and weaken the political elite.2 monarchy’s trust. The By doing so, the party intended to win and Compounding the issue, elections have long party thus prioritized maintain the king’s support, and to survive. been characterized by low voter turnout, Survival also required the party’s ability improved relations reflecting Moroccans’ political disinterest to strengthen its popular base and appeal with the palace over and mistrust of politicians.3 to heterogeneous constituencies. Thus, the In this highly constrained political confrontation. PJD employed a pragmatic approach that environment, how did the PJD survive combined neoliberal economic policies and to win two elections? I argue that the social services. In its economic program, PJD applied pragmatic politics—first, to the party launched major construction maintain the king’s support, and second, to projects, engaged in privatization reforms, appeal to heterogeneous constituencies— and favored public-private partnerships for in order to remain standing. When the provision of public services. The PJD also campaigning in 2011, the PJD promised to RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.31.18

sought to reduce taxes for large companies For example, former party leader Abdelilah and to provide various tax credits and Benkirane is credited with creating a other incentives to small and medium-size new type of politics for the PJD based businesses.7 In addition, foreign enterprises on a simple, populist approach, which were encouraged to invest in Morocco.8 made him extremely popular. Benkirane In regard to social policies, the PJD also favored open, direct channels of aimed to support the most vulnerable communication with citizens by using Moroccans through cash transfers. Widows monthly parliamentary meetings to and divorced mothers were offered financial reassure them that the party was doing help. Poor families also received cash its best to fight corruption and implement assistance on the condition that they sent reforms.14 In another grassroots outreach The PJD’s politics their children to school. More scholarships measure, PJD members of the parliament were made available for students. The organized the “al-Misbah caravan” in 2013. constrained the party PJD also replaced Morocco’s system of In the years since, the caravan has travelled and failed to protect it subsidies with direct cash transfers to across the country and held meetings with from moves to weaken the poor. In addition, the party worked to local communities to share the party’s and fragment it. lower prescription drug prices and provided experiences and the obstacles it faces.15 a health insurance program to the most In the 2011 elections, the PJD principally needy through a system called RAMED, prevailed in large cities, as its core or Regime d’Assistance Médicale pour constituency was primarily composed of the les Économiquement Démunis (Medical urban, educated middle class—engineers, Assistance Plan for the Economically doctors, professors, and lawyers.16 Disadvantaged).9 Finally, party youth However, the PJD’s neoliberal economic groups often organized humanitarian aid policies helped the party to expand its campaigns for those living in rural and electoral base and gain the support of mountainous areas. These campaigns wealthy business owners as well.17 The provided help in the form of clothing and latter, who believed the PJD’s economic also offered educational and extracurricular liberalization plans would make the activities for children.10 Moroccan market more competitive, agreed The combination of neoliberal policies to finance the party’s social policies.18 Such and improved social services proceeded social programs consolidated the party’s In its efforts to survive, in tandem with the PJD’s de-emphasis of support among the poor and helped to the PJD became unable religious discourse and the adoption of portray the PJD as a “people’s party.”19 modern political terminology that primarily In addition, by downplaying its religious to carry through referenced human rights and democracy. and moral discourse, the PJD appealed reform policies, which During the party’s seventh national party to more secularists and technocrats.20 compromised its conference in July 2012, for instance, the The party’s humanitarian aid caravans political power and PJD defended the idea that religion should appealed to voters in rural areas who threatened to weaken function only as a guiding principle to were disappointed with the lack of social politics and included “freedom of belief” in policies from other parties.21 The strategy its popularity. the party program.11 The PJD also endorsed to develop a connection with voters, which a United Nations resolution on religious helped the party to maintain high approval freedom, marking a shift to a discourse ratings,22 projected an image of the PJD as based on policy rather than morality.12 a party that understood the people’s needs, In order to better connect with voters, and appealed to urban and rural voters the PJD implemented a communication disillusioned with other political parties.23 strategy that highlighted the personal The 2016 election results validated PJD’s qualities of party members and utilized approach, as evidenced by its higher vote populist speeches. PJD party members totals (from 22% to 27% of the vote) and were particularly keen on emphasizing seat shares (from 107 to 125) compared to their moral values and how little their the 2011 elections. new positions have changed them.13

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highly critical discourse toward the palace’s THE LIMITATIONS OF PRAGMATIC coterie of elites and their manipulation of POLITICS politics, Benkirane sought to maintain the Although the PJD managed to increase its party’s popularity by reassuring the people popularity in its first term in government, that the PJD was doing its best to implement the party’s decision to not challenge reforms. Calling the economic and political the monarchy’s powers left the party actors close to the palace “ghosts and constrained; its reforms were either crocodiles,” the PJD aimed to protect itself marginally effective or not carried out if from criticism and limit the government’s 29 they were deemed problematic by the accountability for any shortcomings. makhzen. Some reforms were primarily For a political party to survive in symbolic. For example, the reform of the Morocco, it needs to operate with the king’s National Body for Integrity, Prevention, consent. Though the PJD tried to build trust and the Fight Against Corruption in 2014 with the monarchy, there was no shortage did not grant the institution independence of attempts by the monarchy to undermine from the government or the right to pursue the PJD or subvert its internal cohesion. investigations.24 Similarly, the charter First, in order to weaken and contain the 30 introduced by the PJD in September 2013 to PJD, technocrats were appointed in 2011 reform the judiciary led to relatively minor to strategic government departments such changes related to the judges’ salaries as religious affairs, national defense, and and the modernization of courtrooms. the general secretariat, which drafts most Though the PJD tried of the country’s laws. Second, in 2013, the Transparency, accountability, and judicial to build trust with the 25 PJD was confronted with a crisis when the independence were not on the agenda. monarchy, there was Fighting corruption was one of the PJD’s nationalist, monarchist Istiqlal political party main policy stances; when the names decided to withdraw from the coalition no shortage of attempts of those who benefitted from state government. This situation—believed to be by the monarchy to transportation agreements were published, orchestrated by the king’s counselors—led to the nomination of more technocrats to undermine the PJD or no new legal measures were put in place subvert its internal as a result.26 Such agreements—granted important cabinet positions, thus allowing as royal favors to artists, notables, and the regime to maintain control over crucial cohesion. top officials—have largely served to create issue areas such as the ministries of the 31 a system of patronage and clientelism.27 interior and national education. Finally, Efforts to curb corruption and initiate despite its electoral victory in 2016, the reforms would have threatened the PJD had difficulty in forming a coalition makhzen’s interests. Typically, corruption government—a predicament also believed investigations of figures close to the to have been engineered by the king’s monarchy are quickly dismissed. When, coterie. After a months-long post-election for example, a former minister of justice, deadlock, the king dismissed Benkirane and Mustafa Ramid, opened a corruption nominated Saadeddine El Othmani as the investigation against a former minister of head of government. This was followed by finance, Salaheddine Mezouar, and the the formation of a coalition government current treasurer, Noureddine Bensouda, composed of actors that Benkirane had the case went nowhere; Benkirane was once rejected. El Othmani’s government quick to reassure the palace that “God has is weak and might be forced by coalition pardoned what is past,” and he rejected partners to accept governmental decisions criticisms from his own party.28 that would eventually undermine the 32 In its efforts to survive, the PJD reputation and the credibility of the party. became unable to carry through reform The PJD itself went through an episode policies, which compromised the party’s of internal polarization between those political power and threatened to weaken who refused to take part in the coalition 33 its popularity. However, by directing a government and those who accepted it.

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The latter were perceived to have been co-opted by the king and to be a threat to LOOKING AHEAD 34 the party’s independence. Cracks within To date, the PJD has managed to survive the party formed between Benkirane’s by appealing to voters beyond its core sympathizers and El Othmani’s supporters. constituency and transcending class, Indeed, in February 2018, a PJD member, geographical, and ideological divisions. Lahbib Choubani, filed an appeal against However, it is becoming increasingly clear an internal party regulation that bars that the party is “losing” the king’s support. regional party officials from simultaneously The self-described “party of reform” has holding the office of president of a regional, had to make major concessions on its 35 provincial, or communal council. The policies, even as its practical dealings with appeal, which stands to postpone PJD’s the monarchy create major problems within regional congresses, presumably serves the party. Some members, especially the to weaken Benkirane’s sympathizers and youth, fear that a cooperative approach will Some PJD members, thus prevent them from winning the party’s be ultimately detrimental to both the PJD’s 36 regional elections. Disunity within the credibility and the democratic process. especially the youth, PJD was on full display in parliament when fear that cooperation For now, the fissures within the party some PJD parliament members criticized the are less apparent and the PJD remains with the monarchy way El Othmani’s government is handling strong at the local level. However, the 37 will be ultimately unrest in the Rif. Because Benkirane’s palace’s attitude toward the PJD follows detrimental to the increasing popularity began to antagonize a long tradition of delegitimizing political the regime, the PJD made a practical choice party’s credibility and parties, which results not only in their to refuse to change the bylaws and elect marginalization but also in the citizens’ 38 the democratic process. him as secretary general for a third term. disenchantment with the election process. However, the way Benkirane was dismissed In this regard, the PJD is still facing a by his own party angered its popular base formidable threat to its popularity and long- and led to mass resignations among party term interests. 39 members who felt betrayed. The king’s speeches have also become more critical of the PJD and the coalition ENDNOTES government it leads. King Mohammed VI has expressed his disapproval of 1. Saloua Zerhouni, “‘Smartness’ without certain government actions related to vision: the Moroccan regime in the face educational system reforms and criticized of acquiescent elites and weak social the government for failing to address mobilization,” SWP Comments, German outstanding issues such as social inequality. Institute for International and Security “The current government should have Affairs, November 2014, https://www. capitalized on the positive experience swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ gained in the field of education and training” comments/2014C11_zhn.pdf. instead of implementing unsuccessful 2. Intissar Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist educational programs, he said in a Party Redefining Politics Under Pressure,” speech to the nation.40 The king has also Carnegie Endowment for International demanded that the disconnect between the Peace, December 28, 2017, http:// educational system and the demands of carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/28/ the job market be addressed; likewise, he morocco-s-islamist-party-redefining- has called for a resolution to address the politics-under-pressure-pub-75121. inconsistencies between the educational 3. Saloua Zerhouni, “Jeunes et language in primary and secondary levels participation politique au Maroc” [Youth (Arabic) and in higher education (foreign and political participation in Morocco], language). Such royal criticisms are Institute Royal des Etudes Strategique, June reminders that the monarchy remains the 2009, https://www.ires.ma/wp-content/ main political actor in Morocco. uploads/2015/11/jeunes_et_participation_ politique_au_maroc.pdf. 4 THE PARTY OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT’S PRAGMATIC POLITICS

4. Mohammed Masbah, “The Party Just 16. Masbah, “Morocco’s Slow Motion In (and Developing),” Carnegie Endowment Reform.” for International Peace, July 3, 2012, http:// 17. Mohammed Masbah, “His Majesty’s carnegieendowment.org/sada/48743. Islamists: The Moroccan Experience,” 5. Maâti Monjib, “The Islamists Ahead Carnegie Middle East Center, March 23, 2015, in Morocco,” Carnegie Endowment for http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/23/ International Peace, July 2014, http:// his-majesty-s-islamists-moroccan- carnegieendowment.org/sada/56279. experience-pub-59442. 6. Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist Party.” 18. Masbah, “The Party Just In.” 7. For more information on the 19. David Goeury, “Le pouvoir est- PJD’s economic policies, see 2012- il enfin dans les mains des villes?” [Is 2016 Governmental Report, August power finally in the hands of cities?], 2016, https://www.slideshare.net/ EspacesTemps.net, Travaux, December MustaphaKhalfi1/2012-2016-64610039. 5, 2014, http://www.espacestemps.net/ 8. “Renault investit 10 milliards de articles/le-pouvoir-est-il-enfin-dans-les- dirhams dans un nouvel écosystème au mains-des-villes/. Maroc” [Renault invests 10 billion dirhams in 20. Mohamed El-Ka, “Islamist Spring in a new ecosystem in Morocco], Telquel.ma, Morocco, or a Gattopardo’s Effect,” Notes April 2018, http://telquel.ma/2016/04/08/ internacionals CIDOB, no. 47, March 2012, renault-investit-10-milliards-dans-nouvel- https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/ ecosysteme-maroc_1491387. publication_series/notes_internacionals/ 9. For more information on PJD social n1_47/islamist_spring_in_morocco_or_a_ policies, see 2012-2016 Governmental Report, gattopardo_s_effect. August 2016, https://www.slideshare.net/ 21. Huffington Post Maroc, “4 clés MustaphaKhalfi1/2012-2016-64610039. pour comprendre la victoire du PJD” [4 10. “Le ministère de l’Intérieur interdit keys to understanding the victory of une caravane solidaire des jeunes du PJD the PJD], September 2015, http://www. à Azilal” [The Interior Ministry forbids a huffpostmaghreb.com/reda-zaireg/4- solidarity caravan by the PJD youth in Azilal], cles-pour-comprendre-la-victoire-du- Actu-maroc.com, January 2013, http:// pjd_b_8099454.html. www.actu-maroc.com/le-ministere-de- 22. Bernabé López García and Miguel linterieur-interdit-une-caravane-solidaire- Hernando de Larramendi, “The 2016 des-jeunes-du-pjd-a-azilal/. Parliamentary Elections in Morocco: Context 11. Mohammed Masbah, “Islamist and and Interpretations,” Elcano Royal Institute Secular Forces in Morocco Not a Zero-Sum Analyses, September 3, 2017. Game,” SWP Comment, German Institute for 23. Goeury, “Le pouvoir” [Is power]. International and Security, November 2014, 24. Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist Party.” https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 25. Ibid. contents/products/comments/2014C51_ 26. Zerhouni, “‘Smartness’ without msb.pdf. vision.” 12. Ibid. 27. Masbah, “Morocco’s Slow Motion.” 13. Mohammed Masbah, “Morocco’s Slow 28. Maâti Monjib, “All the King’s Motion Reform Process,” SWP Comment, Islamists,” Carnegie Endowment for German Institute for International and International Peace, September 2012, http:// Security, January 2014, http://www.swp- carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=49433. berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments- 29. Manjib, “The Islamists Ahead.” en/swp-aktuelle details/article/moroccos_ 30. The term “technocrat” refers to slow_motion_reform_process.html. decision-makers who are chosen to run 14. Mohammed Masbah, “The PJD’s government agencies because of their Balancing Act,” Carnegie Endowment for technical expertise rather than political International Peace, May 2013, http:// background. In the case of Morocco, loyalty carnegieendowment.org/sada/51671. to the king is also a requirement, as it is for 15. Ibid. all political actors. 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.31.18

31. Zerhouni, “‘Smartness’ without vision.” AUTHOR 32. Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist Party.” Amina Drhimeur, Ph.D., is an associate 33. Ibid. fellow at the Center for Applied Research 34. Ibid. in Partnership with the Orient in Bonn, 35. “La guerre des clans bat a nouveau This issue brief is part Germany. She is currently finishing her son plein au sein du PJD” [Clan war in full Ph.D. in Mohammed V University in Rabat, of a two-year research swing within the PJD], Le360.ma, February Morocco. Drhimeur’s research explores project on pluralism in 22, 2018, http://fr.le360.ma/politique/ democratization process and power the Middle East after la-guerre-des-clans-bat-a-nouveau-son- reconfigurations mainly in South America and plein-au-sein-du-pjd-157163. the Arab uprisings. North Africa. She received her M.A. degree 36. Ibid. from l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon. The project is generously 37. Youssef Lakhdar, “Al-Othmani supported by a grant yuwajih aghlabiyya barlimaniyya from the Carnegie mutasaddi’a bi-sabab barlimaniyyi al-masbah” [Othmani faces a brittle Corporation of New York. parliamentary majority because of the parliamentarians of the “lamp” party], Hespress, July 26, 2017, http://www. hespress.com/politique/359124.html. 38. Fakir, “Morocco’s Islamist Party.” 39. Ibid. 40. “HM the King delivers speech to nation on occasion of 60th anniversary of revolution of king and people,” Agence See more issue briefs at: Marocaine de Presse, August 20, 2013, www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs http://www.mapnews.ma/en/activites- royales/hm-king-delivers-speech-nation- This publication was written by a occasion-60th-anniversary-revolution- researcher (or researchers) who king-and-peopl. participated in a Baker Institute project. Wherever feasible, this research is reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

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Cite as: Drhimeur, Amina. 2018. The Party of Justice and Development’s Pragmatic Politics. Issue brief no. 05.31.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.