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SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DE ECONOMIA Y APOYO A LA EMPRESA

MINISTERIO DIRECCION GENERAL ANALISIS MACROECONOMICO DE ECONOMÍA Y Y ECONOMÍA INTERNACIONAL COMPETITIVIDAD SUBDIRECCION GENERAL DE ECONOMIA INTERNACIONAL

CUADERNO DE DOCUMENTACION

Número 94

ANEXO XII

Alvaro Espina Vocal Asesor 24 de Enero de 2012

ENTRE EL 11 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2011 Y EL 8 DE ENERO DE 2012

BACKGROUND PAPERS:*

1. Islamists in Egypt back timing of military Handover, The New York Times by David D Kirkpatrick…11 2. Arab League to send more inspectors to monitor events in Syria, by Ian Black... 14 3. Catar se erige en el mediador omnipresente en el mundo musulmán, Ángeles Espinosa... 16 4. La Liga Árabe mantiene sin cambios su misión en Siria pese a las críticas, Enric González… 18 5. Watching Elephants Fly, by Thomas L. Friedman… 20 6. In figures: islamists are the unchallengeable winners of the vote, Almasryalyoum by Egypt Independent… 22 7. Siria, sin salida, El País Editorial…24 8. Zomor: Sadat’s assassination preamble to revolution, Almasryalyoum by Egypt Independent…25 9. Arabs may call on United Nations to help in Syria, Almasryalyoum by Reuters…26 10. Why Islamism Is Winning, John M. Owen IV… 28 11. La UE estrecha el cerco sobre Hungría, El País de Ricardo Martínez de Rituerto…30 12. Un peligro para toda Europa, El País de Paolo Flores…33 13. El nuevo aentado en Damasco arroja más sombras sobre el régimen, El País de Enric González…35 14. Una sospechosa brecha de seguridad, Análisis El País de Angeles Espinosa…37 15. Un atentado en Damasco causa decenas de víctimas, El País de Agencias…38 16. Latest Egypt vote brings Islamists closer to win, Reuters by Tom Perry…40 17. Detenido el ex jefe del Estado Mayor turco acusado de golpismo, El País de Agencias…42 18. Turkey arrests former military chief, Financial Times by Daniel Dombey…43 19. Turkey: military chiefs resign en masse, BBC News Europe …45 20. Eight militants, 4 soldiers killed in s Yemen clashes, Reuters …47 21. Una oleada de atentados en Bagdad reabre la herida sectaria en Irak, El País de Angeles Espinosa…48 2

22. Myanmar permite a la Nobel Suu Kyi presentarse a las elecciones, El País de José Reinoso…50 23. Internet Access Is Not a Human Right, Vinton G. Cerf… 52 24. Syria pipeline attacked amid ongoing killing, CNN …53 25. Welcome to another year of protest and instability, Financial Times by Jeffrey Sachs…55 26. Overtures to Egypt’s Islamists reverse longtime US Policy, The New York Times by David Kirkpatrick…56 27. Global unrest: how the revolution went viral, The Guardian by Paul Mason…60 28. Twenty reasons why it’s kicking off everywhere, Newsnight by Paul Mason…66 29. Israeli Foreign Ministry denies opening dialogue with Egypt's Islamists MENA... 70 30. Taliban leaders held at Guantánamo bay to be released in peace talks deal, The Guardian by Julian Borger…71 31. Hope meets hate in the new Libya, Spiegel On Line by Alexander Smoltczk…74 32. El rey de Marruecos VI nombra al primer Gobierno presidido por un islamista, El País de Agencias…81 33. Libya begins plan to elect assembly, http:// internacional.el país.com by David d Kirkpatrick…82 34. Contra Orbán, pero desde dentro, AFP de Heti Vilaggazdasag…83 35. Brotherhood’s, quandary, Almasryalyoum by Khalil Al Anani…86 36. Allies for democracy?, Or not?, Almasryalyoum by Mohamed Gabr…88 37. German think tank chief to be questioned in Cairo, Spiegel On Line…90 38. Los islamistas de Argelia se miran en Egipto y Túnez, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…92 39. Libyan militia captures Gaddafi loyalists over bomb plot, The Guardian by Reuters…94 40. La represión en Siria provoca 5.862 muertes en 2011, según la oposición, El Mundo de Efe…95 41. Actualiza1-Grupos oposición Siria firman acuerdo futuro, Reuters de Erika Solomon…96 42. Un comité árabe pide retirar a los observadores de Siria, Reuters España…98 43. Y el 15-M desbordó fronteras, El País.com de Joseba Elola…100 44. Intifada, no primavera, El País.com de Enric González …103 3

45. This revolution isn’t being televised, The New York Times by Jon B Alterman…107 46. Iran’s rhetoric sets diplomacy on edge, Financial Times by James Blitz…109 47. Turquía: El Gran Ganador De 2011, Ashraf Ghani… 111 48. Our age of mounting indignation, Financial Times by Gideon Rachman…114 49. Egypt: a religious revival, Financial Times by Roula Khalaf…101 50. An act of courage that launched a revolution, The Washington Post by Liz Sly…121 51. Protsters in Syria emboldened by Arab league presence, The Washington Post by Alice Fordham…126 52. Egyptian military gambles by raiding pro-democracy groups, The Washington Post by Leila Fadel…128 53. US touts Saudi Arabia fighter jet deal as a foreign policy, security and economic boon, The Washington Post by Joby Warrick…130 54. Egyptian security forces raid offices of US other democracy groups, The Washington Post by Leila Fadel…131 55. Mohamed VI echa un pulso al islamismo, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…134 56. La misión de los observadores en Siria naufraga en medio de la represión, El País de Enric González…137 57. De hombre de Bashir en Darfur a jefe de los observadores de la Liga Arabe en Siria, El País de Mokhtar Atitar…139 58. A Mission of Amateurs, Spiegen On Line by Yassin Musharbash…140 59. The world’s worst human rights observer, FP by David Kanner…142 60. Arab league needs to tell the truth about Syria, The Washington Post by Editorial…145 61. Chief arab monitor alrms Syrian opposition, Financial Times by Borzoy Daragahi…146 62. Syria: human rights groups challenge leadership of Arab league mission, The Guardian by Julian Borger…148 63. Egyptian army officer’s diary of military life in a revolution, The Guardian by Jack Shenker…150 64. Kursd in Turkey: arrests and violence threaten to radicalize a generation, The Guardian by Constanze Letsch…153 65. Silenced Kurdish storytellers sing again, The Guardian by Constanze Letsch…156

66. Yemenis, on strike, demand that their managers be fired, The New York Times by Associted Press…157 67. Look east for answers to Arab democracy, Financial Times by Ramachandra Guha…159 68. Academic and Profeessional Book, Cambridge by David Lewis…145 69. Syrian opposition politician attacked in Germany, Spiegel On Line…161 70. Les observateurs de la ligue arabe jugent la situation rassurante a Homs, Le Monde.fr de AFP…163 71. Human rights watch accuses Syrian authorities of hiding detainees, Almasryalyoum by AP…165 72. Virginity tests on Egypt protesters are illegal, says judge, The Guardian by Riazat Butt…166 73. Arab league monitors visit Homs, The Guardian by Julian Borger…169 74. Looking to consolidate its influence, brotherhood takes to the media, Almasryalyoum by Noha El Hennawy…171 75. Is Morocco really ready for a mega mall?, The New York Times by The Associated Press…160 76. Arab monitors finish visit to Syria’s homs, Aljazeera.net …178 77. Crowd behavior: United they stand, Financial Times by Clive Cookson…181 78. Life after the Arab, The Guardian by Nesrine Malik…172 79. Yemeni leader’s request for US visa still in flux, The Washington Post by Sudarsan Raghavan…189 80. Path is cleared for Yemeni leader to get care in US, The New York Times by Mark Landler…192 81. US considers Saleh’s travel request, Financial Times by Reuters…194 82. US weighing travel request for Yemen’s president, http://www.ft.com by Julie Pace…195 83. A generation at last in ferment, Financial Times by Roula Khalaf…197 84. El régimen sirio bombardea Homs antes de la llegada de la Liga Arabe, El País de Efe…201 85. Les marocains manifestent pour la démocratie, sans le sislamistes, Le Monde.fr by AFP…203 86. Le chef des observateurs de la Ligue arabe entame sa mission en Syrie, Le Monde.fr by Ashraf Shazly…204

87. Monday’s papers : political negotiations continue, report says chemical weapons used on protesters, Almasryalyoum by Noha El Hennawy…206 88. Siria, el zarpazo de un tigre herido, El País de Simon Sebag…193 89. Sunday’s papers: suggestions for the way forwards, Almasryalyoum by Heba Afify…213 90. US prepares for a curtailed relationship with Pakistan, The New York Times by Eric Schmitt…215 91. The army and the economy in Egypt, Almasryalyoum by Mohamed Al Khalsan…218 92. Freedon and justice party leads in second round of elections, Almasryalyoum by Al Masry …224 93. Islamist parties consolidate Egypt poll gains, Aljazeera.net by AFP…225 94. New Libyan leaders juggle demans, grievances, Reuters by Matt Robinson…226 95. Bombas en Damasco, El País Editorial…229 96. Analysis-Egypt may need up to $15 bln from IMF to avoid crunch, Reuters by Patrick Werr…230 97. Assad’s regime hunts people in homs, Spiegel On Line …233 98. La oposición siria a El Asad cierra filas, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…239 99. Un doble atentado suicida con coche bomba sacude el centro de Damasco, El País de Ana Garralda…241 100. Francia-Turquia el genocidio que molesta, Presseurop …242 101. Los egipcios vuelven a llenar Tahrir en protesta contra la represión militar, El País de Nuria Tesón…246 102. Tahir da la espalda a los islamistas, El País de Nuria Tesón…247 103. Detenidos en Hungría el líder socialista y nueve diputados opositores, El País de Agencias…249 104. Turkey’s war on journalists, Fp by Alia Malek…251 105. The big think behind the Arab spring, FP by Marc Lynch…255 106. Assad’s Lebanese invasion, FP by Mitchell Prothero…259 107. 6,200 killed in Syrian crackdown, claims rights group, The Guardian by Reuters…263 108. Attentats contre les services de sécurité à Damas, selon la télévision syrienne, le Monde.fr by Reuters…265 109. La Turquie accuse la France d’avoir commis un génocide en Algérie, Le Monde.fr by AFP…267 110. ¿Es negativa la primavera arabe para las mujeres?, FP de Isobel Coleman…270 6

111. How to control Libya missiles? buy them up, The New York Times by CJ Chivers…273 112. Reality of life after communism, Financial Times by Leyla Boulton…276 113. Turkey withdraws ambassador from France, Spiegel On Line…281 114. North Africa, one year later, Spiegel On Line by Alexander Smoltczyk…283 115. Revolution, military and pain, Almasryalyoum by Amar Ali Hassan…293 116. Brotherhood opposes handover of power before june, Almasryalyoum by Arabic Edition…294 117. Brotherhood looking to back presidential candidate, Almasryallyoum by Al Masry…295 118. Arab spring yields different outcomes in Bahrain, Egypt and Libya, The Washington Post by March Fisher…296 119. ¿Hacía dónde va Egipto?, El País de Ignacio Álvarez Ossorio…304 120. Sólo pensaba en protegerla, El País de Nuria Tesón…307 121. Foes of Hungary’s government fear domolition of democracy, The New York Times by Nicholas Kulish…309 122. Turkey and France step up row on genocide, The New York Times by Hugh Carnegy…312 123. What can prevent state failure? Almasryalyoum by Egypt Independent…314 124. La defensa europea, ¿en punto muerto?, FP de Francisco Ruiz…316 125. Journée meurtrière en Syrie, alors que Damas accepte la venue d’obsevateurs, Le Monde.fr de AFP…320 126. L’UE relance la cooperation militaire treize ans après Saint Malo, Le Monde.fr de Edouard Pflimlin…322 127. Clinton: Egypt’s treatment of women a disgrace, Almasryalyoum de AFP…324 128. EFE el Gobierno sirio firma el protocol para el envío de observadores árabes al país, Yahoo Noticias…325 129. La fragmentada oposición siria, FP de Hélène Michou…328 130. Brotherhood claims 37% of list-based seats in second phase of elections, Almasryalyoum by Reuters…332 131. Yet another form of resistance, Almasryalyoum de Steven Viney…333 132. Last convoy of American troops leaves Iraq, The New York Times by Tim Arango…335 7

133. Iraq, a war Obama didn’t shaped his foreign policy, The New York Times by Mark Landler…337 134. Blog: Bouazizi’s unfinished business, Almasryalyoum by Abdel Rahman…340 135. States of conflict: a final update, The New York Times by Ian Livingston…342 136. Hamas moves away from violence in deal with Palestinian authority, The Guardia by Phoebe Greenwood…344 137. Samir Raduan: el ejército vela por que el país no vaya a la barbarie, La Vanguardia.com de Alba Tobella…346 138. Un año de revueltas, El País.com…348 139. El Ejército egipcio mata a diez manifestantes en El Cairo, El País de Nuria Tesón…349 140. Los partidos religiosos triunfan en las urnas de Túnez, Marruecos, Egipto, La Vanguardia.com de Xavie Más de Xaxas…351 141. Repressing democracy, with American arms, The New York Times by Nicholas D Kristof…353 142. Help wanted, The New York Times by Thomas L Friedman…355 143. Clinton says women sidelined in Egypt transition, Almasryalyoum by AFP…357 144. Nos han robado la revolución, El País de Fethi Belaid…358 145. El secretario de Defensa de EEUU vaticina una larga transición en Libia, El País de Agencias…361 146. Abul Ela Mady resigns from advisory council, Almasryalyoum by Egypt Independent…362 147. Ne pas devier de la voie pacifique, La Presse.tn …364 148. Tunisians celebrate revolution anniversary, Almasryalyoum by AFP…366 149. In faut créer un groupe de contact sur la Syrie, Le Monde.fr …367 150. Is Egypt becoming another Pakistan ? Almasryalyoum by Maamoun Fendi…368 151. Le pouvoir russe, contesté à Moscou cherche à soigner son image à l’exterieur, le Monde.fr…369 152. Syrian troops fire at protesters after prayers, Almasryalyoum by AP…371 153. Journalists protest manipulation with hunger strike, Spiegel On Line…372 154. Without Iraq Arab spring may have broken out earlier, Spiegel OnLine…374

155. The Arab spring: one year after, Financial Times by Roula Khalaf…376 156. Activists get connected, Financial Times by Julia Ioffe…381 157. Who runs Russia?, Financial Times by Charles Clover…385 158. Self-assessment, Putin style, Financial Times by Andrey Kolesnikov…392 159. Russia’s migrants living on the edge, Financial Times by Isabel Gorst…394 160. Nuevo viernes de la ira en Siria, El País de Enric Gonzalez…400 161. Us, Egyptian military, Islamists engage in precarious dance, Almasryalyoum by Max Strasser…402 162. Russia proposes UN security council resolution on Syria, Almasryalyoum by AFP…405 163. Early second round results: FJP, nour party lists on top, Almasryalyoum by Al Masry Al Youm Staff…407 164. Protests erupt in Cairo over police brutality, Financial Times by Borzoy Daragahi…409 165. Volte-face russe sur le dossier syrien, le Monde.fr de Alexandra Geneste…410 166. The highs and lows of democracy, Financial Times by Philip Stephens…412 167. La Eurocámara veta el acuerdo de pesca con Marruecos por el Sáhara, El País de Ignacio Cembrero…415 168. Thursday’s papers: second round brings more bitterness for Wafd, Almasryalyoum by Sarah Carr…417 169. Advisory council to amend military law, scrap military trials for civilians, Almasryalyoum by Sara Nour…419 170. Will a united government lead Yemen to peace, Worldpress.org by Abubakr Al Shamahi…420 171. La frustration des déserteurs syriens en Turquie, Le Monde.fr by Ricardo Garcia Vilanova…407 172. Mahfouz materials withdrawn from Sotheby’s auction, Almasryalyoum by M Lynx Qualey…424 173. 29 morts en Syrie, Ban Ki-moon presse la communauté internationale d’agir, Le Monde.fr de AFP…426 174. Egpt faces a Hardline Islamic future, Spiegel On linbe By Daniel Steinvorth…428 175. German society is poisoned, Spiegel OnLine…431 176. Turkey’s stance will seal the fate of Syria’s Ceausescu, Financial Times by Michael Williams…436

177. Iran criticizes Turkey’s secular Islamn, Financial Times by Daniel Dombey…438 178. La UE, una cabeza de turco de moda de Military Estambul…440 179. Prejudice is more dangerous tan any racist terrorist, Spiegel OnLine …442 180. Moncef Marzouki: Hamadi Jebali sera chargé mercredi du poste de chef du gouvernement, La Presse.tn…445 181. Conscient de l’ampleur de la responsabilité, La Presse.tn …446 182. La Tunisie inventera son propre modèle, La Presse.tn …449 183. España y Marruecos: el inicio de una etapa incierta, FP de Antonio Navarro…451 184. Syria: 5000 dead inviolence, says UN human rights chief, The Guardian …455 185. Taking on Russia’s old guard with new technology, Spiegel On Line by Benjamin Bidder…456 186. Syrian opposition: deadline nears for Homs residents to stop dissent or face attack, CNN by Wire Staff…461 187. Kerry says Brotherhood elections success unsurprising, Almasryalyoum by Al Masry Al Youm Staff…463 188. El golpe revolucionario de Egipto, El País.com de Sholomo Ben Ami…465 189. Otoño en Paris, El País de Juan Goytisolo…467 190. Europa es cómplice de la represión yemeni, El País.com de Alberto D ‘Argenzio…469

*Índice elaborado por Francisca Simón Gil

World Middle East

January 8, 2012 Islamists in Egypt Back Timing of Military Handover By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK CAIRO — Poised to dominate the new Parliament here, Egypt’s largest Islamist group is putting off an expected confrontation with Egypt’s military rulers, keeping its distance from more radical Islamist parties and hoping that the United States will continue to support the country financially, a top leader of the group’s political arm said Sunday. In a wide-ranging interview, Essam el-Erian, a senior leader of the political party founded by the group, the Muslim Brotherhood, said the party had decided to support keeping the caretaker prime minister and cabinet appointed by the ruling military council in office for the next six months. Mr. Erian and other party leaders had previously suggested that they might act to have the Parliament challenge the council over control of the posts, perhaps as soon as later this month at the legislative body’s first meeting. But on Sunday, Mr. Erian said the party intended to let the caretakers stay on until the military’s preferred date for a handover of power, after the new Constitution is approved and a president is elected in June. To many Egyptians, the conciliatory tone evokes a frequent criticism that the Muslim Brotherhood has often been too willing to accommodate those in power. Many still talk about how it initially collaborated with the military-led government after Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 1952 coup — until Colonel Nasser turned on the Brotherhood and ordered a crackdown that jailed or executed many of its leaders. Mr. Erian made it clear in the interview, though, that the Muslim Brotherhood does not expect the military rulers to relinquish all power on their own. The party’s first step in ultimately removing them, he said, would be to defend the authority of the Parliament to choose, on its own, the members of a planned 100-person constitutional assembly. “Of course, the military wants to delay or disturb the composition of the assembly,” Mr. Erian said. But although the military has sought permanent powers and autonomy, Mr. Erian said, the public is against its continued rule in any form. “No people can support this now,” he said. Still, Mr. Erian said, governing Egypt for the time being would require “cooperation” between the military council, the caretaker government and the Parliament. Once a new president is elected and a new constitution is ratified, he said, “within three months we can have the military back in their camps safely.” He spoke as preliminary results of the third and final round of parliamentary voting confirmed the Brotherhood’s commanding lead. It captured nearly 40 percent of the votes cast for party lists of candidates, and some analysts said that once all runoffs 11

between individual candidates are decided, the Brotherhood could reach an outright majority of seats, though that appeared to be a long shot. Sitting in a parlor in the rundown headquarters of the Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, Mr. Erian expressed satisfaction that, after decades of mutual distrust, Washington appeared willing to accept a Brotherhood-led government in Egypt. Recently, he has met with American officials like Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, and Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, and he is soon to meet with Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns. Mr. Erian brushed aside recent reports by some Arab news outlets that the Brotherhood planned to reject American aid to Egypt, including the military aid of about $1.3 billion a year that Egypt has received since it signed the Camp David accord with Israel in 1978. “If the Americans are ready to support a democratic government in Egypt, this means a lot,” Mr. Erian said, adding that he hoped the United States would “continue the aid, but without political pressure.” The Brotherhood, he said, would honor the Camp David accord. “This is a commitment of the state, not a group or a party, and this we respect,” he said. But Mr. Erian also said that it was now time for Israel to understand the implications of the democratic openings of the Arab Spring — “the biggest change in the Arab world’s history” — which have given new voice to Arab anger at Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. And he reminded his American visitors that they were not the only ones to come calling. “Everyone wants to see us,” he said. “The Chinese were here, the Russians were here.” Mr. Erian acknowledged that the Brotherhood was surprised by the electoral strength shown by the ultraconservative Islamists known as Salafis, whose Al Nour party has received about 25 percent of the vote so far. Salafi leaders have espoused a variety of radical proposals about applying Saudi Arabia-style Islamic law in Egypt as soon as possible — cutting off the hands of thieves, stoning adulterers, banning alcohol, imposing conservative standards of decency on women’s dress, and censoring arts and entertainment. “It is clear that they are a political power,” Mr. Erian said. Still, he dismissed the fears of many Western observers, including some in Washington, that the need to compete with the Salafis would pull the Brotherhood to the right. “We hope that we can pull the Salafis toward us, and both of us will be pulled by the people’s needs,” Mr. Erian said. Indeed, he seemed to regard the Salafis as unsophisticated upstarts compared with the 80-year-old Brotherhood. He sought to explain the Salafis’ popularity the way some liberal analysts have tried to explain movements like the Brotherhood — in terms of social class. While the Egyptian elite was “divided,” Mr. Erian said, the Brotherhood — dominated by doctors, engineers and professionals preaching virtue and discipline — appealed to the upper-middle and lower-middle classes. The Salafis, he said,

appealed to “the lower classes, the marginalized, the people who are always out of the scene.” If the new government addressed the problem of poverty, Mr. Erian said, it could help diminish the Salafis’ appeal. But he also argued that taking part in the democratic political process would moderate Salafi ideology, just it had the Brotherhood’s. Mr. Erian himself was at the forefront of a generation of Brotherhood leaders who won election to Parliament during a period of Hosni Mubarak’s rule when Mr. Mubarak tolerated them as an opposition group; they grew accustomed to the norms of multiparty government, like building coalitions and appealing to moderate voters. “Inclusion in the political process was good for the Muslim Brotherhood, and we hope it will be good for the Salafis too,” Mr. Erian said. “When you meet the facts on the ground, you develop new tools; you learn.” Asked about the Brotherhood’s position on Salafi calls to ban the sale of alcohol or the wearing of bikinis, Mr. Erian replied: “Are you sure that is very important? We are keen to discuss the major issues.” The biggest of those issues, Mr. Erian said, is the form the new Constitution will take. “To have a democracy in the Arab world, to make compatibility between our Arab Islamic culture and democratic values, democratic principles,” he said, “this is our huge burden.” DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK interview, Essam el-Erian Islamists in Egypt Back Timing of Military Handover January 8, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/world/middleeast/muslim-brotherhood-backs- egyptian-militarys-transition-date.html?src=recg

Arab League to send more inspectors to monitor events in Syria As violence continues unabated on the ground, league appears wary of threatening Assad by turning to UN Ian Black in Damascus guardian.co.uk, Sunday 8 January 2012 19.24 GMT

General Nabil Alarabi and Qatari foreign minister Hamad bin Jasim discuss Syria at the Arab foreign ministers emergency meeting in Cairo. Photograph: Khaled Elfiqi/EPA Arab League monitors in Syria are to be reinforced in the coming days, after ministers were told on Sunday that the controversial mission needed more time and resources to observe escalating violence across the country. Qatar's prime minister, Hamed bin Jassem, who was chairing a meeting in Cairo to review progress, had warned earlier that the observers would simply be "wasting time" if their work was ineffective. But there was no agreement that the mission should seek UN "technical assistance" to improve its faltering performance. Any decision to withdraw the mission would require a full session of the league committee handling the Syrian crisis, which according to UN figures has seen the deaths of more than 5,000 people since it erupted in March. The league urged the Assad regime to improve co-operation, end violence and protect civilians. At the Cairo meeting, Mohammed al-Dabi, the Sudanese general leading the monitors, briefed the ministers behind closed doors. Dabi had said earlier that work was only just starting and that they needed more time. The initial one-month deployment is due to end on 19 January, when he is to issue a full report. Bin Jassem, seen as the league's leading anti-Assad hawk on Syria, declined to say what they would do if that report was critical of the regime. "We don't want to threaten anyone," he said at a press conference afterwards. Syrian officials had made clear that it 14

was in their government's interests to see the mission continue, not least because its failure would probably lead to a direct appeal to the UN security council and the internationalisation of the crisis they are desperate to avoid. Damascus did not object "in principle" to observers being given UN technical assistance, a spokesman for the Syrian foreign ministry said. Nabil al-Arabi, the league secretary-general, announced that he would be intensifying talks with the Syrian opposition, whose two biggest groups are divided over the way ahead. Anti-Assad activists have demanded the mission be withdrawn and the issue referred to the security council for punitive action against Syria. Others said it should given more resources to allow it to operate more independently. Monitors are said to be under close surveillance by the regime's ever-present security agencies. A Damascus man told the Guardian that he was conspicuously filmed by government agents as he was talking to a Sudanese monitor. On the ground, opposition sources reported another day of violence. An activist named only as Abu Ahmed described heavy fighting between security forces and defectors in Zabadani, near Damascus. "We are under siege," he told al-Jazeera TV by telephone. In total 20 dead were reported from Idlib, Homs and Deir al-Zor. Funerals were held for six military and police personnel who were killed by "armed terrorist groups" in the Damascus area and Homs, according to the Sana news agency. Officials said there were no new developments in the investigation into last Friday's apparent suicide bombing in the Midan area of the capital, in which 26 people were reportedly killed. Opponents of the government have voiced suspicions of its version of events, suggesting the attack may have been staged. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/08/arab-league-more-inspectors-syria/print

Internacional Catar se erige en el mediador omnipresente en el mundo musulmán El emirato llena el vacío diplomático dejado por Egipto y Arabia Saudí Ángeles Espinosa Dubái 8 ENE 2012 - 20:33 CET10

El emir Hamad bin Jalifa al Thani, en un acto deportivo en diciembre. / FADI AL ASSAAD (REUTERS) El anuncio la semana pasada de que los talibanes afganos van a abrir una oficina política en Catar dice tanto o más del creciente peso político de ese pequeño emirato como de las intenciones de la milicia. La diplomacia catarí lleva varios años mediando en algunos de los problemas más intratables de la zona (Sudán, Yemen, Líbano). Sin embargo, desde el estallido de la primavera árabe su alineamiento con las revueltas ha dado un nuevo énfasis a ese esfuerzo. Como el empeño en albergar grandes eventos deportivos, su política exterior busca sin duda prestigio internacional, pero es sobre todo la estrategia de supervivencia en un entorno regional difícil de un país limitado por su demografía, aunque dotado de ingentes recursos naturales. Con 11.500 kilómetros cuadrados y una población autóctona que apenas alcanza el cuarto de millón, Catar ha adquirido un peso internacional muy por encima de lo esperable. El entusiasmo que ha mostrado por las revueltas en Túnez, Egipto, Yemen, Libia o Siria contrasta con la prevención que los cambios han despertado en Arabia Saudí, y las aparentes simpatías que han despertado en Irán. El apoyo operacional catarí a la zona de exclusión aérea libia fue decisivo para legitimar la resolución de la ONU que firmó la sentencia de muerte del régimen de Muamar el Gadafi. Además, el emirato se ha se ha mostrado más rápido que Occidente en aceptar la realidad del ascenso islamista que ha traído el derribo de los dictadores. "Qatar destaca porque nadie más tiene una política activa en la región", interpreta Tarik Yousef, investigador principal de la Brookings Institution y director de Silatech, una iniciativa para crear empleo juvenil basada en Catar. En su opinión, Egipto y Arabia Saudí, los poderes tradicionales, se están quedando al margen, el primero absorto en sus propios problemas y el segundo, falto de reflejos. Relación con las potencias Yousef admite que también pesa que el emirato "tiene buenas relaciones con las potencias que cuentan, es percibido como un interlocutor justo y tiene los recursos financieros necesarios". De hecho, algunos observadores han tachado sus esfuerzos de 16

"diplomacia de chequera". Disponer de las terceras reservas mundiales de gas ayuda, pero no basta. Todos los analistas consultados destacan la implicación personal del emir y del primer ministro tanto para evitar que Líbano se precipitara en una nueva guerra civil en 2008 como en recabar apoyos para la oposición libia la pasada primavera. Sin embargo, no todo el mundo comparte la idea de que exista un vacío, y la insistencia de Catar por participar en algunas crisis ha molestado a sus vecinos. Tal fue el caso de Egipto al saber de su implicación en Sudán, un país que consideraba dentro de su esfera de influencia, y de Arabia Saudí poco después a raíz de su intento de ayudar al Gobierno yemení a cerrar la crisis con los rebeldes del clan Huthi (chiíes). Ahora, la anunciada apertura de una oficina talibán en Doha vuelve a dejar de lado a ese reino que fue el principal financiador de la milicia afgana. Mehran Kamrava, que dirige el Centro de Estudios Internacionales y Regionales de la Universidad de Georgetown en Catar, considera que la principal motivación del emirato "es una estrategia de supervivencia de un Estado pequeño en un entorno difícil, lo que exige la participación activa con el resto del mundo". La supervivencia buscaría en última instancia la seguridad de la familia gobernante, los Al Thani, una monarquía absoluta que como el resto de las de la región aprendió la lección de la invasión iraquí de Kuwait en agosto de 1990. Ese objetivo explicaría también alguna de las contradicciones que los críticos achacan a la diplomacia catarí, como que no haya mostrado en el caso de Bahréin la misma simpatía que con el resto de las revueltas. Intereses nacionales “La política exterior de Catar se mueve por el interés nacional", explica Kamrava en un email. En Siria, como antes en Libia, los gobernantes cataríes habrían llegado a la conclusión de que su líder está acabado y que el derramamiento de sangre no conviene para la estabilidad regional. En Bahréin, por el contrario, han estimado "que los Al Jalifa no van a hacer concesiones a las reformas porque Arabia Saudí no lo permitiría y en consecuencia cualquier esfuerzo en apoyo de los opositores al régimen sería inútil". Algunos observadores han querido ver un factor religioso en esa actitud. Los Al Thani de Catar son suníes como los Al Jalifa de Bahréin, mientras que el grueso de quienes piden reformas en esa isla-Estado son chiíes. Sin embargo, esa consideración sectaria no ha impedido que el emirato mantenga buenas relaciones con el régimen chií de Irán y haya chocado con la monarquía suní de los Al Saud, de quien hasta hace un par de décadas se le consideraba vasallo. Del mismo modo, sus gobernantes han sido capaces de mantener la presencia en su territorio del Mando Central (CENTCOM) y una base área de EE UU sin ser tachados de lacayos de la superpotencia como otros aliados de la zona. Oportunistas para unos y realistas para otros, han logrado así cultivar una imagen de neutralidad que hoy en día constituye la mejor baza de su política exterior. Sin embargo, a medida que su actividad diplomática vaya situando a Catar en el centro de la escena, la necesidad de tomar posiciones hará más difícil conservarla. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/08/actualidad/1326049348_288616.html

Internacional EL CONFLICTO DE SIRIA La Liga Árabe mantiene sin cambios su misión en Siria pese a las críticas La organización descarta pedir ayuda a la ONU para reforzar el trabajo de los observadores Al menos 47 personas han muerto durante el fin de semana, según la oposición El nuevo atentado en Damasco arroja más sombras sobre el régimen Una sospechosa brecha de seguridad “Los matones del régimen te persiguen también en el extranjero” Enric González Jerusalén 8 ENE 2012 - 11:44 CET319

Protestas contra el régimen sirio, el viernes en Idlib. / REUTERS La Liga Árabe acordó el domingo mantener sin cambios su misión de observadores en Siria, pese a las críticas recibidas en sus primeros diez días de actuación. Los ministros de la organización, reunidos en El Cairo, descartaron por el momento una propuesta de Catar consistente en pedir a la ONU que aportara a la misión algunos técnicos. La Liga Árabe se limitó a pedir al Gobierno de Bachar el Asad y a los “grupos armados” de la oposición que cesen de inmediato la violencia. El jefe de la misión, el polémico general sudanés Mohamed Dabi, acusado de haber vulnerado los derechos humanos en su propio país, presentó ante la Liga Árabe un primer informe en el que señaló que el trabajo de los observadores estaba solo en sus inicios y hacía falta más tiempo para formarse una idea sobre lo que ocurría en Siria. Antes de acudir a El Cairo, el general Dabi declaró en una entrevista al dominical británico The Observer que la misión podría durar bastantes meses y que el Gobierno sirio estaba cooperando. El objetivo de los observadores en Siria consiste en determinar si Bachar el Asad cumple o no el plan de pacificación acordado con la Liga Árabe, basado en unos cuantos puntos esenciales: retirada de las tropas a sus cuarteles, fin de la represión contra los manifestantes, liberación de los presos políticos y apertura de un proceso de

diálogo con la oposición. Hasta ahora, lo único que ha hecho El Asad ha sido liberar a menos de 600 de entre los 14.000 detenidos desde el inicio de la revuelta. Violencia El primer ministro de Catar, Haman bin Jasem al-Zani, afirmó el viernes que “si la violencia no se detiene, da igual mantener la misión o no”. “La misión hace que de alguna parte formemos [la Liga Árabe] parte de lo que está ocurriendo en Siria, y yo no quiero participar en eso”, añadió. La violencia no se ha interrumpido en ningún momento. Tras el atentado registrado en Damasco el viernes, que mató a 26 personas y que el Gobierno atribuye a Al Qaeda, ese mismo día, según la oposición, murieron 35 personas durante las protestas contra El Asad. El sábado las víctimas mortales fueron 27 y ayer domingo, 20, incluyendo a 11 soldados, siempre según la oposición. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/08/actualidad/1326019442_74364 6.html

January 7, 2012 Watching Elephants Fly By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Cairo SOMEDAY I’d love to create a journalism course based on covering the uprising in Egypt, now approaching its first anniversary. Lesson No. 1 would be the following: Whenever you see elephants flying, shut up and take notes. The Egyptian uprising is the equivalent of elephants flying. No one predicted it, and no one had seen this before. If you didn’t see it coming, what makes you think you know where it’s going? That’s why the smartest thing now is to just shut up and take notes. If you do, the first thing you’ll write is that the Islamist parties — the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Al Nour Party — just crushed the secular liberals, who actually sparked the rebellion here, in the free Egyptian parliamentary elections, winning some 65 percent of the seats. To not be worried about the theocratic, antipluralistic, anti-women’s-rights, xenophobic strands in these Islamist parties is to be recklessly naïve. But to assume that the Islamists will not be impacted, or moderated, by the responsibilities of power, by the contending new power centers here and by the priority of the public for jobs and clean government is to miss the dynamism of Egyptian politics today. Come with me to Cairo’s dirt-poor Shubra el-Khema neighborhood and the dilapidated Omar Abdel Aziz School, where I watched the last round of voting on Wednesday at a women-only voting center. We were guided by Amr Hassan, a 22-year-old commerce student from the ’hood — a secular youth, who fought to topple the Hosni Mubarak regime in Tahrir Square last year. Here is what was so striking: virtually all the women we interviewed after the voting — all of whom were veiled, some with only slits for their eyes — said that they had voted for either the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafists. But almost none said they had voted that way for religious reasons. Many said they voted for Islamists because they were neighbors, people they knew, while secular liberal candidates had never once visited. Some illiterate elderly women confided that they could not read the ballot and just voted where their kids told them to. But practically all of them said they had voted for the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafist candidates because they expected them to deliver better, more honest government — not more mosques or liquor bans. Here are some quotes from Egyptian women on why they voted Islamist: “I love the Muslim Brotherhood; they are the only honest ones. ... I want good education and clean air to breathe. ... We need proper medical care. ... I want my kids to be properly educated. They can’t find any jobs. ... The Muslim Brotherhood is not just an Islamist party. It is going to help solve all the problems of the country. ... We have to get the youth working and to raise salaries. Education here is only getting worse. ... My biggest 20

fear is lack of security. We sit in our homes — afraid. You are afraid your son won’t be able to go back and forth to school without being kidnapped.” Meanwhile, when I asked our young guide Hassan, the revolutionary, whom he had voted for, he said that he wrote on his ballot “Down with the SCAF” — the acronym for the Egyptian military council now running the country. He spat out his disgust with the fact that while secular youth like him toppled Mubarak, the Islamist parties were winning the elections and the army generals — who abandoned Mubarak to save themselves — were still in power! And there you have Egypt today — a four-way power struggle between the army, the rising Islamist parties, the smaller liberal parties and the secular youth of Tahrir Square. All of them will have a say in how this story plays out. “We want to see a new Egyptian government with new thoughts,” said Hassan. “I am ready to go back into Tahrir Square if I have to.” Indeed, everyone feels more empowered now. The army has its guns and now runs the country; both the Islamists and the liberals have won electoral mandates; and the secular youth from Tahrir feel empowered by the street — by their now proven ability to mobilize and to fight whenever they see things going awry. Even the silent majority here, called “The Party of the Couch,” feels more empowered, having just voted in high numbers in an election where the votes actually got counted. My favorite election story was told to me by an international observer, who asked not to be identified. His voting station had just closed and as the polling workers were loading up the box filled with votes onto a bus to be taken to a central counting station, an Egyptian woman, who had just voted, ran over to them and shouted: “Please, never leave that box alone. This is our future. Go and make sure they put it in the right place.” That box and all the hopes stuffed into it by so many average Egyptians is surely necessary for a new beginning here. But it is not sufficient. The country needs a leader — there is still a huge vacuum at the top — who can take all those votes, all those hopes, and meld them into a strategy to create the jobs, schooling, justice and security that all Egyptians clearly crave. If that happens, those ballot boxes really will have delivered a different future for Egypt. Until then, I am just taking notes. Thomas L. Friedman Watching Elephants Fly January 7, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/friedman-watching-elephants- fly.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

Publishing Date: Sat, 07/01/2012 - 13:52

In figures: Islamists are the unchallengeable winners of the vote Author: Egypt Independent As in the first two phases of the parliamentary elections, Islamist forces have achieved a sweeping victory, winning 62.2 percent of the vote in the final phase, maintaining their lead in the overall contest. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood, said on its website that it garnered 35.2 percent of the party list vote when the final nine governorates went to the polls on Tuesday and Wednesday. The ultra-conservative Salafi Nour Party said it received 27 percent, coming second in most constituencies as before. The two parties chalked up 65 percent in the first two phases of Egypt's first general election since the February ouster of President Hosni Mubarak. Runoffs for seats being contested by individuals in the latest phase will be held on 10 and 11 January. Some 14 million voters in nine of Egypt's 27 governorates are to elect the remaining 150 members of parliament. Candidates from the formerly outlawed Jama'a al-Islamiya made their best performance in the elections, entering the runoff vote with four candidates: Adel Ebeid in Qena, and Mostafa Abdo, Ahmed Youssef and Haroun Hegazy in Minya. Assem Abdel Maguid, spokesperson of Jama'a al-Islamiya, said the group expects to win 13 seats after the runoffs. Islamists now look set to wield major influence over the shape of a new constitution, which is to be drafted by a 100-strong body that the new legislature will pick, though the Brotherhood has promised that Egyptians of all persuasions will have a say. "We are happy with the results and are also happy that there are 15 or 16 parties in the parliament so far," Essam al-Erian, deputy head of the FJP, told Reuters. In Egypt’s complex electoral system, two-thirds of the 498 people’s assembly seats will be elected by proportional representation, using lists drawn up by parties or alliances. Seats will be allocated proportionally based on a party's showing in each of 46 districts. The remaining third, or 166 seats, in the lower house are open to individuals, who may or may not have party affiliations — two in each of 83 districts. The unofficial final tallies for the third phase show that the FJP won only nine seats for individuals. They have 30 candidates competing in the runoffs, out of the total 88 candidates. The Nour Party is competing with 27 candidates, and the remaining 31 candidates are independent. Having won 39 seats through the proportional representation system of the final phase, the total seats won by the FJP (and its electoral allies) is around 213 so far. This figure will increase after the runoffs.

Nour Party came second, winning one individual seat in this phase in addition to 27 percent of the votes through the proportional representation system. So far the total number of seats for this party is 111 seats. The liberal Wafd Party, which came third, was far behind, gaining 14 seats through the proportional representation system in the final phase. According to a party statement, this brings its total to 37 seats. The Wafd Party comes third at the expense of the secular Egyptian Bloc, which has won fewer votes in this phase. Among the most notable winners in the third phase are Foud Badrawy, secretary general for the Wafd Party, and Yassin Tag al-Din, the party's assistant secretary. One of the surprising results of the final phase is the defeat of Abul Ela Mady, the head of the Wasat Party, who lost against the FJP’s list, led by Saad al-Katatny, which won by a large margin, followed by the Nour Party. Geographically, the Nour Party led the polls in Marsa Matruh and Wadi al-Gadid at the expense of the FJP, winning four of a total of six seats in Matruh. In Wadi al-Gadid, Nour won two seats, while the FJP took only one. Minya, which has a large Coptic community, was the biggest shock for secular forces as Islamists won nearly 70 percent of seats. Only two seats went to the secular Egyptian Bloc in the third phase. The secular Free Egyptian Party said it won 12 percent through the proportional representation system. The party believes that it has won at least 12 seats in the three phases. This makes the Egyptian Bloc the fourth largest party in the parliament. The Reform and Development Party, which has many former NDP members on its lists, said that it came fifth after winning 12 seats in the three phases. The Revolution Continues Coalition achieved its best performance in the elections, saying it won four seats in Daqahliya. The top six parties so far are (approximate numbers): FJP: 213 seats Nour Party: 111 seats Wafd Party: 37 seats Egyptian Block: 12 (or more) Reform and Development Party: 12 seats Jama'a al-Islamiya: 13 seats (as expected by their leaders) Note: Figures above are calculated by Egypt Independent staff. A press conference is due late today to show the final results of the third phase. However, it will take longer to name all the candidates who have won the two-thirds of the 498 people’s assembly seats through proportional representation. Publishing Date: Sat, 07/01/2012 - 13:52 Related material Protesters in Qena block railroad over 'fraudulent' elections results Vote from election's final round brings Islamists closer to win Source URL (retrieved on 07/01/2012 - 18:50): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/588971 23

Internacional EDITORIAL Siria, sin salida La irrupción del terrorismo tras las revueltas pacíficas debilita doblemente al régimen 7 ENE 2012 - 00:39 CET Un nuevo atentado suicida dejó ayer decenas de víctimas en pleno centro de Damasco. Es la segunda vez en dos semanas que la capital siria padece ataques de estas características, que el Gobierno de Bachar el Asad atribuye a los grupos islamistas que supuestamente dirigen las revueltas y la oposición al propio régimen. Con independencia de quiénes sean los autores, las matanzas solo añaden sufrimiento a un país que ha pagado con más de 5.000 muertos su deseo de poner fin a la dictadura hereditaria de la familia El Asad. Y aunque se trate de una reivindicación quimérica en una situación como la que vive Siria desde el inicio de las revueltas, la comunidad internacional no puede renunciar a la exigencia de que el Gobierno de Damasco investigue los hechos y ofrezca una versión más fundamentada que las vaguedades desgranadas hasta el momento. El Asad y su régimen tal vez imaginen que la irrupción brutal del terrorismo tras varios meses de revueltas pacíficas, aunque reprimidas a sangre y fuego, refuerzan su posición. Antes por el contrario, la debilita doblemente. Si tiene responsabilidad por acción u omisión en los atentados, porque habrá ahondado la fosa en la que yace desde hace mucho su legitimidad para seguir al frente de Siria; si no la tiene, porque su obstinación de mantenerse en el poder a cualquier precio estaría abonando el terreno para que Al Qaeda y sus franquicias puedan disimular su proyecto totalitario y sus métodos execrables detrás de una causa justa y con amplio apoyo popular. La misión de la Liga Árabe que debía comprobar la situación sobre el terreno en Siria para dar paso a una salida política ha sido un fiasco debido a la parcialidad y la condescendencia mostradas hacia el régimen de El Asad. La organización sale malparada y, con ella, la tímida esperanza de poner fin a varios meses de muerte y destrucción. Nada volverá a ser como antes de las revueltas, incluso si la oposición pacífica detuviese ahora las protestas. Bachar el Asad es un presidente estigmatizado y los Gobiernos que se avinieran a tratar con él ignorando lo que ha pasado pondrían de manifiesto lo espurio de sus intereses y su verdadera naturaleza. No hay signos de que la oposición pacífica vaya a ceder ni tampoco de que lo vaya a hacer el régimen sirio. La pregunta es cuánto tiempo seguirá paralizada la comunidad internacional. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/07/actualidad/1325893163_39216 1.html

Publishing Date: Sat, 07/01/2012 - 16:37

Zomor: Sadat's assassination 'preamble to revolution' Author: Egypt Independent The assassination of former President Anwar al-Sadat was a preamble to the 25 January revolution in Egypt, Tarek al-Zomor, a leading figure in the formerly outlawed Jama'a al-Islamiya, has said. Zomor said on Friday night that there were many reasons for the revolution, including the violation of people's dignity and enslaving them through the oppressive State Security Agency. Zomor was convicted in 1982, along with his cousin Aboud al-Zomor, for killing Sadat. In March, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ordered their release, among other political prisoners who had served 15 years or more of their jail terms. Zomor was speaking at a conference held in support of Jama'a al-Islamiya and Salafi- led Nour Party candidates in the third electoral constituency in Assuit, where a court ruled that elections should be re-conducted. He described the Upper Egyptian governorate of Assiut as a brave governorate that sacrificed a lot to confront the corrupt regime of former President Hosni Mubarak. Zomor argued that the martyrs are not only those who killed in Tahrir Square, “there are martyrs also who died in detention.” He continued his speech by saying that people revolted because the resources of the country were plundered, and because not only was Egyptian national security violated, but the national security of all Arab nations. “The state of law had been lost and freedoms were trampled upon by the Central Security Forces and Mubarak's men. A detainee could be acquitted by 60 courts and never be released,” he said. He added that the Mubarak regime defamed Egypt all over the world, and Egyptian detentions became a fertile material for western fiction about the most brutal prisons, because mercy or humanitarian ethics were never taken into account in dealing with Egyptian detainees. Related material Assiut voting normal despite reported violations Egypt’s military order two Sadat plotters freed

Source URL (retrieved on 07/01/2012 - 18:36): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/589341

Publishing Date: Sat, 07/01/2012 - 15:12

Arabs may call on United Nations to help in Syria Author: Reuters Arab foreign ministers meet on Sunday to discuss whether to ask the United Nations to help their mission in Syria, which has failed to end a 10-month crackdown on anti- government protests in which thousands have died. The proposal by Qatar is to invite UN technicians and human rights experts to help Arab monitors assess whether Syria is honouring a pledge to stop its crackdown, sources at the Arab League said. A source said it might request that UN staff helping the mission be Arabs. The foreign ministers, who will consider an initial report by the monitors, will also discuss measures to allow the mission to operate more independently of the Syrian authorities, media sources at the league said. The violence has continued since the monitors began working in Syria on 26 December, with scores of people reported killed. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani said Syria was not implementing the deal and monitors could not stay in Syria to "waste time". The Syrian army had not withdrawn from cities and there had been no end to the killing, he said. Sources at the Arab League said ministers were likely to reaffirm support for the monitors, resisting calls to end what Syrian pro-democracy campaigners say is a toothless mission that merely buys more time for President Bashar al-Assad to suppress his opponents. Syria said it was providing the monitors with all the facilities they needed. "What we are looking for is objectivity and professionalism," Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdesi said last week. No one should "rush to verdicts" on the mission's achievements, said the head of the monitoring operations room at the league's headquarters in Cairo, Adnan al-Khudeir. He said the commission overseeing the monitors had the league's full support. The United Nations says more than 5,000 people have been killed in the uprising against Assad. The Free Syrian Army, an armed opposition force composed mainly of army deserters, has joined the revolt. The Syrian government says "terrorists" have killed 2,000 members of the security forces during the uprising. Syria's interior minister said a suicide bomber killed 26 people in Damascus on Friday and vowed an "iron fist" response. Some in the opposition said the government had staged the attack to undermine the pro-democracy movement. The 22-member Arab League suspended Syria in November after months of silence over the crackdown. But some Arab leaders are uncomfortable about targeting one of their peers given their own restive populations, diplomats say. Syria has been a major regional player, allied with Iran and the Lebanese Shia Hezbollah group. 26

Western powers that want Assad to step down to allow for democratic reforms welcomed the league's tougher stance towards Syria. But Arab states have stressed their opposition to any foreign military intervention like that which helped topple Libya's Muammar Qadhafi last year. Qatar's Sheikh Hamad, who chairs the Arab League committee on Syria, said after meeting UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon last week that he was seeking technical aid from the world body. A UN spokesman said Sheikh Hamad and Ban discussed what practical measures the United Nations could use to help the observer mission, possibly training for league observers under the auspices of the UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights. One-month deadline The league has given the monitors one month to assess whether Assad has followed its plan to end the violence by withdrawing the military from Syrian towns and cities. More monitors with varied skills and experience are due in Syria in the coming week, taking the number to 150 who will deploy to all Syrian cities, according to the league. Assad's opponents said the monitors did not have enough access and were escorted by Syrian officials who were manipulating them and hiding prisoners in military facilities. League Secretary General Nabil al-Araby said this week there was still work to be done to honour the agreement between the league and Syria, which also stipulates the release of thousands of prisoners detained since the uprising began in March. Foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Oman, Sudan and Algeria or their representatives are due to attend Sunday's meeting in Cairo. This would give overwhelming weight to the committee's decisions because other league states tend to follow the lead of Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Syria bars most independent journalists from the country, making first-hand reporting impossible, but a BBC Arabic service reporter was allowed to accompany three Arab monitors to a town on the outskirts of Damascus. It was the first time foreign media were known to have been able to cover the activities of the monitors directly, although media access was a condition stipulated by the Arab League. The BBC said it had been able to film, unhindered by the security forces. Protesters and residents told the observers, all Algerian diplomats, of harsh treatment at the hands of the security forces. The observers then witnessed a demonstration in which the crowd demanded Assad's execution, the BBC said. Syrians protest against Assad in Amuda, 27 December Related material Interior minister: Suicide bomb kills 26 in Syria Arab League asks Hamas for help with Syria

Source URL (retrieved on 07/01/2012 - 15:45): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/589151

January 6, 2012 Why Islamism Is Winning By JOHN M. OWEN IV Charlottesville, Va. EGYPT’S final round of parliamentary elections won’t end until next week, but the outcome is becoming clear. The Muslim Brotherhood will most likely win half the lower house of Parliament, and more extreme Islamists will occupy a quarter. Secular parties will be left with just 25 percent of the seats. Islamism did not cause the Arab Spring. The region’s authoritarian governments had simply failed to deliver on their promises. Though Arab authoritarianism had a good run from the 1950s until the 1980s, economies eventually stagnated, debts mounted and growing, well-educated populations saw the prosperous egalitarian societies they had been promised receding over the horizon, aggrieving virtually everyone, secularists and Islamists alike. The last few weeks, however, have confirmed that a revolution’s consequences need not follow from its causes. Rather than bringing secular revolutionaries to power, the Arab Spring is producing flowers of a decidedly Islamist hue. More unsettling to many, Islamists are winning fairly: religious parties are placing first in free, open elections in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. So why are so many Arabs voting for parties that seem politically regressive to Westerners? The West’s own history furnishes an answer. From 1820 to 1850, Europe resembled today’s Arab world in two ways. Both regions experienced historic and seemingly contagious rebellions that swept from country to country. And in both cases, frustrated people in many nations with relatively little in common rallied around a single ideology — one not of their own making, but inherited from previous generations of radicals. In 19th-century Europe, that ideology was liberalism. It emerged in the late 18th century from the American, Dutch, Polish and especially French revolutions. Whereas the chief political divide in society had long been between monarchs and aristocrats, the revolutions drew a new line between the “old regime” of monarchy, nobility and church, and the new commercial classes and small landholders. For the latter group, it was the old regime that produced the predatory taxes, bankrupt treasuries, corruption, perpetual wars and other pathologies that dragged down their societies. The liberal solution was to extend rights and liberties beyond the aristocracy, which had inherited them from the Middle Ages. Suppressing liberalism became the chief aim of absolutist regimes in Austria, Russia and Prussia after they helped defeat France in 1815. Prince Klemens von Metternich, Austria’s powerful chancellor, claimed that “English principles” of liberty were foreign to the Continent. But networks of liberals — Italian carbonari, Freemasons, English Radicals — continued to operate underground, communicating across societies and providing a common language for dissent.

This helped lay the ideological groundwork for Spain’s liberal revolution in 1820. From there, revolts spread to Portugal, the Italian states of Naples and Piedmont, and Greece. News of the Spanish revolution even spurred the adoption of liberal constitutions in the nascent states of Gran Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru and Mexico. Despite their varied grievances, in each case liberalism served as a rallying point and political program on which the malcontents could agree. A decade later, in July 1830, a revolution toppled France’s conservative Bourbon monarchy. Insurrection spread to Belgium, Switzerland, a number of German and Italian states and Poland. Once again, a variety of complaints were distilled into the rejection of the old regime and the acceptance of liberalism. The revolutions of 1848 were more numerous and consequential but remarkably similar to the earlier ones. Rebels with little in common — factory workers in Paris, peasants in Ireland, artisans in Vienna — followed a script written in the 1790s that was rehearsed continuously in the ensuing years across the continent. Today, rural and urban Arabs with widely varying cultures and histories are showing that they share more than a deep frustration with despots and a demand for dignity. Most, whether moderate or radical, or living in a monarchy or a republic, share a common inherited language of dissent: Islamism. Political Islam, especially the strict version practiced by Salafists in Egypt, is thriving largely because it is tapping into ideological roots that were laid down long before the revolts began. Invented in the 1920s by the Muslim Brotherhood, kept alive by their many affiliates and offshoots, boosted by the failures of Nasserism and Baathism, allegedly bankrolled by Saudi and Qatari money, and inspired by the defiant example of revolutionary Iran, Islamism has for years provided a coherent narrative about what ails Muslim societies and where the cure lies. Far from rendering Islamism unnecessary, as some experts forecast, the Arab Spring has increased its credibility; Islamists, after all, have long condemned these corrupt regimes as destined to fail. Liberalism in 19th-century Europe, and Islamism in the Arab world today, are like channels dug by one generation of activists and kept open, sometimes quietly, by future ones. When the storms of revolution arrive, whether in Europe or the Middle East, the waters will find those channels. Islamism is winning out because it is the deepest and widest channel into which today’s Arab discontent can flow. John M. Owen IV, a professor of politics at the University of Virginia, is the author of “The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010.” John M. Owen Iv Why Islamism Is Winning January 6, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/opinion/why-islamism-is- winning.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=thab1

Internacional La UE estrecha el cerco sobre Hungría

Bruselas analiza sanciones contra el Gobierno de Viktor Orbán por su deriva autoritaria El distanciamiento complica para Budapest la ayuda financiera Ricardo Martínez de Rituerto / Silvia Blanco Bruselas / Madrid 5 ENE 2012 - 21:39 CET18

Manifestación contra la nueva Constitución húngara en Budapest. / FERENC ISZA (AFP) Hungría comienza a sentir el escozor de la presión internacional por su controvertida reforma constitucional, que ha llevado al forinto, la moneda nacional, a una depreciación récord con respecto al euro. Budapest ya ha hecho saber que acudirá a preparar la negociación sin condiciones con el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), pero la Comisión Europea, la otra mitad del equipo, no ha decidido aún cuando volverá a negociar. Si el Ejecutivo comunitario tiene dudas y preocupaciones con respecto a la legislación magiar, en el Parlamento Europeo cada vez más reclaman que se aplique a Hungría el artículo 7 de Tratado, el equivalente a una bomba nuclear política. El FMI y la Comisión suspendieron a mediados de diciembre sus negociaciones con Hungría para un plan de ayuda como protesta contra las enmiendas constitucionales que merman la independencia del banco central, cuyos responsables quedan sometidos a la disciplina del Gobierno y en un futuro serán amalgamados con los de la Bolsa. Además, la nueva legislación limita los poderes del Tribunal Supremo y abre nuevas restricciones a la libertad de información. La crisis económica húngara ya hizo que en 2008 el Gobierno del momento tuviera que recibir una ayuda del Fondo, pero el arrollador triunfo electoral en 2010 del conservador Fidesz llevó al nuevo primer ministro, Viktor Orbán, a prescindir de la última parte de

aquel paquete de socorro. Amparado en una mayoría parlamentaria de dos tercios, que le permite reformas constitucionales sin contar con la oposición, Orbán ha impuesto cuestionadas enmiendas a la Carta Magna mientras se deterioraba la economía. Obligado en 2012 a refinanciar unos 5.000 millones de euros y con necesidades adicionales de entre 15.000 y 20.000 millones, el distanciamiento del FMI y de la Comisión agrava el panorama. No solo el forinto está a un tipo de cambio récord (324 por euro y cayendo) sino que los bonos a diez años superan el 11%. “Tenemos un problema con esta legislación”, señala Olivier Bailly, el portavoz de la Comisión. El Ejecutivo comunitario debatirá el próximo miércoles el problema y si asociarse o no con el FMI en el plan socorro a Hungría. Según Bailly, la treintena de medidas legislativas propuestas por Orbán “son potencialmente incompatibles con el derecho comunitario”. José Manuel Durão Barroso, el presidente de la Comisión, ya escribió dos cartas en diciembre a Orbán expresando su inquietud con las informaciones recibidas, intervenciones secundadas por sus vicepresidentes Viviane Reding (Justicia), Olli Rehn (Asuntos Económicos) y por la comisaria Neelie Kroes (Sociedad de Información). Días antes, Orbán recibió una carta de la secretaria de Estado de EE UU, Hillary Clinton, en la que le expresa sus preocupaciones sobre la reforma legal, que son “significativas y fundadas”. Mientras la Comisión, que ha recibido hace unos días la traducción oficial del paquete normativo, espera los dictámenes de sus servicios jurídicos y hace saber que las respuestas pueden ir desde la apertura de un procedimiento a la imposición de sanciones económicas, el Parlamento Europeo cree ver en Orbán una reincidencia en la pulsión autoritaria —puesta ya de manifiesto hace un año con la ley mordaza a la prensa, modificada por exigencias de Bruselas— que requiere acciones inmediatas y contundentes. Guy Verhofstad, líder del grupo liberal, el tercero de la Eurocámara, ha sido el primero en recamar que Barroso y la presidencia danesa de turno de la Unión expliquen en el pleno qué piensan hacer con respecto a la “peligrosa erosión de los controles en la democracia” en Hungría. “Los tratados prevén, en el artículo 7, un procedimiento para tratar con tales situaciones”, recuerda el ex primer ministro belga. “Desgraciadamente ha llegado el momento de aplicarlo, para proteger la democracia y los derechos fundamentales en Hungría y en la UE”. El artículo 7 estipula que en caso de violación por un país de principios básicos de la UE, el Consejo (los Gobiernos de la Unión colegiadamente) podrán imponer sanciones que pueden llegar hasta la suspensión del derecho de voto del socio en cuestión en el Consejo. El procedimiento es largo, está blindado por mayorías muy exigentes y tiene pocas posibilidades de prosperar porque al eventual infractor se le ofrecen muchas posibilidades de rectificar. Aun así, el sólo hecho de hacer que se desencadene el mecanismo es un baldón político. Asfixiados por los impuestos y la crisis, los húngaros empiezan a desconfiar del partido del Gobierno, Fidesz, y la popularidad del primer ministro está en sus mínimos. El lunes, decenas de miles de personas se manifestaron en Budapest contra la nueva Constitución, en cuyo preámbulo se reconoce “el papel de la cristiandad en preservar la nación”. El descontento es claro. Como refleja el último informe del instituto sociológico Political Capital, “el número de indecisos ha subido radicalmente mientras 31

el partido del Gobierno ha perdido 1,5 millones de apoyos en comparación con los sondeos realizados después de las elecciones de 2010”. El ultraderechista Jobbik es el único partido que gana terreno, igualado en las encuestas a los socialistas, la segunda fuerza política.

Las leyes que han hecho saltar las alarmas Como admitió a EL PAÍS en diciembre el secretario de Estado de Comunicación, Zoltán Kovács, “el sistema está en construcción”. Estas son la reformas más cuestionadas: » Banco Central. El Gobierno ha aumentado el número de vicegobernadores y de consejeros del Banco, que serán nombrados por el Parlamento, con lo que queda en entredicho la independencia del organismo que fija la política monetaria en contra de lo previsto en el Tratado de la Unión. “Nadie puede interferir en los trabajos legislativos de Hungría ni indicar a los diputados electos qué tienen que aprobar y qué no”, zanjó Orbán poco antes de aprobar la ley. » Poder judicial. Ha visto recortada su autonomía y sus atribuciones. El Tribunal Constitucional ya no podrá pronunciarse sobre asuntos que tengan que ver con los Presupuestos y la Fiscalía tendrá la capacidad de elegir qué tribunal se ocupa de cada caso. También ha reducido de 70 a 62 años la edad de jubilación de los jueces, así que este año se retirarán unos 250, y los críticos ven en ello una purga. » Sistema electoral. Se reducen las circunscripciones de tal manera que, como informa Efe, si se aplicase de forma retroactiva, Fidesz, el partido del Gobierno, hubiera ganado las elecciones de 2002 y 2006, en las que vencieron socialistas y liberales. Además, a partir de ahora, las leyes orgánicas solo se podrán modificar con el apoyo de dos tercios de los diputados, de modo que cambiarlas o enmendarlas en el futuro será muy difícil. » Libertad de prensa. Aunque el Gobierno ya modificó cuatro artículos de esta ley por exigencia de Bruselas, la Comisión va a estudiar la situación de la libertad de expresión en Hungría. Dos periodistas de medios públicos han sido despedidos tras hacer una huelga de hambre para denunciar el control sobre la información. La última actuación del Consejo de Medios fue eliminar la licencia a Klubradio, la única emisora crítica. » Memoria histórica. Define al Partido Socialista como heredero del régimen comunista y anula la prescripción de los delitos bajo la dictadura. » Religión. Reconoce a solo 14 iglesias, entre ellas varias cristianas y la judía, de entre los 300 grupos religiosos del país. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/05/actualidad/1325795972_22 3093.html

Internacional TRIBUNA Un peligro para toda Europa Paolo Flores d'Arcais 6 ENE 2012 - 16:42 CET Europa cometió un gran error al no intervenir contra Berlusconi durante casi 20 años y, si no interviene contra Orban y sus políticas antidemocráticas, preparará su suicidio La Hungría democrática nos llama; la Europa institucional hace oídos sordos y da largas, llena de hipocresía. Sin embargo, aunque los Gobiernos europeos quieran perder el tiempo en burocracias y procedimientos paralizadores e irresponsables, es necesario que los ciudadanos europeos hagan de la cuestión de Hungría un problema suyo, una batalla suya. Una batalla que ya es inaplazable. El Gobierno de Viktor Orbán ha impuesto una nueva Constitución que pisotea los derechos democráticos mínimos que Europa considera vinculantes e irrenunciables para cualquier país que desee adherirse a la Comunidad. Se ha modificado la ley electoral a medida para facilitar al partido de Orbán futuras victorias, se ha amordazado a la prensa y la televisión, los magistrados están sometidos a la voluntad del Ejecutivo, el banco central ha perdido cualquier margen de autonomía, y el nacionalismo y el racismo se han convertido en el aglutinante popular de este auténtico fascismo postmoderno. Si la Hungría de Orban solicitase hoy la entrada en Europa, se encontraría con el rechazo Si la Hungría de Orbán solicitase hoy la entrada en Europa, se encontraría con el rechazo, porque no cumple los mínimos requisitos democráticos. Pero el artículo 7 del Tratado de Lisboa especifica que un país miembro de la Unión Europea debe perder su derecho de voto cuando viola esos requisitos. Por tanto, es necesario que el Parlamento de Estrasburgo, la Comisión de Bruselas y los Gobiernos europeos de forma individual se movilicen de inmediato para aplicar dicho artículo con una intransigencia absoluta. Cualquier tendencia a esperar, de dejarlo en manos de la diplomacia, de actuar “gradualmente”, serviría solo para animar al Gobierno de Orbán a seguir por la vía que de forma tan arrogante ha emprendido y que amenaza con el contagio antidemocrático de toda la comunidad política continental. Plegarse a la prepotencia de los poderes antidemocráticos, con la excusa del mal menor, es una tentación eterna de las clases dirigentes y privilegiadas. Un ejemplo de trágicos protagonistas aquejados de este síndrome de vileza (que se convierte en ley del silencio) estuvo en Múnich, en 1938, en los tibios demócratas Chamberlain y Daladier, que cedieron ante unos antidemócratas coherentes, Hitler y Mussolini. Si la Europa de Merkel, Cameron y Sarkozy cede hoy ante Orbán, si se limita a mirar hacia otro lado o a aprobar unas sanciones de fachada, estaría repitiendo, a escala reducida, la infamia del 38. Y por favor, que no citen a Marx, que, a propósito de Napoleón III, dijo que la historia se repetía siempre, la primera vez como tragedia y la segunda como farsa. A veces ocurre así, pero, a veces, la nueva tragedia, aunque en formato pequeño, es para quien la vive tan devastadora como la anterior. Con el agravante de que la Alemania de Hitler era una potencia militar y económica que equivalía, por sí sola, al resto de Europa, mientras que el Gobierno de Orban se ve obligado a pedir ayuda al Fondo Monetario Internacional con la gorra en la mano y, si se le encerrase en un cordón sanitario europeo eficaz, tendría que acabar yéndose (igual que hizo el amigo

Berlusconi). Es decir, la vileza de Merkel, Cameron y Sarkozy sería una vileza al cuadrado. Sería complicidad. No es causalidad que Orbán siempre haya señalado a Putin y Berlusconi como modelos, correspondiendo con ello a un ardiente apoyo por parte de ellos (Berlusconi declaró hace 10 años en Budapest: “Nuestros programas y nuestras políticas son idénticos, existe entre nosotros una sintonía extraordinaria”). Es una prueba de que la plaga del fascismo postmoderno, blando solo en apariencia, es una fuerza extendida y con un crecimiento amenazador, de la que Marine Le Pen y la derecha holandesa en la mayoría de Gobierno no son más que otras puntas de iceberg inquietantes. No es causalidad que Orbán siempre haya señalado a Putin y Berlusconi como modelos Si queremos evitar el contagio, es necesario que tratemos a los apestados como apestados. Europa cometió un gran error al no intervenir contra Berlusconi durante casi 20 años y, si no interviene contra Orbán, preparará su suicidio. Porque sancionar a Orbán, privarle del voto en las instituciones europeas, significa apoyar a la República húngara, a los ciudadanos demócratas húngaros, que salieron a las calles cantando el Himno a la Alegría de Schiller y Beethoven, ese himno adoptado por Europa como propio. Nuestro himno, si no queremos que Europa sea solo la de los mercaderes (con sus oídos sordos), los banqueros (con sus valores tóxicos construidos con bonus millonarios) y unos Gobiernos demócratas pero tibios (con su vileza y complicidad). Paolo Flores d'Arcais es filósofo y editor de la revista MicroMega. Traducción de María Luisa Rodríguez Tapia http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/06/actualidad/1325864538_62131 4.html

Internacional EL CONFLICTO DE SIRIA El nuevo atentado en Damasco arroja más sombras sobre el régimen Una explosión causa al menos 26 muertos y decenas de heridos en la capital siria Gobierno y rebeldes se culpan del ataque Una sospechosa brecha de seguridad “Los matones del régimen te persiguen también en el extranjero” Enric González, Jerusalén 6 ENE 2012 - 16:09 CET1224

Víctimas del atentado, en un hospital de Damasco. / REUTERS Un atentado en el centro de Damasco ha causado este viernes la muerte de decenas de personas, quizá 26, aunque resultaba difícil llegar a una cifra concreta por la fragmentación de los cadáveres, e hirió a 46. La explosión, que el Gobierno atribuyó a un terrorista suicida de Al Qaeda, se produjo en la plaza de Midan, en el centro histórico de la ciudad, junto a varias furgonetas policiales. Numerosos miembros de la oposición expresaron la sospecha de que el propio Gobierno pudiera estar detrás de la matanza, con el fin de justificar la represión de la revuelta. El atentado fue similar a los dos registrados el pasado 23 de diciembre, también en Damasco, con 44 muertos. El Gobierno de Bachar el Asad acusó de inmediato a Al Qaeda y el ministro del Interior, Ibrahim al-Shaar, uno de los responsables de la brutal represión contra las manifestaciones opositoras de los pasados nueve meses, prometió usar “un puño de hierro” para castigar a los responsables. Pero nadie aportó pruebas sobre la culpabilidad de Al Qaeda o de cualquier otra organización. El Gobierno trasladó a Midan a varios de los observadores enviados por la Liga Árabe, para que constataran que Siria se enfrentaba a ataques terroristas.

MÁS INFORMACIÓN La sociedad siria se fractura en la lucha contra el régimen de El Asad Intifada, no primavera Bombas en Damasco (Editorial del 24 de diciembre) Poco después se organizaron en la zona, siempre una de las más vigiladas por la policía, manifestaciones de apoyo a Bachar el Asad y de repulsa al terrorismo. Como cada viernes desde marzo, también hubo a la salida de las mezquitas grandes manifestaciones 35

de rechazo a El Asad en las principales ciudades del país. Los Comités de Coordinación Local que organizan las protestas contra el régimen dijeron que las fuerzas de seguridad mataron a otras 20 personas en distintos incidentes. Según el último recuento de la ONU, de hace ya semanas, las víctimas mortales en la revuelta superan las 5.000, sin contar los miembros del Ejército y de los cuerpos policiales muertos en emboscadas y tiroteos. Servicios secretos Portavoces de la oposición expresaron su sospecha de que tras el atentado del viernes y los del día 23 podrían estar los servicios secretos del régimen, y no Al Qaeda, porque ocurrieron en una zona de Damasco muy controlada por la policía y porque fueron utilizados rápidamente por el Gobierno para reforzar su tesis de que la revuelta no es pacífica, sino violenta y protagonizada por el terrorismo islámico. Los servicios secretos sirios y las fuerzas de seguridad son un nido de corrupción y de grupos semimafiosos, especialmente desde que en 2005 fueron retirados de Líbano centenares de agentes que hasta entonces hacían muy buenos negocios clandestinos en el país vecino. Pero cuesta creer en las teorías conspirativas de la oposición, aunque realmente los atentados refuercen las posiciones del Gobierno y puedan empujar a muchos ciudadanos a apoyar a El Asad por miedo a que su caída desemboque en una situación tan violenta como la de Irak. Algunos vecinos de Al Midan, citados por la oposición, se refirieron a una intensa presencia policial antes de la explosión y a algunos cortes de calles no habituales. Quienes respaldaban la teoría conspirativa indicaron también que difícilmente un grupo contrario al régimen elegiría un viernes, el día en que se celebran las mayores manifestaciones contra El Asad, para ensombrecerlo con un atentado. Y señalaron que habría resultado más lógico, de tratarse de un ataque contra el régimen, elegir una de las frecuentes manifestaciones oficialistas o un barrio habitado por altos funcionarios, en lugar de uno conservador e islamista como Madan. La crueldad del régimen sirio, y su experiencia en la organización de atentados con bomba en Líbano, están fuera de duda. La hipótesis de Al Qaeda En cualquier caso, también existían numerosos elementos que apuntaban a la culpabilidad de alguno de los grupos opositores, sin descontar la hipótesis de Al Qaeda. La oposición sufre crecientes divisiones y muestra signos de exasperación ante la resistencia del régimen, la falta de resultados del equipo de observadores enviados por la Liga Árabe y la negativa internacional a una intervención armada contra El Asad. El Ejército de la Siria Libre, compuesto por militares desertores y partidario de acabar con el régimen por la vía de la violencia, había advertido el jueves y de nuevo ayer, poco antes del atentado, que tenía preparadas “acciones importantes” porque “la fuerza es el único lenguaje que Bachar el Asad entiende”, aunque luego negó que hubiera participado de alguna forma en el atentado. Uno de los grandes problemas para comprender la dinámica de la revuelta en Siria, además de la ausencia de periodistas extranjeros, es la falta de credibilidad del Gobierno y de la oposición. El Asad goza aún de un apoyo mayoritario entre la población (el 55%, según un sondeo creíble del Instituto de Doha) y el rechazo a su figura no es, por tanto, tan masivo como afirman los portavoces opositores, pero sus ministros recurren con frecuencia a mentiras flagrantes: varios de los militares incluidos en la lista de víctimas de los atentados del 36

día 23 aparecieron después como víctimas de emboscadas en Daraa y Homs, lo que pone en cuestión el número real de muertos en aquellas acciones. Para respaldar sus denuncias contra la brutalidad del régimen, la oposición ha utilizado a su vez algunas imágenes trucadas y exagera habitualmente las cifras de muertos y heridos. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/06/actualidad/1325847605_54164 9.html ANÁLISIS Una sospechosa brecha de seguridad Si el régimen no tiene que ver con los atentados, debería castigar a los responsables del fallo policial que los ha permitido. Si no lo hace, seguirá planeando la duda sobre Damasco Ángeles Espinosa 6 ENE 2012 - 15:47 CET364 ¿Quién está detrás del atentado de Damasco? Los desertores que han formado el Ejército Libre de Siria (ELS) se han apresurado a distanciarse del ataque y acusan al régimen de Bachar el Asad. Las autoridades hablan de “terroristas” que tras el doble atentado del 23 de diciembre se asociaron con Al Qaeda. Sin observadores independientes sobre el terreno, resulta arriesgado tomar partido. Pero incluso en el mejor de los casos, los responsables salen mal parados. Para tratarse de un sistema policial, el control de la capital del país, blindada cada viernes para impedir la menor manifestación de descontento, se habría probado chapucero. “Condenamos el ataque. Nadie más que el régimen puede hacer algo así”, ha declarado a Al Jazeera el coronel Riad al Asaad, jefe del ELS. La oposición siria ha insistido en su carácter pacífico desde el principio de las protestas el pasado marzo. A finales de noviembre, el Consejo Nacional Sirio (CNS, que agrupa a la mayoría de los grupos disidentes) anunció un acuerdo con el ELS por el que este se comprometió a “no atacar al régimen y limitar su resistencia armada a acciones defensivas”. Es discutible hasta qué punto sus operaciones han cumplido ese espíritu, pero la matanza de decenas de civiles sólo podría acarrearle el rechazo popular. Para el régimen, por su parte, admitir que esos “terroristas pagados por potencias extranjeras” (como los medios oficiales describen a los insurgentes) tienen capacidad logística para montar atentados en el centro de Damasco, sería reconocer su relevancia. De ahí tal vez la referencia a Al Qaeda, demonio que también ha golpeado a Occidente y con cuya ideología salafista se trata de asociar a los opositores. Pero si esa afinidad existiera, ¿qué ganaría ese grupo golpeando precisamente un barrio donde se organizan protestas semanales? No es la primera vez que los servicios secretos sirios son acusados de orquestar un atentado en casa Durante mi visita a Siria el pasado noviembre, y ante la imposibilidad de acceder a los barrios periféricos de Harasta, Duma o Arbeen, los opositores me orientaron hacia el barrio de Midan. Allí, en las mezquitas Al Hasan, Salah y Al Rifaí, la plegaria del viernes sirve de punto de encuentro para los activistas que, religiosos o no, intentan manifestarse a la salida de la oración. Rara vez lo consiguen más de 30 segundos antes de ser detenidos.

El día que estuve presente, el despliegue de seguridad era impresionante. Un policía cada cinco metros, en especial bajo el puente que cruza la calle Midan a la altura de la mezquita Al Hasan, enfrente del lugar donde ha estallado el coche bomba. Por eso no me ha sorprendido que haya chocado con un minibús policial. Decenas de ellos aparcan allí. ¿Era ese el objetivo? En cualquier caso, no es la primera vez que los servicios secretos sirios son acusados de orquestar un atentado en casa. Ya sucedió en septiembre de 2006 cuando ante las amenazas de nuevas sanciones de EEUU, su embajada fue objeto de un tiroteo. También los ataques del año pasado contra varias legaciones diplomáticas de países críticos con el trato a los manifestantes, suscitaron sospechas. Si sus agentes no tienen nada que ver en los atentados, es de esperar que las autoridades castiguen a los responsables de la brecha de seguridad que los ha permitido. Mientras no ocurra, seguirá planeando la duda sobre ellos. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/06/actualidad/1325861238_09 1244.html

Internacional Un atentado en Damasco causa decenas de víctimas La televisión estatal siria ha atribuido a un terrorista suicida el atentado que ha sacudido el barrio de Al Midan en la capital siria. El ataque causa 10 muertos y 46 heridos La sociedad siria se fractura en la lucha contra el régimen de El Asad Intifada, no primavera Agencias Ammán / El Cairo 6 ENE 2012 - 12:33 CET2

Una captura del vídeo mostrado por la televisión estatal siria. / AFP Una fuerte explosión ha sacudido la plaza Al Midan, en el centro de Damasco, y ha causado "decenas de muertos y heridos", según ha informado este viernes la televisión estatal siria, que ha asegurado que ha sido obra de un terrorista suicida que hizo detonar los explosivos junto a un semáforo. El atentado provocó 10 muertos y 46 heridas, según la televisión. La televisión ha mostrado imágenes de restos humanos y de coches calcinados por la explosión, que tuvo lugar junto al colegio de educación primaria Hasan al Hakim. Un residente de la zona consultado por Reuters ha explicado que "hay más seguridad que la habitual en Al Midan porque es viernes" y, por tanto, "hay muchos puestos de control militares y de seguridad". "No sabemos todavía cuál ha sido el objetivo", ha explicado la fuente, que ha pedido permanecer en el anonimato. Algunos activistas opositores han identificado a una comisaría de Policía como el objetivo del atentado, mientras que otros han señalado a instalaciones de Inteligencia. 38

El mes pasado, al menos 44 personas murieron tras dos atentados perpetrados por suicidas contra oficinas de los servicios de seguridad también en la capital siria. La agencia de noticias oficial siria Sana ha confirmado que el barrio de Al Midan, en la zona centro de Damasco, ha sido escenario de una "explosión terrorista" por la cual se han registrado "víctimas", entre las que figurarían tanto civiles como miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad. La información, publicada a través de un aviso urgente en la página web de la agencia, viene a confirmar lo dicho poco antes por un testigo. La fuente, un residente de la zona consultado por la agencia Reuters, aseguró que se había registrado una potente explosión y que hasta la zona se habían desplazado barias ambulancias. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/06/actualidad/1325847605_54164 9.html

Latest Egypt vote brings Islamists closer to win

Fri, Jan 6 2012 By Tom Perry CAIRO (Reuters) - The Muslim Brotherhood won more than a third of the votes in the last stage of elections for Egypt's lower house of parliament, according to partial results on Friday, showing the Islamists are set to dominate the legislature. Banned under deposed President Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood has emerged as a major winner from the uprising that toppled him, exploiting a well-organized support base in the first free legislative vote in decades. The Brotherhood's party list won 37.5 percent of the vote in the third and final stage of voting. Repeating a pattern seen in previous rounds, the hardline Islamist Nour Party list came second in most of the districts after this week's vote, results on its party website showed. The Islamists now look set to wield major influence over the shape of a new constitution to be drafted by a 100-strong body that the new legislature will pick, though the Brotherhood has promised that Egyptians of all persuasions will have a say. "We are happy with the results and are also happy that there are 15 or 16 parties in the parliament so far," Essam al-Erian, deputy head of the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, told Reuters. "This means all voices will be heard in the parliament," he said, speaking at a party rally which drew hundreds of supporters to a working class district of Cairo. "Together we make the future of Egypt," declared a banner at the rally, held in a tent decked out with Egyptian and party flags. Freedom and Justice Party songs blasted out over loudspeakers. Though the success of the Brotherhood and Nour Party has alarmed some Egyptians and the Western governments which backed Mubarak, it is unclear to what extent the rival Islamists will cooperate or compete in the new legislature. The Nour Party seeks a strict application of Islamic law and some analysts believe the more moderate Brotherhood may seek an alliance with liberal groups to allay concerns about the prospect of an Islamist-led Egypt.

For now, the military generals who assumed Mubarak's powers last February will stay in power. They are set to rule until the end of June, by which time they say the country will have a new elected president to whom they will hand power. MORE VOTING TO COME Official results of the voting held this week are due on Saturday, but it will take longer before the exact shape of the 498-seat lower house is known. There are run-offs for seats being contested by individuals in the latest round which will be held on January 10 and 11. And voting must also be held again in a district where the election was cancelled due to irregularities in the first round. According to a complex electoral system, a third of the seats are reserved for individuals. The other two thirds will be distributed among the lists on a proportional representation basis. As well as contesting the lists, both the Freedom and Justice Party and the Nour Party have fielded candidates for the individual seats. Polls for the upper house of parliament will follow later this month and conclude in February. With the elections for the lower house drawing to a close, debate is now likely to focus on the new constitution that will take the place of the one that kept Mubarak in power for three decades. One main area of discussion will be whether there should be a dilution of presidential powers which underpinned his rule. Those powers are now exercised by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has faced mounting criticism from activists who accuse it of seeking to hold on to power and privilege. The military council decided on January 1 to accelerate the timetable for the elections, an apparent response to street protests demanding a faster end to army rule. The council has said that Kamal al-Ganzouri, appointed prime minister in November, will stay in his post after the legislative election. But some analysts believe the emergence of a new legislature with a popular mandate could force changes in cabinet. Erian said the new parliament would make demands of the Ganzouri government, but without saying what they might be. "There is no excuse for provoking any conflict in this country because we are on a threshold of a new period," he said. (Additional reporting by Marwa Awad and Omar Fahmy; Editing by Rosalind Russell) http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/06/us-egypt-election- idUSTRE8051QM20120106

Internacional Detenido el ex jefe del Estado Mayor turco acusado de golpismo El general Basbug, que se retiró en 2010, es el uniformado de más alto rango detenido por el caso de la red golpista conocida como Ergenekon Redada en Turquía contra el golpismo Empieza el macrojuicio contra 196 militares en Turquía Agencias Estambul 6 ENE 2012 - 09:12 CET9

El general Basbug y el primer ministro turco Erdogan, en agosto de 2010. / ADEM ALTAN (AFP) El ex jefe del Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas de Turquía, Ilker Basbug, ha sido detenido este viernes con la acusación de formar parte de un complot militar para derrocar al Gobierno dirigido por Recep Tayyip Erdogan. El general Basbug, que se retiró en 2010, es el uniformado de más alto rango detenido por el caso de la red golpista conocida como Ergenekon. “Al 26º jefe de Estado mayor de la República turca desafortunamente ha sido puesto en prisión preventiva por haber pertenecido y dirigido una organización terrorista y haber intentado derrocar al Gobierno”, ha declarado Me Ilkay Sezer, el abogado del militar, citado por la agencia de prensa Anatolia. Basbug, quien ocupó el máximo cargo de las Fuerzas Armadas de 2008 a 2010, acudió el jueves a la Fiscalía para declarar como sospechoso, pero esta solicitó su arresto y el ex jefe del Estado Mayor ha sido trasladado a los juzgados, aunque será el juez quien decida si queda detenido o no. La decisión del juez llegó pasada la medianoche y el general retirado fue trasladado a la prisión de Silivri en la madrugada de este viernes, informa la emisora NTV. La Fiscalía le acusa de ordenar la creación de páginas web con propaganda contra el gobierno, una iniciativa que se encuadra en las actividades de la red Ergenekon. Según señalaron en 2010 correos electrónicos anónimos del propio entorno militar, el Estado Mayor había establecido 42 páginas web con propaganda contra el gobierno y contra

varias congregaciones religiosas, acusación que se integró en la investigación de Ergenekon. Es la primera vez que detiene a un uniformado de este rango en un país en el que el Ejército ha supervisado durante décadas la política y al poder civil. Desde hace casi dos años, el Gobierno del primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan libra una batalla jurídica contra la cúpula militar, debido a la investigación de varias tramas golpistas. La supremacía militar sufrió un duro golpe en agosto de 2010, cuando la Judicatura decretó el ingreso en prisión de un centenar de altos cargos del Ejército acusados de formar parte de la red Ergenekon, una supuesta red militar que preparaba un golpe de Estado. Desde 2007, los juicios han llevado al banquillo y a prisión preventiva a numerosos generales, pero el rango de Ilker Basbug da una nueva vuelta de tuerca a la pugna entre el AKP y el Ejército. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/06/actualidad/1325837533_40243 4.html

ft.com World Europe Last updated: January 6, 2012 5:14 pm Turkey arrests former military chief By Daniel Dombey in Istanbul

Turkey has arrested and imprisoned its former army chief, in one of the most dramatic moves in the decade-long struggle between the country’s Islamist-rooted government and the once unassailable military. Prosecutors allege that Ilker Basbug, who retired as chief of staff in August 2010, led a terrorist organisation and plotted to overthrow the government. More ON THIS STORY Turkey deal boosts Russia’s pipeline project Turkey warns France over genocide bill Turkish PM to extend grip on armed forces ON THIS TOPIC Turkey fails to stop lira slipping French vote sparks Turkish reprisals Global Insight Anatolian pussycat still has bite Surging Turkish growth raises fears IN EUROPE Irishman moves to UK to go bankrupt Eurozone jobless rate raises recession fears Orban acts to head off more protests Sarkozy and Hollande lock horns

At the heart of the accusations are claims that Mr Basbug ordered the army to operate a series of websites issuing anti-government and anti-Islamist propaganda as part of a self-styled “Action Plan Against Reactionary Forces”. Mr Basbug dismissed the allegations as “tragicomic”. In a court appearance before his overnight incarceration, he added: “Accusing a Chief of the General Staff of setting up an armed terrorist organisation is the greatest punishment that could be given to me.” His detention pending trial is perhaps the most striking indication to date of the decline of the army’s power since the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prime minister, came to power in 2002. Until now no former chief of the country’s military had been arrested. “In Turkey, the justice system always serves a political cause,” said Mustafa Akyol, a writer who is broadly sympathetic to Mr Erdogan’s goals but critical of what he says are excesses such as politicised trials. “It used tbasbugo serve the military establishment. Now it is turning to the other side, it is supporting the government.” In recent years about 60 serving generals and admirals have been arrested as suspects in various alleged plots, together with many other active and retired military officers, although none has yet been convicted. Detainees in Turkey can be held for years before their cases are resolved. Two Turkish human rights organisations recently said that of more than 120,000 people held in Turkish prisons as of April last year, some 42 per cent were awaiting trial. Mr Akyol noted allegations that the prosecution in other cases against military officers has relied on evidence that has been tampered with. However, he also argued that the military retained an ideology that led officers to regard religious conservatives and other groups as internal enemies. The army, which has traditionally seen itself as the guardian of secular values, has mounted three coups since 1960 and effectively ejected a fourth government from office in 1997. But Mr Erdogan has seen off a series of challenges to his rule, scoring three big election victories despite deep opposition from members of the country’s traditional secular elite. In what was seen as a mark of the prime minister’s success in projecting civilian authority over the armed forces, Isik Kosaner, Mr Basbug’s successor as chief of staff, resigned together with senior colleagues last July amid military anger over arrests of army personnel. This week Turkish prosecutors also said they were issuing charges against the surviving leaders of the 1980 military coup, including Kenan Evren, a 94-year-old former president. Prosecutions connected to more recent alleged plots have grown in size and scope. The detention of dozens of journalists has led the European Union and other bodies to express concerns about freedom of expression in Turkey. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e2308730-384c-11e1-9d07- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1im1O1HoL

BBC NEWS EUROPE 29 July 2011 Last updated at 21:29 GMT Turkey: Military chiefs resign en masse

Isik Kosaner (right) was appointed armed forces chief of staff just under a year ago Related Stories Turkey 'plot' officers on trial Turkey names new military chiefs Turkey country profile The chief of the Turkish armed forces, Isik Kosaner, has resigned along with the army, navy and air force heads. They were furious about the arrest of senior officers, accused of plotting, shortly before a round of military promotions. A series of meetings between General Kosaner and PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed to resolve their differences. Turkish President Abdullah Gul moved quickly to appoint General Necdet Ozel as the new army chief. Gen Ozel is widely expected to be swiftly elevated to chief of the general staff in place of Gen Kosaner. Tradition dictates that only the head of the army can take over the top job. There has been a history of tension between the secularist military and the governing AK party, with the two sides engaged in a war of words for the past two years over allegations that parts of the military had been plotting a coup. Investigations into those allegations, known as the "Sledgehammer" conspiracy - appear to be the root cause of today's resignations, says the BBC's correspondent in Istanbul, with the senior military wanting to go ahead with scheduled annual promotions for some of the officers implicated - and the government refusing.

General Isik Kosaner lasted just under one year as Turkey's overall military chief The Supreme Military Council, which will decide on promotions, is scheduled for next week.

The government says the top brass asked to retire. But Gen Kosaner portrayed his resignation as a protest at the jailing of military officers in a variety of court cases. "It has become impossible for me to continue in this high office, because I am unable to fulfil my responsibility to protect the rights of my personnel as the chief of general staff," Gen Kosaner told the Hurriyet news group. 'Sledgehammer' Gen Kosaner and his senior commanders quit just hours after a court charged 22 suspects, including several generals and officers, with carrying out an internet campaign to undermine the government. This case is the latest element of the protracted 'Sledgehammer' controversy - a coup plan allegedly presented at an army seminar in 2003. Seventeen generals and admirals currently in line for promotion were among those jailed in the Sledgehammer prosecutions. Altogether nearly 200 officers were charged with conspiracy. Twenty-eight servicemen will go on trial next month. Gen Kosaner was appointed overall head of the Turkish armed forces just a year ago. His appointment followed a period of intense friction between the government and the military over the Sledgehammer controversy. At that point, the politicians vetoed the army's original choice for joint chief, Gen Hasan Igsiz, because he was implicated in the alleged plot. Nato no comment It reportedly involved plans to bomb mosques and provoke tensions with Greece, in order to spark political chaos and justify a military takeover. The defendants have argued that the plot was a theoretical scenario to help them plan for potential political unrest. The dramatic mass resignation has particular resonance in Turkey, which endured a series of military coups from 1960 to 1980. In 1997, an army-led campaign forced the resignation of the country's first Islamist-led government. The joint resignation of military chiefs is thought to be unprecedented in Turkey, which is a Nato member. In Brussels, a Nato spokeswoman declined to comment on the resignations. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14346325

Eight militants, 4 soldiers killed in s.Yemen clashes Thu, Jan 5 2012 ADEN, Jan 5 (Reuters) - Eight militants and four Yemeni soldiers were killed in clashes on Thursday, local officials and medics said, near a southern provincial capital seized by Islamist dissidents in May. The twelve militants and soldiers were killed in the suburbs of Zinjibar, in Abyan province where the militants have seized several towns, while 11 months of protests against President Ali Abdullah Saleh have pushed Yemen to the brink of civil war. "The bodies of the five soldiers and those of some of the dead armed men have been moved to Aden's medical hospital," a medic told Reuters in the southern port city. The government says the militants are linked al Qaeda's Yemen-based regional wing, which the United States has called the most dangerouch branch of the militant network. Saleh's opponents have accused him of ceding territory to Islamists to bolster his assertion that his rule keeps al Qaeda in check. Neighbouring oil giant Saudi Arabia and Washington fear that continued unrest in Yemen may embolden its al Qaeda wing, which has claimed responsibility for operations that include a failed plot to blow up a U.S.-bound passenger plane in 2009. In Sanaa, Hamid al-Ahmar -- a tribal leader, wealthy businessman and a member of the Islamist opposition party Islah -- called for Saleh to be put on trial, opposing any move to grant him immunity under a transition deal aiming to end nearly a year of unrest in the poor Arabian Peninsula country. The government's proposed immunity for Saleh is tentamount to "neglecting the blood of the Yemeni people", Ahmar said in a statement, referring to the hundreds killed during the protests. Ahmar called for Saleh to be charged, echoing a demand raised by demonstrators across Yemen since the transition deal sponsored by the Gulf Arab states was signed in November to end Saleh's 33-year rule. Separately, Yemen's transport minister told Reuters on Thursday Sanaa would renegotiate a joint venture agreement with DP World to run the Aden container port, accusing the Dubai-based operator of failing to fulfill its obligations. (Reporting by Mohammed Mukhashaf in Aden and Mohammed Ghobari in Sanaa; Writing by Firouz Sedarat; Editing by Matthew Jones) http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/05/yemen-idUSL6E8C54H620120105

Internacional Una oleada de atentados en Bagdad reabre la herida sectaria en Irak Cinco explosiones dejan decenas de muertos días después de la retirada de las tropas de EE UU El Ejército de EE UU concluye su misión en Irak tras nueve años de ocupación El Irak sin EE UU opta por el federalismo Ángeles Espinosa Dubái 5 ENE 2012 - 16:48 CET418

Los hijos de Abbas Lazim, 47, lloran a las puertas del hospital tras conocer la muerte de su padre en el atentado de Ciudad Sadr, Bagdad. / KARIM KADIM (AP) La oleada de explosiones que esta mañana ha sacudido Bagdad y el atentado, horas después, contra un grupo de peregrinos chiíes cerca de Nasiriya, en el sur de Irak, son algo más que una muestra de la frágil seguridad del país, menos de un mes después de la salida de las tropas estadounidenses. Las cuatro bombas que han golpeado la capital han estallado en dos barrios chiíes, un claro mensaje a una comunidad cuya mayoría numérica le da el control del Gobierno, pero sobre todo al primer ministro Nuri al Maliki que está utilizando la carta sectaria para agarrarse al poder. Los ataques revelan también que la brecha entre suníes y chiíes continúa abierta nueve años después de que la invasión de EE UU sacara a la luz el precario equilibrio confesional que ocultaba la dictadura de Sadam Husein. Según las agencias de noticias, dos coches bomba han causado al menos 15 muertos y 32 heridos hacia las nueve de la mañana en el barrio noroccidental de Kadhumiya, el principal santuario chií de Bagdad. Un par de horas antes, otros dos explosivos, uno de ellos escondido en una moto y otro en una cuneta, han matado a otras ocho personas y herido a 37 más en Ciudad Sáder, un inmenso suburbio situado al este de la capital iraquí. La policía ha asegurado haber desactivado dos artefactos más en las proximidades. Ciudad Sáder es el feudo del clérigo radical Múqtada al Sáder (a cuyo padre hace referencia el nombre), un apoyo clave para el Gobierno de Al Maliki. 48

Últimos atentados en Irak

 5 de enero. Al menos 60 personas mueren en cinco explosiones en Bagdad y Nasiriya, en el sur del país.  4 de enero. Al menos tres personas mueren en varios ataques con bombas en Bakuba y Abu Ghraib, en el norte de Bagdad.  26 de diciembre. Un atentado contra el Ministerio del Interior deja siete muertos.  22 de diciembre. 68 muertos en una cadena de atentados en Bagdad.  5 de diciembre. 30 muertos en varios ataques contra chiíes en el centro de Irak.  12 de octubre. 28 muertos en varios ataques con coche bomba en Bagdad.  15 de agosto. Varias bombas se cobran la vida de 28 personas en los alrededores de la capital. Otra bomba, dirigido contra un grupo de peregrinos chiíes iban al santuario de Kerbala, ha estallado en la ciudad de Batha, cerca de Nasiriya, y ha causado 45 muertos y 72 heridos. La matanza se suma a los 72 muertos de las últimas semanas, en atentados similares y también en zonas mayoritariamente chiíes de Irak, y que han resucitado la pesadilla de la violencia sectaria que entre 2006 y 2007 estuvo a punto de sumir el país en una guerra civil. Lo que es más preocupante confirma los temores de que, tras nueve años de ocupación, la insurgencia suní y las milicias chiíes continúan siendo una amenaza para la estabilidad. Crisis política La tensión entre ambas comunidades se ha reavivado a raíz de la grave crisis política que enfrenta a los principales grupos políticos que les representan. Los políticos suníes, agrupados bajo el paraguas del bloque intersectario Al Iraqiya, llevan meses denunciando que la obsesión de Al Maliki con los baazistas (simpatizantes del Partido Baaz de Sadam Husein, ahora ilegalizado) es sólo una tapadera para apartarles del poder. De hecho, la mayoría de los 600 recientemente detenidos bajo esa acusación son suníes, la confesión a la que pertenecía el dictador depuesto y que ha visto desplazada por el peso de los chiíes. Al Maliki, cuyos ramalazos autoritarios admiten incluso algunos de sus socios de coalición, ha agravado el contexto al ordenar hace unos días la detención del vicepresidente Tarek al Hachemi, un suní al que acusa de dirigir escuadrones de la muerte. Al Hachemi, el más alto cargo de esa comunidad, ha encontrado refugio en la región autónoma de Kurdistán, cuya población es también mayoritariamente suní aunque no árabe como en el resto de Irak y donde está fuera del alcance de las fuerzas de seguridad estatales. Al Iraqiya, el segundo grupo parlamentario con 82 diputados a pesar de haber sido el más votado en las elecciones de marzo de 2010, decidió boicotear la Cámara a partir del 18 de diciembre, el mismo día de la salida del último soldado norteamericano para protestar porque el primer ministro controla todos los puestos clave. Sus nueve ministros tampoco asisten a las reuniones del Ejecutivo. La inclusión de Al Iraqiya en la coalición de Gobierno se consideró clave para hacer partícipes a los suníes y evitar una vuelta al sectarismo que ha costado miles de vidas desde la invasión. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/05/actualidad/1325750683_65361 4.html

Internacional Myanmar permite a la Nobel Suu Kyi presentarse a las elecciones Los comicios forman parte de la lenta apertura del régimen birmano Vientos de cambio sobre Myanmar Clinton emprende un viaje histórico a Myanmar para apoyar las reformas Jose Reinoso Pekín 5 ENE 2012 - 17:28 CET1

Suu Kyi, junto al ministro británico de Exteriores, William Hague. / Khin Maung Win (AP) El Gobierno de Myanmar (antigua Birmania) ha aprobado este jueves la participación de la Liga Nacional para la Democracia (LND) -el partido que lidera la opositora y Nobel de la Paz Aung San Suu Kyi- en las elecciones parciales al Parlamento que tendrán lugar el 1 de abril. Suu Kyi, de 66 años, podría convertirse por primera vez en diputada si sigue adelante con sus planes de tomar parte en la votación. La LND ganó las elecciones de 1990, pero estas fueron anuladas por la junta de los militares que entonces gobernaba el país. El partido de la líder birmana boicoteó los comicios generales de 2010, que fueron ganados por una agrupación política respaldada por los militares y condujeron a la inauguración el pasado marzo del primer gobierno civil de Myanmar en medio siglo. Desde entonces, el presidente de Myanmar, Thein Sein, un antiguo general, ha impulsado una serie de reformas para sacar el país del aislamiento, que han insuflado esperanza a la población sobre una futura democratización, tras casi cinco décadas de dictadura militar. Suu Kyi ha asegurado que espera vivir para ver la democracia en Myanmar. “Creo que habrá elecciones totalmente democráticas estando yo en vida, pero por supuesto no sé cuánto tiempo voy a vivir”, ha dicho en una entrevista con la cadena de televisión británica BBC. La dirigente ha asegurado que su partido se ha registrado oficialmente para participar en las elecciones de abril, pero no ha revelado si se presentaría a unos futuros comicios presidenciales. “Ni siquiera estoy segura de que sea algo que me gustaría hacer”, ha afirmado. La dirigente demócrata fue liberada en noviembre del año pasado de su arresto domiciliario, pocos días después de las elecciones, tras haber pasado 15 de los 21 años anteriores privada de libertad.

El número de escaños en juego en abril no es suficiente para poner en peligro el control del Parlamento por parte del partido gobernante. La mayoría de los 48 asientos en liza fueron dejados vacantes por diputados que pasaron a ocupar cargos en el nuevo Ejecutivo. Los militares tienen garantizados 110 escaños de los 440 de la Cámara Baja, y 56 de los 224 de la Cámara Alta. El partido respaldado por los generales ocupa el 80% de los restantes 498 escaños que son elegidos, por lo que, incluso si el LND ganara los 48 en disputa, no se produciría un cambio de equilibrio de poder. El registro del partido de Suu Kyi coincide con la visita a Myanmar William Hague, la primera de un responsable de Exteriores británico desde 1955, antes de que los generales se hicieran con el poder mediante un golpe de Estado en 1962. Hague ha urgido a las autoridades a que liberen a “todos los presos políticos” –se estima que hay entre 500 y 1.700-, celebren elecciones “libres y justas”, permitan el acceso de las organizaciones de ayuda humanitaria a las zonas con conflictos étnicos y den “pasos creíbles hacia la reconciliación nacional”. El viaje de Hague para apoyar el proceso de transición sigue a los realizados entre el 30 de noviembre y el 2 de diciembre por la Secretaria de Estado estadounidense, Hillary Clinton, y en diciembre por el ministro de Exteriores de Japón, Koichiro Gemba. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/05/actualidad/1325780889_10227 0.html

January 4, 2012 Internet Access Is Not a Human Right By VINTON G. CERF Reston, Va. FROM the streets of Tunis to Tahrir Square and beyond, protests around the world last year were built on the Internet and the many devices that interact with it. Though the demonstrations thrived because thousands of people turned out to participate, they could never have happened as they did without the ability that the Internet offers to communicate, organize and publicize everywhere, instantaneously. It is no surprise, then, that the protests have raised questions about whether Internet access is or should be a civil or human right. The issue is particularly acute in countries whose governments clamped down on Internet access in an attempt to quell the protesters. In June, citing the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, a report by the United Nations’ special rapporteur went so far as to declare that the Internet had “become an indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights.” Over the past few years, courts and parliaments in countries like France and Estonia have pronounced Internet access a human right. But that argument, however well meaning, misses a larger point: technology is an enabler of rights, not a right itself. There is a high bar for something to be considered a human right. Loosely put, it must be among the things we as humans need in order to lead healthy, meaningful lives, like freedom from torture or freedom of conscience. It is a mistake to place any particular technology in this exalted category, since over time we 51

will end up valuing the wrong things. For example, at one time if you didn’t have a horse it was hard to make a living. But the important right in that case was the right to make a living, not the right to a horse. Today, if I were granted a right to have a horse, I’m not sure where I would put it. The best way to characterize human rights is to identify the outcomes that we are trying to ensure. These include critical freedoms like freedom of speech and freedom of access to information — and those are not necessarily bound to any particular technology at any particular time. Indeed, even the United Nations report, which was widely hailed as declaring Internet access a human right, acknowledged that the Internet was valuable as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. What about the claim that Internet access is or should be a civil right? The same reasoning above can be applied here — Internet access is always just a tool for obtaining something else more important — though the argument that it is a civil right is, I concede, a stronger one than that it is a human right. Civil rights, after all, are different from human rights because they are conferred upon us by law, not intrinsic to us as human beings. While the United States has never decreed that everyone has a “right” to a telephone, we have come close to this with the notion of “universal service” — the idea that telephone service (and electricity, and now broadband Internet) must be available even in the most remote regions of the country. When we accept this idea, we are edging into the idea of Internet access as a civil right, because ensuring access is a policy made by the government. Yet all these philosophical arguments overlook a more fundamental issue: the responsibility of technology creators themselves to support human and civil rights. The Internet has introduced an enormously accessible and egalitarian platform for creating, sharing and obtaining information on a global scale. As a result, we have new ways to allow people to exercise their human and civil rights. In this context, engineers have not only a tremendous obligation to empower users, but also an obligation to ensure the safety of users online. That means, for example, protecting users from specific harms like viruses and worms that silently invade their computers. Technologists should work toward this end. It is engineers — and our professional associations and standards-setting bodies like the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers — that create and maintain these new capabilities. As we seek to advance the state of the art in technology and its use in society, we must be conscious of our civil responsibilities in addition to our engineering expertise. Improving the Internet is just one means, albeit an important one, by which to improve the human condition. It must be done with an appreciation for the civil and human rights that deserve protection — without pretending that access itself is such a right. Vinton G. Cerf, a fellow at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, is a vice president and chief Internet evangelist for Google. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/opinion/internet-access-is-not-a-human- right.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212&pagewanted=print

Syria pipeline attacked amid ongoing killing By the CNN Wire Staff CNN.com 2012-01-03 T11:33:50Z

(CNN) -- Syrian officials and opposition activists blamed each other for an attack on a gas pipeline near the restive city of Homs on Tuesday, while opposition groups said more than 30 people had died in new clashes. The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said three civilians were killed by government troops in Homs, while deserting government troops killed 18 members of the security forces in the city of Jasem. Syrian officials did not respond to CNN requests for comment on the incident, and state media did not mention it. And the Local Coordination Committees of Syria, an opposition umbrella group, said police and troops still loyal to President Bashar al-Assad's government killed 11 people in and around Damascus, Hama and Homs, where the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency blamed the pipeline explosion on a "terrorist group." Another activist in the city of Hama said the Arab League monitors there were surrounded by Syrian officials and security forces, making it difficult for locals to speak to the observers freely. The activist said the city still has many checkpoints and security forces with heavy machine guns, and that tanks have not been withdrawn from the city - - just hidden where monitors cannot see them. The activists spoke to CNN by Skype from Syria. CNN is not naming them to protect their safety. Top U.S. and French officials also expressed doubts about whether Syria was abiding by its November agreement with the Arab League, which calls for the release of protesters jailed by the months-long crackdown on anti-government demonstrations and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from cities. White House spokesman Jay Carney said Damascus was clearly breaking its deal with its fellow Arab states. "Across the country, the Syrian people continue to suffer at the hand of the Assad regime, as indiscriminate killing of scores of civilians continues," Carney said. He said it was "past time" for the U.N. Security Council to take action, and said Washington was working with its allies "to increase the pressure on the Assad regime." And U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said that while some prisoners have been freed, the releases are "nothing like what the Syrian government promised to the Arab League." "Our concern is that the Arab League monitors, although they are providing some ability for some demonstrators to express their views in some places, they have not led to the full implementation of the commitments that the Assad regime took on," Nuland 53

told reporters in Washington. Meanwhile, she urged Syrian opposition forces to avoid attacks that would play into the government's hands. "That's exactly what the regime wants, is to make Syria more violent and have an excuse to retaliate itself," Nuland said. In Paris, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe told France's I-Tele on Tuesday that he was "a little skeptical" about whether the monitors are getting free access to the facts. "We await their report that will be carried out in the coming days," Juppe said. But he added, "I do not consider the battle already lost." "The secretary-general of the Arab League has expressed the will to get to the bottom of this investigation," he said. "The truth must be established, and the regime cannot poison the observers who are on the ground." French President Nicolas Sarkozy said Tuesday that President Bashar al-Assad must relinquish power, saying the "massacres" by his forces "evoke disgust and revolt in the Arab world, in France, in Europe and everywhere in the world." Sarkozy said nations must continue "unrelentingly denouncing a barbaric repression and ensuring that the observers from the Arab league have the means and the freedom to carry out their work correctly." Arab League Secretary-General Nabil el-Araby is scheduled to discuss the monitoring team's preliminary report on Saturday, an official with the organization told CNN on condition of anonymity. El-Araby is scheduled to meet with the head of the Arab Human Rights Council on Wednesday, said the official, who is not authorized to speak to the press and asked not to be named. El-Araby said Monday that the killing was still going on despite the presence of his observers. "There is still gunfire, there are still snipers, and we hope that all that will disappear," he said in Cairo, adding: "There is gunfire from various directions, which makes it hard to tell who is shooting. There is no doubt that killing is ongoing, but I can't pinpoint the numbers." Arab League observers entered Syria last week after the United Nations estimated that 5,000 people had been killed since March in an uprising against the government. Al-Assad's government says it is cracking down on armed terrorists. The Arab League aims "to provide protection to Syrian civilians," el-Araby said Monday, adding that it was asking for a cease-fire and for the names of detainees in Syrian prisons. Nearly 3,500 prisoners have been freed, he said. The Arab League has placed more than 70 monitors in six cities, and the number of observers soon will exceed 100, el-Araby said. CNN's Amir Ahmed, Hamdi Alkhshali, Arwa Damon, Saskya Vandoorne and Alexander Felton contributed to this report. http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/03/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html?eref=ft

ft.com comment The A-List

Jeffrey Sachs January 3, 2012 Predictions from the FT's A-List on the big challenges of 2012 Welcome to another year of protest and instability I bravely predict more of the same in 2012. By this I mean the following. First, Mitt Romney will win the Republican nomination after the party has exhausted its one-week- long love affairs with each of the non-Romneys: Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry, Herman Cain, Ron Paul and Newt Gingrich. Mr Romney is the only one of the list that is even plausibly qualified to be president. Somehow the Republican party’s bizarre reality TV-style nominating process, much closer to American Idol than to politics for adults, will actually sort this out. Second, Barack Obama will win re-election. This will not be a triumph of party, accomplishment or experience. It will not have been earnt by economic recovery, political bravery, or long-term vision. It will not reflect a renewal of the love affair with Mr Obama in 2008. It will occur because his one consistent strategy – to stay one step towards the centre of the rightwing Republican party – will prevail. The Republicans and Mr Romney will have cornered themselves. Third, the presidential elections will do nothing to reinvigorate American society. Government will remain corrupt, incompetent and shortsighted. Both political parties will remain firmly to the right of centre. The rich will keep most of their existing tax breaks. Loopholes and lack of enforcement will offset any increased taxes that might be enacted on paper. Good jobs will remain scarce for the young, returning veterans and many others. A chronic budget deficit will lead Congress to continue to slash education, family support, health for the poor, infrastructure, and science and technology. American exceptionalism will mean that the US is the only leading country at war with its own teachers and children. Fourth, the world will become less stable. Though word has not yet reached (drought-stricken) Texas, climate change is real; so too is a rapid increase of population whenever families have no access to family planning and basic healthcare. As a result, our world of 7bn inhabitants (8bn by 2024) will be buffeted by more droughts, floods, food shortages, natural disasters, epidemics and violence. These will turn into more coups, drone missiles, UN Security Council resolutions, but not more common sense to invest in poverty reduction, population control and mitigation of climate change. Fifth, Asia, Latin America, and now Africa will continue to outpace the sluggish or stagnant economies on both sides of the northern Atlantic. Convergence will remain the dominant macroeconomic force of the global economy. Sixth, the young generation will increasingly tire of the increasingly turgid baby-boomer politics. The groups that took to the streets this year from Tunis to Cairo to Tel Aviv to Santiago to Wall Street to Moscow will be back. By the next US election in 2016, America will have at least a third, if not a fourth, major political party building on the progressive energies of the millennial generation. This, then, is the meaning of more of the same: the continuity of change. As the great A-lister of the sixth century BC, Heraclitus, put it much better: “All is flux, nothing stays still.” The writer is director of the Earth Institute and author of ‘The Price of Civilization’ http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2012/01/03/welcome-to-another-year-of-protest-and- instability/#axzz1iUDjpvHZ

Middle East

January 3, 2012 Overtures to Egypt’s Islamists Reverse Longtime U.S. Policy By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK and STEVEN LEE MYERS CAIRO — With the Muslim Brotherhood pulling within reach of an outright majority in Egypt’s new Parliament, the Obama administration has begun to reverse decades of mistrust and hostility as it seeks to forge closer ties with an organization once viewed as irreconcilably opposed to United States interests.

Khaled Desouki/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images Voters in Minya, Egypt, took part in the final phase of parliamentary elections on Tuesday. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party holds the lead. The administration’s overtures — including high-level meetings in recent weeks — constitute a historic shift in a foreign policy held by successive American administrations that steadfastly supported the autocratic government of President Hosni Mubarak in part out of concern for the Brotherhood’s Islamist ideology and historic ties to militants. The shift is, on one level, an acknowledgment of the new political reality here, and indeed around the region, as Islamist groups come to power. Having won nearly half the seats contested in the first two rounds of the country’s legislative elections, the

Brotherhood on Tuesday entered the third and final round with a chance to extend its lead to a clear majority as the vote moved into districts long considered strongholds. The reversal also reflects the administration’s growing acceptance of the Brotherhood’s repeated assurances that its lawmakers want to build a modern democracy that will respect individual freedoms, free markets and international commitments, including Egypt’s treaty with Israel. And at the same time it underscores Washington’s increasing frustration with Egypt’s military rulers, who have sought to carve out permanent political powers for themselves and used deadly force against protesters seeking an end to their rule. The administration, however, has also sought to preserve its deep ties to the military rulers, who have held themselves up as potential guardians of their state’s secular character. The administration has never explicitly threatened to take away the $1.3 billion a year in American military aid to Egypt, though new Congressional restrictions could force cuts. Nevertheless, as the Brotherhood moves toward an expected showdown with the military this month over who should control the interim government — the newly elected Parliament or the ruling military council — the administration’s public outreach to the Brotherhood could give the Islamic movement in Egypt important support. It could also confer greater international legitimacy on the Brotherhood. It would be “totally impractical” not to engage with the Brotherhood “because of U.S. security and regional interests in Egypt,” a senior administration official involved in shaping the new policy said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss diplomatic affairs. “There doesn’t seem to me to be any other way to do it, except to engage with the party that won the election,” the official said, adding, “They’ve been very specific about conveying a moderate message — on regional security and domestic issues, and economic issues, as well.” Some close to the administration have even called this emerging American relationship with the Brotherhood a first step toward a pattern that could take shape with the Islamist parties’ coming to power around the region in the aftermath of the uprisings of the Arab Spring. Islamists have taken important roles in Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt in less than a year. “You’re certainly going to have to figure out how to deal with democratic governments that don’t espouse every policy or value you have,” said Senator John Kerry, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and recently joined with the ambassador to Egypt, Anne W. Patterson, for a meeting with top leaders of the Brotherhood’s political party. He compared the Obama administration’s outreach to President Ronald Reagan’s arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. “The United States needs to deal with the new reality,” Mr. Kerry said. “And it needs to step up its game.” In the meeting with the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, he said, the Brotherhood’s leaders said they were eager to work with the United States and other Western countries, especially in economic areas.

“They certainly expressed a direction that shouldn’t be a challenge to us, provided they follow through,” he said, adding, “Obviously the proof will be in the pudding.” Brotherhood leaders, for their part, often talk publicly here of their eagerness for Egypt to have cooperative relations “as equals” with the United States. The Brotherhood renounced violence as a political tool around the time the 1952 revolution overthrew the British-backed monarchy. Over the years, many of its leaders said they had become comfortable with multiparty electoral democracy while serving as members of a tolerated — if marginalized — parliamentary minority under Mr. Mubarak. They also seem to revel in their new standing. After the meeting with Senator Kerry and Ambassador Patterson, the Brotherhood’s newspaper and Web site reported that Mr. Kerry said “he was not surprised at the progress and leading position of the Freedom and Justice Party on the electoral landscape in Egypt, emphasizing his respect for the public will in Egypt.” “Egypt is a big country with a long honorable history and plays an important role in Arab, Islamic and international issues, and therefore respects the conventions and treaties that were signed,” the Brotherhood leaders said they told Mr. Kerry. But, on the group’s English language Web page, the report also urged the United States “to hear the peoples, not to hear of them,” and advised “that America could play a role in the economic development and stability of various peoples of the world, if it wished.” On Tuesday, the administration intensified its criticism of Egypt’s military rulers over raids that last week shut down 10 civil society groups, including at least 3 American- financed democracy-building groups, as part of an investigation of illicit foreign financing that has been laden with conspiratorial and anti-American rhetoric. “It is, frankly, unacceptable to us that that situation has not been returned to normal,” a State Department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland, said, charging that Egypt’s military rulers had broken pledges last week to top American officials, including Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta. She called the officials behind the campaign against the organizations “old Mubarak holdover types who clearly are not on the new page with the Egyptian people.” The administration’s willingness to engage with the Brotherhood could open President Obama to new attacks by Republicans who are already accusing him letting Islamists take over a pivotal ally. Some analysts, though, said the overtures amounted to a tacit admission that the United States should have begun such outreach to the region’s Islamist opposition long ago. Discreet American contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood go back to the early 1990s, although they were previously limited to unpublicized meetings with members of Parliament who also belonged to the Brotherhood but were elected as independents. And even those timid encounters evoked vitriol from Mr. Mubarak. “Your government is in contact with these terrorists from the Muslim Brotherhood,” he reportedly told the American journalist Mary Anne Weaver in 1994. “Very secretly, without our knowledge at first,” he said, adding, “I can assure you these groups will never take over this country.”

Shadi Hamid, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, argued that the United States missed chances to build ties to moderate Islamists earlier. When Mr. Mubarak jailed thousands of prominent Brotherhood members in 2005 and 2006, for example, the organization reached out to Washington. “Now the Brotherhood knows it is in a stronger position and it is almost as if the U.S. is chasing them and they are sitting pretty,” Mr. Hamid said. “But what can the U.S. do, intervene and change the election results?” he asked. “The only alternative is to be against democracy in the region.” Egypt’s elections are expected to continue to Wednesday, with runoffs next week, and Parliament’s first session is expected to open Jan. 23, two days before the anniversary of the protests that forced out Mr. Mubarak. David D. Kirkpatrick reported from Cairo, and Steven Lee Myers from Washington. David D. Kirkpatrick y Steven Lee Myers Overtures to Egypt’s Islamists Reverse Longtime U.S. Policy January 3, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/world/middleeast/us-reverses-policy-in-reaching- out-to-muslim-brotherhood.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

Global unrest: how the revolution went viral The past 18 months have seen extraordinary outpourings of discontent. But what links them? In this extract from his new book, Paul Mason examines how technology has been at the heart of the global unrest, and finds parallels less with 1968, and more with 1914

Paul Mason guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 3 January 2012 20.00 GMT

Egyptian bloggers work on their laptops in Tahrir Square, Cairo, February 2011. Photograph: Patrick Baz/AFP/Getty Images It was a cold Friday night early last year, sometime between the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and the fall of the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. I got a call: would I do a lecture on the history of the Paris Commune for something called The Really Free School in Bloomsbury? I turned up to the venue to find it was a squat. They had formed an ad hoc university, occupied an 18th-century townhouse in the heart of London and stuck a sign on the door saying "Journalists Fuck Off". Here was the hard core of the student protest movement: dedicated eco-warriors, veterans of suicidal sit-downs in front of tanks in Gaza, the demobbed Clown Army and, as my host put it, "the Situationist Taliban". The discussion buzzed: is it technology, economics, mass psychology or just the zeitgeist that's caused this global explosion of revolt? I inclined to a technological- determinist explanation: "Look how your eyes shine when we talk about the network. It's the network!" Glancing at my iPhone, I realised why they seemed occasionally distracted: they were tweeting the entire conversation, live, to their friends.

The next morning I wrote a blogpost based on the conversation: Twenty Reasons Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere. It went viral. Within a month I met an American hacker, who told me that "there are discussion groups in the US studying your blog". Later, I found out that a global collective of protesters were working on a book critiquing it; later still I met some of them, as they tried to avoid having their heads bashed in by Greek riot police. One thing was clear: the events taking place across the world carried too much that was new in them to ignore. If the Arab spring had happened in isolation, it might have been categorised as a belated aftershock of 1989; if the student unrest had been part of the normal cycle of youth revolt, it could have been quickly forgotten. But the momentum gathered, from Iran to Santa Cruz, to London, Athens and Cairo. The media began a frantic search for parallels. Nigel Inkster, former director of operations for Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, told me: "It's a revolutionary wave, like 1848." Others found analogies with 1968 or the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In late January 2011, I sat with veteran reporters in a TV newsroom and discussed whether this was Egypt's 1905 or its 1917. But there is something in the air that defies historical parallels: something new to do with technology, behaviour and popular culture. As well as a flowering of collective action in defence of democracy, and a resurgence of the struggles of the poor and oppressed, what's going on is also about the expanded power of the individual. For the first time in decades, people are using methods of protest that do not seem archaic or at odds with the contemporary world; the protesters seem more in tune with modernity than the methods of their rulers. Sociologist Keith Kahn-Harris calls what we're seeing the "movement without a name": a trend, a direction, an idea-virus, a meme, a source of energy that can be traced through a large number of spaces and projects. It is also a way of thinking and acting: an agility, an adaptability, a refusal to accept the world as it is, a refusal to get stuck into fixed patterns of thought. Why is it happening now? Ultimately, the explanation lies in three big social changes: in the demographics of revolt, in technology and in human behaviour itself. At the centre of all the protest movements is a new sociological type: the graduate with no future. In North Africa there is a demographic bulge of young people, including graduates and students, who are unable to get a decent job – or indeed any job. By 2011, there was 20% youth unemployment across the region, where two-thirds of the population is under the age of 30. In Libya, despite high GDP growth, youth unemployment stood at 30%. But youth unemployment is not a factor confined to North Africa. In Spain, in 2011 youth unemployment was running at 46%, a figure partially ameliorated by the tendency for young Spaniards to live off their extended families. In Britain, on the eve of the student riots of 2010, youth unemployment stood at 20%. The financial crisis of 2008 created a generation of twentysomethings whose projected life-arc had switched, quite suddenly, from an upward curve to a downward one. The promise was: "Get a degree, get a job in the corporate system and eventually you'll achieve a better living standard than your parents." This abruptly turned into: "Tough, you'll be poorer than your parents." The revolts of 2010–11 have shown, quite simply, what this workforce looks like when it becomes

collectively disillusioned, when it realises that the whole offer of self-betterment has been withdrawn. In revolts sparked or led by educated youth – whether in Cairo or Madrid – a number of common traits can be observed. First, that the quintessential venue for unrest is the global city, a megatropolis in which reside the three tribes of discontent – the youth, the slum-dwellers and the working class. The estates, the gated communities, the informal meeting spaces, the dead spaces between tower blocks just big enough to be blocked by a burning car, the pheromone-laden nightclubs – all combine to form a theatrical backdrop for the kind of revolts we've seen. Second, members of this generation of "graduates with no future" recognise one another as part of an international sub-class, with behaviours and aspirations that easily cross borders. I saw the Egyptian rap artist Gigi Ibrahim (@GSquare86), an iconic figure in the 25 January revolution, speak to London students a few weeks after Mubarak fell. There was no noticeable difference between her clothes, language and culture and theirs. She didn't mind that the meeting was small, that people came and went at random, depending on their other social commitments; she was not put off by their texting and tweeting during her speech. The boom years of globalisation created a mass, transnational culture of being young and educated; now there is a mass transnational culture of disillusionment. And it transmits easily. When activists such as Ibrahim began to appear on TV in vox pops from Tahrir Square, youth all over the world – above all in America, where the image of the Arab world has been about Islam, terrorism and the veil – simply said to themselves: "Heck, that kid is just like me." There is a third social impact of the graduate with no future: the sheer size of the student population means that it is a transmitter of unrest to a much wider section of the population than before. Since 2000, the global participation rate in higher education has grown from 19% to 26%; in Europe and North America, a staggering 70% now complete post-secondary education. In Britain, the Blair government's policy of getting half of all school-leavers into higher education meant that, when it broke out, student discontent would penetrate into hundreds of thousands of family homes. While the middle-class student activists of 1968 thought of themselves as external detonators of the working class, the students of 2010 were thoroughly embedded both in the workforce and in low-income communities. In North Africa, though many of the college students who led the revolutions were drawn from the elite, you find this same blurring of the edges between the educated youth and the poor. The story of Mohamed Bouazizi, the street trader whose self- immolation on the morning of 17 January 2011 sparked the revolution in Tunisia, illustrates this well. He can't get a job because, in a corrupt dictatorship, he lacks the right connections. He's a street vendor earning $140 a month, but he's using the money to put his sister through college. The 2008 uprising in Mahalla, Egypt, saw this same overlap of worker, student and urban poor. As the blogger and activist Hossam el- Hamalawy told me, in the poor neighbourhoods of Egypt you will usually find one son unemployed, another working in a factory, another at university. The issues of poverty and repression overlap; in each poor neighbourhood the police station is basically a torture centre.

This new sociology of revolt calls to mind conditions prior to the Paris Commune of 1871: a large and radicalised intelligentsia, a slum-dwelling class finding its voice through popular culture, and a weakened proletariat, still wedded to the organisations and traditions of 20 years before. It makes the social order of the modern city highly fragile under economic stress. The French historian Hippolyte Taine understood the essential danger of this social mix. When it comes to revolution, he warned, forget the poor and worry about poor lawyers: "Now, as formerly, students live in garrets, bohemians in lodgings, physicians without patients and lawyers without clients in lonely offices … so many Brissots, Marats, Dantons, Robespierres, and St-Justs in embryo. Only for lack of air and sunshine they never come to maturity." Taine put his finger on what, in 1789, had turned the normal rebelliousness of impoverished graduates into a force that would reshape the world. He saw that the "worm-eaten barriers [had] cracked all at once".

Get yourself connected: a demonstrator from the hacker group Anonymous, San Francisco, August 2011. Photograph: Justin Sullivan/Getty Images Technology, social change, institutional decay had unleashed something bigger than teenage angst. If this sounds like an 18th-century version of the "death of deference" complaint, well, it was. A deep social crisis was under way, then as now. But with one big difference: today, in every garret there is a laptop. Social media and new technology were crucial in shaping the revolutions of 2011, just as they shaped industry, finance and mass culture in the preceding decade. What's important is not that the Egyptian youth used Facebook, or that the British students used Twitter and the Greek rioters organised via Indymedia, but what they used these media for – and what such technology does to hierarchies, ideas and actions. Here, the crucial concept is the network – whose impact on politics has been a long time coming. The network's basic law was explained by Bell Telephone boss Theodore Vail as early as 1908: the more people who use the network, the more useful it becomes to each user. (The most obvious impact of the "network effect" has been on the media and ideology. Long before people started using Twitter to foment social unrest, mainstream journalists noticed – to their dismay –that the size of one's public persona or pay cheque carried no guarantee of popularity online. People's status rises and falls with the reliability and truthfulness of what they contribute.) 63

If you look at the full suite of information tools that were employed to spread the revolutions of 2009–11, it goes like this: Facebook is used to form groups, covert and overt – in order to establish those strong but flexible connections. Twitter is used for real-time organisation and news dissemination, bypassing the cumbersome newsgathering operations of the mainstream media. YouTube and the Twitter-linked photographic sites – Yfrog, Flickr and Twitpic – are used to provide instant evidence of the claims being made. Link-shorteners such as bit.ly are used to disseminate key articles via Twitter. Underpinning the social media is mobile telephony: in the crush of every crowd we see arms holding cellphones in the air, like small flocks of ostriches, snapping scenes of repression or revolt, offering instant and indelible image-capture to a global audience. And in all the theatres of revolution, blogs have offered a vital resource: somewhere to link to. Their impact can be measured by the fact that, in 2011, 7% of Middle Eastern bloggers surveyed reported they had been arrested by their respective security forces. The ability to deploy, without expert knowledge, a whole suite of information tools has allowed protesters across the world to outwit the police, to beam their message into the newsrooms of global media, and above all to assert a cool, cutting-edge identity in the face of what WH Auden once called "the elderly rubbish dictators talk". It has given today's protest movements a massive psychological advantage, one that no revolt has enjoyed since 1968. Suddenly, the form of today's protests seems entirely congruent with the way people live their lives. It is modern; it is immune to charges of "resisting progress". Indeed, it utilises technology that is so essential to modern work and leisure, governments cannot turn it off without harming their economies. And, as Mubarak, Gaddafi and the Bahraini royals discovered, even turning it off does not work. Because – and here is the technological fact that underpins the social and political aspects of what has happened – a network can usually defeat a hierarchy. The pioneer of network theory, Walter Powell, summed up the reasons for this as follows: the network is better at adapting to a situation where the quality of information is crucial to success, but where information itself is fluid; a hierarchy is better if you are only transmitting orders and responses, and the surrounding situation is predictable. Once information networks become social, the implications are massive: truth can now travel faster than lies, and all propaganda becomes instantly flammable. Sure, you can try to insert spin, but the instantly networked consciousness of millions of people will set it right: they act like white blood cells against infection so that ultimately the truth, or something close to it, persists much longer than disinformation. Whereas the basic form of, say, a Leninist party, a guerrilla army or even a ghetto riot has not changed in a century, once you use social networks the organisational format of revolt goes into constant flux. Even in the period since the Iranian uprisings of July 2009, changes have taken place in the way protesters use social media, in the way rioting is directed (as with the BlackBerry riots in England in 2011), and in the way people evade internet shutdowns. In the middle of the biggest upsurge in labour protests for a decade, it seems impolite to mention the name of André Gorz. Gorz was a French Marxist who for 20 years was spat on by left commentators for writing a book entitled Farewell to the Working Class 64

(1980). Gorz asserted that the old proletariat had been dissolved by modern technology and that the class struggle would be replaced by individual personal politics. He was wrong: the world economy has created 1.5 billion extra workers since his book was written. He was also wrong to claim that capitalism was destroying skilled work. And yet parts of the book now bear rereading, in particular Gorz's definition of revolution: taking power implies taking it away from its holders, not by occupying their posts but by making it permanently impossible for them to keep their machinery of domination running. Revolution is first and foremost the irreversible destruction of this machinery. It implies a form of collective practice capable of bypassing and superseding it through the development of an alternative network of relations. By this definition we are in the middle of a revolution: something wider than a pure political overthrow and narrower than the classic social revolutions of the 20th century.

The birth of a revolutionary technology: telephone operators in Vienna, c1910. Photograph: Imagno/Getty Images The decade before 1914 was an age very much like ours, one in which the most innovative technologies were those that produced greater freedom of action and thought: the motor car, the cinema, the phonogram and the telephone. The Austrian writer Stefan Zweig summed up how it felt to be young before 1914, and what was lost when war, revolution and the swing towards totalitarianism ended it all: "Before those wars," he recalled, "I saw individual freedom at its zenith and after them I saw liberty at its lowest point in hundreds of years." Looked at this way, the real precedent for the past 20 years of ecstasy-fuelled, iPod- engrossed, latte-sipping individualism is not the 1960s but the years before 1914. The radicals of the 60s were able to conceive the possibility of a new mode of human existence, but technology and the balance of global forces – class, race, inter-state rivalry – militated against achieving it. In the pre-1914 period, the freedom zeitgeist, technological progress and globalisation were aligned. Now they are aligned again. The past 10 years have seen disruptions in the pattern of social life that mirror what happened in that era. But this time, it's happening at high velocity and across the canvas of all humanity.

Extracted from Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions by Paul Mason, to be published by Verso, £14.99. Paul Mason will be discussing his book with Mark Fisher, Ewa Jasiewicz, Gillian Tett and the Guardian's Katharine Viner at Southbank Centre, London SE1 on 2 February, southbankcentre.co.uk

Paul Mason Global unrest: how the revolution went viral3 January 2012 20.00 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/03/how-the-revolution-went- viral?CMP=EMCNEWEML1355 Mason, Paul (2012), Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions Verso, enero.

Twenty reasons why it's kicking off everywhere Paul Mason | 19:07 UK time, Saturday, 5 February 2011 We've had revolution in Tunisia, Egypt's Mubarak is teetering; in Yemen, Jordan and Syria suddenly protests have appeared. In Ireland young techno-savvy professionals are agitating for a "Second Republic"; in France the youth from banlieues battled police on the streets to defend the retirement rights of 60-year olds; in Greece striking and rioting have become a national pastime. And in Britain we've had riots and student occupations that changed the political mood. What's going on? What's the wider social dynamic? My editors yesterday asked me put some bullet points down for a discussion on the programme that then didn't happen but I am throwing them into the mix here, on the basis of various conversations with academics who study this and also the participants themselves.

At the heart of it all are young people, obviously; students; westernised; secularised. They use social media - as the mainstream media has now woken up to - but this obsession with reporting "they use twitter" is missing the point of what they use it for. In so far as there are common threads to be found in these different situation, here's 20 things I have spotted: 1. At the heart if it all is a new sociological type: the graduate with no future 2. ...with access to social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and eg Yfrog so they can express themselves in a variety of situations ranging from parliamentary democracy to tyrrany. 3. Therefore truth moves faster than lies, and propaganda becomes flammable. 4. They are not prone to traditional and endemic ideologies: Labourism, Islamism, Fianna Fail Catholicism etc... in fact hermetic ideologies of all forms are rejected. 5. Women very numerous as the backbone of movements. After twenty years of modernised labour markets and higher-education access the "archetypal" protest leader, organizer, facilitator, spokesperson now is an educated young woman. 66

6. Horizontalism has become endemic because technology makes it easy: it kills vertical hierarchies spontaneously, whereas before - and the quintessential experience of the 20th century - was the killing of dissent within movements, the channeling of movements and their bureaucratisaton. 7. Memes: "A meme acts as a unit for carrying cultural ideas symbols or practices, which can be transmitted from one mind to another through writing, speech, gestures, rituals or other imitable phenomena. Supporters of the concept regard memes as cultural analogues to genes, in that they self-replicate, mutate and respond to selective pressures." (Wikipedia) - so what happens is that ideas arise, are very quickly "market tested" and either take off, bubble under, insinuate themselves or if they are deemed no good they disappear. Ideas self-replicate like genes. Prior to the internet this theory (see Richard Dawkins, 1976) seemed an over-statement but you can now clearly trace the evolution of memes. 8. They all seem to know each other: not only is the network more powerful than the hierarchy - but the ad-hoc network has become easier to form. So if you "follow" somebody from the UCL occupation on Twitter, as I have done, you can easily run into a radical blogger from Egypt, or a lecturer in peaceful resistance in California who mainly does work on Burma so then there are the Burmese tweets to follow. During the early 20th century people would ride hanging on the undersides of train carriages across borders just to make links like these. 9. The specifics of economic failure: the rise of mass access to university-level education is a given. Maybe soon even 50% in higher education will be not enough. In most of the world this is being funded by personal indebtedess - so people are making a rational judgement to go into debt so they will be better paid later. However the prospect of ten years of fiscal retrenchment in some countries means they now know they will be poorer than their parents. And the effect has been like throwing a light switch; the prosperity story is replaced with the doom story, even if for individuals reality will be more complex, and not as bad as they expect. 10.This evaporation of a promise is compounded in the more repressive societies and emerging markets because - even where you get rapid economic growth - it cannot absorb the demographic bulge of young people fast enough to deliver rising living standards for enough of them. 11.To amplify: I can't find the quote but one of the historians of the French Revolution of 1789 wrote that it was not the product of poor people but of poor lawyers. You can have political/economic setups that disappoint the poor for generations - but if lawyers, teachers and doctors are sitting in their garrets freezing and starving you get revolution. Now, in their garrets, they have a laptop and broadband connection. 12.The weakness of organised labour means there's a changed relationship between the radicalized middle class, the poor and the organised workforce. The world looks more like 19th century Paris - heavy predomination of the "progressive" intelligentsia, intermixing with the slum-dwellers at numerous social interfaces (cabarets in the 19C, raves now); huge social fear of the excluded poor but also many rags to riches stories celebrated in the media (Fifty Cent etc); meanwhile the solidaristic culture and respectability of organized labour is still there but, as in Egypt, they find themselves a "stage army" to be marched on and off the scene of history. 13.This leads to a loss of fear among the young radicals of any movement: they can pick and choose; there is no confrontation they can't retreat from. They can "have a day off" from protesting, occupying: whereas twith he old working-class based movements, their place in the ranks of battle was determined and they couldn't retreat once things started. You couldn't "have a day off" from the miners' strike if you lived in a pit village. 14.In addition to a day off, you can "mix and match": I have met people who do community organizing one day, and the next are on a flotilla to Gaza; then they pop up working for a think tank on sustainable energy; then they're writing a book about something completely different. I was astonished to find people I had interviewed inside the UCL occupation blogging from Tahrir Square this week. 15. People just know more than they used to. Dictatorships rely not just on the suppression of news but on the suppression of narratives and truth. More or less everything you need to know to make sense of the world is available as freely downloadable content on the internet: and it's not pre-digested for you by your teachers, parents, priests, imams. For example there are huge 67

numbers of facts available to me now about the subjects I studied at university that were not known when I was there in the 1980s. Then whole academic terms would be spent disputing basic facts, or trying to research them. Now that is still true but the plane of reasoning can be more complex because people have an instant reference source for the undisputed premises of arguments. It's as if physics has been replaced by quantum physics, but in every discipline. 16.There is no Cold War, and the War on Terror is not as effective as the Cold War was in solidifying elites against change. Egypt is proving to be a worked example of this: though it is highly likely things will spiral out of control, post Mubarak - as in all the colour revolutons - the dire warnings of the US right that this will lead to Islamism are a "meme" that has not taken off. In fact you could make an interesting study of how the meme starts, blossoms and fades away over the space of 12 days. To be clear: I am not saying they are wrong - only that the fear of an Islamist takeover in Egypt has not been strong enough to swing the US presidency or the media behind Mubarak. 17. It is - with international pressure and some powerful NGOs - possible to bring down a repressive government without having to spend years in the jungle as a guerilla, or years in the urban underground: instead the oppositional youth - both in the west in repressive regimes like Tunisia/Egypt, and above all in China - live in a virtual undergrowth online and through digital comms networks. The internet is not key here - it is for example the things people swap by text message, the music they swap with each other etc: the hidden meanings in graffiti, street art etc which those in authority fail to spot. 18. People have a better understanding of power. The activists have read their Chomsky and their Hardt-Negri, but the ideas therein have become mimetic: young people believe the issues are no longer class and economics but simply power: they are clever to the point of expertise in knowing how to mess up hierarchies and see the various "revolutions" in their own lives as part of an "exodus" from oppression, not - as previous generations did - as a "diversion into the personal". While Foucault could tell Gilles Deleuze: "We had to wait until the nineteenth century before we began to understand the nature of exploitation, and to this day, we have yet to fully comprehend the nature of power",- that's probably changed. 19. As the algebraic sum of all these factors it feels like the protest "meme" that is sweeping the world - if that premise is indeed true - is profoundly less radical on economics than the one that swept the world in the 1910s and 1920s; they don't seek a total overturn: they seek a moderation of excesses. However on politics the common theme is the dissolution of centralized power and the demand for "autonomy" and personal freedom in addition to formal democracy and an end to corrupt, family based power-elites. 20. Technology has - in many ways, from the contraceptive pill to the iPod, the blog and the CCTV camera - expanded the space and power of the individual. Some complications.... a) all of the above are generalisations: and have to be read as such. b) are these methods replicable by their opponents? Clearly up to a point they are. So the assumption in the global progressive movement that their values are aligned with that of the networked world may be wrong. Also we have yet to see what happens to all this social networking if a state ever seriously pulls the plug on the technology: switches the mobile network off, censors the internet, cyber-attacks the protesters. c) China is the laboratory here, where the Internet Police are paid to go online and foment pro- government "memes" to counteract the oppositional ones. The Egyptian leftist blogger Arabawy.org says on his website that : "in a dictatorship, independent journalism by default becomes a form of activism, and the spread of information is essentially an act of agitation." But independent journalism is suppressed in many parts of the world. d) what happens to this new, fluffy global zeitgeist when it runs up against the old-style hierarchical dictatorship in a death match, where the latter has about 300 Abrams tanks? We may be about to find out. e) - and this one is troubling for mainstream politics: are we creating a complete disconnect between the values and language of the state and those of the educated young? Egypt is a 68

classic example - if you hear the NDP officials there is a time-warped aspect to their language compared to that of young doctors and lawyers on the Square. But there are also examples in the UK: much of the political discourse - on both sides of the House of Commons - is treated by many young people as a barely intelligible "noise" - and this goes wider than just the protesters. (For example: I'm finding it common among non-politicos these days that whenever you mention the "Big Society" there's a shrug and a suppressed laugh - yet if you move into the warren of thinktanks around Westminster, it's treated deadly seriously. Dissing the Big Society has quickly become a "meme" that crosses political tribal boundaries under the Coalition, yet most professional politicians are deaf to "memes" as the youth are to the contents of Hansard.)

That's it - as I say, these are just my thoughts on it all and not researched other than through experience: there are probably whole PhD theses about some of this so feel free to hit the comments. Likewise if you think it is all balderdash, and if you are over 40 you may, vent your analog-era spleen below. http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2011/02/twenty_reasons_why_its_kicking.ht ml

Israeli Foreign Ministry denies opening dialogue with Egypt's Islamists Author: MENA

AP The Israeli Foreign Ministry denied news that it has allowed its ambassador in Cairo, Yaakov Amitai, to enter into a dialogue with Islamists in Egypt, Israeli radio said Wednesday. Israeli radio cited sources from the Israeli Foreign Ministry as saying that Israel does not interfere in what is going on in Egypt and is waiting to see how the new regime will turn out. This response came after Israeli daily Maariv said Wednesday that the Israeli Foreign Ministry has given Amitai the freedom to contact members from the Muslim Brotherhood after they made considerable gains in the parliamentary elections. Yousry Hammad, spokesperson for the Salafi-led Nour Party, said Israeli radio correspondent Jackie Khoji contacted him to ask about the party’s stance on the Camp David Accords. “I told him the treaty is binding because Egypt has signed it,” Hammad said, explaining to him that the Egyptian people want to amend certain articles to enable Egypt to better control Sinai. Hammad said Nour Party was not invited to open dialogue with Israel. “This must come through the Foreign Ministry in the form of an official invitation,” he said. Rafi Barak, the director-general of the Israeli foreign ministry, had previously rejected a request by former Israeli Ambassador to Egypt Isaac Levanon to open a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood shortly after the breakout of the 25 January revolution and the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak. Egyptians protest at Israeli violence Archived Photo?: Publishing Date: Wed, 04/01/2012 - 12:34 Related material Calls to raise Israel-Egypt treaty troop limits Israel nervous, but major change in Egypt relations unlikely

Source URL (retrieved on 19/01/2012 - 11:49): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/583986 70

Taliban leaders held at Guantánamo Bay to be released in peace talks deal US agrees in principle to releasing top officials from Afghanistan insurgent group in exchange for starting process of negotiations Julian Borger, and Jon Boone in Kabul guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 3 January 2012 19.32 GMT

The US detention centre in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, holds leading Taliban figures such as the former army commander Fazl Akhund. Photograph: John Moore/Getty The US has agreed in principle to release high-ranking Taliban officials from Guantánamo Bay in return for the Afghan insurgents' agreement to open a political office for peace negotiations in Qatar, the Guardian has learned. According to sources familiar with the talks in the US and in Afghanistan, the handful of Taliban figures will include Mullah Khair Khowa, a former interior minister, and Noorullah Noori, a former governor in northern Afghanistan. More controversially, the Taliban are demanding the release of the former army commander Mullah Fazl Akhund. Washington is reported to be considering formally handing him over to the custody of another country, possibly Qatar. The releases would be to reciprocate for Tuesday's announcement from the Taliban that they are prepared to open a political office in Qatar to conduct peace negotiations "with the international community" – the most significant political breakthrough in ten years of the Afghan conflict. The Taliban are holding just one American soldier, Bowe Bergdahl, a 25-year-old sergeant captured in June 2009, but it is not clear whether he would be freed as part of the deal.

"To take this step, the [Obama] administration have to have sufficient confidence that the Taliban are going to reciprocate," said Vali Nasr, who was an Obama administration adviser on the Afghan peace process until last year. "It is going to be really risky. Guantánamo is a very sensitive issue politically." Nasr, now a professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, said the Taliban announcement on the opening of an office in Qatar was a dramatic breakthrough. "If it had not happened then the idea of reconciliation would have been completely finished. The Qatar office is akin to the Taliban forming a Sinn Féin, a political wing to conduct negotiations," Nasr said, but added: "The next phase will need concessions on both sides. This doesn't mean we are now on autopilot to peace." Michael Semple, a former EU envoy in Afghanistan who has maintained contact with senior Taliban figures, agreed that the deal represented a critical moment. "This is at last a real process," Semple, now at Harvard University, said. "There is a long list of things we don't have and there has been no progress on substantive issues. But now there is a certain amount of momentum. Every discussion over the past couple of years has been heavy on western enthusiasm with nothing substantial from the other side." This time, he said, it was clear that the top Taliban council – including its reclusive leader, Mullah Omar – was on board with the proposal. In return, Semple said he thought the release of a few prisoners from Guantánamo Bay was politically feasible for the Obama administration, even in an election year. "The prospect of ending a costly war in Afghanistan is sufficiently attractive for the Obama administration to move forward with it," Semple said. "Even if all five of these people they release went straight back to Quetta [the Taliban stronghold in Pakistan] to rejoin a fight, it wouldn't make any real difference." Negotiations over the opening of a Taliban political office and the release of prisoners have been underway for more than a year in secret contacts in Germany and in the Gulf between US and Taliban officials, but have been continually held up by political obstacles on all sides. The Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, had preferred Saudi Arabia or Turkey to host the Taliban political bureau, but dropped his opposition to Qatar under heavy US pressure. Tuesday's announcement was made by email by a Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid. "Right now, having a strong presence in Afghanistan, we still want to have a political office for negotiations," Mujahid said. "In this regard, we have started preliminary talks and we have reached a preliminary understanding with relevant sides, including the government of Qatar, to have a political office for negotiations with the international community." The announcement was strongly endorsed by former officials who served under the Taliban regime in the 1990s, many of whom have been pushing for an overseas Taliban "address" for years.

"Everyone now agrees on the need for an office: the government, the foreigners and the Taliban," said Mohammed Qalamuddin, one-time head of the Taliban regime's "vice and virtue" police. "Now is the time to talk face to face with the Taliban and ask them what they want and why they are fighting." He said that a number of leading Taliban took part in the secret talks that led to agreement with Qatar, including the former Taliban ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Shahabuddin Dilawar, the former deputy foreign minister Sher Mohammad Stanekzai and Tayeb Agha, a top aide to Mullah Omar, the mysterious Taliban leader who, even in power, only ever met with a handful of western diplomats. "The important thing is that all these men are operating with the approval of Mullah Omar," he said. It is not clear when the office will open, and there is also likely to be disagreement on the role of the Kabul government. A senior Afghan government official said the Karzai administration had accepted the creation of a Taliban office in Qatar only after demanding assurances from foreign powers that any peace process must be kept under the firm control of the Afghan government. "If it is not led and owned by the Afghan government, it will fail," the official said. However, Tuesday's Taliban statement said the group was only interested in talking to the "United States of America and their foreign allies," Mujahid said. Western diplomats hope the opening of an office in Qatar will also lessen Pakistan's control of the Taliban. Pakistan plays host to most of the Taliban leadership, which it sees as an important bargaining counter in negotiations over the future of the region. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/03/taliban-leaders-guantanamo-bay- deal?CMP=EMCNEWEML1355

01/03/2012 01:14 PM North African Road Trip Hope Meets Hate in the New Libya By Alexander Smoltczyk One year after the Arab Spring, SPIEGEL correspondent Alexander Smolzczyk set out on a journey through the Maghreb to assess the region's transformation. On the second leg of his journey, he travels through post-revolution Libya and finds a country marked by a mixture of hope, desperation and the will to build a new democracy. On Dec. 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a young man in rural Tunisia, poured gasoline on himself -- and ignited an entire region. One by one, the people of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya toppled their rulers. One year after Bouazizi's self-immolation, much has changed in the Maghreb. But a lot has remained the same. In places where secular rulers prevailed for decades, Islamists are now trying to seize the reins of power. And many people there are just as poor and hopeless as they were before the revolutions. This is the second article in a series by SPIEGEL correspondent Alexander Smoltczyk as he travels along the Transmaghrébine highway from Morocco to Egypt together with a photographer. On the second leg of his journey, he travels through Libya and finds people who have freed themselves from dictator Moammar Gadhafi, but not from the demons he left behind. Be sure to also read the first part of the series.

Ben Gardane, the last town before Tunisia's border with Libya, is a hive of smuggling and contraband -- a transit zone consisting of a jumble of unpainted concrete shops, storage sheds, barbecue stands and dirty hotels. Every few hundred meters, illegally imported gasoline is sold in bright red, blue and green bottles. Everyone in Ben Gardane is involved in smuggling, from young children to old men. After it passes Djerba, the Transmaghrébine, the highway of the revolutions, extends along the flat Mediterranean coast. Youngsters hold up dried fish and crabs. Plastic toys and gutted sheep swing in the gusts of wind from the trucks roaring down the highway. There they are, behind a bulwark of sand, the camps of those who fled Libya, shortly before the last checkpoint in Tunisia, under the flags of organizations like UNHCR and Islamic Relief. The men here come from countries like Somalia, Niger and Sudan. There are reportedly some 1,400 of them still here. Abraham came here from Eritrea. "Eighteen days without seeing a tree," he says, describing his journey. The 36-year-old is a teacher and a computer specialist. He purchased his passage through the desert for $1,600 (€1,230) and worked for the Japanese Embassy in the Libyan capital Tripoli. Then the revolution began, in the guise of a civil war. The refugees say that they are afraid of being beaten to death in the new, liberated Libya because they are black. They can't return to their countries or go back to Tripoli, and they don't want to stay in Tunisia either. "They don't like us," says Abraham. "No matter how well you speak Arabic." The camps are slated to be cleared in early January. Only

600 of them have received official refugee status. What can they do but hope for asylum in Canada, Australia or the EU? Their only way out is north across the sea. The beach is just 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) away. KILOMETER 2,609: Ras Ajdir, Crossing the Border to Libya The walls beyond the border have been transformed into newspapers. They invoke the names of martyrs in fresh paint. They warn traitors, they implore, scold, praise and admonish. "God disapproves: Trading food stamps! And weapons!" and: "NO to terrorism, YES to keeping the peace at night and tracking down spies!" Or, in a somewhat pleading tone: "Oh, youth! You are building our Libya, hand in hand, you have liberated us! You protect the law and private property." High hopes. There was a dormant revolution in Morocco, and a sobering and subdued one in Tunisia, but the upheaval in Libya is still fresh. Step out of the car and you can't help but tread on the spent cartridges that litter the ground. There was recently heavy fighting between two militia groups on this section of the Transmaghrébine. Some of the pick- ups reportedly bore the inscription: "Brigade of the martyr Moammar Gadhafi." The country is visibly saturated with weapons. The most difficult task facing the transitional government is to disarm its citizens again. KILOMETER 2,787: Tripoli, Martyrs' Square There are the same traffic jams as before. What's new, though, are these vehicles -- rusty, banged-up veteran pick-ups with anti-aircraft guns mounted on their cargo beds. It's a relief to see that they stop at the traffic lights like everyone else. The city appears to have survived the fighting relatively unscathed. At the airports and in government buildings, young men loiter about, wearing open camouflage jackets and with sunglasses in their hair. The walls are covered with the names of martyrs, the national colors, slogans and other patriotic graffiti. Uniforms are worn as the latest look, with weapons as accessories. Government agencies resemble alternative youth centers. A book carousel displays works on Islamic history next to the self-help book "Genuine Sexual Fulfillment among Spouses." The trees along the streets are being pruned. "It's very important to cut back the trees," says Abd al-Hakim al-Nadshih. He's sitting in the Café Serail on the edge of Green Square, which is now called Martyrs' Square. "People need to take their minds off things. It may sound strange, but I seriously think that we need a ministry for fun in Libya." Nadshih has studied in the central German town of Marburg. He heads the chamber of commerce and is one of the founders of the "Tripoli Coalition" citizens' forum. The previous evening, the forum had invited all of the heads of the militias to a dinner, one of the first such gatherings since the end of the war. Something really impressed Nadshih: "They all wore a tie." Too Soon for Ideologies There was a militia in nearly every city district -- over 100 in all. Now, tens of thousands of fighters have to be lured out of their pick-ups. Most of them are young and were able to taste the poison of power during the war. "We offer them management

training," Nadshih says. "Then they can return to their old jobs, but are ranked one level higher. That's the least we can do." Gadhafi turned Libya into a chaotic country, played the people against each other and allowed the cities to decay. It's still too early to fight over ideologies, says Nadshih. First, the foundation has to be laid, a modicum of reconstruction. "You Europeans collaborated with our autocrats for decades -- don't start talking about the danger of Islamism now. I would also rather have liberal political parties. But the Islamists are there anyway, whether we like it or not." Even Europe's communists eventually became upright social democrats, he argues. Perhaps Islamism, that lifeline to Arab-Islamic culture, actually has its counterpart in Europe. Perhaps it can be compared with rebellious Catholicism in Poland and with the renaissance of orthodoxy in Russia. In any case, people are thirsting for debate. The newspapers are already sold out by noon. KILOMETER 2,792: Tripoli, Bab al-Aziziya, Gadhafi's Palace Dungeon No one but the tyrant was allowed to set foot in this room in the heart of his palace. A lattice of steel rods, half an inch thick and reaching from the floor to the ceiling, blocks the entrance. No daylight enters the chamber, which is surrounded by thick bunker walls. Gadhafi ruled from this room -- alone, guarded and isolated from all noises. It was his inner sanctuary. It looks like a dungeon cell. The ruler's palace has been gutted by fire, and the surrounding watchtowers, barracks and living quarters have been demolished. The tyrant's lair lies naked, deboned and gutted. The people have dragged out what they could use. Now, only the poorest are here to fetch what should belong to them. One man uses his Toyota to pull a length of cable out of a hole, others burn the plastic insulation from wiring or cut steel pipes out of the rubble. Families carrying bags of popcorn stroll amid the rubble, while souvenir hawkers crouch behind their merchandise. It was here that Gadhafi splashed around with his female playmates, here that he invited guests of state to attend barbecues. A slender, serious-looking man is pushing a cart through the rubble and asks to have his picture taken. "The frizz-head stole 42 years of my life," says Dr. Akram Bennuh, using a mocking Libyan nickname for the curly-haired dictator. He was the manager of the national bank in the 1960s and has now returned to Libya for the first time. Bennuh has made an appointment with the new prime minister. "I know where the money is. I know which companies belong to the clan. I have it all right here." He pats a briefcase. "I'll tell the new government. But I want to be paid -- for 42 years in exile." The landscape beyond Tripoli includes a sprawling trash dump, eucalyptus trees, bleak self-constructed buildings and the ubiquitous tire repair shops. The Transmaghrébine rolls with six freshly paved lanes out of the city and toward the east. The sea is a corrugated metallic blue. "Allahu akbar" ("God is great") is emblazoned at every checkpoint, a connecting tautology, linking people from Rabat to Cairo. Fifteen kilometers before Misrata, in Slitan, the first battlefield can be seen. The lampposts are perforated, and the walls pockmarked with bullet holes. A tank is twisted and crushed as if it were made of children's modeling clay.

KILOMETER 2,999: Misrata, Museum The best way to come to terms with the past is to make a museum. In Misrata, the museum was created directly on the battlefield. It's an unusual repository. Some exhibits look as if they are still warm. This museum, which is housed in a former furniture store, is a mixture of junkyard, arsenal and martyrs' shrine. There is a crossbow made from the laminated spring of a truck's suspension, and right next to it a mobile machine gun bolted to a wheelbarrow. You see carefully arranged ammunition, mines, aerial bombs, hundreds of Russian antitank rocket launchers, helmets and homemade multiple rocket launchers next to beverage cases filled with Molotov cocktails. Two tanks are parked there. Neatly dressed children climb on them as if they were knights slaying a dragon. "They simply brought their weapons and wanted to tell their stories. That's how the museum was created," says the curator of the collection. Some of the exhibits first had to be defused, he says, adding that everything happened very quickly. The room is full of families. Children are shown photos: That was Sithi the butcher, over there is our baker, the one with four sons. The photos of 1,135 martyrs hang in the inner room. Women are not among them, he says, because the families were against the idea. 'Better Off as a Martyr' Photos of battle wounds are exhibited in a display of ostentatious exhibitionism. Nearby are the passports of the mercenaries and traitors and, in the middle of the room, the trophies: a gilded armchair, an honorary dagger once owned by the tyrant. There's also a pair of shoes, allegedly from Gadhafi, made of gray snake leather. They look like something that a pimp might wear. "Respect" is stamped on the insole. Ali al-Tabal is 32 years old. He has carefully gelled his hair and painstakingly selected his T-shirt. But a puppet arm is protruding from his right sleeve. "I was unlucky," he says. "We were just about to retreat when I got shot in the hand. I'd forgotten about the snipers." He pulls off his cheap prosthesis and shows the stump of his arm, which is roughly sewn and looks like the end of a sausage. He hasn't received a single dinar in aid and he can't work anymore. "I would have been better off as a martyr," he says. A delegation enters the room. It's the Kuwaiti ambassador, a gentleman with a pockmarked face who is wearing a gold-edged coat. The near-martyr is shoved to the front. "We're very proud of you. God is great," says the man. He pats Tabal on the shoulder and moves on. Tabal holds onto his prosthesis. The way he stands there quietly amid the crowd, he looks as if he were part of the exhibition himself. 'Our Blood Isn't Pepsi' Reconstruction in Misrata has not yet begun. There are still no cement mixers turning in front of the ravaged façades. People are still busy sweeping. Wherever you look there are men -- old and young, volunteers and day laborers -- sweeping up the debris. The names of martyrs are written on the walls like house numbers -- along with warnings to the cowards and the cautious: "Let's give the returnees a kick in the backside. Misrata belongs to those who fought for its liberation." Parts of the city have been totally destroyed, and Tripoli Street is reminiscent of photos of what war-torn 77

Sarajevo and Grozny once looked like. The traffic lights are working again, and motorists adhere to them -- except for during the evenings and at night when the pick- ups take to the streets and tear around corners with screeching tires as if there were still a war on. A young man careens down the street in his pick-up with a caved-in windshield, oil- saturated fleece seat covers and a cut-open machine gun at his side. There are ammunition boxes on the back of the truck and on top of that, tied to a piece of rebar, flies the rebel flag. The young man is wearing a pirate bandana under a baseball cap with a pair of sunglasses perched on top. There's nobody cooler than he is. "Ali Bani," he introduces himself, in English, and it sounds like "anybody." "I take the truck everywhere," he yells while a group of children admires him. Has he fought? Has he also killed? "Many times," he says. The answer comes without hesitation or emotion. Perhaps it's true nevertheless. Are they allowed to return, those who didn't stay and fight? "Our blood isn't Pepsi," says Ali Bani. "But they're not traitors. I only feel sorry for them." KILOMETER 3,244: Sirte, Corniche After Misrata, the eucalyptus trees become sparser and a reddish, stony desert reaches to the horizon. Now and again there are a few camels or a burned-out bus. The red-black- green of the new Libyan flag is everywhere: on the cars, the shutters of shops, the walls and the burned-out tanks. In Misrata every tree lining the streets was painted in the national colors. But the closer we come to Sirte, the rarer the flags become. Twenty kilometers from the town where Gadhafi was born, and where he died, there's not much more red-black-green to be seen. The tanks parked at the last checkpoint before the city are deserted. There is only a boy sitting on a plastic chair. Yes, he says, he's from Sirte and, yes, he knows where Gadhafi was killed. He gets in the car. Sirte appears to be devoid of people. Only one butcher has hung out his lambs. The power was turned on again in the city only a few days ago. The university is riddled with bullet holes, the ministry buildings are burned out and many apartment blocks have been reduced to cement skeletons by the bullets. Only the streetlights are standing upright, along with celebratory signs from Gadhafi's last "African Union Day." There's no sign of military, militia or police in the city. At the central intersection, two teenagers are brandishing their Kalashnikovs. They're not wearing national colors. "Tell the foreigners they shouldn't talk now," the boy says to the driver. Sirte, Gadhafi's home town, is a conquered city -- not a liberated one. Sometimes at night, a Gadhafi-era green Libyan flag is still hoisted. Loyalists are reportedly still hiding in the town. The inhabitants are returning to their destroyed homes and are said to be full of hate. The driver refuses to stop. He's from Tripoli. KILOMETER 3,613: Between Brega and Ajdabiya The highway runs within sight of the coast, but the Libyans almost seem to want to hide the sea. The beaches are the land's dirty edges, not places that would be proudly presented on the other shore of the Mediterranean with signs like "Il mare" or "El mar."

"Forced to live within view of such a wonderful landscape, the inhabitants surmounted this difficult test by surrounding themselves with ugly buildings. One expects a city that is open to the sea, bathed and refreshed by the evening breezes. And one finds a city that turns its back on the sea." This is how French author Albert Camus described one of these Maghreb cities, the Algerian town of Oran. Roughly 30 kilometers beyond Brega, the oil terminal that still remains closed, rusty car wrecks lie widely dispersed across the stony ground. Some are upside down. Two people, clearly recognizable as foreigners even from a distance, are walking amid the wreckage. The man has his gray hair combed back in a somewhat old-fashioned style. They are Jürgen Todenhöfer, a former politician with Germany's conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and photographer Julia Leeb. In March, their car was hit by a rocket launched by Gadhafi's supporters. Their companion was killed. Todenhöfer and Leeb want to know where the rocket was manufactured. Perhaps in Germany? Todenhöfer finds his burned-out car and pockets the remains of his glasses as a kind of memento mori. He has his doubts about the new era. "The way the rebels treated Gadhafi after they took him prisoner was appalling," he says. "They would have had an opportunity to prove that they are more civilized than the old regime. It's a shame." The Detritus of War The Transmaghrébine now extends through the detritus of war, the junk and the filth, the tires, the shreds of plastic that bloom everywhere and the camel carcasses, whose legs stick up in the air over their bloated stomachs. The highway is, with the exception of an occasional shell hole, the only pure, straight and peaceful place in this landscape. Finally, close to the suburbs of Benghazi, we come across the remains of the kilometer- long convoy whose appearance on the Transmaghrébine on March 17, 2011 tipped the scales in favor of a UN resolution to intervene in Libya. On the afternoon of March 19, French fighter jets attacked this armada of tanks, trucks, tanker trucks, buses and Jeeps. Only half a dozen tanks can still be seen next to a jumble of pick-ups and trucks. It's hard to believe that this military force ever existed. Films on YouTube show cheering supporters and mercenaries who quickly jumped down from trucks to help themselves to tomatoes. A few hours later, they had been incinerated. How can this country reinvent itself? KILOMETER 3,830: Benghazi, Conference Room of the Agricultural Agency There are more than 100, perhaps 150 men -- heads of militias, rebel leaders, freedom fighters and insurgents: the survivors of the liberation. They trudge back to their seats, exhausted after two days of discussions. The rows of seats are still in the green livery of Gadhafi's former regime. There's a sense of unity reminiscent of the French revolutionaries in June 1789 and a hint of the Tennis Court Oath in the room: We shall remain together, despite the power of our own bayonets, and shall not yield until we have reached an agreement. The former commanders from throughout the country have gathered here for the first time ever. Many have never seen each other before. Most of them are still in uniform, but slippers and sandals can be seen on many feet, as if the process of returning to civilian life begins from below. Some are wearing suits, as

if they had been transformed back into the orthopedists, teachers and civil engineers that they were before the revolution. Entering The Second Stage They have been sounding each other out for two days. The secretary now reads the negotiated text, regularly interrupted by calls of "Allahu akbar," or the ringing of a Nokia cell phone. "In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful," he begins. "We have removed the dictatorial regime. Now, the revolution has to enter a second stage and attend to matters of state." There are 14 articles, each one a slogan in the no man's land of liberated Libya. Article 1: Libya is an Islamic country. Article 2: Libya is a modern country, based on the rule of law and with the guarantee of freedom, dignity and integrity of the individual. This is followed by independence of judges, the right to property, human rights and separation of powers. It's a catalogue of basic rights whose value is only truly appreciated by those who have had to live without them their entire lives. Now, all they have to do is vote. A total of 40,000 people have reportedly died. Now it's enough. "Please, now, who is in favor?" Everyone raises their hand. Amid a chorus of "God is great," they raise their hands, men in camouflage uniforms, suits and traditional garb -- men who in most cases abandoned their careers as engineers, insurance salesmen and doctors to halt Gadhafi's army. 'Libya Has a Great Future' "Under certain circumstances, you quickly learn how to drive a tank." This was said by the only German citizen among the rebel leaders. Esam el-Hasairi worked in exile as a mechanical engineer for BMW and operates a large taxi company in Munich. He returned before the revolution and became the head of security in Benghazi. Hasairi is a clever, driven man who finally wants to see his country realize its potential. "We are one of the richest countries and one of the poorest people. We have virtually no debts. We have an abundance of oil, gas and sunlight, 2,000 kilometers of beaches just a one-and-a-half hour flight from Europe and a population of only 6 million," he says, while the commanders withdraw to their hotels. "Libya has a great future. We just have to have the right man in the right place. Doctors should work in hospitals, not factories." Nor should they serve as military commanders. "We cannot allow the 40,000 to have died in vain," says Hasairi before he steps into his armored sedan. He had it imported from Munich at his own expense. It's already survived 12 attacks. Late at night, during the drive back to the center of town, past a ghostly empty district of new apartment buildings, the car lurches after every pothole. Even vehicles have their war injuries. "You know, we don't care which party governs -- as long as there's somebody governing," says Hasairi. He's 55 years old and has just fathered another child. "Actually, we had to carry out the revolution for a very simple reason," he says. "To be able to go to bed at night knowing that the next morning the house would still be standing and your family would still be alive. That's all we want." 80

Translated from the German by Paul Cohen URL: Alexander Smoltczyk Hope Meets Hate in the New Libya01/03/2012 01:14 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,806428,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: A Journey through the New Libya http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-76842.html • The Streets of the Revolution: North Africa, One Year Later (12/22/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,805190,00.html • What the Salafists Want: Egypt Faces a Hardline Islamic Future (12/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,803500,00.html • The Despot's Demise: Gadhafi Legacy a Lasting Burden for Libya (10/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,793612,00.html

Internacional El rey de Marruecos VI nombra al primer Gobierno presidido por un islamista Los ministerios de Exteriores, Justicia e Interior, hasta ahora designados por el monarca, pasan a manos de los partidos políticos Del nacionalismo al islamismo moderado Los islamistas ganan por primera vez las elecciones de Marruecos Agencias Rabat 3 ENE 2012 - 15:57 CET27

El rey Mohamed VI y su hijo Hasán, posan con los nuevos miembros del Gobierno en el palacio real de Rabat. / MAP

El rey de Marruecos ha nombrado hoy al primer Gobierno del país presidido por un islamista, Abdelilá Benkiranen, el que los principales ministerios, hasta ahora designados por el monarca, pasan a manos de los partidos políticos. Según la agencia oficial MAP, las carteras de Exteriores, Justicia e Interior, llamadas "de soberanía", estarán dirigidas por el Partido Justicia y Desarrollo (PJD), las dos primeras, y por el Movimiento Popular (MP), la tercera. El PJD, vencedor en las elecciones del pasado 25 de noviembre, se queda con la mayoría de las carteras del nuevo Ejecutivo, tras arduas negociaciones con los otros partidos de la coalición de gobierno: el nacionalista Istiqlal, el bereber Movimiento Popular (MP) y el ex comunista Partido del Progreso y el Socialismo (PPS). El nuevo Ejecutivo se compone de 30 ministros, de los cuales cinco son independientes, 12 pertenecen el PJD, 6 a Istiqlal, 4 al MP y otros 4 al PPS. Al frente de Exteriores se pone Saad Edine Othmani y Mustafa Ramid lo hace en Justicia, ambos del PJD, mientras que la de Interior la preside Mohand Laenser, del MP. El responsable de Asuntos Islámicos seguirá siendo Ahmed Toufiq (independiente), la Secretaria General del Gobierno sigue en manos de Driss Dahak (independiente), mientras que Abdellatif Ludiyi es el ministro delegado de la Dirección General de Defensa. La formación del nuevo Gobierno se ha hecho esperar debido a los desacuerdos entre los partidos y la reticencia de Mohamed VI sobre algunos candidatos. Benkirán presentó ayer una lista definitiva de sus ministros al Gabinete real tras haber realizado ciertas modificaciones exigidas por el monarca sobre la lista inicial entregada la semana pasada. El nuevo primer ministro será el más poderoso de cuantos ha tenido Marruecos. La nueva Carta Magna ha supuesto un recorte de las atribuciones del monarca en beneficio del jefe del Gobierno. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/03/actualidad/1325602665_20 9549.html Libya Begins Plan to Elect Assembly By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK January 2, 2012 CAIRO — Libya’s interim government posted on its Web site a draft law laying out procedures for electing a planned constitutional assembly, taking a first step toward the establishment of a new government after the overthrow of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. The draft law leaves the most difficult and politically delicate questions, like drawing up districts or settling on an electoral system, to a proposed commission to be named later. Those questions are especially thorny because their answers will inevitably favor some regions or groups over others. The transitional government is already struggling with little success to persuade various local militias around the country to surrender their arms and submit to a central authority. The local chiefs are holding on to their weapons in part to ensure that their local interests do not lose out in the formation of a new government. The law would bar former officials of the Qaddafi government from serving on the panel. But it would not remove them from the current interim administration or from future government jobs. The presence of former Qaddafi government personnel is a common complaint with the transitional administration. The law would allocate 20 of the 200 seats in the assembly to women. The assembly is expected to be chosen by June and empowered to form a government while it writes a new constitution. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/world/africa/libya-sets-plan-for-assembly-on- constitution.html?src=recg 82

PAÍSES MIEMBROS HUNGRÍA Contra Orbán, pero desde dentro 3 enero 2012 Heti Világgazdaság Budapest

Una manifestante protesta contra el Gobierno de Viktor Orbán, el 2 de enero frente a la Ópera de Budapest. AFP/Attila Kisbenedek En Budapest arrecian las protestas contra el primer ministro húngaro, acusado de ser responsable de una deriva autoritaria. Aunque la comunidad internacional empieza a reaccionar, la oposición también debe evitar apoyarse en las injerencias extranjeras, considera el filósofo Gáspár Miklós Tamás. Extractos. Gáspár Miklós Tamás No cabe ninguna duda de que la Comisión Europea y el FMI han impuesto deliberadamente al Gobierno húngaro unas condiciones imposibles de cumplir, con el objetivo probablemente de incitar a que Viktor Orbán dimita. Por eso, la delegación de la UE-FMI ha roto las negociaciones. Mientras, el subsecretario de Estado Norteamericano Thomas O. Melia ha vuelto a manifestar su preocupación respecto a la regresión de la “democracia ciudadana” en Hungría hacia un poder autoritario, dictatorial; Viviane Reding, comisaria de los Derechos Fundamentales en el seno de la UE, ha echado duramente en cara al Gobierno húngaro las continuas violaciones de los principios de una democracia libre y constitucional; estos reproches se enmarcan dentro la línea de duras críticas que emanan del Parlamento Europeo, de la Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa[OSCE], del Consejo de Europa y de la Comisión de Venecia (e incluso del Secretario General de Naciones Unidas). El presidente de la Comisión Europea, José Manuel Barroso, remitió recientemente una carta al primer ministro húngaro en la que le invitaba muy educadamente a no someter a votación en el Parlamento algunos proyectos de ley. Los medios de comunicación escrita más prestigiosos de Europa Occidental, al igual que los de Europa del Este y de Norteamérica y sus periodistas, protestan, se sienten ultrajados y se burlan continuamente y

sin descanso. No se puede imaginar una presión más intensa ni más seria. Únicamente puede incrementarse por la vía de sanciones directas. Mientras, uno de los partidos de la oposición parlamentaria, el LMP (Lehet màs a politika – Por otra política; de centro-izquierda con tintes ecologistas) declara que ya resulta imposible hacer una oposición democrática en esa versión que hasta ahora es pacífica y parlamentaria. Esto trasciende a la calle, donde dos nuevos movimientos prometedores, Szolidaritàs y 4K!, se manifiestan (y auguran manifestaciones todavía más numerosas), los sindicatos se preparan, y nuevos movimientos nacidos de la sociedad civil expresan su deseo de continuar en esa línea de acción. ¿Qué posición con respecto a las presiones extranjeras? La pregunta crucial es saber qué posición tienen las fuerzas de oposición consideradas, o no, de izquierda y/o liberal frente a las presiones que emanan del extranjero (Occidente y las grandes potencias). La respuesta no es evidente. Por un lado, dado el poder aplastante de la derecha antidemocrática, la destrucción de las instituciones democráticas (un hecho casi consumado) podría justificar la intervención occidental a favor de la democracia. Sin embargo, además de querer conservar un régimen representativo y constitucional y una separación de poderes, las potencias occidentales y, en primer lugar, la Comisión Europea, desean que Hungría adopte una política económica que no sirva necesariamente (y esto es un eufemismo) a los intereses del pueblo magiar. El pueblo húngaro, decepcionado en numerosas ocasiones, podría no ver en la “causa democrática” sino un ornamento puesto como colofón a unas medidas de austeridad cada vez más pesadas, impuestas por las potencias occidentales preocupadas por la estabilidad financiera. Si la protección de las instituciones democráticas va necesariamente ligada a un continuo empobrecimiento del pueblo húngaro, no hay porqué extrañarse de que a los ciudadanos húngaros no les entusiasme el binomio que conforman restauración de la democracia liberal y miseria. La mayoría de las críticas occidentales contra el Gobierno son justas, pero el cuerpo electoral húngaro apenas las manifiesta. Los ciudadanos húngaros no delegan cambiar la política de su país, y tampoco pueden hacerlo en las potencias occidentales. No se justifica doblegar a la democracia por medios antidemocráticos impulsados desde el exterior, y la experiencia demuestra que tampoco resulta eficaz aplicar dichos medios. Esta contradicción hace que la posición de la oposición democrática húngara sea muy peligrosa. Por una parte, apoya una política económica y social que combatiría si el Gobierno húngaro la llevase a cabo. Por otro lado, se mostraría solidaria con los procedimientos antidemocráticos – contradiciéndose a sí misma – sin siquiera considerar que, con malevolencia, sería acusada de traición. La independencia, última protección El primer ministro húngaro analiza la situación de la siguiente manera: “A lo largo de la última década, los países occidentales se han refugiado en el recurso al endeudamiento en detrimento de los ingresos por el trabajo para satisfacer los deseos de consumo. Este tipo de endeudamiento se ha tornado incontrolable, sobre todo desde que el propio Estado lo utiliza para financiar su sistema de prestaciones sociales”. Se trata de una verdad a medias que resulta muy nociva y además de un discurso de inspiración neoconservadora, una corriente que supuestamente combate. Al igual que el primer ministro arremete obsesivamente contra la percepción de ingresos sin trabajar, también insiste machaconamente en desmontar un sistema de subsidios sociales, perseverando así en su sombría demagogia contra las subvenciones, puesto que ha sido él 84

quien ha suprimido de hecho las prestaciones por desempleo, quien ha ido en contra de las pensiones, quien ha destruído el sistema sanitario, y quien ha restaurado astutamente el sistema complementario de sanidad privada, de una manera aún más radical que sus predecesores neoliberales [el Gobierno de izquierda de Ferenc Gyurcsány] que únicamente soñaban con ello, pero cuyos proyectos se vieron minaron por los mismos sindicatos que entonces apoyaba Viktor Orban. Entonces ya no hay ninguna divergencia entre el Gobierno de Viktor Orbàn y la UE/FMI. En términos generales, el dilema dentro del propio dilema reside en saber si es necesario o no defender la independencia nacional cuando la soberanía del pueblo está en ruinas y cuando los derechos fundamentales de la libertad se han visto relativizados. La restauración de la democracia sigue siendo un prerrequisito para la restauración de la independencia nacional. La reconstrucción y la renovación de la democracia, que según mi parecer no puede sino provenir de nuevas fuerzas políticas emanadas de la sociedad civil, no debe quedar puesta de antemano en peligro debido a consideraciones temporales tácticas. Mientras no exista una democracia europea confederada, la independencia será nuestra última protección. Se trata de un marco en el que, según las actuales condiciones, se nos permite restablecer e incluso reinventar la soberanía del pueblo. Eso revierte en el interés del pueblo húngaro. Es inquietante que el pueblo húngaro carezca de un aliado fuerte, tanto en el interior como en el exterior del país. Y resulta igualmente importante que los amigos del pueblo sean fieles y consecuentes. CONTEXTO Más poderes para Orbán Entre 70.000 y 100.000 personas se manifestaron en Budapest el pasado 2 de enero para protestar contra la nueva Constitución, que entró en vigor la víspera. El texto, que suprime la referencia a la “República de Hungría”, aumenta el control del Gobierno sobre el Tribunal Constitucional e introduce une referencia directa a Dios, y ha sido interpretado como un instrumento al servicio del Fidesz, el partido del primer ministro Viktor Orbán. También se protesta contra la ley electoral que aprobó el Parlamento el pasado 23 de diciembre. En ella se reduce el número de diputados, se instaura un escrutinio a una única vuelta, aumente el número de firmas necesarias para presentarse a la elecciones, redibuja las circunscripciones y permite votar a las minorías húngaras en el extranjero. Este nuevo modelo de escrutino se considera como un medio de facilitar la victoria del Fidesz en las próximas elecciones. Estas novedades políticas acaecen cuando las negociaciones con el FMI y la UE quedaron interrumpidas el 16 de diciembre. Las dos instituciones consideran que el nuevo estatuto del Banco Nacional de Hungría pone en entredicho su independencia. Paralelamente, el Parlamento ha instaurado una mayoría de dos tercios para modificar cualquier asunto fiscal, lo que hace mucho más difíciles las negociaciones al respecto. El control que las autoridades ejercen sobre los medios de comunicación, parcialmente cuestionado por el Tribunal Constitucional, se ha traducido en una huelga de hambre de dos periodistas de medios públicos. Ambos han sido despedidos. http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/1351011-contra-orban-pero-desde- dentro

Publishing Date: Sat, 03/12/2011 - 08:20

Brotherhood’s quandary Author: Khalil Al-Anani Many have laid blame on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) for failing to join the protesters in Tahrir Square following the eruption of the recent clashes with security forces. Worthy to mention, it was one of the most critical moments the MB has ever faced over the past two decades. The most popular movement in Egypt was trapped between two bitter options: whether to join Tahrir’s saga to appease protesters, however with the possibility of confronting the military and security forces and postponing if not abandoning the parliamentary elections, or to defy the calls for joining the protests, however discredits its public image as an egalitarian rather than elitist movement. Clearly, the MB has chosen the latter to avoid the former. However, to grasp the MB’s decision not to join Tahrir Square protests, we must put it in the larger context which can reveal the rationale behind taking such decision. Over the past few weeks, the relationship between the MB, as well as other Islamists, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has deteriorated due to the dispute over passing the “supra-constitutional principles” document, which puts the Egyptian military above politics. This means, if the MB did join the protests, the relationship with SCAF will become more tense and might lead to serious consequences the MB can not tolerate. In addition, joining Tahrir protests would stamp it by Islamic color which liberal and secular forces will employ against the MB as power display reflects its self- inflation as they typically did with the MB protest in November 18th. More importantly, the ambiguity and uncertainty of how Tahrir gory clashes have been erupted makes any decision by joining the protests precarious, at least according to the MB reading of the events. In such situation, it was tremendously problematic for MB to make any decision that might satisfy the protesters, however, damage the movement in the long term. Not surprisingly, the MB perceived Tahrir protests as an entrapment to implicate it in a confrontation with SCAF as its leaders have repeatedly claimed a conspiracy behind the curtain. As a shrewd and blatantly pragmatic movement, the MB made its decision according to benefits vs. losses calculations. If the MB would have chosen the option of sit-in, it would have satisfied the masses in Tahrir square and affirmed the popular character of the MB as an egalitarian rather than elitist movement. However, such decision would have entailed an unavoidable confrontation with police forces as a response to provocations whether from the angry protesters or as a response to the brutality of police forces. In other words, in either case the MB would find itself in a pickle. If they do not defend the protesters as they did in what is known as "Camel Battle" during the first round of the revolution last February, they will be accused of cowardice and abandonment, while if they do engage they will be accused of using violence and the MB’s violent history during the 1940s will be invoked by its adversaries. Moreover, such decision by sit-in Tahrir would be suicidal for the MB not only will it lead to the

most explicit confrontation with the Egyptian state since 1954, but will also mean losing all the significant gains the MB has achieved since the downfall of Mubarak. Most importantly, if the MB had joined the sit-in and clashed with security forces, this would have meant the disruption of the elections and giving the SCAF a pretext to suspend the whole process of handing over power to an elected civilian government. Something, if it would have happened will take the country into the path of Algerian scenario in the beginning of 1990s whereby elections were suspended and revolution was aborted. For the MB, electionsare fundamental not only because its chances to get the majority of parliament seats, but most importantly because it will be the only tool to de- legitimize SCAF’s rule afterwards. As for the decision not to join Tahrir protests, the gains of the MB as perceived by its leadership are as the following: first, avoiding the inevitable confrontation with the police and the military junta. Second, not providing any excuse for postponing the elections. Third, not providing any pretext for the cancellation of the transfer of power to civilians. Fourth, preventing any increased division between the MB and the political elite. Fifth, avoiding further bloodshed, in light of the potential for a chaotic and uncontrolled situation. In light of such complicated calculations, the MB leadership decided not to join Tahrir protests as the best choice due to the logic of the lesser of two evils. According to them, the damageresulted from such decision can be compensated in the short term, however, the losses incurred by joining the sit-in could be catastrophic and could possibly bring the group back to its pre- 25 January position.However, the big lossof the MB will be if its candidates could not win the elections at the time the movement has already lostmuch of its credibility. And herelies the Brotherhood’s quandary. In short, history will tell if the MB’s decision not to join Tahrir square was the right one. Author: Khalil Al-Anani Scholar at Middle East Institute at Durham University and expert on Islamist Politics. Related News: The Gandhis and the Guevaras Tahrir clashes throw election plans into doubt Egyptians will curse all politicians Publishing Date: Sat, 03/12/2011 - 08:20

Source URL (retrieved on 07/01/2012 - 15:33): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/531281

Publishing Date: Sun, 01/01/2012 - 19:30

Allies for democracy? Or not? Author: Mohamed Gabr Nearly a year after the 25 January revolution, Egypt is in the midst of turmoil. On the brink of civil unrest and economic collapse, there seems to be no end in sight. A nation full of hope, seemingly on the road to democracy and prosperity during the early weeks following the ouster of Hosni Mubarak, is now plagued with doubts. A lot of the blame has been put on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) for its erratic rule, which resulted in the complete mismanagement of the transitional period until the election of the parliament and the president. However, many Egyptians believe that the radicalism of the revolutionary youth is to blame for the outbursts of violent confrontation, and, in spite of mounting evidence of serious human rights violations by the military, Egyptian society is torn between pragmatic denial or apathy and the honorable confrontation of the truth. It has become apparent that the SCAF is not willing to completely let go of power as it tries desperately to ensure that the interests of the military are protected either de facto or through special provisions in the new constitution. This has been met with resistance from Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, as they seek to cautiously rise to power in the wake of their resounding success in the parliamentary elections. Tensions between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood are bound to surface as their future interests collide. It sometimes appears that the SCAF and the Brotherhood are acting in concert; however, this convergence of interests is temporary. The SCAF is keen on organizing an efficient elections process to improve its reputation and solidify its position internally and internationally. The Brotherhood is adamant that the elections proceed at any cost in order for them to secure a parliamentary majority and at last achieve the legitimacy that has eluded the organization for nearly 80 years. However, as this process draws to a close, without a tacit agreement to split power with a mutually agreeable president acting as a buffer between those two significant players in Egyptian politics, confrontation is inevitable. There are several key phases in the democratic transition process, and although the interests of the SCAF and the Brotherhood are aligned in the current phase of the process, the potential for fallout cannot be ignored in the coming phases, especially during the drafting of the constitution and the determination of the composition and powers of the post-elections government. Doubtful that the SCAF will willingly handover power, disgusted at the practices of the SCAF — especially violence and human rights violations — and frustrated that the electoral process has left them without a real say in Egypt’s future, the revolutionary youths are now back in the streets. However, this time around, the youths are unable to secure meaningful support from the masses. In fact, it is undeniable that the majority of Egyptians are either indifferent or against the demonstrations, even sometimes choosing to turn a blind eye to obvious atrocities by the military. Mubarak’s regime, which lasted almost 30 years, managed to wrong so many Egyptians that the possibility of ousting him ignited hope for change among millions of Egyptians, crossing geographic, class, political and religious boundaries. For many people, the SCAF, on the other hand, is

equivalent to the military, the cornerstone of the Egyptian state, and the last somewhat- properly functioning state-run institution. Amid fears of a failed state and a fragmented society, many Egyptians are willing to tolerate transgressions and even atrocities by the SCAF. In this type of environment, the revolutionary youths, mostly liberal and leaning to the left in a far more conservative society, are becoming more and more condemned to the fate of Sisyphus, compelled to roll a huge rock up a hill, only to watch it roll back down. Sadly, this has entailed suffering death, injury, persecution, military trial, brutality — especially against females — and worst of all, character assassination. Strikingly, due to ideological differences and built-up mutual doubts, the revolutionary youths and the Islamists are involved in bitter media battles, with the youth accusing the Islamists of betraying the cause of the revolution, especially the Brotherhood, and the Islamists countering by accusing the demonstrators of undermining stability and democracy. These mutual doubts, and the resulting bitterness and frustration, defy logic, as any neutral observer would conclude that the youths ignited the revolution while the Brotherhood, informally and then formally joining the cause, ensured it was not crushed. Unfortunately, the alliance that brought Mubarak down is collapsing very fast. The revolutionary youths, without popular support or even informal support from the Islamists, are struggling to create momentum against the SCAF, and without outbreaks of unnecessary violence by security forces and/or the military, the youth are largely alone in a fight against a far-stronger adversary. On the other hand, if the youth are crushed within the coming few weeks, confrontation with the SCAF will be inevitable, and the Islamists will run the risk of the military turning against democracy, as was the case in Algeria in the 1990s, or extracting huge concessions from them to avoid such a scenario. Without the support of the youth, who are capable of transcending narrow interests and petty ideological differences, the SCAF could be viewed, both inside and outside the country, as undermining the power of the Islamists as opposed to undermining democracy itself. In short, the youths need the support of the Islamists to corner the SCAF, while the Islamists need the support of the youths to make their fight about democracy and not about power. Both parties should reach a mutual understanding, with the Islamists tolerating the more radical approach of the revolutionary youths, and the latter recognizing that the Brotherhood, in particular, cannot ignore political considerations. Otherwise, the SCAF is likely to crush the revolution, and then concentrate on strangling the nascent democracy and solidifying its power by marking the Islamists as a power-hungry ideological threat to stability and the civil nature of state and society. It could be that the Brotherhood is inclined to believe it will be in a position of relative power and legitimacy after the elections draw to a close; however, it is probably underestimating the ramifications of the SCAF being able to crush the more radical idealistic core of the revolution that brought Mubarak down. Mohamed Gabr is a lawyer and member of Adl Party Related News: Brotherhood’s quandary To whom should power be handed over? Source URL (retrieved on 07/01/2012 - 15:28): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/579181

01/02/2012 03:29 PM NGO Crackdown in Egypt German Think Tank Chief to Be Questioned in Cairo The head of a major German political think tank's Cairo office has been snared in the Egyptian government's crackdown on local and foreign non-governmental organizations operating in the country. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation and other institutions remained closed in the capital on Monday. Despite massive criticism from abroad, Egyptian authorities continue to defend raids conducted last week at the offices of several foreign organizations operating in the country. Among the offices subsequently shut down was the Cairo bureau of Germany's Konrad Adenauer Institute, a think tank named after the former German leader that is aligned with Chancellor Angela Merkel's conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party. Andreas Jacobs, who heads the local office of the institute, is expected to be ordered to appear before the public prosecutor in the coming days, Hans-Gert Pöttering, the head of the Konrad Adenauer Institute in Berlin, told the Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung newspaper. In addition to the institute, the offices of 16 other non-government and pro- democracy organizations, including human rights groups, have been forcefully closed by Egyptian officials in recent days. Pöttering told the newspaper that prosecutors' claims against the organization were baseless. "I call on the Egyptian authorities not to further hinder our valuable work in promoting democratic structures," the former European Parliament president said. "The computers and documents that have been seized must also be returned without delay, as the (ruling Egyptian) military council has also suggested," he added. Pöttering noted that the Konrad Adenauer Foundation has been working for more than 30 years in Egypt and that it has always operated according to democratic principles. The foundation's leader said that Cairo office chief Jacobs had not been provided with any documentation to justify the allegations. Egypt Claims Offices Opened Illegally The raids on Thursday sparked criticism around the world. Germany's foreign ministry called them "unacceptable" and summoned the Egyptian ambassador in Berlin. But the Egyptian transitional government defended its actions over the weekend. Since the insurgency began at the beginning of last year, foreign organizations have "opened offices in an illegal manner in Egypt and violated the law by doing so," Egypt's international cooperation minister, Faiza Aboul Naga, said at a press conference in Cairo on Sunday. Egyptian law prohibits the financing of politically active foreign nongovernmental organizations, she added to justify the actions, noting that Washington has a similar rule. Speaking next to his fellow cabinet member, Egyptian Justice Minister Adel Abdel- Hamid said Egypt had an interest in ensuring that the organizations conduct their work "without being influenced" from the outside. He added they must be "free and independent, but that they must also operate within the framework of the Egyptian 90

constitution." Representatives of the Egyptian democracy movement have accused the military council of seeking to intimidate foreign organizations. Egyptian officials have conversely alleged that foreign organizations have played a role in recent violent protests that threatened to disrupt elections in the country. It's an accusation that all of the organizations have firmly denied. However, countries including Germany are investing significantly in a democratic future for Egypt and other countries whose governments have been toppled over the course of the Arab Spring. In Germany, the federal government has provided additional funding to a handful of its political think tanks that are aligned with major parties to promote the creation of democratic structures in Egypt and other countries. The German Development Ministry has made €5 millionavailable for a democracy fund, €8 million for an employment- generating fund and €23 million for an economic fund. In addition, the German Foreign Ministry is committing €50 million in funding per year through 2013. In the face of continuing demands to expedite the democratic process in Egypt, the country's ruling military council recently announced a shortening of parliamentary elections. Elections for the second chamber, the Shura Council, will take place in two instead of three phases, with the final run-off scheduled for Feb. 22 rather than the originally planned March 11, Egyptian news agency Mena reported. In addition, the Shura will convene for its first session almost a month earlier than previously planned. Under the new plan, both chambers of parliament will begin working sooner to develop a new constitution for the country. The election for the lower house of parliament has been ongoing since November. The third and final phase of the vote begins on Tuesday and will end on Jan. 17. Under the military council's plan for handing over power, both chambers will select members from among their ranks to form a constitutional commission right after the election. Most political parties are pursuing the goal of working out a new constitution prior to a presidential election that is envisioned for June. dsl -- with wires URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,806711,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • What the Salafists Want: Egypt Faces a Hardline Islamic Future (12/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,803500,00.html • Freedoms at Risk: Arab Women Fight to Defend their Rights (11/29/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800447,00.html • Egypt Heads to the Polls: The Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for Power (11/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800338,00.html • Will Vote Be Delayed?: Violence Threatens Historic Egyptian Election (11/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,799775,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'How Can Egypt Vote Under Such Conditions?' (11/21/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,798991,00.html • Riots in Cairo: Sentiment Growing against New Wave of Protests (11/21/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,799014,00.html 91

Internacional Los islamistas de Argelia se miran en Egipto y Túnez

El principal partido religioso deja el Gobierno y marca su perfil opositor Argelia, ¿La tercera revolución? Revueltas en Argelia Ignacio Cembrero Madrid 1 ENE 2012 - 23:41 CET31

Buguerra Soltani, presidente del Movimiento para la Sociedad y la Paz. / REUTERS Los islamistas moderados de Argelia, el Movimiento para la Sociedad y la Paz, van a ir a por todas en las próximas elecciones legislativas previstas para la primavera. Quieren cosechar un éxito similar al de sus correligionarios norteafricanos de Túnez o Marruecos, algo que está probablemente a su alcance si la consulta es libre y transparente. Por esa razón el Movimiento para la Sociedad y la Paz (MSP) anunció hoy domingo que rompe con la Alianza Presidencial, la coalición de tres partidos que apoya al presidente Abdelaziz Buteflika. Sus dos socios gubernamentales son el Frente de Liberación Nacional, el antiguo partido único, y el Reagrupamiento Nacional Democrático, que encabeza el primer ministro Ahmed Ouyahia. Los ministros islamistas saldrán del Ejecutivo.

El anuncio de la ruptura fue hecho por el presidente del MSP, Bouguerra Soltani, el sábado, al término de una reunión de la asamblea del partido, según la agencia oficial de prensa argelina APS. Permanecer dentro de la Alianza es, dijo, “persistir en la mediocridad política” lo que “no sirve de nada al país ni a sus ciudadanos”. Soltani justificó su pertenencia a la Alianza porque hasta ahora “la prioridad” era “la reconciliación nacional” tras la guerra civil larvada que vivió Argelia en los noventa entre islamistas radicales y el Ejército que causó cerca de 200.000 muertos. Pero, según él, ha llegado la hora de “liberarse del doble lenguaje”. El líder islamista Soltani denuncia la restricción de las libertades políticas El líder islamista denunció a continuación “las restricciones de las libertades políticas, de expresión sindicales (…)” e hizo un llamamiento a efectuar auténticas reformas para erigir el Estado de derecho. La Constitución argelina, que debe ser reformada este año, deberá consagrar, según él, “un régimen parlamentario plural y transparente”. Soltani alabó la voluntad declarada de Buteflika de celebrar unas legislativas limpias, bajo control judicial y con presencia de observadores internacionales, pero como no se acaba de fiar que vaya a ser así abogó por la creación de un “frente nacional contra el fraude electoral”. Daba así a entender que las anteriores elecciones estuvieron amañadas. “Si son totalmente libres hay grandes probabilidades de que suceda lo mismo que en Túnez, en Marruecos o en Egipto”, declaró el politólogo Rachid Grim al diario El Watan de Argel. “Unas elecciones libres generarán automáticamente una gran mayoría islamista” porque “el islamismo está instalado en todas partes, en las escuelas, en los barrios, etcétera”, añadía. “Pero no creo en la transparencia de las próximas elecciones”, concluía. Abldelaziz Belkhadem, el líder del antiguo partido único, reconoció, por su parte, que el conjunto de las formaciones islamistas podrían obtener en las legislativas de la primavera entre el 35% y el 40% de los sufragios, pero que no ganarían las elecciones por mayoría absoluta como estuvo a punto de conseguirlo, en Argelia, en enero 1992 el Frente Islámico de Salvación (FIS). Un golpe de Estado militar impidió su victoria. Así empezó entonces la guerra civil larvada. Desmarcándose de la Alianza Presidencial, Soltani intenta también no perder militantes ni votos en las franjas islamistas de la sociedad atraídas por otras dos formaciones del mismo corte ideológico que deberían concurrir a las elecciones: el Frente Nacional para el Cambio y el Frente para la Justicia y el Desarrollo, de Abdala Djaballah, un islamista con pedigrí, pero hostigado por las autoridades. Los que no podrán presentarse a los comicios son los fundadores del FIS, ilegalizado hace 20 años. El Parlamento argelino aprobó a finales de año una ley que lo prohíbe expresamente motivo por el cual Ali Benhadj, el más carismático de los antiguos dirigentes del FIS, llevó a cabo en solitario una sentada de protesta ante la sede de la cámara baja.

Ignacio Cembrero “Los islamistas de Argelia se miran en Egipto y Túnez”, 1 ENE 2012 - 23:41 CET31 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/01/actualidad/1325457662_57784 0.html

Libyan militia captures Gaddafi loyalists over 'bomb plot' Nine men had been planning to blow up Tripoli power grid on New Year's Eve, militia chief says Reuters in Tripoli guardian.co.uk, Sunday 1 January 2012 18.04 GMT

The Libyan militia leader Abdullah Naker said nine Gaddafi loyalists were captured with explosives bought on the black market. Photograph: Ismail Zitouny/Reuters A Libyan militia has captured nine Gaddafi loyalists who had been plotting to blow up Tripoli's power grid on New Year's Eve, its leader has said. "We captured explosives with them that they bought from the black market and now we're interrogating them," the commander of Tripoli's Revolutionist Council, Abdullah Naker, said. Militia groups who helped overthrow Muammar Gaddafi last year still hold considerable power in Libya, and have taken the law into their hands in several areas, setting up road blocks and arresting suspects, despite the presence of an official police force. Naker said the men had been funded by a group of businessmen affiliated to the former leader who was killed in October after militias overran his home town of Sirte. He also accused them of trying to relaunch Gaddafi's official television station Al Jamahiriya. State media, quoting Libya's electricity and renewable energy authority, reported that the men had been planning to set off a number of explosions in Tripoli. Libya's interim government is trying to persuade thousands of militia fighters to join the military, police and civil service and to break up the forces controlled by rival commanders with regional allegiances. It set a deadline of 20 December for militias to leave Tripoli and most withdrew their fighters and dismantled checkpoints last week. Naker said some returned to the capital on Saturday in a show of strength to Gaddafi supporters that he said were still at large, threatening the country. He and other militia chiefs have said they want guarantees that their fighters will be paid well by the government before letting them go. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/01/libyan-militia-captures-gaddafi-loyalists/print 94

La represión en Siria provoca 5.862 muertes en 2011, según la oposición Efe | Madrid

Actualizado domingo 01/01/2012 16:25 horas La cifra de muertos a lo largo de 2011 por la represión en Siria alcanzó los 5.862, según ha informado el grupo opositor Comités de Coordinación Local, que realiza un seguimiento diario de las víctimas registradas tras el comienzo de las protestas contra el régimen de Bachar al Asad el pasado marzo. Entre los fallecidos se cuentan 395 menores y 146 mujeres, explicaron en un comunicado los Comités, que agregaron que 287 personas perdieron la vida tras haber sufrido torturas a manos de las fuerzas de seguridad sirias. El nuevo año ha comenzado de la misma forma sangrienta en Siria, según este grupo, con la muerte en las primeras horas del domingo de dos personas en Hama (centro), uno de los bastiones de los sublevados contra Al Asad. La primera persona en perder la vida en 2012 fue Mahmud Anas Al Shamy, que murió por la falta de plasma sanguíneo en el hospital de Al Hekma, adonde había sido trasladado el jueves tras ser herido en una manifestación, según la fuente. Los Comités denunciaron que hay francotiradores apostados en los edificios altos de Hama y que se escuchan disparos en muchas partes de la ciudad. La acción represora del régimen sirio persiste pese a la presencia en el país de una misión de observadores de la Liga Árabe, que debe verificar el cese de la violencia y el repliegue de las fuerzas de seguridad y el Ejército. Los observadores enviados por la Liga Árabe se han desplegado en las ciudades de Homs y Hama, en el centro; Idleb, en el norte; y Deraa, en el sur; y hasta el momento han podido moverse con libertad, según dijo el pasado sábado en El Cairo el jefe de Operaciones de la misión, Adnan Isa al Jodeir. Los dos principales grupos de la oposición al régimen, el Consejo Nacional Sirio (CNS) y la Coordinadora Nacional de la Fuerzas del Cambio Democrático (CNFCD), tienen previsto presentar ante el secretario general de la Liga Árabe, Nabil al Arabi, su proyecto común para la transición en Siria, alcanzado el sábado. Efe La represión en Siria provoca 5.862 muertes en 2011, según la oposición 01/01/2012 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/01/01/internacional/1325414461.html

ACTUALIZA1-Grupos oposición Siria firman acuerdo futuro sábado 31 de diciembre de 2011 18:55 GYT Por Erika Solomon BEIRUT (Reuters) - Dos de los principales partidos de oposición en Siria desarrollaron una hoja de ruta para la democracia en caso de que las protestas masivas tengan éxito en derrocar al presidente Bashar al-Assad, según una copia de un documento al que Reuters tuvo acceso. Cientos de miles de manifestantes salieron a las calles de Siria el viernes para mostrar la fuerza de su movimiento a observadores de la Liga Arabe que vigilan si Assad está cumpliendo o no con la promesa de detener su represión armada contra la revuelta. El Observatorio Sirio de Derechos Humanos, con sede en Londres, dijo que fuerzas de seguridad mataron a 27 personas el viernes en área donde no había observadores, lo que elevó la cifra de víctimas en un conflicto que, según la ONU, ha acabado con la vida de más de 5.000 personas, la mayoría de ellos civiles desarmados. El Observatorio dijo que cuatro civiles más fueron abatidos a tiros el sábado, tres de ellos por francotiradores. Los cuerpos de tres detenidos también fueron llevados a casa y una mujer falleció debido a una herida de bala. El principal grupo de oposición en el exilio, el Consejo Nacional Sirio (SNC, por su sigla en inglés), firmó el acuerdo con la Comisión Nacional de Coordinación, un grupo cuya mayoría está dentro del país y que ha tenido desavenencias con los llamados del SNC a la intervención extranjera. Bajo su pacto, los dos lados "rechazan cualquier intervención militar que afecte a la soberanía o la estabilidad del país, sin considerar una intervención árabe como extranjera". El sábado, activistas sirios expresaron sus pocas expectativas de que la visita que están realizando monitores de la Liga Arabe al país pueda poner fin a la represión de ya nueve meses que está imponiendo Assad sobre las protestas. Los activistas han hecho un llamado a los Estados Arabes a tomar medidas más firmes destinadas a poner fin a los derramamientos de sangre. El acuerdo considera un período de transición de un año, que podría renovarse una sola vez de ser necesario. Durante ese lapso, el país adoptaría una nueva Constitución "que asegure un sistema parlamentario para un Estado democrático y pluralista y que garantice el cambio de poder mediante elecciones para un Parlamento y un presidente de la república". El documento señala que el acuerdo se presentará a otros grupos opositores durante una conferencia el mes próximo. Moulhem Droubi, un miembro de alto rango del SNC, que

pertenece a los Hermanos Musulmanes sirios, confirmó a Reuters que el documento se firmó el viernes. MANIFESTACIONES MASIVAS El texto establece también que la libertad religiosa estará garantizada por la nueva constitución y condena cualquier señal de sectarismo o de "militarización sectaria". La violencia durante las manifestaciones ha provocado temores de violencia sectaria porque buena parte del movimiento sirio es de mayoría musulmana sunita. Assad es apoyado por muchos miembros de la minoría alauita, a la que pertenece. El jefe del Consejo Nacional Sirio, Burhan Ghalioun, dijo el viernes que si el Gobierno no implementa el plan de paz, "no hay otra solución excepto ir al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU y creo que estamos caminando al Consejo de Seguridad". El sábado, miles de manifestantes salieron a las calles en Idlib, llevando los cuerpos de tres camaradas muertos y envueltos en sábanas blancas y cubiertos de hojas. "El mártir es amado por Dios y Assad es enemigo de Dios", gritaron los manifestantes, según testigos. La mayoría de los medios extranjeros tiene prohibido operar en Siria, lo que hace difícil verificar los informes de testigos. La agencia de noticias estatal SANA informó ampliamente sobre "manifestaciones masivas" en toda Siria el viernes en apoyo a Assad y contra "el complot al que está expuesta Siria". SANA afirmó que los manifestantes habían denunciado "la presión y campañas arbitrarias contra la seguridad y la estabilidad de Siria" y las "mentiras e invenciones de los engañosos canales de medios" que habían causado derramamiento de sangre siria. "Creo que en este punto es obvio que la Liga Arabe necesita tomar una postura más enérgica", dijo el activista Manhal Abu Bakr por teléfono desde Hama. "Ha pasado casi una semana y ellos (los observadores) no han detenido las matanzas", añadió. El secretario general de la Liga Arabe, Nabil Elaraby, dijo al comienzo de la misión que debería tomar sólo una semana para establecer si Assad estaba cumpliendo o no con sus promesas. (Reporte adicional de Mariam Karouny en Beirut y Ayman Samir en El Cairo; escrito por Douglas Hamilton y Erika Solomon; Editado en español por Marion Giraldo y Patricio Abusleme) http://lta.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idLTASIE7BU03520111231

Un comité árabe pide retirar a los observadores de Siria domingo 1 de enero de 2012 14:08 CET EL CAIRO (Reuters) - Un organismo de asesoría de la Liga Árabe pidió el domingo la retirada inmediata de la misión de observadores que ha desplegado la organización en Siria, afirmando que está permitiendo a Damasco cubrir su violencia y abusos continuados. La Liga Árabe ha enviado un pequeño equipo a Siria para comprobar si el presidente, Bashar el Asad, está cumpliendo su promesa de poner fin a la represión contra las revueltas opositoras iniciadas hace nueve meses. La misión de observadores ya ha provocado polémica. Varios grupos de derechos han informado de nuevas muertes en enfrentamientos y docenas de miles de manifestantes han tomado la calle para mostrar a la delegación el nivel de su descontento. También el líder sudanés de la misión sembró indignación al sugerir que su primera impresión de Homs, uno de los principales centros de las protestas, había sido tranquilizadora. El Parlamento Árabe, un comité asesor de 88 miembros formado por delegados de los estados de la Liga, dijo el domingo que la violencia sigue cobrándose muchas víctimas. "Que esto ocurra en presencia de los observadores árabes ha despertado la ira del pueblo árabe y niega el propósito de enviar una misión que descubra los hechos", afirmó el presidente de la organización, Ali al Salem al Dekbas. "Esto da al régimen sirio una cobertura Árabe para continuar sus acciones inhumanas bajo los ojos y oídos de la Liga Árabe", añadió. El Parlamento Árabe fue el primer organismo en recomendar la suspensión de la membresía siria en la organización como respuesta a la represión de Asad. Un miembro de la Liga Árabe dijo a Reuters, comentando el comunicado del Parlamento, que es demasiado pronto para juzgar el éxito de la misión, añadiendo que tiene previsto permanecer un mes en Siria y que van a enviarse más observadores. El parlamento pidió al secretario general de la Liga Árabe, Nabil Elaraby, que organice una reunión de ministros árabes de Exteriores para tomar la decisión de retirar inmediatamente a la misión. El abuso y asesinato continuados de civiles sirios inocentes es "una flagrante violación del protocolo de la Liga Árabe", dijo Dekbas. La agencia estatal siria SANA dijo que el viernes se habían realizado "manifestaciones masivas" en el país en apoyo de Asad, denunciando "la trama a la que se ha visto expuesta Siria".

Los manifestantes, según la agencia, denunciaron "la presión y campaña tendenciosa contra la seguridad y estabilidad siria" y las "mentiras e invenciones de los canales de medios engañosos". Las autoridades sirias han acusado a las potencias extranjeras de armas y financiar "terroristas" en su país y dicen que 2.000 de los soldados del Gobierno y la policía han sido asesinados. Un comité árabe pide retirar a los observadores de Siria1 de enero de 2012 14:08 CET http://es.reuters.com/article/topNews/idESMAE80002F20120101?sp=true

REPORTAJE: LA GRAN CRISIS Y el 15-M desbordó fronteras Este movimiento fue uno de los fenómenos que en 2011 colocaron a España en el mapamundi. En un año marcado por las malas noticias, aportó un soplo de aire fresco y combativo con su ADN no violento

España tenía todas las papeletas para alumbrar esta protesta: millones de parados, crisis, jóvenes con empleos precarios... La exportación del modelo se gestó en junio en una pequeña asamblea en la plaza del Carmen de Madrid Una clave del éxito fue el lema de la primera convocatoria: "No somos mercancía en manos de políticos y banqueros" Un gran parte de quienes integran este movimiento rechazan convertirse en un partido político más JOSEBA ELOLA 31/12/2011 99

Dice Eduardo Galeano que hay un nuevo mundo latiendo en el vientre del mundo en que vivimos: "Hay un mundo que puede ser latiendo en este mundo que es". Las palabras del escritor uruguayo, tan certero en la prosa como poético en el verbo, se pueden escuchar en un vídeo que aloja la web de los indignados chilenos ( www.chileindignado.cl). Las pronunció a principios de diciembre, en plena plaza de Catalunya, adonde acudió a solidarizarse con la acampada de Barcelona. "Este mundo de mierda está embarazado de otro y son los jóvenes los que lo llevan adelante", proclamó enfático. "Y yo lo reconozco en estas manifestaciones espontáneas". Ese mundo que late dentro de este latió en las calles españolas un 15 de mayo de 2011. Siguió latiendo en días posteriores, revolucionando los días previos a unas elecciones cruciales. Su latido traspasó barrios, provincias, fronteras. Latió, latió, latió. Y al llegar octubre, el latido se escuchó en plazas de medio mundo. España exportó un latido, el latido de los indignados. El Movimiento 15-M es uno de los fenómenos que en 2011 colocaron a España en el mapamundi. En un año marcado por las malas noticias, aportó un soplo de aire fresco y combativo. Su ADN no violento, horizontal, asambleario, marcadamente democrático, apoyado en las redes sociales y construido sobre la ocupación de plazas, revolucionó las calles en España y generó un nuevo modelo de protesta. Los indignados españoles han marcado un cambio de época en la historia de las movilizaciones sociales. Una nueva generación de activistas muy conscientes de sus derechos ciudadanos incorporaron las nuevas tecnologías a la protesta civil, vitaminaron las calles desde las redes. La noche del 23-F de 1981 fue bautizada como la noche de los transistores. En el caso del 15-M, el día 16 de mayo podría haber sido bautizado como el día del tuit: en esa jornada, la protesta española se convirtió en trending topic mundial, es decir, en uno de los temas comentados en la red social Twitter. La #spanishrevolution tomó la Red. La tormenta digital no se quedó en el mundo online, saltó a la calle. Y se transformó en una masiva e inesperada concentración el martes 17 de mayo en la Puerta del Sol, el martes mágico: a las ocho de la tarde, citados a través de las redes, cerca de 6.000 manifestantes se congregaban en la plaza que simbolizaría la protesta. "No estamos en Facebook, estamos en la calle", proclamaban los jóvenes en la plaza. España tenía todas las papeletas para alumbrar una protesta multitudinaria: crisis profunda, cinco millones de personas en paro, desahucios, jóvenes con precarias perspectivas laborales. Pero nadie previó que el 15-M pudiera cosechar semejante cadena de éxitos. En un año, tres movilizaciones (15-M, 19-J, 15-0) y tres llenazos. Cuentan los cronistas que nadie previó tampoco el Mayo del 68 francés. En un principio, los más escépticos recurrieron a manos negras y demás teorías conspiranoides para explicar lo que germinaba en las calles. Era difícil de asimilar que, una semana antes de unas elecciones cruciales, legiones de ciudadanos gritaran pidiendo una democracia real ya. Una de las claves del éxito fue el lema de la primera convocatoria del 15 de mayo: "No somos mercancía en manos de políticos y banqueros". Bajo este paraguas, el 15-M consiguió, en sus primeros compases, unir sensibilidades muy distintas. El rechazo a la corrupción rampante unió voluntades. La trama Gürtel, el caso Brugal, el caso Palma Arena, el saqueo del Palau de la Música en Cataluña, los ERE

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fraudulentos en Andalucía, el culebrón de la trama corrupta marbellí... La confianza en las profesionalizadas clases políticas se ha venido laminando año tras año. Los gritos también se alzaron contra bancos y mercados. Tres años después del rescate de las entidades financieras, nada ha cambiado. Tres años después de anuncios como el de Nicolas Sarkozy, que llamó a refundar el capitalismo, las economías europeas aparecen en manos de las agencias de rating. La desregulación de los mercados, la confianza en la mano invisible de Adam Smith, se reveló como una trampa total para los indignados. Se acude al rescate de los bancos y de las economías, sí, pero ¿quién acude al rescate del ciudadano? "¿Por qué gobiernan los mercados si yo no los he votado?", rezaba una camiseta del 15- M. Las maniobras del sistema financiero fueron alimentando la indignación. Bonus para el que más se endeuda, para el que concede hipotecas basura; recompensas para los que arruinan a sus empresas, que al abandonarlas se llevan, encima, un buen pellizco. Las perversiones del capitalismo a la vista de todos, expuestas en películas como Inside job, denunciadas por intelectuales como Stéphane Hessel en el panfleto ¡Indignaos! o el escritor José Luis Sampedro. Los indignados españoles han generado un nuevo modelo de protesta. No han inventado la pólvora, pero construyeron un modelo que acabó siendo imitado. El 15-M, de hecho, bebió de otras revueltas, tuvo sus fuentes de inspiración. Dos fueron sus principales referentes: por un lado, Islandia, donde las protestas ciudadanas desencadenaron reformas constitucionales; por otro, la llamada primavera árabe, donde las redes sociales catalizaron las movilizaciones. El 15-M se define por su horizontalidad. Una horizontalidad que en algunos casos dificultó la toma de decisiones, pero que sirvió para crear consensos. Se desprecian las estructuras verticales. Las decisiones se toman mediante procesos asamblearios en la red y en la calle. La ciudadanía es el nuevo sujeto central. Los procesos asamblearios en red son caóticos, sí, pero a fuerza de ir sumando propuestas se generan consensos. Las redes son inteligentes. Es un movimiento fundamentalmente reformista. A pesar de la etiqueta #spanishrevolution, reivindica una democracia más participativa, que cuente con las herramientas digitales para incorporarlas al proceso de toma de decisiones, reivindica un sistema electoral que dé voz a las minorías y destierre el bipartidismo. Los indignados no creen en los políticos y en unas viejas instituciones anquilosadas, pero sí en la política. Consideran que las estructuras tradicionales no dan las respuestas adecuadas al momento presente, sino que actúan al son del statu quo y bailan al ritmo de los mercados. Lejos de las interpretaciones de ciertas cavernas periodísticas que vieron en el movimiento a un hatajo de perroflautas antisistema bañados "en olor a porro", como se escuchó en una memorable entrevista del canal Intereconomía, el 15-M fue y es democrático y no violento. Se produjo el episodio del asalto a los parlamentarios catalanes, sí, un capítulo lamentable que solo se puede atribuir a elementos que se colaron en unas protestas y en una forma de protestar que no era la suya. De hecho, elementos hubo en todas las plazas. El movimiento abrió sus brazos y no pudo impedir que se les colaran algunos indeseables. Como los que, sin escrúpulo alguno, se llevaron

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una quincena de ordenadores de una de las carpas que rodeaban la estatua del impertérrito Carlos III en Sol. No recurren a la violencia, pero sí a la desobediencia civil. Ese es uno de los elementos clave de su ADN. Y ese es uno de los factores que se exportaron a Nueva York: la ocupación del espacio público. El 15-M traspasó fronteras y exportó su modelo más allá de las fronteras. De hecho, esa exportación se gestó en una pequeña asamblea en la madrileña plaza del Carmen. El 17 de junio de 2011, un mes después de la manifestación a la que acudieron 80.000 ciudadanos en las principales ciudades españolas, unas 40 personas se reunieron a las cinco de la tarde. Había norteamericanos, franceses, griegos, argentinos... y una chica israelí, Aya, que se llevó varios manuales de activista de la acampada de Sol. Nada más llegar a Tel Aviv, tradujo al hebreo la Guía de asambleas y el Cómo cocinar una revolución, material que sirvió a los jóvenes que se alzaron el 14 de julio. El modelo de www.tomalaplaza.net también sirvió de inspiración para crear la web que vertebraría las protestas del verano en Israel y las de Nueva York en septiembre con el movimiento Occupy Wall Street. La protesta global del 15-O fue anunciada por los indignados españoles poco después del 15-M. Tras meses de arduo trabajo, 951 ciudades de 82 países se sumaron a la cita. La indignación frente a la actuación de los políticos, los mercados financieros y la banca volvía a unir a los manifestantes, esta vez de todo el planeta. En España, la convocatoria volvía a ser un éxito rotundo, con cientos de miles de personas marchando por las calles bajo el lema Unidos por un cambio global y con la emblemática Puerta del Sol nuevamente abarrotada. Poco después de la protesta global, Metroscopia publicaba un sondeo que ponía de manifiesto las simpatías que el movimiento ha recabado en la población española. Siete de cada diez españoles piensan que el movimiento tiene razón en sus reivindicaciones, un 73% de la población. De hecho, algunas de sus propuestas acabaron abriéndose paso en los programas de algunos de los partidos que concurrieron a las elecciones del 20-N. El socialista Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba dejó caer en su cara a cara con Mariano Rajoy, el entonces candidato del PP y hoy ya presidente del Gobierno, que la democracia española ya está lo suficientemente madura como para plantearse una revisión de la Ley Electoral. A pesar del amplio apoyo popular, cada una de sus convocatorias fue mirada con lupa. Cada vez que dejaron de aparecer en los medios de comunicación por espacio de 15 días se habló del ocaso del movimiento. Resultados, resultados, resultados. El cortoplacismo lleva a exigir resultados inmediatos, resultados ya, cuando lo importante es el proceso: el 15-M ha abierto un proceso. Un proceso del que solo hemos visto el inicio. Los más jóvenes no están atontados frente al ordenador, ni están embobados con las nuevas tecnologías. Saben utilizar las nuevas herramientas para desafiar al sistema. Conocen sus derechos. El movimiento ha tenido y tiene sus problemas. Su estructura horizontal ralentiza la toma de decisiones. De hecho, Democracia Real Ya ha empezado a tomar decisiones por mayoría para agilizar los procesos. La diversidad del propio 15-M dificulta los consensos en acciones concretas. Se han producido roces entre estructuras: DRY, Acampadas, Barrios, Comisiones. Ha habido momentos, antes del verano, en los que el ritmo de concentraciones era tan alto que se desgastó la capacidad de convocatoria. El 102

riesgo de diluirse en decenas de propuestas, las que elabora cada una de las comisiones, existe. Acotar objetivos y poner de acuerdo a las múltiples sensibilidades que habitan el movimiento es uno de los retos que afrontan. Pero lo relevante es que el 15-M se ha convertido en una referencia. Vivimos tiempos de cambio. El mundo está cambiando de piel, las incertidumbres afloran. La revolución digital debería llegar de algún modo a la arena política, las herramientas para consultar a la ciudadanía existen, pero los partidos políticos siguen funcionando con los viejos esquemas. Lo que está claro es que la ciudadanía pide paso, quiere que su voz sea escuchada. Y por eso gran parte de los integrantes del movimiento rechazan convertirse en partido político. No quieren darse un barniz de burocracia que les conduzca al anquilosamiento. Quiere ser un lobby social. Presionar. ¿Acaso no lo hacen las grandes empresas y los bancos? Pues los ciudadanos también. - JOSEBA ELOLA Y el 15-M desbordó fronteras 31/12/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/domingo/15- M/desbordo/fronteras/elpepuesp/20120101elpdmg_3/Tes REPORTAJE: LA GRAN CRISIS Intifada, no primavera El gran riesgo de las revueltas árabes radica en que se produzcan vacíos de poder y en la tentación de sustituir los corsés dictatoriales por las viejas afinidades religiosas y de clanes ENRIC GONZÁLEZ 31/12/2011 Las poblaciones árabes han irrumpido este año en la historia del mundo. Varios siglos bajo la dominación otomana y europea, una descolonización zafia trazada por las potencias occidentales y la progresiva esclerosis del nacionalismo panarabista, que degeneró en una serie de regímenes tan opresivos como corruptos, habían convertido a los árabes en un paradigma de decadencia fatalista. En 2011 ha cambiado el viento. Los árabes sienten que su futuro depende de ellos mismos. La cadena de convulsiones conocida como primavera árabe está aún lejos de terminar y el renacimiento político, de momento marcado por el islamismo, se enfrenta a inmensas dificultades socioeconómicas. Pero la vehemencia con que millones de personas reclaman su derecho a la dignidad hace pensar que el fenómeno desembocará en unos sistemas más participativos que los que se derrumban ahora. Quizá el término intifada, traducible como sacudida o revulsión, sería más adecuado, pese a su vinculación a la cuestión palestina, que la optimista referencia a los brotes primaverales. La emotiva historia del frutero tunecino Mohamed Bouazizi, cuya inmolación, el 18 de diciembre de 2010, detonó una pequeña revuelta local que creció con rapidez y en menos de un mes derribó al presidente Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, suscitó la impresión de que las dictaduras árabes iban a transformarse en democracias de forma relativamente incruenta. Esa impresión se reforzó con la crisis egipcia: el 28 de enero, los manifestantes derrotaron a la policía y tomaron la plaza de Tahrir, en El Cairo; al cabo de solo 14 días,

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el 11 de febrero, dimitió el presidente Hosni Mubarak. La fuerza hipnótica de Tahrir, escenario de batallas y debates multitudinarios retransmitidos en directo a todo el planeta, influyó en movimientos tan remotos como el de los indignados occidentales. Aquel atisbo de primavera resultó hasta cierto punto engañoso. Cuando la intifada llegó a Libia, a mediados de febrero, adoptó la forma de una guerra civil y suscitó una casi inmediata intervención de la OTAN contra las fuerzas de Muamar el Gadafi, un grotesco dictador petrolero al que hasta poco antes se mimaba en los foros internacionales. Las estimaciones más prudentes cifran el número de muertos en 15.000, y el país, invertebrado y mísero pese al petróleo (las favorables estadísticas de desarrollo humano de la ONU no guardan relación con el subdesarrollo que se percibe en sus calles), corre peligro de inestabilidad crónica. También a mediados de febrero cristalizó la protesta en Yemen, con altas dosis de violencia y sin que la largamente demorada dimisión del presidente, Ali Abdulá Saleh, el mes pasado, haya aclarado las perspectivas. En Siria, donde las protestas comenzaron a mediados de marzo en una ciudad poco importante como Daraa, se han superado ya los 5.000 muertos según la ONU, y el régimen de Bachar el Asad se muestra todavía fuerte frente a una oposición fragmentada. El riesgo más sangriento que afronta el proceso de cambio árabe no es la resistencia del viejo orden, por feroz que esta resulte. Tampoco lo es la situación de calamidad económica, desempleo masivo y desequilibrio demográfico a favor de los adolescentes y los jóvenes. El gran riesgo, a corto plazo, radica en que se produzcan vacíos de poder y en la tentación de sustituir los corsés dictatoriales por las viejas afinidades religiosas y de clanes. La posibilidad de que la hegemonía de los Hermanos Musulmanes y el movimiento salafista en Egipto, reflejada en las elecciones en curso, derive hacia un conflicto con la minoría cristiana (10% de la población) palidece ante la hipótesis de un conflicto intermusulmán en Oriente Próximo. Las dos grandes ramas del islam, sunismo y chiismo, mantienen una convivencia precaria. Cualquier alteración del statu quo, consistente en general en la dominación de los suníes sobre los chiíes, implica un alto potencial de inestabilidad. Esa es la experiencia de Irak, donde la caída de un régimen teóricamente laico pero apoyado en la tradición suní ha supuesto un vuelco a favor de los partidos chiíes y ha generado resentimientos en amplios sectores suníes. Además de costar más de 400.000 vidas, la invasión liderada por Estados Unidos ha avivado los conflictos sectarios y deja al país en una situación de guerra civil larvada. En ningún lugar es tan grande ese riesgo como en Siria. El régimen baasista de la familia El Asad es, como lo fue el régimen baasista de Sadam Husein, teóricamente laico (aunque su Constitución establece que la ley islámica es la base de todo el entramado jurídico); en la práctica, el régimen se apoya en una élite militar y burocrática perteneciente a la minoría alauí, una secta chiita. Alauíes y cristianos sirios han convivido pacíficamente con la mayoría suní durante décadas. Pero el que la revuelta contra Bachar el Asad esté mayoritariamente protagonizada por suníes, y que las minorías alauí y cristiana se mantengan en general del lado del presidente, abre divisiones religiosas en amplias zonas del país. En Homs, por ejemplo, los barrios suníes y alauíes están separados por puestos de control y se han cometido docenas de asesinatos sectarios. Resulta significativo que Alepo y Damasco, las dos grandes ciudades donde la burguesía mercantil suní se ha beneficiado del

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régimen y no predominan sentimientos de discriminación, permanezcan casi ajenas a la crisis. Los problemas entre suníes y chiíes se extienden al golfo Pérsico. Ni siquiera países tan ricos como Bahréin y Arabia Saudí escapan al problema. En el pequeño Bahréin, donde la población chií es mayoría (eso solo ocurre en otros dos países, Irán, que no es árabe, y tal vez en Irak, donde no está claro cuál es la confesión más numerosa), la monarquía suní ha reprimido violentamente las reivindicaciones chiíes con el apoyo militar saudí. En Arabia Saudí, cuya versión del sunismo, el wahabismo, es la más extrema y ultraconservadora, el Ejército ha acallado también las protestas de la comunidad chií en la zona petrolera oriental. En un sentido o en otro, la gran intifada árabe está marcada por la religión. Incluso como trasfondo estratégico: la Arabia Saudí suní y el Irán chií (cuyo único aliado, Siria, podría cambiar de bando) libran una guerra encubierta, en la que Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea apuestan por los saudíes. La presión internacional y las sanciones contra Irán para frenar su programa nuclear, que provoca auténtico terror en las monarquías petroleras, pueden evolucionar hacia un escenario bélico. Israel lleva años preparando un posible ataque preventivo cuyos efectos se extenderían al conjunto de la región, empezando por el hipercombustible Líbano, donde Irán dispone de la milicia chií Hezbolá, en estos momentos la mayor fuerza política y militar del país. Una hipotética nueva guerra en el Golfo exacerbaría las tensiones internas en el conjunto de las sociedades árabes, al margen de sus consecuencias humanitarias y económicas. Las revueltas no surgieron de la nada, ya se habían registrado síntomas previos de malestar, pero adquirieron importancia de forma relativamente espontánea y al margen de liderazgos políticos. En ninguno de los países implicados existe un Nelson Mandela, ni alguien remotamente parecido, capaz de ejercer como referencia del cambio y de tender puentes entre el viejo y el nuevo orden. Lo único disponible son los Hermanos Musulmanes, organización supranacional suní fundada en 1928 en Egipto, que ha resistido la represión de los regímenes militares y ha desarrollado, con ayuda de donaciones saudíes, una importante obra social. Los Hermanos Musulmanes son el patrón del islamismo más o menos moderado que ha asumido el poder en Túnez, que está en vías de asumirlo en Egipto y que posiblemente ofrece la alternativa más realista al actual régimen sirio. Las continuas invocaciones a la experiencia de Turquía, donde el islamismo ha conseguido domeñar al Ejército, funcionar en una democracia parlamentaria y auspiciar un auge de la economía y la influencia diplomática, son sinceras. Habrá que ver si el modelo turco, propio de un país perteneciente a la OTAN y aspirante frustrado al ingreso en la Unión Europea, es exportable a realidades muy distintas. Conviene señalar que Arabia Saudí, el país con mayor capacidad financiera para influir en el juego político regional, exporta un islamismo integrista: es el salafismo, que en Egipto ha obtenido uno de cada cuatro votos. El auge salafista, muy discriminatorio contra la mujer, coloca un interrogante sobre la evolución del islamismo representado por los Hermanos Musulmanes. Cabe pronosticar que cuanto mayor sea la resistencia al cambio del Ejército egipcio, auténtico núcleo del antiguo régimen, y cuanto mayores sean las fricciones entre la junta militar y el Parlamento islamista que debería constituirse en los próximos meses, más tenderán los Hermanos Musulmanes a radicalizarse.

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Ningún país árabe ha quedado al margen de la primavera, o la intifada. Los efectos provisionales del fenómeno han sido muy distintos en cada uno. En monarquías como Marruecos, Arabia Saudí, Kuwait o Jordania han puesto en marcha tímidas reformas políticas y algunas mejoras sociales; en Argelia y Mauritania, las protestas han sido débiles; en Túnez ha caído la dictadura y se abre un horizonte relativamente prometedor; en Líbano se perciben síntomas de contagio de la tensión siria entre suníes y chiíes; en la Palestina ocupada por Israel se perfila una difícil reconciliación entre los nacionalistas de Fatah y los islamistas de Hamás; en Bahréin se ha combinado la represión armada sobre los chiíes con gestos de apertura; en Yemen impera la confusión; en Libia y Siria prevalece la violencia y las perspectivas son inciertas, igual que en Egipto, la potencia cultural de cuya transición depende en gran parte el futuro de Oriente Próximo y el norte de África. Sobre las causas de un estallido tan súbito y generalizado se ha teorizado en abundancia. Las razones de fondo son obvias: regímenes dictatoriales, corrupción, tortura sistemática, pobreza y, por encima de todo, ausencia de perspectivas de mejora. Lo que moviliza a los manifestantes y les empuja a enfrentarse a unas fuerzas de seguridad armadas hasta los dientes es, más que la voluntad de crear un sistema más libre o democrático, el ansia de acabar con unos dirigentes odiados como paso decisivo hacia la recuperación de la dignidad personal y colectiva. Como detonante inmediato aparece el suicidio de Mohamed Bouazizi en Túnez, complementado por otros incidentes locales, como la detención y tortura de un grupo de escolares en Daraa (Siria), o, en Egipto, el rechazo popular a que Hosni Mubarak dejara el país en herencia a su hijo Gamal. Existen otros elementos sin los que la gran Intifada habría resultado improbable. Es excesivo atribuir a la política intervencionista de George W. Bush, culminada con la invasión y destrucción de Irak, algún mérito en los vientos de cambio; aunque las imágenes de la detención de Sadam Husein, en las que el dictador todopoderoso aparecía humilde y vencido, y de su posterior ejecución en 2006 causaron un formidable impacto sobre las poblaciones árabes. También impactaron las revelaciones de Wikileaks, porque reflejaban la hipocresía de las élites dirigentes, su alto grado de corrupción y en algunos casos su connivencia oculta con Estados Unidos e Israel, los dos países más impopulares entre las poblaciones locales. La capacidad de convocatoria y difusión informativa de las redes sociales ha sido fundamental. En Siria, donde no se permite la entrada a la prensa extranjera independiente, esas redes son el único medio por el que la oposición emite al exterior su versión (siempre interesada y no siempre fidedigna) de los acontecimientos. No hay que olvidar tampoco la importancia de Al Yazira. La televisión por satélite de la monarquía absolutista de Catar lleva años haciendo inútil la censura de las televisiones nacionales árabes. Al Yazira fue protagonista en la cobertura de la guerra de Irak (incluyendo las imágenes de la derrota de Sadam Husein) y de las filtraciones de Wikileaks, y ahora mantiene su condición de referencia con una cobertura exhaustiva de este primer año de la gran Intifada. Al margen de su alto nivel profesional, permanece abierto el debate sobre la orientación ideológica de Al Yazira, cuyos propietarios son bastiones del sunismo antiiraní, y su incidencia en la opinión pública. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/domingo/Intifada/primavera/elppor/20120101elpdmg_4/Tes

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December 30, 2011 This Revolution Isn’t Being Televised By JON B. ALTERMAN Washington THE Egyptian revolution did not happen last winter. It is happening now. And it is not taking place in Tahrir Square, but in towns and villages throughout the country. Although protests and violent military responses in central Cairo have seized world attention, they involve only a small fraction of Egyptians. Much more important are the millions who voted this month in a rolling election process that will continue into January, setting the stage for a negotiation between newly elected officials and Egypt’s military rulers over the country’s political future. We must focus our attention on its outcome and, perhaps counterintuitively, try to ensure an ambiguous result so that no side is left empty-handed. In February, the picture looked very different. The youthful energy of Egypt’s revolutionaries captivated audiences and furthered the view that educated and tolerant people across the region were poised to seize power from brutal dictators. As the Arab Spring wore on, it became clear that not as much had changed in Egypt as many had thought. Army officers in suits had ruled Egypt since the 1950s. They were still in command, albeit now in uniform. Many Egyptians bristled, and thousands protested the army’s ongoing rule and the slow pace of reform. A core of activists still come to Tahrir Square, but the real game is farther afield, where Islamist parties have mobilized tens of thousands to get out the vote and monitor polling stations. For Americans, it is hard to imagine that religious parties could win almost 70 percent of the Egyptian vote. But I served as an official election observer earlier this month, and it is hard for me to imagine how they could not. Islamists have grasped that the game has moved beyond protests to the mechanics of elections, and their supporters are motivated, organized and energetic. By contrast, the secular liberal parties are virtually absent from the countryside. Judging from posters, billboards, bumper stickers and banners, the two major Islamist parties have the field almost to themselves. Although Egypt’s rising Islamist politicians are seeking to take power from the military, the army has generally supported the political process by guarding polling stations and maintaining order. But the army’s legitimacy is now fading due to its brutal treatment of protesters. While it had initially approached the elections with professionalism and fairness, raids on civil society and democracy groups in recent days represent a real departure. As the army’s image declines, high voter turnout and strong poll results are enhancing Islamists’ legitimacy.

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This is but a prelude to the real battle, which will come in the spring as a new Parliament is seated, constitutional revisions begin and a presidential election campaign kicks off. Egypt is also likely to be running low on foreign exchange reserves, tempting the government to devalue the pound and spur inflation. Elected politicians and the army will both be working to set the rules by which Egypt will be governed. Each side is likely to take things to the brink, reminding the other of its strengths and ensuring that it gets the best deal. Many in Israel and America, and even some in Egypt, fear that the elections will produce an Islamist-led government that will tear up the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, turn hostile to the United States, openly support Hamas and transform Egypt into a theocracy that oppresses women, Christians and secular Muslims. They see little prospect for more liberal voices to prevail, and view military dictatorship as a preferable outcome. American interests, however, call for a different outcome, one that finds a balance — however uneasy — between the military authorities and Egypt’s new politicians. We do not want any one side to vanquish or silence the other. And with lopsided early election results, it is especially important that the outcome not drive away Egypt’s educated liberal elite, whose economic connections and know-how will be vital for attracting investment and creating jobs. Our instinct is to search for the clarity we saw in last winter’s televised celebrations. However, what Egyptians, and Americans, need is something murkier — not a victory, but an accommodation. Jon B. Alterman is director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jon B. Alterman This Revolution Isn’t Being Televised December 30, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/egypts-real-revolution.html?src=recg

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ft.com World Middle East & North Africa December 29, 2011 6:56 pm Iran’s rhetoric sets diplomacy on edge By James Blitz in London and Najmeh Bozorgmehr in Tehran Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping if the US and European Union press ahead with fresh sanctions against Tehran is being dismissed by western diplomats, who argue that such a move would end up further crippling the beleaguered Iranian economy. However, Iran’s tough rhetoric also signals how tense diplomatic relations between Iran and the west could become over the next few weeks as the US and EU move to impose sanctions which for the first time will significantly affect the country’s oil sector. More ON THIS TOPIC Iranian navy chief adds to strait tensions Iranian currency plunges to record low Democrat proves YouTube hit on Iran sanctions Tehran welcomes Islamist poll victories IN MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA Bahrain reviews verdicts against protesters Monitors raise heat on Damascus Tribal loyalties sway votes in south Egypt Syrian rebels raise a flag from the past Earlier this week, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, Iran’s first vice-president, warned that the country would not allow “even one drop of oil” to flow through the strait should the west impose oil sanctions on Tehran. His comments caused the price of oil to briefly spike, amid concerns that one-sixth of the world’s oil production passes through this neck of the Persian Gulf and that closing it off could throttle the global economy In London, the Iranian vice-president’s comments are been dismissed by diplomats. “Our judgment is that while the Iranians are proving unpredictable, they would not carry through such a threat,” said a UK diplomat. “It is not in their interests economically and politically and would isolate them still further in the international community.” Other western diplomats also take the view that a move to close off the strait of Hormuz would create serious international tensions and would be hard to imagine. In their view, Iran is not in a position militarily to undertake such a confrontation, which would almost certainly meet retaliation at sea from the US and other states in the region. Despite this, western states are well aware that the next few weeks will see a heightening of the war of words between Iran and the west as the US and EU are on the verge of a significant escalation of sanctions against the Iranian nuclear programme – one which will for the first time affect the real Iranian economy. In Washington, President Barack Obama is preparing to sign legislation that penalises foreign companies that do business with the Central Bank of Iran and could substantially reduce Iran’s oil revenue. Amid the rising tensions with Tehran, the Obama administration said on Thursday it would sell nearly $30bn of F-15 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, confirming the main part

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of a $60bn arms package initially announced last year which is aimed at countering Iranian influence in the region. “This agreement serves to reinforce the strong and enduring relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It demonstrates the US commitment to a strong Saudi defence capability as a key component to regional security,” said Andrew Shapiro, an assistant secretary of state. The EU, meanwhile, is set to ban all oil imports from Iran by its 27 member states. Iran exports 18 per cent of its oil to the EU and a European ban could significantly reduce Iranian foreign currency reserves. The sanctions drive comes in the wake of a damning report into the Iranian nuclear programme that was published last month by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN watchdog. This has suggested that Iran has sought in the past to use its nuclear programme to make an atomic weapon. Iran is one of the world’s biggest oil exporters and as they press ahead with sanctions, the US and EU will want to ensure that their moves do not trigger a jump in the price of oil. One of the core tasks facing the EU as it prepares to impose sanctions is to make sure that Arab nations supply southern European states that rely on Iranian oil, such as Greece and Italy. Despite the belief of some diplomats that Iran will not retaliate irrationally against fresh sanctions, others have concerns. In recent weeks, the Iranian regime has permitted the ransacking of the British embassy in Tehran. Iranian groups were also at the centre of an alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US. Both events have fuelled the view among some diplomats that the Tehran leadership is becoming increasingly unpredictable. James Blitz in London and Najmeh Bozorgmehr Iran’s rhetoric sets diplomacy on edge December 29, 2011 6:56 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/095b5b42-3239-11e1- b4ba-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1iO4a351C

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Argumentos TURQUÍA: EL GRAN GANADOR DE 2011 29 de diciembre de 2011 Ashraf Ghani Por qué pronto se convertirá en una importante potencia.

AFP/Getty Images

Mientras la eurozona experimenta la peor crisis de su historia, hay al menos un país – Turquía– que contempla feliz desde fuera la situación. Su economía se ha triplicado desde que el primer ministro Recep Tayyip llegó al cargo, y su Gobierno ha articulado una visión para convertirse en la décima mayor economía del mundo para 2023 –el año del centenario de la república turca. La piedra angular del éxito del país es el fuerte liderazgo del Ejecutivo, que, en marcado contraste con los líderes europeos, está comprometido a llevar a cabo reformas y muy centrado en aprovechar las oportunidades asociadas a la actual crisis. Existen tres factores que hacen muy probable que Ankara sepa gestionar los riesgos del actual periodo y continúe respondiendo a su potencial. En primer lugar, ha resuelto en gran medida su crisis de identidad. En vez de formular la cuestión de la identidad en 111

términos de oposición entre lo que es europeo y lo que es de Oriente Medio, de lo religioso o lo secular, de lo oriental o lo occidental, Turquía está ahora planteando sus ventajas en términos de cooperación: musulmán y secular, oriental y occidental, regional y global. En el proceso, ha diseñado una narrativa que utiliza todas las facetas de su rica cultura, historia y situación geográfica con el propósito de hacer realidad su visión de convertirse en un actor global. La seguridad humana y el imperio de la ley se han vuelto asuntos centrales de esta narrativa. En segundo lugar, el Gobierno turco ha adquirido la confianza necesaria para tomar decisiones políticas difíciles. La Administración de Erdogan se ha embarcado en reformas tanto fiscales como monetarias a la vez que lleva a cabo una difícil revisión de la Constitución mediante un exhaustivo proceso público. Gran parte de la responsabilidad por esta sensación de confianza proviene del equipo de Gobierno que ha logrado reunir Erdogan, que ha logrado sobreponerse al clásico problema del líder fuerte rodeado de seguidores débiles, y en el que recae parte del mérito por este nuevo sentimiento: Alí Babacan, viceprimer ministro; Egmen Bagis, ministro de asuntos de la UE y principal negociador; Ahmet Davutoglu, ministro de Asuntos Exteriores; y Mehmet Simsek, ministro de Finanzas, articulan una visión compartida de los desafíos de Turquía y se adhieren a un planteamiento común de las políticas que es necesario implementar. El Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo de Erdogan también se enorgullece de contar con una fuerte conexión con muchos ciudadanos turcos. Proporciona el vehículo para una narrativa compartida, el aparato para movilizar al electorado y un canal para el ascenso social de la generación más joven. En tercer lugar, el Gobierno ha iniciado una asociación orgánica con el sector privado, abriendo paso a un profundo cambio en la formación y el funcionamiento de la esfera económica. En el pasado, la élite empresarial turca dependía del clientelismo y la protección del Ejecutivo. La cerrada economía del país conformaba un sistema propenso a la crisis, en el que la inflación periódicamente se llevaba por delante los ahorros e infligía graves daños a los pobres.

Las nuevas compañías y líderes empresariales turcos, en contraste, son producto de la dura escuela de la Contar con legitimidad en el competencia global y están interior del país es la base de una incansablemente concentrados en política exterior activista, y Turquía establecer una reputación en un variado está desempeñando un papel cada conjunto de países. La nueva flexibilidad vez más significativo en la escena de Turquía se ha hecho evidente en sus global prácticas empresariales: el país ha reorientado su economía para competir a escala global. La industria turca de la construcción se ha erigido como un protagonista importante, operando desde Rusia hasta el Kurdistán iraquí. Con una diversificación que va de los textiles a la electrónica o la industria de defensa, las firmas turcas se están volcando en los mercados emergentes a lo largo de todo el mundo. Hay una doble transformación en marcha: el Gobierno no critica a las empresas, sino que apoya su autonomía y trabaja con ellas para ampliar las oportunidades del mercado 112

global. A su vez, el sector privado acepta la necesidad de un marco normativo, predecible pero firme, por parte del Ejecutivo y exige mayores inversiones del Estado para generar las capacidades humanas que son el pilar de la competitividad nacional. Turquía está gastando en educación el mayor porcentaje del presupuesto de su historia para poder proporcionar a la juventud otros caminos para el ascenso social. Contar con legitimidad en el interior del país es la base de una política exterior activista, y Turquía está desempeñando un papel cada vez más significativo en la escena global. Ahora se manifiesta con una voz propia en temas de política internacional que van desde Afganistán a la Primavera Árabe, pasando por la crisis financiera, Palestina o Somalia. Su cooperación con la Liga Árabe para desarrollar una respuesta a la actual crisis en Siria es una manifestación y un reconocimiento de la temprana adopción de Ankara del papel de líder del cambio en Oriente Medio. El potencial de Turquía podría verse socavado, no obstante, por sus viejos demonios. Las tensiones entre el gobierno y sus ciudadanos kurdos, el legado de las divisoras tensiones entre los líderes civiles y los militares, los conflictos congelados de Chipre y Armenia, el estancamiento de Europa y las incertidumbres de la economía global tienen el potencial de amenazar lo logrado y de renovar desencantos pasados. Pero por el momento Turquía parece haber dejado estos obstáculos atrás. Al convertirse en un caso excepcional en el mundo musulmán, Turquía ofrece un ejemplo de las ganancias que se pueden cosechar poniendo en práctica la voluntad política y el compromiso democrático. No habrá por tanto una más apropiada celebración del centenario de la república turca que el que el país se convierta en una rotonda global, un lugar en el que las ideas, las personas y los bienes fluyan de y hacia todo el mundo.

Artículos relacionados • Turquía mira al sur. Ricardo Ginés • El poder del agua en Oriente Medio. Andy Guess • Éxodo. James Traub • Turquía: El buen vecino. Ricardo Ginés • Es Europa, estúpido, no Turquía. Jorge Dezcallar • El Henry Kessinger turco. Ricardo Ginés

Ashraf Ghani TURQUÍA: EL GRAN GANADOR DE 2011 29 de diciembre de 2011 http://www.fp- es.org/turquia-el-gran-ganador-de-2011

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ft.com comment Columnists ember 29, 2011 8:08 pm Our age of mounting indignation

By Gideon Rachman

It has been many centuries since the Mediterranean Sea was the centre of civilisation. But in 2011 the Med was back – not just as a holiday destination – but at the very centre of world affairs. This was a year of global indignation, from the Occupy Wall Street movement to the Moscow election protests and China’s village revolts. It was popular protests on either side of the Mediterranean – in Tahrir Square in Cairo and Syntagma Square in Athens – that set the tone for 2011. Revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia at the beginning of the year sparked off the Arab spring, a political earthquake whose after-shocks were felt as far afield as Moscow and Beijing. On the other side of Mare Nostrum, Europe’s sovereign debt crisis spread from riotous Greece to Portugal, and then to Italy and Spain. By the end of the year, the fate of the world economy seemed to hang on the ability of southern Europe to service its debts. More ON THIS STORY In depth Euro in crisis In depth Middle East protests Protesters pile pressure on Putin Defiant mood in village that shook China Occupy sets its sights beyond Wall Street

FROM GIDEON RACHMAN Farewell to a dumb war in Iraq This summit will prove a footnote Western dreams and Egypt’s reality The long shadow of the 1930s For that reason this column – devoted to my annual list of the five most important events of year – has to begin with the Arab spring and Europe’s debt crisis: regional crises with global implications. Both events brought crowds on to the streets. But the Arab uprisings were also marked by bloodshed and warfare. Even the relatively peaceful transition in Egypt cost some 800 lives, while Muammer Gaddafi in Libya was only deposed (and ultimately murdered) after a full insurrection, backed by western air power. However, while the costs of the Arab spring were far higher, it, at least, was driven by a faith that the future could be better. Europe’s debt crisis, by contrast, was characterised 114

by fear of the future. The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia gave many ordinary people a heady sense that, at last, they had the chance to take control of their own destiny, while Europe’s debt problems left most citizens feeling they were at the mercy of economic forces that they could not control. The appointment of governments led by unelected technocrats in Italy and Greece towards the end of the year strengthened the sense that decisions were being taken out of the hands of voters. Although Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos were both appointed in a constitutional manner, their arrival on the scene showed that the normal processes of democracy in Italy and Greece had been unequal to the economic crisis. The European Union’s repeated failure to find a solution to the debt crisis – and so secure the future of the euro – illustrated that pan-European politics were working no better than the national variety. For all the patent differences in levels of wealth and freedom between Europe and the Arab world, it was difficult not to see some parallel between the crowds of angry, young unemployed people in north Africa and southern Europe. The indignados – who occupied central Madrid in May to protest against a youth unemployment level of 40 per cent in Spain – made the connection explicit by rather vaingloriously claiming the mantle of Tahrir Square. After riots in London and popular protests against inequality and corruption in countries as diverse as Chile, China, Israel and India, I wrote a column at the end of August, headlined “2011, the year of global indignation”. At the time, I speculated that the US might prove immune to the wave of social protest spreading around the world. But that idea was quickly proved wrong. By September, the Occupy Wall Street movement had got going. Combined with Standard & Poor’s decision in August to downgrade US debt from its triple A status, OWS underlined the depth of the country’s economic problems. Some argued that the fact that occupiers lacked a coherent programme meant that their significance was limited. But the Occupy movement did serve to push inequality to the centre of debate in the US. Its slogan – “We are the 99 per cent” – became the phrase of the year. The resonance of the slogan beyond the shores of the US also connected the events in Wall Street to the protests against austerity in Europe and even to anti- corruption movements in Asia, all of which used inequality and anti-elitism as rallying cries. For that reason, the emergence of Occupy Wall Street is my third most significant event of the year. The killing of Osama bin Laden, a decade after the September 11 attacks, is my fourth choice. The death of the leader of al-Qaeda allowed Barack Obama in effect to call an end to the “War on Terror” as the organising principle of US foreign policy. The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq at the end of the year sent the same message and set the stage for a similar pull-out from Afghanistan over the next three years. What should be the fifth story of the year? Any account of the main events of 2011 has to include the Japanese tsunami, which swept away as many as 20,000 people. The dignity and stoicism of the Japanese in the face of a natural tragedy put the political and economic problems of the rest of the world into a proper perspective. But one event, right at the end of the year, may yet prove as important as, if not more so than, most of my top five. Protests against the alleged rigging of elections in Russia saw the year of global indignation arrive on the streets of Moscow. The protests threaten the

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system of “managed democracy” put together by Vladimir Putin and may even undermine his bid to return to the Kremlin as president, after elections next March. The virus of popular protest and demonstration that began in Cairo and Athens this year is now visible from Wall Street to the Kremlin. Next year, it is likely to intensify. [email protected] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c62a0b58-2cb5-11e1-8cca- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1iDICjvJV

ft.com Comment Analysis December 29, 2011 7:17 pm

Egypt: A religious revival By Roula Khalaf and Heba Saleh As Islamists emerge from elections as the country’s leading political force – to the alarm of democracy campaigners and regional autocrats alike – western governments will have to adapt to a power shift they have long sought to prevent

The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party holding a campaign rally Back in January, as popular protests against President Hosni Mubarak gathered pace, the Muslim Brotherhood was easy to spot, its young women in headscarves and youths taking charge of security checkpoints in Tahrir Square. But, as just one of the many groups organising daily life in the encampment that formed the nerve centre of the uprising, the 80- year-old Islamist movement was not especially prominent. Yet within nine months, the Brotherhood had reclaimed its status as Egypt’s most powerful political force following decades of suppression. In the country’s first free parliamentary elections, its newly created Freedom and Justice party won more than 35 per cent of the vote in the first round, and slightly more in December’s second round.

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More ON THIS STORY In depth Egypt in transition Egypt police raid civil rights groups Egypt’s revolution turns into media war Egypt’s rulers warn state faces ‘foreign plot’ Mubarak’s corruption trial postponed ON THIS TOPIC Thousands continue protest in Tahrir Square Cairo’s depleted bank coffers weigh on stocks Activists plotting Egypt’s fall, claims general Cairo activists battle army for third day

IN ANALYSIS Production processes A lightbulb moment Crowd behaviour United they stand Debt relief A time for forgiveness Analysis Skyscrapers – striving for the highest Even more worrying for those hoping the Arab world’s largest nation would adopt a liberal, pro-western face, fellow Islamists from the puritanical Salafi movement emerged with more than 25 per cent, a score likely to be confirmed in the third and final round of voting in January. “This is the real Egyptian revolution,” says Jon Alterman of the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies and one of the international observers at the Egyptian elections. “In February, the military removed Hosni Mubarak. This is the revolution that reorients power in Egypt.” In both a domestic and a broader Arab context, the political events of the past few weeks in Egypt represent a political earthquake, one that Arab regimes and western powers alike had long sought to prevent. For decades, the region’s rulers defended their authoritarianism to western partners by raising the spectre of an Islamist takeover as the only alternative. Any prospect of the US or other western allies holding a dialogue with Islamists was seen as an affront. For their part, western governments played along, largely because foreign policy in Cairo and several other Arab capitals was accommodating to their own interests – particularly in terms of preventing excessively aggressive policies towards Israel. Today, however, 20 years after Algeria’s military staged a coup to prevent a parliamentary landslide by the Islamic Salvation Front, and five years after Hamas rode to victory in the Palestinian territory only to face a western boycott, Islamists are demonstrating their power of survival. As policymakers around the world adapt to the new realities of the region, their biggest concern will be to develop new ties with Islamist groups as they stand for the first time on the brink of power without constraint. The most critical test will be in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest Arab Islamist group, is the inspiration for other movements, and its first effort to share power is likely to have wider regional ramifications. Even before Egyptians went to the polls, Tunisia’s Islamists had set the tone of the new political order. The Nahda party, persecuted under the fiercely secular previous regime, regrouped with astonishing speed following the fall of President Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali in January. The party’s exiled leaders, some of them turned successful businessmen in Europe and the Middle East, returned to run an efficient campaign in which Nahda won more than 40 per cent in the October vote for the constituent assembly, the country’s first democratic poll. There was a similar story in Morocco. In November elections, the first to be held under a new constitution giving the prime minister expanded powers, the opposition Justice and Development party emerged as the largest single bloc in parliament, even if well short of a

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majority. The leader of the Islamist grouping has now been charged with forming a government. Political analysts say that in Libya’s conservative society, politics are likely to be dominated by Islamist-leaning parties, too. Meanwhile, the Syrian National Council, the umbrella group leading the battle to bring down the regime, is fighting perceptions that it is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, the party that the father of President Bashar al-Assad crushed brutally in the 1980s. “The foreseeable future is Islamist – this much we know. It’s just a reality that people have to come to terms with,” says Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Doha Center. “People want to see Islam play a larger role in political life and liberals are going to have to learn to speak the language of religion and stop being the anti-Islamist choice.” . . . Islamists might share in the broad objective of establishing a state based on sharia law. But the commitment of the various groups to participatory politics, and their vision of government, in many cases differ widely. At one end of the spectrum is Tunisia’s Nahda which sees itself as mildly Islamist, its leader, Rached Ghannouchi, insisting the state should be founded on the principle of citizenship not religion. If Nahda has a model, it is Turkey’s Justice and Development (AK) party, which has Islamist roots and has presided over a rare period of stability and economic prosperity. At the other end are the ultraconservative Salafi parties, founded on a vision of an Islamic state that replicates the strict social norms of Saudi Arabia. Many see democracy as incompatible with this goal. Doctrine and democracy When Egypt’s Salafi Nour party polled more than a quarter of the vote in the first two stages of staggered parliamentary elections, it confounded predictions that its purist brand of Islam would appeal to only a small fraction of the electorate, write Heba Saleh and Roula Khalaf. Initial impressions are that its utopian rhetoric and literal reading of religious doctrine, presenting a simplified “roadmap to paradise”, has appealed to a swath of poorer voters who distrust politicians and are more comfortable supporting those they consider “men of God”. Before the popular revolt that swept President Hosni Mubarak from power in February, the Salafis kept a low profile; many of their leaders were closely watched by the security services. A broad movement that has long eschewed political activism – many Salafi sheikhs preach obedience to the rulers – it was widely considered too disparate and disorganised to win a significant number of votes. But the Salafis control a large network of mosques, several television channels and well-established charities with a formidable record of providing services in poor areas. The official press, citing unnamed justice ministry sources, said recently that Salafi charities received about E£400m ($66.3m) this year from donors in Gulf Arab states. Thanks to their surprisingly strong electoral performance, the Salafis are certain to constitute an important bloc in parliament, a fact that is likely to have a significant impact on the calculations of other forces. Ever ready with accusations of apostasy, they are likely to inhibit the small contingent of liberal representatives in the assembly.

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In addition, their presence will mean the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party will not be the only group claiming to represent an Islamic point of view. The less pragmatic Salafis are likely to set the bar high, possibly forcing Freedom and Justice into more hardline positions. The uneasy relationship between the two groups ensures that Egyptian politics will no longer be split only along liberal-Islamist lines. “Throughout [the Middle East and north Africa], the divide between Islamist and liberal will remain one of the primary conflicts,” says Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Doha Center. “But that will go hand in hand with an intra-Islamist debate, and the two will be related.” Somewhere in between is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a more mainstream Islamist organisation that considers Nahda too liberal but views democratic politics as the best means of bringing about the gradual Islamisation of society. Western officials and policy analysts will be pondering what is driving societies that have rid themselves of tyranny to put their faith in Islamists, whether moderate or hardline. Yet the appeal of religious parties, particularly at a time of great political uncertainty, is not surprising. In Egypt, secular groups with leftist and pan-Arab ideologies ossified under the weight of repression by successive regimes determined to abolish all potential challengers. The Brotherhood, with its message rooted in Islam and spread through mosques and charities, proved harder to eradicate. When Mr Mubarak fell, the organisation – with its long-standing structures and networks – remained the country’s most organised political force, even as new secular and liberal groups scrambled to form parties under the chaotic watch of the ruling military council. Their brand recognition and history of victimisation by the previous regime made them the logical choice for many voters, who saw them as strong and credible agents of change. “We have tried many things, so this time let’s try those who are religious,” says Abdel Moneim Said, a carpenter in Ard al-Lewa, an impoverished district of Cairo, echoing a widespread sentiment. “Maybe they will prove honest. Anyway, we don’t see anyone else.” But the Brotherhood is also an experienced political actor that has proved more astute than others since the revolution, judging the public mood better than liberal parties and managing a tricky relationship with the military council to its own benefit. Even before the fall of Mr Mubarak, Brotherhood leaders played their cards well. They sent reassuring messages to the west that they would not seek to monopolise power, nor run a presidential candidate. In the aftermath of a youth-led and leaderless revolution, moreover, the army saw the Brotherhood as one of the few grown-up interlocutors with which it could seek accommodation, and appeared to give it preferential treatment in the drafting of constitutional amendments. By the middle of summer, however, the honeymoon was over between the Brotherhood and a military seeking to protect its interests, privileges and control over sensitive issues such as Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. Relations have grown tense, with the Brotherhood and the Salafis twice calling massive rallies to protest against plans by the generals to impose constitutional provisions that shield the army from parliamentary oversight and give it a permanent political role. The issue has not been resolved – and the Brotherhood’s biggest power struggle in the near future will be with the military. For now though, the organisation’s leaders are attempting to play down the confrontation. “If there is a hair between us, we will not 119

cut it,” Mohamed Badie, the supreme leader of the Brotherhood, said of the army in a recent television interview. . . . But for Egypt’s Islamists, the real challenge lies ahead. Having waited decades for power, they might now be getting what they wished for – however, they also inherit a state saddled with the legacy of decades of mismanagement; and an economy shattered by recent political turmoil. Indeed, from Tunis to Cairo, Islamist victors are showing little appetite for ruling alone in the near future. Tunisia’s Nahda has already formed a coalition with two secular parties. In Egypt, Brotherhood officials say no group can govern alone given the magnitude of the nation’s problems, including pervasive poverty and rising rates of unemployment. After initially clamouring for the right to form the government after the completion of the elections, the organisation now says it recognises that the military council is entitled to appoint an administration that governs until a new constitution has been drafted by the elected parliament. It has also distanced itself from the Salafis, suggesting it would prefer to form a coalition with liberal parties. “It is not a condition that we should lead the government,” says Saad al-Katatny, a senior official. “We do not want to repeat the mistakes of the previous ruling party [which monopolised power].” The Brotherhood’s dilemma is evident in its party’s detailed 160-page election manifesto. Freedom and Justice says it wants to reduce the budget deficit, attract investment and tackle expensive subsidies – all of which appeal to the business community and to potential foreign investors. At the same time, however, it wants to change the face of society in ways that could outrage liberal businessmen and alarm foreigners. The programme, for example, launches a bitter attack on Egypt’s endorsement under Mr Mubarak of international agreements abolishing discrimination against women and assuring the rights of children. It also seeks a less pro-western foreign policy that could clash with a new government’s need to attract international assistance. The challenge for Egypt’s Islamists will be to strike a balance between their religious aspirations and the pursuit of pragmatic political and economic policies. As Mr Alterman of CSIS argues, they cannot afford to alienate those who have the talent to take Egypt forward economically, many of whom are highly educated liberal-minded businesspeople. The more tolerance Egypt’s Brotherhood shows, the more likely it is to succeed where it matters most – in improving the daily life of a population that rose against decades of repression, corruption and neglect. Véase Roula Khalaf y Heba Saleh “Egypt: A religious revival”, 29 Diciembre, 2011 7:17 pm, en: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/363239ba-308b-11e1-9436- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1i1NXwmP5 Jon B. Alterman This Revolution Isn’t Being Televised December 30, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/31/opinion/egypts-real-revolution.html?src=recg

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An act of courage that launched a revolution

By Liz Sly, Published: December 30 MAHALLA EL-KUBRA, EGYPT — Much was made of Facebook, Twitter and the role social media played in lending a sense of youth and modernity to the uprising that ended Hosni Mubarak’s rule. Then came the ascendancy of political Islam, which seems to be leading Egypt in a different direction entirely.

Liz Sly/The Washington Post - Wedad Demerdash, 45, at her home in the Egyptian town of Mahalla al-Kubra, where she has worked at the country's largest cotton mill all her life. Her role in organizing a 2007 labor strike helped trigger the chain of events that led to the Egyptian revolution.

But the real roots of the revolution may lie here in this crumbling cotton mill town in the Nile Delta, Egypt’s industrial heartland, and with an old-fashioned labor dispute over pay that began five years ago. And, according to one reading of the events that unfolded, it all began with a little- known act of courage on the part of a matronly, middle-aged millworker who wears a head scarf and was inspired to act because she couldn’t afford to buy meat for her family. It was she who helped organize the initial strike by disgruntled workers in December 2006 that culminated in a nationwide call for a work stoppage on April 6, 2008. The

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date inspired the 6th of April Facebook group, which was used to rally the protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in January.

http://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10150654629113294.480104.32847763293&type=3 When the men of the mill balked at joining the banned strike action, she seized the initiative and led her female co-workers out into the factory grounds. Chanting “Where are the men? Here are the women,” they marched around the mill until the men were shamed into joining them. After three days, the workers won. Amid the upheaval of the past year, the part labor played in the birth of the revolution has been largely forgotten. But workers joined the revolutionaries in the square in February and have continued to stage strikes throughout the year, taking on a far greater role in Egypt, with its strong industrial base, than labor has in other countries where uprisings have taken place. The strikes continue to this day, and although they have been eclipsed by the far-better- publicized demonstrations in Tahrir Square, future Egyptian governments will need to

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address at least some of the demands of an increasingly organized labor movement if the country’s unrest is to be tamed. This is the story of Wedad Demerdash, 44, a mother of four and, perhaps, the original revolutionary. ‘Mahalla sets the tone ’ The Misr Spinning and Weaving Co. in Mahalla is Egypt’s biggest industrial enterprise and one of the largest cotton mills in the world. Founded in 1927, it was once the flagship of Egyptian industry, churning out high-quality cotton that was sold around the globe. In recent years, its workforce has dwindled to 21,000 from a peak of nearly 40,000, and it operates at a considerable loss to the state. But to Egyptians, the mill is legendary. Known simply as Mahalla, it has become synonymous over the years with the militancy of its workers. “Whatever happens in Mahalla sets the tone for Egypt,” said Hossam el-Hamalawy, a labor activist and blogger. “If Mahalla goes on strike and wins, you can be assured the rest of the country will go on strike too.” So it was in 2006. Demerdash had gone to work there in 1984 at age 16, paying little attention to politics as she married and raised four children while holding down her job as a garment stitcher. The militancy of Mahalla had been muted by the repression of the Mubarak era. But by the middle of the past decade, change was coming to Mahalla. Cheaper Chinese and Indian cotton threatened the mill’s competitiveness. Inflation was eroding the already pitiful basic wage of 300 Egyptian pounds a month — about $60. Fears were rife that the mill would be privatized and sold, and that all would lose their jobs, as had happened to many other enterprises. By the end of 2006, when the management had not fulfilled a government promise to pay a bonus of 100 pounds — about $20 — the workers of Mahalla stirred again. The price of chicken Demerdash cannot explain what it was that pushed her to take a leading role in the strike that would unleash a revolution, except that it had to do with the price of chicken, a basic wage that had not risen in years and a burning sense of injustice that the bonus had not been paid. “God has given you the ability to confront others, and you should go ahead with it,” she recalls her husband telling her. She says she discovered in herself previously unrecognized abilities to organize and to persuade. She printed leaflets and argued with co-workers who were reluctant to take action that could land them in jail. Soaring food prices had pushed meat beyond the means of most. Chicken was a once-a-month treat. Soon, the women were eager to join the strike. “The women were more militant than the men,” said Joel Beinin, a professor at Stanford University who has written extensively on Egypt’s labor movements. At the moment called for the strike to begin, Demerdash led the women out of the building where they worked onto the sprawling grounds of the mill complex. They

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found themselves alone. Through the windows of the other buildings she saw the hesitant men. “We could see that they were just standing by their machines. We could see they were afraid,” says Demerdash, recalling the moment when she burst into her chant. “So we decided to incite them in any way we could. We wanted them to be ashamed.” It worked. The men spilled out to join the strike. For three days, the workers occupied the factory grounds. On the fourth day, management caved, and the bonus was paid. The victory triggered a wave of copycat strikes around the country throughout 2007. Egypt was plunged into the most intensive period of industrial unrest it had witnessed in decades. The Mahalla workers took the lead again in the spring of 2008, calling for a general strike on April 6 to demand a national minimum wage. A group of young Internet activists named its Facebook page after the date, and in January this year, the 6th of April group became renowned around the world for its role in galvanizing the uprising. The baton had passed, to a new and very different generation of revolutionaries. But, for Hamalawy, who closely chronicles Egypt’s labor movement, it was that first strike that started it all. “December 2006 was definitely the turning point that will be engraved forever as the start of the liberation of Egypt,” he said. “If that strike had not taken place and had not been victorious, I don’t think we would have witnessed all the revolutionary transformations we have seen.” A tireless campaigner Demerdash’s role also has gone largely unnoticed outside this dusty, decrepit town where almost everyone either works at the mill or knows someone who does. Here she has become something of a celebrity and a source of advice on labor issues. At a tea garden beside one of the tributaries of the Nile, a janitor recognizes her and approaches to ask how to improve his working conditions. She whips out a dog-eared copy of Egypt’s labor law from her purse and quickly finds the clause relevant to his concerns. She continues to campaign tirelessly for better working conditions, while holding down her 48-hour-a-week job at the mill. She has also acquired a partner and soul mate, Amal Ahmad Said, 44, who is equally garrulous and passionate about her cause. They have become regulars on the labor activist conference circuit and traveled to Tahrir to participate in labor demonstrations. But theirs is not the militancy of Marx or Che Guevara, the icons of the leftist, secular crowd that dominates the Tahrir protests. A Koran is on display in Demerdash’s living room, along with an abundance of pink- and lemon-colored teddy bears and white fluffy dogs that speak to the innocence she brings to her quest for decent pay and working conditions. She dismisses as irrelevant the Facebook revolutionaries who named their page for the strike she helped inspire. “I don’t acknowledge them,” she says. “April 6 was born in Mahalla. It was a miracle that this corrupt regime was toppled, and it was to the credit of the workers.” She holds in even greater contempt the Islamist parties that have emerged in the first rounds of Egypt’s elections as the revolution’s biggest winners. Though a devout 124

Muslim who covers her hair, she thinks politics and religion shouldn’t mix. The Islamists, she says, “have hijacked the revolution.” “I hate them,” she says. “The real owners of the revolution are the workers.” But although she, like many Egyptians, feels the revolution has lost its way, at the close of a tumultuous year that has transformed her country almost beyond recognition, she cannot say it was in vain. A mini-revolt at the mill at the time Mubarak fell brought in new managers, who have been more sympathetic to workers’ concerns. No longer does she fear that the company will be privatized and sold. The industrial action of those earlier years saw her basic wage increased to 500 pounds a month — she takes home about 900, including incentives and bonuses — and there is a promise, not yet implemented, of a national minimum wage of 1,200. Whether it will be paid is in doubt, given the rocky state of Egypt’s economy. But there are other improvements. “We do our jobs now with high spirits,” she says. “Workers are being treated with more mercy these days, which is right because all the worker wants is to work to feed his family.” For Demerdash, that’s what it has always been about. About pay, to be sure, but also respect, and the future of the mill to which she has given a lifetime’s work. Her eyes gleam when she talks about it. “I love my work. I love and fear for my company. I love the sounds of the machines when I get to work in the morning, and I love the sounds of the machines going home in the evening,” she says. “As long as the machines are running, it means we can provide for our families and for our homes.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/an-act-of-courage-that-launched-a- revolution/2011/12/22/gIQAZxDyQP_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

Department of History

Stanford University

Stanford, CA 94305-2024 Email: [email protected]

(650) 723-4956 Fax: (650) 725-0597

Joel Beinin is the Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History and Professor of Middle East History. He received his A.B. from Princeton University in 1970, his M.A. from Harvard University in 1974, and his A.M.L.S. and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1978 and 1982. He also studied at the American University of Cairo and and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He lived in Egypt in 1969, 1980-81, 1985, 1986, 1994, 2004-05, and 2006-08 and in Israel in 1965-66, 1970-73, 1987, 1988, 1993, and 1993. He has taught Middle East history at Stanford University since 1983. From 2006 to 2008 he served as Director of Middle East Studies and Professor of History at the American University in Cairo. His research and writing focuses on workers, peasants, and minorities in the modern Middle East and on Israel, Palestine, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Beinin has written or edited nine books, most recently Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa; co-edited with Frédéric Vairel (Stanford University Press, forthcoming, May 2011) and The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt (Solidarity Center, 2010). His articles have been published in leading scholarly journals as well as The Nation, Middle East Report, The Los Angeles Times, The San Francisco Chronicle, Le Monde Diplomatique, and others. He has appeared on Al-Jazeera TV, BBC radio, National Public Radio, and many other TV and radio programs throughout North America, and in France, Egypt, Singapore, and Australia, and has given frequent interviews to the global media. In 2002 he served as President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America.

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Protesters in Syria emboldened by Arab League presence

By Alice Fordham, Published: December 30 BEIRUT — Tens of thousands of protesters poured into streets across Syria on Friday, braving a government onslaught of tear gas, nail bombs and gunfire that activists said killed at least 16 people. The demonstrations marked a display of renewed vigor for opponents of President Bashar al-Assad, who are eager to make their case during a visit by Arab League observers. Crowds of demonstrators, dancing and singing, gathered in parts of the Damascus suburbs and the cities of Homs and Hama, where the monitors were visiting, in an apparent bid to draw international attention to the brutality of Assad’s crackdown on dissent. In Douma, outside Damascus, more than a dozen soldiers were said to have defected during protests there, shooting at their commanders before escaping, while thousands of people clustered in the suburb’s main square, singing, “We don’t want you, Assad,” and waving banners asking the Arab League to help them. Soldiers later fired tear gas and nail bombs into the crowd, causing more than 70 injuries, said one member of the Local Coordination Committees activist network. The monitors’ presence has reinvigorated a protest movement that had been flagging, according to activists. “When they saw the Arab League, they felt confident,” said Rami Abdulrahman of the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. He added, however, that the approximately 60 observers in the country have not been able to achieve their stated mission of overseeing an agreement for troops to withdraw from the cities, end the use of force against peaceful protesters and free political prisoners. Many Syrians have expressed disappointment with the role played by the monitors, but they have continued to try to protest in areas where the monitors can see them. The activist in Douma said observers stood on the steps of a mosque during the demonstration there and spoke with people in the crowd about protester deaths, abuse in detention, the searching of houses and electricity cuts. But he, too, voiced skepticism about their role. “The mission was for one thing: to make the regime stop killing us,” he said. “Until now, the regime did not do that, so I am not generally hopeful for the mission.” Wissam Tarif, a human rights activist with the Avaaz organization, said that protests had grown since the observers arrived, not because Syrians felt any safer in the streets but because they wanted to be visible.

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“The people are willing to take the risks to show the Arab League what is happening,” he said. Tarif added that activists had told Avaaz researchers that three people in Homs were arrested after speaking with the observers earlier this week, including one woman whose son was in detention. A nine-month crackdown by Syrian forces on the scattered protest movement has killed more than 5,000 people, according to a United Nations estimate, and the opposition has become increasingly militarized. The death toll has continued to rise since the Arab League delegation arrived more than a week ago, with more than 150 people killed, including at least 34 who died or were found dead Friday, according to Abdulrahman, the London-based campaigner. Friday’s countrywide toll included at least 27 civilians, two defected soldiers and five members of the security forces, he said. Heavy tanks and artillery have partially withdrawn from cities, although some protesters assert that they have been hidden in places across the country, including in the mountains in northwestern Idlib province, rather than returned to military bases. An activist in Damascus said that since a double car-bombing that killed more than 40 people last week, the capital has filled with checkpoints and snipers have been stationed atop buildings. The opposition military operations also appear to be continuing. A video uploaded Wednesday purported to show armed rebels attacking vehicles full of security forces in Daraa, the southern city where the uprising began. The five security personnel who died Friday were killed in an ambush outside Homs, Abdulrahman said. Syrian authorities tightly control journalists’ access to the country, making it impossible to verify information. The Free Syrian Army, a loose group of defectors and armed rebels commanded by exiled former Syrian officers, said Friday that it has suspended operations to allow the Arab League to operate. “We want to give the Arab League mission a chance and remove any pretext for the regime to blame us for bloodshed similar to the Damascus bombings,” Col. Malik Kurdi said by telephone. He said he hoped the delegation would accurately record the situation in Syria and call for international intervention by the U.N. Security Council. Alice Fordham, Protesters in Syria emboldened by Arab League presence,December 30 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/protesters-in-syria-emboldened-by-arab-league- presence/2011/12/30/gIQAUXeWQP_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Egyptian military gambles by raiding pro-democracy groups By Leila Fadel and Joby Warrick, Published: December 30 CAIRO — By storming the offices of international and domestic pro-democracy groups Thursday, Egypt’s military rulers took a perilous gamble: cracking down on dissent ahead of a crucial transition to elected governance at the risk of alienating their most important benefactor: the United States. But faced with a sharp reaction from Washington, the ruling generals appeared to retreat Friday. They promised the U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Anne Patterson, that the raids on international organizations would stop and that confiscated property would be returned immediately, the State Department said. Yet, the offices of three raided American organizations remained closed Friday. “We’re getting mixed messages from the authorities,” said Leslie Campbell, regional director of Middle East and North Africa programs for the National Democratic Institute, one of the U.S. democracy-building groups shut down Thursday. The coordinated and unprecedented raids on at least 17 offices belonging to seven civil society organizations, including the American groups, represented an escalation of an effort by the military rulers to suppress growing dissent. The effort appears aimed at heading off what they fear could become a second revolt when Egyptians mark the Jan. 25 anniversary of the start of the uprising that ousted president Hosni Mubarak. “They’re constructing a narrative about what’s going on in the country to support their moves and to try to build support in the run-up to Jan. 25, to quash potential serious dissent,” said Michael Wahid Hanna, an Egypt expert at the New York-based Century Foundation. “They think they are untouchable . . . but the patience of the international community is not going to be unlimited.”

For decades, the military chiefs have gone unchallenged by Washington and the Egyptian population. They collect $1.3 billion in annual U.S. aid, ensuring that they honor a peace treaty with Israel. They are estimated to control somewhere between 5 and 45 percent of the economy without public scrutiny. Analysts say the generals appear to be worried about losing control and being subjected to oversight. One Washington expert said the raids on the U.S. pro-democracy groups marked a “moment of truth” for the Obama administration. The military rulers were acting as though democracy promotion marked the biggest threat to their rule, said Michele Dunne, a former National Security Council staffer who now heads the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. “If the Egyptian military is not allowing a real democratic transition to civilian rule, if it is harassing civil society, and if it is trying to prevent the United States from funding civil society groups, the time has come to suspend the military aid until things improve,” she

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said. “In the end, the Egyptian military can do what it likes inside the country — I don’t think the U.S. is going to invade — but at a minimum we can stop funding it.” The generals have banked on the notion that Washington continues to look at Egypt primarily through one lens: the security of Israel. They also believe that the West sees them as a counterweight to Islamists who are winning so far in multi-phased parliamentary elections, analysts said. “Unfortunately it’s the Israel card that trumps everything else,” said Khaled Fahmy, a historian at the American University in Cairo. “The army is effectively promising impotency and are rewarded for it. They are paid not to fight. This is the main prism through which U.S. foreign policy looks at this region, and the high brass of the Egyptian military knows this.” Since the spring, the military chiefs have allowed or ordered major crackdowns on protesters that have left as many as 100 people dead, and they have sought to enshrine their powers in a new Egyptian constitution but so far have failed. Now the generals seem to be using civil society groups as scapegoats, accusing them of using foreign funds to support nefarious efforts to destroy Egypt. “This is an internal judicial issue,” said a military official who asked not to be named because he was not authorized to speak publicly. “We are applying law against the organizations that break it.... Please don’t make this bigger than it is.” But civil society leaders were defiant Friday, slamming Egypt’s military rulers for attempting to shut down human rights and advocacy groups and accusing them of using tactics from the Mubarak era to throttle an unfinished revolution. Twenty-eight rights groups signed a statement accusing the military of taking vengeance on organizations that participated in the uprising against Mubarak. By raiding the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute and Freedom House — all Washington-based and funded in part by the U.S. government — as well as Germany’s Konrad Adenauer foundation, the military angered American and European leaders. The Obama administration warned that economic aid could be withheld unless authorities returned seized equipment and stopped harassing the organizations. “No one really believed us,” said Ziad Abdel Tawab, deputy director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. “This action proved that this is a true campaign against all the actors” involved in the uprising last winter. In Berlin, German officials summoned the Egyptian ambassador to protest the raids. The U.N. human rights office called on Egypt’s rulers to “carry out their important work without undue influence” and criticized the “unnecessarily heavy-handed measures,” according to the Associated Press. Egyptian presidential hopeful and revolutionary favorite Mohamed ElBaradei condemned the raids, saying efforts to suppress human rights groups would be “a major setback” and would “surely backfire.” Warrick reported from Washington. Leila Fadel y Joby Warrick Egyptian military gambles by raiding pro-democracy groups December 30 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rights-leaders-in-egypt-condemn- raids-on-pro-democracy- groups/2011/12/30/gIQAsc4RQP_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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U.S. touts Saudi Arabia fighter jet deal as a foreign policy, security and economic boon

By Joby Warrick and Jason Ukman, Joby Warrick and Jason Ukman, Friday, December 30, 2:56 AM The Obama administration on Thursday hailed a new $30 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia as both a hedge against Iranian aggression in the Persian Gulf and an economic windfall that could create thousands of U.S. jobs over the next decade. The agreement to sell 84 top-of-the line F-15SA fighter jets to the Saudi air force also provided a needed boost to U.S. relations with the oil-rich kingdom after months of strain over the White House’s response to the Arab Spring uprisings, U.S. officials and Middle East analysts said. The deal, which was finalized after more than a year of negotiations, was announced during a week of increased tensions with Iran, which has renewed its threat to block ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in response to international economic sanctions. The administration has pursued a policy of supplying advanced weapons systems to friendly Arab states to keep Iran’s regional ambitions in check. “This sale will send a strong message to countries in the region that the United States is committed to stability in the gulf and broader Middle East,” Andrew Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, told reporters. The deal — outlines of which were disclosed to Congress last year — also calls for refurbishing 70 F-15s currently in Saudi Arabia’s fighter fleet, as well as providing munitions, spare parts and training for Saudi pilots and air crews. The deal comes at a time when the Pentagon is considering supplying “bunker-buster” bombs and other munitions to another key gulf ally, the United Arab Emirates. U.S. officials said the timing of the announcement was unrelated to Iran’s recent provocations. “Clearly, one of the threats that [the Saudis] — that they face, as well as other countries in the region — is Iran,” Shapiro said. “But . . . this is not solely directed toward Iran. This is directed toward meeting our partner Saudi Arabia’s defense needs.”

While not the newest U.S. fighter jet, the model of the F-15 being acquired by Saudi Arabia will be equipped with the latest computers, radars and electronic warfare systems and will be “one of the most capable aircraft in the world,” said James Miller, the Defense Department’s principal deputy undersecretary for policy. U.S. officials also touted the deal’s impact at home, saying the production of the Boeing-built F-15s would support 50,000 American jobs. “It will engage 600 suppliers in 44 states and provide $3.5 billion in annual economic impact to the U.S. economy,” Shapiro said. “This will support jobs not only in the 130

aerospace sector but also in our manufacturing base and support chain, which are all crucial for sustaining our national defense.” Saudi Arabia, which has a predominantly Sunni Muslim population, is the key regional rival to Shiite-dominated Iran, as well as a vital U.S. ally. The Obama administration has sought to smooth relations with Riyadh after months of strain over U.S. support for democratic uprisings in the Middle East. Saudi leaders were particularly angered when the White House criticized the crackdown on a Shiite-led movement in the neighboring kingdom of Bahrain. The initial notification of the arms sale to Saudi Arabia, in 2010, prompted concern about security implications for Israel. U.S. officials have sought to allay those concerns and said Thursday that the sale would not degrade Israel’s military advantage. Joby Warrick and Jason Ukman, Joby Warrick and Jason Ukman U.S. touts Saudi Arabia fighter jet deal as a foreign policy, security and economic boon December 30, 2:56 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/massive-us-saudi- arms-deal-seen-as-a-foreign-policy-security-and-economic- boon/2011/12/29/gIQATNWQPP_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

Egyptian security forces raid offices of U.S., other democracy groups

By Leila Fadel and Joby Warrick, Published: December 29 CAIRO — Egyptian authorities stormed the offices of three U.S. democracy-building organizations and at least three other nonprofit groups Thursday in a dramatic escalation of a crackdown by the military-led government that could imperil its relations with the United States. The move represented the most definitive sign to date that Egypt’s military intends to run the country’s post-revolutionary transition on its own terms and without interference from Washington, its biggest benefactor. The Obama administration demanded an immediate explanation from Egyptian officials and said the computers and other items taken during the raids ought to be returned promptly. Victoria Nuland, a spokeswoman for the State Department, warned that economic aid could be withheld if Cairo’s leaders do not respond appropriately. “We were very clear that this issue needs immediate attention, and we look forward to hearing back from the Egypt government,” Nuland told reporters. She called the raids “inconsistent with the bilateral cooperation we have had over many years.” Referring to recently approved congressional legislation tying U.S. aid to democratic progress in Egypt, Nuland said the country’s ruling military council “needs to be aware of this.”

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‘Illegal foreign funding’. The coordinated raids Thursday appeared to reflect an effort by the embattled military chiefs to prove that foreign organizations have been funding and orchestrating the recent waves of unrest in which scores have been killed and hundreds wounded. Egypt’s military leaders have shown little tolerance for criticism since they pushed President Hosni Mubarak aside amid nationwide demonstrations against his rule in February. They have arrested bloggers and tried thousands of activists and others in military court. They have also sought to absolve themselves of blame for the country’s recent problems by hinting vaguely at “foreign hands” and have demonized civil society organizations that accept U.S. and other foreign assistance. Ironically, Egypt’s military is by far the country’s largest recipient of U.S. aid, receiving about $1.3 billion a year. The United States budgeted a fraction of that sum — $65 million — for pro-democracy aid to Egypt this year. Activists described the raids Thursday as the biggest crackdown on civil society in recent Egyptian history, noting that Mubarak had quietly tolerated many nongovernmental organizations during the latter part of his three-decade reign. Among the Cairo offices raided Thursday were those of the Washington-based National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute and Freedom House. Security forces confiscated computers, cellphones and documents. NDI’s offices in Alexandria and Assiut also were raided. Security forces stormed Germany’s Konrad Adenauer Foundation and at least two Egyptian nongovernmental organizations: the Arab Center for Independence of Justice and Legal Professions and the Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory. NDI and IRI are democracy-building organizations backed by the U.S. government that operate globally. Both have been monitoring Egypt’s ongoing, multi-phase parliamentary elections. Freedom House advocates for democracy, political freedoms and human rights. All three organizations issued harshly worded condemnations of the raids. “These actions come in the context of an intensive campaign by the Egyptian Government to dismantle civil society through a politically-motivated legal campaign,” Freedom House President David J. Kramer said in a statement. “It is the clearest indication yet that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has no intention of permitting the establishment of genuine democracy and is attempting to scapegoat civil society for its own abysmal failure.” In all, at least 17 raids were conducted simultaneously on orders of the Justice Ministry in a crackdown on “illegal foreign funding” and other unspecified “crimes,” the state- run Middle East News Agency reported. In at least one case, an NGO worker was arrested. The offices were sealed off and closed, at least temporarily. U.S. officials and Egypt’s ruling generals have been feuding for months over the funding of NGOs. Egyptian authorities want to control the distribution of cash to civil groups. Justice Minister Mohamed Abdel Aziz el-Gendy recently accused local NGOs of taking foreign money and using it to sow unrest during a period when the military was being criticized for using deadly force against protesters.

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Alarm, anger in Washington . U.S. officials said the raids could increase congressional resistance to providing military and economic assistance to a country that is among the top recipients of American aid. A number of congressional leaders were threatening to cut funding to Egypt after a mob attack on the Israeli Embassy in Cairo in September and amid lingering questions about the Egyptian military’s commitment to democracy. The State Department has previously criticized attacks on nongovernmental groups inside Egypt, but the targeting of U.S.-backed organizations was viewed with particular alarm. Nuland, the State Department spokeswoman, said the groups attacked Thursday were seeking to foster the development of democratic institutions and traditions and had been “very open and transparent with Egyptian authorities at all levels.” On Thursday night, the director of NDI’s office in Egypt, Julie Hughes, was at a police station filing a report and trying to recover computers and other items seized from the group’s offices, said Les Campbell, NDI’s director for Middle East and North Africa programs. “I see this as a high-stakes negotiation. The Egyptian government is looking for ways to get assistance, but on their terms,” Campbell said. He added that NDI had been summoned to the Justice Ministry for questioning and that the group was being transparent with the government about its operations. NDI opened an office in Egypt in 2005. “Cracking down on organizations whose sole purpose is to support the democratic process during Egypt’s historic transition sends a disturbing signal,” NDI President Kenneth Wollack said in a statement. ‘New attack on freedoms’ Helmy el-Rawy, executive director of the Egyptian Budgetary and Human Rights Observatory, said four vehicles with police and military commandos rolled up to the group’s office and posted men with AK-47 assault rifles outside. Rawy said the security forces confiscated all documents and computers and arrested an economics researcher, Ahmed Ali, the only person in the office. “This is a new attack on freedoms in Egypt, and it targets the mouths trying to reveal the military council’s violations,” Rawy said. The Justice Ministry began a probe into foreign funding of civic organizations about four months ago, focusing on at least 39 groups and activists, according to reports leaked to local media outlets. If the organizations under investigation are found at fault, they could be closed or fined and their members could face jail time, said Heba Morayef, an Egypt researcher for Human Rights Watch. “We’ve never had such a broad-based investigation into the human rights and NGO community,” Morayef said. “The entire independent civil society could be shut down.” Warrick reported from Washington. Special correspondent Ingy Hassieb in Cairo contributed to this report. Leila Fadel y Joby Warrick, Egyptian security forces raid offices of U.S., other democracy groups Published: December 29 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egyptian-security-forces- raid-offices-of-us-other-democracy-groups/2011/12/29/gIQA2jlbOP_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines 133

Internacional

Mohamed VI echa un pulso al islamismo El rey de Marruecos se resiste a nombrar ministro de Justicia a un islamista. El monarca aumenta el número de consejeros reales como contrapeso al futuro Gobierno. Mohamed VI designa al islamista Benkiran nuevo primer ministro Ignacio Cembrero Madrid 29 DIC 2011 - 22:03 CET9

El rey Mohamed VI recibe al islamista Abdelilá Benkiran, el 29 de noviembre, y le anuncia su nombramiento como jefe del Gobierno. / AZZOUZ BOUKALLOUCH (AFP) Treinta y cinco días después de las elecciones legislativas que se saldaron con una victoria islamista, un mes después de la designación por el rey Mohamed VI del barbudo, Abdeblilá Benkiran, como primer ministro, Marruecos sigue sin Gobierno. El anterior Ejecutivo ha celebrado incluso un Consejo de Gobierno, el pasado miércoles. La razón de la tardanza es el primer pulso entre el palacio real y el Partido de la Justicia y Desarrollo (PJD, islamista moderado). Benkiran, de 57 años, entregó el sábado pasado la lista de los 24 miembros de su gabinete en el palacio real porque, con la nueva Constitución (artículo 47), el monarca sigue nombrando a los ministros a propuesta del jefe del Gobierno. El soberano elige por su cuenta, sin consultarle, a los titulares de Asuntos Religiosos, Defensa y al secretario general del Ejecutivo, que tiene rango de ministro. Benkiran llegó incluso a anunciar que el lunes se conocería la composición de su Gobierno, que algunos periódicos ya anticipaban. El PJD dirigiría varios de los 134

ministerios importantes, como Hacienda, Exteriores, Fomento y Justicia. Hasta ahora, Bekiran no ha recibido el visto bueno del palacio real y, ante la prensa, guarda un silencio nada habitual en él. Desde círculos afines al rey sí se ha dado una explicación: algunos de los ministros propuestos, sobre todo el de la cartera de Justicia, no gustan al jefe del Estado por su escasa competencia o por otras razones. “El nombramiento de Ramid rechazado: primera crisis entre el palacio y Bekiran”, titulaba en portada el diario independiente Akhbar al Youm. Mustafá Ramid, un abogado de 52 años, es el dirigente del PJD más crítico con el sistema monárquico marroquí. En 2004 publicó, por ejemplo, un artículo en el que arremetía contra la figura del Comendador de los Creyentes, que convierte al rey en jefe espiritual de los musulmanes marroquíes. Pedía una monarquía parlamentaria. El año pasado dimitió de su puesto de presidente del grupo islamista en la Cámara baja del Parlamento para protestar por la “marginación” de la institución. “No le puedo comentar nada”, respondió Ramid cuando este corresponsal le llamó hoy para preguntarle si había un veto real a su nombramiento. Recordó, eso sí, que su designación para el cargo había sido sometida, como la de los demás ministros del PJD, a la aprobación interna del partido y que fue él el que obtuvo la votación más favorable. “Gané muy holgadamente”, comentó satisfecho. Ese apoyo del partido reduce al margen de maniobra de Benkiran. Ramid no es el único ministro en ciernes mal visto. Hay otros aspirantes, de otros partidos, que no gozan del necesario beneplácito. Es el caso de Gajmula Ebbi, diputada saharaui del Partido del Progreso y del Socialismo (excomunista), a la que se iba a atribuir la cartera de la Emigración. Tras el desmantelamiento por la fuerza, en noviembre de 2010, del campamento saharaui de Gdim Izik, en las afueras de El Aaiún, la diputada no dudó en afirmar que el Ministerio del Interior había engañado a los jóvenes que encabezaban la protesta. El titular de Interior, Taieb Chekaui, les tachó de “terroristas”, y ella se preguntó: “¿Cómo es posible entonces que el ministro les recibiera y cenase con ellos?”. Con sus 107 diputados, Bekiran no obtuvo la mayoría absoluta en la Cámara baja. Para gobernar ha formado una coalición heterogénea que incluye al Istiqlal (derecha nacionalista), al Movimiento Popular (partido de inspiración bereber) y a los excomunistas. En los días posteriores a la victoria islamista, Mohamed VI ha reforzado además el gabinete real con dos nuevos consejeros de mucho peso —en 2011 ha duplicado el número de sus consejeros— Omar Azziman, exembajador en España, y Fuad Ali el Himma, amigo del rey desde la adolescencia. “Es como si quisiera hacer contrapeso al Gobierno”, señala un diplomático. El PJD siempre ha sostenido que Fuad el Himma ejercía una mala influencia sobre el soberano. El AVE marroquí, en el alero del Ejecutivo I. CEMBRERO, Madrid Si hay un proyecto al que el rey Mohamed VI está apegado es el del tren de alta velocidad, que construyen empresas francesas entre Tánger y Casablanca. A finales de septiembre inauguró, junto con el presidente Nicolas Sarkozy, los trabajos de construcción del AVE marroquí que costará unos 3.000 millones de euros de aquí a 135

finales de 2015. Francia y las monarquías del Golfo han concedido a Marruecos créditos blandos. Es una “inversión catastrófica” en un país en el que miles de pueblos carecen de infraestructuras básicas, afirmó, el jueves 22, Lahcen Daoudi, el más conocido de los economistas del Partido de la Justicia y del Desarrollo (PJD, islamista). Daoudi, que pronunció una conferencia en una escuela de negocios de Rabat, dejó caer que la construcción del tren podría alargarse hasta 2020 o 2025. A Daoudi las quinielas de la prensa le atribuyen en el nuevo Ejecutivo la cartera de Educación, la de Hacienda o la de Fomento. Quizá por eso los nacionalistas del Istiqlal, el principal socio de Gobierno de los islamistas, cambiaron el domingo pasado de parecer. Habían renunciado a Fomento a cambio del Ministerio de Agricultura y de que el aspirante al cargo, Karim Ghellab, fuese elegido presidente de la cámara baja lo que logró el 19 de diciembre. No hubo comunicado tras la reunión del Comité Ejecutivo del Istiqlal, pero uno de sus miembros, Mohamed Al-Khalifa, dio a entender que el reparto de carteras pactado con los islamistas no era justo. Debía ser, explicó Al-Khalifa, proporcional no solo al número de escaños sino “a la posición del partido en el escenario marroquí y a su historia de lucha”. El Istiqlal fue el artífice de la independencia de Marruecos en 1956. De paso se preguntó también por qué el Istiqlal no iba a ocupar ninguno de los llamados “ministerios de soberanía” empezando por el de Justicia. La nueva reivindicación del Istiqlal podría no ser espontánea. Si conservan la cartera de Fomento —Ghellab ha sido su titular hasta hace 11 días- la construcción del AVE estaría probablemente garantizada. Si obtienen, en cambio, la de Justicia impedirían así al polémico islamista Mustafá Ramid acceder a una cartera harto sensible. Ignacio Cembrero Mohamed VI echa un pulso al islamismo29 DIC 2011 - 22:03 CET9 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/29/actualidad/1325191658_98741 9.html

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Internacional VIOLENCIA EN SIRIA La misión de los observadores en Siria naufraga en medio de la represión

Las tropas abren fuego contra los manifestantes cerca del equipo de enviados Dudas sobre el papel del general sudanés que dirige la delegación de la Liga Árabe La Liga Árabe afirma que la situación en Homs "parece tranquilizadora" La represión de El Asad, ante los ojos de los observadores Enric González Jerusalén 30 DIC 2011 - 08:15 CET695

Manifestación contra el presidente Bachar el Asad en Amude (noroeste de Siria), el pasado martes. / REUTERS La misión de la Liga Árabe en Siria corre un serio riesgo de naufragio. No la toman en serio ni el Gobierno de Bachar el Asad, que dispara contra los manifestantes en presencia del equipo de observadores, ni los grupos de oposición, para quienes la misión no merece crédito por el oscuro pasado del general sudanés que la dirige. El jefe de la misión, el general Mustafá Dabi, fue jefe de la Inteligencia Militar sudanesa y hombre de confianza del presidente Omar Bashir, acusado de genocidio y crímenes contra la humanidad. Dabi acudió el pasado martes a Homs, la ciudad siria que más sufre la violencia, y comentó que lo que había visto le parecía “tranquilizador”. Hoy la misión de la Liga Árabe ha asistido a nuevas escenas “tranquilizadoras”: las fuerzas de seguridad han abierto fuego sobre miles de manifestantes cerca de un edificio oficial, en las afueras de Damasco, que en ese momento visitaban los observadores. 137

Portavoces de la oposición afirmaron que al menos 29 personas murieron durante la jornada, en Douma, muy cerca de la capital, y en otras ciudades. La presencia de los observadores parece haber provocado un aumento de la violencia, en lugar de disminuirla. Cada uno de sus desplazamientos suscita la movilización de grupos de ciudadanos que quieren aproximarse a la misión para denunciar al régimen de El Asad, y soldados y policías disuelven a tiros esas manifestaciones. Los grupos armados de la oposición tampoco han interrumpido sus ataques contra las fuerzas de seguridad, pese a los ruegos de sus dirigentes políticos. El principal dirigente de la oposición siria, Burhan Ghalioun, se ha entrevistado hoy en El Cairo con el secretario general de la Liga Árabe, Nabil Elaraby. Ghalioun ha pedido a Elaraby que la misión dirigida por el general Dabi no se limitara a observar, sino que exigiera de forma activa al Gobierno de Bachar el Asad el cumplimiento del acuerdo que alcanzó con la Liga Árabe el pasado día 19. Según ese acuerdo, El Asad debe retirar sus tropas de las calles, liberar a los presos políticos, permitir la entrada en el país de periodistas y trabajadores humanitarios y abrir un diálogo abierto con la oposición. Por el momento, ninguno de esos puntos se ha cumplido. El Gobierno ha puesto en libertad a 755 de los detenidos por participar en las protestas, pero quedan en las cárceles al menos 14.000, según estimaciones de la ONU. Ghalioun eleva la cifra de presos políticos a 100.000 y asegura que muchos de ellos han sido ocultados en cuarteles y buques de guerra y corren peligro de ser asesinados. Ante los incumplimientos flagrantes del Gobierno y la actitud contemporizadora del general Mustafá Dabi, la oposición ha perdido casi por completo las esperanzas en que la misión de la Liga Árabe sirva para algo. Lo importante, en cualquier caso, será el informe que en su momento, aún no determinado, la misión debe presentar al secretario general de la organización. Si el informe indica que Bachar el Asad no cumple el acuerdo de pacificación, la Liga Árabe pedirá al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU una resolución que incluya sanciones severas contra Siria. El grupo opositor Revolución Siria 2011, muy activo en Facebook y organizador de las primeras protestas populares contra el régimen, en abril pasado, ha hecho un llamamiento para que mañana se celebren manifestaciones masivas en todo el país. “Marcharemos como hicimos ya en Homs y Hama, donde llevamos ramas de olivo y fuimos atacados con fuego de artillería y de ametralladoras por las bandas de Bachar”, se dice en la convocatoria. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/29/actualidad/1325163087_96414 1.html

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Internacional De hombre de Bashir en Darfur a jefe de los observadores de la Liga Árabe en Siria Las ONG de defensa de Derechos Humanos critican la elección del general Dabi por su papel en el régimen sudanés y sus estrechas relaciones con el presidente, acusado de genocidio La oposición siria asegura que la represión continúa ante los observadores MOKHTAR ATITAR Madrid 29 DIC 2011 - 20:29 CET6 La hoja de servicios del general sudanés Mustafa Dabi, jefe de la misión de observadores de la Liga Árabe enviada a Siria, está íntimamente ligada al presidente sudanés Bashir y al conflicto de Darfur. Desde marzo de 2009 hay emitida por la Tribunal Penal Internacional una orden de arresto internacional contra Bashir por crímenes de guerra y lesa humanidad, ampliada en 2010 por una acusación de genocidio. Nada más liderar el golpe de estado de 1989, Bashir colocó a Dabi como jefe de la inteligencia militar, un puesto clave tras la asonada. Ocupó el cargo hasta el año 1995, cuando pasó a encargarse de la inteligencia exterior. Durante este periodo Osama Bin Laden usó Sudán como refugio, con el beneplácito de Bashir. Un año después Dabi asumió la jefatura de las operaciones del Ejército, cargo que ocupó hasta 1999 para dar el salto a la diplomacia, como embajador en Catar, hasta el 2004. Precisamente el emirato fue el patrocinador de unas conversaciones de paz para Darfur, con el general Dabi como representante de Jartum. Catar también ha sido el país que más ha presionado dentro de la Liga Árabe para que se envíe a una comisión de observadores a Siria. Despierta un especial recelo en las organizaciones de defensa de los Derechos Humanos su papel en Darfur. El general Dabi fue el impulsor de las llamadas Fuerzas de Paz, creadas para “restablecer la calma”, y que actuaron en realidad como un apoyo soterrado para los Janjawid, milicia que aglutina a las tribus árabes partidarias de Jartum y brazo ejecutor del genocidio contra los grupos étnicos de los Fur, Zaghawa y los Masali, siempre negado por el régimen, y que la ONU eleva hasta 300.000 el número de víctimas. “Sudán registró récords de abusos durante el periodo en el que Dabi fue jefe de la inteligencia militar", declara Jehanne Henry, investigadora para África de Human Rights Watch (HRW). "Con el nombramiento, la Liga Árabe mina la credibilidad de la misión”, continúa . “La misión de la Liga Árabe es más que un individuo y esperamos, por el bien del pueblo sirio, que los esfuerzos de los observadores avancen desde este titubeante inicio y marquen una real diferencia sobre el terreno”, añade Henry. Los servicios secretos sudaneses han estado implicados en la violación de Derechos Humano” Jehanne Henry, defensora de HRW Con todas estas credenciales, la publicación americana Forieng Policy calificaba a Dabi "como el peor observador de Derechos Humanos del Mundo".

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Al problema de credibilidad de Dabi como jefe de la misión, se añade el desconocimiento sobre la composición y capacitación del resto de la misión. “No sabemos cuántos observadores hay, porque primero la Liga Árabe dijo que iba a ser 50, para luego ampliarla hasta 150”, cuenta el politólogo sirio Salam Kawakibi, del centro de estudios The Arab Reform Initiative. “Los grupos opositores han estado siempre de acuerdo con la iniciativa árabe, porque no quieren que se les acuse de que solo quieren una intervención extranjera”, añade. “Están allí, que es importante, pero no se sabe si cuentan con los medios necesarios, si la gente va a poder hablar con ellos con total libertad y si la elección de Dabi le resta toda credibilidad”, puntualiza, recordando que esta es la primera misión de este tipo que organiza la Liga Árabe en sus 66 años de historia. "La clave es si la misión de la Liga Árabe va a tener un acceso sin obstáculos a todos los detenidos", señala Herny desde HRW. "Hemos documentado los esfuerzos de las autoridades sirias para trasladar a los prisioneros, aparentemente para evitar a los observadores. Es esencial que la Liga Árabe haga un seguimiento de estos hechos, y que hable clara y públicamente contra estas prácticas", concluye. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/29/actualidad/1325177721_10 7045.html 12/29/2011 03:26 PM Arab League in Syria A Mission of Amateurs A Commentary by Yassin Musharbash Just as their mission begins, Arab League observers are already in danger of losing their credibility in Syria. Their comments about the situation in the opposition stronghold of Homs seemed dismissive to the insurgents. And that's not the only mistake already made during the important visit. The information emerging about the visit of Arab League observers to Syria is alarming -- but not because they plan to pointedly pursue the accusations against the regime of President Bashar Assad. Instead, it's because the first statements made by its leader, Sudanese Lt. Gen. Mustafa al-Dabi, are scandalous. Speaking in the insurgent stronghold of Homs, he said that some areas looked "a bit of a mess," but otherwise he'd seen "nothing frightening" While Dabi also said the mission to Syria would require more time, the fatal aspect of his statement is that it sounds dismissive, even if perhaps that's not how it was meant, even if the observers didn't witness a massacre that day, and even if he was trying to acknowledge the regime's promised withdrawal of the military from the area. His statements set off alarm bells for parts of the Syrian opposition. They fear that Assad will be whitewashed, or that the regime in Damascus will be able to lead the observers only to places where no human rights violations are apparent. It seems inconceivable that the Arab League has praised Dabi for his diplomatic experience. This is exactly the kind of situation where making light of things should be avoided.

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Abandoning Demands on the First Day There are also other indications that the Arab League emissaries have been unprofessional. News agency Reuters quoted a Homs resident on Wednesday as saying that observers declined to investigate a hard-hit district of the city without the accompaniment of a Syrian military official. If that's true, the Arab League, on the first day of its mission, has made a mockery of its central demand -- free, unfettered access to the entire country. If the emissaries fear the public, they're in the wrong place. That's even more the case if they're worried about spoiling things with the Syrian army. Officially, the Arab League has taken a hard line against President Assad, threatening him with sanctions. After weeks of tricky maneuvering, he finally let observers into the country, a place where serious estimates put the number of civilians killed at some 5,000, and where thousands of opposition members are thought to be imprisoned. Squandering Capital The Arab League, long considered a paper tiger rather than a powerful body, had appeared to be empowered. But its first mistake was putting a controversial former Sudanese general in charge of the mission. He is suspected of looking the other way during the mass murders and expulsions that took place in the crisis region of Darfur. The Arab League is in danger of instantly squandering its newfound capital -- and of looking like overwhelmed amateurs. Bashar Assad and his clique are shrewd. While the president's troops massacred civilians, he appeared several times on state television, promising dialogue and reform with a smile. If the Arab League officials don't quickly and convincingly make clear that they are seeking to expose the truth, that they distrust this regime, that they insist on moving around independently, that they are listening to those affected by the brutal crackdown, and that they are unbiased, then the mission is useless. In that case, valuable time will be wasted that could have been better spent applying more international pressure or pushing for hard sanctions. URL:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,806230,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • 'Hunted, Persecuted and Intimidated': Syrian Opposition Politician Attacked in Germany (12/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,806051,00.html • Inside Syria's Death Zone: Assad's Regime Hunts People in Homs (12/23/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,805519,00.html • The Tolerant Dictator: Syria's Christians Side with Assad Out of Fear (11/30/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800450,00.html • Filming Syria's Women: 'It Is Difficult Making Anything Critical of the Regime' (11/30/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800854,00.html

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The World's Worst Human Rights Observer As Arab League monitors work to expose President Bashar al-Assad's crackdown, the head of the mission is a Sudanese general accused of creating the fearsome "janjaweed," which was responsible for the worst atrocities during the Darfur genocide. BY DAVID KENNER | DECEMBER 27, 2011

For the first time in Syria's nine-month-old uprising, there are witnesses to President Bashar al-Assad's crackdown, which according to the United Nations has claimed more than 5,000 lives. Arab League observers arrived in the country on Dec. 26, and traveled to the city of Homs -- the epicenter of the revolt, where the daily death toll regularly runs into the dozens, according to activist groups -- on Dec. 27. Thousands of people took to the streets to protest against Assad upon the observers' arrival, while activists said Syrian tanks withdrew from the streets only hours before the Arab League team entered the city. TwitterRedditBuzz More... "I am going to Homs," insisted Sudanese Gen. Mohammad Ahmed Mustafa al-Dabi, the head of the Arab League observer mission, telling reporters that so far the Assad regime had been "very cooperative." But Dabi may be the unlikeliest leader of a humanitarian mission the world has ever seen. He is a staunch loyalist of Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for genocide and crimes against humanity for his 142

government's policies in Darfur. And Dabi's own record in the restive Sudanese region, where he stands accused of presiding over the creation of the feared Arab militias known as the "janjaweed," is enough to make any human rights activist blanch. Dabi's involvement in Darfur began in 1999, four years before the region would explode in the violence that Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled as "genocide." Darfur was descending into war between the Arab and Masalit communities -- the same fault line that would widen into a bloodier interethnic war in a few years' time. As the situation escalated out of control, Bashir sent Dabi to Darfur to restore order. According to Julie Flint and Alex De Waal's Darfur: A New History of a Long War, Dabi arrived in Geneina, the capital of West Darfur, on Feb. 9, 1999, with two helicopter gunships and 120 soldiers. He would stay until the end of June. During this time, he would make an enemy of the Masalit governor of West Sudan. Flint and De Waal write: Governor Ibrahim Yahya describes the period as ‘the beginning of the organization of the Janjawiid', with [Arab] militia leaders like Hamid Dawai and Shineibat receiving money from the government for the first time. ‘The army would search and disarm villages, and two days later the Janjawiid would go in. They would attack and loot from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m., only ten minutes away from the army. By this process all of Dar Masalit was burned.' Yahya's account was supported five years later by a commander of the Sudan Liberation Army, a rebel organization movement in the region. "[T]hings changed in 1999," he told Flint and De Waal. "The PDF [Popular Defense Forces, a government militia] ended and the Janjawiid came; the Janjawiid occupied all PDF places." Dabi provided a different perspective on his time in Darfur, but it's not clear that he disagrees on the particulars of how he quelled the violence. He told Flint and De Waal that he provided resources to resolve the tribes' grievances, and employed a firm hand to force the leaders to reconcile -- "threatening them with live ammunition when they dragged their feet," in the authors' words. "I was very proud of the time I spent in Geneina," Dabi said. De Waal told FP that Yahya, who would become a senior commander for the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), had "an axe to grind" against the Sudanese military -- but his charge that Dabi spurred the creation of the janjaweed wasn't far off base. "[T]he army command finds the militia useful and fearsome in equal measure," De Waal said. "So al-Dabi's regularization of the Arab militia served both to rein them in, but also to legitimize their activities and retain them as a future strike force." Dabi's role in Darfur is only one episode in a decades-long career that has been spent protecting the interests of Bashir's regime. He has regularly been trusted with authority over the regime's most sensitive portfolios: The day Bashir took power in a coup in 1989, he was promoted to head of military intelligence. In August 1995, after protesters at Khartoum University rattled the regime, Dabi became head of Sudan's foreign intelligence agency -- pushing aside a loyalist of Hassan al-Turabi, the hard-line Islamist cleric who helped Bashir rise to power but would be pushed aside several years later. And as civil war ravaged south Sudan, Dabi was tasked from 1996 to 1999 as chief of Sudan's military operations.

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It is likely, however, Dabi's more recent career that led to his selection as head of the Arab League observer mission in Syria. He served as Sudan's ambassador to Qatar from 1999 to 2004, and would return to Doha after his term ended in a Darfur-related position -- making him a well-known quantity to the Qatari government, which has taken the lead among Arab states in pressuring Assad's regime. In 2006, Dabi was appointed head of the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission (DSAIC) -- according to the peace agreement, De Waal said, a representative of the former rebels was supposed to get the position, but Bashir "simply ignored" that provision to tap Dabi. In this new position, he played a major role in the peace talks, sponsored by Qatar, which resulted in the government and one rebel group signing the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in July 2011. While much of Dabi's activities in recent years have been behind closed doors, his limited media statements show that he remains a Bashir loyalist par excellence. In 2006, he slammed U.N. Special Representative Jan Pronk's statement that Sudan had suffered defeats in Darfur as "false and misleading," according to the Sudanese press, urging Pronk to "steer clear" of military issues and "concentrate on his duties instead." That same year, his aide suggested there would be a time limit to the African Union troops in Darfur, saying the peacekeepers could "stay until the crisis is over, but not indefinitely." Dabi's checkered past is only one of the criticisms of the observer mission, which human rights activists have criticized for falling far short of its promise to monitor the implementation of an Arab League initiative meant to end Assad's crackdown. Wissam Tarif, the Arab world coordinator for the human rights group Avaaz, slammed the mission for being far too small -- at roughly 50 people -- to monitor the situation across Syria, for failing to provide any biographical information about the observers to human rights organizations, and for relying on Assad's forces to shepherd them around the country. "I helped set up a meeting with activists in Homs, and [the observers] arrived with 10 security officers along with them," Tarif noted -- obviously a huge risk to the protest organizers' safety. As monitors arrive in Homs, Syrians will no doubt cheer their arrival at the center of the uprising. But given the stumbles of the Arab League observer mission, it's clear that Syrians are still very much alone. Save big when you subscribe to FP. ASHRAF SHAZLY/AFP/Getty Images http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/27/the_worlds_worst_human_rights_ob server?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

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Arab League needs to tell the truth about Syria By Editorial Board, Thursday, December 29, 1:34 AM THE HOPES of Syrians for an end to the criminal repression by the regime of Bashar al-Assad now depend on the Arab League and the observer force it dispatched to the country this week. It is a very thin reed. The observers were originally meant to number 500, but have been pushed down to 150; 66 had arrived in the country by Wednesday. Their chief, Gen. Mustafa al-Dabi, is a former intelligence director for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who himself is under international indictment for crimes against humanity. On Tuesday, the mission visited Homs, the site of some of the bloodiest attacks by government tanks and troops against civilians. Reports said the observers were shadowed by government minders and did not enter neighborhoods where the worst violence has taken place. Meanwhile, another 17 people were reported killed in the city, including some of the thousands who tried to gather in a central square. Yet Gen. Dabi, who has been linked to the genocide in Darfur, was disconcertingly upbeat about what his team witnessed: “The situation seemed reassuring so far,” he told Reuters on Wednesday. The Arab League faces a critical dilemma. On Nov. 2, it announced that Syria had accepted a number of stringent measures, including the withdrawal of military forces from cities, an end to violence against peaceful protesters, the release of all political prisoners and the admission of observers and foreign journalists. Were it to honestly implement all those steps, the Assad regime would promptly collapse, since it would be unable to contain the massive opposition movement that has grown up in the past nine months. So it wheedles and cheats and bargains for time. So far, it has won nearly two months of indulgence from the Arab governments, during which it has massacred hundreds more people and arrested thousands. The deceptions continue. On Tuesday, Human Rights Watch reported that hundreds of prisoners had been transferred from detention in Homs to military bases, from which the observers are banned. It also said police identification cards were being issued to troops, so that the regime could claim to have withdrawn the army from the city without doing so. On Wednesday, Damascus announced that 750 prisoners had been released — but the opposition says tens of thousands remain in custody. Gen. Dabi and his observers, and the Arab League as a whole, eventually must either report the truth about the regime’s continuing crimes or pretend they are not occurring. The United States and its allies, for their part, will have to decide whether to continue to rely on the Arab states to end the bloodshed in Syria or take more measures of their own. On Tuesday, the State Department hinted at the latter, saying in a statement that “if the Syrian regime continues to resist and disregard Arab League efforts, the international community will consider other means to protect Syrian civilians.” It did not say what those “other means” are. But if they are to stop the violence, they will have to be robust. Arab League needs to tell the truth about Syria December 29, 1:34 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/arab-league-needs-to-tell-the-truth-about- syria/2011/12/28/gIQAf2DGNP_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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ft.com World Middle East & North Africa Politics & Society

Last updated: December 28, 2011 7:35 pm Chief Arab monitor alarms Syrian opposition By Borzou Daragahi and Noah Browning in Cairo and William Wallis in London

The Sudanese general leading an Arab League delegation to Syria was thrust into the centre of the country’s crisis on Wednesday after he appeared to play down the government’s violent crackdown on opposition protesters. Mustafa Dabi told Reuters that “things were calm and there were no clashes” and that what they had seen was “reassuring so far” in Homs. More ON THIS STORY Syria renews bloody crackdown in Homs In depth Syria Arab League monitors reach Homs Editorial Islamism and the Arab awakening Russia unveils UN resolution on Syria ON THIS TOPIC Monitors arrive in Syria to assess violence Syria to allow monitors from Arab League Pressure on Syria as death toll mounts Hamas reconfigures engagement with Syria IN MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS & SOCIETY Mubarak’s corruption trial postponed Israelis rally against gender segregation Syria blasts kill at least 44 at security agencies Islamist poll triumphs worry Christians Video footage posted to the internet in recent days showed tanks and armoured vehicles ploughing through the beleaguered western Syrian city. Plainclothes militiamen and soldiers have killed hundreds of protesters, according to human rights observers and activists. “I wonder how he found Homs quiet when he saw the tanks and heard the sound of shooting,” said Heba, an activist in Homs who declined to give her family name. Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, reluctantly signed up to an Arab League proposal to end the violent standoff between security officials and protesters. Arab League monitors dispatched throughout the country are attempting to verify Syria’s compliance with a plan meant to end the violence.

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However, Syrian opposition activists worry Gen Dabi’s team will provide Mr Assad with diplomatic cover. In Homs on Wednesday monitors refused to enter the neighbourhood of Baba Amr, where violence has been particularly intense, without their Syrian military escort. Gen Dabi served as head of military intelligence and head of foreign intelligence after a coup brought his ally Omar al-Bashir to power as president in 1989. Experts say the general was instrumental in formalising the role of violent “Janjaweed” militias in Khartoum’s counterinsurgency strategy against rebels in Darfur. One Sudanese source said he had cultivated ties with Syria and Iran, as well as with Hamas in Palestine and Hizbollah in Lebanon. An official of the Syrian National Council, an opposition umbrella group, said the group had opposed Gen Dabi’s appointment from the beginning. Khaled Kamel said: “His appointment made us angry from the beginning and we expressed our anger in our meetings with the Arab League. They said that there would be foreign media accompanying him and monitoring his visits, but that has not occurred up until now.” Others said his role as head of foreign intelligence would necessarily have brought him into contact with a variety of Middle East figures. One Arab League official said Gen Dabi deserved more time: “It’s too early to assess ... We should wait and evaluate his work.” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2de5e2ee-3148-11e1-a62a- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1huhdEbOj

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Syria: human rights groups challenge leadership of Arab League mission Doubts raised after Sudanese general says situation in Homs is 'reassuring' despite footage of monitors witnessing casualties Julian Borger, diplomatic editor The Guardian, Thursday 29 December 2011

A Syrian tank moves through Homs where the Arab League observer mission began on Tuesday. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images The judgment of an Arab League observer mission in Syria has been called into question after its leader, the Sudanese general Mustafa al-Dabi, described the situation in the opposition stronghold of Homs as "reassuring", despite video footage of his monitors witnessing heavy gunfire and being shown civilian casualties. Syrian opposition groups reported more deaths on Wednesday in Hama, where security forces allegedly used live ammunition against protesters attempting to stage a sit-in in the city centre before a scheduled Arab League mission on Thursday. Estimates of casualties range from seven wounded to six killed. Al-Jazeera television footage from Hama showed gunfire, rising black smoke and men marching through the streets chanting "Where are the Arab monitors?" One man appeared to be bleeding from the neck. The appointment of Dabi as the head of the observer mission was criticised on Wednesday by international human rights groups, who point to his past as a military intelligence chief and long-serving loyalist of President Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted by the international criminal court for genocide and crimes against humanity in the Darfur region. Dabi was a military commander in Darfur in 1999, when Arab Janjaweed militias, later accused of killing many of the local population, were co-opted by the army in a counterinsurgency against rebel groups.

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Nearly 3 million people were forced to flee their homes in Darfur and the UN says about 300,000 have died, mostly from disease. Amnesty International said Sudan's military intelligence under Dabi's command "was responsible for the arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearance, and torture or other ill-treatment of numerous people in Sudan". Alex de Waal, co-author on a book on the Darfur conflict who now runs the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University, said of Dabi's time in the region: "Many were arrested during his tenure and the Darfur rebels say that his stint in the area was "the beginning of the organisation of the Janjaweed". Dabi argues that he was even-handed and that it was "necessary to show a firm hand in the face of dissent that threatened to spiral out of control". The Arab League has defended its choice of Dabi to lead the monitoring team. Observers speculated that his selection represented a reward to the Sudanese government for its support of Qatar in opposing the Gaddafi regime in Libya and in taking a tough line on Syria. The mission, currently 60-strong but eventually intended to comprise 150 observers, began its work on Tuesday in Homs, a city of 1 million people and stronghold of the rebel Free Syrian Army, where the government reportedly used tanks and armoured cars on Monday against the restive district of Baba Amr. "Some places looked a bit of a mess but there was nothing frightening," Dabi told Reuters on Wednesdayby phone from Damascus. "The situation seemed reassuring so far … Yesterday was quiet and there were no clashes. We did not see tanks but we did see some armoured vehicles. But remember this was only the first day and it will need investigation. We have 20 people who will be there for a long time." The British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed security forces killed 15 people across the country on Tuesday, six of them in Homs. It said 34 were killed the day before. A video distributed by activists in Homs showed Arab League monitors in a battle- scarred area of the city on Wednesday, taking cover when heavy fire rang out. Another showed the body of a little boy, purportedly killed in this week's fighting in Homs, being laid on the bonnet of an Arab League monitors' vehicle. Omar, a Baba Amr resident and activist, told Reuters: "I felt they didn't really acknowledge what they'd seen – maybe they had orders not to show sympathy. But they didn't seem enthusiastic about hearing people tell their stories. "We felt like we were shouting into a void. We placed our hopes in the entire Arab League. But these monitors don't seem to understand how the regime works, they don't seem interested in the suffering and death people have faced." The Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad said it was fighting a terrorist insurgency, which has killed 2,000 soldiers and police. The regime claimed to have freed 755 detainees "whose hands were not stained with Syrian blood", but according to Amnesty International 15,000 Syrians remain in detention. Julian Borger Syria: human rights groups challenge leadership of Arab League mission Doubts raised after Sudanese general says situation in Homs is 'reassuring' despite footage of monitors witnessing casualties29 December 2011http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/syria-arab-league-observer- mission/print 149

Egyptian army officer's diary of military life in a revolution 'When the rallies happened in Tahrir Square, we would all receive a large bonus' Jack Shenker in Cairo guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 28 December 2011 18.34 GMT

Egyptian anti-goverment demonstrators in Tahrir Square, Cairo. Photograph: Pedro Ugarte/AFP/Getty Images Despite the crucial role played by the military in Egypt's upheaval, little is ever heard from those at the heart of the armed forces: the ordinary, mid-ranking personnel whose loyalty to the military, or lack of it, could yet determine the outcome of the revolution. Now, one insider has penned a unique account of life in the Egyptian army. A reserve officer for several years, he was in active service throughout the anti- Mubarak uprising and worked through this year's unrest before completing his duty in late 2011. The officer's name and identity has been concealed; the text below has been edited for clarity and to preserve the writer's anonymity. "Officer training was intense. Our days started at 5am, and conditions were terrible. It was an attempt to 'break us' and transform us from civilians to military men. The hours were filled with pointless assemblies and formations where we'd stand for hours in the sun, the recital of army songs, singing the national anthem daily and following orders from the sergeants and warrant officers who would treat us terribly. But even those who gave us lessons would complain about the army and tell us how surprised and shocked they were at how different it had been from their expectations, and how frustrated they were at being unable to leave. Regulation food was awful and served most of the time with dirty plates and spoons; it was partly bad management but I also believe they arranged things like that deliberately as it was possible to buy your own food instead from the well-stocked cafeteria and this was a way for the army to make money.

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Punishment for misdemeanours included being forced to stay at the training academy on your days off, being made to lie down with your hands behind your back and then crawl on the ground, and being told to stand under the sun for an hour in full uniform and equipment, or getting thrown into military jail. It was all designed to humiliate you, but often we preferred being sent to jail; it was better than the normal daily schedule because at least it meant we were out of the sun. Sometimes we'd rebel until the prison was full, at which point they'd have to try and be nicer to us. At the beginning we weren't even allowed phones, but over time everyone found ways around the rules and we managed to get anything we wanted into the barracks: mobiles, laptops, beer, hashish, chess, cards and kettles. The main challenge was staying sane and keeping your chin up, remembering that they were trying to crack your spirit. The senior officers are all still living in 1973 [the year of Egypt's last major military conflict, the Yom Kippur war with Israel] and spent all their time reminding us of the imminent threat posed by Israel and how the Israelis are scared of the huge numbers of educated young officers drafted annually into the Egyptian army. It was different in the old days; back then they had a cause to fight for – now it's all just bullshit and corruption, just another job for most of the personnel. Most of the mid-ranking officers are completely uninterested in all the patriotic rhetoric. For them it's just stable employment with decent benefits; the majority are pretty naive and not very politically conscious, and the revolution took them by surprise. When 25 January [the outbreak of the revolution] began these officers were instinctively against the protests but once the regime began to crack they were appalled at the stories that emerged of corruption surrounding Mubarak and his cronies. Most became relatively pro-revolution but I think there was some bitterness over the fact that things had clearly been so rotten for so long and yet their generation had done so little about it. Now it was the younger kids who were forcing political change; the older guys felt confused and weren't sure what to believe. After Mubarak fell and the rule of Scaf (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) began, the top brass moved quickly to secure the loyalty of all mid-level and junior officers. Whenever a big Friday street demonstration or rally in Tahrir Square took place we would all receive a bonus of between 250 and 500 Egyptian pounds (£26-52), whether or not we had anything to do with policing the protests. It's ridiculous; at the height of the unrest reserve officer salaries doubled and everyone was getting huge bonuses all the time (an average of 2,400 pounds – £254 – for me in January and February). Most full-time officers didn't really care what was happening politically on the streets, they were just happy with the extra money. Occasionally though you'd hear guilty jokes about how we were the only people who were benefiting from the revolution and the Egyptian people had been screwed over. It was clear that the army desperately wanted to avoid any form of protest in the country once Mubarak was gone. The aim was to win over more of the Islamist population who might have traditionally been more hostile to the armed forces, as well as scaring the shit out of anyone else who might be thinking of holding a demonstration. Each confrontation with protesters was a test to measure the reaction of the general public and see what level of brutality and violence they could get away with. That was especially obvious during the Maspero events [a protest by Coptic Christians and their supporters on 9 October which was attacked by the armed forces, leaving 27 151

dead]. The media, army and interior ministry have always worked hand in hand for their personal goals, and in this instance they worked to escalate the fitna [an Arabic word denoting chaos and division] between Muslims and Christians, and there was a great deal of ignorance and confusion within the ranks. The Christian minority are seen by many – inside the army and outside – as less important, so they were an easy target. You have to bear in mind that for the most part, officers only watch mainstream Egyptian television and so they never see the YouTube videos showing the darker side of Scaf. They're in denial. But as the months went on, despite this ignorance and the generous bonus system, dissent against [Egypt's commander-in-chief and current head of Scaf, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein] Tantawi has grown. Most of the mid-level officers now think of him as Mubarak's right-hand man, and they hate the fact that Scaf's violence has tarnished the army's image in the eyes of the public. Many still disapprove of the current protests because they feel it's not the right time, and also because they're resentful that others can go and demonstrate on the streets when they themselves do not have such freedom. But that attitude is beginning to change, especially as independent TV channels have been airing video clips of the recent violence and the brutality of the security forces is being openly discussed by people like [prominent media personalities] Yosri Fouda and Ibrahim Eissa. More and more mid-level officers are turning against Scaf, and against Tantawi." http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/egyptian-military-officers- diary?CMP=EMCNEWEML1355

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Kurds in Turkey: arrests and violence threaten to radicalise a generation Constanze Letsch reports on the Turkish crackdown on the country's Kurds and the cultural oppression that goes with it Constanze Letsch in Diyarbakir guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 28 December 2011 18.20 GMT

Children enjoy a motorbike ride in Diyarbakir, a mainly Kurdish city in south-eastern Turkey where a courtroom has been built for the mass trial of more than 150 Kurdish politicians and activists. Photograph: Bulent Kilic/AFP Since the beginning of the Arab uprising Turkey has been held up as a blueprint for the emerging Middle Eastern democracies to copy. But many observers question whether its treatment of its Kurdish minority gives it the right to be treated as a role model. This year more than 4,000 people have been arrested under arbitrary terrorism charges, including dozens of journalists arrested last week, military operations against Kurdish separatists have intensified, with at least 27 killed in December alone, and guerrillas have stepped up violent attacks on security forces and civilians. Mass trials of Kurds, including local deputies, mayors, academics and human rights activists, have inched forwards. In the biggest case, more than 150 politicians and activists are being tried in a specially built courtroom in Diyarbakir. More than 100 of the defendants have been in pre-trial detention, some of them for many months. Abdullah Demirbas, the mayor of a district in the mainly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey, is among the defendants on trial for "membership in the KCK", an illegal pan-Kurdish umbrella organisation that includes the armed Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK).

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If convicted, he faces 35 years in jail on these charges alone. "They have not even found a pocket knife in my house," Demirbas said. Human rights groups have repeatedly expressed their concern about the arbitrary use of terrorism laws in Turkey. "The Turkish laws make no distinction between political activity and terrorism. It is never examined in what kind of activities people are actually involved and whether these qualify them for prosecution. Very many of these cases are based on guilt by association," said Emma Sinclair-Webb, the Turkey researcher for Human Rights Watch. "People have a right to association. You may not like what people are associating with, but it is illegitimate to just jail, suppress and silence critics." Demirbas fears that the massive repression of politicians and human rights activists will decrease confidence in politics and lead to more violence: "A state that wants to end violence should widen the political sphere as much as possible, so that people who used to feel compelled to use armed force will turn to dialogue instead. "But [Turkey] does exactly the opposite: they arrest more than 4,000 people that have never held a weapon, so people will think: 'If we enter politics, we will end up like that.'" Demirbas does not need to look far for examples: he was given a prison sentence of two years and six months after saying, in May 2009, that "a soldier's and a guerrilla's mother's tears are the same colour. This war needs to end". Three weeks later his then 16-year-old son joined the PKK. "He told me: 'Dad, see this is what happens when you try to do politics. This state does not understand politics, it only understands weapons.'" Demirbas said that he tried in vain to persuade his son to stay. "That is the psychology of thousands of Kurds. I know of at least 2,000 young Kurdish people who have [joined the PKK] since then." Mehmet Emin Aktar, president of the Diyarbakir Bar Association, said that Turkey had become "a republic of fear". He says: "A democratic state needs to provide a trustworthy judiciary. People need to know that they can expect justice if they step in front of a judge. But this is no longer the case." Like many of his colleagues, he is very worried that the situation will reach a breaking point: "If fear and threats continue to be the main method of the government, the younger generation of Kurds will become more radical." In the cafeteria of the Dicle Firat cultural centre, a group of men were discussing the latest KCK arrests. "We all have our bags packed," Kazim Öz said. "We now live on the assumption that each and every one of us could be arrested at any minute." Another man nodded. "Where is this supposed to end? They can't arrest all of us! This morning I counted 36 grandchildren. They can't finish us Kurds like this."

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With tensions turning violent again, investment and business development in Diyarbakir has stalled, making unemployment and poverty, for decades a major problem in the predominantly Kurdish south-east, ever more acute. With prejudice fuelled by the Turkish media, discrimination against Kurds continues. "Those who conduct business outside Diyarbakir province will not register their car here," said one local Turkish Kurdish politician from the ruling AKP party. "The '21' on your licence plate is often enough to get randomly pulled over and fined. It's just not worth the trouble." Most people agree dialogue must be reopened and that the Democratic Opening, an ill- fated attempt at rapprochement launched at the end of 2008, was on the right lines. Recent reports have indicated the AKP may be on the verge of a new peace overture. "The AKP is wrong when they think they can destroy the PKK through military force," said Vahap Coskun, assistant professor at the Diyarbakir Dicle University. "The PKK's strength does not stem from the approximately 5,000 fighters in the mountains, but from its widespread legitimacy among an important part of the population. For every fighter that they kill, another will go to join them." Coskun said that the PKK, too, was making a mistake in escalating attacks and violence. "People here are tired of fighting. The PKK's attempts to use the momentum of the Arab spring to incite people to revolt have failed." He believes that the Kurdish-aligned Peace and Democracy BDP party should encourage peaceful civil disobedience campaigns again, and keep young Kurds from taking up arms. "There is a massive potential: they have a party, civilian organisations, media, and a very young and mobile mass of people," he said. "If they manage to gather 10,000 people in the streets of Diyarbakir, peacefully demanding mother tongue education, the government would have to acknowledge their request." This would also put in question the AKP government's use of the "terrorist" label. "The unsuccessful civil disobedience campaign [after the 2011 elections] scared the government, because you cannot label civil disobedience as terrorism," says Coskun. In his butcher shop in the Diyarbakir city centre, Metin Özsanli, who is a member of the peace committee that has been arbitrating blood feuds, says: "My father has ended 250 blood feuds, and I have ended 65. It is incredible to see that capacity for forgiveness in people." He added: "We have to talk to both families many, many times, visit them both many times – when only one person has been killed. But over 40,000 people have died in this conflict. "Prime minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan should not give up this easily. It will take many more talks with both sides to end this feud, but I am hopeful that it will end one day." Constanze Letsch Kurds in Turkey: arrests and violence threaten to radicalise a generation28 December 2011 18.20 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/kurds-turkey-arrests-violence- radicalise/print 155

Silenced Kurdish storytellers sing again Dengbêj disappeared following the criminalisation of the Kurdish language after the 1980 military coup but have re-emerged Constanze Letsch in Diyarbakir guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 28 December 2011 18.00 GMT

Dengbêj in Diyarbakir. The tradition stretches back to pre-Islamic times. Photograph: Constanze Letsch for the Guardian It is one of the few places in Turkey where neither blasting pop music nor flatscreen televisions entertain visitors: in the House of Dengbêj, the professional reciters of epics have gathered. One singer, his hand cupped behind his ear, recites a love story in song, unaccompanied by musical instruments. "I am the nightingale of Diyarbakir," says 80-year-old Seyithan Simsek, who has been a dengbêj, or epic singer, since he was aged seven. "But the art of the dengbêj was started by women. When a family member fell ill or was killed, and their pain was too much to bear, they started singing." The dengbêj tradition reaches back to pre-Islamic times, but Simsek remembers whole villages gathering around him, eagerly listening to his songs. "Nobody would sleep. After dinner I started to sing, and I would not stop until the break of dawn." With the arrival of radio, television and the computer, interest in the tales of the dengbêj diminished. Criminalisation of the Kurdish language after the military coup of 1980 finally silenced the storytellers, and many songs were lost. "Not a single cassette was saved from the fascist period of [coup leader] Kenan Evren," one dengbêj says. "Every recording they found was burned or broken and buried, and the people they had found them with were beaten and arrested." Ramzi Mutlu, a regular visitor though not a dengbêj, recalls: "They found a cassette in my house, one little cassette. It contained two or three songs in Kurdish. Because of it, I was tortured for two days and then went to jail for four months."

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When in 1991 Turgut Özal legalised the use of Kurdish in recording and publishing, the dengbêj started to re-emerge. The Diyarbakir municipality inaugurated the House of Dengbêj in 2007; according to the singers there, it is the only one in the Kurdish region. Not everyone believes the dengbêj are now free: "We are allowed to sing, but only the songs the government likes to hear," says one singer. Among themselves, they sometimes sing about the Kurdish struggle, but never on TV or on stage. "You are allowed to sing about love, but not about politics. But the essence of the art of dengbêj is supposed to express all the sorrows and the worries of the Kurdish people." Dengbêj do not receive a salary, but the municipality provides them with a free lunch and a bus ticket to the city centre, and the local Gün TV station pays a small fee for appearances. Hundreds of ballads and epics are npw gathered in a digital archive, and Kurds of all factions have started to take a more active interest in the singers, formerly dismissed as part of a feudal past. Simsek thinks it is good there is a house where the dengbêj can freely gather and sing again, and says political pressure has decreased. With the Kurdish issue still unresolved, and with violence and political arrests on the rise, there remains much to be sung about http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/kurdish-singing-storytellers-rise- dengbej/print

Middle East

December 28, 2011 Yemenis, on Strike, Demand That Their Managers Be Fired By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS SANA, Yemen (AP) — Strikes spread through Yemen on Wednesday as workers demanded reforms and the dismissal of managers over accusations of corruption linked to the country’s departing president. Corruption was one of the grievances that ignited mass protests against the long rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh last February. After months of stalling, Mr. Saleh last month signed an agreement to transfer power. The agreement includes immunity from prosecution for Mr. Saleh, but the demonstrators reject that. They are demanding as well that his relatives and associates, also suspected of corruption, be removed from their posts in the government and the military and be put on trial. The strikes are following a pattern. Workers lock the gates to an institution and then storm the offices of their supervisors, demanding new bosses who are not seen as tainted by connections to the old government. So far, the chain of events has played out in 18 state agencies. “This is the real revolution, the institutions revolution,” said Mohammed Gabaal, 40, an accountant who is on strike. “The president has appointed a ring of corrupt people all over government agencies.” 157

The case of the Military Economic Institution stands out. Hundreds of workers demonstrated in front of the building on Wednesday. The agency collects significant revenues from naval transport and other investments, but its budget is kept secret. Striking workers are demanding the dismissal of the agency manager, Hafez Mayad, who is from Mr. Saleh’s tribe and is seen as one of the government’s most powerful and corrupt figures. Opponents of the Saleh government charge that armed civilians who attacked protesters in Sana, the capital, got their funds from Mr. Mayad. The wave of labor unrest began last week when employees of the national airline, Yemenia Airways, walked off their jobs, demanding dismissal of the director, a son-in- law of Mr. Saleh. The strikers accused him of plundering the company’s assets and driving it into bankruptcy. The government gave in to the demands. Months of turmoil in Yemen have given Islamic militants more freedom of action. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/world/middleeast/in-yemen-anti-corruption- strikers-demand-dismissal-of-managers.html?ref=world

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ft.com comment The A-List

Ramachandra Guha December 28, 2011 Predictions from the FT's A-List on the big challenges of 2012 Look east for answers to Arab democracy In choosing “the protester” as their Person of the Year, Time Magazine had in mind anti-corruption crusaders in India and the “Occupy” movements in North America and Europe, but above all the young men and women who surged into the squares of Tunis, Cairo, Damascus, Sana’a and Benghazi; protesters who gave a whole new meaning to the term “Arab street”. Long used to denote a sullen, inchoate, unfocused rage, it now came to mean a yearning for democracy, for a political form long identified with the western world alone. What will happen, in 2012 and beyond, to the quest for democracy in the countries of the Arab world? Will it be further deepened by the establishment of representative government, a free press and an independent judiciary? Or will it be aborted by new forms of authoritarianism or a return to older tribal rivalries? A transition to democratic consolidation will depend in part on the models the protesters seek to uphold. Rather than looking west, Arab democrats should study the experience of the newer democracies that lie to their east. Consider India, where every general election (there have been 15 thus far) represents the largest expression of the democratic franchise in human history; where the military is kept firmly away from politics; and where people of all faiths have equal rights under the constitution and in law. Even more relevant than India is Bangladesh. Once written off as a basket case, this country now has an average annual economic growth rate close to five per cent. It is self-sufficient in food and has a large manufacturing sector that employs more than a million women. The military has retreated to the barracks, the Islam on display is more ecumenical than literalist, and there is a vigorous civil society. Bangladesh’s turnaround is the subject of a fine recent book by David Lewis, which went to press before the Arab Spring and now acquires great salience because of it. Can a culture steeped in Islam respect women’s rights? Can a polity dominated by the army break free of it? Can a desperately poor country assure decent education and health care at the same time as promoting economic growth? These are all questions pertinent to the Arab protesters – who might find answers in a country to their east that does not yet appear to be on their horizon. The writer holds the Philippe Roman Chair in history and international affairs at the London School of Economics Ramachandra Guha Look east for answers to Arab democracy December 28, 2011 http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/12/28/look-east-for-answers-to-arab- democracy/#axzz1huqJMJF6

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David Lewis (2011), Bangladesh. Politics, Economy and Civil Society, CUP, diciembre

Reviews "This book analyzing the social, political and economic changes in Bangladesh presents the complex story of the evolution of a new state in a globalized world. It highlights the challenges, achievements and dilemmas of Bangladesh and provides a new perspective to the country. The study will be an excellent resource for academics, policy makers as well as practitioners interested in understanding the interlocking processes of global and local development." – Rounaq Jahan, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Bangladesh "The book is a thorough yet concise account of this vastly understudied and under- reported country of 150 million people. It would be an ideal text for a university course on South Asian politics or anyone wishing to get a well-written and comprehensive background on contemporary Bangladesh. Diplomats, journalists, donor officials, and business representatives will find it an excellent introduction to this country." – Harry Blair, Yale University "Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society offers important new insights into the changing role and growing importance of Bangladesh within the global political- economic order. But it should also be a key text for anyone who wants to get to know Bangladesh - a lively introduction to a country that few outsiders ever get to know as well as Professor Lewis." – Naomi Hossain, Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Features • An informed and readable account of the economics, politics and society of Bangladesh since its independence in 1971 • Challenges the notion of Bangladesh as a failed state and shows how it has emerged as a functioning democracy with a rapidly growing economy • As an indicator of some of the key issues of the modern age, Bangladesh is of increasing interest to the global community Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. A state in the making 3. Towards Bangladesh: British and Pakistani rule 4. State, politics and institutions 5. Non-governmental actors and civil society 6. Economic development and transformation 7. Population, natural resources and environment 8. Conclusion: Bangladesh faces the future.

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12/28/2011 01:10 PM 'Hunted, Persecuted and Intimidated' Syrian Opposition Politician Attacked in Germany Following an attack on a local politician of Syrian origin in Berlin, members of Germany's Green Party are accusing Syrian intelligence of perpetrating the beating. The victim, active in the local city council, is also a member of the opposition Syrian National Council. He had been threatened before. Berlin authorities are investigating an attack that took place on Dec. 26 on a local politician of Syrian origin who is a member of the Syrian opposition. At around 2 a.m. on Monday morning, Ferhad Ahma was attacked by two unidentified assailants who had come to his door and identified themselves as police. The attackers apparently beat the 37-year-old with clubs, leaving him covered with bruises and other injuries. The Green Party chapter in the city's Mitte district, as well as a group of opponents of the regime of Bashar Assad, suspect the Syrian secret service may have been behind the attack on Ahma, who is a party member and active in city politics. Green Party members said their theory was supported by the fact that Ahma said his attackers appeared to be of Arab origin and that Ahma had previously received threats. Volker Beck, a senior member of the Green Party's group in the national parliament said that Ahma is a member of the opposition Syrian National Council. Beck has called on German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle to meet with the Syrian ambassador to discuss the incident. "It cannot be accepted that members of the Syrian opposition in Germany are hunted, persecuted and intimidated by Syrian services," the he said. Beck added that Ahma should be provided with state protection in the future. A spokeswoman at the Foreign Ministry said that German diplomats are aware of the incident and of the accusations against Syria. She said the ministry is in "contact with the responsible investigative authorities and has made clear its interest in a quick and comprehensive investigation of the incident." Berlin police have also confirmed that charges have been filed in the case, although the background remains unresolved. The investigation has been taken over by a police unit responsible for probing incidents that may be politically motivated. A 'Cowardly Attack' The website of the influential German weekly Die Zeit quoted both Jutta Schauer- Oldernburg, the spokeswoman for the Green Party in the Mitte district city council, and former federal health minister Andrea Fischer as condemning "the cowardly attack by the Syrian secret service." Given earlier threats and the fact that the two attackers who refused to identify themselves were Arab in appearance, "one has to fear that we are dealing with employees of the Syrian secret service who are seeking to intimidate Ahma, who is active in the Syrian opposition," they said. The politicians called for immediate political action to be taken. Schauer-Oldernburg and Fischer said they were "shaken and angry about the insidious attack," adding that it shows "the Syrian regime is even persecuting those who desire

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democracy and progress abroad." They said Assad could not be allowed to intimidate members of the Syrian opposition in Germany. In Syria, Assad's army has been conducting a massive crackdown against the democratic movement there. The United Nations estimates that more than 5,000 people have been killed since the start of the insurgency in March. On Tuesday, Assad's army withdrew its tanks following the arrival of Arab League monitors in Homs, the city at the heart of the anti-regime uprising. The Syrian army had reportedly been shelling the city for days. Tens of thousands of Syrians reportedly took to the streets on Tuesday in protest against Assad, emboldened by the arrival of the monitors. However, activists claimed that Assad's forces continued firing on them. His regime officially yielded to demands by the Arab League on Dec. 19, announcing it would allow independent observers into the country. The Arab League is hoping to end hostilities within nine months through negotiations between the Assad regime and the opposition. But nothing has changed since Assad promised an end to the violence months ago. Assad's opponents now fear he will use the mission to create the illusion abroad that he is respectable and upstanding, while continuing the violent crackdown against the protests. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claims that security forces killed 15 people across the country on Tuesday, including six people in Homs, news agency Reuters reported. It also cited an activist network claiming that 34 people had been killed on Monday. dsl -- with wires URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,806051,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Inside Syria's Death Zone: Assad's Regime Hunts People in Homs (12/23/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,805519,00.html • The Tolerant Dictator: Syria's Christians Side with Assad Out of Fear (11/30/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800450,00.html • An Ultimatum: Arab League Fed Up With Syrian Violence (11/22/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,799070,00.html • Interview with Syrian Grand Mufti: 'Assad Could Step Down After Free Elections' (11/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,796363,00.html • Police State: Is Syria Monitoring Protesters with German Technology? (11/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,796510,00.html

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Les observateurs de la Ligue arabe jugent la situation "rassurante" à Homs LEMONDE.FR avec Reuters et AFP | 28.12.11 | 11h25 • Mis à jour le 28.12.11 | 11h42

Une vidéo montre des tanks se déplaçant dans la ville de Homs, le 26 décembre.AFP/- La situation à Homs, bastion de la contestation en Syrie, est "rassurante jusqu'à présent" mais mérite de nouvelles enquêtes, a déclaré mercredi 28 décembre le chef des observateurs de la Ligue arabe. Les observateurs, en mission en Syrie depuis lundi, ont passé la journée de mardi dans cette ville du centre du pays, bastion de la contestation contre le régime de Bachar Al-Assad. "Hier (mardi), c'était calme et il n'y a pas eu d'affrontements. Nous n'avons pas vu de chars, mais nous avons bien vu quelques véhicules blindés, a dit le général soudanais Moustapha Al-Dabi à Reuters. Mais souvenez-vous qu'il s'agissait juste de notre premier jour et qu'il faudra enquêter davantage. Nous avons vingt personnes qui resteront longtemps sur place." Lire le portrait de Moustafa Dabi : "L'étrange pedigree du chef de la mission arabe en Syrie" Mardi à Homs, les observateurs ont pourtant été accueillis par une manifestation d'au moins 70 000 personnes. Selon l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme (OSDH), les forces de sécurité ont tué trente-quatre personnes lundi et six autres mardi. Pendant la visite des observateurs sur place et alors qu'ils discutaient avec des habitants, une fusillade a éclaté à quelques mètres du rassemblement. Peu avant leur arrivée, onze chars se sont retirés du quartier Bab Amro, au lendemain d'intenses bombardements par les forces gouvernementales, toujours selon l'OSDH. Après Homs, les observateurs doivent se rendre dès mercredi soir à Deraa, Hama, Idleb et autour de Damas, a déclaré le général Moustapha Al-Dabi. A Deraa, quatre soldats de

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l'armée syrienne ont été tués et douze autres ont été blessés dans une embuscade tendue par des déserteurs mercredi, selon l'OSDH. DES OBSERVATEURS SOUS CONTRÔLE Mercredi, Moscou a appelé son allié syrien à donner un maximum de liberté aux observateurs arabes. "Nous sommes en relations permanentes avec les dirigeants syriens et les appelons à coopérer pleinement avec les observateurs de la Ligue arabe et à créer des conditions de travail aussi agréables et libres que possible", a déclaré le ministre russe des affaires étrangères, Sergueï Lavrov. L'indépendance des observateurs soulève en effet l'inquiétude de l'opposition syrienne et d'ONG. Dans un témoignage recueilli par France Inter, un habitant de Homs explique : "J'ai essayé de parler avec les observateurs, mais ils avaient une attitude négative, ils ont refusé de voir l'intégralité de notre quartier, je n'ai aucune confiance en eux. Ils n'ont rien vu. On a essayé de leur demander de venir avec nous pour voir que l'armée a accaparé certaines de nos maisons pour y dormir, et ils ont encore une fois refusé." Burhan Ghalioun, président par intérim du Conseil national syrien (CNS), qui regroupe la majorité de l'opposition, avait affirmé à Paris que les observateurs de la Ligue arabe "ne pouvaient pas aller là où les autorités ne veulent pas qu'ils aillent", ajoutant qu'ils "travaillent dans des conditions que la Ligue arabe dit ne pas être bonnes". Une accusation qui fait écho aux informations dévoilées mardi par l'organisation de défense des droits de l'homme Human Rights Watch (HRW), qui accuse le régime syrien d'avoir transféré des centaines de détenus vers des sites militaires interdits aux observateurs de la Ligue arabe. HRW a pressé la Ligue d'exiger "le plein accès à tous les sites" de détention, "conformément à son accord conclu avec le gouvernement syrien". SITES DE DÉTENTION INTERDITS D'ACCÈS "Le gouvernement syrien a montré qu'il ne reculera devant rien pour entraver la surveillance indépendante de la répression qu'il exerce. La Ligue arabe doit réagir à ce subterfuge et insister clairement sur un accès complet à tous les détenus", écrit Sarah Leah Whitson, directrice de la division Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord à HRW dans un communiqué. Selon le protocole d'accord signé entre la Syrie et la Ligue arabe le 19 décembre, les observateurs sont "libres de communiquer avec quiconque, en coordination avec le gouvernement syrien". Mais le ministre des affaires étrangères syrien, Walid Mouallem, avait déclaré à la presse que les observateurs ne pourraient pas accéder aux "points militaires sensibles". Un membre des forces de sécurité syriennes à Homs a confié à Human Rights Watch qu'après la signature du protocole le directeur d'une prison de la ville avait ordonné un transfert des détenus. Selon cette source, les 21 et 22 décembre, entre 400 à 600 détenus ont été transférés vers d'autres lieux de détention auxquels les observateurs internationaux n'auraient pas accès – notamment un centre militaire de fabrication de missiles situé à Zaidal, dans la périphérie de Homs. Ce témoignage concorde avec d'autres recueillis par Human Rights Watch en Syrie. http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/12/28/les-observateurs-de-la- ligue-arabe-jugent-la-situation-rassurante-a- homs_1623283_3218.html#ens_id=1481132 164

Published on Al-Masry Al-Youm: Today's News from Egypt

Human Rights Watch accuses Syrian authorities of hiding detainees Author: AP BEIRUT — Human Rights Watch is accusing Syrian authorities of hiding hundreds of detainees from Arab League monitors now in the country. The New York-based international watchdog says the detainees have been transferred to off-limits military sites and urged the observers to insist on full access to all sites used for detention. A group of Arab observers kicked off their one month mission in Syria with a visit to the flashpoint central city of Homs on Tuesday. Syrian officials have said the team will have unrestricted access to trouble spots but will not be allowed to visit sensitive military sites. The Human Rights Watch report issued late Tuesday echoes charges made by Syrian opposition members that thousands of detainees were being transferred to military sites ahead of the observers' visit.

Syrian troops Archived Photo?: Publishing Date: Wed, 28/12/2011 - 11:13 Related material Arab League monitors in Syria head to Homs In show of force, Syrian regime holds war games

Source URL (retrieved on 28/12/2011 - 11:49): AP Human Rights Watch accuses Syrian authorities of hiding detainees 28/12/2011 - 11:13 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/572306

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'Virginity tests' on Egypt protesters are illegal, says judge Riazat Butt and Abdel-Rahman Hussein in Cairo guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 27 December 2011 20.30 GMT

Samira Ibrahim, who says she was humiliated and tortured by the military, flashes a victory sign after the court ruling in Cairo yesterday. Photograph: Ahmed Ali/AP Forced "virginity tests" on female detainees were ruled illegal in Egypt on Tuesday, after a court ordered an end to the practice. Hundreds of activists were in the Cairo courtroom to hear the judge, Aly Fekry, say the army could not use the test on women held in military prisons in a case filed by Samira Ibrahim, one of seven women subjected to the test after being arrested in Tahrir Square during a protest on 9 March. Fekry, head of the Cairo administrative court, decreed that what happened to Ibrahim and six other detainees was illegal and any similar occurrence in the future would also be considered illegal. The court is expected to issue a further injunction against such tests and decree that the test was completely illegal, opening the door for financial compensation. After the verdict Ibrahim, 25, posted on Twitter: "Thank you to the people, thank you to Tahrir Square that taught me to challenge, thank you to the revolution that taught me perseverance." The 25-year-old marketing manager, who said she faced death threats for bringing the case, told CNN: "Justice has been served today. "These tests are a crime and also do not comply with the constitution, which states equality between men and women. I will not give up my rights as a woman or a human being." Ibrahim said her treatment showed the tests were intended to "degrade the protesters. "The military tortured me, labelled me a prostitute and humiliated me by forcing on me a virginity test conducted by a male doctor where my body was fully exposed while military soldiers watched."

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After the verdict she and others, including the presidential candidate and former broadcaster Bothaina Kamel, marched to Tahrir Square. Ibrahim was later photographed at Kaser el Nil bridge flashing the victory sign. Egyptian academic and columnist Amira Nowaira gave a cautious welcome to the ruling. Speaking from Alexandria she said: "Nobody had heard of the virginity tests before so it is good a court has said they cannot be used. People should be prosecuted but it's going to be hard, even assigning blame will be difficult. Who is ultimately responsible?" "The military had been denying they were doing the tests, then they said it was a standard procedure and came up with lots of excuses about why they were doing it." The head of the judicial military authority, General Adel Morsy, was cited in state- owned Al-Ahram newspaper as saying that the administrative court ruling could not be implemented because there was nothing in the statutes that govern military prisons about permitting the carrying out of virginity tests. Ibrahim will return to court in February, to appeal against the one-year suspended sentence she received for insulting authorities and participating in an unauthorised assembly in March. The case brings to the fore protester complaints against military actions during the transitional period. There is a long list of violations attributed to the military, with some 12,000 civilians being charged and sentenced in military courts, and numerous incidents that have led to deaths of protesters. Almost in conjunction with the administrative court ruling, it was announced that the military doctor who undertook the tests would be referred to a military court on 3 January. He is being charged with public indecency and disobeying military orders, but not sexual assault. Hossam Bahgat, the head of Egyptian initiative for personal rights (EIPR), said: "To call it a medical checkup is disingenuous. It was torture and sexual assault. "It wasn't conducted in a medical clinic, but in full view of the soldiers, hence why the charge is one of public indecency, which is incorrect? "The military doctor being charged is a scapegoat, because these soldiers follow orders and what happened to the detainees is the responsibility of those running the prison." Ibrahim, in recounting her ordeal to Human Rights Watch, said two officers had entered the prison cell, where the women were detained, and asked which of them were married. The officers informed them they would be subjected to virginity tests to confirm they were not lying. "They took us out one by one … they took me to a bed in a passageway in front of the cell. There were lots of soldiers around and they could see me. "I asked if the soldiers could move away and the officer escorting me teased me. "A woman prison guard in plainclothes stood at my head and then a man in military uniform examined me with his hand for several minutes. It was painful. He took his time."

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The case was heard in the first circuit of the administrative court, known as the rights and freedoms circuit, and was filed by three Egyptian rights advocacy groups – EIPR, the Hisham Mubarak law centre and the Nadeem centre for the rehabilitation of victims of torture.However, the court ruling is an administrative one only, and because of the provisions of the military penal code the chances of pursuing criminal liability against the transgressors lies only within the jurisdiction of military courts.Campaign groups have been documenting the escalation in sexual violence towards female demonstrators and claim brutal tactics are used are to deter, intimidate and humiliate those taking part in political activities. Last week Nadya Khalife, from Human Rights Watch, said: "Images of military and police who strip, grope, and beat protesters have horrified the world and brought into sharp focus the sexual brutality Egyptian women face in public life. At this crucial stage in Egypt's history, women need to be able to take part in demonstrations and elections without fear. "Security forces' disgraceful attacks and the government's broader failure to address sexual violence and harassment do not bode well for Egypt's women." The New Woman Foundation, in Egypt, said at least nine women were arrested during a protest in November, with some accusing security forces of physical and verbal assault.

Humiliation and violation claims Samira Ibrahim was one of seven female protesters subjected to the "virginity test" after being arrested in Tahrir Square during a protest on 9 March. The demonstrators were among almost 200 detained that day, 20 of whom were women. The following day the female detainees were separated into two groups, the married and unmarried. The seven unmarried women were given a medical checkup during which the "virginity test" was done. The incident occurred a month into the handling of the country's affairs by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, their authority granted by the deposed Hosni Mubarak before his ousting on 11 February. The military was by then losing patience with Tahrir protesters, already having forcibly dispersed protests against the government of the then Egyptian prime minister, Ahmed Shafik, Mubarak's final cabinet appointment. The case of Ibrahim and the other six female detainees is one of a litany of abuses that occurred that night on the night of 9 March, with many protesters who were held being tortured and beaten on the site of the Egyptian museum that lies off the square. Other protesters were subjected to whipping and electric shocks throughout the night. Ibrahim was one of those transferred to the military prison known locally as the Haykestep, referring to its location off the Cairo-Ismailia road. The virginity tests were carried out in full view of soldiers and other detainees present at the prison, according to the human rights lawyer Ahmed Hossam, who was representing Ibrahim in the case and is attached to the Egyptian initiative for personal rights. Abdel-Rahman Hussein 'Virginity tests' on Egypt protesters are illegal, says judge27 December 2011 20.30 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/27/virginity- tests-egypt-protesters-illegal/print

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Arab League monitors visit Homs Tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to try and prevent what some warned would be a whitewash inspection Julian Borger, diplomatic editor guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 27 December 2011 19.58 GMT

Syrian tank driving through the city of Homs during a visit from Arab League observers. Photograph: AFP Tens of thousands of Syrian demonstrators took to the streets of Homs during a visit by Arab League monitors, to protest against alleged mass killings of civilians and prevent what some warned would be a whitewash inspection. Syrian security fired teargas into the crowd, which the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed was 70,000 strong, as it approached the centre of the restive city. The army appeared to withdraw some tanks from Homs hours before the Arab League visit, after pounding rebel districts the previous day. But opposition activists alleged that many tanks had been hidden in government facilities for the visit and that snipers were opening fire on people trying to recover bodies from ruined buildings. The protesters appeared determined to show the Arab League observers the scale of the damage to residential neighbourhoods, concerned that the inspection could be stage- managed by the government. The Syrian National Council (SNC), the main umbrella group of opponents to President Bashar al-Assad, said the observers were "being held prisoners by the Syrian system". In a video sent to Reuters news agency by activists, residents of the rebel district of Baba Amr pleaded with monitors to inspect the area. "Come and see, they are slaughtering us I swear," a man yelled. Another video, ostensibly from Baba Amr, showed corpses among the ruins.

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There were reports of Arab League monitors being prevented by sniper fire from entering a mosque where corpses had allegedly been left. Government soldiers were also reported to be among the casualties, having come under fire from rebels of the Free Syrian Army, made up of defectors from the regular military, who claim to be protecting civilians in parts of Homs. "The violence is definitely two-sided," a Homs resident, who gave his name only as Mohammed, told Reuters. "I've been seeing ambulances filled with wounded soldiers passing by my window in the past days. They're getting shot somehow." Human rights groups have voiced scepticism over how much the Arab League mission will be allowed to see, and how searching its inquiry will be. There has been criticism of the choice of the team leader, Mustafa Dabi, a Sudanese general and former head of military intelligence under the regime of President Omar al- Bashir. Bashir was indicted by the international criminal court for alleged genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Sudan's Darfur region. "It is perplexing that the Arab League chose the Khartoum regime's General al-Dabi to lead its team monitoring the Syria regime," said Omer Ismail, a Sudanese analyst for the Enough Project, a Washington-based organisation focused on genocide and crimes against humanity. "When he served as Sudan's former head of military intelligence … alleged war crimes including genocide were committed on his watch. Instead of heading a team entrusted with a probe of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity by Syria, the general should be investigated by the ICC for evidence of similar crimes in Sudan." Dabi was quoted by the French press agency AFP as saying that the Syrian authorities were being "very co-operative", and added his monitors were using government- provided vehicles. The Arab League, however, insists the mission will nevertheless retain an "element of surprise" and will be able to go wherever it chooses without notice. Dabi's initial 50-strong team is split into five groups of 10. Another 100 monitors are expected soon. The observer mission, the first the Damascus regime has allowed in nine months of protests, is meant to monitor implementation of an Arab League plan to stop the killing of civilians. After accepting the plan early last week, Assad appeared to be intensifying the crackdown before the observers' arrival. On Monday, security forces killed at least 42 people, most of them in Homs. The bombardment was reported by opposition sources to have abated on Tuesday morning, hours before the Arab League mission arrived in Homs. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said some army vehicles pulled out of Homs while other relocated in government compounds "where [they] can deploy again within five minutes." Julian Borger Arab League monitors visit Homs27 December 2011 19.58 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/27/arab-league-monitors-syria-homs/print

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Publishing Date: Tue, 27/12/2011 - 22:27 Published on Al-Masry Al-Youm: Today's News from Egypt

Looking to consolidate its influence, Brotherhood takes to the media Author: Noha El-Hennawy In a spacious newsroom divided by pillars, reporters, focused on their computers, sit at a round table. Around the corner, some colleagues have removed their shoes and lined up for noon prayers. Meanwhile, Mohamed Mostafa, one of the paper’s four managing editors, roams the office in socks and slippers and holding proofs of the next day’s issue. It is one of his busiest days, Mostafa tells Egypt Independent. It is his turn to oversee the production process of the nascent Freedom and Justice, the official newspaper of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). A year ago, it would have been inconceivable for Egypt’s oldest Islamist organization to openly issue its own daily paper. Now, a year after the outbreak of the January revolution and the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, the FJP seems poised to dominate the coming parliament. This ascent has been accompanied by the group’s investments in a media empire that they hope will build bridges to a larger audience and bolster the Brotherhood’s political leverage. In recent months, the group has tapped into print and broadcast media by launching a satellite channel in addition to the Freedom and Justice daily. Beyond propaganda? “From day one, the paper’s editorial policy has sought to address all readers,” says 31- year-old Mostafa, who sports a light beard. “The paper is not only the FJP voice and does not only address readers who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood,” explains Mostafa, a founding member of the FJP and a 13- year member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He assures that not all the staff shares his background. “More than 70 percent of those who work at the paper belong neither to the Muslim Brotherhood nor the FJP,” says Mostafa, who used to work for the investigative journalism department at the state-owned newspaper Al-Akhbar. To explain the paper’s editorial position, the Cairo University graduate borrows the same discourse of the group’s stalwarts, arguing that the Freedom and Justice paper, which shares the name of the Muslim Brotherhood’s party, stands as a venue to promote a “renaissance-oriented project” based on a moderate interpretation of Islam. Nevertheless, the paper, which first hit newsstands in late October, appears to be a platform for the Muslim Brotherhood to market its positions on contentious political issues and rebut charges leveled against Islamists.

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In November, the paper spearheaded opposition to calls made by some secular groups to postpone parliamentary elections until violence had subsided. Other content has echoed the group’s resistance to the military’s attempts to circumvent the roadmap for the transition period in a way that could weaken Islamist parties. While Mostafa insists that his paper seeks to downplay divisions between political forces and emphasize points of agreement, observers argue otherwise. “The discourse is not objective,” says Ashraf al-Sherif, an expert on the group. “[The paper] carries attacks on other political forces.” “The discourse is similar to that of the NDP [Mubarak’s former ruling party]. It accuses whoever disagrees with the Muslim Brotherhood of bad faith.” Recently, the paper has been attempting to shed light on the “third party” that the military holds responsible for violence on Qasr al-Aini Street earlier this month. On Sunday, the paper dedicated almost a full page to discussing the ideology of “anarchist forces” that seek to undermine the Egyptian state. The paper is preoccupied with promoting political stability, according to Sherif. In the midst of the ongoing parliamentary race, Freedom and Justice can also serve as a crucial campaign tool. On an almost daily basis, the paper runs lengthy interviews with FJP parliamentary candidates. It has recently devoted full pages to highlighting FJP ideas on housing, education and other issues, though Sherif still believes that the paper falls short of advancing sophisticated policy prescriptions. Since its inception, the 83-year-old Islamist organization has sought to use the media for outreach. In 1933, the Muslim Brotherhood issued “Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin,” or “The Muslim Brotherhood Magazine,” its first weekly news publication. Until Gamal Abdel Nasser’s clampdown on the group in the 1950s, the Brotherhood released other publications under different names, such as Al-Nadhir, Al-Mabahith and Majallet al- Da’wa. After Anwar Sadat released jailed brothers and allowed the group to operate again, the monthly magazine Da’wa was issued in the 1970s. Mubarak’s regime was inconsistent in its treatment of the group, at times loosening its grip on the Brotherhood and allowing members to create their own publications before cracking down and censoring them. To evade the regime control, the group resorted to cyberspace. In 2001, it launched its official website Ikhwan Online and five years later the English-language website Ikhwan Web. Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated sites and blogs mushroomed from there. The Brothers hit the waves The end of the Mubarak era encouraged a group of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated businessmen to launch Misr25, a satellite television channel, in May. The channel has a general interest format with a special emphasis on news programming. Three news bulletins are aired throughout the day and five minute news briefs are transmitted at the top of the hour. A rolling news ticker is updated continuously. Hazem Ghorab, the channel’s director, insists that Misr25 is not a Muslim Brotherhood mouthpiece. “I cannot and would not engage in partisan journalism. Before I joined, I made it conditional that the ownership be separated from the management of the channel,” says Ghorab, who is neither an FJP nor a Brotherhood member, but admits that he supports the group. 172

“I said that even the Supreme Guide [the Muslim Brotherhood’s highest official] will not be able to interfere,” adds 59-year-old Ghorab, who previously worked for Al- Jazeera and a Japanese television station. Like most of its competitors, the channel invests in news talk shows. Most of these feature politicians and pundits known for their sympathy with political Islamic groups and who attempt to diffuse fears of the Islamists’ ascent to power. For the brothers, secular channels inherently hostile to Islamist groups constantly feed those fears. According to Safwat al-Alem, a professor at Cairo University’s Mass Communication School, the Brotherhood — like its liberal counterparts — has the right to tap into broadcast media. He points out that Wafd Party head Al-Sayed al-Badawy owns the Hayat channel and Naguib Sawiris, the founder of the Free Egyptians Party, owns ONTV. “Today, they have the right to have a channel,” says Alem, speaking of the Muslim Brothers. “After the results of the first parliamentary round, a war was waged against them and their candidates, so they have the right to reply to the propaganda.” Sherif says there is more to it than countering the liberals. The Brotherhood also wants to challenge the Salafi “media empire.” For years, Mubarak’s regime allowed Salafi satellite channels to grow, while Salafi groups remained aloof from politics, supported the status quo and showed hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood. After the revolution, the Salafis emerged as an adversary of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the ongoing elections, the Salafi Nour Party and the FJP are competing for the same Islamist constituency. In the first round, the FJP ranked first, garnering 40 percent of the votes while the Nour Party emerged as a surprise runner-up with 25 percent. In the second round, the results were similar. A traditional touch Misr25 reflects the Brotherhood’s conservative social outlook. The channel’s female correspondents and anchors have to abide by an Islamic dress code. Wearing a hijab, long-sleeve jackets and almost no makeup, women go on air reading the news, reviewing the press and hosting guests. “Our Islamic identity says that a woman should dress modestly and the headscarf is part of this modesty,” says Ghorab, accusing other channels of succumbing to Western culture when they let unveiled anchors wearing “sleeveless” or “décolleté” shirts appear on TV, or when they air drama shows that do not conform to Islamic culture. But the decision to show women on television at all may mark progress for the group. “We had a problem showing women’s pictures on the site. Even pictures of veiled women were hard to show in the beginning,” says Abdel Galeel al-Sharnouby, former editor of Ikhwan Online and a former Muslim Brother. He adds that the group was also reluctant to use music. The Freedom and Justice daily has covered cinema, culture and music in an attempt to challenge stereotypes about the group’s disapproval of various art forms. Still, the coverage has flirted with Islamic conservatism by running interviews with veiled singers or actresses.

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But Mostafa argues that their culture pages are engaging with artistic content that does not necessarily bear conservative undertones; he points out that the paper reviews comedy movies. “We don’t judge art by moral values but by artistic values,” he says, adding that the only moral restrictions art pages should observe is to refrain from displaying “inappropriate” pictures. “I won’t run inappropriate pictures to prove that I’m open-minded,” says Mostafa. The daily's editorial policy, he argues, resonates with the moral standards of a society where the majority is “inherently religious.” Archived Photo?: Mohamed Mostafa, managing editor of the Freedom and Justice newspaper

Publishing Date: Tue, 27/12/2011 - 22:27 Related material Muslim Brotherhood works to implement 'renaissance project' Show in newsticker: Mohamed Mostafa, managing editor of the Freedom and Justice newspaper

Source URL (retrieved on 28/12/2011 - 12:00): Noha El-Hennawy Brotherhood takes to the media 27/12/2011 - 22:27 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/572181

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Middle East

December 28, 2011 Is Morocco Really Ready for a Mega Mall? By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS CASABLANCA, Morocco (AP) — Inaugurated by popstar Jennifer Lopez in front of the cream of Moroccan society, Casablanca's first mega mall, complete with two-story- high aquarium, is dripping with glamour and luxury. While developers describe it as a step bringing Morocco closer to the ranks of the developed world, detractors worry that it is a vanity project that a country teetering on the edge of an economic crisis can ill afford. Morocco at first seems a curious choice for what its developers are billing as the biggest mall in Africa. It already has world-renowned traditional bazaars featuring exquisite ceramics and rugs that draw tourists from across the globe. The North African kingdom of 32 million is home to the largest income inequalities in the Arab world — and now hosts Louis Vuitton, Gucci, Dior and Ralph Lauren boutiques and department store Galeries Lafayette in the new mall, a futuristic, bulbous silver structure perched on Morocco's coast overlooking the crashing waves of the Atlantic. It is a stark symbol of the contrasts of a country with 8.5 million people in poverty that ranks 130 out of 186 on the U.N.'s human development index, but will still host acts like Shakira and Kanye West for a summer concert series. The 20-minute coastal drive from downtown Casablanca — Morocco's largest city — to the mall showcases the complexity of the country, with slums hidden from sight by high walls, construction areas for new shopping centers and finally the villas and night clubs of the wealthy. "It is a great honor for Morocco to have a project of such dimensions," said Salwa Akhannouch, head of the Aksal group and the driving force behind the mall, at its opening this month. Most Moroccans will not be shopping at the mall. The country has some of the lowest literacy and highest unemployment rates and the highest income disparity in the Middle East and North Africa, according to the Gini coefficient, a statistical tool used by economists to measure the inequality of distribution in a country. The disparity has been growing every year. Crowds packed the mall in the weeks after it opened, ambling through sunlit galleries and gazing at the aquarium and the 350 stores on offer. Periodically, colorfully dressed performers, some from as far away as Eastern Europe, would burst into enthusiastic dance routines to the accompaniment of loud drums. There were few shopping bags in sight, however, and most seemed just curious to finally see this much-talked-about monument to shopping that has been four years and $260 million in the making. 175

"There is a big gulf between the rich and the poor and the rich just seem to be getting richer and the poor, poorer —the mall is a symbol of that," said Hassan Ali, a 45-year- old shopkeeper selling handtooled leather jackets in Casablanca's modest old quarter. Tourism is a vital part of the mall's plan, according to its secretary general, Jenane Laghrar, who anticipates 20 percent of its estimated 12 million annual visitors will come from abroad. She said sales for the first week were on target. "When you enter the mall, you see Gucci and Dior, but don't forget you have the largest content in Africa — at the same time you have more affordable brands," she said. There is also an aspiring middle class that wants to be able to buy these luxury products, she added. The hope is also that European tourists will add to their usual itinerary of beaches and the exotic cities of Fez and Marrakech, a trip to Casablanca — and the mall. Laghrar said they are especially hoping to attract visitors from the rest of Africa who pass through Casablanca airport on their way to Europe. For now, however, visitors from Africa make up less than 5 percent of Morocco's tourists, with the vast majority still from Europe. This could well be a problem as the European continent sinks into crisis, said economist Najib Akesbi, and in fact Europe's woes pose a dilemma for the Moroccan economy as a whole, which is deeply intertwined with its neighbors across the Mediterranean. Morocco's main sources of hard currency, including foreign investment, tourism and remittances from its workers abroad, overwhelmingly come from Europe. On Dec. 20, the government reduced growth projections for 2012 by half a percentage point in response to Europe's crisis. "The world is entering a period of crisis, the next four or five years are not going to be years of prosperity," warned Akesbi, who teaches at the Hassan II Institute for Agronomy in the capital Rabat. For him the Morocco Mall is part of a bet Morocco is making that it can become a kind of Dubai for the western Mediterranean, attracting consumers from across Africa and Europe to make up for weak local demand. "It is a bit of a fragile model," he said. "The success depends less on durable local demand than betting on foreign demand." The mall's developers point to Morocco's consistent growth of between 4 and 5 percent for the past few years as a sign that the economy can support this kind of luxury shopping. Those growth figures, however, are not producing jobs, and unemployment overall is at least 8 percent, while for those under 34 it is a staggering 30 percent. Pro-democracy demonstrations that rose up in Morocco earlier this year have faded away, but there are still regular protests by the millions of unemployed university graduates across the country, frustrated at their prospects. Investment has not been in sectors like industry that produce a lot of jobs, rather in retail, services and infrastructure that have not been creating the employment the nation needs, said Akesbi.

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And the economy is still at the whim of the annual agricultural harvest. Part of the reason for the country's steady growth recently has been good weather. "Here we are in 2011 and the economy is still largely determined by the sky," said Akesbi. Even though only 25 percent of the economy relies on agriculture, it employs 40 percent of the work force and a bad harvest can hurt other sectors. The government budget is also dangerously overstretched, after it increased food subsidies and raise government salaries in a bid to stave off the anti-government unrest sweeping the Arab world. The Morocco Mall project was conceived in the headier days of the mid-2000s when it was decided that what the country needed was more shopping centers. While Europe falters, the wealthy oil states of the Gulf are playing a role in building a more consumerist Morocco. Half the funding for Morocco Mall comes from the Saudi Al-Jedaie Group which has built malls across Saudi Arabia and two new initiatives looks set to shower Morocco with Gulf money. AP Is Morocco Really Ready for a Mega Mall? December 28, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/12/28/world/middleeast/AP-ML-Morocco- Mega-Mall.html?hp=&pagewanted=print

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Arab monitors finish visit to Syria's Homs

Thousands demonstrate in the country's protest hub, with Arab League observers on hand to oversee peace plan. Last Modified: 27 Dec 2011 14:07 Arab League observers finished their first day of observation in the Syrian city of Homs, and will continue touring the area on Wednesday, the Syrian television channel Dunia said. Arab League peace monitors are on a mission to assess whether Syria has halted its nine-month crackdown on protests against President Bashar al-Assad. The delegation met the governor and toured the city on Tuesday as thousands gathered to rally against the government. This came a day after activists said dozens of people were killed in Homs, which has been at the centre of the protests. "The delegation is checking the damage left by the terrorist groups in Bab Sbaa and meeting with one of those who were kidnapped and families of the martyrs," Syrian Dunia TV said earlier. Footage posted online showed big crowds of anti-government protesters in the neighbourhoods of Bab Sbaa and Khaldiyeh and a funeral march in Ghouta area. Meanwhile, rallies in favour of President Bashar al-Assad and the army were reported in two other neighbourhoods.

Witnesses said the army pulled back tanks from Bab Amr, a flashpoint neighbourhood in the city, ahead of the observers' arrival on Tuesday. However, some activists said tanks had just been repositioned in other areas of the city. The 50 observers, who arrived in Syria on Monday, will be split into five teams of 10, according to Reuters news agency. Teams are also due to visit Damascus, Hama and Idlib on Tuesday. 'No restrictions' The teams will use government transport, according to their head, Sudanese General Mustafa al-Dabi. But delegates insist the mission will nevertheless be able to go wherever it chooses with no notice. "Our Syrian brothers are co-operating very well and without any restrictions so far," al- Dabi told the Reuters news agency. 178

Other delegates said they expected to be able to "move freely between hospital, prisons and detention centres all over Syria".

"The element of surprise will be present," Mohamed Salem al-Kaaby, a monitor from the United Arab Emirates, said. "We will inform the Syrian side the areas we will visit on the same day so that there will be no room to direct monitors or change realities on the ground by either side." The observers' mission is part of a plan seeking to put an end to the government's crackdown, which the United Nations estimates to have killed more than 5,000 people since March. Syrian foreign ministry spokesman Jihad al-Makdissi said the "mission has freedom of movement in line with the protocol" Syria signed with the Arab League. Under that deal, the observers are banned from sensitive military sites. The arrival of the observers and 10 Arab League officials came as activists reported the deaths of at least 45 people around the country on Monday, 33 of them in Homs. An advance team of monitors arrived in Damascus on Thursday to lay the groundwork for the observer mission to oversee the implementation of the peace plan. Peace plan Burhan Ghalioun, head of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), said some of the observers were in Homs "but they are saying they cannot go where the authorities do not want them to go". Ghalioun also sought UN and Arab League intervention "to put an end to this tragedy", and urged the UN Security Council to "adopt the Arab League's plan and ensure that it is applied". "The plan to defuse the crisis is a good plan, but I do not believe the Arab League really has the means [to enforce it]," he told reporters in Paris. "It is better if the UN Security Council takes this plan, adopts it and provides the means for its application." The Arab League plan endorsed by Syria on November 2 calls for the withdrawal of the military from towns and residential districts, a halt to violence against civilians and the release of detainees. Assad's government has been accused of intensifying its crackdown since signing the agreement. Homs 'slaughter' Residents in Homs said on Monday that army tanks fired shells, machine guns and mortars into their neighbourhoods. Amateur video filmed by anti-government activists showed carnage in the city. "What is happening is a slaughter," Fadi, who lives near the Bab Amr neighbourhood, told the Reuters news agency. "They hit people with mortar fire."

Bab Amr has been one of the hardest hit areas of Homs, a focal point of the Assad government's crackdown on nine months of anti-government demonstrations.

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Some parts of Homs have also seen fierce clashes between the Syrian army and the so- called Free Syrian Army which is made up of army defectors who say they decided to side with protesters. There have been reports that deserters have been able to inflict casualties on the army. "The violence is definitely two-sided," said a resident who gave his name only as Mohammed. "I've been seeing ambulances filled with wounded soldiers passing by my window in the past days. They're getting shot somehow." The opposition SNC said on Sunday that Homs was under siege and facing an "invasion" from about 4,000 troops deployed near the city. http://www.worldpress.org/link.cfm?http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/1 2/2011122675532134954.html

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ft.com Comment Analysis December 27, 2011 8:19 pm Crowd behaviour: United they stand By Clive Cookson and Daryl Ilbury The throngs driving the year’s most memorable events, from the Arab uprisings to the eurozone crisis, may be social and political worlds apart – but they share more than at first appears

Group think: Egyptian protesters await an address by President Hosni Mubarak, who resigned shortly afterwards From Cairo to Tunis, demonstrators united by emotion, purpose and social media gather in their thousands to topple long-standing despotic regimes. Across the UK, crowds of a different temperament surge through summer streets, leaving behind them a trail of destruction. Meanwhile, in the world’s financial centres, bond traders linked by the internet behave like a “virtual” crowd as they sell the securities of increasingly embattled eurozone members, leading yields to soar. The crowd was at the heart of some of the most memorable events of 2011, demonstrating the power of the group driven by common identity and capacity for decision-making. They are classic examples of the herd mentality – the shared and self- regulated thinking of individuals in a group – an area of study popular with sociologists and psychologists. More ON THIS STORY Person of the Year Arab youth Podcast World Weekly with Gideon Rachman In depth Egypt in transition In depth Middle East protests Thousands continue protest in Tahrir Square ON THIS TOPIC Interactive Mapping Middle East unrest Art dealers woo young Middle Eastern buyers HSBC to resurrect Saudi exchange-traded fund Editorial Agency problem IN ANALYSIS Production processes A lightbulb moment Debt relief A time for forgiveness Analysis Skyscrapers – striving for the highest Shipping hard astern And while a social, economic and cultural chasm separates wealthy financial traders fixated by screens in corporate offices from unemployed youths hurling bricks, recent research into herd mentality suggests the two groups are, in fact, closer than is

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commonly believed. Moreover, their behaviour can be examined, plotted and, to a certain degree, predicted. Research now shows that similar behaviour can occur in both real and virtual crowds where they share a sense of collectivity, driven by common goals and interests. Whereas individuals in a physical crowd may take their cue from the visible behaviour of others, fund managers and online gamers take theirs from changes on a screen. “Some studies suggest that it’s enough just to imagine a situation – you don’t actually have to be there,” says Michelle Baddeley, a behavioural economist at Cambridge university, “and people’s emotions can easily be engaged in virtual emotions, for example in computer games and on-line gambling.” Emotions – innate and instinctive responses to stimuli – are, according to Ms Baddeley, an integral component in financial decision-making, and help explain the seemingly irrational herd mentality displayed during good times and bad. While psychologists have long talked about concepts such as the “wisdom of the crowd”, many of today’s economists remain reluctant to embrace the concept of group behaviour. The discipline has steered away from the sociological and psychological factors in decision-making and focused instead “on narrow behavioural assumptions in which expectations are formed on the basis of mathematical algorithms”, Ms Baddeley says. To them, crowd behaviour is just too messy, irrational and unpredictable. John Maynard Keynes, by contrast, believed professional investors would “follow the herd”, at least partly, for the sake of their reputation. “Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally,” he wrote in 1935, in the midst of the Great Depression. The idea of a neurological component in financial decision-making is of central interest to those digging around in the relatively new field of neuroeconomics, where neurology, psychology and economics overlap. Vasily Klucharev, a neuroeconomics researcher at the university of Basel, is particularly interested in the part of the brain that triggers a “learning signal” when our behaviour differs from that of the crowd we are in, and which makes us adjust to match the group. He says this is an automatic process in which people form their own opinion, face the group view then quickly shift their attitude to make it more compliant. But the group view is not always healthy or in the best interest of the individuals in the crowd. Automatic, uncritical adjustment can backfire, whether in the case of over- exuberance in a bull market that precedes a crash or in mass looting of shops that destroys a rioter’s own neighbourhood. Mr Klucharev points out that the processes that occur rapidly in crowds are akin to changes in attitude that occur slowly in more diffuse groups. “Think of geographic areas in the United States where obese people are a very common sight,” he says. “In that case, the conflict area in a person’s brain no longer sees being overweight as negative, and the eating behaviour is sustained rather than corrected. Ironically, in these circumstances, it is the more healthily eating people who get the basic brain message: I am doing something wrong.” . . .

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Research in social psychology is shedding more light on the processes that drive humans to separate into groups. According to the “minimal group paradigm”, people will do this based on almost any characteristic, and will even show loyalty to groups formed at random. Seeing other members of the group in a real crowd enhances the effects of herding, but it is not indispensable, Mr Klucharev says. Take the role of social media in the Arab uprisings and the UK riots. The point here is not whether Facebook, Twitter or BlackBerry Messenger were organising tools for mass action but that they helped to create a common identity. Recent events in Russia are another case in point. Despite state media’s depiction of widespread support for Vladimir Putin, the prime minister, social networks unified those objecting to the results of recent elections. As a result, tens of thousands found a common voice, pouring on to the streets of Moscow to challenge Mr Putin. Neuroscientists such as Mr Klucharev are studying the neural origins “informational cascade” – the process by which individuals change their minds when they learn about the decisions of others in the group. “Such changes occur in individuals independently of their own private information signals,” he says. “You can see it in the ‘herding behaviour of traders, especially in times of uncertainty.” The modelling of crowd behaviour – an important component in urban planning and the design of large buildings – depends on the notion that groups of individuals operate as a co-ordinated unit. To some extent, they can act like a living, thinking form and thus their movements can be predicted and plotted. The resultant mapping of the interaction between crowds and geographical spaces is known as geosimulation. Computer models are constructed based on the movement of groups under different geographical and behavioural scenarios, including emergency evacuations and riots. But geosimulation is undergoing something of a change, as research reveals more about the intricacies of herd behaviour. Previously, modelling employed a physics-based approach, assuming individuals respond individually but predictably to forces of attraction and repulsion in their physical environment and others in the crowd – a bit like molecules in a stream of gas. This is now seen as simplistic because individuals can spontaneously behave in a more socially coherent manner. Carol O’Sullivan, professor of visual computing at Trinity College, Dublin, explains that for computer modelling to be accurate, it has to “give a sense of intelligence to the crowd”. Individuals in geosimulation models are therefore programmed to react to different alternative scenarios as well as to other individuals, especially in situations of panic or high emotion. Further research is needed to examine what percentage of a crowd can change the emotional character of the whole under varying circumstances. What does it take for a powerful individual or small contingent to sway opinion? “It would also be interesting”, she adds, “to try and model the influence of agent provocateurs in crowd behaviour.” Nonetheless, the concept of a crowd psychology is gaining ground. According to Stephen Reicher, professor of social psychology at the University of St Andrews: “Individuals don’t lose identity in the crowd and they don’t lose control over their

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behaviour or rationality. Rather they shift to a shared social identity and seek to act in terms of that shared identity.” But the process is not mechanical or thoughtless, he insists. “Shared identity helps the creation of consensus through debate. For that reason, I deeply dislike notions such as ‘herd mentality’, which derives from the idea of an inferior animal mentality in crowds. Group or crowd members are as thoughtful as isolated individuals. The difference is that the processes of thought and discussion are scaffolded by social as opposed to individual identity.”

Traders in Chicago . . . Although psychologists recognise that links between, say, political demonstrations and financial trading are a fruitful field for research, they warn against pushing the similarities too far. “Financial and political environments will be affected in similar ways,” says Ms Baddeley. “However it is important to recognise that for political protests the goals are quite different – in a financial environment, the goals are at least a lot cleaner and starker.” “The riots and the Arab spring are about inter-group behaviour,” says Prof Reicher. “People cohere and work together because they are acting as one group against another. Traders, on the other hand, don’t have an obvious ‘out group’ but are rather engaged in intra-group behaviour. They compete against their fellow traders and are set against each other as individuals. “Problems may arise precisely because of this lack of ‘groupness’, and the competition, mistrust and negative inferences about others that this entails,” he continues. “Perhaps, then, the answer is to increase a sense of common group membership.” It seems shared emotions can give a seething crowd a common purpose – destructive or constructive, according to the observer’s perspective – by activating neural areas usually associated with fear and greed. If the same brain regions are activated in financial herds, is the image of the cool, calculating, rational trader outdated? Ms Baddeley put the question to people in the financial services sector in a recent study. They agreed that, for high-frequency trading in very volatile markets, it would be hard

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to imagine traders remaining cool and calculating – after all, they are only human – and felt it was not necessarily bad to be guided by emotions. Neuroscientists are still far from understanding – let alone controlling – all the factors that lead crowds to behave as they do. But with more volatility forecast for 2012, in both the streets and in the financial markets, they are likely to gain plenty of fresh material for their studies...... FINANCE AND FEELINGS: The neural ‘pleasure centre’ a the heart of herd behaviour’ Which part of the brain is powerful enough to overwhelm individual thought and generate the desire to be part of a herd? Neuroscientists believe a neural network that includes the nucleus accumbens – more popularly known as the “pleasure centre” – is responsible. It is part of the limbic system associated with generating feelings and emotions such as fear, reward, punishment and pleasure.

Exposing subjects to situations that forced them to change their individual decisions to fall into line with those of a group, Basel university’s Vasily Klucharev and colleagues saw neural activity in the posterior medial frontal cortex – which monitors behaviour – and the nucleus accumbens using functional magnetic resonance imaging. But when they temporarily shut down the cortices of the volunteers with a non-invasive procedure known as transcranial magnetic stimulation, the subjects ceased to adjust their behaviour to comply with that of the group. In other words, deactivating a specific part of the brain made subjects temporarily immune to social influence, and thus incapable of joining the herd mentality. The nucleus accumbens is also important for understanding the primary drivers of financial traders’ decision-making: risk and reward. “Whereas a neurological basis for risk is difficult because the concept of ‘risk’ is hard to define – it is different for economists and psychologists – the experience of ‘reward’ can be traced to the nucleus accumbens,” says Gregory Berns, professor of neuroeconomics at Emory University in Atlanta. His studies have underscored the pleasure centre’s role in mediating the release of dopamine, a powerful neurotransmitter (chemical messengers in the brain). Dopamine is

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also linked to addiction; cocaine and amphetamines stimulate the release of dopamine, which produces the characteristic “high”. According to Prof Berns, actually receiving the reward is not necessary. “Just the anticipation of a reward is sufficient to generate activity in this part of the brain,” he says. “It’s the expectation of what’s going to happen in the future that helps guide financial decision-making.” The system sheds light on the herd mentality, he says: “It helps explain our need for a sense of belonging. Just as teenagers may rate music according to a star rating others have accorded it, our judgments are influenced by the desire to belong to a crowd, and the expectations of the reward of the acknowledgement of that crowd.” You do not even have be in the physical presence of others to receive the feedback that encourages a change of opinion. “Our own processing stimuli can be turned off and our decisions can be swayed, simply by the suggestion that others thought differently,” says Prof Berns, whose studies show this. Clive Cookson and Daryl Ilbury Crowd behaviour: United they stand December 27, 2011 8:19 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9eec57ac-2c8e-11e1-8cca- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1huhdEbOj

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Life after the Arab Egypt's progress from dictatorship to democracy is messy but offers hope to the Arab world

Nesrine Malik guardian.co.uk, Monday 26 December 2011 17.00 GMT

An anti-government protestor holds a bloodied Egyptian flag in Tahrir Square, Cairo. Photograph: Dan Kitwood/Getty Images This time last year, I was in Khartoum, scouring Arabic TV channels trying to find any reports of events in Tunisia. Twitter and a few blogposts in Arabic and French were reporting that a man had allegedly burned himself alive and protests were erupting throughout the country. There was nothing. Today, the Arab spring dominates the Arab airwaves. Egypt in particular, where the awakening flowered with the removal of Hosni Mubarak, occupies the Arab psyche as a bellwether, a litmus test of how this new political phase is progressing. In a few months, the Egyptian revolution and its aftermath have witnessed a resurgent dictatorship in the shape of the military junta, an intransigent old guard, the trial of the former president, parliamentary elections, and the subsequent victory of the Muslim Brotherhood. If there were ever an Arab country that displayed the full gamut of elements and interlocutors that constitute the random mix that is the contemporary Arabic polity, it is Egypt. However, the country's most important contribution to the Arab spring has been in delivering a dose of reality, a promotion of a politically mature understanding that things will take time. Far from demoralising, events in Egypt are refocusing people on the importance of thinking beyond the toppling of presidents.

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The latest round of disturbances over the past few weeks has been widely referred to as Egypt's revolution "2.0"; a second wave after the first revolution was "stillborn". Given the sacrifices before and the euphoria after the ousting of Mubarak, it is dispiriting to see the same scenes play out again in Cairo, with arrests, killings and harassment of women dominating the news from the country. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Scaf), the military council in charge, has been given a chance and proved that it is cut of the same cloth as its predecessor. But the current wave of protests represents a different dynamic. We are beginning to see a shift away from one-way dictat to real politics. The military now knows that it cannot call the shots indefinitely. Far from being frustrating, this new dynamic is encouraging. It would have been an abortion if the new regime were welcomed unquestioningly, as far more acceptable than the previous, and the Egyptian people slipped back into the Mubarak era malaise of surrendering civic rights. It displays a covetousness, a monitoring of the aftermath of the revolution, and a knowledge and determination to ensure that it is not aborted. Commentator Firas al Attrachi refers to it as "a new social contract". He states that "events in Tahrir Square, to some extent in January/February and more so in the past week, have forced the foundation of a new social contract along the lines of how nations were formed during the Greek city-state era", redefining the relationship between people and government, and the very meaning of citizenship in the country. In the absolute rejection of any government other than a civilian one, Egyptian protesters and activists show they are no longer willing to accept political smoke and mirrors. To the rest of us in the Arab world watching the events unfold, it appears nothing short of a miracle that, almost overnight, Egypt went from an ostensibly inert political environment, to one where the most established regime in the region was toppled, to one where, without skipping a beat, there has emerged a lively and robust political dynamic. One that teaches us that it is not just individuals that must be overthrown, but that there also must be a purging of the old guard. The day-to-day events on the ground are arresting, and amplified, but rather than taking the wind out of the Arab awakening's sails, they give succour. There is a perception that this new presence in Tahrir and on the streets of Cairo is disembodied, no longer an avant garde for the nation's sentiment. "Egypt is not Tahrir Square," Scaf declared. But this does not necessarily imply support for Scaf. A weak political class "stumbling around the middle ground trying to capitalise on piecemeal concessions" from the military has been circumvented and protesters and political activists are now going about it the only way they know: bottom up. The electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first round of parliamentary elections was what the naysayers have been waiting for. The Islamic bogeyman rearing its ugly head, ready to cannibalise the hard-won spoils of the revolution. But the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party has made it clear that a swift end to military rule is a top priority, echoing the national sentiment that the army must return to the barracks. As in Tunisia, victorious Islamic parties seem to be treading the transition waters carefully, in a curative function under the watchful eye of a flammable electorate. Having been the only consistent vehicle of opposition during the Mubarak era, it was to be expected that Islamic parties would be best poised for electoral victory, as was Al Nahda in Tunisia. But this does not necessarily reflect a more religiously conservative bent. It is still a worrying development for liberals, though, and there is

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trepidation that an overwhelmingly secular revolution will segue into Islamic governance in the absence of civil leaders of the revolution. But this is a political dynamic, not a revolutionary one. It's fragmented and messy, and many within Egypt and across the Arab world crave stability, but appreciate that the ongoing volatility is still necessary. Things will almost certainly get worse before they get better, but we are seeing the vital signs of a revolution that is far from stillborn. If anything, the revolution is alive and kicking, taking its first gulps of air in a political atmosphere where Arabs are now learning to negotiate the post-dictator era. Nesrine Malik Life after the Arab spring 26 December 2011 17.00 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/26/arab-spring-egypt

Yemeni leader’s request for U.S. visa still in flux

By Sudarsan Raghavan and David Nakamura, Published: December 27 A senior Yemeni official said Tuesday that the Obama administration has assured the government that President Ali Abdullah Saleh will be allowed to enter the United States to receive medical treatment, a decision that could prove politically dicey if it actually occurs. The State Department strongly denied that a decision had been reached, saying that it is still reviewing Saleh’s visa application. The department stressed that it would not allow Saleh entrance for any other reason than legitimate medical concerns. “Contrary to some reports that we’ve seen, that permission has not been granted yet,” State Department spokesman Mark Toner said. But a top adviser to Saleh expressed surprise Tuesday at the denials, saying the Yemeni government was told by the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa that the visa had been approved. “We were informed yesterday from the American Embassy about the arrival of the visa,” said Sultan al-Barakani, a senior ruling party official. “They called us again today and confirmed the visa. And they requested to know the date of the travel and the route.” When asked whether the visa was contingent on Saleh receiving medical treatment, Barakani said it was “unconditional.” The White House deliberations reflect a sensitive political calculus. The administration is trying to help orchestrate a smooth transition in Yemen, where Saleh has ruled for 33 years. But the U.S. government does not want to appear to be supporting a repressive strongman — a politician many Yemenis want to face trial for the deaths of hundreds of political dissidents over the years. Demonstrators have called since January for his removal, and Saleh has formally relinquished power to his vice president in anticipation of a presidential election in February. 189

But Saleh remains in the presidential palace and is widely believed to still be in charge. Government forces controlled by his son shot and killed nine demonstrators who took part in a protest march last weekend. Saleh, who suffered serious wounds in a June attack on the palace, told reporters Saturday that he would leave the country for the United States. He suggested he would undergo medical tests but described his plans more in terms of temporary exile, the Reuters news agency reported. “I will go to the United States,” Saleh said. “Not for treatment, because I’m fine, but to get away from attention, cameras, and allow the unity government to prepare properly for elections.” He said he would “be there for several days, but I’ll return because I won’t leave my people and comrades.” In Honolulu, where President Obama is vacationing, a White House spokesman denied a New York Times report that the Obama administration had granted Saleh’s request and that he could be admitted to a hospital in New York this week. The newspaper subsequently retracted the report and said the decision had been made in principle, subject to conditions including Saleh submitting an itinerary. “U.S. officials are continuing to consider President Saleh’s request to enter the country for the sole purpose of seeking medical treatment, but initial reports that permission has already been granted are not true,” deputy press secretary Josh Earnest said Tuesday. Asked about Saleh’s request to travel to the United States, a U.S. Embassy spokesman in Sanaa said Tuesday, “It’s something under consideration.” Yemen’s deputy information minister, Abdu al-Janadi, also said there were no dates, itinerary or a visa issued for a trip. But he said Yemeni officials were under the impression that the United States had approved Saleh’s visit for medical treatment. Janadi said heading to the United States or Europe for medical treatment was one of Saleh’s conditions for stepping down as part of an agreement with the U.N. Security Council. “The president has decided to go to the United States for a medical checkup and to stay away from Yemen so that the coalition government could go ahead and do whatever it has to do, and so that no one places the blame on the president if things don’t go correctly regarding the elections,” Janadi said. But he also said that Saleh may postpone his trip because of the political situation. The political opposition — the Joint Meeting Parties, or JMP — has been trying to oust some of Saleh’s loyalists from key positions. “The president is reconsidering his decision about traveling due to JMP showing bad intentions,” Janadi said. “The president sees that it’s important to fix what’s going on prior to making any decisions in terms of traveling.” Raghavan reported from Nairobi, Nakamura from Honolulu. Staff writer Joby Warrick in Washington and special correspondent Ali Almujahed in Sanaa contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/yemeni-leaders-request-for-us-visa- still-in-flux/2011/12/27/gIQABWSaKP_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Middle East

December 26, 2011 Path Is Cleared for Yemeni Leader to Get Care in U.S. By MARK LANDLER and ERIC SCHMITT HONOLULU — The Obama administration has decided in principle to allow the embattled president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to enter the United States for medical treatment, subject to certain assurances, two administration officials said Monday. But those conditions — including a proposed itinerary — have not yet been submitted to the American Embassy in Yemen, these officials said, and no visa has yet been issued to Mr. Saleh. The decision of whether to admit Yemen’s longtime leader has stirred a vigorous debate within the administration, with some officials fearing sharp criticism for appearing to provide a safe haven for a reviled Arab figure accused of responsibility for the death of hundreds of antigovernment protesters. The complex negotiations over Mr. Saleh’s visa request attest to the high stakes for the administration, which urgently wants to secure room for political progress in Yemen but does not want to allow Mr. Saleh to use a medical visit as a way to shore up his political position. Nor do they want to play into Mr. Saleh’s penchant for keeping people off kilter. If allowed to enter, Mr. Saleh would be the first Arab leader to request, and to be granted, an extended stay in the United States since political unrest began convulsing the region a year ago. One administration official said that there was no further “impediment” to issuing Mr. Saleh a visa, and that he could arrive at NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital as soon as the end of this week for additional treatment of medical problems stemming from a near- fatal bomb blast in June at the mosque in his presidential complex. Though the administration had been concerned that approval would anger the many Yemenis eager to see Mr. Saleh prosecuted for the killing of protesters by his security forces, some believe that giving him a way out of Yemen, even temporarily, could help smooth the way to elections next year and perhaps end a political crisis that has brought the government of the impoverished nation to the brink of collapse. “In the end, we felt there was enough good to be gained that it was worth managing the criticism that we’d get, including any comparisons to past episodes,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the arrangement was still being completed. The official was referring to President Jimmy Carter’s decision in 1979 to admit the ailing shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, into the United States for medical

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treatment. That so infuriated the Islamic revolutionaries who had overthrown the shah that they stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage. Antigovernment activists in Yemen said in recent days that they were worried that the United States would grant Mr. Saleh refuge and that if it did, they would demand he be returned for prosecution at home. In a statement on Sunday in Hawaii, where President Obama is vacationing this week, the administration said that if Mr. Saleh was granted a visa, it would be only for “legitimate medical treatment.” On Monday, the White House denied that it had made a decision on whether to grant Mr. Saleh a visa. “U.S. officials are continuing to consider President Saleh’s request to enter the country for the sole purpose of seeking medical treatment,” said the White House’s deputy press secretary, Joshua R. Earnest, “but initial reports that permission has already been granted are not true.” Still, it appeared that the administration was also looking for a way to help calm the political chaos that has undermined efforts to prevent terrorist groups from operating in Yemen. “The main goal is to remove him physically from Yemen so there’s no way he can meddle in the political process there,” the official said. “Getting him medical treatment seemed a logical way to do this.” Mr. Saleh would not be allowed to bring a large entourage or use his visit for political reasons, the official said. Mr. Saleh contacted the American Embassy in Yemen’s capital, Sana, about the visa, officials said. His lingering injuries from the bomb blast include shrapnel wounds and extensive burns. The most serious medical condition is a balance problem caused by inner-ear damage. A spokeswoman for NewYork-Presbyterian, Myrna Manners, said she could not confirm whether Mr. Saleh would be going there. “As of now, we are not admitting him to NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital,” she said. After Mr. Saleh’s three decades in power, doubts remain about his motives for departing now. He signed an accord a month ago in Saudi Arabia, agreeing to step down and authorizing an election in February to choose a new president. But until then, he maintains his title and much of his authority. Fears that he might find a way to hang on to power have hampered Yemen’s transition and played a role in the chronic political violence gripping the country, the poorest in the Middle East. On Saturday, government security forces opened fire on protesters in Sana, killing at least nine people. The demonstrators were protesting a deal that would grant Mr. Saleh legal immunity if he gave up his post. The United States has found itself in a sometimes awkward position as the unrest in the Arab world has swept through Yemen. The administration conducts extensive counterterrorism operations with the Saleh government on suspected Qaeda cells. It was unclear whether the United States was Mr. Saleh’s first choice for a destination, and as officials weighed his request, some worried that he might stop in other countries and seek support for some kind of effort to stay in power.

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“They don’t want him to get back into the game,” said another official, “and everything he’s done since he went to Riyadh suggests he hasn’t entirely given up.” Part of the problem is divining what the president is thinking. Some American officials seem persuaded by Mr. Saleh’s frequent claims that he has no desire to return to power. Others are less certain. The two key officials involved in the decision are John O. Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism adviser, and the American ambassador in Yemen, Gerald M. Feierstein. Mr. Brennan almost certainly took the decision to Mr. Obama for final approval, an official said. On Sunday, Mr. Brennan called Yemen’s vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, to urge the government to show restraint against protesters, Mr. Earnest said. “Mr. Brennan emphasized strongly the need for Yemeni security forces to show maximum restraint when dealing with demonstrations, and called upon all sides to refrain from provocative acts that could spur further violence,” Mr. Earnest said. Vice President Hadi, who is supposed to assume Mr. Saleh’s powers during the transition, told Mr. Brennan that the government would investigate the deaths and injuries, Mr. Earnest said. Shortly after the June bombing, Mr. Saleh was flown to a hospital in Saudi Arabia. But after three months, he returned to Yemen. On Saturday, Mr. Saleh told reporters that he was leaving “not for treatment, but to get out of sight and the media, to calm the atmosphere for the unity government to hold the presidential election,” according to The Associated Press. Yet that statement seemed calculated for domestic consumption, a Yemeni official said, and Mr. Saleh added that he hoped to return to work as an “opposition figure.” Mark Landler reported from Honolulu, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Robert F. Worth contributed reporting from Washington, and Anemona Hartocollis from New York. Mark Landler y Eric Schmitt Path Is Cleared for Yemeni Leader to Get Care in U.S. December 26, 2011http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/world/middleeast/saleh- yemen-leader-to-be-admitted-into-us-for-medical- care.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

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ft.com World Middle East & North Africa Last updated: December 26, 2011 3:20 pm US considers Saleh’s travel request

The US government would only allow Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to travel to the United States for “legitimate” medical treatment, and is now considering the request, a senior Obama administration official said on Monday. The official said Saleh’s office recently contacted the US embassy in Sanaa to say the president planned to leave Yemen soon and wanted specialised care in the US related to injuries he sustained in a June assassination attempt that forced him into hospital in Saudi Arabia. “The request for approval for President Saleh to travel to the United States is currently under consideration. The only reason that travel to the United States by President Saleh would be approved would be for legitimate medical treatment,” the official said. On Saturday, just hours after his forces killed nine people who had demanded he be tried for the killings of demonstrators over the past year, Saleh said he would leave for the US and give way to a successor. He did not say when he would depart. The Yemeni leader said he would undergo some medical tests but characterised his intended trip as one of temporary exile. “I will go to the United States. Not for treatment, because I’m fine, but to get away from attention, cameras, and allow the unity government to prepare properly for elections,” he said. “I’ll be there for several days, but I’ll return because I won’t leave my people and comrades who have been steadfast for 11 months,” Saleh said. Increasing bloodshed and political uncertainty in Yemen is a major concern to its neighbour Saudi Arabia and Saleh’s former supporters in Washington, who worry the country’s al Qaeda wing could gain control of key oil shipping routes in the chaos. US President Barack Obama’s top counter-terrorism official John Brennan called Yemen’s acting leader on Sunday to emphasise the need for Yemeni forces “to show maximum restraint” when dealing with demonstrations, White House spokesman Josh Earnest said in a statement issued in Hawaii, where Obama is on holiday. In his phone conversation with Yemeni Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, Brennan also called for all sides in Yemen’s political transition to avoid “provocative acts that could spur further violence”. Hadi told Brennan he has launched an investigation into the deaths and injuries that occurred and said he would do his utmost to prevent further bloodshed, Earnest said, adding that both officials agreed it was important to stick to the transition path leading to the February 21 presidential election.

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Meanwhile, the head of the Arab League’s monitoring mission said on Monday he met several government officials who have been cooperative and said access had been unfettered “so far”. Sudanese General Mustafa Dabi, who arrived in Damascus on Saturday, is leading a team of observers that will check whether Syria is implementing part of an Arab peace plan requiring it to pull out of civilian areas and put an end to bloodshed. “We are in Damascus now and have started our mission and will head to other cities faster than you think,” Dabi said. “Our Syrian brothers are cooperating very well and without any restrictions so far.” Arab League delegates have said they will try to maintain an element of surprise by only announcing the specific areas they would visit on the same day of their departure. The general said he had already met the foreign minister and his deputy, as well as several officials from the armed forces. He warned those watching the mission not to jump to conclusions about the results of the monitoring mission. “Give us some time, we just got here.” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e9ccb1b2-2fb9-11e1-8ad0- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1hf2F5Zlb AP News Dec 26, 7:04 AM EST

US weighing travel request for Yemen's president By JULIE PACE Associated Press

HONOLULU (AP) -- The Obama administration is considering whether to allow Yemen's outgoing president into the United States for medical treatment, as fresh violence and political tensions flare in the strategically important Middle Eastern nation. A senior administration official said President Ali Abdullah Saleh's office requested that he be allowed to receive specialized treatment in the U.S. for injuries sustained in a June attack on his compound. The request was being considered, and would only be approved for medical reasons, the official said. Until now, the White House had not commented on Saleh's assertion Saturday that he would be leaving Yemen and traveling to the U.S. Saleh insisted he was going in order to help calm tensions in his country, not for medical treatment. The official, who requested anonymity because of a lack of authorization to speak publicly, did not say when the Obama administration would decide on Saleh's request. But the official said Saleh's office indicated that he would leave Yemen soon and spend time elsewhere abroad before he hoped to come to the U.S. Demonstrators began protesting against Saleh and calling for his ouster in February.

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The Yemeni government responded with a bloody crackdown, leaving hundreds of protesters dead, and stoking fears of instability in a nation already grappling with burgeoning extremism. Last month, Saleh agreed to a U.S.- and Saudi-backed deal to hand power over to his vice president and commit to stepping down completely in exchange for immunity. The deal further angered Saleh's opponents, who demanded he be tried for his attacks on protesters. American officials are deeply concerned that the months of turmoil in Yemen have led to a security breakdown. The dangerous al-Qaida branch in Yemen, known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, has taken advantage of the vacuum to expend its presence in southern Yemen. Pressure has been mounting in recent weeks for Saleh to leave Yemen altogether. Opponents say he has continued to wield influence through his loyalists and relatives still in positions of power, hampering the transition ahead of presidential elections set for Feb. 21. Many feared he would find a way to continue his rule. Activists said troops commanded by Saleh's relatives attacked protesters in the capital of Sanaa Saturday, killing at least nine people. Tens of thousands of people demonstrated the following day, protesting the deaths and demanding the resignation of Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi for failing to bring the killers to justice. The White House said President Barack Obama's top counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan, called Hadi Sunday and emphasized the need for Yemeni security forces to show "maximum restraint" when dealing with demonstrations. Hadi told Brennan that he had launched an investigation into the recent deaths and injuries and would do his utmost to prevent further bloodshed, the White House said. The White House said Brennan and Hadi agreed on the importance of continuing with the agreed-upon path of political transition in Yemen in order to ensure that the February elections take place. Obama was being briefed on developments in Yemen while in Hawaii for his Christmas vacation. The U.S. has experience with letting unpopular foreign leaders into this country for medical treatment. More than three decades ago, President Jimmy Carter allowed the exiled shah of Iran into the U.S. for medical treatment in October 1979, eight months after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led a revolution that ousted the shah and created the Islamic Republic of Iran. On Nov. 4, 1979, Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Iran. Fifty-two American hostages were held for 444 days in response to Carter's refusal to send the shah back to Iran for trial. JULIE PACE US weighing travel request for Yemen's president Dec 26, 7:04 AM EST http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_US_YEMEN?SITE=ORROS&SECTION=

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ft.com comment Columnists December 23, 2011 7:31 pm A generation at last in ferment By Roula Khalaf

The most striking aspect of Mohamed Bouazizi’s life is how ordinary it was. He was a typical 26-year-old Arab trying to make a living in a neglected Tunisian town, a fruit and vegetable seller whose ambition was to save enough money to buy a car. His meagre daily earnings were spent on supporting his family. No one of course will know what went through his mind when he bought a bottle of petrol and burnt himself alive. But the morning of his December 17 suicide had been a Kafkaesque struggle to recover the cart that had been confiscated by the police. He was sent off from one government office to another. It was on the doorstep of the governor’s office that his desperation finally exploded, unleashing his agonising personal protest. While he died two weeks later from his wounds, he will forever be remembered as the spark of the Arab spring. With one tragic act, he awakened a generation of Arab youth from a long, uneasy sleep and altered Arab history. More ON THIS STORY Podcast World Weekly with Gideon Rachman In depth Egypt in transition In depth Middle East protests Thousands continue protest in Tahrir Square Cairo activists battle army for third day ON THIS TOPIC Syria blasts kill at least 44 at security agencies Islamist poll triumphs worry Christians UAE confirms move against Islamist group Editorial Islamism and the Arab awakening FROM PERSON IN THE NEWS Mikhail Prokhorov A pretender’s bid for power Person in the news Newt Gingrich Person in the News Paul McMullan Person in the News Richard McGregor The flame he lit in the little-known town of Sidi Bouzid led to the toppling of the country’s dictator and soon spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, as youth-led uprisings – some still raging – fractured a decades-old authoritarian order. 197

Along the way he has shattered long-held assumptions on which world powers based their policies in the region and financial markets predicated their analysis – namely that autocracy was the key to stability. Even in the wealthiest, most apathetic corners of the Arab world, governments were forced into a soul- searching exercise and had to race to tame potential unrest with generous handouts. As youths poured on to the streets in a largely peaceful human wave of fury and bravery, defying tanks and bullets and ignoring the torture they might suffer at the hands of brutal police, they demonstrated that they were no different from their western peers, aspiring to embrace the same values of freedom and democracy. Bouazizi symbolised the combination of drift and what Arabs call ihbat (extreme frustration), the bane of a generation. In fact, his self-immolation could have gone unnoticed – he could have been just another victim of abuse in a police state that had so repressed society that it assumed it to be numb. But below the surface of calm projected by Tunisia, an image so mistakenly accepted by the west, many young men and women were waiting for a spark. Bouazizi’s suicide was seized on by a savvy network of young unemployed university graduates, who fed pictures of protests to Al Jazeera, the pan- Arab channel with a unique power of mobilisation in the region, and disseminated them through Facebook. Within a month, the protests had reached Tunis, the capital, and President Zein al- Abidine Ben Ali and his corrupt family were fleeing to Saudi Arabia. Young Egyptians watched in admiration and asked themselves, why not us? Eleven days after Mr Ben Ali’s fall, the children of the region’s most populous nation brought revolution to the heart of the Arab world. Abdelkhaleq Abdulla, the Emirati academic, says Bouazizi’s plight reverberated so poignantly because he represented the two essential but missing needs for Arab youth. “First is the search for dignity that people have been trying to reclaim for the past 40 or 50 years. Bouazizi told them that they had to revolt to bring back that dignity,” he says. “Second is that he stood for tens of millions of Arab youth who needed jobs, who wanted jobs, who were capable of jobs but who could not find jobs. All he wanted was to be a fruit seller and he couldn’t even have that.” It is true that no one had foreseen an explosion in the Arab world at this particular moment. But the symptoms of a youth malaise had been diagnosed year in and year out, by academics and businessmen, by multilateral institutions, and by the autocratic governments themselves. The change sparked by Bouazizi was in reality a broader youth rebellion against the political elite The statistics told a part of the story: over half the population under the age of 30, and youth unemployment the highest in the world. Even those who sought higher education – and their numbers were growing – entered job markets for which they were of little use. In a paper released a few months before Bouazizi’s tragedy, the World Bank warned that “not investing in young people, in particular not creating the required jobs for them, will make youth more vulnerable and at risk of being marginalised, creating generations of idle citizens ... subject to negative societal phenomena and will require substantially higher investments to recover.” But young Arabs had already reached that stage of alienation. And their rage and resentment were particularly acute in countries where leaders were ready to deliver the 198

ultimate insult and pass on power to their children, perpetuating their dictatorship. “Bouazizi lit the fuel that was there for a long time, an accumulation of frustrations, from unemployment to the inability to express yourself, from the migration of young people to the repression of the state,” says 28-year-old Khaled, an activist from Syria, where the revolution is now in its 10th month. What escaped the Syrian regime, and its peers, he says, was that young Arabs were creating useful links with each other through social media sites, a virtual connection in which they were flooded with information and could exchange revolutionary advice. Some young men and women also had attended workshops on peaceful resistance, applying the lessons in Tahrir Square, and sharing them with other Arab activists. In Syria, activists communicate via Skype and they have countered the information blackout by sending out videos of protests recorded on mobile phones. “The regimes thought the youth were divorced from politics,” says Khaled. “They didn’t notice that young people were connected among themselves, that they had ambitions, that they were aware and that their awareness was higher than among the traditional opposition.” The political transformation sparked by Bouazizi was in reality a broader youth rebellion against the political elite, including the traditional opposition. In some ways, it can be seen as a rejection of an older generation that had failed its children, allowing the state of ihbat to persist. The ideals of Arab nationalism that the parents of the Arab youth had aspired to were not only bankrupted by military defeats against Israel but also exploited by dictators to justify the repression. One of the martyrs of the Egyptian revolution was 23-year-old Sally Zahran. She was said to have been clubbed to death in Tahrir Square but it later emerged that she had accidentally fallen from the balcony after arguing with her mother and threatening to kill herself if she was not allowed to join the protests. In denouncing the old order, Arab youth also have been reluctant to appoint leaders, despising forms of authority they consider corruptible. The absence of leadership has been one of their most potent weapons, as regimes confronted an uncontrollable mass, oblivious to political deal-making. Even when Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian Google executive whose kidnapping during the revolution earned him hero status, suggested that a transfer of power to Egypt’s vice-president – a step short of his resignation – might be satisfactory, the youth turned against him. “He [Mr Ghonim] has fallen,” was the reaction of Tahrir Square. Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the youth is that they were able to shed the fear that had trapped the older generation for decades. In the alleys of Sidi Bouzid and other towns, peaceful protests in the day gave way to street fighting at night. The turning point in Egypt too was on January 28, when demonstrators doggedly returned to confront security forces. The police melted away that day; and has yet to return to the streets in full force. “Surprisingly, when the protesters are attacked violently, more come in,” Tawwakul Karman, the fiery, charismatic Yemeni activist, who was one of three women to win the 2011 Nobel peace prize, remarked earlier this year. “It is like they are saying to the regime: you can kill us, but we will never die.” It was in Libya that young men, many of whom had never seen a machinegun, let alone held one, demonstrated the greatest courage, rushing to the front lines after minimal 199

training. Even those who were in their late 30s or 40s liked to call themselves “Arab youth”, so appealing was the brand when the Libyan uprising erupted in March. While no one can dispute the phenomenal role of Arab youth as the engine of change, as countries move from revolution to political transition, the youth’s greatest strength is also proving their weakness. Focused on destroying the old order, the diffuse, youth movements are finding themselves ill prepared for political life. Their dreams of a more just and dignified existence, of jobs, have been disappointed not least by the economic losses caused by the turmoil. As political elites return to the fore, the unity of purpose that joined them regardless of sect or ideology is fraying. Impatient and idealistic, many are eager to return to the streets at every disappointing turn in the transition. “The energy is still there but we didn’t organise ourselves from a political sense. We were busy with the revolutionary process,” laments Shadi al-Ghazali Harb, a young Egyptian. “The roads [to politics] were blocked and the seniors, the elite, whether liberal or Islamists, didn’t allow the youth to take over in leading positions.” But the youth who have carried Bouazizi’s cause will have to adapt. As Prof Abdulla says, they “can already claim a victory in bringing down the old regimes and that was their historical role. They are not the ones who will build the new system, a formidable task for all of us, and a job for the next 20 or 30 years”. Additional reporting by Andrew England and Heba Saleh Roula Khalaf A generation at last in ferment December 23, 2011 7:31 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/de1e960a-2b36-11e1-a9e4- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1hf2F5Zlb

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Internacional LA REVUELTA CONTRA EL ASAD El régimen sirio bombardea Homs antes de la llegada de la Liga Árabe Una veintena de personas han muerto en las últimas horas en el bastión de la oposición El jefe de los observadores afirma que se ha reunido con varios responsables gubernamentales que se han mostrado cooperativos y "por ahora" no ha habido restricciones El organismo panárabe tiene previsto visitar Homs el jueves EL PAÍS / EFE Madrid / El Cairo 26 DIC 2011 - 15:11 CET16

Imagen sin fecha tomada de YouTube en la que aparecen víctimas de la represión en Rastan, cerca de Homs. / AFP Al menos 20 civiles han muerto hoy y decenas han resultado heridos en la ciudad de Homs, uno de los bastiones de la oposición, que ha sido bombardeada por las fuerzas leales al régimen de Bachar el Asad, según el Observatorio Sirio de Derechos Humanos. El grupo opositor asegura que 14 de las víctimas mortales se han registrado en el barrio de Bab Amro, de mayoría suní y donde se están concentrando los ataques de las fuerzas del régimen. Otras cuatro personas han muerto en distritos colindantes. La ofensiva de El Asad coincide con la llegada de los monitores de la Liga Árabe al país, ya enturbiada por el doble atentado suicida que sacudió Damasco el pasado viernes. "Bab Amro está siendo bombardeada por artillería pesada y fuego antiaéreo", han comunicado los comités locales que coordinan las movilizaciones opositoras desde el terreno. Más al norte, en Hama, otro de los frentes rebeldes, tres civiles han muerto por los disparos de las fuerzas de seguridad. Uno de ellos tenía 14 años. El jefe de la misión de observación de la Liga Arabe enviada a Siria, el general sudanés Mustafá Dabi, ha señalado hoy que se ha reunido con varios responsables gubernamentales que se han mostrado cooperativos y "por ahora" no ha habido restricciones de acceso. Dabi, que llegó el sábado a Damasco, encabeza un equipo de observadores que tratará de comprobar si el Gobierno de Bachar al Asad está cumpliendo con su compromiso de retirar al Ejército de las calles, liberar a los presos 201

políticos e iniciar un diálogo con la oposición para poner fin al baño de sangre que vive el país desde el pasado mes de marzo.

Una menor siria de origen kurdo protesta junto a la oficina de la Liga Árabe en Beirut (Líbano). / ANWAR AMRO (AFP) "Estamos en Damasco ahora y hemos comenzado nuestra misión y nos dirigiremos a otras ciudades más rápido de lo que pensáis", ha declarado Dabi a la agencia Reuters. "Nuestros hermanos sirios están cooperando muy bien y sin ninguna restricción hasta ahora", ha precisado. 50 observadores han llegado hoy y serán divididos en equipos de diez para misiones de observación. Algunos miembros de la delegación han dicho que prevé visitar la ciudad de Homs este jueves. El general sudanés ha explicado que ya se ha reunido con el ministro de Exteriores, Walid al Moallem, y con su número dos, así como con varios oficiales de las fuerzas armadas. Ayer, el Consejo Nacional Sirio (CNS), máximo órgano de la oposición, instó a los observadores de la Liga Árabe a que visiten inmediatamente Homs, que sufre "una amenaza real de genocidio y de crímenes contra la humanidad". El jefe de la misión de la Liga en Siria ha informado de que un segundo grupo de monitores viajaría hoy al país para investigar la situación en Homs, Deraa, Idlib, Alepo y Hama, los cuatro principales puntos de enfrentamiento entre opositores y fuerzas del régimen. El Gobierno francés, a través del portavoz de Exteriores, Bernard Valero, ha instado al Gobierno de El Asad a que permita la entrada del personal de la Liga Árabe a Homs "debido a que la represión no ha hecho más que acentuarse". El Observatorio ha destacado que el último es el ataque más intenso contra el distrito de Bab Amro en los últimos tres días, según le ha contado un testigo. Estas informaciones no han podido ser verificadas por periodistas u organizaciones internacionales por las restricciones impuestas por las autoridades sirias. El pasado día 22, un grupo de expertos de la Liga Árabe llegó a Siria para comprobar sobre el terreno que el régimen cumple con la iniciativa de esta organización para solucionar la crisis en el país. El plan del organismo panárabe prevé el fin de la violencia, la retirada de las fuerzas del régimen de los focos de la oposición y la puesta en libertda de los presos políticos. Desde que comenzaron las protestas a mediados de marzo pasado, más de 5.000 personas han fallecido por la represión gubernamental, según la ONU. El régimen sirio bombardea Homs antes de la llegada de la Liga Árabe http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/26/actualidad/1324900377_74497 1.html

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Afrique Les Marocains manifestent pour la démocratie, sans les islamistes LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 26.12.11 | 08h25

Manifestation le 25 décembre à Casablanca, organisée par le Mouvement du 20 février afin de demander des réformes politiques et sociales de grande ampleur.REUTERS/STRINGER Plusieurs milliers de personnes ont manifesté dimanche 25 décembre à Casablanca et Rabat, à l'appel des jeunes du Mouvement du 20 février, qui revendique des réformes politiques profondes. Pour la première fois, la manifestation s'est déroulée en l'absence des représentants du mouvement islamiste Justice et bienfaisance. Ce dernier s'est récemment retiré de la contestation menée depuis le début de l'année par les jeunes pour la démocratie. Entre 4 000 et 5 000 personnes sont descendues dans la rue dans le quartier populaire Hay Mohammadi à Casablanca pour appeler à la poursuite de la lutte pour les réformes démocratiques. A Rabat, le nombre de manifestants était de 300 à 500 personnes. La police a, pour sa part, indiqué à l'AFP que 3 500 personnes avaient manifesté dans tout le royaume. PLUS DE JUSTICE SOCIALE "Nous manifestons pour dire que la lutte va continuer malgré le retrait des organisations politiques, qu'elles soient islamistes ou autres, a déclaré à l'AFP Hamza Mahfoud, de la section de Casablanca du mouvement. Nos revendications sont légitimes et elles n'ont pas varié : une monarchie parlementaire et une plus grande justice sociale." "L'actuel gouvernement ne changera rien", "Non au cumul de la fortune et du pouvoir" ont scandé les manifestants à Rabat et Casablanca. Justice et bienfaisance, l'un des plus importants mouvements islamistes, toléré par les autorités marocaines, a mis un terme à son appartenance au Mouvement du 20 février "en raison des attaques" dont il a dit être l'objet de la part de certains jeunes contestataires. Ces manifestations se poursuivent malgré l'appel au dialogue lancé par le nouveau chef du gouvernement marocain, l'islamiste modéré Abdelilah Benkirane, dont le parti Justice et développement a remporté les législatives à la fin de novembre. http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/12/26/les-marocains-manifestent-pour-la- democratie-sans-les-islamistes_1622696_3212.html

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Le chef des observateurs de la Ligue arabe entame sa mission en Syrie LEMONDE.FR avec AFP et Reuters | 26.12.11 | 06h52 • Mis à jour le 26.12.11 | 10h18

Le Soudanais Mohammed Ahmed Moustapha Al-Dabi est le chef de la mission d'observateurs attendue en Syrie.AFP/ASHRAF SHAZLY Les violences se poursuivent lundi 26 décembre en Syrie alors que la Ligue arabe entame sa mission dans le pays. Selon l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme (OSDH), au moins treize civils ont été tués lundi à Bab Amro, un quartier sunnite opposé au régime à Homs, dans le centre de la Syrie. "Des tirs d'obus et de mitrailleuses lourdes contre le quartier de Bab Amro ont fait lundi matin au moins treize tués et des dizaines de blessés. La situation est effrayante et le pilonnage est plus intense que les trois derniers jours", a affirmé l'OSDH, basé au Royaume-Uni, citant un militant sur place. Dimanche, le chef de la mission d'observateurs de la Ligue arabe, le général soudanais Ahmed Moustafa Al-Dabi, est arrivé en Syrie avec un premier groupe de cinquante observateurs, pour vérifier l'application par Damas d'un plan de sortie de crise après neuf mois de manifestations réprimées dans le sang. Les observateurs de la Ligue arabe, dont l'arrivée a été passée sous silence par les médias officiels, entameront leur mission par une visite de Homs, haut lieu de la contestation du régime de Bachar Al-Assad. Mardi, ils devraient se rendre à Damas et à Edleb, selon une source proche de leur équipe. Dimanche, le Conseil national syrien (CNS), qui regroupe divers mouvements d'opposition, avait exhorté la Ligue arabe à se rendre à Homs, où des milliers de soldats "assiègent" un quartier insurgé. "Depuis ce matin, le quartier de Bab Amro est assiégé et sous la menace d'une invasion militaire de la part d'une force estimée à quatre mille soldats, annonce le CNS. Cela s'ajoute au bombardement continue de Homs qui dure depuis des jours." Cent vingt-quatre habitants de Homs ont été blessés dans le bombardement, qui a fait également trois morts, selon l'Observatoire syrien pour les droits de l'homme.

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Bourhan Ghalioun, le chef du CNS, a également estimé que la Ligue arabe devait accentuer la pression sur Damas en demandant au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU d'adopter son plan de paix. LA FEUILLE DE ROUTE DE LA LIGUE Après six semaines de tergiversations, le pouvoir syrien a finalement accepté de signer le protocole d'admission des observateurs sur son sol. Le plan de la Ligue prévoit l'arrêt des violences, le retrait des troupes stationnées dans les rues, la libération de prisonniers et un dialogue avec l'opposition. Les opposants du président Bachar Al-Assad restent cependant sceptiques sur l'intérêt d'une mission d'observateurs visant à surveiller l'application d'un plan de paix qu'ils sont persuadés que Damas ne respectera pas. Avant son départ pour la Syrie, le général Dabi a rencontré au Caire le secrétaire général de la Ligue arabe, Nabil El-Arabi, afin d'établir la "feuille de route" de la mission, dont il a promis qu'elle travaillerait dans la transparence. Interrogé par l'agence de presse égyptienne Mena, le militaire soudanais a déclaré que les observateurs prévoyaient de rencontrer divers protagonistes de la crise, issus de l'armée comme des rangs de l'opposition. La Ligue arabe espère envoyer au total environ 150 observateurs en Syrie d'ici la fin de l'année. Nabil El-Arabi a estimé qu'il faudrait une semaine seulement pour constater le respect ou non par les autorités syriennes du plan de sortie de crise élaboré par l'organisation. Face à la répression des manifestations, dont le bilan s'élève à plus de cinq mille morts depuis neuf mois, selon l'ONU, la Ligue a également suspendu la Syrie de ses instances et imposé des sanctions économiques à Damas. >> Lire le zoom sur Ahmed Moustafa Al-Dab : "L'étrange pedigree du chef de la mission arabe en Syrie " UN ATTENTAT SANS PRÉCÉDENT Malgré une première équipe de la Ligue arabe, arrivée jeudi à Damas pour préparer la mission des observateurs de l'organisation, les violences se sont poursuivies, notamment avec un double attentat-suicide perpétré vendredi. Samedi, des milliers de personnes ont participé aux funérailles des quarante-quatre personnes tuées lors de ces attaques qui visaient des locaux des services de sécurité à Damas. Alors que les autorités syriennes ont vu "la main d'Al-Qaida" derrière ces attentats, les Frères musulmans ont accusé Damas de les avoir "mis en scène" dans le but de "détourner l'attention (des observateurs arabes) des manifestations hebdomadaires". Ils l'ont, en outre, accusé d'avoir "fabriqué de toutes pièces" un communiqué revendiquant les attaques au nom de la confrérie. Enfin, selon le quotidien israélien Maariv, Bachar Al-Assad envisagerait l'exil en Russie. Citant des sources israéliennes, le quotidien assure que le vice-président Farouk Al-Charaa s'est rendu à Moscou le 15 décembre pour rencontrer le ministre des affaires étrangères russe Sergueï Lavrov afin de discuter de cette éventualité et proposer de remplacer Al-Assad après son départ. Une information à laquelle Damas n'a pas réagi. Le chef des observateurs de la Ligue arabe entame sa mission en Syrie26.12.11 | 10h18 http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/12/26/le-chef-des-observateurs-de-la- ligue-arabe-entame-sa-mission-en-syrie_1622692_3218.html#ens_id=1481132

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Monday's papers: Political negotiations continue, report says chemical weapons used on protesters Author: Noha El-Hennawy Al-Tahrir newspaper leads with “SCAF is bargaining.” Instead of heeding demands to hold presidential elections on 25 January and ultimately relinquish power in February, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) “circumvents” them by announcing that Shura Council elections will be concluded on 22 February instead of in mid-March, says the paper. “The SCAF is still dealing with the revolutionaries’ demands like a merchant,” reads the report. The privately-owned paper dedicates almost a full page to review a recent European Commission report that says the military used prohibited chemical weapons against protesters during clashes that took place on Mohamed Mahmoud Street in Cairo, Somouha in Alexandria, and Mamar Square in Ismailia between 19 and 24 November. By analyzing the victims' autopsies, the commission concluded that white phosphorus was used against protestors, says the paper. This chemical substance can damage human bones and inhaling it can be fatal, according to the report. It is worth noting that it was the police’s Central Security Forces, not the military, that spearheaded the clashes with protesters in November. On Al-Tahrir’s last page, Gamal Fahmy has a satirical piece that mocks the ongoing paranoia about mysterious forces seeking to “destroy the state.” After every incident of violence, SCAF members try to convince the public that unknown forces are seeking to drive wedges between the military and the people in order to “destroy the state." Fahmy challenges these claims with his well-known scathingly sarcastic tone. “You must be following the chapters of the comic, ridiculous and mean novel that is being played in the national cabaret these days under the title ‘A plot to destroy the state’,” says Fahmy, going on to narrate a conversation, possibly virtual, that he had with someone he dismisses as “coward” about this plot. He asks the latter to explain what he means by destroying the state. “Destroying the state means destroying the state,” answers Fahmy’s virtual interlocutor. Fahmy replies, “It seems to me, and God knows better, that the meaning you have in your head draws analogies between the state and a pregnant woman. If you hit her in the back, she will have a miscarriage.” The ruthless columnist goes on to mock the Muslim Brotherhood members who filed a complaint earlier this week against three socialist revolutionaries, accusing them of being this mysterious force. Ironically enough, one of the plaintiffs is a lawyer and a member of the Bar Association’s Freedom Committee and the other is a journalist. Fahmy highlights this paradox, saying, “You would wonder about the relationship between lofty meanings such as freedom, law, journalism and Islam on one hand, and actions that are denounced and condemned in all religions on the other, namely informing against someone and turning the rulers against political groups that do not agree with [the Muslim Brotherhood].” Al-Shorouk newspaper says that the military-appointed civilian Advisory Council is expected to discuss in its next meetings the eligibility conditions for members of the

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constituent assembly that will write the constitution, and the possibility of holding presidential elections earlier than scheduled. The paper adds that the council’s intention to interfere with the make-up of the constituent assembly has been met again with Islamist opposition. Al-Shorouk quotes Yosry Hammad, spokesperson of the Salafi-led Nour Party, expressing vehement opposition to any attempt to tread on the turf of the new parliament, which is set to elect the constituent assembly. The paper says that some non-Islamist parliamentarians are taking the same stance, referring to Amr Hamzawy from the liberal Egypt Freedom would-be party, and Saad Aboud from the Nasserist Karama Party. Al-Shorouk quotes Aboud as saying: “It [the Advisory Council] has no authority to draft a bill on how to select the members of the constituent assembly, because this falls only in the elected parliament’s jurisdiction.” Al-Dostour says Mohamed Kamal Abouel Magd, a member of the Advisory Council, has already presented to fellow members 14 examples from other countries that elected constituent assemblies to write their constitutions. Abouel Magd also said that the Advisory Council is waiting for the right moment to discuss the final version of the presidential elections’ law, according to Al- Dostour. Al-Wafd newspaper runs a report on Tahrir Square, saying that life has gone back to normal there with cars driving through and people flooding into the Mugamma. In the meantime, Sheikh Rihan and Qasr al-Aini streets have turned into tourist sites as visitors stop to take pictures of the cement wall that the military built after last week’s bloody clashes. Meanwhile, dozens of protesters are convening in the middle of the square to discuss politics, adds the paper. Al-Ahram newspaper reports that activist Ahmed Harara returned yesterday from France, where he went in the hopes of saving his eye. Many activists rallied at the airport yesterday to receive the 31-year-old dentist who lost one eye on 28 January and the other on 19 November on Mohamed Mahmoud Street. Unfortunately, French doctors could not save the second eye, which means he will be blind for life, according to Al-Ahram. To boost Harara’s morale, last week activists called on people to rally at the airport on his arrival. Egypt's papers: Al-Ahram: Daily, state-run, largest distribution in Egypt Al-Akhbar: Daily, state-run, second to Al-Ahram in institutional size Al-Gomhurriya: Daily, state-run Rose al-Youssef: Daily, state-run Al-Dostour: Daily, privately owned Al-Shorouk: Daily, privately owned Al-Wafd: Daily, published by the liberal Wafd Party Youm7: Daily, privately owned Al-Tahrir: Daily, privately owned Freedom and Justice: Daily, published by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party Sawt al-Umma: Weekly, privately owned Al-Arabi: Weekly, published by the Nasserist Party Friday of Reclaiming Honor in Tahrir Publishing Date: Mon, 26/12/2011 - 10:03 Related material Thursday’s papers: A plot to burn Egypt on 25 January The subtext of the military council's video ‘evidence’ Source URL (retrieved on 26/12/2011 - 13:39): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/568856 207

Internacional

LA REVUELTA CONTRA EL ASAD Siria, el zarpazo de un tigre herido El historiador británico analiza el papel crucial de Damasco en Oriente Próximo SIMON SEBAG MONTEFIORI 25 DIC 2011 - 19:46 CET90 Las revoluciones, esas misteriosas convulsiones de luchas callejeras e intrigas a base de secretos susurrados, las fluctuaciones de las insondables mareas del poder, se desarrollan por fases, y los levantamientos de los dos países árabes más importantes, Egipto y Siria, se encuentran ahora al borde de un nuevo momento trascendental. En las revoluciones, la primera fase es la del aumento de las protestas populares; la segunda fase es la represión despótica para aplastarlas, y la tercera es la de la supervivencia y el impulso creciente de la revuelta, hasta desembocar en la caída del tirano si pierde el apoyo de su Ejército o su corte. La primera etapa es la más apasionante para la prensa occidental y la más emocionante para los jóvenes participantes, un material digno de Los Miserables y otras obras parecidas, pero suele ser la menos importante. Las revoluciones no terminan casi nunca como parecen empezar, y las consecuencias siempre son totalmente distintas de las intenciones de los revolucionarios. Tardan años, a veces decenios, en aparecer, no meses; y lo que importa es quién controla a quién al final. La esperanza es que sea el pueblo el que de verdad acabe por controlar el Estado.

El presidente sirio, Bachar el Asad, en una imagen de archivo. / EFE

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La revolución libia fue un éxito claro y audaz para David Cameron, una intervención liberal limitada de las que el vizconde Palmerston habría admirado. Pero esa intervención fue posible porque Libia era un país periférico y gobernado por el mamarracho dictador más despreciado en el mundo árabe. En cambio, Egipto y Siria son los dos puentes de mando del mundo árabe. En primavera, la caída del anticuado faraón Hosni Mubarak pareció una revolución democrática. Desde luego, fue un instante en el que, para parafrasear a Mao Zedong, el pueblo egipcio se puso en pie; perdió sus miedos y obtuvo la promesa de elecciones democráticas. Ante las acciones depredadoras de los militares, los egipcios han comprendido que su revolución fue parcial, o incluso de imitación. La casta estructura político-económica del régimen militar, en el poder desde la revolución de Nasser en 1952, ha permanecido intacta en los nombres del mariscal de campo Mohamed Husein Tantaui, de 76 años, tan arrugado, casi momificado, que no llamaría la atención entre los faraones embalsamados y vendados del Museo Egipcio, y su junta, el Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas (conocido por su acrónimo, CSFA). La furia y la frustración de la “segunda revolución” que estamos viendo ahora representan el intento del pueblo de hacer realidad las victorias de la primera. En la época de las Cruzadas, Saladino gobernaba Egipto, Palestina, Jordania y La Meca desde Damasco Siria también está al borde de una situación nueva, y es todavía más importante porque se trata del corazón del mundo árabe. La importancia de Egipto es conocida. Aparte de ser una antigua civilización de faraones y pirámides, tiene la característica de ser el Estado árabe más poblado, famoso por su sofisticada clase dirigente y su papel, durante los 18 años de mandato del presidente Nasser, como líder del nacionalismo árabe. El santuario de Siria La importancia de Siria se conoce menos. Deriva del primer califato en el siglo VII y el nacimiento del nacionalismo árabe en el siglo XX. Damasco fue la primera gran capital que cayó en poder de los ejércitos islámicos. Cuando los árabes se apoderaron también de Jerusalén, alrededor del 638, agruparon Palestina y Siria en una tierra que consideraron la verdadera tierra santa islámica: Bilad al Shams. En un ejemplo típico de los llamados Méritos de Jerusalén, leemos: “El santuario de la Tierra es Siria; el santuario de Siria es Palestina; el santuario de Palestina es Jerusalén”. En 661, el astuto y carismático califa Muauiya, fundador de la dinastía Omeya, hizo de Damasco la capital de Bilad al Shams. Sus familiares, los grandes califas Abdel Malik y su hijo Al Walid I, construyeron la Mezquita Omeya en dicha ciudad, que incorporó la iglesia que albergaba la cabeza de Juan el Bautista. Durante sus 100 años iniciales, Siria fue el cuartel general de un vasto imperio árabe que se extendía desde España hasta las fronteras de India. Es fácil olvidar que Damasco fue, durante un tiempo, la capital del mundo. En la época de las Cruzadas, Saladino gobernaba Egipto, Palestina, Jordania y La Meca desde Damasco. Saladino adoraba Damasco, donde había crecido y había sido un joven mimado que jugaba al polo toda la noche, a la luz de las velas, con su soberano. Para él, Egipto no era más que su gallina de los huevos de oro: “Egipto fue la puta”, bromeaba, “que intentó separarme de mi fiel esposa, Damasco”. Churchill tenía razón al decir que “los dictadores cabalgan sobre tigres de los que no se atreven a bajar 209

Con los siglos, Siria siguió siendo una idea emocional y religiosa que se convirtió en un talismán nacionalista. A medida que la conciencia nacional árabe se despertaba de la represión otomana durante la I Guerra Mundial, el sueño fomentado por T. E. Lawrence fue el de un reino árabe con sede en el centro, Siria. Ese fue el objetivo de la revuelta árabe: cuando, en 1918, el príncipe hachemí Faisal liberó Damasco, se declaró rey de la Gran Siria. Antes de que existiera el nacionalismo palestino, los palestinos soñaban con vivir en el reino de Siria y Líbano de Faisal. Pero no fue así: los franceses querían Siria y derrocaron a Faisal en 1920. Los franceses inventaron las fronteras actuales de Siria. El Mandato Francés comprendía Líbano y Siria, pero París siempre había protegido a los cristianos maronitas de Monte Líbano. Esa fue la razón de que, entre las dos guerras mundiales, Francia separase Líbano, designado santuario maronita, de Siria. De modo que la Siria moderna, una obra colonial, con una mayoría suní y unas minorías cristiana y alauí del 10% cada una, nunca ha tenido una vida normal; ha habido más de 30 golpes militares; en 1949, hubo tres en un año. Durante los años cuarenta y cincuenta, los políticos sirios estudiaron fusionarse con Irak; a finales de los cincuenta, Siria se unió con Egipto en la República Árabe Unida. En 1969, el adusto y despiadado comandante de la fuerza aérea Hafez el Asad, pronto conocido como la Esfinge de Damasco, encontró otra manera de gobernar Siria: una dictadura controlada a través de su familia y los hermanos alauíes, que cooptaron a oficiales suníes de confianza y a ricos comerciantes suníes de Damasco y crearon una élite cleptocrática con su policía secreta. En cuanto a Occidente, la caída de El Asad será la caída de un enemigo de todos los intereses occidentales Para impedir la disidencia en su propio país, los Asad exportaron sin piedad un terror radical, anti-israelí y antiamericano, a sus vecinos. Convirtieron Líbano, que consideraban parte de Siria, en su patio de recreo, su colonia, su hucha y su marioneta, pero necesitaban un patrocinador: primero fue la Unión Soviética y luego fue el Irán islámico. Sin embargo, los Asad disfrutaban de un estatus especial en Occidente, y de ahí el extraño respeto mostrado a Siria incluso por el presidente Obama. La Esfinge de Damasco fomentó la posición de Siria como elemento clave para la paz en Oriente Próximo debido a su historia como corazón del mundo árabe. Ahora bien, nunca dejó de ser una tiranía dinástica y cruel, desgarrada por disputas familiares. Cuando los Hermanos Musulmanes de Hama se rebelaron, el hermano de Hafez, Rifaat, comandante de la guardia pretoriana, mató a 10.000 personas. Pero entonces intentó derrocar a la Esfinge, que le exilió a París. La Esfinge murió en 2000, y le sucedió, a la manera monárquica, su hijo Bachar, que a su vez cuenta con la ayuda de su hermano, Maher, también comandante de la Cuarta Brigada. Hasta hace muy poco tiempo, un Occidente crédulo e ingenuo ha tolerado su reinado de terror en Líbano, su apoyo a Hezbolá y Hamás, y ahora la matanza de 3.500 inocentes y el encarcelamiento de 20.000: esos regímenes siempre recurren a vender la esperanza de reforma. En Libia, era el heredero, Saif el Islam, quien desempeñaba ese papel. En Siria, fue Bachar. Su juventud y su simpatía, su título de oftalmólogo obtenido en Londres y su matrimonio con una belleza siria también educada en Londres contribuyeron a 210

engatusar a los estadistas occidentales durante 10 años. Basta comparar la ruidosa reacción de Occidente al más mínimo error israelí —titulares de prensa, indignación generalizada, manifestaciones, fastuosos actos para recaudar fondos— con el casi silencio de esa misma gente sobre las matanzas y las mutilaciones de mujeres y niños cometidas por El Asad. La Liga Árabe decidió suspender a Siria. El rey Abdalá de Jordania dijo que El Asad debe marcharse. Francia exige sanciones o una intervención como la de Libia. Pero Siria no es Libia: una intervención occidental podría tener consecuencias imprevistas y peligrosas. Las luchas étnicas ya han comenzado. Si Siria se disuelve en una guerra civil, los alauíes de las fuerzas de seguridad intensificarán sus ataques contra los suníes y los cristianos. El Asad, que gobierna con una pequeña camarilla de familiares y esbirros, intentará distraer a los sirios mediante la movilización de Hezbolá y provocando choques con Israel. Pero es prácticamente indudable que recurrirá a las bombas o los asesinatos para involucrar a Líbano: al fin y al cabo, los dos son un solo país. Si cae El Asad, los alauíes se encontrarán con una venganza terrible. La mayoría suní acabará dominando, y los Hermanos Musulmanes serán la fuerza hegemónica. Pero, como demuestran los golpes de Estado anteriores, los suníes más laicos, presentes en las élites militar y empresarial, tendrán un papel muy importante. Ya no harán concesiones a los chiíes de Hezbolá ni a los ayatolás de Irán: probablemente, la nueva Siria recurrirá a Egipto, como en otros tiempos. No obstante, los mayores efectos se sentirán en las dos grandes potencias en ascenso de Oriente Próximo: parece indudable que Turquía, la potencia imperial entre 1517 y 1918, que ya hace exhibición de su poderío otomano, está armando a la oposición siria y quizá pronto cree una tierra de nadie para protegerla. El país más importante en la primavera árabe no es árabe. La abortada Revolución Verde de Irán sirvió de disparadero de la de la primavera, pero fue aplastada por Alí Jamenei, el líder supremo, que tal vez condene pronto a muerte a sus dirigentes. Irán, nacionalista y nuclearizado, está haciendo lo mismo que El Asad a gran escala, sembrando la discordia entre sus vecinos y adoptando la arrogancia de una potencia regional para evitar la desintegración interna. La caída de los Asad sería un golpe para Irán y sus clientes, Hezbolá y Hamás, que dependen de las armas iraníes suministradas a través de Siria. Pero Hezbolá controla Líbano, que ya está totalmente armado y preparado para una guerra con Israel. En Palestina, Hamás encontrará otros protectores. Eso sí, ambos quedarán más expuestos. Irán y Turquía tenían buena relación, pero, a la hora de la verdad, la teocracia chií y la democracia suní chocarán por las cenizas de los Asad y el premio de Siria. En cuanto a Occidente, la caída de El Asad será la caída de un enemigo de todos los intereses occidentales. El Asad ha proclamado que está dispuesto a morir por Siria. El primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, respondió: “Si quiere ver a alguien que luchó contra su pueblo hasta morir, fíjese en Hitler y Musolini. Si no puede aprender nada de ellos, fíjese en el líder libio asesinado”. El propio El Asad ha puesto el dedo en la llaga: aunque se presenta como un caballero árabe dispuesto a morir en la refriega, quizá entiende también que estas dictaduras 211

dinásticas de Oriente Próximo son esencialmente monárquicas. Es difícil ver de qué forma podría retroceder; su poder, férreo y manchado de sangre, solo puede morir con el rey. Churchill tenía razón al decir que “los dictadores cabalgan sobre tigres de los que no se atreven a bajar”. El tigre sirio está tocado, pero no hay nada más peligroso que un tigre herido. Simon Sebag Montefiore es historiador británico. Su libro más reciente es Jerusalén: la biografía (Crítica). Traducción de María Luisa Rodríguez Tapia. Simon Sebag Montefiori Siria, el zarpazo de un tigre herido25 DIC 2011 - 19:46 CET90 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/25/actualidad/1324838816_520223.html

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Publishing Date: Sun, 25/12/2011 - 16:09

Sunday’s papers: Suggestions for the way forward Author: Heba Afify Sunday’s papers focus on suggestions to accelerate the timeline of the transitional period as the results of the second round of the People’s Assembly elections are announced. The recent clashes between protesters and military forces which prompted these suggestions are also still in the forefront of media coverage, as attempts are made to analyze the events and provide updates on individuals arrested during them. State-run Al-Ahram newspaper says the advisory council appointed by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is considering moving up Shura Council elections so they will end on 22 February instead of 11 March in order to shorten the transitional period. Al-Dostour newspaper had another take on the advisory council’s suggestion, reporting it under the headline, “The military council demands the approval of the Islamists to move the presidential elections up.” The story claims that the advisory council started discussing the possibility of holding presidential elections before the new constitution is drafted after the SCAF gave them the green light to alter the timeline of the transitional period if they can get the consent of Islamist political forces. Al-Shorouk reports that the advisory council rejected calls from some recently-elected MPs and other public figures for power to be transferred to the speaker of parliament. Al-Shorouk reports on another initiative suggested by 60 public figures, including Islamic scholar Kamal al-Helbawy and activist George Ishak, to hold a presidential nomination period between 25 January and 11 February 2012. Following the announcement of the second round election results, Al-Shorouk paper runs a diagram showing the Islamic domination of the upcoming parliament. Today’s papers contain many attempts to untangle the mystery of recent clashes in downtown Cairo that resulted in 17 deaths. In a front page story titled “You pulled the trigger,” Al-Tahrir newspaper accuses the military of using the live ammunition based on forensic doctors reports that the dead were shot from distance, ruling out the possibility that they were shot by fellow protesters, as had previously been suggested. In Al-Shorouk, the former head of forensics is quoted saying that the shooting in front of the cabinet building was “aimed to kill.” On its front page, Al-Shorouk also reveals that some of those who appeared on state television confessing to having been paid to instigate violence during the cabinet clashes are suspects in other, unrelated cases, according to their lawyers.

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Al-Tahrir personalizes recent events, publishing pictures and information about the 17 victims of the clashes. The newspaper reports about one of the injured, Hend Nafe, who reportedly yelled at the Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi when he visited her in her hospital room and asked him to leave. Al-Tahrir says that Nafe, a university professor, is one of nine girls who were severely tortured and sexually assaulted by military forces last week. They were referred to state prosecution for charges of vandalism and assault and denied necessary medical care for 16 hours. In an interesting column in Al-Shorouk, Mohamed al-Menshawy says that the cabinet events are the real end of the state created in 1952. Menshawy says that even after the fall of Mubarak, the legitimacy of the free officers 1952 coup is what sustained the military rulers of the country. Menshawy says that the recent violence unleashed by soldiers against protesters cost the military establishment this legitimacy, and marking the beginning of a second state — the state of the 25 January revolution. Building barrier in Kasr al-Aini street Publishing Date: Sun, 25/12/2011 - 16:09 Related material Advisory council proposes moving up Shura Council elections, shortening transition period Activists, public figures demand early presidential election

Source URL (retrieved on 26/12/2011 - 13:35): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/567881

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Asia Pacific

December 25, 2011 U.S. Prepares for a Curtailed Relationship With Pakistan By ERIC SCHMITT ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — With the United States facing the reality that its broad security partnership with Pakistan is over, American officials are seeking to salvage a more limited counterterrorism alliance that they acknowledge will complicate their ability to launch attacks against extremists and move supplies into Afghanistan. The United States will be forced to restrict drone strikes, limit the number of its spies and soldiers on the ground and spend more to transport supplies through Pakistan to allied troops in Afghanistan, American and Pakistani officials said. United States aid to Pakistan will also be reduced sharply, they said. “We’ve closed the chapter on the post-9/11 period,” said a senior United States official, who requested anonymity to avoid antagonizing Pakistani officials. “Pakistan has told us very clearly that they are re-evaluating the entire relationship.” American officials say that the relationship will endure in some form, but that the contours will not be clear until Pakistan completes its wide-ranging review in the coming weeks. The Obama administration got a taste of the new terms immediately after an American airstrike killed 26 Pakistani soldiers near the Afghan border last month. Pakistan closed the supply routes into Afghanistan, boycotted a conference in Germany on the future of Afghanistan and forced the United States to shut its drone operations at a base in southwestern Pakistan. Mushahid Hussain Sayed, the secretary general of the Pakistan Muslim League-Q, an opposition political party, summed up the anger that he said many harbored: “We feel like the U.S. treats Pakistan like a rainy-day girlfriend.” Whatever emerges will be a shadow of the sweeping strategic relationship that Richard C. Holbrooke, President Obama’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, championed before his death a year ago. Officials from both countries filled more than a dozen committees to work on issues like health, the rule of law and economic development. All of that has been abandoned and will most likely be replaced by a much narrower set of agreements on core priorities — countering terrorists, stabilizing Afghanistan and ensuring the safety of Pakistan’s arsenal of more than 100 nuclear weapons — that Pakistan will want spelled out in writing and agreed to in advance. With American diplomats essentially waiting quietly and Central Intelligence Agency drone strikes on hold since Nov. 16 — the longest pause since 2008 — Pakistan’s

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government is drawing up what Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani called “red lines” for a new relationship that protects his country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Said an American official: “Both countries recognize the benefits of partnering against common threats, but those must be balanced against national interests as well. The balancing is a continuous process.” First, officials said, will likely be a series of step-by-step agreements on military cooperation, intelligence sharing and counterterrorism operations, including revamped “kill boxes,” the term for flight zones over Pakistan’s largely ungoverned borderlands where C.I.A. drones will be allowed to hunt a shrinking number of Al Qaeda leaders and other militants. The C.I.A. has conducted 64 missile attacks in Pakistan using drones this year, compared with 117 last year and 53 in 2009, according to The Long War Journal, a Web site that tracks the strikes. In one of the most visible signs of rising anti-American sentiment in this country, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets of Lahore and Peshawar this month. And on Sunday in Karachi, Pakistan’s biggest city, at least 100,000 people rallied to support Imran Khan, a cricket celebrity and rising opposition politician who is outspoken in his criticism of the drone strikes and ties with the United States. Some Pakistani officers talk openly about shooting down any American drones that violate Pakistani sovereignty. “Nothing is happening on counterterrorism right now,” said a senior Pakistani security official. “It will never go back to the way it was.” Any new security framework will also require increased transit fees for the thousands of trucks that supply NATO troops in Afghanistan, a bill that allied officials say could run into the tens of millions of dollars. Officials from Pakistan and the United States anticipate steep reductions in American security aid, including the continued suspension of more than $1 billion in military assistance and equipment, frozen since the American raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May. The number of American military officers, enlisted troops and contractors in Pakistan has dropped to about 100, from about 400 more than a year ago, including scores of American trainers who have all been sent home. Pakistan is also restricting visas to dozens of other embassy personnel, from spies to aid workers. Of the nearly two dozen American, Western and Pakistani officials interviewed for this article, a few sought to put the best face on a worsening situation. With Pakistan taking a seat on the United Nations Security Council for two years beginning next month, these officials argued that too much was at stake to rupture ties completely. “It is better to have a predictable, more focused relationship than an incredibly ambitious out-of- control relationship,” said one Western official. But another Western diplomat put it more bluntly: “It’s a fairly gloomy picture.” Just two months ago, a visit here by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; David H. Petraeus, the C.I.A. director; and Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seemed to begin to thaw relations that had been nearly frozen since Raymond Davis, a C.I.A. security contractor, shot and killed two Pakistanis in Lahore in January and Navy Seals killed Bin Laden in May.

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Pakistani manufacturers of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, a component of homemade bombs used against American soldiers in Afghanistan, tentatively agreed to dye it for easier tracing, American officials said. Interior Ministry officials pledged to track large, unexplained purchases of the substance. At the same time, Pakistani officials indicated that they would help rein in attacks by the Haqqani network, an insurgent group that is the main killer of allied troops in Afghanistan, and there were hints that Pakistan would pave the way for peace talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan. But the fatal airstrike on Nov. 26 erased that preliminary progress, dealing the most serious blow to reconciliation talks involving Pakistan. “It’s not happening,” said Aftab Ahmed Sherpao, a former interior minister. All of this comes as the Pakistani economy is in a free fall, civilian and military leaders are clashing over purported coup plots, and 150,000 Pakistani troops are stuck in a stalemate fighting a witches’ brew of militants along the Afghan border. “These people are stuck there very badly,” said Javed Ashraf Qazi, a retired lieutenant general and a former head of the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, Pakistan’s main spy agency. The number of attacks from homemade bombs throughout the country, but mostly focused in the border areas, skyrocketed to 1,036 through November this year, compared with 413 for all of 2007, according to the Pakistani military. More than 3,500 Pakistani soldiers and police have been killed since 2002. The Obama administration is desperately trying to preserve the critical pieces of the relationship. General Dempsey asked the Pakistani Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in a phone call on Wednesday if the relationship could be repaired, a person briefed on the conversation said. General Kayani said that he thought it could, but that Pakistan needed some space. The State Department this month quietly dispatched a senior diplomat and South Asia specialist, Robin Raphel, to canvass a wide spectrum of Pakistanis. She returned with a sober assessment and the view that many Pakistanis will not move forward without a formal apology from President Obama for the airstrike, which White House aides say is not in the offing. Still, administration officials held out hope. “We’ve been very forthright in acknowledging that this is a relationship that needs to work,” a State Department spokesman, Mark Toner, said on Friday. Eric Schmitt U.S. Prepares for a Curtailed Relationship With Pakistan December 25, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/26/world/asia/us-preparing-for-pakistan-to- restrict-support-for-afghan- war.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2&pagewanted=print

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The army and the economy in Egypt Author: Mohamed Al-Khalsan Should the production of pasta, mineral water, butane gas cylinders and gas station services qualify as classified military secrets? And does discussing these enterprises in public pass as a crime of high treason? The leaders of the Egyptian armed forces believe the answer is “yes.” Until this very day, the role of the military establishment in the economy remains one of the major taboos in Egyptian politics. Over the past thirty years, the army has insisted on concealing information about its enormous interests in the economy and thereby keeping them out of reach of public transparency and accountability. The Egyptian armed forces own a massive segment of Egypt’s economy — 25 to 40 percent, according to some estimates. In charge of managing these enterprises are the army’s generals and colonels, notwithstanding the fact that they lack the relevant experience, training or qualifications for this task. The military’s economic interests encompass a diverse range of revenue-generating activities, including the selling and buying of real estate on behalf of the government, domestic cleaning services, running cafeterias, managing gas stations, farming livestock, producing food products and manufacturing plastic table covers. All this information is readily available on the websites of relevant companies and factories, which publicly and proudly disclose that they belong to the army. Yet for some reason the military establishment insists on outlawing any public mention of these activities. Why is the budget of the Egyptian army above public transparency and accountability? Is it because it is exclusively concerned with national defense and thus must remain classified? Not really. It is certainly true that one part of the Egyptian army’s budget is concerned with defense-related activities, such as the procurement or co-production of weaponry. These activities, however, hardly have anything to do with the “classified” part of the army’s budget. As a matter of fact, information about many of these budgetary items is readily available in public records. That is because such items are mainly concerned with Egypt’s joint endeavors with a foreign partner that is legally obligated to disclose to its own citizens a full account of its activities, including military aid and arms deals (or co- production of military equipment) with countries like Egypt. This partner is, of course, the United States government, which grants the Egyptian army an annual US$1.3 billion in aid through its Foreign Military Financing program. Reports on official US government websites, such as that of the Government Accountability Office, Department of State, Department of Defense and Congress, provide data on US arms sales to Egypt and military equipment that the United States helped produce in Egyptian military factories. The part of the military’s budget that is kept secret has little to do with national defense and more with the huge profits the army accrues from the production of non-military goods and services. In other words, these budgetary items have to do with: how many 218

bags of pasta and bottled water were sold last month; how much money Wataniya, the military’s gas station, generated last year; how many houses Queen, the military’s cleaning services company, attended to this month and how many nurseries the same company is in charge of running; how many truckloads of fresh beef have the military’s high-tech slaughterhouses in East Uwaynat sold this year; how many cabins they managed to rent out in the north coast Sidi Crir resort last summer; and how many apartments they sold in Kuliyyat al-Banat residential buildings and at what price? All these items together make up the “classified” part of the army’s budget, which the military establishment insistently keeps off the public record and out of the reach of parliamentary and public deliberation as well as oversight. Attempting to discuss the army’s so-called classified activities in public could result in military prosecution and trial, because these are, supposedly, “national security secrets” that Egypt’s rivals — like Israel — must not find out about. This article examines the hidden role of the military in Egypt’s economy and how it tends to take on the form of economic activities for which the army is unfit and that steer the military establishment away from its principal obligations, namely advancing national defense and protecting the country’s borders. Of greater concern is how many of the army’s leaders have entered into networks of corruption and unlawful partnerships with private capital. The discussion that follows does not rely on classified sources, and is based on public information available in the news media and the websites of the military-owned companies along with the job and marketing ads they publish. The army’s control over the economy began in the aftermath of the 1952 revolution/coup, which paved the way for Egypt’s experience with state socialism under leadership of the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser. During this era, the state came to own all economic assets and means of production through nationalization programs. Austerity measures were adopted to limit consumption with the aim of enhancing the country’s economic independence. Egypt’s new ruling elite among army officers quickly installed themselves as the managers of state-owned enterprises — a task for which they were largely unqualified. “The people control all means of production,” according to the 1964 Constitution, and Egypt’s military rulers in turn took the initiative to claim this control on behalf of the people. As corruption and mismanagement soon proliferated throughout the public sector, Nasser’s project ultimately failed to deliver the promise of economic prosperity. In some ways this failure was unsurprising given that officers, whose skills and knowledgebase were limited to military affairs and warfare, came to assume responsibilities such as managing the economy and the means of production — tasks for which they were unprepared. In the 1970s, the army’s monopoly over power started to erode as late President Anwar Sadat decided to take Egypt off its socialist path and reintroduced market economics as a means for fostering strategic and economic ties with the West. Sadat took steps to privatize parts of the state-owned sector, which military leaders tended to control, and pursued policies that gave Western consumer goods and services access to Egyptian markets. These policies came at the partial marginalization of military leaders, who now had to share influence with a rising community of crony capitalists, many of whom were close to Sadat and his family. Fortunately for military leaders, however, this humiliating situation did not last for very long as the 1979 peace treaty with Israel came to the rescue of army leaders, helping

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them recover some of the influence they had lost under Sadat’s presidency. After ending the state of war with Israel, Egyptian leaders reasoned that laying-off thousands of well- trained army officers was politically undesirable. Thus, the state established an economic body known as the National Services Projects Organization (NSPO) which founded different commercial enterprises run by retired generals and colonels. Through various subsidies and tax exemptions, the state granted military-owned enterprises privileges not enjoyed by any other company in the public or private sectors. The military’s enterprises were not accountable to any government body and were above the laws and regulations applied to all other companies. After 1992, when deposed President Hosni Mubarak began advancing full-fledged economic liberalization under US pressure — as proscribed by blueprints devised by the IMF and the World Bank — privatization programs steered clear of military-owned enterprises. Even when the Gamal Mubarak-controlled cabinet of businessmen accelerated privatization programs between 2004 and 2011, military-owned companies remained untouched. In fact, high-ranking army officers received their share of benefits from corruption-ridden privatization deals in the form of appointments to prestigious positions in recently privatized public sector enterprises. Generally speaking, the Egyptian military establishment does not believe in US-style neoliberalism or free market policies, particularly those that would result in the army’s loss of its valued companies and assets. Such feared measures include limiting the state’s economic role, privatization and promoting the role of private capital. For instance, in a 2008 Wikileaks cable, a former US ambassador to Egypt indicated that Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi was critical of economic liberalization on the grounds that it undermined the state’s control over the economy. Tantawi’s skepticism of neoliberal economics has little to do with his loyalty to the socialist model of the Soviet Union, where he received his training as a young officer. Rather, it is privatization’s potential encroachments against the vast economic empire owned by the military that Tantawi fears the most. As managers, Egyptian army leaders usually run their enterprises in a traditional Soviet style inherited from the Cold War era. Yet as consumers, they tend to adopt a more “Americanized,” globalization-friendly orientation. There is no doubt that the ties between Egyptian military elites and their counterparts in the Pentagon play a role in fostering this “consumerist” orientation among Egypt’s military leaders. As part of defense cooperation programs between the two countries, many Egyptian officers travel on annual trips to the United States, getting exposed to a lifestyle that is radically different from the life of Soviet-style austerity through which they endured during the sixties and seventies. For instance, as he made his famous visit to Tahrir Square to meet with protesters during last winter’s eighteen-day uprising, Tantawi arrived in a fancy US-made jeep. Lieutenant General Sami Anan, prominent member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), is known for his fondness for American consumer goods, according to a New York Times article. During his regular visits to Washington DC, Anan and his family are reported to shop for jeans, clothes, and electronics at Tysons Corner shopping mall in the suburbs of northern Virginia. In fact, American-style consumerism is rumored to be so prevalent among young army officers that many of them try to purchase their uniforms from American producers. If military leaders were in fact fine administrators who are capable of advancing the country’s social and economic development, it would make sense for them to continue

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to maintain their economic interests and assets for the greater good of Egypt. But are they really capable of managing these enterprises? Once again, the answer is no. For example, very few of us have heard of Queen, the army-produced brand of pasta. Those of us who know it have never once described it as the best brand on the market. Nor does one ever hear that the army’s Wataniya gas stations offer services superior to those of other stations. Nor have we once heard anyone raving about Safi mineral water and how every dining table should have it. In reality, the army manages to sell its products not due to their superior quality, but rather through draconian practices. For example, the army effectively forces enlisted soldiers to spend their meager salaries on military- produced food products at army canteens in remote areas where non-military brands are not sold. In other cases, the army gets civilian distributors to sell its products by offering them “favors” through underhanded deals. Additionally, the military is heavily engaged in profiting from its control over vast amounts of land — thanks to a law that allows it to seize any public land for the purpose of “defending the nation.” In practice, military leaders use this law in order to use public lands for commercial investments, rather than the legally mandated purpose of national defense. An agency known as The Armed Forces’ Land Project specializes — as its name suggests — in launching projects on lands controlled by the armed forces. Properties owned by this agency include lands in Nasr City on which residential units are currently being constructed. In the northern coast, the military is using its seized lands to build tourist resorts and hotels, as it has done in Sidi Crir. Recent newspaper advertisements indicate that the armed forces are currently engaged in the commercial sale of lands in the northern coast for the purpose of building tourist resorts and residences. Furthermore, as the managers of a state-owned economic empire built on corruption and oppression of working classes, military leaders have become decisively complicit in repressing labor and violating their rights. Being an army general, a member of the National Democratic Party (NDP) and a Member of Parliament for ten years almost guarantees that one is part of a corruption network. General Sayed Meshaal perfectly fits this profile. Before becoming Minister of Military Production, Meshaal was a director of the NSPO. During that time, he was also a member of the NDP and an MP for Cairo’s district of Helwan for three consecutive terms from 2000 to 2011. He used to proudly brag about managing to name the military-produced bottled mineral water Safi after his daughter. Meshaal was removed from his post after the revolution as a result of referrals to the general prosecutor accusing him of wasteful spending of the ministry’s funds. Meshaal’s victory in parliamentary elections in Helwan was made easy by the fact that he could mobilize the votes of tens of thousands of individuals who work at Military Factory 99, located in the district. Meshaal used to show up at the factory to celebrate and make merry with the workers during election campaign events, only to disappear and hardly return after his victory. The name Military Factory 99 has also become associated with the repression of workers, especially that labor-employer relations in the factory are not subject to traditional union or government regulations. In August of 2010, Factory 99’s workers broke out into intense protests after one of their colleagues died as a result of an explosion. The director of the factory, who was also a general, had brought in a number of gas cylinders in order to test them out, even though the workers were not trained to

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use them. When several cylinders exploded, he told the workers that it would not matter if one or two of them died. Then, when one of them did in fact die, they stormed his office, gave him a beating and then staged a sit-in. Subsequently, the workers’ leaders were tried in military courts for charges of revealing “war secrets” on account that they spoke publicly about butane gas cylinders. This in turn leads us to the issue of the repressive treatment of workers on military- owned livestock farms. These workers are usually poor conscripts who end up laboring without pay. The typical story goes as follows: A soldier who hails from rural areas or poor cities is conscripted (supposedly) to learn to recite patriotic slogans and songs during morning assemblies and marches. He then forgets about all these, along with his own dignity, as he finds himself laboring with no pay in one of the military’s livestock farms, which usually extend over hundreds of thousands of acres. As he collects eggs and tends to livestock and chickens, he endures humiliation and subjugation at the hands of his supervising officers. There, he loses any feeling of national dignity, which the army allegedly seeks to instill in him. Should any war ever break out, his performance in the battlefield would be shockingly horrid, having not received any training in combat skills — thanks to the leaders who have recruited him and assigned him his post. The military establishment’s propagandists often argue through state controlled media outlets that the secrecy of the armed forces’ budget is a patriotic duty that we must honor and protect as Egyptians. It is hardly convincing, however, that those conscripts who are carrying out forced labor at the NSPO agree with that statement. In fact, given their conditions, they may not even grasp the concept of “patriotism” to begin with. Any discussion of the relationship between the army and economy cannot ignore the military establishment’s near-absolute dominance of the local economy in various Egyptian governorates. It is well known to many that Egyptians outside of Cairo live under virtual military rule, wherein 21 of the 29 appointed governors are retired army generals. This is in addition to dozens of posts in city and local governments that are reserved for retired officers. These individuals are responsible for managing wide- ranging economic sectors in each governorate. In other words, army generals — whose expertise does not go beyond operating armored tanks or fighter jets — are suddenly tasked with managing and overseeing significant economic activities, such as the critical tourism sectors of Luxor and Aswan, Qena’s sugar manufacturing enterprises or Suez’s fishing and tucking industries. There is no shortage of corruption stories involving army generals and their mismanagement of local economies. For example, in one such incident former Luxor Governor General Samir Farag — who previously served as director of morale affairs in the armed forces — sold land to a local businessman below market prices. The land was initially designated for building an Olympic games stadium. In fact, after hundreds of millions of Egyptian pounds were spent on the project, all of a sudden construction was suspended and all the spent funds went to waste, as the land was sold to a businessman that owned a hotel across the street. Similarly, the residents of Aswan allege that their governor General Mostafa al-Sayyed was involved in corruption cases involving public lands and the tourism sector. Sayyed recently appointed at least ten retired army brigadier generals as managers of the quarries and river ports and offered them exorbitant salaries, even though they lack relevant qualifications and experience.

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Given that those in charge of managing our local economies receive such jobs as a “retirement bonus,” it is unsurprising that local development throughout Egyptian governorates has remained stagnant for decades and lags behind other countries. It is for the sake of all the aforementioned interests and privileges that military leaders killed unarmed revolutionaries (and continue to do so) in Tahrir, Abbasseya, Maspero, Mohamed Mahmoud and Qasr al-Aini. Completing the revolution and the triumph of Egyptian demonstrators would inaugurate a genuine democratic transformation in this country. It means full financial transparency and subjecting all budgets to the principle of accountability. Completing the revolution means the army must lose its institutional economic privileges, as military leaders return to their original role, namely national defense — and not the management of wedding halls. This article originally appeared in Jadaliyya. Author: Mohamed Al-Khalsan Related News: US expert: Leadership of 'Military Inc.' is running Egypt Publishing Date: Sat, 24/12/2011 - 15:23 corruption economy military economy privatization

Source URL (retrieved on 28/12/2011 - 11:53): Mohamed Al-Khalsan The army and the economy in Egypt 24/12/2011 - 15:23 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/566416

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Publishing Date: Sat, 24/12/2011 - 17:55

Freedom and Justice Party leads in second round of elections Author: Al-Masry Al-Youm Staff The High Judicial Elections Commission (HJEC) held a press conference on Saturday to announce the winners of the run-offs for the single-winner seats in the second phase of parliamentary elections held on 21 and 22 December. Abdel Moez Ibrahim, head of the HJEC, announced the results for the nine governorates included in the round. In Giza’s third constituency, Amr al-Shobaki, a political analyst, won the professional seat. Mohamed Abdel Moneim al-Sawy, an independent who briefly served as culture minister immediately following the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, won the professional seat in Giza’s fourth constituency. Among the most notable losers in the second round were Mubarak-era Social Solidarity minister Ali al-Sayed Ali al-Moselhi, who lost the professional seat in the third constituency in Sharqiya. The Freedom and Justice Party remained in the lead with 4,058,498 votes, followed by the Nour Party with 3,216,430 votes and Wafd with 1,077,244 votes. The Egyptian Bloc was fourth with 785,000,084 votes and the Wasat Party followed with 368,000,375 votes. The Reform and Development Party garnered 231,000,713 votes and the Egypt National Party won 169,000,662 votes. The remaining votes went to the Revolution Continues Coalition, the Egyptian Citizen Party, the Conservative Party and the Democratic Peace Party. Voter turnout in the second phase climbed slightly to 65.98 percent. Of 17,978,399 eligible voters, 11,863,000 went to the polls, with 11, 173,818 valid votes. Publishing Date: Sat, 24/12/2011 - 17:55 Related material High elections commission to announce election results Saturday Voter turnout at 67 percent, Islamists leading again

Source URL (retrieved on 24/12/2011 - 18:51): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/566406

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Islamist parties consolidate Egypt poll gains Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi al-Nour party maintain lead as results from second round of polling is announced. Last Modified: 24 Dec 2011 15:37

Even as the elections process continues, protesters have been demanding that the military cede power [AFP] Islamist parties in Egypt have consolidated their gains in Egypt's parliamentary elections, securing more than 65 per cent of the seats determined so far, according to the latest results released. Abdel-Moez Ibrahim, the country's election commission chief, announced the results from the second round of voting for party lists, in which nine provinces with about 7 million voters cast their ballots, on Saturday, Based on the announcement, the Muslim Brotherhood says that its Freedom and Justice Party won 86 (47 per cent) of the 180 seats on offer so far. The al-Nour party, the political arm of Egypt's Salafi movement, has won around 20 per cent of the seats contested so far. The FJP officially won 36.5 per cent of the current vote for party lists, and al-Nour won 28.78 per cent. The country's liberal parties fared badly again in the second round, with al-Wafd - the country's oldest party - winning 9.6 per cent of the party list vote and the Egyptian Bloc, the main liberal coalition, taking just seven per cent. In Egypt's complex electoral system, voters cast ballots for party list candidates who will make up two-thirds of the parliament. They will cast direct votes for individual candidates for the remaining one-third of seats.

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Saturday's results are in line with trends from the first round of voting, held in late November, when the two blocs together won nearly 70 per cent of the vote. The elections were scheduled over three rounds, with run-offs for individual candidates after each round. The third round of voting is due to be held over two days beginning January 3, followed by another three rounds of voting for the Senate. The lower house of parliament is due to convene on January 23. The military, which has faced down days of deadly protests in November and this month, says it will transfer power to civilians after a presidential election is held by the end of June next year.

Source: Agencies

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/12/20111224144836572326.html

New Libyan leaders juggle demands, grievances Fri Dec 23, 2011 5:16pm GMT By Matt Robinson and Mohamad Al-Tommy TRIPOLI/BENGHAZI (Reuters) - The mood was almost merry outside Prime Minister Abdurrahim El-Keib's Tripoli office. Under a weak winter sun, teenagers in flip-flops scaled palm trees above a crowd that sang and danced to the beat of a drum. But their message was serious. "If you don't have dinars, give us dollars!" they sang this week. "Where's our share?!" cried a voice from the throng. The protesters were mainly from the Libyan capital, some of them students who said they had swapped their books for guns and joined the fight against Muammar Gaddafi. More than two months after his capture and killing, they want their reward. "We're not asking for money, we're asking for a chance to work," said Anis Bashir, who described himself as a unit commander from the Libyan capital. "The ministers say one thing, their deputies another, and the NTC (National Transitional Council) something else entirely. Just give us an answer!" The common cause that united fighters during the bruising war that ended Gaddafi's 42- year dictatorship in August is giving way to factionalism and bitterness. Weak and disorganised, the self-appointed but internationally-recognised interim leadership, known as the NTC, is under attack from all sides, but can satisfy only some. 226

The winners include fighting units from the western mountain town of Zintan, lounging in armchairs on the second floor of Keib's building where Zintan military commander Osama Al-Juwali now occupies the wood-panelled office of the interim defence minister. After months of rocket bombardment by pro-Gaddafi forces, the Zintanis broke the siege and swept down into the plains backed by NATO bombing to join the push on Tripoli in August. TRIBAL RIVALRY They seized the international airport, and still hold it today by force of arms. In November, they captured Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam and spirited him by plane to Zintan, where he remains. These are powerful bargaining chips, and days after Saif's capture, Al-Juwali got his job in a divvying-up of portfolios that reflected Libya's deep tribal divisions and modern- day power struggles. His wartime comrades will reap the benefits. This North African desert state is sparsely populated, rich in oil and potentially affluent. The militias hold the turf they took when Tripoli fell, refusing to disarm or disperse until they get what they are owed. The weak, meanwhile, scrawl their demands on sheets of paper and scale the railings outside Keib's office. They include public sector workers who say they have not been paid for months. The leadership would do well to heed the lessons of Tunisia and Egypt, where dictatorships were also swept aside by the Arab Spring but a dearth of trust in the unelected people who replaced them pending elections led to violence in the streets. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Libya's rebellion turned to war, and has bred a sense of entitlement among those who say they spilled the most blood. "Workers from this company also joined the fight," said 32-year-old engineer Sami Al- Bakoush. "They live in Tripoli and now they want to go back to their work, but how can they when they don't have a salary?" He and the other 500-600 employees at the state-run Engineering Technology Company walked off the job in March, saying they suspected the factory would be used to feed Gaddafi's war apparatus, and have not been paid since June. In the eastern city of Benghazi, seat of the rebellion that began in February, some 20,000-30,000 people filled the central Shajara square earlier this month to protest against the NTC. Hundreds daily have been demonstrating since. They complain the NTC lacks transparency and legitimacy, and are calling for the state to be purged of alleged collaborators with the old regime. MISTRUST "There's a lack of trust between the politicians and the streets," said Alhabib Alamin, a 44-year-old writer and political activist in Benghazi. "Libyans feel there's a power struggle between political factions, and interference from foreign parties. Fear is rising on the Libyan streets in general, not just in Benghazi."

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On Tuesday, an envoy of NTC chairman Mustafa Abdel Jalil met the protesters and local council leaders and they agreed to suspend Benghazi's NTC representatives and elect replacements, an activist close to the negotiations told Reuters. A small number of protesters took up the call in the trading hub of Misrata, scene of some of the bloodiest fighting of the war, and political activists said NTC representatives in Zawiyah -- site of Libya's second largest oil refinery -- might also be replaced. Employees at Libya's state broadcaster have also demonstrated, accusing the NTC of reneging on a promise to set up an independent governing board, and doctors in Tripoli have called for the resignation of interim Health Minister Fatima Al-Hamroush after she hired her sister as chief of staff. The interim government might win some respite with the release of an estimated $150 billion in overseas assets after the United Nations last week lifted sanctions on Libya's central bank and a subsidiary. The cash will go a long way towards rebuilding the country and paying the public sector. They also talk of a plan to integrate the fighters into an army and police force that are still being formed. But there won't be space for everyone. Prime Minister Keib emerged from his office to address the protesters this week, telling them to submit their names and the serial numbers of their weapons and they would be paid. But inside the foyer, the Zintan pilot who picked up Saif al-Islam after his desert capture was fingering his pistol. Abdullah al-Mehdi had swapped his green flight fatigues for a sharp dark suit and shiny leather shoes, and he was dismissive of the crowd. "They didn't fight," he said. Matt Robinson and Mohamad Al-Tommy New Libyan leaders juggle demands, grievances Dec 23, 2011 5:16pm GMT http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE7BM05420111223?sp=true

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EDITORIAL Bombas en Damasco El terror a gran escala irrumpe en la capital siria coincidiendo con la avanzadilla de la Liga Árabe 24/12/2011 La espiral de violencia en Siria, tras nueve meses de revuelta y feroz represión gubernamental, ha franqueado un nuevo mojón con el doble atentado de ayer en Damasco contra centros de seguridad del régimen, en el que han muerto decenas de personas. La hipervigilada capital siria, junto con Alepo, en el norte, era la única gran ciudad del país que se había visto relativamente libre de la escalada sangrienta y la progresiva militarización de un conflicto inicialmente pacífico que se ha cobrado ya en torno a 5.000 vidas. No es casual que los atentados de Damasco, atribuidos instantáneamente por el Gobierno a Al Qaeda, coincidan con la llegada de la avanzadilla de la Liga Árabe que debe preparar el despliegue en el país de una misión de observadores, de acuerdo con el compromiso adquirido esta semana por Bachar el Asad. El presidente sirio, progresivamente acorralado también en el escenario internacional, ya frustró a comienzos del mes pasado esa misión, que establece la libre circulación de observadores y periodistas árabes y que es preámbulo de un plan de paz que prevé el acuartelamiento del Ejército, la liberación de miles de presos políticos y el comienzo de un diálogo con una oposición todavía débil y fragmentaria. A la luz de los acontecimientos recientes -las matanzas gubernamentales de esta semana en Idlib, junto a la frontera turca, los brutales atentados de ayer en la capital- resulta tan improbable que la Liga Árabe pueda cumplir libremente sus objetivos de fiscalización como que el déspota El Asad haga bueno su compromiso con un plan cuya aplicación real acarrearía inevitablemente el final de su régimen sanguinario. Para Damasco, la cooperación aparente con la Liga es ya la única manera de ganar tiempo. La masa crítica de odio y violencia acumulados hace inverosímil la reforma de una dictadura hereditaria como la siria. La apertura del régimen, totalitario e impenetrable, llevaría más temprano que tarde a la desaparición del déspota y su círculo de poder. Si algo han demostrado los nueve meses de revuelta popular en Siria, más allá de cualquier duda, es que Damasco tiene en la represión armada su única herramienta para mantener el control sobre zonas cada vez más amplias del país. El Asad, a estas alturas, pisa las mismas arenas movedizas que otros tiranos árabes felizmente destronados. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Bombas/Damasco/elpepuopi/20111224elpepiop i_2/Tes

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ANALYSIS-Egypt may need up to $15 bln from IMF to avoid crunch Fri Dec 23, 2011 11:45am GMT * Egypt rejected $3 bln IMF package in June * Moody's downgrade adds to economy's troubles * Interim military rulers reluctant to turn to IMF * Economic crunch could come at politically awkward time By Patrick Werr CAIRO, Dec 23 (Reuters) - Egypt has little choice but to return to the IMF to help it find up to $15 billion to stave off a full-blown financial crisis, but the ruling army seems to be stalling to avoid blame for approaching a foreign institution for cash on its watch. The $3 billion facility from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that Egypt negotiated then rejected in June may no longer be enough to manage an orderly currency devaluation and get a growing budget deficit under control, economists say. Adding to woes of an economy hammered by months of turmoil and violence, credit rating agency Moody's downgraded Egypt by a notch this week and warned a further cut could be on the way because of political uncertainty. "It's not enough, because when the $3 billion was negotiated in June, the situation was very different," said Said Hirsh, an economist with Capital Economics. Two finance ministers during Egypt's political transition, both of now out of office, the planning minister who is still in her post and the new prime minister have all indicated Egypt was considering or needed the IMF's support. But on most occasions as government officials seem to edge close to signing up, the army has indicated its reluctance. "The easiest thing would have been for the military council to accept the loans from abroad, give it to Egyptians to live a better life and then hand over power and the Egyptian people would have been responsible to repay these debts," General Mokhtar al-Mullah told reporters this month. IMF HESITATIONS For many Egyptians who follow the nation's finances, the IMF is associated with stringent conditions that have often hurt many in the society, though economists say and officials privately admit the measures have helped the economy as a whole. Officials have also quietly acknowledged -- and sources with a knowledge of talks with Washington-based institutions have concurred -- that the last facility came with very few strings.

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Army-appointed Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri, also premier in the 1990s when Egypt was under an IMF programme, said last week the government would not agree to an IMF facility until the outlook for the budget was clearer. But he said it could be necessary and has warned that the country needed some austerity measures to correct its finances, though the most needy would be protected. "If we are forced to resort to the IMF, we will resort to it. This is a matter open for discussion," he said. But the army rulers and its cabinet are wary of tightening purse strings when the uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak was fuelled partly by the deep anger of many Egyptians who felt they were growing poorer as a well connected elite prospered. Egypt's economy has been reeling since the uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak in February frightened away tourists and investors, and some economists say if Egypt does not come up with external funding soon it could face both a currency and a budget crunch in the first quarter of 2012. PROBLEMS MULTIPLY Economists say political and economic problems have grown since Egypt rejected the IMF facility in June. Dozens of protesters have died in clashes with army, the budget deficit has mushroomed, the cost of domestic borrowing has increased, foreign reserves have fallen and demand for Egypt's exports has fallen as the global economy weakened. Any IMF package would almost certainly need to be renegotiated and enlarged, and any delays will only compound the crisis, the economists said. The Egyptian pound's losses are likely to accelerate, driving inflation and interest rates on government securities yet higher, sparking further civil unrest as more people are plunged into poverty and causing already declining FDI to drop further. Several economists estimated that any IMF package would now need to be worth $10 billion to $15 billion. "I suspect the government was hoping the economic conditions would be different now than they actually are," Hirsh said. Part of the IMF funding could be used to help the government finance its budget deficit, now running at about 11 percent of gross domestic product, at cheaper rates of interest. By relying solely on the domestic market for funds, the government in recent weeks has driven up interest rates on some of its securities to above 15 percent, versus the 1.5 percent it would have been paying for the IMF funds. The higher cost of debt is in turn widening the deficit and forcing the government to borrow even more. EGYPTIAN POUND Another part of the IMF financing could help the central bank manage an orderly devaluation of the Egyptian pound. The central bank has helped keep the pound strong since the uprising by drawing down about $16 billion in foreign reserves, which at the end of November stood at only $20 billion. Reserves have fallen by almost $4 billion in the last two months alone. 231

The rapid decline makes the central bank's currency policy look increasingly unsustainable, and economists say a currency crunch could come sometime in the first quarter, a politically awkward time for the military council as it guides the country toward civilian rule. "This is significant because it would be before parliament stands and presidential elections," an economist at a Western embassy said. Under the military council's schedule, parliament will come into session in April, followed by a politically fraught process of drawing up a new constitution and the holding of a presidential election at the end of June. Hirsh estimated that if the government undertook an orderly devaluation supported by IMF funds, the pound would fall to 6.50 to the dollar by the end of June from 6.01 currently, but if the decline was disorderly it could fall to 8.00. A weaker pound would translate into higher inflation, including higher prices for imported food staples such as the tea and sugar would cut into the budgets of lower- income Egyptians. "The political situation will not be conducive to fixing the economy. We quite possibly will have people back on the street. It will be hard to take austerity measures," one diplomat said. "The political hit for any austerity in the next six months would be pretty big." (Reporting by Patrick Werr; Editing by Toby Chopra) Patrick Werr ANALYSIS-Egypt may need up to $15 bln from IMF to avoid crunch Dec 23, 2011 11:45am GMT http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL6E7NM2DW20111223?sp=true

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12/23/2011 12:54 PM Inside Syria's Death Zone Assad's Regime Hunts People in Homs The regime in Damascus is using snipers to hunt down its own people. Rebels on the ground in besieged Homs, the site of some of the most extreme brutality, say the international community is hesitating to help Syrians out of fear that it will trigger a civil war. But the threat is merely propaganda from ruler Bashar Assad, they claim. When the haze dissipates in the late afternoon light, and when the last unfortunate souls hurry across the open space, running in a zigzag pattern, hunting season begins on Cairo Street. There is random shooting all day long at this spot, but from this moment on the shooting becomes targeted. A few people make it to the other side on this day, but one does not. He screams and falls to the ground as he is hit. He was carrying a loaf of bread, something that was no longer available on his side of Cairo Street. Pedestrians are rarely targeted in the morning. But beginning in the afternoon and continuing throughout the night, the wide, straight street that separates the Khalidiya and Bayada neighborhoods becomes a death zone. That's when they -- the snipers working for Syrian intelligence, who are nothing more than death squads, and the Shabiha killers, known as "the ghosts," mercenaries who are paid daily wages and often earn a little extra income by robbing their victims -- shoot at anything that moves. The map of Homs is a topography of terror these days. Entire sections of Syria's third- largest city are besieged. Hundreds of thousands have become the hostages of a regime whose president, Bashar Assad, insisted with a chuckle in an interview with America's ABC News, that only a madman would order his forces to shoot at his own people. What began nine months ago as a peaceful protest against the dictatorship of the Assad dynasty has since become a campaign against the people by the regime -- a regime that, for 41 years, was accustomed to using brutality to enforce submission. Since it realized that this brutality was no longer sufficient, it decided to use even more -- and then even more when the resistance continued to grow. There are no negotiations. In the heavily guarded downtown section of Homs, where the regime feigns an eerie mood of normality for foreign visitors, it has put up signs that read: "The continuation of dialogue guarantees stability." Random Targets On Monday, the regime officially yielded to demands by the Arab League, announcing that it would now allow independent observers into the country. But Assad had already promised an end to the violence months ago, and nothing changed. On Tuesday, his forces bombarded Homs with rockets. Many cities in Syria have become combat zones, and now the uprising has even reached the suburbs of Damascus. But, in Homs, anywhere from five to 15 people die every day, most as the victims of snipers. The insurgents have counted more than 200 sniper positions in Homs, from which people are being shot arbitrarily and without warning -- not because they are protesting, but merely because they are there.

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One was the man who crossed the street to buy bread, who a few courageous bystanders pulled out of the line of fire and took to a field hospital the insurgents had set up in Khalidiya. But the victim was removed from the hospital within minutes. "He was shot in the head," a pale doctor says tersely. "We could do nothing for him and we need the space." A young teacher, now filling in as a nurse, says: "Help us! We need medication, weapons, everything!" In the next room, a doctor is using a thin, folded prayer rug to teach five women how to suture deep wounds. In another room, a man is doubled over in pain as doctors amputate part of his foot after a gunshot wound became infected there. According to an announcement coming from the loudspeakers of a nearby mosque, the pedestrian with the bread has just died. Outside, in the bluish light of dusk, a vegetable truck drives by loaded with his corpse and the body of another person who was shot earlier in the day. A couple stands in front of their house, shaking in anger and despair, watching the truck disappear down the street. The woman, who is veiled, says: "Why can we simply be killed like this? Why is no one helping us? Where is the Arab League, and where are France, Germany, America?" She screams in exasperation. She tells us about an old man around 70 years old who was hit by two bullets in front of her house. "We couldn't get him out for an entire hour. When we had finally moved him into the house, we were so afraid that we tried to rinse away the blood, so that the Shabiha wouldn't attack us. Under these conditions, what does it matter whether we live or die? I'm going to the checkpoint! I'm going to put on an explosive belt, so that at least I can take them with me!" Homs is a complicated city, a microcosm of the country. More than half of its 1.5 million inhabitants are Sunnis, a little more than 10 percent, respectively, are Christians and Alawites, and the rest of the population is distributed among smaller minorities. The protests against the regime have inevitably developed their own dynamic. President Assad, the highest-ranking generals and the heads of the intelligence agencies are Alawites, as are most of the men in the death squads and the Shabiha militias. Their victims are almost exclusively Sunnis. Soldiers and members of the intelligence agencies who have defected say that the regime has also deployed forces dressed in civilian clothes to attack Alawites in the name of the Sunnis and Sunnis in the name of the Alawites. Peaceful protesters are being painted as Islamist fanatics who have come to rape Christian women. 'They Kill Everyone' There have been unsolved kidnappings and murders in Homs, and there are reports of beheadings. And even though life is still relatively normal in the Alawite neighborhoods, the tension is building. "The fear of a civil war is prompting other countries to hesitate before helping us," says one of the young coordinators of the Revolutionary Committee in Homs, who says we should call him Ahmed. "But the longer it takes, the greater the risk of civil war." Ahmed guides us to a meeting of Alawite activists in the Bayada neighborhood. He wants to show us how they are trying to prevent the tension from escalating. The route takes us across Cairo Street, which is still quiet on this morning. It passes through houses where walls have been broken down to create new paths out of the snipers' range of fire. And it leads past knee-high piles of garbage and families fleeing with their

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suitcases, hoping to make it to other cities, where the situation is hardly any better. We finally arrive on Wadi-al-Arab Street in Bayada. Different rules apply here than only a few blocks away. The shooting is constant. People gather on both sides of the street, where bullets whip across the asphalt every few minutes on this morning. To get food and medication into the neighborhood, a few brave souls summon up their strength and throw bread, noodles, cigarettes and diapers across the street. Then, using wire snares, ropes and hooks, they try to pull to safety whatever has been left lying in the street. An old woman stands weeping in front of a building wall. "It's been like this for two months now. This is a prison. Even worse. I live over there (on the other side of the street). But I can't run so fast anymore. They'll kill me if I try to go home. They kill everyone. Katl, katl," she says, repeating the Arabic word for "kill." As the tears run down her cheeks, she sobs for a moment, then rubs her eyes with the back of her hand and says: "Excuse me." Waiting for an Attack After half an hour, a small, white delivery van arrives -- the taxi of madness. Those who wish to ride in the makeshift taxi say goodbye to the others and whisper quiet prayers. A man shouts: "And if we die, we die -- for a piece of bread!" Then they get in, first the old woman, her eyes shut, mumbling her prayers. An old man, carrying heavy bags, follows suit, then a few boys who try to lie down between the others, making themselves as small as possible. The people standing around the van step back. The driver puts it into reverse, gets a 30- meter (98-foot) running start, floors the accelerator and rushes across the street. He almost hits a parked car on the other side before coming to a stop amid cheers from the crowd. No shots were fired this time. Three other cars perform the same daring stunt, and everyone makes it. Prominent Alawites and a Christian from different cities have gathered in the house of a Sunni sheikh on the other side. They are planning demonstrations in relatively safe neighborhoods to protest the government's attempts to incite religious violence. "The world should know that the civil war is Assad's propaganda," one man says to murmured assent from the others. The problem, Ahmed explains, is that both of the sniper positions at the two ends of Wadi-al-Arab Street are in Alawite neighborhoods and are flanked by militias from the neighborhood. "The Alawites are the last bastion of the regime," he says. "The Sunnis are the victims, no matter what we say." But this, he adds, is a rather theoretical debate, since it is questionable whether they will even be alive in a few days. Some 200 to 300 tanks of the "Assad army" have been posted outside Homs for weeks. Residents anticipate an attack any day now. Everyone wonders what is making Assad hesitate, hoping that it is the mistrust of generals in his own army. The highest-ranking officers may be Alawites, but most of the soldiers, non- commissioned officers and lower-ranking officers are Sunnis. If they are forced to attack, men from the militias and the intelligence services will be standing at their backs to force them to shoot -- by threatening to shoot anyone who refuses to kill.

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Peaceful Protests Are Dead Assad's regime speaks of foreign terrorists and a "global conspiracy." His thugs torture prisoners to extract confessions to support the claim that a Saudi-Israeli-American plot is at work in Syria -- although they themselves are the ones shooting at fellow Syrians and even at their own soldiers, and afterwards parading the bodies on government television as the victims of the alleged conspiracy. The consensus of peaceful protests, which had lasted until the late summer, is literally dead. The fighters, most of them army defectors, have filled the vacuum. Under the nominal leadership of a colonel who fled to Turkey, they are trying to establish the so- called "Free Syrian Army," or FSA. It is unclear whether this FSA actually consists of more than 15,000 soldiers, as it claims, but its numbers are increasing by the day. In Homs, at any rate, it has managed to turn a drab, working-class suburb into a symbol of hope. Baba Amr, a poor district in the southwestern part of the city, is the first liberated zone in central Syria. Within these three square kilometers, everything is different. On the way there, not far from the headquarters of the air force intelligence agency, the blood-covered corpses of two torture victims lie in the grass by the side of the road. Here, in the no-man's land between the opposing fronts, no one dares to recover the bodies. At the first FSA checkpoint, the men salute and introduce themselves by stating their rank and the name of their unit. They have weapons, but only two uniform jackets, which they put on in turn to pose for photos. There are armed guards at almost every corner, and small units of a dozen men each are positioned behind sandbags and barricades at various points along the perimeter of the neighborhood, which is home to more than 50,000 people. Families from the neighborhood bring food to the men, who are armed with Kalashnikovs and a few RPGs. Baba Amr is protected by a total of 500 soldiers under the command of the defected Lieutenant Colonel Abdul-Razak Tlas, a distant nephew of the former defense minister. On the day he disappeared, says Tlas, he received calls from generals in his neighborhood, who said: "Come back! We'll make sure you won't have any problems. You'll get money, a lot of money!" He didn't return. A few days later, he says, others called and said: "If you don't turn yourself in, we'll kill your wife and children!" But, by then, the family had already gone into hiding. Life in the Liberated Zone An eerie quiet hangs over Baba Amr at the moment. The army withdrew in November after heavy fighting. At the FSA checkpoint across from the university, a space of only 25 meters lies between the rebels and Assad's troops. It's been this way for six weeks. "As long as they don't attack, we don't shoot, either," says Tlas. And what happens if the tanks come? "We'll stall them as long as possible." And then? "We'll withdraw, just as we did in October, the last time the army attacked Baba Amr," forcing thousands of residents to flee to nearby villages. "After all, we don't have any tanks." But what about all the talk of foreign support? "You mean the global conspiracy? The one Bashar, that dog, is always mentioning?" one of the deserters interjects. "We could

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use it," Tlas says hoarsely. "We would be grateful for every round of ammunition! But what we really need is a no-fly zone!" There is something desperate about calling for a no-fly zone when Assad has hardly used any aircraft yet. So far, guns and tanks have been enough to kill thousands. "Nevertheless," Tlas insists, "such a zone would encourage many officers to defect with their men and tanks." In the relative calm of the moment, the neighborhood is doing its best to remain self- sufficient. Committees handle the distribution of food and water, as well as the electricity supply. Defectors from the army and doctors are coming from around the country. Couriers bring money and medications. Shepherds discreetly drive their herds along the edges of the neighborhood. Even Friday prayers at the largest local mosque have taken on a secular tone: "And if you still have diesel in your home, share it with the others! If you have food, share it! Open your houses to the refugees! God is with the charitable! Also, the hospital needs blood donors! Rh negative!" A chain-smoking trio -- a greengrocer, the manager of a chain of perfume stores and a computer scientist -- coordinates Baba Amr's contact with the outside world. In the apartment the group uses as its headquarters, sheikhs stumble across the tangled cables coming from several computers, the phones ring all night long, students upload videos of the most recent protests and the shooting victims, and hand grenades, ashtrays and coffee cups are piled high on overloaded tables. A Victim is Buried Everyone talks nonstop. When one of the young activists receives a call, he suddenly falls silent and stares at his screen without moving. His cousin has been shot to death. He lived in Dar Kabira, a village outside Homs, and was just on his way home with neighbors when it happened. The Shabiha at the checkpoint in the main road had apparently checked their identification cards, allowed them to pass and, seconds later, opened fire on the car. Two survived, but the cousin, a 20-year-old man named Malik, was killed. It isn't entirely clear what kinds of weapons the Shabiha were using, but half of Malik's head was blown off. He had worked as a baker in Homs and was supporting his younger siblings. His dream, says the uncle on the other end of the line, was to own his own bakery. The next morning Malik's body, wrapped in a white shroud, is laid out in a wooden coffin in the small mosque in Dar Kabira. A plastic bag is wrapped around his neck where his head should be. One of the bystanders offers to remove the bag for the photographer, but Malik's uncle begs them not to: "No, don't, please!" It is a powerful image: an entire village burying one of its own. The houses are empty on this morning. Almost everyone is in the street. The village dignitaries in their finest robes lead the funeral procession, followed by the farmers, children and women. It is a scene of stone-faced mourners, tears quickly brushed aside and muttered curses. Girls scatter flowers from the rooftops. The crowd chants that this is Malik's path to paradise. They force themselves to celebrate. This is their custom, but it isn't working well anymore. The people of Dar Kabira are too enraged to celebrate. "They storm our village at night, they break into the houses, and they arrest and shoot people to death," one of the men says angrily, "just because they are demonstrating 237

peacefully. What kind of a government does this? Bashar Assad says he is a legitimate president. Does a legitimate president do something like this? We may be farmers, but we will no longer bow our heads! Even if they massacre half of our village!" A New Mood of Trust The journey back into the city has become dangerous. A car that remains ahead of us reports new checkpoints, and the convoy leaves the road to continue on field paths. Farmers offer us tea and protection for the night. We continue on foot and on motorcycles until we reach the first guard posts at Baba Amr. In the past, Syria was a country of paranoid suspicion. But in the months of the insurrection, an unprecedented mood of trust has developed. Strangers open their doors when deserters or the injured need a place to hide. Passersby warn drivers about new sniper positions and checkpoints. Doctors treat the injured in government hospitals, even though a single denunciation could be a death sentence for them. The regime, which spied on and spread fear among its own population, is now being infiltrated itself. Informants in the military and intelligence services warn outsiders of arrests, pass on lists of people being sought and reveal the government's attack plans. But the system is still holding up. "What does the world do?" an old man standing on the cemetery hill in Dar Kabira asks, without expecting an answer. When what was left of Malik was lowered into the grave, the old man gazed across the cold winter landscape, as if hoping to find an answer somewhere out there. And then he finds what was looking for, and says: "Back there at the creek, the people from intelligence sometimes drop off the bodies. It doesn't stop. Bashar will have them kill as many people as the world allows him to kill." Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,805519,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: The Syrians Fight Back http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-76640.html • The Tolerant Dictator: Syria's Christians Side with Assad Out of Fear (11/30/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800450,00.html • Filming Syria's Women: 'It Is Difficult Making Anything Critical of the Regime' (11/30/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800854,00.html • An Ultimatum: Arab League Fed Up With Syrian Violence (11/22/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,799070,00.html • Police State: Is Syria Monitoring Protesters with German Technology? (11/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,796510,00.html

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Internacional La oposición siria a El Asad cierra filas La portavoz del Consejo Nacional Sirio afirma que su organización reagrupa ya al grueso de los adversarios del régimen y se coordina con los desertores Un doble atentado con coche bomba sacude el centro de Damasco Ignacio Cembrero Madrid 23 DIC 2011 - 20:45 CET28

Bassma Kodmani durante una conferencia en Estambul en septiembre. / Burhan Ozbilici (ASSOCIATED PRESS) Ya están casi todos y empiezan a diseñar una hoja de ruta para la transición en Siria. El Consejo Nacional Sirio (CNS) reagrupa “al grueso de los movimientos de oposición”al régimen del presidente Bacharel Asad y “comparte una visión de cómo debe desarrollarse la transición pacífica”, explica Bassma Kodmani, su portavoz, en conversación con este periódico. La rebelión empezó en Siria hace más de nueve meses y la represión se ha cobrado más de 5.000muertos, según la ONU, a los que hay que añadir miles de desaparecidos. La oposición ha tardado en organizarse, pero el pasado fin de semana sus miembros cerraron filas bajo la batuta de su presidente, el académico Burhan Ghalioun, y de su portavoz, Kodmani, ambos residentes en París. Junto a estos intelectuales, demócratas de izquierdas, conviven en la asamblea del CNS otras corrientes políticas como los Hermanos Musulmanes,otros islamistas, defensores de los derechos humanos, cristianos –sobre todo a sirios-, kurdos e incluso alauitas como Nibras el Fadel. El presidente Asad pertenece a esa minoría religiosa que controla los servicios de seguridad y la cúpula militar. En la asamblea de260 miembros, que elige un comité ejecutivo y una secretaría, faltan unos pocos como, por ejemplo, el grupo de intelectuales de izquierdas que encabeza en Damasco Hassan Abdul-Azim. Tampoco acudió a la cita de Túnez el Ejército Libre deSiria (ELS) que, compuesto por un puñado de desertores, se entrena en el este de Turquía y empieza a asestar golpe dentro del país.

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Ser opositor sirio no es fácil ni siquiera en el exilio. En España algunos de sus miembros han sido amenazados y en Francia Ghalioun y Kodmani son escoltados por la policía las 24horas del día desde que, a principios de octubre, se creó en CNS. “Somos representativos del exilio y de los que luchan dentro”, recalca Kodmani que en1968 llegó a París de la mano de sus padres exiliados y dirigía la Iniciativa Árabe para la Reforma, un proyecto sobre transiciones democráticas en el que colaboran institutos árabes y occidentales. “Los Hermanos Musulmanes aceptan de buen grado la diversidad dela sociedad”, prosigue. Algún grupo opositor kurdo plantea, en cambio,problemas “porque reivindica el derecho a la autodeterminación”. Taysir Alouni, el célebre excorresponsal de la televisión Al Jazeera residente en Granada, sostiene, sin embargo, que el CNS “no cuenta con el pleno respaldo de los que se manifiestan dentro del país”. “A los de dentro les gustaría que los de fuera apostaran con más firmeza por una intervención extranjera, sea de quién sea,que pare la hemorragia”, añade Alouni, de origen sirio y que declinó, por razones personales, ingresar en el CNS. A principios de mes Ghalioun, presidente del CNS, aún rechazaba en tajantemente en Sofia cualquier intervención, pero el lunes, en Túnez, admitía que se creen “zonas seguras” para los civiles mediante una “utilización limitada” de la fuerza. ¿Quién la emplearía? “Primero la LigaÁrabe y solo en el peor de los escenarios”, responde Kodmani. “Es verdad que estamos muy cerca de ese escenario”, reconoce. Es dudoso que los árabes tengan capacidad para organizar esa operación. Las modalidades del empleo de la fuerza han originado también desavenencias, ahora casi superadas, entre el CNS y el ELS que dirige el coronel Riyad el Asad.El CNS aceptó que los militares desertores pudieran defender con sus armas a los civiles atacados, pero no que tomase la iniciativa. “Es inaceptable que pasen a la ofensiva”, afirma Kodmani. “La revolución debe de ser pacífica”. Aun así, precisa satisfecha, “se han colocado bajo la autoridad política del CNS”. El periodista Alouni, que ha invitado a España a célebres disidentes, sostiene que al CNS aún le falta una “visión clara” de cómo desarrollar la lucha y la transición. “Lavamos perfilando”, asegura Kodmani. “Tenemos ya claro que no puede empezar mientras El Asad permanezca en el poder”, señala. ¿Estarían dispuestos a concederle inmunidad a cambio de que se marche? “Estamos a favor de todo aquello que contribuya a la paz social y a la reconciliación”, responde evasivamente. “Las ofertas que hacemos hoy no serán válidas dentro de un mes”. A diferencia del Consejo Nacional de Transición de Libia, el de siria no ha obtenido ningún reconocimiento internacional. A Kodmani no le preocupa. “Estamos en contacto permanente con los gobiernos árabes, europeos etcétera”, subraya. “El pleno reconocimiento significaría que deben cerrar sus embajadas en Damasco algo que no deseamos porque los embajadores son testigos incómodos de la represión y trasladan información fehaciente a sus capitales”. Ignacio Cembrero Madrid La oposición siria a El Asad cierra filas23 DIC 2011 - 20:45 CET28 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/23/actualidad/1324669510_83422 5.html

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Internacional Un doble atentado suicida con coche bomba sacude el centro de Damasco

Hay al menos 44 muertos y más de 150 heridos.- El régimen sirio culpa a Al Qaeda del ataque Los observadores de la Liga Árabe llegan a la capital siria para vigilar el plan firmado con El Asad Ana Garralda Jerusalén 23 DIC 2011 - 14:05 CET89

Un grupo de sirios trasladan a una de las víctimas del doble atentado. / AFP Un doble ataque suicida con coches bomba ha sacudido Damasco esta mañana, tan solo unas horas después de la llegada de los observadores de la Liga Árabe a la capital siria. Según el primer balance del Ministerio de Exteriores sirio, al menos 44 personas han perdido la vida y más de 150 han resultado heridas por las explosiones que han tenido lugar junto a dos edificios de los servicios de inteligencia. Según un comunicado de prensa distribuido posteriormente, la autoría podría atribuirse a una célula de Al Qaeda que se habría infiltrado dos días antes en el país procedente de Líbano, cuyos servicios de inteligencia habrían informado a los sirios. De acuerdo a esta hipótesis, Al Qaeda estaría echando leña al fuego de la revuelta siria para boicotear la misión de observación panárabe. Los dos coches-bomba estallaron en el barrio de Kfar Suseh. El primer vehículo ha detonado los explosivos al intentar forzar su entrada en un complejo del Directorio de Seguridad General, mientras que el segundo lo ha hecho cuando se encontraba estacionado frente a unas dependencias locales del Servicio de Inteligencia. "El terrorismo quiso que la primera jornada de los observadores en Damasco fuera trágica pero el pueblo sirio hará frente a esta máquina de matar", ha agregado Meqdad, que también ha responsabilizado a Occidente de instigar las revueltas contra el régimen de Bachar Al Asad. Según las organizaciones de derechos humanos, el número total de muertos desde que comenzaran las protestas y la subsiguiente represión hace nueve meses, habría sobrepasado ya los 6.000. Frente a esta cifra de víctimas civiles las autoridades aseguran que también habrían muerto unos 2.000 miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad, objetivos

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de atentados como los de hoy y de emboscadas perpetradas por milicias clandestinas como el autodenominado “Ejército Sirio Libre”. Observadores de la Liga Árabe Los atentados eclipsaron los llamamientos formulados por activistas pro-democracia para protestar contra la misión de observadores de la Liga Árabe, por temor a que su despliegue provoque una reacción aún más dura por parte del Gobierno contra los manifestantes. Precisamente ayer llegaba a Damasco una avanzada de esta misión, compuesta de una docena de agentes de seguridad y de personal legal de la Secretaría General de la Liga Árabe. La misión de observación está encabezada por el veterano general sudanés Mohamed Ahmed Mustafá al Dabi y tiene previsto desplegar entre 150 y 200 observadores durante los próximos días. Su mandato será el de verificar el "cese de la violencia por todas las partes y asegurar la liberación de todos los detenidos en relación con la actual crisis", de acuerdo con el texto de la resolución, aprobada hace un mes por 19 de entre sus 22 miembros. No obstante, muchos de los líderes opositores sirios parecen coincidir en que la decisión gubernamental de aceptar esta misión después de varias semanas de indecisión no deja de ser una "maniobra" para evitar que la Liga Árabe eleve el caso ante el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas. Algunos de estos líderes rebeldes sirios han llegado incluso a acusar al propio Servicio de Inteligencia de orquestar los ataques para sembrar todavía un mayor caos y asustar a los observadores. Sean quienes sean los verdaderos autores, las escenas emitidas por la televisión estatal siria y por el canal libanés Al Manar recordaban a las vividas este pasado jueves en Bagdad, donde una serie de una docena de atentados de diverso tipo se cobraba 70 muertos. Retirada de Irak La retirada del Ejército estadounidense de Irak hace cinco días podría haber supuesto el comienzo de una nueva etapa de enfrentamientos fratricidas entre árabes. Siria, de mayoría sunita, se encuentra gobernada desde hace décadas por la secta de los alauitas - a la que pertenece la familia Asad y gran parte de la clase gobernante- de la misma forma que el actual Irak se encuentra gobernado por el Primer Ministro chiita Nuri Al Maliki. Y ambos mandatarios gozan del apoyo de la República Islámica de Irán, que además de patrón del movimiento Hizbolá en Líbano apoya a otras milicias chiitas. Por otro lado, los consejos tribales de autodefensa sunitas, alentados por el hoy Director de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA), David Petraeus y otrora Jefe del Mando Central del Ejército estadounidense y que tan útiles resultaron en la lucha anti- insurgencia en Irak durante los años 2006 a 2008, podrían haberse trasladado a Líbano y Siria, habiéndose unido a la campaña anti-Asad y pudiendo ser los ejecutores de los atentados de hoy en Damasco. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/23/actualidad/1324635495_67 3247.html

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REVISTA DE PRENSA Francia-Turquía: el genocidio que molesta 23 diciembre 2011 Presseurop

Stephff La votación de una propuesta de ley que condena la negación del genocidio armenio en Francia ha desatado el enfado de Ankara. Si la prensa francesa se muestra crítica con esta iniciativa, las reacciones turcas son más airadas. Los diputados franceses han zanjado la polémica. El pasado 22 de diciembre aprobaron un proyecto de ley sobre la negación de los genocidios. Con el apoyo tanto de la mayoría como de la oposición de izquierda, castiga con un año de prisión y 45.000 euros de multa “poner en duda la existencia de genocidios reconocidos por ley”, y se añade así a otras cuatro leyes “de la memoria”, es decir, que concretan el punto de vista oficial de un Estado sobre un hecho histórico. El texto alude implícitamente al genocidio armenio, entre 1915 y 1916, en el que murieron cerca de 1,2 millones de armenios (dos tercios de los que vivían en el Imperio Otomano) por las deportaciones y por las masacres organizadas por el Estado otomano. Por eso el proyecto – que todavía debe ser aprobado por el Senado y después, de nuevo, por la Asamblea Nacional – ha despertado la ira de Ankara, que ha llamado a consultas a su embajador en París y amenaza a Francia con tomar represalias comerciales y diplomáticas. En Le Point, el cronista Pierre Beylau denuncia una maniobra política del Gobierno francés ante la cercanía de las elecciones presidenciales:

¿Era realmente oportuno desenterrar la vieja serpiente de mar del genocidio de 1915, de cuya existencia nadie en su sano juicio duda? Se trata evidentemente de una política propia de políticos que emana de los diputados en cuyas circunscripciones el "voto armenio" se considera determinante. Para complacer a un lobby, no se duda en correr el riesgo de ocasionar desperfectos de considerable magnitud tanto en el plano diplomático como en el económico. Desde el punto de vista de la diplomacia francesa en Oriente Próximo, "echar un pulso con Ankara es absurdo", añade Le Monde. Pero para este diario, el problema reside antes que nada en la propia naturaleza del proyecto de ley:

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No incumbe al legislador – representado en este caso por el Elíseo – dictar la historia. Desde hace algunos años, la Francia oficial adora esta tribunalización de la Historia. Se votan leyes de memoria que crean el delito del negacionismo. Pero no sirven de nada, ni siquiera mitigan el dolor de los que lo consideran su pasado (…) innoblemente reescrito con el objetivo de poder negarlo. Por su parte, el sitio Mediapart interpreta esta disputa indagando en la historia de los dos países, cada uno de ellos dirigido por un líder fundador de la nación moderna del que las élites actuales tienen dificultad para deshacerse: el general De Gaulle y Mustafa Kemal Attatürk:

Francia y Turquía padecen, en distintos grados, la misma patología nacional: la incapacidad de pasar el duelo de su grandeza pasada; el intento desesperado de aferrarse a un salvador supremo engatusando a la madre patria con una mitología de hierro; el rechazo de inventariar la historia, de proceder a una criba, de reconocer las faltas y los crímenes. Por parte turca, en la versión anglófona del diario Zaman, el periodista de opinión Bülent Keneş la toma directamente con el presidente francés: “Al introducir una prohibición que concierne únicamente a una parte del debate sobre un polémico asunto histórico que debe ser zanjado por los historiadores, y justo antes de las elecciones presidenciales, se ha demostrado a todo el mundo lo que la democracia significa para Sarkozy”.

Dado su notable interés en crear dogmas acerca de episodios pasados controvertidos a través de medios políticos y legislativos, debería haberse fijado sobre todo en un pasado colonial indiscutible en lugar de indagar en las lagunas de la historia de Turquía. Todo lo que se puede esperar de un bufón hipócrita de la política francesa llamado Sarkozy es prohibir las opiniones e ideas que podrían expresarse con un supuesto “genocidio”, del que se supone que los armenios fueron víctimas en 1915, sin siquiera haber presentado antes sus disculpas por las masacres cometidas por Francia en Argelia en un pasado aún más reciente […] o por las muertes que masivamente se llevaron a cabo en otros países africanos y en Indochina, así como en las colonias marítimas. En Milliyet, Mehmet Tezkan considera que el presidente francés “tiene dos razones para querer se apruebe esa ley” :

La primera es una inversión política dirigida a captar el voto de los armenios. La segunda es perjudicar las relaciones con Ankara. Las relaciones entre Sarkozy y Erdogan no son 244

buenas. A partir de hoy, se han quemado los puentes. El objetivo de Sarkozy es alejar a Turquía de la UE a través de este tipo de maniobras. Por su parte, Ali Bayramoglu, del diario Yeni Şafak, recuerda que

Según la interpretación más común del artículo 301 del código penal turco, se considera un crimen decir que “tuvo lugar un genocidio armenio”. En Francia, lo que se considera un crimen es decir que “el genocidio armenio no tuvo lugar”. ¿Cómo podemos no darnos cuenta de que ambas actitudes coartan la libertad de expresión… e impiden a las dos partes preguntarse sobre su pasado? La ley francesa va a provocar daños importantes. Francia-Turquía: el genocidio que molesta23 diciembre 2011 http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/press-review/1325561-francia-turquia-el- genocidio-que-molesta

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Internacional LA TRANSICIÓN EGIPCIA Los egipcios vuelven a llenar Tahrir en protesta contra la represión militar La plaza símbolo de la revuelta egipcia se llena de gente para manifestarse contra la Junta Militar que gobierna el país ¿Hacia dónde va Egipto? Nuria Tesón El Cairo 23 DIC 2011 - 17:40 CET10

Mujeres egipcias gritan eslóganes durante una manifestación en condena del uso de la violencia contra las mujeres activistas por parte del Ejército, en El Cairo. / MOHAMED OMAR (EFE) “La gente quiere que caiga el [mariscal Hussein] Tantaui”. Este canto que han coreado durante horas miles de egipcios en la plaza de Tahrir, en el centro de El Cairo, resume por qué han estado protestando el último mes. Los jóvenes que protagonizaron el alzamiento contra Hosni Mubarak siguen manteniendo en las calles un pulso contra la Junta Militar que gobierna desde la forzada renuncia del rais. Exigen que acabe lo que consideran una nueva dictadura militar. Desde primera hora de la mañana, paulatinamente, el centro del foro egipcio, se ha ido llenando de manifestantes de todo signo. La protesta esta respaldada por movimientos liberales como el 6 de abril, pero también por partidos islamistas como el Wasat, de tendencia moderada. No han respondido a la convocatoria, sin embargo, los líderes del Partido de la Libertad y la Justicia (PLJ) de los Hermanos Musulmanes, quienes han optado por desmarcarse de los incidentes que en la última semana han dejado un saldo de 17 muertos y más de 1.000 heridos, en la represión de la policía militar contra los manifestantes. Esta postura que hoy era criticada por algunos en Tahrir, que consideran que la alineación de los islamistas con la Junta militar es cada vez más patente, no ha evitado sin embargo que muchos de sus miembros acudieran “a título personal”. EL PLJ lidera unos comicios legislativos que han estado ensombrecidos por la represión de las manifestaciones y que, divididos en tres rondas de dos vueltas cada una, finalizarán el próximo enero. Los islamistas de la cofradía religiosa aglutinaron en la primera ronda casi el 40% de los votos en disputa y datos oficiosos les otorgarían un éxito similar en la segunda, que finalizó ayer. Algunos sheijs de la Universidad de Al-Azhar, de donde partió una de las 246

tres protestas que han confluido hoy en Tahrir coreaban: “Dónde están los hermanos [Musulmanes], Al Azhar está aquí”. Una de las víctimas en los disturbios de la última semana fue un sheij de la institución religiosa que perdió la vida tras recibir un disparo. Las mujeres, por su parte, encabezaron una marcha contra la violencia y “los abusos” de los militares contra ellas. En los cánticos no faltaron las menciones a las “pruebas de virginidad” a las que manifestantes bajo custodia de la policía militar han sido sometidas. Tampoco las referencias e imágenes de la joven velada que ha dado la vuelta al mundo después de que le arrancaran la ropa, la golpearan y pisotearan. La protesta de hoy se ha desarrollado en una relativa calma después de una semana de enfrentamientos entre personas que mantenían una sentada frente al Parlamento y otra en Tahrir y que fueron desalojados con palos y piedras por los soldados que también prendieron fuego a las tiendas en las que dormían. En un intento de aislar las protestas en Tahrir y alejarlas de los centros de Gobierno (Parlamento, Consejo de Ministros y Ministerio del Interior), el Ejército ha levantado tres muros de bloques de hormigón en las principales vías de acceso a la plaza: Mohamed Mahmud (donde se centraron las protestas hace un mes), Sheij Rihad y Kasr el Ainy (donde se han desarrollado los últimos enfrentamientos). http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/23/actualidad/1324658425_11 2423.html

Internacional Tahrir da la espalda a los islamistas El proceso de transición en Egipto se empaña por el enfrentamiento de manifestantes contra el Gobierno militar El rechazo a los Hermanos Musulmanes por su boicoteo a las protestas se extiende El Ejército egipcio resiste la presión popular para que entregue el poder Nuria Tesón El Cairo 23 DIC 2011 - 18:38 CET3 Egipto entra en la recta final de las elecciones legislativas que acaban a principios de año inmerso en un clima de tensión tras las protestas contra la Junta militar que han sido reprimidas en el último mes dejando 60 muertos y más de 2.000 heridos. Esta violencia ha desvirtuado la imagen de los militares entre la población. “Hasta que dejen el poder habrá más problemas”, apunta Bahey El Din Hassan, director del Instituto de El Cairo para el Estudio de los Derechos Humanos (CIHRS, en sus siglas en inglés). Pero Egipto también afronta el distanciamiento de su población, dividida entre los que quieren continuar la presión y los que abogan por una tregua que permita el retorno de la estabilidad a las calles. La pregunta que planea ahora sobre Tahrir, donde hoy siguen las protestas, y que se extiende más allá de las fronteras de Egipto, es si estos enfrentamientos entre los jóvenes que se alzaron contra Mubarak y el Gobierno militar que tomó las riendas del país harán descarrilar el proceso de transición. Desde que acabó la revolución ha habido más de 12.400 juicios militares a civiles. Esta degradación, afirma el director del CIHRS, “por la falta de justicia y la falta de confianza en la justicia, aumenta la 247

inclinación hacia la violencia de los egipcios”. Los partidos políticos, por su parte, han tomado posturas dispares. Hay unanimidad en la condena de la violencia pero no a la hora de respaldar las protestas donde ha sido significativa la decisión de los Hermanos Musulmanes de ponerse del lado de la Junta Militar. Los revolucionarios entienden que la hermandad, líder en el recuento electoral con un 36% en la primera vuelta y con más del 30% en la segunda, según resultados oficiosos, les ha dado la espalda. Para algunos esta es además la confirmación de que los Hermanos Musulmanes habrían llegado a algún tipo de acuerdo con los militares. “Los islamistas no tienen una posición clara y sólo se preocupan por cultivar éxitos electorales. Los liberales les defendieron en la época de Mubarak, especialmente en los juicios militares y los casos de tortura, pero desde marzo no les hemos visto criticar a la Junta por esos mismos abusos”, argumenta Hassan. Este jueves el primer ministro Kamal Ganzury aparecía por segunda vez en una semana en rueda de prensa. Su discurso, sin embargo fue muy distinto al que lanzó el 17 de diciembre, nada más empezar la última ola de violencia en El Cairo. A los que antes llamaba "contrarrevolucionarios”, asegurando que “terceros”, sin determinar quiénes, estarían alentando el caos en el país, ahora los invita al dialogo y les pide dos meses de tregua. Sin embargo, los egipcios que van y vienen sin abandonar nunca Tahrir desde el 18 de noviembre, no lo ven tan claro. Reconocen abiertamente que fue un error dejar la plaza un día después de la renuncia de Mubarak, y no quieren tropezar dos veces con la misma piedra. Al mismo tiempo en la calle, lejos de la plaza y de otros centros de protesta en ciudades como Alejandría, muchos egipcios anhelan únicamente el retorno de la tranquilidad. La imagen de los militares se ha deteriorado, pero todavía gran parte de los egipcios cree que sólo ellos serán capaces de lidiar con un país de ochenta millones de habitantes, la mitad de los cuales vive por debajo del umbral de la pobreza, y cuyo índice de analfabetismo es del 30%, del 60% entre las mujeres. "Los islamistas no tienen una posición clara y sólo se preocupan por cultivar éxitos electorales", dice el analista El Din Hassan En un mes se cumplirá el primer aniversario del inicio de la revolución. Como respuesta a la crisis los jóvenes del 25 de enero, secundados por algunas fuerzas políticas, proponen celebrar en ese día las elecciones presidenciales, que los militares adelantaron, de una fecha indeterminada de 2013 a junio de 2012, sólo tras las protestas de hace un mes que dejaron 44 manifestantes muertos. Esta propuesta no ha gustado al Partido de la Libertad y la Justicia (PLJ), de los Hermanos Musulmanes que considera que “un traspaso inmediato del poder no resolverá la actual crisis”. “Cualquier desviación respecto al calendario dará lugar a un caos mayor”, afirmó el secretario general del PLJ, Mohamed Katatni en un comunicado. “Si la violencia continua el Ejército tendrá que ceder y adelantar las elecciones”, apunta por el contrario la doctora Hala Mustafa, investigadora del Centro Al-Ahram de estudios sociales y políticos. “Celebrar elecciones presidenciales cuanto antes es la mejor solución para acabar con esa violencia”, argumenta la doctora quien tampoco coincide con Bahey el Din Hassan. “La salida es sencilla, pero el CSFA no tiene voluntad política suficiente para afrontarla”, argumenta el director del CIHRS. “No creo que haya que adelantar las elecciones sino nombrar un Gobierno en el que la gente confíe y con poderes reales para preparar ese proceso”, afirma Hassan.

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“En este momento hay muchos interesados en hacer descarrilar el proceso, los que tienen el dinero, los miembros del viejo régimen... Por eso debemos pararnos a pensar con amplitud de miras”, concluye Mustafa. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/23/actualidad/1324661919_17630 3.html

Internacional Detenidos en Hungría el líder socialista y nueve diputados opositores Los parlamentarios de la oposición protestaban ante el Parlamento contra dos polémicas leyes del Gobierno conservador La receta húngara: más nacionalismo contra la crisis Especial: Europa convulsa Agencias Budapest 23 DIC 2011 - 17:03 CET

La policía levanta a un activista que protestaba contra los proyectos de ley del Gobierno, hoy en Budapest / LASZLO BALOGH (REUTERS) La Policía húngara ha detenido hoy al líder del partido socialista, Attila Mesterhazy, y a nueve diputados del partido ecologista húngaro LMP durante una protesta delante del Parlamento, en Budapest. Los opositores han sido detenidos cuando estaban intentando evitar que la Policía evacuara a los activistas que estaban participando en una protesta por la tramitación de dos leyes que, denuncian, sirven a los intereses del partido gubernamental, Fidesz, de centroderecha. La oficina de prensa de "La Política Puede Ser Diferente" (LMP) ha informado de que sus parlamentarios, que se habían encadenado en la verja exterior del Parlamento, fueron acusados de "limitación de la libertad personal", ya que con su acción impidieron la entrada de otros diputados al edificio de la Cámara. Previamente, la Policía había obligado al exprimer ministro socialista Ferenc Gyurcsany a abandonar esta protesta. Un fotógrafo de la agencia Reuters ha podido ver cómo Gyurcsany, que encabezó los dos últimos gobiernos del país y actualmente es diputado, era llevado a un coche policía. Posteriormente, Gyurcsany ha indicado que había sido

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puesto en libertad y que por ahora desconoce qué tipo de procedimiento iniciará la Policía contra él y los demás parlamentarios detenidos durante la protesta. Los diputados se manifestaban contra dos leyes, que iban a ser debatidas y aprobadas hoy, una que reforma el sistema electoral y otra sobre estabilidad financiera, que ha sido criticada por la Comisión Europea y que determina una tasa única de impuestos sobre la renta del 16%. Finalmente el Parlamento húngaro ha aprobado esta tarde la polémica ley de estabilidad económica, pese a que incluso el presidente de la Comisión Europea, José Manuel Barroso había pedido al primer ministro húngaro, Viktor Orbán, que la retirara, debido a las dudas sobre su compatibilidad con los tratados comunitarios La principal crítica frente a esta ley es que sólo podrá ser modificada en el futuro con el apoyo de dos tercios de los diputados en el Parlamento, una mayoría constitucional con la que cuenta ahora el partido conservador Fidesz, pero que es poco habitual. Además, la ley limita el crecimiento de la deuda pública en función de la inflación y del aumento del PIB. Anoche, el primer ministro, Viktor Orban, había rechazado la petición de la Comisión Europea de que retirara las dos controvertidas leyes e insistió en continuar con la tramitación parlamentaria. Durao Barroso había escrito a Orban pidiéndole que retirara también otra ley, relativa al banco central que la Unión Europea considera infringe la independencia del banco central. Se espera que esta tarde se apruebe otra polémica ley, la electoral, acusada de redistribuir el peso de las circunscripciones para favorecer al partido conservador Fidesz. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/23/actualidad/1324656218_29832 7.html

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Turkey's War on Journalists As Prime Minister Erdogan's government grows increasingly intolerant of dissent, the media is bearing the brunt of its effort to silence its critics. BY ALIA MALEK | DECEMBER 22, 2011

ISTANBUL —When the terrorism trial of jailed Turkish journalists Ahmet Sik and Nedim Sener began in Istanbul on Nov. 22, only a handful of their colleagues -- far fewer than expected -- gathered in protest outside the courthouse that will decide their fate. A mosaic of the smiling photographs of many of Turkey's detained journalists was laid out on the ground at the foot of a swarm of TV tripods, their cameras aiming for a glimpse of the defendants. Sik and Sener's case is perhaps the most high-profile example of what critics see as the Turkish government's crackdown on critical voices, which has transformed it into one of the world's leading jailers of journalists. TwitterRedditBuzz More... Some of the protesters wore T-shirts with a cartoon of a hand covering the mouth of someone trying to speak. Others carried signs written in English and Turkish. "TURKEY SET JOURNALISTS FREE; THERE CAN BE NO FREE SOCIETY WITHOUT FREE JOURNALISM," read the centerpiece. Only one prominent columnist from the mainstream daily Haber Turk, Ece Temelkuran, was willing to risk joining those outside the courthouse. Already that morning, a colleague dropped by her office to tell her he was too afraid to go. He had moved his wife and children abroad and will join them as soon as he can. 251

"I too am afraid," Temelkuran admitted, eyeing the size of the crowd. "I'm freaking out." Having written repeatedly against what she sees as a crackdown on those who oppose AKP or Erdogan, she keeps a lawyer on stand-by should she be summoned. Indeed, during the demonstration several people approached Temelkuran, a recognizable public figure, and said, "Next time, we'll be here for you." Sik and Sener have been detained since March, on charges that seemed at first too ludicrous to stand. They are accused of being members of Ergenekon, a shadowy, ultranationalist group that allegedly has been trying to foment a coup against the Turkish government - despite the fact that Sik is known in Turkey for having written the definitive exposé on the group. Sik's supporters believe he ran afoul of the Turkish justice system when he began to investigate the influence of the Fethullah Gulen movement, a powerful Islamist network that is one of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's most important pillars of support. Sener's research into the murder of the Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink -- which asserted that the police and the state were involved in his killing -- touched on another of Turkey's taboo subjects. Sik and Sener's detention are hardly an anomaly in today's Turkey. Currently, 76 Turkish journalists are in jail, more than in any other country. In a Dec. 20, roundup, several more journalists were among those newly detained when the Turkish government jailed roughly 40 people, accusing them of links to Kurdish militants. In addition to journalists, Erdogan's government has jailed lawyers, academics, and students, also ostensibly on terrorism-related charges that critics counter are transparent attempts to stifle freedom of expression and dissent. The arrests, however, have yet to shock the conscience of most Turks. In June, voters returned Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in a landslide. The current narrative that dominates discussion about Turkey -- both internationally and domestically -- emphasizes its booming economy and regional ascendance. For admirers in the Arab world, the AKP's devout orientation represents a path they seek to emulate. And for those in the West concerned by Arab Islamist parties' success at the ballot box, Erdogan's party is a comforting model for reconciling piety and democracy. Similarly, with the United States eyeing an opportunity to weaken Iran's influence in the region, specifically in Syria, Turkey has become ever more strategically important. With Turkey and Erdogan basking in the glow of such electoral and international approval, watch-groups and critics say AKP feels entitled to have an equally friendly media and public at home. "AKP has started to act like a civil authoritarian regime," said a representative of Insan Haklari Dernegi, which monitors the human rights situation in Turkey. Currently, three of its four branch directors are in prison, and the organization requested anonymity for this article due to fears of persecution at the hands of the government. "Exactly when AKP gained its big electoral mandate, they felt themselves so powerful, that they could do what they want because the public legitimized their power; they are like a spoiled child." Indeed, Erdogan has taken to lashing out at journalists that displease him and lecturing the media on its coverage. At a closed door meeting in late October, Erdogan met with media owners and executives regarding their coverage of the Kurdish conflict, in which 252

he urged them not to become tools of the propaganda of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has waged a long guerrilla war against the Turkish state. Almost immediately following the meeting, five leading Turkish news agencies issued a joint statement that they were going to "comply with the publication bans of the competent authorities." Reporters Without Borders described the development as "disturbing" and a "serious threat to freedom of information." Meanwhile, the Turkey's journalists remain on edge as they await the verdict in Sik and Sener's case. Their trial has been adjourned till Dec. 26, and Sik and Sener will remain in jail at least until that time. "There's no free media when you have a government that wants all under their control," said Banu Güven, after hearing the news. A popular TV host, she lost her job at the Turkish news channel NTV after objecting to a ban on interviews with leading Kurdish campaigners. "The prime minister talks about a well developed and progressive democracy. He makes these concepts void." *** Defenders of the government deny that these journalists' arrests are about silencing opposition. "AKP are way too popular to need that," said columnist Mustafa Akyol, who has praised Erdogan while still being critical of Sik and Sener's imprisonment. Akif Beki, who was Erdogan's spokesperson from 2005 to 2009 and has also been vocally critical of the arrests of Sik and Sener agreed. "The process would not start with them," he said. "[T]here are bigger voices to silence." Erdogan's supporters contend that Sik and Sener's detention is the unfortunate result of an overzealous pursuit of what are, however, very real threats in Turkey: the armed conflict with Kurdish separatists and the frequency of military-orchestrated coups against democratically elected governments. AKP supporters contend that the government is dismantling what has become known as the "Deep State" -- a group of military-controlled apparatuses that are the self-appointed guardians of Turkey's secular political system. However, critics say those organizations were left intact -- and instead, Erdogan has used the trials to silence his critics and purge the military of career professionals. "Turkey did not undergo the liberal transformation we hoped for," said the representative of Insan Haklari Dernegi. "The process did not change, just those who are in power." "What is new in Turkey is that before, media freedom was limited because of Turkey's ‘integrity and security,'" explained Rusen Cakir, a prominent Turkish journalist for the daily Vatan who is an expert on the AKP. "Now journalists are harassed in the name of the ‘advanced democracy.'" Even if elements of the Deep State are still plotting against the Turkish government, many of those arrested - including Sik and Sener -- are unlikely members of this shadowy cabal. The weakness of the evidence so far presented by prosecutors has only increased critics' suspicions that the charges are politically motivated. For example, in one seminal case, significant state's evidence is found in documents that include information that could not possibly have been known at the time they were supposedly drafted, suggesting that they are forgeries.

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Many of these cases are being brought under changes made in 2005 to the Turkish law on terrorism. These changes included the offense of "venerating" terrorism, which criminalizes speech that is considered favorable to organizations like the PKK. Terrorism charges are investigated and heard by courts where the process afforded defendants is much less rigorous than in non -terrorism criminal proceedings. Indeed, an AP report released in September on global terrorism convictions since 9/11 found that more than half come from two countries that have been accused of using anti-terror laws to crack down on dissent: Turkey and China (and China is far more populous than Turkey). Turkey alone accounted for a third of all global convictions, with 12,897. The day of the protest outside the courthouse, Temelkuran invoked these numbers in her column for Haber Turk. "Did we suddenly start breeding terrorists in this country?" she asked. "Is this country so crazy as to consist of one-third of the terrorists in the world?" *** Supporters of Ahmet Sik believe his two-volume book on Ergenekon is a conclusive answer to any claims he is part of the conspiracy. Rather, they believe his imprisonment has been sparked by his latest, unfinished book -- The Imam's Army. In the book, Sik investigates how the followers of Fethullah Gulen -- a Turkish preacher living in self- imposed exile in the United States -- have infiltrated the police. He described the close- knit relationship between Gulenists and the AKP, and argued that without the Gulenists, Erdogan's party would not have been able to bring the security forces under its control. When Sik was finally questioned, according to Sik's lawyer and the transcript of his interrogation, most of the questions were about the book he was currently writing. Sik and his wife Yonca first realized he might be in trouble when news broke in February that an Ergenekon-related government raid on the offices of OdaTV had turned up a draft of The Imam's Army. They were shocked -- initially by the fact that a draft of his book had ended up in those offices. And then reality quickly sunk in: Would the government really try to tie Sik to the organization he had worked for years to expose? Weeks later, they woke to the barking of their golden retriever, Pablo. Eleven policemen were at the door with a warrant. Even as they searched their house for seven hours, Yonca still thought the absurdity of it all would bring the nightmare to a rapid end. So when the police prepared to lead Sik away, and the women who had come in solidarity - - veterans of the days when the Deep State took people away -- suggested she pack him a bag, Yonca didn't think it was necessary. But she folded a fresh pair of underwear and an undershirt and sent it with Ahmet in case he stayed the night. On Dec. 26, the next opportunity for a court to free Ahmet, it will have been 298 nights. Yonca won't say she's optimistic, but she refuses to believe that all is lost. "I feel strong and that I have the power to fight this thing," she says. "I hope the Arab Spring is the model for us." Alia Malek Turkey's War on Journalists DECEMBER 22, 2011 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/22/turkeys_war_on_journalists

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The Big Think Behind the Arab Spring Do the Middle East's revolutions have a unifying ideology? BY MARC LYNCH | DECEMBER 2011

"Why does every nation on Earth move to change their conditions except for us? Why do we always submit to the batons of the rulers and their repression? How long will Arabs wait for foreign saviors?" That is how the inflammatory Al Jazeera talk-show host Faisal al-Qassem opened his program in December 2003. On another Al Jazeera program around that same time, Egyptian intellectuals Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Fahmy Howeidy debated whether it would take American intervention to force change in the Arab world. Almost exactly seven years later, Tunisians erupted in a revolution that spread across the entire region, finally answering Qassem's challenge and proving that Arabs themselves could take control of their destiny. Throughout this year of tumult, Arabs have debated the meaning of the great wave of popular mobilization that has swept their world as vigorously as have anxious foreigners. There is no single Arab idea about what has happened. To many young activists, it is a revolution that will not stop until it has swept away every remnant of the old order. To worried elites, it represents a protest movement to be met with limited economic and political reforms. Some see a great Islamic Awakening, while others argue for an emerging cosmopolitan, secular, democratic generation of engaged citizens. For prominent liberals such as Egypt's Amr Hamzawy, these really have been 255

revolutions for democracy. But whatever the ultimate goal, most would agree with Syrian intellectual Burhan Ghalyoun, who eloquently argued in March that the Arab world was witnessing "an awakening of the people who have been crushed by despotic regimes." In March, Egyptian writer Hassan Hanafi declared that the spread of the revolutions demonstrated finally that "Arab unity" -- long a distant ideal in a region better known for its fragmentation and ideological bickering -- "is an objective reality." This unified narrative of change, and the rise of a new, popular pan-Arabism directed against regimes, is perhaps the greatest revelation of the uprisings. Not since the 1950s has a single slogan -- back then Arab unity, today "The People Want to Overthrow the Regime" -- been sounded so powerfully from North Africa to the Gulf. This identification with a shared fate feels natural to a generation that came of age watching satellite TV coverage of Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon over the previous decade. Al Jazeera, since its rise to prominence in the late 1990s, has unified the regional agenda through its explicitly Arabist coverage -- and its embrace of raucous political debates on the most sensitive issues. That pan-Arab popular identification extended to the democracy movements that multiplied across the region -- whether Egypt's tenacious street protesters, Bahraini human rights activists, or Yemenis (including this year's Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakkol Karman) protesting President Ali Abdullah Saleh's nepotism and corruption. A decade-long, media-fueled narrative of change is why Arabs immediately recognized each national protest as part of their own struggle. As Wadah Khanfar, the network's recently departed director-general, put it, "That was Al Jazeera's role: liberating the Arab mind. We created the idea in the Arab mind that when you have a right, you should fight for it." So while the Arab uprisings generated a marvelous range of innovative tactics (uploading mobile-camera videos to social media like Facebook and Twitter, seizing and holding public squares), they did not introduce any particularly new ideas. The relentless critique of the status quo, the generational desire for political change, the yearning for democratic freedoms, the intense pan-Arab identification -- these had all been in circulation for more than a decade. What changed with the fall of Zine el- Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia was the recognition that even the worst tyrants could be toppled. It shattered the wall of fear. That is why hundreds of thousands of Egyptians came into the streets on Jan. 25. It's why protests broke out in Yemen, Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan. It's why Syrians and Libyans took unfathomable personal risks to rise up against seemingly untouchable despots despite the near certainty of arrest, torture, murder, and reprisals against their families. The uprisings came in the wake of years of institutional and political decay diagnosed acutely by Arab intellectuals such as Egyptian jurist Tariq al-Bishri, by the prescient 2002 Arab Human Development Report, and by nascent political leaders like former International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei. Beneath the edifice of stability, they warned, state institutions were crumbling, their legitimacy faded in the relentless drift of corruption, nepotism, casual brutality, and indifference toward their people. Elections became ever more fraudulent (with the Egyptian and Jordanian elections of late 2010 among the worst), security services more abusive, graft more flagrant.

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All this greatly contributed to the economic underpinnings of this year's discontent. The previous decade saw neoliberal economic reforms that privatized industries to the benefit of a small number of well-connected elites and produced impressive rates of GDP growth. But, as ruthlessly dissected by Arab economists like Egypt's Galal Amin, the chasm between the rich and poor grew and few meaningful jobs awaited a massive youth bulge. For many leftist activists, the uprisings were a direct rejection of this neoliberalism -- and those ideas and the technocrats who advanced them have likely been driven from power for the foreseeable future. But the uprisings were not only about jobs and bread; as Sudanese intellectual Abdelwahab El-Affendi wrote in January, echoing a famous slogan of the 1950s, the revolutions were needed so that the people would deserve bread. The theme of restoring the dignity of the people pervaded the Arab uprisings. The police abuse that drove Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation and killed the young Egyptian Khaled Said struck a chord with populations who experienced daily the depredations of uncaring states. The gross corruption of Ben Ali's in-laws and Hosni Mubarak's efforts to groom his son for the presidency simply insulted many Tunisians and Egyptians -- and they were ever less afraid to say so. A fiercely independent and articulate rising generation would no longer tolerate brazen corruption, abusive police, indifferent bureaucracy, a stagnant economy, and stage-managed politics. Egypt's Kefaya ("Enough" in Arabic) movement was in many ways the forefather of the Arab uprising. Originally drawn together for state-sanctioned protests over Palestine and Iraq, the organizers of the loose movement courageously turned their focus inward to challenge the succession of Gamal Mubarak. Kefaya brought together an astonishing range of ideologies with revolutionary socialists protesting side by side with Muslim Brothers, and liberals with Nasserists. It pioneered the use of social media, mastered the art of symbolic demonstrations, and pried open a space in the Egyptian media. That opening was seized by an increasingly aggressive press, led by figures like the irreverent editor Ibrahim Eissa and liberal publisher Hisham Kassem, as well as determined new Internet citizen journalists. Independent newspapers such as Eissa's al- Dustour eviscerated the pretensions of their rulers. Al Jazeera talk shows threw every issue open for debate. Activists like Tunisia's Sami Ben Gharbia used Internet tools to reveal the Tunisian first lady's shopping trips to Paris on the president's private jet. Bahrainis used Google Earth to reveal the shocking size of lands expropriated by the royal family for private use. Egyptians like blogger Wael Abbas circulated videos of police abuse and identified individual officers online. This opening of closed regimes to raw information and opinion, a faith in the power of public ideas, was itself one of the key ideas underpinning the Arab uprisings. But it would be a mistake to portray the enthusiasm for revolution as universal in the Arab world. Saudi and Gulf intellectuals, in particular, argued fiercely against the spread of the revolutions to their own lands, insisting that the Gulf monarchies were different. Many, such as Emirati writer Sultan Al Qassemi, argued that the monarchical regimes would prove more resilient than the republics, whether due to greater legitimacy or simply greater wealth. Most have indeed avoided significant internal challenges. For now. Some Arab intellectuals go further to say that the Gulf is leading a "counterrevolution" -- a wide-ranging conspiracy to restore the status quo. In this 257

telling, the conservative Gulf regimes, after protecting themselves, set out to use their wealth and media empires to rebuild relations with the Egyptian military, rid themselves of the hated Muammar al-Qaddafi, promote Islamist movements against liberals, and support the challenge to Iran's major Arab ally, Syria. Anxious revolutionaries around the region likely attribute too much coherence and power to these counterrevolutionary efforts. But even in Egypt, the fears of chaos and disorder run deep, and many will be susceptible to the lure of a return to normality. No final answer has yet been delivered to the question posed by Lebanese liberal Hazem Saghieh in February: "Can a corrupt dictator be overthrown without descending into chaos or a new tyranny?" And then there is the contested role of religion in the Middle East's new politics. Islamist political movements such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Jordan's Islamic Action Front have long participated in elections, citing the fatwas of Doha- based cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi to avoid seeing democracy as an un-Islamic innovation. In Tunisia and Egypt, such movements rapidly demonstrated their mastery of the techniques of political competition, out-organizing and out-campaigning their secular rivals. Even more tellingly, their longtime Salafi critics -- who had spent decades denouncing them for joining an un-Islamic political game -- now rushed to form their own political parties. But as their power grows, these Islamists have struggled to reassure their domestic critics and the West of their commitment to democratic principles -- and, given their first opportunity to actually exercise power, to figure out for themselves how deep those commitments run. The uprisings were also about America -- just not in the way most Americans would have it. Arabs found the idea that Iraq's liberation had inspired their democracy struggle laughable; if anything, it was the protests against the Iraq war that taught them the value of public dissent. Americans cheered themselves with the thought that the protesters in Tahrir Square were not burning American flags -- and that Libyans in Benghazi were waving them. But this was a dangerous misunderstanding. Many Arab analysts directly equated dictatorial regimes at home with a foreign policy they considered subservient to Israel and the United States. The Arab uprisings called for independence, national sovereignty, and respect for the will of the people -- all of which pointed to less eager cooperation with Washington and frostier relations with Tel Aviv. None of that, however, means that Arabs are flocking to join a new anti-American axis. Indeed, groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which inspired many Arabs over the last decade with their perceived success and anti-American defiance, have lost appeal, equivocating as their patrons in Damascus and Tehran preside over the slaughter of unarmed protesters in the streets. In a pointed challenge to Syrian leader Bashar al- Assad, who has sought refuge in "resistance" to Israel as Syrians have risen against him, Palestinian writer Ibrahim Hammami wrote in June, "We say to those who raise the slogan of resistance to repress their people: Freedom first, and dignity is more important." So it's early days yet. But as Palestinian intellectual Khaled Hroub wrote in February, "the fundamental change is the return of the people" to the region's politics. And that -- the idea that the opinions of Arabs matter and can never again be ignored -- may be the most potent new idea of all. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/the_big_think?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

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Assad's Lebanese Invasion The Syrian regime wants to crush any expression of dissent in its fragile neighbor. President Bashar al-Assad's allies in Beirut are only too happy to oblige. BY MITCHELL PROTHERO | DECEMBER 22, 2011

BEIRUT – The blacked-out sport utility vehicles entered the small mountain village of Arsal, in the furthest reaches of Lebanon's Beqaa Valley, at midnight on a cold night late last month. The mostly Sunni residents of the town immediately knew what was happening: Hezbollah had come to grab someone from his bed. The target appears to have been a Syrian relative of the dominant local tribe, the Qarqouz, who had taken refuge in the village, which lies just a few miles from the Syrian border. With close families ties on both sides of the line, as well as a central government presence that doesn't even live up to the designation of "weak," the tribes make little distinction between Syria and Lebanon, and many make their livings plying that most cliché of all Beqaa trades: cross-border smuggling. TwitterRedditBuzz More... Whether the wanted man is a dissident Syrian remains unclear -- the family certainly denies any such thing. Nevertheless, the raid by Hezbollah's internal security apparatus follows a pattern of harassment, kidnapping, and cross-border rendition of Syrian anti-regime activists by Syria's many loyalists in Lebanon, which also include rogue police units, pro-Syria political movements, and even Kurdish separatists. As President Bashar al-Assad looks to squelch an astonishingly persistent nine-month revolt, Lebanon is fast becoming another battleground between supporters and opponents of his rule.

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The Arsal incursion, however, did not go how Hezbollah planned. The men in black trucks didn't impress the residents of Arsal: True to their reputation as a flinty bunch, the tribes immediately sent out men bedecked with the ubiquitous accessories of any respectable Beqaa smuggler -- the AK-47 and rocket propelled grenade launcher -- and ambushed the convoy before it could lay hands on the purported Syrian fugitive. Local officials released a statement shortly afterwards, warning Hezbollah against any attempt to repeat its adventure. "Let everyone know that Arsal is not orphaned," it read. "[A]nyone attacking Arsal or any other Lebanese town would be definitely serving the Zionist enemy and Assad's brigades." Hezbollah, which tepidly denied the incident, hasn't released any casualty figures, but the ensuing firefight was nasty enough that the Lebanese Army dispatched a team to extract the Hezbollah men from the ambush -- and itself came under fire from Sunni mountainfolk with little use for either Shiite militant supporters of the Assad regime, or law enforcement of any sort. The Lebanese army claimed in a convoluted statement the next day that an intelligence unit was in hot pursuit of a known criminal when it unexpectedly came under attack. However, that narrative unraveled over the next few days, when a collection of local officials and anti-Syrian Sunni politicians accused Hezbollah of instigating the attack -- a claim confirmed to FP by multiple intelligence and law enforcement officials, as well as one prominent human rights activist. This latest incident is just the latest example of how the Syria revolt has spilled over onto Lebanese soil, threatening to destabilize the already fragile country. Over the last few months, as the protest movement has waxed and waned, Syrian troops have repeatedly crossed into Lebanese territory, breaching a frontier they never really respected in the first place, and laid land mines along their shared border in a bid to stop smugglers and deter both refugees from leaving and armed opponents of the regime from mounting operations. Hezbollah, which has stood firmly behind the Syrian regime during the current crisis, has been Assad's primary Lebanese ally in this crackdown. Internal security and counterintelligence for Hezbollah falls under the domain of perhaps the single most feared man in Lebanon, the head of internal security for the Islamic Resistance, Wafiq Safa, whose men arrest and interrogate perceived threats to the "resistance." In the Hezbollah-dominated southern suburbs of Beirut, which is full of Syrians who have come to Lebanon for economic or political reasons, there is a noticeable chill as people try to avoid getting caught in the crossfire of Syria's war. "If you're being arrested by men in blacked-out SUVs or vans, you're being arrested by Hezbollah," according to one Shiite Lebanese resident of southern Beirut who lives near Hezbollah's "security zone," which houses headquarters buildings and the families of top officials. "Even [military intelligence] guys have to have license plates on their cars and identify themselves. But ‘the resistance' doesn't need to bother. No one in Lebanon can touch them for murder of a prime minister -- ask the special tribunal -- so do you think they worry about traffic tickets, or kidnapping a Syrian? No one would dare question them." Like virtually everything else in this divided country, which narrative a particular Lebanese believes is directly tied to their political allegiances. For Hezbollah and other Syrian regime allies, Assad is battling a truly complex alliance of al Qaeda and Sunni 260

fundamentalists --sponsored by the Americans and Israelis. Assad's opponents, on the other hand, hold that the Lebanese government has been cowed by threats of a Syrian invasion if it doesn't help crush dissent in the rural safe havens along the border. Lebanon's Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn, a Hezbollah ally, announced on Dec. 21 that Arsal had become an al Qaeda safe haven, drawing bitter denials from the village's mayor and tribal elders, who pointed to months of local farmers being shot by Syrian troops for tending fields along the border, Syrian troops incursions, and of course, last month's Hezbollah-led debacle. For anti-Assad dissidents in Lebanon, even more ominous than the Arsal raid is the growing evidence that they are not even safe from Assad's long reach in the capital of Beirut. The illegal abduction of three Syrians in February from the parking lot of a police station - where they were then transported over the border and turned over to Syrian intelligence - confirmed many Lebanon-based Syrians' worst fears. Jassim Jassim, one of the hundreds of thousands of day laborers who make their living working in Lebanon, had been arrested briefly by the Lebanese police for handing out flyers calling for the end of Assad's regime, according to police officials who investigated the incident. Shortly after his arrest, Jassim, a Sunni from Homs, called his brother and brother in-law to say he would be released shortly and they should come to the station in the Beirut suburb of Baabda to pick him up. Hours later, after none of the men returned, Jassim's wife called his mobile phone. A man speaking in a Syrian accent answered, and informed her that the three men had been taken "home." They've never been heard from again. An investigation by the head of Lebanon's Internal Security Forces (ISF), Brig Gen. Ashraf Rifi, a supporter of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri from Tripoli, discovered that the three men were thrown into an SUV with ISF markings in the police station parking lot. Even more disturbingly, the driver was later indentified as Lt. Saleh al-Hajj, the head of the ISF protection detail at the Syrian embassy in Beirut. According to a police officer assigned to the embassy protection team who has worked with Hajj in the past, it is widely known that Hajj works closely with Syrian intelligence. His father, Ali al-Hajj, was a top Lebanese intelligence official under the Syrian occupation and one of four top security officials detained for years on suspicion of plotting the murder of Saad Hariri's father Rafiq, also a former prime minister. However, because of Lebanon's diverse mosaic of loyalties and patronage, there is nothing even the head of the police can do to rein in such rogue operators. "Everyone in the [police] works for some faction or party," the young officer explained. "The corruption is bad enough, but it's the politics that can get you killed. Sometimes I think everyone I work with has two commanders -- his police commander and his political commander: Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia. Some people have even turned out to work for the Israelis. It's a catastrophe for Lebanon." Other dissidents have gone missing as well, and still more have fled the country after receiving warning that their names have appeared on a hit list of anti-regime targets being sought by Syria's Lebanese allies. "[T]he Syrians have a long arm in Lebanon," according to Rami Nakhle, a prominent Syrian dissident who was based in Lebanon at the start of the uprising but was 261

eventually forced to flee to the United States after being warned his name was on a list for assassination or kidnapping held by Hezbollah and other Syrian-aligned groups. Another activist, who remains in Lebanon but asked not to be identified for safety reasons, said that sympathetic members of the Lebanese intelligence services have done their best to protect them, but due to the influence of Hezbollah and remnants of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, "often the best they can do is warn us when our name comes up for elimination." Hezbollah, for its part, denies involvement in anything sinister. One Hezbollah internal security official interviewed by FP admitted that his teams were hunting Syrian dissidents, but denied kidnapping peaceful demonstrators. "We're looking for weapons dealers, al Qaeda members, and those who would destabilize Lebanon," he said. "It's like when the Iraqi refugees first started coming here in 2004. We had to closely monitor them to make sure they were safe. But we don't kidnap people and if we arrest them, we turn them over to the Lebanese authorities for prosecution." The claim that Hezbollah is only targeting weapons dealers or terrorists runs into some basic mathematical problems. One Lebanese intelligence official said the number of actual weapons smugglers or al Qaeda-types arrested "might reach 10. Maximum." Meanwhile, dozens of Syrians in Lebanon have reported harassment or arrest, and even in some cases been victims of disappearances. The situation has put the professionals in the Lebanese military and intelligence services in a bind. Nobody these days envies the position of Prime Minister Nijab Miqati, who is attempting to balance the interests of the pro-Syrian political bloc that brought him to power with the beliefs of his own Sunni constituency, which is outraged by Assad's brutality. In an effort to heal Lebanon's social and political fabric -- which was fraying even before Syria started to self-immolate -- Miqati has worked overtime to appear as neutral as possible without infuriating either Hezbollah or the ruthless Syrian regime next door. His government has backed the Syrian regime at the Arab League, but has also not entirely squelched Syrian refugees' freedoms in Lebanon. One consistent fear is that Syria, which blames Lebanon's predominantly Sunni northern city of Tripoli and its outlying rural areas for fomenting much of the unrest, might become even more emboldened and expand its operations beyond small-scale raids in an attempt to halt the Syrian rebels' flow of support. The Lebanese military recent cut off access for journalists and non-residents to the area of Wadi Khaled, north of Tripoli, where as many as 5,000 Syrians have taken refuge. The area is also a hotbed of rebel support, and even sympathetic Lebanese officials are terrified that Syria might escalate the conflict there. "We have to [take these steps]," one exasperated military intelligence official said in an interview. "Even if you sympathize with the Syrian people, and many of us do, we can't allow Lebanon to go down the same path." MITCHELL PROTHERO Assad's Lebanese Invasion DECEMBER 22, 2011 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/22/assads_lebanese_invasion

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6,200 killed in Syrian crackdown, claims rights group British-based Avaaz group says it has evidence of more than 6,237 deaths, with at least 400 of the victims children Reuters guardian.co.uk, Thursday 22 December 2011 18.06 GMT

A rally in support of the Syrian regime in Damascus. Photograph: News Pictures / Rex Features More than 6,200 people, including hundreds of children, have died in Syria's crackdown on an anti-government revolt, a human rights group said on Thursday. Syria is facing increasingly fierce international condemnation for its handling of months of demonstrations against President Bashar al-Assad's rule, partly inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings that have swept across North Africa and the Middle East. Syria says it is fighting foreign-backed "terrorists" and on Thursday announced that more than 2,000 of its security forces had been killed in the unrest. The British-based Avaaz rights group said it had collected evidence of more than 6,237 deaths of civilians and security forces, 617 of them under torture. At least 400 of the dead were children, it added. The figures were about 1,000 higher that the latest UN estimates, which have also been climbing sharply in recent months. "No once can now turn a blind eye to the horror show in Syria … One in every 300 Syrians has either been killed or imprisoned," said Avaaz executive director Ricken Patel. "The world faces a choice: it stands by while brutal civil war rips through the country or it steps up the pressure to force Assad out," he added.

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Security forces had detained at least 69,000 people since the uprising began in March, Avaaz said, around 32,000 of whom had since been released. The death toll is rising sharply as the mainly peaceful protest movement against the Assad family's 41-year rule becomes overshadowed by clashes with armed rebel groups, who call themselves the Free Syrian Army. Avaaz estimated that 917 in its count died in those clashes, with the casualties roughly divided between the armed rebels and Syrian security personnel. This has been one of the bloodiest weeks of the nine-month uprising. On Tuesday, the army's efforts to quash revolt near the Turkish border killed more than 111 civilians and activists, another activist group said. An advance team for an Arab League monitoring mission was due to arrive in Damascus on Thursday to prepare the ground for about 150 observers. They will have the job of checking if Syria is complying with an Arab initiative that calls for an end to violence, the withdrawal of troops from the street and the release of prisoners. Avaaz said it had more than 50 monitors on the ground collecting data for its reports. Each person on its death toll was confirmed by three individuals, it said, including a relative of the deceased and a cleric who handled the body. The group estimates that 40% of the deaths were in the central city of Homs, a protest hotspot and centre of armed rebellion against security forces. Reuters 6,200 killed in Syrian crackdown, claims rights group December 2011 18.06 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/22/6200-killed-in-syrian- crackdown?CMP=EMCNEWEML1355

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Attentats contre les services de sécurité à Damas, selon la télévision syrienne LEMONDE.FR avec Reuters et AFP | 23.12.11 | 10h42 • Mis à jour le 23.12.11 | 10h44

Des opposants au régime de Bachar Al-Assad manifestent à Zabadani, près de Damas, le 21 décembre.REUTERS/HANDOUT Des installations des services de sécurité syriens dans la capitale, Damas, ont été la cible de deux attaques, rapporte vendredi 23 décembre la télévision publique. Des témoins disent avoir entendu deux explosions. Ces attentats, qui auraient fait plusieurs morts civils et militaires, sont sans précédent depuis la guerre entre le président Hafez Al- Assad et les Frères musulmans dans les années 1980. Il s'agirait d'attentats-suicides à la voiture piégée, selon la télévision publique syrienne, qui accuse Al-Qaida "selon les premiers résultats de l'enquête". "Deux attentats commis par des kamikazes à bord de voitures piégées ont visé un siège de la sécurité de l'Etat et une des branches des services de sécurité", annonce le média. Un témoin de l'Observatoire syrien pour les droits de l'homme a rapporté que des fusillades avaient éclaté après ces déflagrations. Selon des témoins, les deux attentats ont eu lieu dans le quartier de Kafar Soussé. Une voiture a tenté de forcer l'entrée de l'enceinte du siège de la sécurité de l'Etat et une autre a explosé devant un bâtiment des services de sécurité dans le même quartier. La Syrie est depuis la mi-mars le théâtre d'un mouvement de contestation contre le régime de Bachar Al-Assad, violemment réprimé par les autorités. L'évolution de la situation, et l'apparition d'une "Armée syrienne libre" formée notamment de déserteurs, font craindre que la Syrie ne bascule dans une guerre civile.

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PRÉPARATION DE LA VENUE D'OBSERVATEURS Jeudi, la mission chargée de préparer la venue des observateurs de la Ligue arabe est arrivée en Syrie. Cette délégation d'une dizaine de membres a pour tâche de régler les problèmes logistiques du premier groupe de 30 à 50 observateurs qui doit arriver dimanche. Ces observateurs devrait être 150 à 200 au total, tous des experts civils ou militaires arabes qui travailleront sous la houlette du général soudanais Mohammed Ahmed Moustapha Al-Dabi. L'ONG Enough Project a dénoncé la présence de ce général soudanais impliqué dans la guerre civile et au Darfour. Le choix du général Dabi par la Ligue arabe est "curieux", écrit l'ONG, rappelant que "des crimes de guerre, et y compris de génocide", ont été commis au Darfour à l'époque où il dirigeait les renseignements soudanais. Cette mission arrive au lendemain de l'appel de l'opposition syrienne à une réunion d'urgence de la Ligue arabe et du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU après "les massacres du régime", qui auraient fait 250 morts en deux jours. Jeudi, les violences ont encore fait 21 morts dont 14 civils, selon des militants des droits de l'homme. http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/12/23/attentats-contre-les- services-de-securite-a-damas-selon-la-television- syrienne_1622169_3218.html#ens_id=1481132

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La Turquie accuse la France d'avoir commis un "génocide" en Algérie "On estime que 15 % de la population algérienne a été massacrée par les Français à partir de 1945. Il s'agit d'un génocide", a déclaré Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Génocide arménien : une proposition de loi "anticonstitutionnelle", selon Robert Badinter Paris, Ankara et le génocide arménien... un débat passionnel Du vote de l'Assemblée à la crise diplomatique Vain débat sur les lois "mémorielles" La Turquie va "réviser ses relations avec la France" LEMONDE.FR avec AFP et Reuters | 22.12.11 | 13h36 • Mis à jour le 23.12.11 | 10h49

Le premier ministre turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan a parlé de "plaies irréparables et très graves dans les relations bilatérales" après l'adoption d'un projet de loi sur les génocides, jeudi 22 décembre.AFP/ADEM ALTAN Le ton s'est encore un peu plus durci vendredi matin entre Paris et Ankara. Au cours d'une conférence de presse à Istanbul, le premier ministre turc a accusé la France d'avoir commis un "génocide" en Algérie. "On estime que 15 % de la population algérienne a été massacrée par les Français à partir de 1945. Il s'agit d'un génocide", a déclaré

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vendredi Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Il réagissait au vote la veille par les députés français d'une proposition de loi réprimant la contestation du génocide arménien de 1915. Il s'est ensuite directement attaqué à Nicolas Sarkozy, qui "cherche des voix en attisant islamophobie et turcophobie", a-t-il estimé. Peu après l'adoption par l'Assemblée nationale d'une proposition de loi sur la négation des génocides, dont celui des Arméniens en 1915, jeudi 22 décembre, Recep Tayyip Erdogan a annoncé une série de mesures de rétorsion contre la France. "Cela va ouvrir des plaies irréparables et très graves dans les relations bilatérales"et relève d'"une politique fondée sur le racisme, la discrimination et la xénophobie". a-t-il prévenu, avant de déclarer : "Nous révisons nos relations avec la France". Dans un premier temps, Ankara a rappelé son ambassadeur à Paris qui a quitté le territoire français vendredi matin. Recep Tayyip Erdogan a annoncé devant la presse la suspension des visites bilatérales, le rappel pour consultations de l'ambassadeur de Turquie en France et indiqué que "les exercices militaires conjoints avec la France et toutes les activités militaires avec ce pays ont été annulés". La Turquie décidera désormais au cas par cas pour toute demande militaire française d'utiliser son espace aérien et "rejette dorénavant toute demande française pour ses bâtiments de guerre de visiter les ports turcs", a souligné le chef du gouvernement turc. Ce dernier a expliqué qu'il s'agissait là d'un premier train de sanctions contre la France, alliée de la Turquie au sein de l'OTAN, et que "graduellement" d'autres mesures pourraient être mises en oeuvre. Ces mesures étaient largement attendues en cas d'adoption du texte, les reponsables turcs répétant qu'il y aurait des "conséquences" à un tel geste. "Ce que je souhaite, c'est que nos amis turcs ne surréagissent pas", a réagi le ministre des affaires étrangères, Alain Juppé. REMERCIEMENTS DE L'ARMÉNIE Le texte déposé par la députée UMP Valérie Boyer a été adopté en première lecture à main levée par une très large majorité de la cinquantaine de députés présents, jeudi. La proposition de loi, qui visait dans une première version la négation du seul génocide arménien, a été élargie pour s'appliquer à tous les génocides reconnus par la loi. Elle prévoit de punir la négation d'un génocide d'un an d'emprisonnement, d'une amende de 45 000 euros ou des deux à la fois. Le ministre des affaires étrangères arménien, Edouard Nalbandian, a quant à lui voulu "une fois de plus, exprimer [s]a gratitude aux plus hautes autorités de la France, à l'Assemblée nationale et au peuple français". L'examen de ce texte s'est déroulé dans un climat parfois empreint d'émotion, et avec peu de voix discordantes, malgré les réserves exprimées dans les médias par plusieurs membres de la majorité. Devant l'Assemblée, plusieurs centaines de manifestants s'étaient réunis pour protester. a été l'un des derniers orateurs à défendre à la tribune de l'Assemblée nationale la proposition de loi de sa collègue Valérie Boyer, avant la discussion des amendements. "Il ne s'agit pas d'écrire l'histoire mais de poser un acte politique indispensable", a-t-il dit. Visiblement ému, il a souligné qu'il n'y avait "pas besoin de réunir les historiens pour savoir s'il y a eu ou non un génocide" en 1915. M. Devedjian a rappelé que des

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historiens turcs avaient été poursuivis par la justice de leur pays "pour avoir affirmé l'existence d'un génocide arménien". Il estime "qu'il y a une majorité au Sénat pour voter ce texte" et "espère que cette majorité votera de manière conforme". "SOUFFLER SUR LES BRAISES" Seul opposant à la proposition autorisé à prendre la parole lors de la discussion générale, selon Lionel Tardy, le député UMP Michel Diefenbacher, président du groupe d'amitié France-Turquie, s'est exprimé à la tribune de l'Assemblée "contre" le texte. Selon lui, "dans cette région stratégique, si sensible et si fragile, personne n'a intérêt à souffler sur les braises. C'est pourtant cela que fait le texte. (...) Que dirions-nous, nous Français, si un autre pays venait nous dire ce qu'il faut penser du massacre des Vendéens sous la Convention et nous menacer de sanctions si nous pensions autrement ?", a-t-il lancé. Michel Diefenbacher est intervenu après de nombreux autres députés de gauche comme de droite, la plupart élus de départements où vivent de fortes communautés arméniennes, qui ont approuvé la proposition de Valérie Boyer, suscitant une remarque ironique de Lionel Tardy sur Twitter.

le député UMP Michel Diefenbacher, président du groupe d'amitié France- Turquie, s'est exprimé à la tribune de l'Assemblée "contre" le texte. AFP/JACQUES DEMARTHON François de Rugy, député EE-LV, a indiqué que lui et ses deux collègues à l'Assemblée n'avaient pas participé au vote. François Pupponi, député et maire PS de Sarcelles, a pour sa part souhaité un prochain vote favorable du Sénat nouvellement passé à gauche sur ce texte. "J'espère qu'avant la fin de cette législature, nous aurons l'honneur de voter ce texte", a-t-il dit. Mercredi, le président de l'Assemblée nationale, Bernard Accoyer, avait laissé entendre que le texte ne serait vraisemblablement pas adopté avant la fin de la législature en cours. Jean-Michel Baylet, sénateur et président du Parti radical de gauche, a annoncé que les sénateurs de son parti "ne voteront pas la proposition de loi" car "les radicaux de gauche sont opposés à cette nouvelle loi mémorielle". La Turquie accuse la France d'avoir commis un "génocide" en Algérie Mis à jour le 23.12.11 | 10h49 http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/12/22/les-deputes-votent-le-texte-sur-la-negation-des- genocides_1621648_823448.html#ens_id=1620748

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¿ES NEGATIVA LA PRIMAVERA ÁRABE PARA LAS MUJERES? 22 de diciembre de 2011 Isobel Coleman Poner fin a la dominación masculina puede ser más difícil que acabar con un dictador.

AFP/Getty Images

En muchos aspectos, 2011 ha sido el Año de la Mujer Árabe. Desde los primeros días de la rebelión que empezó el pasado mes de diciembre en Túnez, las mujeres han estado en primera línea de las protestas, encabezando manifestaciones, escribiendo comentarios apasionados en blogs, informando de los disturbios como periodistas, poniendo en marcha campañas en los medios sociales, introduciendo municiones de contrabando y cuidando a los heridos. Cuando la yemení Tawakkul Karman recibió el Premio Nobel de la Paz –la primera mujer árabe en obtenerlo –, tuvo un recuerdo entusiasta para sus numerosas hermanas árabes, que han luchado “para conquistar sus derechos en una sociedad dominada por la supremacía de los hombres”. Sin embargo, en la región, las mujeres se quejan de que derrocar a los dictadores está resultando más sencillo que dar un vuelco a la omnipresente supremacía masculina. Gamila Ismail, destacada activista y política egipcia, lo resumió al abandonar la carrera para las elecciones parlamentarias, indignada tras enterarse de que la iban a colocar en tercer lugar de la lista en su distrito, un puesto que no iba a salir elegido. “Las mujeres tuvimos un papel muy importante antes, durante y después de la revolución, y hoy no podemos aceptar esto”, lamentó en una entrevista en televisión. (Se presentó como candidata independiente y perdió por muy poco.) En Túnez, unas activistas descontentas han formado el Frente del 24 de octubre, para defender los derechos de las mujeres tras la victoria electoral de los islamistas. “Queremos una constitución que respete los derechos de la mujer y no deshaga los avances conseguidos”, dijo una manifestante tunecina. Las mujeres árabes están en una situación difícil desde múltiples puntos de vista. En primer lugar, están las arraigadas costumbres patriarcales que las reprimen. El patriarcado no es exclusivo de los países árabes, desde luego, pero está muy asentado. Lo complica el hecho de que, durante decenios, la defensa de los derechos de la mujer estuvo asociada a los regímenes autoritarios ahora desacreditados: en Egipto, Suzanne Mubarak dirigía una ONG de mujeres 270

vinculada al Estado; la odiada peluquera y primera dama de Túnez, Leila Ben Alí, era presidenta de la Organización de Mujeres Árabes, un órgano intergubernamental patrocinado por la Liga Árabe; y tanto Asma al Assad, esposa del presidente sirio, como la reina Rania de Jordania han trabajado en cuestiones relacionadas con la mujer. El ascenso y el aumento de poder político de los partidos islamistas que se oponen a las leyes existentes para las mujeres por motivos religiosos plantea serias dificultades para ellas. Aunque el activismo femenino ha sido muy importante en las revueltas árabes, no existen garantías de que las activistas vayan a poder transformar su compromiso en ganancias económicas, sociales y políticas a largo plazo. Es más, en algunos países, hay razones para temer que los derechos de las mujeres se erosionen. Un caso simbólico es el de Libia. En la ceremonia que conmemoró la liberación oficial del país en octubre, uno de los primeros anuncios que hizo Mustafá Abdel Jalil, líder del Consejo Nacional Libio de transición, fue que se anularía cualquier ley que contradijera la sharia. En concreto, dijo que, a partir de ahora, la poligamia iba a ser legal, un anuncio que provocó los vítores y los disparos jubilosos de una muchedumbre compuesta en su mayor parte por hombres. Las mujeres libias expresaron su sorpresa y su decepción y se preguntaron por qué, con los acuciantes problemas que padece el país, el restablecimiento de la poligamia tenía que ser una prioridad (los responsables de la OTAN también se lo preguntaron). Aunque la poligamia era legal, en teoría, en tiempos de Gadafi, estaba desaconsejada, y hoy su práctica no está muy extendida, pero las cosas pueden cambiar. Las estudiantes universitarias, que en general se califican de devotas, han prometido combatir este retroceso. En Egipto, varios sucesos ocurridos en el último año ponen de relieve que los derechos de la mujer constituyen una cuestión conflictiva en el país. Las estimulantes imágenes de solidaridad entre los sexos en la Plaza de Tahrir, en los primeros tiempos de la revolución, dejaron paso enseguida a desagradable episodios de acoso personal. Una manifestación planeada con precipitación el 8 de marzo, Día Internacional de la Mujer, convocó a unos cuantos centenares de mujeres, pero también a una serie de hombres enfurecidos que se dedicaron a empujar a las manifestantes y a gritarles que se fueran a casa, porque sus demandas de derechos eran contrarias al islam. Más o menos por aquel entonces, el Ejército egipcio detuvo a decenas de mujeres y, en una actuación puramente intimidatoria, sometió a muchas de ellas a “pruebas de virginidad”. En el plano político, las egipcias han estado excluidas de los órganos de toma de decisiones desde la caída de Hosni Mubarak, y da la impresión de que son muy pocas, o ninguna, las que obtendrán escaños en las elecciones parlamentarias. A su escaso éxito ha contribuido la decisión del Ejército de eliminar la cuota existente en tiempos de Mubarak, que garantizaba 64 escaños a las mujeres. La medida representó un retroceso en la participación política de las egipcias, pese a que la política de cuotas tenía poca credibilidad porque se había utilizado para premiar a los leales a Mubarak. Los buenos resultados de los partidos islamistas en la primera vuelta de las elecciones parlamentarias egipcias preocupan a las mujeres. Los ultraconservadores grupos salafistas, que obtuvieron un sorprendente 20% de los votos, no tienen reparos en oponerse a que las mujeres deban desempeñar un papel moderno en la sociedad. Un dirigente salafista se negó a aparecer en un programa televisivo de entrevistas políticas mientras la presentadora no se pusiera un pañuelo. Otro criticó la norma impuesta por el Gobierno de incluir a mujeres en las listas electorales y la calificó de “perversa”, a pesar de que Emad Abdel Ghafour, responsable de al Nour, el principal partido salafista, dijo que su grupo sí acepta tener candidatas. Pero las mujeres salafistas que se presentaron tuvieron cuidado de no mostrar el rostro en los carteles electorales y lo sustituyeron por imágenes de flores; además, el partido las agrupó de forma deliberada en la parte inferior de las listas, con pocas probabilidades de obtener escaño. Un jeque salafista declaró hace poco que las mujeres no debían llevar zapatos de tacón en público. Junto a las afirmaciones sobre la intención de prohibir el alcohol y limitar el turismo en las playas, son medidas contra las mujeres que inquietan a los liberales.

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Pero los liberales tampoco han sido grandes Los ultraconservadores grupos defensores de los derechos de las mujeres en salafistas, con el 20% de los votos, no Egipto. La decisión, aprobada en 2000, de tienen reparos en oponerse a que las concederles el derecho al divorcio no mujeres deban desempeñar un papel culpable (antes, tenían que superar el moderno en la sociedad complicado obstáculo legal de demostrar que había malos tratos o abandono), se encontró con las críticas de los grupos islamistas y también de varios laicos, que dijeron que debilitaba la familia. Otros cambios habidos en las leyes que afectan a la condición individual y que han beneficiado a las mujeres durante la última década, en particular una ampliación de los derechos de custodia, son cada vez más objeto de críticas. Los detractores de estas leyes las ridiculizan y las llaman las “leyes de Suzanne”, por Suzanne Mubarak. Dicen que están hechas para contentar a las amigas acomodadas de la ex primera dama, y les atribuyen el aumento de divorcios en el país. Dados los ataques que sufren estas leyes desde todos los rincones del espectro político, es probable que el nuevo parlamento las modifique, y no para bien de las mujeres. La situación parece estar mejor en Túnez. Los liberales y los laicos están muy preocupados por el ascenso de al Nahda, el principal partido islamista del país, y advierten de que podría conducir a revocar los derechos de la mujer. Desde los 50, las tunecinas han disfrutado de los derechos legales más amplios de la región, incluyendo un matrimonio relativamente progresista, divorcio, acceso a métodos anticonceptivos y aborto. Desde que volvió a Túnez a principios de este año, Rached Ghannouchi, el líder de al Nahda, se ha esforzado en tratar de convencer a los tunecinos de que su partido no va a intentar cambiar las leyes que afectan a la condición individual. Sin embargo, algunos acusan al partido islamista de ocultar sus verdaderas intenciones tras una retórica de moderación, una acusación que no impidió que al Nahda obtuviera la victoria con el 41% de los votos en los comicios de octubre. Gracias a unas normas electorales que exigen que se las coloque en puestos favorables en las listas, las mujeres consiguieron el 23% de los escaños en el Parlamento, una proporción más alta que en el Congreso de Estados Unidos. Casi todas pertenecen a al Nahda y seguramente respetarán las opiniones tradicionales de su partido sobre las mujeres, pero, por lo menos, la presencia de un número tan elevado da normalidad al hecho de que las mujeres tengan un papel político activo. Además, hasta ahora, Ghannouchi y otros dirigentes de al Nahda se han centrado deliberadamente en los esfuerzos para reanimar la economía, producir empleo y tranquilizar a los inversores extranjeros. Al Nahda ha formado una coalición con los partidos liberales y, para conservarla, tendrá que seguir prestando atención a la economía y los derechos humanos, en vez de dejarse empantanar en controvertidas guerras culturales. Ghannouchi parece entender que, aunque retirar los beneficios a las mujeres puede darle votos entre los conservadores islámicos, al final, la victoria o derrota de al Nahda dependerá de motivos económicos, y las mujeres son actores económicos importantes. En Túnez tienen un alto grado de alfabetización y una fertilidad relativamente baja, por lo que constituyen casi un tercio de la fuerza laboral del país. La realidad económica exige una estrategia pragmática a la hora de tratar con las tunecinas. Confiemos en que Ghannouchi pueda hacérselo comprender a sus hermanos islamistas de toda la región. De no ser así, las mujeres árabes podrían muy pronto decir lo mismo que sus hermanas iraníes, que se quejan de que la Revolución Islámica de su país no les ha aportado más que pobreza y poligamia. Artículos relacionados ¿Traerá la Primavera Árabe cambios contra las mujeres? Clare Castillejo// "Necesitamos que EE UU y Europa nos dejen en paz". Ana Mangas// Mujeres en posconflictos. http://www.fp-es.org/%C2%BFes-negativa-la-primavera-arabe-para-las- mujeres?utm_source=SendBlaster&utm_medium=email&utm_term=SendBlaster&utm_content=ealerta& utm_campaign=la%25fragmentacion%25siria

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Africa

December 22, 2011 How to Control Libya Missiles? Buy Them Up By C. J. CHIVERS TRIPOLI, Libya — The United States is discussing with the Libyan interim government the creation of a program to purchase shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles from militia members and others who gathered them up during the war, American government officials said. The talks are the latest step in a multinational effort to contain the risks posed by the thousands of portable antiaircraft weapons that are unaccounted for after rebel fighters overran government weapons depots during the battle against Col. Muammar el- Qaddafi’s forces. Western security officials worry that terrorists could use this particular type of missile, which is lightweight and relatively easy to fire, to menace civilian passenger planes. Details remain unresolved, the officials said. But in essence the United States would provide money and technical support to Libya’s government, which would purchase the missiles, and either lock them up in government arsenals or destroy them. “We think we have come to the point where we need some sort of special program,” one official familiar with the plans said. The missiles, believed to command premium prices on the black market, are a limited threat to modern military warplanes but pose potentially grave dangers to civilian aircraft, which rarely are equipped with the electronic countermeasures that can thwart heat-seeking warheads. Known as Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, or Manpads, the missiles are a class of weapon that includes the well-known Stinger. The version loose in large quantities in Libya, the SA-7, is an earlier Eastern bloc generation. Assistant Secretary of State Andrew J. Shapiro raised the American desire to arrange a purchase program in a meeting this month with Libya’s new defense minister, according to American officials familiar with the proposal. The United States has committed $40 million to secure Libya’s arms stockpiles, much of it to prevent the spread of Manpads. No budget has been designed for a purchase program, and the price to be paid for each missile and its components has not been determined, the official said. If Libya agrees to a program, prices will probably be set by Libyan officials after testing the market, he added. The official, along with others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because the program, if approved, would be classified. Although such efforts are often called “buyback” programs, in this case even the label raises sensitivities, officials said.

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After providing Stinger missiles to Afghan forces fighting the Soviets in the 1980s, the United States organized a buyback program, trying to reduce the chance that the missiles would be used against international civilian air traffic or Western military planes. In Libya, the program would not technically be a buyback, as these weapons were not provided by the West, American officials said. They were purchased from Eastern bloc suppliers during Colonel Qaddafi’s long period of arms acquisition. Matthew H. Schroeder, a researcher who covers proliferation of Manpads at the Federation of American Scientists, said that such purchase programs had taken missiles out of circulation in Afghanistan and Iraq. “These programs have netted Manpads in the past, in at least quantities in the low hundreds,” he said. He emphasized that he did not know any details of the American plans for Libya, and that he could not comment on them. The American government has estimated that Libya’s military imported 20,000 of the missiles during Colonel Qaddafi’s reign; the number now missing is a fraction of that. Precise estimates are impossible, officials say, because no one is sure how many the military still possessed at the outset of the uprising or later after months of fighting. Some of the missiles were fired in training and in war. Others were disassembled by rebels, who used their tubes as makeshift launchers for other looted ordnance. Many of the missing missiles were looted, either by rebels or would-be profiteers. Many more were destroyed in bunkers that were hit in airstrikes. Since the war’s end, the State Department has paid for teams of private security contractors who have been canvassing the country, examining former government arms depots and meeting with anti-Qaddafi militia commanders to try to account for and secure the remaining stock. The United States has also sent teams to the countries bordering Libya to encourage increased inspections and vigilance for missile trafficking. So far, the survey teams have accounted for about 5,000 missiles, the State Department said, including those destroyed or fired, held by militia groups or disabled by the teams. Officials caution that given the large number of missiles presumed missing, and the limited ability of Libya’s interim authorities to police their borders or to control the militias, not all the missiles will be accounted for or secured. The goal, they said, is to reduce the chances of large numbers turning up on the black market by finding and collecting as many missiles as they can, and ensure that as many others as possible are stored safely. “We’re buying down risk,” Mr. Shapiro said in an interview last month, before the discussions for a purchase program began. During that interview, he explicitly refused to comment on any efforts to purchase the missiles. Through a spokesman, he declined to comment again this week. Many factors have made precise accounting difficult, including the poor record-keeping of the Qaddafi military. The survey teams have not found detailed ledgers of inventory, or how many were issued to units or fired in training, where the missiles were kept or even whether the stock was rotated and inspected.

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“We have found no databases, nothing,” said Nicholas A. Spignesi, a State Department official who supervised the effort in Libya in November. The decision to seek Libya’s agreement for a missile-purchase program is a recognition that the efforts so far have had their limits. As part of the assessment of problems in recent months, survey teams have found that significant quantities of the missiles are in the hands of the hundreds of armed militias in Libya. But the militias have shown little interest in turning the weapons in, participants said. An official familiar with the proposal said that putting money or other forms of aid on the table in exchange for the missiles might create incentives for the militias. The official said that the Libyan government could offer cash for missiles and missile components, or “in-kind support,” like jobs or other equipment for fighters looking to return to civilian life. Although there have been news media reports of the more modern Russian SA-24 Manpads in Libya, there is no evidence yet to support the claims, American officials said. The SA-24s purchased by Libya were part of a vehicle-mounted system, the evidence suggests, and were not configured for shoulder firing. No SA-24 grip stocks or paperwork for grip stocks have been found. Several people involved in the effort said there had been an internal debate about the merits of a purchase program, which could lead to many missiles’ being turned in, but may also make some groups hold out for higher prices. “It is a delicate balance on when you do it and when you don’t do it,” one official said. C. J. Chivers reported from Washington, and Misurata, Mizdah and Tripoli, Libya. C. J. CHIVERS How to Control Libya Missiles? Buy Them Up December 22, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/world/africa/us-seeks-program-to-buy-up-missiles-loose-in- libya.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

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ft.com World Europe December 22, 2011 8:53 pm Reality of life after communism By Leyla Boulton Leyla Boulton, former Moscow correspondent, returns to Russia 20 years after the Soviet collapse

A pro-democracy demonstrator drags a Soviet soldier out of his tank during the abortive coup A coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, the secretary-general of the Communist party who attempted the gradual perestroika (restructuring) of the Soviet Union, paved the way for the collapse of the Soviet empire and its state-run economy 20 years ago this weekend. In place of the USSR came 15 separate countries. Chief of these was Russia, whose democratically elected president, Boris Yeltsin, had stood atop a tank to defy the hardline coup leaders who held Mr Gorbachev prisoner in his holiday villa on the Crimea. More ON THIS STORY Medvedev urges far-reaching reforms Editorial Looking the bear straight in the eye Climate of protest emboldens Russian TV Comment The myths of Russia old and new Interview Infighting fails to quell Russia opposition ON THIS TOPIC Kremlin accused of move to split protesters Mikhail Prokhorov A pretender’s bid for power Putin on defensive over protests Speaker of Russia’s parliament stands down IN EUROPE Austerity set to increase inequality in Portugal El Gordo brings festive spirit to weary Spain Ukraine’s Tymoshenko boycotts ‘farce’ appeal trial VW gives BlackBerry-wielding workers a silent night By the time the coup fizzled out, the scene was set for the Communist party to give up its 84-year monopoly on power. A team of young reformers headed by Yegor Gaidar liberalised prices and launched mass privatisation through vouchers given to every Russian. Ensuing economic hardship, aggravated by the reformers’ compromises and missteps under President Yeltsin’s erratic leadership, triggered a backlash against change any other society would have found bewildering. Yeltsin’s replacement, Vladimir Putin,

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presided over an increasingly authoritarian system of government, and pandered to nostalgia for the past while allowing the economy to stagnate on the back of high oil prices. For the 61-year-old former spymaster, the Soviet Union’s collapse was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. In contrast, Dmitry Medvedev, 45, the current president, says Russians of his age are probably the “happiest generation” for being able to appreciate how far the country has travelled since the empty shop shelves of the dying Soviet era. I returned to Russia for the verdict of four friends. The author was an FT correspondent in Moscow from 1990-94 The civil society activist

Lena Nemirovskaya, an art historian who used to gather foreigners and Russians around her kitchen table, set up a school in 1993 to inculcate democratic values in a new generation of politicians. “It’s like a big kitchen table,” Lena, a youthful 71-year-old, explains over dinner. “We had the illusion that with a change of generation, this Sovietness would go away, but it was not so.” She draws some comfort however from this month’s protests after clearly-documented fraud in this month’s elections. “This is a civic movement, about giving people dignity as citizens,” she explains. She and her husband Yuri Senokosov, a philosopher who also teaches at the school, were among the signatories of a declaration urging Russians to work together to reverse the country’s slide into authoritarian rule. “We appeal to all social forces to unite to act in order to avoid a national catastrophe,” says the grandly-named memorandum of the founding conference of the December 12 roundtable. Her Moscow School of Political Studies has given its short lecture courses to 10,000 people since it opened its doors 18 years ago, supported by western grants and, more recently, donations from Russian business. Speakers have included Peter Mandelson, the British ex-minister, European Commissioner, and spin-doctor.

How much difference has the school made? “Our sessions have changed. People now accept criticism and the opinion of others,” she says, speaking before the latest outburst of civic activism. Her graduates include the mayors of sizable cities like Nizhny- Novgorod, the president’s speechwriter, and a deputy finance minister. But it has been a lonely struggle. “We would like this education to be less unique and for it to be available in schools,” she says, referring to a lack of civic education for young Russians.

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The businessman

Misha Berger, now 58, started his conversion from journalist to businessman when he developed a “sushi index” for provincial towns to figure out where media advertising would flourish. “I travelled to many regions and since official data were unreliable or often just wrong, I would ask how many Japanese restaurants a town had. If it had five to six, there had to be an upper middle class.” By that indicator, Perm with six sushi bars was a far more attractive commercial proposition than sushi-free Krasnoyarsk. After a distinguished career at Izvestia covering the economy from the death throes of communism to the birth of market reforms, he put up a sign saying “Berger for sale” when the paper was taken over by Vladimir Potanin, an oligarch who made clear that coverage should not touch any of the sectors covered by his diversified business empire. “I understood that if you considered all the interests of [Potanin’s] Onexim group, you would have to close down the newspaper’s economic coverage.” He then went to set up a new daily newspaper for Vladimir Gusinsky, a media magnate who ended up fleeing abroad to escape Vladimir Putin’s crackdown on oligarchs.

Misha stayed and thrived to become director-general of United Media, a media group owned by one of the other oligarchs still standing after the crackdown. In business, Misha steers clear of political coverage to focus on business and entertainment. Yet during this month’s protests, he was working round the clock – to oversee the news coverage of the protests. And he is not afraid to voice his views. “I have a great deal of respect for Gorbachev,” says Misha, who attended the ex-Soviet leader’s 80th birthday celebrations in London - a reminder of how the man who presided over the Soviet system’s demise is reviled, or at best forgotten, at home. “It’s a shame we have to export this feeling of pride. Here we behave as if he does not exist.” The policewoman

A career policewoman, Galya Lebedeva-Yegorova, 56, was one of Russia’s first entrepreneurs – in the days when private businesses were not allowed. In 1990 she used her time off duty to paint my flat. Having retired two years ago with a clutch of Veteran of Labour medals, she is contemplating a return to work as an office “menedzher” [manager]. Yet she remains a steadfast supporter of the Communist party,

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which feeds on resentment of the country’s conspicuous inequalities and the authorities’ failure to provide as they once did in an increasingly idealised Soviet past. Galya shrugs off charges of widespread corruption in the police force, saying “there is nothing to steal”. She regrets the forced departure earlier this year of old-style operator Yuri Luzhkov as Moscow mayor. In his time, she says, the roads were properly cleared of snow and police enjoyed free travel on all public transport. How Elena Baturina, his property-developer wife, became Russia’s richest woman during his time in office is of little interest to her. Since the collapse of communism paved the way for Russians to travel abroad freely, Galya has been on police exchange trips to Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and Israel.

She is unimpressed by the other big change since Soviet times – the abundance of goods in the shops. “There is a lot in the shops but everything is expensive,” she says, speaking in a flat that still has no washing machine. She reminds me that in the old days, I gave her daughter and son-in-law trainers from abroad as wedding presents. “We traced their feet on pieces of paper for you because they were difficult to find here.” Galya hints she might have been open to voting differently, had squabbling democrats such as Grigory Yavlinsky got their act together to win popular appeal. “I don’t necessarily agree with you,” she tells her husband as he declares the couple’s allegiance to the Communist party. “I might be a radical.” The politician

At 59, Grigory Yavlinsky, an economist and founder of the opposition Yabloko (Apple) party, has been confined to the role of a latter-day Cassandra since walking out of the first democratically-elected Russian government of Boris Yeltsin in November 1990. A charismatic and highly-intelligent figure, he has consistently warned that disaster would follow the policies implemented by others. After years in a marginalised opposition, he gets his latest chance of a “voice” – a chance to put his views to the public on state-controlled broadcast media – with his bid to run for president against Vladimir Putin in elections next March. “If you are jumping out of a window, it’s a very fast way down,” is how he describes the price liberalisation and privatisation pursued by a team of young reformers led by Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais after Russia became fully independent in December 1991. “I was proposing we take the stairs. The problem is that Chubais and Gaidar were asking other people to jump out the window, while they stayed in the room.”

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As a result, in the Putin era, “we have an economy without property rights, without the rule of law and where there is an enormous gap between rich and poor – three per cent who have a very high standard of living, 20 per cent who have a a western standard of living and 75 per cent of people who have no future, no prospects of a decent job, education or medical care.”

Other economists like Yevgeny Yasin, a former economics minister, argue there was no scope for the gradual approach advocated by Yavlinsky, who retorts:. “The major problem of this period is the disappointment of the people, and that’s why people are leaving.” This includes his two sons, both of whom are living in London but who would like to return to Russia when they see signs of progress. What keeps him going? “I love my country, I love my people. I love my children. I have pessimistic thinking, but an optimistic will.” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2a39d804-2cd3-11e1-b485- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1hLSKRrfn

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12/22/2011 06:28 PM Armenian Genocide Vote Turkey Withdraws Ambassador from France Following a move by the French lower house of parliament to pass a bill making it a punishable crime to deny the genocide of Armenians, Turkey has announced retaliatory measures. The issue of the killings between 1915 and 1917 has long divided Ankara and European countries. In the end, repeated protests from Turkey had little impact: France's lower house of parliament voted on Thursday to approve a draft law that would impose stiff penalties on any person in France who denies the genocide of Armenians by Ottoman Turks between 1915 and 1917. In an interview with French foreign broadcaster France 24, Patrick Devedjian, a member of Sarkozy's UMP party of Armenian origin, praised the vote. "The purpose of the bill is to stop foreign nations from coming to France and pushing discriminatory propaganda against people living here," he told FRANCE 24. "We are not seeking to rewrite history; the Armenian genocide is an established fact, an undeniable truth." It didn't take long for Ankara to provide an official response. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said his country would recall its ambassador from France, suspend joint military maneuvers and restrict French military flights. "We are recalling our ambassador in Paris to Ankara for consultations," the Turkish president said. "As of now, we are cancelling bilateral level political, economic and military activities," Erdogan said, according to the Associated Press. "We are suspending all kinds of political consultations with France." Both Turkey and France are members of NATO, and the disagreement comes at a time of cooperation on issues ranging from the uprising in Syria to Afghanistan, according to AP. Paris moved in January 2001 to formally recognize the killings that took place as genocide, but at the time that decision did not include any punitive measures for anyone denying the Armenian massacres took place. If the legislation is implemented, the Public Prosecutor would now be empowered to press charges against anyone who denies any case of genocide officially recognized by France on French soil -- even at public protests. The law also carried additional weight because organizations that, "in their charter" engage themselves on behalf of "the moral rights and honor of the victims of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes," can also be able to be included as co-plaintiffs in future cases against people who deny genocides. 'Lasting and Irreparable Consequences' Turkey, as the legal successor to the Ottoman Empire, disputes that what took place between 1915 and 1917 can be called "genocide." In a statement, the French National Assembly described attempts by Turkey to apply pressure on the parliament as "unacceptable." In the run-up to Thursday's vote, Ankara had warned of "lasting and irreparable consequences" if the French moved to approve the draft law. "It is out of the question 281

for us to accept the draft law that is on the agenda of the National Assembly of France, which aims to eliminate our freedom to refute the unfair and unfounded accusations against our country and nation," Turkish President Abdullah Gül said in a statement released earlier this week. Officials in Turkey consider the planned law to be a maneuver by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and motivated by an election campaign in which he is targeting ethnic Armenian voters in France. Leaders of the opposition Socialist Party in France tend to agree. Around 500,000 people of Armenian origin reside in France, and Armenian groups had pushed for the legislation. The draft law had been written by Valérie Boyer, a member of Sarkozy's UMP party, and with the president's backing. Under the law, denying genocide would be a crime punishable with a fine of up the €45,000 ($59,000) and one year in jail. However, following its passage in the National Assembly, the bill still requires the approval of the country's second legislative chamber, the Senate, which is dominated by the opposition Socialists. It could face a significant challenge there given that the Socialists are viewing the bill as a campaign move by the president. The speaker of the National Assembly says it may not go before the Senate until the end of 2012. The controversial legislation deals with a particularly dark chapter in Turkish history. Between April 1915 and July 196, around two-thirds of all Armenians living in the territory of what is modern-day Turkey were either deported or killed. It has been estimated that between 200,000 and 1.5 million Armenians lost their lives in the Ottoman Empire during the massacres, which were organized by the so-called Young Turks during World War I, who were allied with the Central Powers, which included the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The planned killing of the Christian minority is considered the first genocide of the 20th century, and more than a dozen parliaments around the world have codified the massacres as official cases of genocide. Turkey, however, has never accepted the description and instead speaks of "tragic events" that took place at the time. A few hours after the vote in the National Assembly, more than 1,000 people of Turkish origin protested in front of the parliament in Paris against the planned law. In addition to the Armenian genocide bill, France has had legislation in place since 1990 making it a crime to deny the Holocaust. But Berlin still has not officially recognized the Armenian genocide. In 2005, the German parliament called upon Turkey to acknowledge its "historical responsibility," but avoided using the word "genocide." Germany is home to a population of several million residents of Turkish descent. dsl -- with wires

URL: Turkey Withdraws Ambassador from France12/22/2011 06:28 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,805460,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • The Art of Turkish-Armenian Relations: Controversial Kars Monument Could Come to Berlin (05/05/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,760384,00.html

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• Demons of the Past: The Armenian Genocide and the Turks (04/08/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,687449,00.html • Serge Sarkisian on Armenian-Turkish Relations: 'We Wanted to Break Through Centuries of Hostility' (04/06/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,687387,00.html • SPIEGEL Interview with Turkey's Prime Minister: 'There Can be No Talk of Genocide' (03/29/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,686131,00.html • Turkish EU Minister on the Armenian Genocide Controversy: 'We Are Very Sensitive About This Issue' (03/16/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,683701,00.html

12/22/2011 03:47 PM The Streets of the Revolution North Africa, One Year Later By Alexander Smoltczyk Twelve months ago, a young man in Tunisia ignited himself and triggered a revolution that spread across northern Africa. A year later, correspondent Alexander Smolzczyk set out in a new series on a journey to assess the changes the tumultuous Maghreb region has undergood -- from Morocco to Egypt. On Dec. 17, 2010, Mohamded Bouazizi, a young man in rural Tunisia, poured gasoline on himself -- and ignited an entire region. One by one, the people of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya toppled their rulers. One year after Bouazizi's self-immolation, much has changed in the Maghreb. But a lot has remained the same. In places where secular rulers held prevailed for decades, Islamists are now trying to seize the reins of power. And many people there are just as poor and hopeless as they were before the revolutions. This is the first article in a series by SPIEGEL correspondent Alexander Smoltczyk as he travels eastward across the Maghreb, from Rabat to Alexandria, from the Atlantic to the Nile, to take the pulse of the region and explore where things might go from here. The Cairo-Dakar Highway runs 8,636 kilometers (5,366 miles) across North Africa, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Nile River. The section along the Mediterranean coast is called the "Transmaghrébine." Parts of the Transmaghrébine have broad lanes and are outfitted with tollbooths and roadside lighting. In other parts, it is a work in progress or suddenly stops and disappears into the sand. These are the places where there are still World War II-era German bunkers, and where the bombed-out tanks of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi are already beginning to rust. Some countries have just begun construction, while patches of new asphalt are already missing in others, revealing the old road surface underneath. Some say that the Transmaghrébine is a historic project, proof of a turning point for North Africa and the Arab world. Others say that the project is doomed to fail because

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nothing can ever change for the better in the Maghreb, the northern region of Africa stretching from Libya to Mauritania. Of course, a road is not proof of change by itself. But anyone who embarks on a trip along the Transmaghrébine these days will quickly realize that he or she is not alone. Indeed, many people are traveling on the Transmaghrébine, with even more waiting on the side of the road. And the segment between the Moroccan capital Rabat and Cairo cuts right through a region of recent rebellion, offering the traveler a composite view of revolutions in their diverse aggregate states -- sometimes hot, sometimes cold and sometimes already dissipated. So let's go, let the journey begin! Or, to quote Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, "Off to Benghazi!" KILOMETER 0: Rabat, Fort Rottembourg Highways are like revolutions. No one knows exactly where they begin or end. In the far western part of Rabat -- so close to the Atlantic that you can taste the spray on your lips -- stands Fort Rottembourg, like a rampart, with its rusted steel and two iron domes over the command post. A German engineer built the fort for a Moroccan sultan more than 100 years ago, and no one has ever captured its walls. Except Saber the Clown. Saber Abderrahmane lives there with his mother and family. They settled down here and planted tomatoes. He rolls his eyes behind thick glasses. Then he raises his eyebrows and puts one hand behind his ear. War. You hear the sounds of stamping boots, fanfares, gunshots and an explosion. Someone shouts commands, and then there are sirens, an air-raid alarm, the rat-a-tat-tat of machine-gun fire, the squawking of radios and, once again, the screeching of the Stuka bombers. A picture of a battle in sounds comes pouring out of the mouth of Saber the Clown. Ever since doctors removed a tumor from his head when he was a child, Saber has had the uncanny ability to imitate any sound. Whatever he hears re-emerges from his lips like an echo. He could perform, perhaps even on television. But no one in Rabat is interested. Saber, 33, is standing in his fort, wearing a T-shirt imprinted with the words "Mouvement Populaire," or Popular Movement. He got it for free as a promotional gift. How does a clown feel about the rebellions happening all around him? Saber purses his lips and out comes the dark hoot of a screech owl. A short man joins us. Then he nods, listens and smiles. Saber has given up hoping for anything. What will change? Nothing. What more can one do? Little more than nothing. Saber is imitating a birdcall when a policeman in a carefully pressed uniform appears out of nowhere. Someone called him. "What are you doing?" he demands. "I'm whistling," says the clown. "For foreigners? Do you have a permit?"

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He has no permit, so the officer orders him to stop whistling. There will be no whistling here, he says. Morocco hasn't had its revolution yet. But, like the coastline of Gibraltar, it's is simultaneously close and unattainable.

KILOMETER 3: Rabat, Royal Palace The short, smiling man who had joined us is part of a network of informants the palace uses to control Morocco. They include ragged park attendants, janitors, all the people standing on corners, the block wardens and the people who sit in coffeehouses. The sovereign rules in two ways, wrote Alexis de Tocqueville: "He controls one part of his people with their fear of his officials, and the other with their hope of becoming his officials." "Le Palais" is the center of power. The palace is located in downtown Rabat, a sort of campus with pruned espalier trees and a school for the king's children. The official name of the palace is Dar al-Makhsen, which roughly translates into "House of Power." It is said that King Mohammed VI ("M6") has never been particularly interested in ruling, preferring instead to play with his cars or jet off to Paris. Of course, this is just nonsense, subversive nonsense. Even though images of him are rarely to be seen in the streets, M6 is an absolute monarch. Every word spoken by the king in an official capacity is noted and has the force of law. Three or four circles have formed around the ruler, consisting of at least a dozen close advisers who control the country. They were educated in France and equipped with perfect manners -- and a determination to stay in power. Morocco is controlled by a trinity of "God, Fatherland and King." But if a young soccer fan decides to paint the words "Dieu, Patrie, Barça!" -- the last word referring to famous Spanish soccer club FC Barcelona -- onto a wall, he can be locked up. The House of Power has been on edge since a young fruit vendor set himself on fire in Tunisia a year ago. There were protests in Morocco on Feb. 20, when tens of thousands stood in the pouring rain to demand the dismissal of the government, reforms and jobs. The protesters, who would like to see the country adopt a Spanish-style monarchy, call themselves the "Mouvement du 20. Février," or "M20." The government responded by quickly recruiting new security personnel, while the existing security officials were ordered to beef up their visibility. Provocateurs turned up to discredit the citizens' and youth movement as troublemakers. It reportedly cost the government €30 million ($39 million) to stem the revolution in Morocco. Le Palais is in charge of everything, including revolutions. "I want this reform," King Mohammed declared stiffly, looking earnest in a TV address on March 9, while at the same time announcing that a new constitution was to be drawn up. Soon afterwards, on July 14, the Constitutional Council was able to announce that, according to a referendum, 98.47 percent of Moroccans support the new constitution. The text is displayed at kiosks. The prime minister is now appointed from within the strongest faction in parliament, and no longer at the king's discretion. Nevertheless, Article 46 of the new constitution reads: "The person of the king is inviolable, and he is to be treated with respect." A Revolution Postponed

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Driss Ksikes is sitting in the Weimar Café at the local Goethe Institut, the German cultural institution. It is an open space with a license to serve alcohol that is equally popular among artists, informants and court officials. In early 2007, Ksikes -- a playwright, author and sociologist -- was convicted of "defaming Islam" after having published a book about humor in Morocco. "The king believed that autocracy is better than Islamism, and he believed that he could placate the people with his major projects," says Ksikes, as he eats olives, raising his voice to be heard in the noisy café. "Both ideas were failures because both only increased corruption." The election victory of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) was accepted as fate in Morocco. Hassan II, the father of M6, banned many of the liberal arts in the 1970s, fearing that they would undermine his power. Instead, he imported Koran teachers from Egypt. As a result, two entire generations of Moroccans were deprived of intellectual stimulation. The success of the religious party is the delayed result of Hassan's policies. As has happened in Tunisia and Egypt, they have captured the trust of the uneducated and the rural population -- in other words, of those who were excluded from modernization efforts. Ksikes now expects to see an alliance develop between the Islamist party and other conservatives. "That would mean somewhat less corruption and more budgetary discipline," he says." More equality, but less freedom." Shariah, or Islamic law, forms the basis of Morocco's legal system. Ksikes predicts that it will probably be interpreted somewhat more strictly now. To the king, the Islamists are nothing if not suspect. He senses that they derive their power from something that cannot be readily co-opted with money. But Le Palais will come to some kind of arrangement with them. It doesn't matter, says Ksikes. The Movement of Feb. 20 has shown that Moroccans are not just subjects, but also citoyens, or citizens. "A crack has begun to open up," Ksikes says. "It will get bigger. Perhaps it will take five years, or perhaps 10. The revolution has merely been postponed." Morocco's intellectuals are preparing for a period of hibernation. "Islamist totalitarianism" may only be a stage on the road to democracy, wrote the independent weekly magazine Telquel, "a night that must be traveled through before one can see the light of day." A Renewed Islamic Identity An icy rain is falling. National Highway 6 passes eastward through Salé, a drab suburb of Rabat. The first republic on African soil was proclaimed there in 1627: the free Republic of Bou Regreg, founded by Barbary pirates. Today, the city is a stronghold of devout Salafists, who are eyed with great suspicion by the country's security forces -- almost as if the pirates had returned. Young men are selling nuts in plastic cups. The palace's first reaction to the news that a street vendor had set himself on fire in Tunisia was to give every subject the right to place a piece of cardboard on the sidewalk and sell goods, even goods as mundane as used shoes and nuts.

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There is not a tree in sight for hundreds of kilometers, only shrubs and mud huts. The road bisects the pale yellow, washed out plains as it heads eastward in the direction of the Orient. The protests moved in the same direction. After the Arab Spring, people were no longer afraid to express their opinions. And since no one is willing to oppose the will of the people, the Arab Spring has turned into an Islamic spring. This will be our experience on this journey, at every stage of the Transmaghrébine -- in Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi and Alexandria. The same language is spoken everywhere, and the same television stations are watched. And in all the places where autocrats have squandered their opportunities, the Islamic- Arab identity is being reconfirmed. A new region has been created -- and Europe will have to get used to it. KILOMETER 516: Oujda, Crossing the Border into Algeria The Transmaghrébine ends at a few oil barrels filled with cement. A dog walks sluggishly out from behind one of the barrels. The currency exchange office is closed. There is nothing to exchange. The border has been repeatedly closed since 1963, sometimes because of a border conflict, sometimes because of the Polisario Front liberation movement and, most recently, because of an assassination in Marrakesh. Morocco and Algeria are simultaneously enemies and sister states. There is a go-cart racetrack at Café l'Etape, on a sand dune right near the border. "There is a place north of here where we can wave to each other," says the daughter of the café owner, who has family on the other side. "Otherwise, we drive to Casablanca and fly to (nearby) Oran from there. That's normal." These resemble the facts of life that existed in Berlin before the Wall came down. In the border city of Oujda, there is a modern airport and a municipal art gallery where a photo of the king is hanging on the wall. There are French-style traffic lights, and the cafés are full. Everything is ready. Oujda is waiting for relations to thaw and for the border to open -- or for the government on the other side to collapse. Still, the regime on that other side believes that its revolutions are over and done with. In Algeria, the word "revolution" is something for military parades and speeches given by stiff-hipped leaders, but not a term of present-day relevance. The former fighters for independence from France have become very rich. They know what they stand to lose. They also know how to overthrow a regime, which is why they are so vigilant. An uprising has been underway throughout the country since the beginning of January. At first, it was to protest increased prices, but then it quickly turned against the system. The system had to bring in armored vehicles to break down the barricades that had been set up by the young protesters, and there were casualties. Then the price hikes were reversed. Algeria has seen a lot of blood: in the war of independence, which lasted until 1962; in the 1988 bread riots; and in the civil war of the 1990s. Algeria was the first country in the Maghreb to hold elections that saw a majority of voters support Islamists. This prompted the military to take over power. "Algeria paid a high price, with thousands dead, and it still hasn't fully recovered from this situation. What does Algerian society want? To gradually descend into hell?" These

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were the words of Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, spoken in full knowledge of just how vivid memories of the civil war still are today. A Country Skipped On the other side of the border post, behind olive trees and a herd of sheep, a freshly paved highway suddenly emerges out of nowhere. The edges of the road are ragged, but the highway already has a shoulder and road signs. It is the Transmaghrébine, inviting and yet inaccessible and, as if to make a defiant statement, it is separated from its Moroccan segment by a few hundred meters. In the Algerian Embassy, we were told that, "unfortunately, Monsieur," a visa could not be issued to someone whose passport identifies him as a journalist, "but perhaps at another time." And so, despite the wide, paved highway, our journey will have to skip planned stops in Oran, Algiers and Annaba, the coastal Algerian cities mentioned in the writings of Albert Camus. This is a shame. The rebellions in the spring also skipped over the country. Perhaps at another time. KILOMETER 1,944: Tunis, "Quartier de la Révolution" Latifa Charny was born 49 years ago in St. Etienne, on the Loire River, and trained as an executive assistance. When she fell in love with a local boy, her family reacted by marrying her off to a man in their native Tunisia. Instead of resisting, she learned the Arab words for goat and water and man. Now, seven children, 32 years and many prayers later, she is standing on the side of an access road northwest of Tunis. "Regardez," says Charny, "just look." A dozen shacks, cobbled together out of sheet metal, pallets, bricks and plastic, stand in a flat, rocky field. The inhabitants were evicted from their apartments in the turmoil of the rebellion. But, since then, no one has felt responsible for their plight. They named their shantytown "Thaura," the Arabic word for "revolution," in the hope that it would make things change more quickly. Eleven months later, there is a new governor and new officials in city hall. But they are still where they were, waiting in their huts on this reddish plot of barren land. There is no electricity, and they buy their water at a construction site and carry it home in buckets. In one of the huts, a three-day- old baby is lying on a mattress under an oil lamp. The Tunisians were the pioneers of the Arab spring. They are the first to have a freely elected government, complete with a human rights activist as their new president. The Tunisians have already arrived at the place that Libyans, Algerians, Moroccans and Egyptians want to reach. Growing Support for Islamists So who did Charnya -- a woman who was abducted by her own family at 17 and condemned to a life of herding goats, and who now lives in a shack with her husband, who has lung disease, and their seven children -- vote for? "Me?" Charny asks. "I voted for Islam." In other words, she voted for its secular manifestation, the Ennahda Movement, which was banned for years. They were the only ones who came to see the people living in the Thaura neighborhood. "They give us hope," says Charny. 288

Some 37 percent of Tunisians voted for the Ennahda Party, 27 percent of Moroccans voted for the PJD and about 40 percent for the Muslim Brotherhood in the first round of elections in Egypt. This is an Islamism that is betting on elections -- because it can't lose them. The dialectic of enlightenment: In all Maghreb countries, the Arab Spring has witnessed a blossoming of support for Islamists rather than for Western-style civil society. But revolutions can last a long time. In 1971, then-US President Richard Nixon asked Zhou Enlai, the Chinese prime minister and a top aide to Mao Zedong, how the French Revolution had changed the West. Zhou reportedly responded: "It is still too early to tell." KILOMETER 1,980: Carthage, "Villa Didon" "The revolution is like a child. You wait for years until it finally works. Then it's born, and you notice that it's handicapped, that it has Down's syndrome. At first, you are distraught. But then you love it nonetheless, because it's so full of life." Actress Nadia Boussetta has the profile of the Goddess Athena, and she's furious. Her remark about the child-like revolution comes at the end of an evening, in the city's most fashionable club high above the Bay of Carthage, at the end of a long, angry monologue about the "ancien régime" (the former regime of deposed Tunisian leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali), the ineptness of the left and the manipulations of the system. Her parents believed in Nasser, the Egyptian revolutionary, and Arab unity. She accuses them of having failed to notice how the population was mired in poverty. "We knew nothing about the people," she says, after slipping into the first person plural. Fear of Increased Islamization More than 100 new parties have been created, including several that are hardly more than one-man movements. A Tunisian exile, Hachemi Hamdi, ran an election campaign from London with the help of his own television station. Earlier, he was a friend of toppled dictator Ben Ali, but now he is a friend of the Islamist party. He is nicknamed "la girouette," the weathercock. But his faction is the third largest in the new parliament. "How can this be?" asks Boussetta, who took part in the protests from the very first day. She published a dossier about the torture chambers. She attends every women's demonstration, especially when the goal is to fight the barbarism of the past. Unfortunately, the bearded Islamists won the election. "I fight," she says, pausing to take a drag from her long cigarette holder, "because if my six-year-old daughter did not have the right to the pill, abortion and divorce one day, I would be ashamed." But what if her daughter wants to wear the veil in a few years? "That. Will. Not. Happen." KILOMETER 1,991: Tunis, the Casbah District Blood mixed with cigarette butts still fills the gutters of the Old City. Blood and bits of hair are stuck to the paving stones of public squares. Skulls and claws are cooking on home-made grills, sometimes fired only with garbage. It is early November and the day

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after Eid al-Adha, the Islamic feast of sacrifice. The streets are filled with the stench of charred meat. The campaign posters have been removed, leaving behind only black grids resembling rows of crosses on the walls. Channeling Che Guevara, one could say that elections are the cemeteries of revolutions. There is more football-related graffiti to be seen along the street than political slogans. Someone says that the rebellion began in the stadiums two years ago. Having the police beat fans and the crowds boo government representatives were ominous signs. So were the networks born on the Internet and the appointments made on Facebook. Everything was already there in the fan community. A fighting ram with enormous testicles is tied to a table in one of the cafés in the Casbah. Young men taunt the animal out of boredom, gyrating their lower bodies like matadors. A young woman walks by, looking proud in her sunglasses and uncovered hair. Will she be able to do this in a few years? "No." Najmeddin Mokhrani wouldn't forbid it, he says, but "society will be different. This woman will dress differently of her own accord." Perhaps Mokhrani knows more about the future than others. Not because he has found "the way," but because the future belongs to him. His people won the election. Mokhrani is an Islamist, and that, as he says, is a good thing. "Islam is a voice, not an ideology, and not politics." Mokhrani is a 30-year-old with crow's feet around his eyes. In the past, he says, he was the crook of the neighborhood. He is familiar with Europe, after having been married to a Dutch woman in Amsterdam. "The mother-in-law didn't want me," he says, even though he wasn't wearing a beard yet at the time. His ideal country, he says, would be Qatar. Or Malaysia. Not westernized Turkey, and not Dubai. While Mokhrani chats amiably about Shariah and the ban on alcohol that he says will soon take effect, a guest sitting at the next table becomes increasingly agitated. He is apparently a boyhood friend from the same neighborhood. Finally, he can no longer contain himself and interrupts the conversation: "Okay, Najmeddin, and what about stoning?" he asks. "Would you participate in that?" "No." "Okay, but would you be for it?" "I can't be against it. It's written in the Koran." Mokhrani is a member of the Ennahda Party, which is seen in the West as the proponent of a moderate Islamism. KILOMETER 2,217: Sfax, Turnoff to Sidi Bouzid Sfax is a port city where Italian dealmakers, sailors, smuggling barons and homeless Gadhafi supporters drink beer in the hotel bars. For some reason, Sfax is also the twin city of Marburg, a medieval university town in central Germany. A marble panel attests to the fact. The text is written in German, albeit with many spelling errors. 290

From Sfax, a narrow country road leads past the usual tire shops, car-repair joints, poorly constructed warehouses and drab cafés in the direction of Sidi Bouzid. Everywhere there are young men wearing oversized sunglasses, cheap leather jackets and soccer-player haircuts. They lean against trees, lounge in dirty plastic chairs by the roadside or stand in squares, smoking in silence. There are dozens, even thousands of these Giacometti-like figures. They are part of the landscape. They stand around in Fez and Tunis and Misurata, and they stand around in Benghazi and the poverty-stricken suburbs of Cairo. They are waiting, but they have forgotten what it is that they are waiting for. Something had to happen. But the most cataclysmic thing that could have happened, the revolution, already has, and yet they are still standing there. Tarps are already spread out on the ground under some of the trees. The olive harvest is approaching, just as it was on the afternoon of Dec. 17, 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi's mother was in the fields and received the news that her son had been taken to the hospital in Sfax with severe burns. "The martyr Mohamed Bouazizi, was born on 3/29/1984 and died on 1/4/2011." This is the inscription on her son's gravestone, 20 kilometers (13 miles) outside the city. There is an empty flag holder next to the grave. This was where it all began, and where it ended, at least for Bouazizi, who was 26 when he died. A year later, everyone in Sidi Bouzid says that it was really nothing but "a bloody accident." A man named Rochdi says he knew the fruit vendor. "Mohamed wasn't depressed, and he was doing well," he says. "It was just so unfair that they took away his scale and his wares." Rochdi, a 35-year-old who lived in Lausanne, Switzerland, for a long time, pounces on every foreigner he sees like a man dying of thirst. Bouazizi had wanted to speak to the governor. He poured gasoline on his head and held up a lighter. Perhaps he was just carelessly playing with the lighter. But no matter how it transpired, he was suddenly on fire. Rochdi and two friends posted a clip on Facebook. Someone had heard that a woman from the municipal offices had slapped Bouazizi, and someone else explained that he was actually a college graduate facing a hopeless situation like so many others. "Well," says Rochdi, "that isn't quite true." But it worked. A spark is a spark. And this time the ignition was intentional. A Fight for Dignity The traces of fire have been removed from the red-and-yellow paving stones on the sidewalk in front of the governor's mansion. There is no plaque to commemorate the martyr, only some graffiti dubbing the area "Bouazizi Square." And all the streetlights on the main street have been smashed. But that happened in the first post-revolutionary rebellion, when, after the election, a few thousand enraged protesters attacked the police station and the headquarters of the Islamist party. It was a protest stemming from regional concerns. "Many fear that the good positions will now be awarded, once again, to the politicians in Tunis and on the coast," Rochdi says. "And that, once again, we'll get nothing." The people in Sidi Bouzid are not starving. The soil there is fertile. But they object to the fact that the olives they harvest and the tomato paste they make are sold for pennies

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to Sicily, where they are converted into Italian antipasti. It angers them that people with university degrees have to work in the olive groves. What do you want? "Our dignity," Rochdi says. Can he be more specific? "A paved access road, a new cannery and the proper recording of parcels by the land registry office," he says. Sometimes revolutions are stupid affairs. Even more stupid are those who allow conditions to deteriorate so much that revolutions become inevitable. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL: Alexander Smoltczyk North Africa, One Year Later12/22/2011 03:47 PM • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,805190,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • What the Salafists Want: Egypt Faces a Hardline Islamic Future (12/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,803500,00.html • Egypt Heads to the Polls: The Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for Power (11/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800338,00.html • Victory for Ennahda: Why Tunisians Voted for the Islamists (10/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,794133,00.html • Freedoms at Risk: Arab Women Fight to Defend their Rights (11/29/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800447,00.html • Halting Steps Toward Democracy: Arab Revolution Caught Between Euphoria and Despair (08/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,779071,00.html • The Smiling Islamist: Popular Politician Worries Secular Tunisians (10/11/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,791018,00.html • Return of the Islamists: A Questionable Form of Freedom for North Africa (09/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788397,00.html • The End of Western Credibility: Will Democracy Become Islam's Best Friend? (02/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,743330,00.html • After the Revolution: Egypt's Struggle to Reinvent Itself (06/27/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,770813,00.html • Quiet Revolution in Rabat: Morocco's Youth Want Their Own Form of Change (05/25/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,764898,00.html

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Publishing Date: Thu, 22/12/2011 - 15:51

Revolution, military and pain Author: Amar Ali Hassan No one hates stability, security and calm, but true stability comes from a clarity of vision, a general sense of justice and a confidence that the future will bring with it freedom and progress, rather than being imposed through tyranny. Let us not forget that the Mubarak regime ruled us for 30 years under the pretense of “stability and continuity”; the former it transformed into rigidity and the latter into permanent presidency. We should not ignore history, which teaches us that the word “stability” has always been used as a magical term for the counter-revolution. The Advisory Council may be nothing more than a balcony from which the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) takes a bolder look at civilian life. Or perhaps it is a bridge between two different political systems, or a safety net that will allow the generals a safe and gradual exit from power. They may also use it as an alternative to parliament, which is already suffering from “manufacturing flaws”. The worst option is that it may become a wall to hide behind while they plan in the dark what they failed to plan in broad daylight, or a thick rope with which to hang the revolution and revolutionaries. The conflicting statements made by members of the SCAF may be the result of the personal assessments and evaluations of each member to the events on the ground. This may be part of the classic good cop, bad cop routine, whereby someone launches a test balloon, and if it meets with an angry reaction, someone else extinguishes the anger. There may be two wings within the SCAF, which may explain the nature of its current and future political role. In any case, the SCAF has no right to get upset over the reactions, no matter how severe or scathing, so long as it insists on remaining in the “quagmire of politics”, even if for only a temporary period. A constitution written by a majority will most definitely be amended or replaced by a different majority in the future. Therefore, it is best for all political currents to open-mindedly move towards a consensus concerning the new constitution. They should bear in mind that a true, lasting and modern constitution is one considered by the regular citizen — whatever his class, religion, race, accent, ideology or sex — to have been written with the intention of protecting his/her rights and dignity, and of defending his/her interests. In the novel "Children of Gabalawi", Arafa, who symbolizes modern science, fails to control the course of events after Gabalawi kills “religion”. He finds himself in need of religion in order to keep things on the right path. The novel’s clear message is that “religion is indispensable in this life.” In the novel "Ibn Fatouma’s Journey", the main character comes to the conclusion that the answer lies in identifying the Divine Self. In “al-Harafeesh”, the moral of the story is the search for justice. While, in "Cairo 30", we read about the more mature and disciplined Maamoon, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is how Naguib Mahfouz wrote, only to be accused of evil and being

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immoral by an ignorant few. They were ruthless during his life and after his death. Ignorance is truly an affliction. Women’s lines outside of the polling stations were much longer than the men’s lines, and yet woman do not win the seats. It's a mystery on which I have many theories, but I want to hear an explanation for this painful phenomenon from you. Anyone sending in the military police, or any other military units, to confront peaceful protesters is gambling with Egypt’s security and future, and will bear responsibility before God and the homeland for the serious consequences that will result from the armed forces' mistake of entering the political swamp. Oh, how I long for the virtue of self-denial for the sake of general interest. This value and obligation is currently missing from the actions of movements, parties, activists, and public figures, with a few exceptions. When I leave my apartment I leave with hope, but at the end of the day I come home filled with sadness at the site of a poster with the faces of the martyrs, which my wife hung on the door in February. I look at their faces and with all my heart I tell them I will never betray them, even if it means joining them. Everywhere I go, I hear people chanting: “It’s the same gang… They removed thieves only to bring in others”. Translated from Al-Masry Al-Youm Amar Ali Hassan Related News: What can prevent state failure? Against violence Publishing Date: Thu, 22/12/2011 - 15:51

Source URL (retrieved on 22/12/2011 - 19:40): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/563351

Publishing Date: Wed, 21/12/2011 - 19:14

Brotherhood opposes handover of power before June Author: Arabic Edition The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party has rejected an initiative called for by other parties and political movements for the military council to hand over power through presidential elections next January, and not in June as originally planned. “We abide by what all political forces have already agreed upon,” said party secretary general Saad al-Katatny. Liberal parties had called for holding the presidential elections on 25 January and immediately forming the constituent assembly to write the new constitution. Translated from Al-Masry Al-Youm 294

Publishing Date: Wed, 21/12/2011 - 19:14 Related material Calls for presidential elections to be held before parliamentary ones Facebook campaign calls for presidential elections on 25 January

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Brotherhood looking to back presidential candidate Author: Al-Masry Al-Youm Staff The Muslim Brotherhood announced Thursday it is looking for a candidate to support in the presidential election scheduled for June. The Brotherhood is looking to back a convincing figure outside of those hopefuls whose names have already been floated, the group’s spokesperson Mahmoud Ghozlan said in a statement to London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. Several months ago the Brotherhood banned members from running in the race and announced it did not intend to nominate a candidate. The group banned Abdel Moneim Abouel Fotouh after he announced his intention to run in violation of the decision. Other likely candidates include Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Amr Moussa, former foreign minister and Arab League chief, Hamdeen Sabbahi, founder of Karama Party, Salafi sheikh Hazem Abu Ismail, and Islamic thinker Mohamed Selim al-Awa. The Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) rejected Wednesday an initiative to push for presidential elections in January. Other members of the Democratic Alliance and some public figures want the vote moved up to immediately follow parliamentary elections. The liberal Free Egyptians Party issued a statement Wednesday calling on the SCAF to hold elections earlier and hand over power to a civilian government within three months. The Adl, Karama, Wasat and Wafd parties, as well as the Kefaya movement, also issued a joint statement Wednesday calling for a vote on 25 January to coincide with the first anniversary of the revolution. The groups said early elections are the only way out of what they called Egypt's crisis. Translated from Al-Masry Al-YoumFJP wins run-off elections in Luxor Related material Brotherhood opposes handover of power before June Egypt presidential hopefuls want early poll date Source URL (retrieved on 22/12/2011 - 14:56): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/562751

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Arab Spring yields different outcomes in Bahrain, Egypt and Libya By Marc Fisher, Wednesday, December 21, 3:11 AM At the dawn of the first winter after the Arab Spring, Bahrain is an island of sadness. Every few minutes, U.S.-made Apache helicopters buzz Rula al-Saffar’s suburban walled community, a collection of pleasant, sand-colored stucco houses that is home to teachers, engineers, nurses and other middle-class families. Black armored vehicles filled with commandos stand guard at checkpoints along quiet lanes. On a bucolic December morning, sun-drenched and warm, Saffar steers her Mazda SUV past the evidence of last night’s confrontations — fresh graffiti denouncing the king; spent tear-gas canisters fired at the teenagers who take to the streets in protest each night. Saffar, 49, is a petite nurse who spent 18 years working at a Dallas hospital and came home to Bahrain with more than a little Texas twang to her English. She wears a brave smile with her jeans and favorite Christmas shirt from Dallas, but any day now, the security police could show up to take her away. Her crimes, best she can tell, were to join multitudes of Bahrainis who demonstrated for democracy early this year and then to treat protesters injured by police and military forces. The Arab Spring arrived in this island nation with picnics and parades. Saffar, who works at the country’s biggest hospital, reveled in “the beauty of the Pearl Roundabout,” a reference to those days in February and March when tens of thousands — young and old; rich, poor and in between — gathered at the vast traffic circle in the center of the capital, Manama, encouraged by their own crown prince, who had declared protests a worthy expression of democracy. Nine months later, in a country only slightly bigger than the District of Columbia, hopes are dashed, the uprising is crushed, and the royal family is still in charge — though deeply damaged by its own crackdown. Trust has been vaporized. In the Arab world this year, starting in Tunisia and flowering in Egypt, a movement of people frustrated by oppressive government, corrupt leaders and a lack of jobs suddenly felt safe to take to the streets. As with all revolutions, they would live days of euphoria followed by more sober times, when the burdens of history and reality weigh heavily against the prospect of change. A journey to three countries where ordinary people risked everything to reach for a better future reveals three very different outcomes. In Libya, perhaps the least likely of uprisings has led not only to the ousting and killing of longtime ruler Moammar Gaddafi, but also to a fast-moving, well-organized push toward elective democracy. The fall of the government has kicked up tribal rivalries and exposed a vein of religious extremism, but there is a powerful sense of optimism on the streets of Tripoli, the whitewashed capital on the Mediterranean. 296

In Egypt, by far the largest of the Arab nations to experience a revolt, the despised Hosni Mubarak finds himself deposed and on trial. But despite a swift move to elections, power remains in the hands of the military and the oligarchs whose economic domination was one of the protesters’ chief grievances. With its sparkling glass skyscrapers and broad modern highways, Bahrain looks peaceful and prosperous. It is a wealthy nation that refines much of the Persian Gulf region’s oil. But, like Tunisia, Egypt and the other Arab countries where people took to the streets this year, it is a place where the government is viewed as corrupt and distant, where in recent years the rich got richer, the poor grew poorer and the middle class increasingly lost its sense of possibility. Cairo’s Tahrir Square has become a worldwide symbol of the power of ordinary people to bring down tyranny. Bahrain’s Pearl Roundabout, by contrast, has been erased from the map — literally. The government brought in bulldozers to demolish it. The revolt in Bahrain resulted not in elections or new leaders but in 3,000 arrests, an epidemic of torture and innumerable crushed souls. The Sunni-led government and private employers fired thousands of workers, nearly all of them Shiite Muslims. A people united in a spring of hope were by fall spurning friends who descended from a different sect. In each country, revolution brought disparate groups together in a burst of people power organized through social media. But the second, slower phase of change has exposed and highlighted religious, ethnic and class differences. Young, secular liberals who were instrumental in the Arab Spring revolts have been pushed aside as Muslim groups long suppressed by secular autocrats won favor from voters who associated them with honesty and community service. In Bahrain, the government and its media allies stoked sectarian conflict, stirring fears among the country’s Sunni elite of an Iranian-controlled Shiite takeover. Many Bahrainis grew up knowing little or nothing about the historical division between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, but after the protests began, the government put out word that the mostly Shiite demonstrators — Bahrain’s population is about 70 percent Shiite — were acting on behalf of Iran, the much-feared neighbor across the Persian Gulf. Just days after the demonstrations began, the country’s security police joined with masked thugs to break up the protests with metal batons, tear gas, rubber bullets and birdshot. Saffar and her colleagues worked round-the-clock tending to injured protesters. But in the next days, dozens of doctors and nurses — nearly all of them Shiites — began to vanish from the hospital, taken away by masked security men. One day in March, Saffar got a call at home: Come to the police station for questioning or we will come get you. She dressed in a suit and heels and called her attorney. Change into jeans and a shirt, he told her. When Saffar arrived at the police station, the nurse, like dozens of other medics who had treated injured demonstrators, was blindfolded, handcuffed and thrown into an ice- cold cell. For five hours, she was forced to stand ramrod straight, interrogated by people she could not see. A policewoman hit her about the face with her hands. A man slapped her, pulled her hair and poked at her with an electric prod. They called her a whore. They accused her of inciting hatred at a public gathering. They called her “filthy Shia.” 297

Guards threatened to rape Saffar. She was made to shout, “Long live the king and crown prince!” The medics stood, blindfolded and cuffed, for three days without sleep, food or water. On the third day, the guards hung a sign on Saffar’s back that invited kicks and slaps. They walked her down a hallway where people in uniform accepted the invitation. After seven days, the still-blindfolded Saffar was allowed to dictate a statement about what she had seen and done at the hospital during the uprising. Then her interrogator tore up the document and burned her hair with a cigarette lighter. The blindfold ordeal lasted 15 days. When Saffar came home in August after 143 days in detention, she had lost nearly a third of her weight. She looked in the mirror “and I saw an old woman.” When she tried to return to work, she was told that she had been suspended — no reason given. A military court sentenced her to 15 years in prison. An appeal is to be heard in criminal court next month. At the bottom of the police summons that each arrested medic received from the Interior Ministry, a slogan in large type says, “With your cooperation we will achieve security and stability.” An investigation by an international panel of jurists last month verified the accounts of torture and indiscriminate arrests. The king promised to hold those responsible to account and to restore the jobs of thousands. But the promises have yet to be met. Saffar, who like many Bahrainis with money went to an English-language school as a teen, grew up not knowing whether she was Sunni or Shiite. She said her mother would tell her, “You’re a Muslim Bahraini, and that’s it.” In fact, she is what Bahrainis call a “Su-Shi,” with a Sunni mother and Shiite father. Such intermarriages are common in Bahrain. Just a few minutes’ drive from Saffar’s house, in a walled community where some of the country’s investment bankers and other beneficiaries of oil wealth live, four couples gather for dinner and a chance to see how far along their friends are in creating Plan B — their escape from the country they love. These are not the kind of people who go to protests, but some were rooting for the demonstrators. Others around the table were put off by the protesters’ disruptive tactics, such as pouring motor oil on highways. All of the couples have started planning their departures. If the kids miss a month of school because of disturbances, we’re out of here, one businessman says. If investment here continues to drop, we’ll have to move, another says. They wonder how their country can climb down from the heated Sunni-Shiite confrontation: At their children’s school, a sixth-grader asked her friends not to talk to Shiite girls. In another grade, a child handing out invitations to his birthday party inquired whether his friends were Sunni or Shiite; only the Sunnis got invitations. Some Sunnis understand the royal family’s decision to play hardball: Being across the gulf from Iran — which sponsored a coup attempt in Bahrain three decades ago — the king is spooked by the Shiite Islamist theocracy. But the independent commission found no evidence of involvement by Iran in Bahrain’s protests. Organizers of the

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uprising say that they may be Shiite but that they are committed to pluralism, secular rule and even the ruling family — if it grants the people a bigger voice. Change is coming, says blogger and businessman Suhail Algosaibi, who is close to the royal family: “You don’t think the family has seen what’s happening in Egypt and Libya? They know they must reform or they won’t be here anymore. We’re not ready for full democracy; at this stage, we’d very likely have guys with big beards and big turbans and that would be very bad. But they will reform — they have to to survive.” (The Washington Post repeatedly sought interviews with Bahraini government ministers; despite promises that an official would be made available, none was.) Back home with her husband, Saffar has taken out her Texas Christmas baubles and her porcelain cowboy boots. She will always be part of Texas, but “this is my home. I will never leave it,” she says. “The government created this conspiracy story about the Shia to scare the Sunni, making them believe Iran is planning a revolution here. But ours was never a revolution — it was an uprising to make Bahrain a better place for all of us.” The morning paper, ever supportive of the royal family, announces that the king has moved to rehire all of the fired Shiite workers. But on a dusty parking lot across from the Labor Ministry building, no one has passed that word to hundreds of terminated workers holding a rally. Ministry officials stay inside the gates, watching from behind a billboard that displays portraits of the king, crown prince and prime minister. The text under their smiling faces reads, “Our full loyalty and allegiance is to our wise leadership.” An hour or three away from Cairo, depending on the Egyptian capital’s world-class traffic jams, huge white letters in the style of California’s famous “HOLLYWOOD” sign spell out “DREAMLAND.” What Ahmed Bahgat built in the desert beyond the pyramids during the reign of Hosni Mubarak is a manufacturing, real estate and entertainment empire beyond the imagination of most Egyptians. It was the perfect target for a revolution in a country where four in 10 residents get by on $2 or less a day. So when the revolution swiftly spread out from Tahrir Square in February, Bahgat’s dream darkened. The magnate says he spent the Arab Spring in shock as police vanished from the streets, his factory workers stayed home and his photo was carried by a major newspaper depicting him as the archetypal fat cat who prospered under Mubarak. Bahgat had plenty to lose. Dreamland covers 150,000 acres and includes 5,000 villas and apartments. It houses office complexes for the Egyptian arms of Microsoft, IBM and other multinational companies. It has a Hilton and a Sheraton; a shopping mall; three schools; a golf course; the studios of Bahgat’s TV network, Dream TV; and an amusement park designed by the company that planned the Universal Studios theme park in California. In those first weeks after Mubarak’s ouster, critics went to the state prosecutor and accused Bahgat of getting a sweetheart deal for the vast tract of desert he acquired in the early 1990s. In four court cases, debtors and prosecutors challenged his control of his empire. Bahgat’s Dream Park is mostly empty these days. At his hotels, occupancy rates are half what they were before the revolution. The sales office for Dreamland’s sumptuous villas and apartments rarely gets even a nibble anymore, says Mohamed Fathy, the sales

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director. “No one wants to invest in real estate in a country whose future is so cloudy,” he says. But as the first anniversary of the Tahrir Square protests approaches, Bahgat says he’s on the verge of winning back complete control of his empire. The revolution was indeed televised, but after the cameras moved on, Egypt’s most powerful men remained very much in charge. Mubarak is gone, and Egyptians have come out in huge numbers in the first rounds of parliamentary elections, with about two-thirds of voters selecting Islamist parties, either the more-moderate Muslim Brotherhood or the fundamentalist Salafists. But from the poorest slums to the most luxurious of gated communities, Egyptians agree with Bahgat that very little has changed in their daily lives: The military still controls much of Egyptian life and shows few signs of ceding power, and the billionaires who made out like bandits under Mubarak are still doing splendidly — a reality no one expects will change anytime soon. “For three months, everyone was shouting about thieves, meaning people with money,” Bahgat says. “But they will get tired of hating us. This is a wave, and we are nearing the end of the wave.” At the birthplace of the revolution, it’s hard to argue with Bahgat’s view. A few tents remain in Tahrir Square, but the encampment of protesters no longer reflects a cross section of Egyptian society. On most days now, only a few fringe fundamentalist Muslim preachers manage to muster even a small crowd. In Dreamland, the boss’s frontline managers see a similar desolation. “We used to have freedom, but not anymore,” says the general manager, Hefni Higazi, who misses Mubarak’s firm stand against Islamists. “Our last hope is that the army will protect our secular life. Otherwise, we’ll become another Iran. The core of our economy is tourism, and now we have people voting for Islamist parties that want to ban alcohol and bikinis on the beach. It’s just crazy.” Bahgat liked Mubarak. It was Mubarak who personally appealed to Bahgat to move back to Egypt from a professorial stint in Atlanta. The two loved to think big. Mubarak was very good to the developers who built Cairo’s satellite cities over the past two decades. But Bahgat’s relationship with the Mubarak family soured in the months before the revolution, especially after a popular talk-show host on Bahgat’s Dream TV dared to opine that the president’s son Gamal should not be allowed to succeed his aging father. Bahgat fired the host, but that did not mollify Mubarak. Two days after that show aired last year, Bahgat got a call from the presidential palace: He could sign over to the regime a big chunk of his assets, or he could find himself in jail. Bahgat signed. So he was glad to see the Mubarak family fall in February. But Bahgat had no illusions that the revolution would bring about fundamental change. Neither do the customers at the tiny “Men 2000” barbershop in the cacophonous, congested, working-class Cairo neighborhood of Imbaba: “The rich still have their fingers in everything,” says Hisham Kamassim, who repairs air conditioners for a living. A few blocks away, at the Church of the Virgin Mary, Father Sarabamon Abdo tries to calm his Coptic Christian parishioners, the more financially stable of whom are 300

considering leaving Egypt because of attacks against churches by Salafists since the fall of the regime. “What has changed is that some Muslims now openly accuse us of being infidels even though Muslims and Christians have lived together here for 1,400 years,” the pastor says. “If the Muslims take over the government, will they apply their sharia law on me, a Christian? In the Koran, it says the Christians should be ruled by their own book, the Bible. So what do I do now? Do I trust you if you call me an infidel, or do I trust the Koran that respects us as a people of faith?” Fifteen miles south, in a scruffy corner of the affluent Maadi neighborhood, Salafists shop for votes just blocks from a Nile River party boat that thumps dance tunes while Egyptian teens — boys and girls together — boogie on the deck. The Salafists’ Nour party is drawing about 20 percent of the vote so far, thanks to campaigners such as Ali Muhammad, a 35-year-old with a trim beard, a master’s degree in Islamic history and a novel concept of democracy. When Islamists become the majority in the new parliament, he says, “those who do not like the laws we enforce will be contravening democracy because in democracy, the majority creates the law. Behavior opposed to the prophet’s words will be banned. The state will punish those who disobey. If a current emerges that is contradictory to the religious ideology, the people will rise up against this current.” Islam is also central to Bahgat, a tall, lumpy engineer who was living in Atlanta when he got his start by inventing a digital alarm clock that alerts Muslims to their five daily prayer times. But he is adamant that mixing religion and government is a mistake his countrymen will come to regret. “The Muslim Brotherhood tells the people: ‘Choose me and I will get you a car and money and medical help.’ Then the people will get nothing,” Bahgat says, “and they will see that these Islamists are not qualified to run the country.” The revolution “has had a devastating impact on everything,” Bahgat says. The government confiscated most of his assets; he’s suing to get his money back. “Egyptians believe you cannot have money unless you stole it. Americans admire rich people and celebrities. In Egypt, they hate them.” Still, Bahgat sees a return to normality on the horizon. Most of his companies — the real estate holdings, the TV manufacturer that is the largest in the Middle East, the plastics company that churns out parts for his home appliance enterprise — are showing improved numbers, and Bahgat is confident that what the world viewed as a revolution will soon be revealed as a passing fancy. “Everything in Egypt will continue as is,” the magnate says. Supplicants enter the grand marble Italian palazzo on one of Tripoli’s once-elegant squares, gingerly stepping into a lush lobby decorated with wooden cutouts from the Ottoman era. For 42 years, most Libyans entered such buildings only on command and with fear. Now, smiling men in suits invite them to wait on velvet thrones to meet with the man who as of a few weeks ago runs their city. In moments, they are ushered into the huge corner office of Abdul Rezzaq Abuhajar, who until last spring sold bedsheets in a Tripoli shop. Under Moammar Gaddafi, there was no local government; the dictator ran everything. Now, Abuhajar — a hero to many residents of the Libyan capital because he organized opposition to Gaddafi from exile in Egypt for many years — is head of the interim city 301

council. That makes him responsible for the city’s trash, sewage and thousands of refugees, who fled towns destroyed in the battles between rebels and Gaddafi loyalists. “I have to open schools for the children who’ve come to the capital. I need shelters, a food supply. And I’ve got to get the police back on the streets,” he says. Tripoli is still nursing its wounds and celebrating its liberation. Gaddafi’s palace, bombed into a concrete shell, has become a macabre playground for children. At major intersections, ragtag gangs of militiamen — teenagers with automatic weapons, really — hang out, supposedly protecting the people. Abuhajar has little, if any, sway over the boys in camos. But he is confident that the militias will come under civilian control soon, because money talks and Libya has it by the barrel. Libya looks disorganized, but its small population is united — in their euphoria over the demise of Gaddafi, in their hunger for jobs and in a more wholehearted embrace of Islam than their dictator allowed. “We are only 6 million people, and we have this oil and a 2,000-kilometer coastline,” Abuhajar says. “We can use the oil money to help people with their needs now, buying us time to build a government and create new sources of jobs and income.” “We will be patriotic and efficient and open to the world,” he said, “like Europe and America. And Islam will keep people peaceful.” Except that when night falls, gunfire pierces the calm along the Mediterranean shoreline. Salafist extremists conduct drive-by shootings on mosques that house tombs of much-admired Islamic scholars who died centuries ago — a tribute that the Salafists believe violates the faith’s ban on idolatry. Abuhajar’s deputy, Hisham Krekshi, is dispatched to a 13th-century seaside mosque to see whether he can help. A banner outside the whitewashed stucco house of worship announces “Yes to National Unity, No to Religious Extremism.” Krekshi assures the imam that his police forces will come by from time to time but adds that there’s not much more he can do — or wants to do. “I’m not so worried about these extremists,” he says. The deeper problem is that “there’s nothing here. We don’t have parking lots, we don’t have parks. We have such basic needs that we don’t have time for religious differences.” Back at city hall, those needs keep Abuhajar’s aides streaming in and out of his office, directing visitor traffic, funneling documents to the boss. A man arrives to plead the case of an ailing relative who cannot be treated at Tripoli’s ill-equipped hospital. Abuhajar opens a drawer, takes out a stack of cash and peels off enough for the sick man to travel to Turkey for proper care. Abuhajar is a respected elder now, but in a quiet moment, the 71-year-old recalls how he was arrested in 1973 and spent 18 months in prison, accused of having started an unauthorized Islamic organization. “They accused me because I have a beard and pray in a mosque,” Abuhajar says. “We never had any group. We talked about it but never did it.” Day after day for more than a year, Abuhajar was interrogated, often while hanging upside down. When he finally saw a judge, his case was dismissed. He’d had enough of Gaddafi’s Libya, so he moved his family to Cairo, where he sold furniture and helped organize an exile opposition group called the Seventh Front. In

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1984, the group launched an assassination plot against Gaddafi, but the dictator’s security force discovered the scheme, killed some of its operatives and sent others to prison. Abuhajar turned to raising money for poor Libyans in Egypt. In 1996, Abuhajar returned to Tripoli. There was no plot this time, just a deep and abiding homesickness. He was hauled in for questioning every few months, but in the last few years of the Gaddafi regime, they left him alone — an old man selling bedsheets didn’t seem much of a threat anymore. Then, in February, in the eastern city of Benghazi, the first rumblings of an anti-Gaddafi uprising led Abuhajar to start raising money from Muslim Brotherhood allies in Tunisia and Europe, as well as from trusted friends in Libya. “I need medicine for my daughter,” Abuhajar would say on the phone, hoping Gaddafi’s secret police wouldn’t catch on to the code for “I need guns for the rebels.” Now, he’s reading memos rather than running guns. An assistant leans over Abuhajar’s shoulder, whispers a few words and hands over a summary of a case he must adjudicate: Revolutionaries searching for Gaddafi loyalists found 1.4 million dinars — about $1.1 million — in one man’s house. Assuming it was ill-gained, the revolutionaries confiscated the money and now claim the 10 percent bounty that the new government offers to those who reclaim any of Gaddafi’s plunder. The council chief must decide what to do with the cash. He reads testimonials to the honesty of the man whose house was raided. With a swift signature, Abuhajar returns the money to its owner. “He’s well respected, a good man,” Abuhajar says. “We only want to punish those who killed and tortured for Gaddafi. . . . The others, like this man, they are Libyans. If they were pro-Gaddafi, or they were bought by money, they are still our neighbors. Time heals. If we make enemies of our neighbors, we will get nowhere.” Abuhajar stares down at his hands. There is so much to do, and so many years were wasted. Gaddafi, he says, “stole 40 years of my life.” It is a sentiment heard throughout the city. In the old city’s warren of alleys lined with shops selling gold, copper and spices, Rashid Alhamadi sits in his open-air stall, bundled in sweater and coat, hunched over his manual typewriter. He is a scribe, serving customers who need someone to type up court documents or letters. Alhamadi, 59, has been here for three decades, ever since Gaddafi’s men had him imprisoned and tortured. His crime: As a high school teacher, he chastised Gaddafi’s son Mohammed for bringing to school a wooden device used to hang people by their feet. The teacher lost his job and house for daring to question the dictator’s son. “We all lost something,” Alhamadi said. “Now, we start with a blank white page. We are thirsty for work and education. We can be like Europe or America; we can talk back and say this is good, this is bad. Like Watergate — we can take someone in power who has done wrong and change them out.”

Marc Fisher Arab Spring yields different outcomes in Bahrain, Egypt and Libya December 21, 3:11 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-spring-yields- different-outcomes-in-bahrain-egypt-and- libya/2011/12/15/gIQAY6h57O_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines 303

Internacional TRIBUNA ¿Hacia dónde va Egipto? No hay vuelta atrás: la revolución de Tahrir ha elegido la libertad y la democracia Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio 21 DIC 2011 - 22:43 CET3 La celebración de la primera fase de las elecciones legislativas egipcias ha deparado no pocas sorpresas. Aunque se daba por descontado el triunfo del islamista Partido Libertad y Justicia, la irrupción del salafista Al Nur ha generado inquietud no solo entre los sectores liberales y la minoría copta, sino también entre los propios Hermanos Musulmanes que hasta ahora venían detentado en solitario el monopolio del islam político. Pese a haber mantenido una actitud ambigua en las movilizaciones que propiciaron la caída de Mubarak, las formaciones islamistas han sido las principales beneficiarias como demuestra el hecho de que hayan obtenido dos de cada tres de los votos depositados en las urnas. Aunque algunos exégetas sigan empeñados en presentar una foto fija del movimiento de los Hermanos Musulmanes a partir de sus textos fundacionales, para conocer sus actuales planteamientos parece más oportuno acudir al programa de su plataforma electoral: el Partido Libertad y Justicia. En él se reivindica la Revolución del 25 de Enero que habría permitido al pueblo egipcio “salir del túnel de la pobreza, la ignorancia y la enfermedad y abrazar la libertad, la democracia, la justicia social y los derechos humanos tras poner fin al autoritarismo político, la opresión social, el saqueo económico, el atraso científico y educativo y la manipulación informativa”. El programa defiende el equilibrio de poderes, las libertades públicas, la alternancia en el Gobierno y la sociedad civil. Como no podía ser de otra manera también reafirma sus posicionamientos tradicionales en torno a la necesidad de que los valores del islam guíen la vida individual y pública y que los principios de la sharía sean la principal fuente de jurisdicción (como, de hecho, ya recoge la actual Constitución). No obstante, los dirigentes islamistas son plenamente conscientes de que no es posible una vuelta atrás y que la calle egipcia no permitirá que un autoritarismo sea reemplazado por otro. Las líneas rojas establecidas por la revolución de Tahrir son claras: plena libertad de expresión, de reunión y de organización y establecimiento de una democracia multipartidista. Arabia Saudí financia a los salafistas como cortafuegos frente a la 'primavera árabe' Pese a que todo parece indicar que será la mayor fuerza parlamentaria, el Partido Libertad y Justicia se verá obligado a legislar para todo el pueblo egipcio y no solo para sus votantes, lo que implica que deberá establecer alianzas con los sectores liberales y con los partidos laicos (tal y como ha hecho Ennahda en Túnez). En pocas palabras: deberán realizar un ejercicio de pragmatismo y evitar el frentismo para impedir que la brecha entre religiosos y laicos se amplíe.

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De ahí las declaraciones de su líder Mohamed Morsi: “No buscamos el monopolio del poder ni tampoco deseamos controlar el Parlamento. Esto no sería del interés de Egipto. Queremos un Parlamento equilibrado que no sea dominado por ningún partido”. Al inclinarse por esta fórmula pretendería lanzar un mensaje de moderación en la línea de lo que la comunidad internacional espera oír, pero también blindarse ante un periodo extremadamente complejo en el que hará falta mucho diálogo y consenso para afianzar la transición y reducir, de manera progresiva, el peso de los militares. Una alianza con los partidos liberales les otorgaría, además, un certificado de buena conducta ante los países occidentales que, alarmados por el ascenso de los salafistas, no tienen otra opción que reconocer como interlocutor al Partido Libertad y Justicia, aunque sea como un mal menor. Si la victoria de los islamistas moderados era del todo previsible, la gran sorpresa de la primera ronda electoral la ha deparado la inesperada irrupción del partido Al Nur, que ha alcanzado casi el 25% de los votos. La sorpresa es doble puesto que los salafistas siempre han sido reacios a participar en el juego político. Hasta hace poco, los clérigos salafistas tachaban a la democracia como una forma de apostasía y, en consecuencia, rehusaban concurrir a las elecciones. Este movimiento, de carácter puritano y rigorista, pretende erigir una sociedad a imagen y semejanza de la umma establecida 14 siglos atrás por Mahoma. Además, promueve una lectura literal de los textos sagrados, la plena instauración de la sharía, el restablecimiento del califato y la estricta separación de sexos. En los últimos años, los salafistas han creado una extensa red de asociaciones caritativas y de beneficencia que prestan ayuda a los sectores más desfavorecidos de la empobrecida población. No debe olvidarse que, según el Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, dos de cuatro egipcios viven bajo el umbral de la pobreza. Los petrodólares también sufragan una docena de canales por satélite desde los que pontifican telepredicadores ultraconservadores Esta tarea ha contado con la inestimable ayuda de las petromonarquías del golfo Pérsico (y, en particular, de Arabia Saudí), que han engrasado la maquinaria salafista y financiado la construcción de numerosas medersas desde donde se ha propagado su ideario radical. Por todos es sabido que la monarquía saudí está extraordinariamente preocupada por el avance de la primavera árabe. Su objetivo es establecer un cortafuegos para evitar la consolidación de la democracia en el Egipto pos-Mubarak y en el resto del mundo árabe, hecho que tendría funestas consecuencias para el propio reino. Los petrodólares también financian una docena de canales por satélite desde los cuales los telepredicadores ultraconservadores pontifican sobre lo divino y lo humano y propagan una visión extremadamente reaccionaria de la religión musulmana. Uno de los máximos referentes de los salafistas es el teólogo medieval Ibn Taymiya, al que se atribuye la máxima “60 años de un gobernante injusto son mejores que una sola noche sin Gobierno”. Se entiende así que el depuesto Mubarak favoreciera la implantación de los salafistas con el objetivo de mantener a los egipcios alejados de la política, pero también de crear un contrapeso a los Hermanos Musulmanes. Como ha señalado el escritor Alaa al Aswany, los telepredicadores “jamás hablan de libertad, justicia e igualdad, que son los valores humanos para cuya realización el islam fue originalmente revelado”. De hecho, cuando estalló la Revolución del 25 de Enero, el 305

influyente clérigo salafista Mahmud Amer criticó la movilización ciudadana y recordó que, según los textos sagrados, estaba estrictamente prohibido alzarse contra los gobernantes. Aunque los islamistas moderados del Partido Libertad y Justicia hayan aceptado formalmente las reglas del juego político, en el futuro tendrán que esforzarse por disipar las sospechas en torno a la posible existencia de una agenda oculta y demostrar que son capaces de conciliar islam y democracia. También deberán convivir con una Junta Militar escasamente proclive a ceder el poder a un Gobierno civil y, mucho menos, a uno controlado por los islamistas. Previsiblemente el Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas, dirigido por el mariscal Tantawi, tratará de evitar que el poder islamista se extienda más allá del Parlamento, para lo que empleará todas las prerrogativas constitucionales que todavía conservan. Todo parece indicar, pues, que el pulso entre los islamistas y los militares no ha hecho más que empezar y continuará, al menos, hasta que la celebración de las elecciones presidenciales y la redacción de la nueva Constitución despejen algunas de las incógnitas que ahora se ciernen sobre Egipto. En los próximos seis meses, salafistas y liberales deberán elegir cuál de los dos partidos tomar si no quieren quedar relegados a un segundo plano en la edificación del Egipto pos-Mubarak. Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio es profesor de Estudios Árabes e Islámicos de la Universidad de Alicante. Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio¿Hacia dónde va Egipto? 21 DIC 2011 - 22:43 CET3 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/21/actualidad/1324503833_08007 4.html

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Internacional “Solo pensaba en protegerla” El joven que se interpuso ante las fuerzas de seguridad que maltrataban a una manifestante en El Cairo relata la escena que ha dado la vuelta al mundo El Ejército egipcio asegura que condenará a los culpables de los abusos a mujeres Las mujeres egipcias marchan contra los abusos de las fuerzas de seguridad Nuria Tesón El Cairo 21 DIC 2011 - 20:59 CET15

Hasan Shahin, este miércoles en El Cairo. / MIGUEL ÁNGEL SÁNCHEZ “Solo pensaba en protegerla y que me pegaran a mí en su lugar, pero al final los dos recibimos una paliza. No entiendo a este Ejército que en lugar de protegernos, viola el honor de las egipcias”. Detrás de la imagen de la mujer que fue golpeada y desnudada por los militares durante una manifestación hace unos días hay otro protagonista: Hasan Shahin. Él no aparece en la foto de Reuters que fue portada en medios de todo el mundo y que ha sido censurada en Egipto, como símbolo de la represión. Sin embargo, en un vídeo en el que se recoge el asalto de los militares a la plaza de Tahrir, además de la escena en la que los soldados golpean, pisotean y arrancan la ropa a la muchacha, se puede ver a un joven que intenta en vano arrastrarla y que acaba recibiendo una paliza por detenerse a ayudarla. Ese es Hasan. Tiene una sonrisa tímida bajo los moratones y es alto y delgado. Le acompaña Yasmin, una amiga periodista, como él, que le mira con admiración mientras habla. Hasan tiene 307

20 años y ha vuelto a Tahrir “en cuanto he podido”, pero se encuentra mal y decidió ir al hospital para que le echaran un vistazo. Tiene seis puntos en la ceja y el brazo en cabestrillo, pero lo que más le duele es no lograr entender por qué los militares actuaron así. “Había ido a cubrir la información. Vi el Instituto Egipcio en llamas y llamé a mi periódico. Luego vi cómo los militares rompían la verja del Consejo de Ministros y se lanzaban contra los manifestantes. Fue entonces cuando la vi en el suelo. Le grité que corriera pero no respondió y pensé que podía estar inconsciente”. El vídeo muestra a Hasan tratando de llevar en volandas a la chica. Una conocida “de otras manifestaciones” cuya identidad guardan con celo sus amigos. “Se encuentra bien. Hablé con ella en cuanto me atendieron en el hospital ese día y hablo con ella a diario. Su familia no sabía que había ido a manifestarse, son muy conservadores, así que no quiere hablar con la prensa, ni que se sepa ningún dato que pueda identificarla. Pero es fuerte y se está recuperando en casa”, afirma. Hasan Shahin trató de identificarse como periodista ante los militares El joven trató de identificarse como periodista ante los militares y les gritó que la mujer estaba inconsciente, pero hicieron caso omiso. “Fue una sensación horrible. Pensé que la dejarían ir y que me pegarían solo a mí, pero no les importó”. En los últimos días, además de Hasan Shahin y la mujer de la fotografía, más de medio millar de manifestantes han sido heridos y 14 han muerto, la mayoría a causa de heridas de bala, mientras las elecciones legislativas siguen su curso. Hani Enas, un arquitecto de 30 años, recibió un disparo que le atravesó el estómago y salió por la espalda. Pero ha tenido la suerte de contarlo. En el hospital de Qasr el Ainy, cuenta que el viernes que se iniciaron las protestas estaba en casa y vio en la red social Twitter que los militares estaban disparando a la gente. “Me dirigí hacia allí porque pensé que siendo muchos podríamos disuadirlos”. Cuando llegó a la calle del Parlamento vio cómo “los soldados tiraban piedras desde un edificio”. Después de tres horas de enfrentamientos “unos 40 soldados con piedras y palos y dos oficiales con pistolas” les persiguieron. “Oí disparos. Uno de los oficiales me mostró su arma y creí que me estaba advirtiendo. Entonces sentí un dolor en el estómago y pensé que sería una pedrada. Me senté y cuando empecé a perder sangre dos o tres chavales me sacaron de allí”. Enas reconoció a su agresor en una foto publicada por un diario egipcio. “En cuanto salga le denunciaré. El hecho de que no se haya castigado a los culpables antes ha permitido que se crean intocables. No pueden tratarnos como si no tuviéramos dignidad, siempre gobernando con el terror”, argumenta. “Nunca debimos aceptar que tomaran parte en la economía ni en la política del país”, prosigue Enas. “Los soldados obedecen a mandos que tienen sus propios intereses”. Ni Hasan Shahin ni Hani Enas ven claro el futuro. “La violencia solo puede generar más violencia”, explica el primero. “Si el pueblo ve que les atacan con balas no está muy lejos el día en que piensen en tener sus propias armas para defenderse”. Nuria Tesón “Solo pensaba en protegerla” 21 DIC 2011 - 20:59 CET15 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/21/actualidad/1324497561_13962 9.html

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Europe December 21, 2011 Foes of Hungary’s Government Fear ‘Demolition of Democracy’ By NICHOLAS KULISH BUDAPEST — In less than two years as a member of the Hungarian Parliament, Timea Szabo says she has looked on helplessly as the ruling Fidesz Party has used its two- thirds majority to tighten its grip on the news media and the courts, redraw parliamentary districts in its favor and pack the constitutional court with supporters. On Jan. 1, a new “majoritarian” Constitution written and ratified by Fidesz takes hold. “They are preparing the funeral for the Hungarian Republic,” Ms. Szabo said. Opposition groups, including Ms. Szabo’s small, green Politics Can Be Different Party, known by its Hungarian abbreviation L.M.P., have called for a demonstration on Friday against the “demolition of democracy” by Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Democracy here is dying not with a single giant blow but with many small cuts, critics say, through the legal processes of Parliament that add up to a slow-motion coup. And in its drift toward authoritarian government, aided by popular disaffection with political gridlock and a public focused mainly on economic hardship, Hungary stands as a potentially troubling bellwether for other, struggling Eastern European countries with weak traditions of democratic government. To mounting criticism from the European Union and the United States, Fidesz is racing to use its supermajority in Parliament to pass a flurry of legislation before the new Constitution takes effect, a push that critics say will consolidate overwhelming power with Mr. Orban, a political veteran who got his start opposing Communist rule as it waned in the late 1980s. Party loyalists are being given 9- to 12-year terms at the head of powerful institutions like the public prosecutor’s office and the state audit office. Judges are being forced from the bench with a drop in the mandatory retirement age to 62 from 70, even while the approval process is being altered to assure the speedy ascension of the government’s nominees. On Tuesday, Hungary’s media council announced that it intended to throw an independent, opposition-aligned radio station, Klubradio, off the air. “What you have is the systematic destruction of checks and balances in the government,” said Peter Hack, a law professor at the Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest who, as a member of Parliament from the pro-business Free Democrats, worked on judicial matters. “The present situation is really a building where the foundations are weakened.” Mr. Orban and his supporters counter that they are only following through on their promises in last year’s election campaign to sweep away the old order, which they say was hamstrung by compromises to ensure a smooth transition from communism but left behind a legacy of gridlock. Government supporters note the left-wing opposition’s contradictory claims, on the one hand saying that Fidesz is establishing unassailable

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authoritarian control while warning that the real danger is the far-right party Jobbik taking control of a system of government shorn of checks and balances. The constitutional court this week struck down portions of the controversial media law, as well as changes to the criminal code and a law governing churches, but the high court’s own purview will be limited by the new Constitution, one of several steps reining in the power and independence of the judiciary. Meanwhile, representatives of the International Monetary Fund and European Commission walked out of negotiations last week over assistance for the heavily indebted country after the government introduced proposals to significantly restrict the independence of the Hungarian National Bank. As the pace of legislative and constitutional change gained speed this year, international observers including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton expressed concerns over the erosion of independent institutions. But the situation in Hungary has remained largely under the radar in Europe, whose leaders have been almost entirely preoccupied with the sovereign debt crisis that has threatened the survival of the euro. On a recent afternoon at the ornate Parliament building here on the Danube River, Ms. Szabo strode out of a meeting of her party. “We are discussing the latest crisis of the democracy,” Ms. Szabo said. “It is a nightmare.” With Mr. Orban’s center-right Fidesz Party proposing and passing legislation more or less at will, Ms. Szabo and other opposition lawmakers sometimes had only a few hours’ warning before debates began on complex laws. Her party decided to boycott Tuesday’s debate on the central bank legislation. “We more and more feel that by sitting there in Parliament we’re legitimizing what’s happening without really being able to do anything about it,” Ms. Szabo said. The new Constitution, she noted, fittingly changed the name of the country, removing the word Republic and leaving it officially just Hungary. Zoltan Kovacs, a government spokesman, said that opposition parties and the analysts sympathetic to them were painting legal changes in a dire light simply because they disagreed politically. “Whatever we do, the first accusation is that we are reducing the independence, the autonomy of that working body,” Mr. Kovacs said. “It’s a little bit curious for an external observer because it seems to be fast, it seems to be too much at once, but that’s actually what we have promised,” Mr. Kovacs said. “We are refurbishing; we are renewing the country.” The level of antagonism in Hungarian politics rose significantly starting in September 2006, when radio stations played a leaked recording of Ferenc Gyurcsany, the Socialist prime minister, who admitted that he had lied to the public about the dire state of the country’s economy before elections. Before austerity became the watchword for countries like Greece, Ireland and Spain, the Hungarian government was cutting government jobs, raising taxes and imposing new fees to try to control its growing budget deficits as early as 2007. Steel barriers surrounded the Parliament building to protect it from tens of thousands of demonstrators.

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Dissatisfaction over cutbacks and Mr. Gyurcsany’s speech helped fuel the rise of the nationalist, anti-Semitic Jobbik Party. Once a fringe group with a paramilitary wing, an energized Jobbik won nearly 17 percent of the vote in 2010. But the main beneficiary of voter outrage toward the Socialists was Fidesz, which gained a critical two-thirds majority in Parliament — enough to pass constitutional amendments and even an entire new Constitution without votes from opposition parties. Zoltan Horvath, 51, an engineer from Szombathely in western Hungary, said that a “tabula rasa” was necessary after the compromises of the post-Communist transition. “Yes, there is a risk that one party has too much power, but the desire to change things is correct. There is danger, but I don’t have sleepless nights,” Mr. Horvath said. But Fidesz’s popularity is sinking fast in opinion surveys. Mr. Hack, the law professor, said he was concerned that Jobbik would benefit from the rising antiestablishment mood and anger over deeper cuts in public spending. “A lot of people are not saying that Orban is doing too much, but that he is doing too little,” Mr. Hack said. The centralization of power would look very different, even to Fidesz, with someone else in charge. “In the short term it seems reasonable to take out the brakes from a car, it appears to go faster,” Mr. Hack said. “The problem is when the first curve appears and you need them.” NICHOLAS KULISH Foes of Hungary’s Government Fear ‘Demolition of Democracy’ December 21, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/world/europe/foes-of-hungarys-government-fear-demolition- of-democracy.html?ref=world&pagewanted=all

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World Europe December 20, 2011 8:26 pm Turkey and France step up row on ‘genocide’ By Hugh Carnegy in Paris and Daniel Dombey in Istanbul France has warned Turkey against any commercial reprisals in an escalating dispute over a French bid to make it a crime to deny that a genocide of Armenians took place in the final days of the Ottoman Empire almost a century ago. As Turkish business leaders joined a parliamentary delegation in Paris this week to lobby against the initiative by the French national assembly, the French foreign ministry publicly reminded Ankara it had to respect its obligations under World Trade Organisation rules and its agreements with the European Union. More ON THIS STORY Turkey warns France over genocide bill France and Turkey tighten the screw on Syria But Turkish businessmen and leaders labelled the bill “unacceptable”. “If it passes, the world of business between France and Turkey will be badly hit,” Rifat Hisarciklioglu, chairman of the Turkish chambers of commerce, told a press conference in Paris, amid suggestions of a possible boycott of French business. He pointedly referred to orders made by Turkish Airlines for Airbus aircraft and billion of dollars of investment planned in the energy sector for which French companies would likely be bidders. Paris has refrained from reacting publicly to such threats, but privately French officials say they have been counterproductive. “It has gone beyond pressure and legitimate lobbying and become an attempt at intimidation. It is unacceptable,” said one senior official. Turkey has always rejected the description of the mass killings of Armenians as genocide. But, by contrast with previous disputes over similar legislation, the current fight comes at a time of heightened tension between Ankara and France and with the EU more generally, as well as Turkey’s increasing self confidence on the world stage. “France should not sacrifice the centuries-old Turkish-French friendship, common interests and ties of alliance for small political calculations,” Abdullah Gul, Turkey’s president, said on Tuesday. “How strange and thought provoking that these kinds of initiatives come at a pre-election time”. Recep Tayyip Ergodan, Turkish prime minister, has already warned President Nicolas Sarkozy of “irreparable damage” to relations between the two countries if the law is passed when it comes before the National Assembly on Thursday. Mr Erdogan has threatened to raise France’s own “dirty and bloody history” in Algeria and Rwanda and take “all kinds of diplomatic” action in response to the law. Alain Juppé, foreign minister, agreed to meet the parliamentary delegation on Tuesday evening, but officials said there was no question of intervening to delay the passage of

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the bill. Paris is anxious to contain the issue, not least because it wants to continue to work closely with Ankara on efforts to convince Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, to step down. French officials argue any threat to French business interests in Turkey could rebound on the Turkish economy. France is the third largest foreign investor in Turkey, with 970 enterprises operating in the country – including names such as Axa, the insurer, Carrefour, the retailer, and Renault, the car maker. French investments reached €12bn in the past year, they said. The number of French tourists has also exceeded 1m per year. The new law, which would make denial of an Armenian genocide punishable by up to a year in prison and a fine of €45,000, is sponsored by Mr Sarkozy’s majority right-of- centre UMP party, but is drawing support from opposition parties as well. It comes on top of a 2001 law recognising an Armenian genocide. It has been strongly supported by the 500,000 strong Armenian community in France. Mr Sarkozy has in the past supported these moves – and has angered Ankara with his explicit opposition to eventual Turkish membership of the European Union. Among the French business leaders seen by their Turkish counterparts were Laurence Parisot, head of Medef, the French business confederation, and Henri de Castries, chief executive of Axa. Medef said it was very concerned by the issue but warned against any commercial boycott. Hugh Carnegy in Paris and Daniel Dombey Turkey and France step up row on ‘genocide’ December 20, 2011 8:26 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0bae3b7a-2b2d- 11e1-9fd0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gz7jBM9r

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Publishing Date: Tue, 20/12/2011 - 19:41

What can prevent state failure? Author: Egypt Independent Downtown Cairo is once again a battlefield, and this time, the military is not just a silent facilitator, but an active participant — beating, dragging, shooting, and assaulting civilians. The latest round of brutality has led us to not only question the military’s handling of the transition period, but also the nature of the modern Egyptian state, which is associated with a strong military. We are at a juncture whereby the revolution has begun to challenge the centrality of the military to the modern state, a legacy dating back to Mohammed Ali’s rule. When the ruling military junta presented its own version of recent events at a press conference on Monday, the generals, yet again, raised the terrifying prospect of “state failure,” saying that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the army are the sole protectors of the state and everything they do is justified in the name of preventing its dissolution at the hands of those who want to undermine it. This self-assigned supremacy is rapidly losing even the pretense of legitimacy. The army’s violence and cruelty has been thoroughly documented by eyewitnesses, in photos and videos. We will not soon forget the image of two soldiers dragging a woman, half naked, by her clothes while a third stands ready to stomp on her chest. When skeptics condemn descriptions of soldiers resorting to violence, they cite how the army was provoked, or how paid infiltrators are allegedly plotting chaos and instability for Egypt. But what can provoke an organized professional army to engage in disorganized, unprofessional street fighting against civilian protesters? The SCAF claims that “thuggery” and “chaos” have marred the purity of the 25 January revolution. After watching the events of the past five days, we have to agree. The state’s prestige has been irreparably undermined by soldiers urinating on protesters from atop a government building, sexually assaulting women, throwing furniture and flatware from government offices, making lewd sexual gestures, and turning sites of heritage and democracy — such as the Egyptian Museum and the parliament building — into temporary torture centers. The chant “Say it, out loud, don’t be scared, the council has to go,” which reverberated across the square during last month’s fighting between police and protesters, is the rallying cry of Egypt’s revolution. Egypt’s revolutionaries, even the statists among them, perceive that the SCAF has failed at running the country’s transition. They demand not only their return to the barracks, but a reconsideration of their role in Egypt’s affairs. Egypt’s military should not define the state. It’s part of a regime that people revolted against. Claiming to side with the revolution, it took a moment to distance itself from Mubarak’s regime on 11 February, but it couldn’t dupe the revolutionaries for long. Its practices speak loudly to its association with the toppled regime: It embarked on systematic violence against protesters not long after the toppling of Mubarak on 11 314

February when it dispersed a sit-in by force on 26 February; it incarcerated vocal activists; it put a massive number of civilians on military trial; it threatened the media; and, most notably, it attempted to monopolize the truth. If the junta assumes the burden of representing Egypt’s military as a whole, and of attempting to manage the affairs of state, there are issues that the generals may not be ready to deal with. Once in the spotlight, how long may they act with impunity? The revolutionaries are saying that the time has come to reconfigure the council’s power. A reconfiguration will require concessions. Coming to terms with the necessity of this political process — not a strong military hand — is what will prevent state failure. The SCAF should rid itself of the burden of being the sole representative of the revolution and the state. Only the revolution should choreograph the future of the state, while navigating the threats of counter-revolution. Author: Egypt Independent Related News: The battle of loose cannons Live update: SCAF says no attempt to end sit-in forcibly Publishing Date: Tue, 20/12/2011 - 19:41 state failure Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)

Source URL (retrieved on 24/12/2011 - 15:34): What can prevent state failure? 20/12/2011 - 19:41 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/559856

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Francisco Ruiz LA DEFENSA EUROPEA, ¿EN PUNTO MUERTO? 20 de diciembre de 2011 Francisco Ruiz La falta de un cuartel general permanente de nivel operacional es uno de los grandes lastres de la Política de Seguridad y Defensa de la UE.

AFP/Getty Images El pasado mes de julio la Alta Representante de la UE para la PESC, Catherine Ashton, presentó en el Consejo de Asuntos Exteriores un informe sobre cómo avanzar en la Política Común de Seguridad y Defensa (PCSD), aprovechando las nuevas herramientas que el Tratado de Lisboa ofrece para hacer más eficaz la acción exterior de la Unión. En el informe se exponía la necesidad de crear un Cuartel General permanente de nivel Operacional (OHQ) para el planeamiento y conducción de las operaciones militares que el Consejo Europeo decida lanzar. Esa idea está en consonancia con el informe de mayo de 2010 de un grupo de expertos sobre el futuro de la UE en el horizonte de 2030, en el que se afirma que “es necesario crear un Estado Mayor Europeo realmente operativo y dotado de personal suficiente, encargado de planificar, desplegar y supervisar las operaciones civiles y militares en el exterior”.

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La propuesta provocó la inmediata reacción en contra del ministro británico de Exteriores, William Hague, algo que era de esperar ya que Reino Unido siempre ha considerado este tema como una línea roja. Los argumentos van desde que ese OHQ supondría un derroche económico, al duplicar estructuras ya existentes en la OTAN y en los Estados miembros, hasta los sostenidos por los más furibundos euroescépticos tories, que afirman que minaría la soberanía nacional y debilitaría la cooperación trasatlántica en temas de seguridad. Se recuperan así los postulados de Margaret Thatcher, que en 2002 escribía que “el impulso hacia una defensa europea separada es más político que militar y, al proceder de Francia, tiene como objetivo rivalizar con una OTAN liderada por EE UU, en lugar de colaborar con ella”. Según esa postura, por tanto, cuando la UE estima que sus intereses de seguridad están en juego, y decide ejecutar una operación militar para salvaguardarlos, debería solicitar a la OTAN la utilización de sus capacidades de planeamiento y conducción, haciendo uso de los acuerdos “Berlín +” de marzo de 2003. Esto deja la aprobación final en manos de los aliados estadounidenses, que en ocasiones no compartirán la visión de la Unión para la gestión de una crisis concreta, o de Turquía, que no ha dudado en el pasado en usar su condición de miembro de la OTAN para entorpecer las relaciones de seguridad con la Unión, en lo que considera una justa respuesta a la falta de avances en el proceso negociador para su entrada en la UE. De hecho, si ya las negociaciones de los citados acuerdos “Berlín +” se prolongaron tres años por la rivalidad entre Turquía y Grecia, la entrada en 2004 de Chipre en la UE ha supuesto la paralización práctica de la cooperación a nivel político-estratégico entre la OTAN y la UE. Como es bien sabido, Turquía invadió la isla en 1974 y apoyó la proclamación de una “República Turca” en su tercio norte. En consecuencia, cuando en 1994 la OTAN creo su “Asociación por la Paz” Chipre no se sumó a la iniciativa, lo que implica que este país se deba ausentar de cualquier reunión UE-OTAN en la que se traten operaciones PCSD desarrolladas con medios y capacidades de la Alianza, algo inaceptable para la Unión. Por ello, sólo dos operaciones de la UE se han desarrollado en el marco de “Berlín +”: Concordia en la República de Macedonia y Althea en Bosnia-Herzegovina, ambas anteriores a 2004. Cabe añadir que en el caso de Althea la fase de planeamiento se prolongó nada menos que seis meses, ante las continuas peticiones de información por parte de Turquía y la amenaza de veto de ese país en el Consejo del Atlántico Norte. Para otras operaciones militares, por ejemplo, en República Democrática del Congo, Chad o República Centroafricana se han empleando algunos de los cinco OHQ nacionales ofrecidos a la Unión. La operación de adiestramiento de tropas somalíes en territorio ugandés (EUTM Somalia) se está dirigiendo desde su inicio en 2010 desde el Centro de Operaciones, posible embrión de un futuro OHQ en Bruselas, dada su relativa poca entidad militar. La frustrada operación para proteger la asistencia humanitaria en la sitiada ciudad de Misurata (EUFOR Libia) hubiese empleado el OHQ de Roma. El quinto OHQ nacional ofrecido a la UE, el de Larissa (Grecia), hasta la fecha no ha sido utilizado. Sin embargo, la opción de usar esas instalaciones también dista mucho de ser una solución óptima, al depender de la voluntad política del Estado miembro que lo aporta. Así, el lanzamiento de Artemis en 2003 se completó en tan sólo 13 días desde la aprobación de la Resolución 1484 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU que la autorizaba, al aportar Francia el OHQ y el grueso de las tropas. Por contraste, cuando en 317

diciembre de 2005 la ONU solicitó a la UE una operación de apoyo durante las elecciones congolesas de verano de 2006, la Unión se encontró en serias dificultades ya que Francia, que de nuevo aportaba la mayoría de las tropas, solicitó que el OHQ fuese en esta ocasión el alemán, y Berlín se negó a iniciar el planeamiento hasta que Potsdam fuese oficialmente designado y las naciones asegurasen la asignación de fuerzas. Se produjo así un retraso de un mes, y la UE no habría estado en condiciones de lanzar EUFOR RDC a tiempo si finalmente no se hubiese pospuesto la fecha de las elecciones. Incluso cuando el planeamiento se ejecutó con éxito, como en el caso de EUFOR Chad- RCA, existieron inconvenientes prácticos. Sin entrar en detalles técnicos, cabe destacar que el Estado Mayor de la UE se ve obligado a realizar la fase inicial de planeamiento, en el nivel político-estratégico, sin las oportunas recomendaciones de un OHQ todavía pendiente de designar. Además, en los OHQ nacionales no se llega a acumular experiencia operacional, al funcionar en base a personal internacional enviado en rotaciones sucesivas, y carecen de algunas capacidades tecnológicas que no se adquieren ante la evidencia de que su asignación a la UE es meramente coyuntural. En todo caso, y más allá de cualquier consideración operativa, la cuestión del OHQ tiene un calado político que trasciende, con mucho, el ámbito de la PCSD. Tras el fracaso europeo en las crisis de los Balcanes, precisamente fueron franceses y británicos, en su Cumbre bilateral de Saint-Malo en 1998, los que decidieron que la UE debía “tener una capacidad autónoma de acción, respaldada por unas fuerzas militares creíbles, con los medios necesarios para utilizarlas, y estando dispuesto a hacerlo como respuesta a las crisis internacionales”. Esta decisión del entonces premier Tony Blair fue una relativa sorpresa, y parecía modificar el tradicional euro escepticismo británico.

Sin embargo, y al igual que en otras La actitud de Reino Unido en la cuestiones como la Unión Monetaria, la última década ha sido en general actitud de Reino Unido en la última contraria a los avances hacia una década ha sido en general contraria a los mayor integración en este ámbito avances hacia una mayor integración en este ámbito o a la asunción de un papel internacional relevante por parte de la UE, respetando la especial relación que le une con su antigua colonia, EE UU, para quien ejerce en ocasiones el papel de Caballo de Troya en Europa. Un ejemplo es su reticencia a participar en los proyectos de la Agencia Europea de Defensa, pero sin duda es en el caso del OHQ donde la postura es más enconada, aunque con argumentos francamente discutibles. Así, cabe recordar que la entidad del OHQ propuesta sería de unos 250 efectivos, entre militares y civiles. Si el conjunto de la UE, con 27 Estados, 500 millones de habitantes, 15 billones de dólares de PIB, y 225.000 millones de dólares de presupuesto de defensa, no es capaz de afrontar ese esfuerzo, desde luego hemos de convenir que la Unión sigue cumpliendo al aforismo de ser “un gigante económico, un enano político, y un gusano militar”. En lo referido a la OTAN, organización en la que según algunos se deben focalizar los esfuerzos de defensa europeos, el nuevo Concepto Estratégico aprobado en Lisboa en noviembre de 2010 prevé el cierre de cuatro de los once Cuarteles Generales existentes, y la reducción de 12.000 a 8.000 del personal que forma parte de las estructuras de mando. La comparación de esas cifras con las del pretendido OHQ de la 318

UE es especialmente llamativa, y parece invalidar los argumentos en contra de su creación. No obstante, en los últimos meses y tras la experiencia de la crisis libia, parece que algunos Estados se han decidido a desafiar el actual statu quo. Así, el llamado Trío de Weimar, Alemania, Francia y Polonia, a los que se han unido Italia y España, han remitido una carta a la Alta Representante instándole a impulsar avances concretos en la PCSD y ,en particular, le han informado que si no se aprueba la creación de un OHQ permanente, esos cinco países tomarán la iniciativa de hacerlo mediante una Cooperación Estructurada Permanente, figura prevista por el Tratado de Lisboa, que requeriría la aprobación del Consejo por mayoría cualificada y no por unanimidad, sorteando el previsible voto en contra de Reino Unido. La falta de un OHQ permanente sigue siendo uno de los principales lastres para el pleno desarrollo de la PCSD, y el constituir uno supone un esfuerzo relativamente pequeño, si se compara con el beneficio que representaría para las operaciones militares de la UE. Todo ello, aunque nos lleve a concluir que es inevitable una Europa de la seguridad y defensa a distintas velocidades, constata la falta de voluntad y/o capacidad de muchos Estados miembros. Francisco Ruiz “La defensa europea, ¿en punto muerto?”, 20 de diciembre de 2011 http://www.fp- es.org/la-defensa-europea-en-punto- muerto?utm_source=SendBlaster&utm_medium=email&utm_term=SendBlaster&utm_content=ealerta& utm_campaign=Los%25%25libros%de%25FP%2011

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Journée meurtrière en Syrie, alors que Damas accepte la venue d'observateurs LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 20.12.11 | 07h22 • Mis à jour le 20.12.11 | 08h18

Manifestation à Damas contre le régime du président Bachar Al-Assad, le 19 décembre.REUTERS/HANDOUT La Syrie a connu, lundi 19 décembre, une de ses journées les plus sanglantes. Cent personnes ont été tuées dans les violences qui n'ont pas faibli, en dépit de l'accord formel de Damas à la venue d'observateurs arabes, jugé par l'opposition comme une "manœuvre" pour gagner du temps. Entre soixante et soixante-dix déserteurs de l'armée ont été tués en fin d'après-midi alors qu'ils tentaient de fuir leurs postes dans les localités de Kansafra et Kafr Awid, dans la province d'Idleb (nord-ouest), a annoncé l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme (OSDH). Les affrontements entre l'armée régulière et les déserteurs se sont multipliés ces dernières semaines, notamment à Idleb, Homs (centre) et Deraa (sud), hauts lieux de la contestation contre le régime de Bachar Al-Assad réprimée dans le sang depuis plus de neuf mois. L'OSDH avait fait état, plus tôt, de la mort de trois soldats de l'armée régulière dans des affrontements avec des déserteurs à Kansafra. En outre, 40 civils ont été tués par les forces gouvernementales. Treize personnes ont péri dans la province de Homs, onze dans la province de Deraa, neuf dans la province d'Idleb, trois dans la province de Deir Ezzor et un tué sous la torture à Hama (centre), selon l'OSDH. A Damas, les forces de sécurité ont ouvert le feu sur des manifestants dans le quartier historique de Midane, tuant trois personnes, selon la même source. Dans un communiqué, les Comités locaux de coordination (LCC, qui chapeautent les manifestations sur le terrain) ont annoncé que 937 civils, dont 60 enfants, ont été tués par les forces gouvernementales en un peu plus d'un mois. "LE DÉBUT D'UNE COOPÉRATION" Ces nouvelles violences surviennent alors que le vice-ministre des affaires étrangères syrien Fayçal Al-Maqdad a signé au Caire un document autorisant la venue d'observateurs, dans le cadre d'un plan de sortie de crise mis au point par la Ligue arabe, que Damas avait déjà accepté "sans réserves" sans jamais pour autant l'appliquer. A Damas, le chef de la diplomatie Walid Mouallem a assuré que les observateurs arabes étaient "les bienvenus" en Syrie, lors d'une conférence de presse. "La signature du protocole est le début d'une coopération entre nous et la Ligue arabe. Nous

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accueillerons avec satisfaction la délégation des observateurs." Et d'ajouter que "cet accord sera renouvelé dans un mois si les deux parties sont d'accord". Le secrétaire général de la Ligue Nabil Al-Arabi a annoncé qu'une première délégation se rendrait en éclaireur à Damas sous trois jours. Elle sera "composée d'observateurs de la sécurité, du droit et de l'administration", a déclaré M. Arabi, précisant que des équipes incluant des experts des droits de l'Homme suivraient. "VOIR DES ACTES" La France a réclamé aussitôt que les observateurs arabes puissent remplir leur mission "le plus rapidement possible sur le terrain". L'administration américaine a, quant à elle, douté de la volonté réelle de la Syrie d'admettre des observateurs sur son sol, demandant à "voir des actes". L'Iran, alliée de la Syrie, a annoncé soutenir la décision de Damas. "La position officielle de l'Iran sur la Syrie et le plan de la Ligue arabe, est que tout ce que Bachar Al-Assad estime acceptable, nous l'approuvons et l'acceptons", a ainsi affirmé le vice-ministre des affaires étrangères, Hossein Amir Abdollahian. A Tunis, Burhan Ghalioun, chef du Conseil national syrien (CNS), qui regroupe la majorité des courants de l'opposition a estimé que les déclarations de M. Mouallem étaient une "manœuvre pour couvrir l'échec du régime syrien". Les observateurs pourront "accéder aux points chauds, mais pas aux points militaires sensibles", a affirmé M. Mouallem, précisant que son pays n'avait accepté de signer le document que parce qu'il respectait sa "souveraineté". "Dans ce protocole, nous parlons de protéger les civils contre les groupes terroristes", a-t-il ajouté. RÉSOLUTION "DÉSÉQUILIBRÉE" A New York, l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU a adopté une résolution condamnant la situation des droits de l'Homme en Syrie où les violences ont fait plus de 5 000 morts selon une estimation des Nations unies. La résolution a été adoptée par une majorité de 133 pays pour, 11 contre et 43 abstentions. L'ambassadeur syrien à l'ONU Bachar Jaafari a qualifié la résolution de complot "démoniaque" contre son pays. Cette condamnation est adoptée alors que le Conseil de sécurité a entamé des négociations sur un projet de résolution proposé par la Russie qui se contente de condamner la violence en Syrie provenant des deux parties. Les pays occidentaux du Conseil jugent ce projet de résolution déséquilibré car il met sur un même pied la violence causée par l'opposition et celle provenant des autorités syriennes. "De nombreux pays dans le monde ne veulent pas reconnaître la présence de groupes terroristes armés en Syrie. Ils vont venir et ils vont voir qu'ils sont présents. Nous ne devons absolument pas avoir peur", avait affirmé plus tôt le ministre Mouallem. "Il n'y a aucun changement dans la position russe. Il y a une coordination quotidienne avec les [dirigeants] russes. Ils ont conseillé à la Syrie de signer le protocole et nous l'avons fait", a, d'autre part, assuré M. Mouallem. Paris a souligné que l'envoi d'observateurs "ne constitue que l'un des éléments" du plan de sortie de crise arabe qui prévoit aussi "l'arrêt de la répression, la libération de toutes les personnes emprisonnées à l'occasion des manifestations, le retour de l'armée dans les casernes et l'accès au territoire syrien des médias internationaux". AFP Journée meurtrière en Syrie, alors que Damas accepte la venue d'observateurs20.12.11 | 08h18 http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/12/20/journee-meurtriere-en-syrie-alors-que-damas- accepte-la-venue-d-observateurs_1620648_3218.html 321

L'UE relance la coopération militaire treize ans après Saint-Malo

Point de vue | LEMONDE.FR | 20.12.11 | 09h52 • Mis à jour le 20.12.11 | 09h52 par Edouard Pflimlin, journaliste au Monde.fr Le Royaume-Uni s'est mis, lors du sommet de Bruxelles du 9 décembre, , en retrait de l'Union européenne (UE), qui compte avancer sans lui vers une plus grande intégration économique. Quelles sont les conséquences pour l'Europe de la défense ? Est-ce la fin de celle-ci comme l'estiment certains observateurs ? Certainement pas. Depuis le sommet franco-britannique de Saint-Malo le 4 décembre 1998 l'Europe de la défense a progressé. Ce sommet appelait l'UE "à avoir une capacité autonome d'action, appuyée sur des forces militaires crédibles, avec les moyens de les utiliser et en étant prête à le faire afin de répondre aux crises internationales". Depuis, une analyse détaillée des besoins en capacités a fait apparaître des déficiences dans 64 domaines comme les bombes intelligentes, le système de commandement intégré, ou encore le transport stratégique. Sur ce point, les capacités de déploiement des troupes européennes sont préoccupantes. Avec 1,61 million de militaires en 2010, l'UE ne peut en déployer que 40 à 50 000 pour des opérations de moyenne à haute intensité du type de celle menée en Afghanistan. Face à cette situation, la création de l'Agence européenne de défense (AED), lancée fin 2003, avait pour but de mobiliser les Etats au service de ces objectifs capacitaires. Elle n'a pas encore donné les résultats attendus mais la situation a évolué récemment. La Présidence française de l'UE avait donc fait en 2008 une priorité du renforcement des capacités cherchant à promouvoir notamment la projection des forces avec le développement d'une flotte européenne de transport aérien. Paris avait aussi pensé que la réintégration de la France dans le commandement militaire intégré de l'OTAN en 2009 permettrait de promouvoir plus facilement l'Europe de la défense. Il n'en a rien été et Paris a joué la carte franco-britannique, laissant – temporairement – de côté l'Europe de la défense. Le sommet bilatéral de Lancaster House du 2 novembre 2010 a conduit à un accord de coopération militaire étendu. Elle s'est manifestée dans le conflit libyen. Mais cette guerre a montré les faiblesses des deux pays et de l'UE, notamment en matière de munitions de précision, de surveillance et de ravitaillement en vol. De plus, si l'opération est un succès opérationnel, elle est un échec politique pour l'Europe. Seuls 6 pays européens sur 27 ont participé aux frappes aériennes. Toutefois la volonté sous la présidence polonaise de l'UE au second semestre 2011 de faire avancer l'Europe de la défense a donné des résultats récents significatifs. La réunion de l'AED, le 30 novembre, a retenu 11 projets de coopération comme la formation des pilotes, le renseignement, les satellites… Certains répondent à des besoins récents comme les bombes à guidage laser qui ont fait défaut côté pendant le conflit libyen.

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Dans ce contexte, la coopération franco-britannique bénéficiera-t-elle à l'Europe de la défense ? Les deux sont complémentaires. Comme le souligne le professeur en relations internationales de l'université Yale, Jolyon Hoyworth, les forces nucléaires britannique et française participent à la sécurité collective de l'UE. Et Jean-Pierre Maulny, directeur adjoint de l'IRIS, estime que "toutes les coopérations engagées entre la France et le Royaume-Uni sont de long terme", notamment sur les futures drones de combat. Cette coopération apparaîtcomme un impératif : " il est plus difficile d'obtenir des progrès à Londres qu'à Paris. Mais on ne voit pas en raison de la crise et des restrictions budgétaires, d'autres alternatives à ce projet ", indiquait Camille Grand, directeur de la FRS. Il faudra aussi mettre fin au déclin des dépenses de défense à l'œuvre en Europe. A force de tailler dans les dépenses d'équipement, l'UE perdra des capacités militaires. Dépenser mieux les quelques 186 milliards d'euros qu'a consacré en 2010 l'UE à sa défense est nécessaire. Moins de 15 % de cette somme est employée à des acquisitions d'armements modernes. La France et le Royaume-Uni représentent à eux deux 50 % des dépenses de défense de l'Union. Un tel déséquilibre a des conséquences sur les capacités militaires – trop faibles – de certains Etats. Des projets en "pooling and sharing" ("mise en commun et partage") s'imposent de plus en plus. On en voit d'ailleurs déjà les points positifs dans le cas de l'EATC (commandement de transport aérien européen), lancé en 2010, qui rassemble 4 Etats ; il a permis aux Pays-Bas de faire 20 % d'économies annuelles sur ses dépenses de transport militaire. Ceci pose aussi la question de l'industrie européenne d'armement qui doit se consolider pour être en mesure de répondre efficacement aux besoins de capacités militaires en pouvant financer les efforts de R&D dans un contexte budgétaire difficile. Mais il est nécessaire d'avoir des projets d'envergure estime Sven Biscop, directeur de recherche à l'Institut Egmont (Bruxelles) : de ce point de vue, le Conseil des ministres des affaires étrangères de l'UE du 1er décembre 2011 est très positif créant "une dynamique capacitaire" avec des projets en matière de ravitaillement en vol et aussi de futurs satellites de communication. Par ailleurs, ce Conseil insiste aussi sur l'importance d'"améliorer significativement la performance de l'UE en matière de planification et de conduite des opérations civiles et militaires". Le débat sur un quartier général européen, auquel se refuse Londres, est donc relancé. Dans ce développement capacitaire de l'UE, la France doit jouer un rôle de leader et donner une vision à l'Europe, sur ce que sont ses valeurs, notamment en matière de défense, souligne le général Jean-Paul Perruche, ancien directeur général de l'état-major militaire de l'UE. A court terme et dans un contexte budgétaire contraint, elle peut favoriser des projets plus modestes. Comme l'a dit Robert Schuman dans sa déclaration du 9 mai 1950 : "L'Europe ne se fera pas d'un coup, ni dans une construction d'ensemble : elle se fera par des réalisations concrètes créant d'abord des solidarités de fait". Edouard Pflimlin L'UE relance la coopération militaire treize ans après Saint- Malo20.12.11 | 09h52 http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/12/20/l-ue-relance-la- cooperation-militaire-treize-ans-apres-saint-malo_1620614_3232.html

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Clinton: Egypt's treatment of women a 'disgrace' AFP Author: AFP WASHINGTON — An impassioned Hillary Clinton accused post-revolution Egypt of failing its women as she denounced the stripping and beating of a female protester as "shocking" and a "disgrace." In unusually strong language, the US secretary of state accused Egypt's new leaders of mistreating women both on the street and in politics since the revolt nearly a year ago that overthrew leader Hosni Mubarak. "This systematic degradation of Egyptian women dishonors the revolution, disgraces the state and its uniform and is not worthy of a great people," Clinton said in a speech at Georgetown University. In images widely seen over YouTube, helmeted troops were shown beating a veiled woman after having ripped her clothes off to reveal her bra and stomach. Other pictures circulating on social media networks that have enraged protesters include one of a military policeman looming over a sobbing elderly woman with his truncheon. "Recent events in Egypt have been particularly shocking. Women are being beaten and humiliated in the same streets where they risked their lives for the revolution only a few short months ago," Clinton said. She denounced a "deeply troubling pattern" of military authorities and the major political parties alike keeping Egyptian women out of decision-making. "At the same time, they have been specifically targeted both by security forces and extremists," the top US diplomat said. "Women protesters have been rounded up and subjected to horrific abuse. Journalists have been sexually assaulted and now women are being attacked, stripped and beaten in the streets." Responding later to a question by a student, Clinton said that Egyptians and not Americans should be the first ones disturbed by poor treatment of women. "Beating women is not cultural, it's criminal and it needs to be addressed and treated as such," she said to applause. Clinton, who narrowly lost her bid to be the first female US president, has frequently been outspoken about women's rights during her tenure as the country's top diplomat.

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She addressed events in Egypt as part of a broader speech in which she argued that peacemaking efforts around the world would benefit from greater involvement by women. President Barack Obama on Monday signed an executive order setting up a "National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security," which Clinton said would advance women's role in peacemaking throughout US government agencies. "Women are bellwethers of society and, in fact, sometimes they do play the role of canary in the coal mine. They know when communities are fraying and when citizens fear for their safety," Clinton said. As part of the new effort, the United States will monitor violence and discrimination against women to help detect future conflicts, Clinton said. The United States will also step up assistance to grassroots groups working to stop violence against women and increase their economic empowerment. The first round of grants will cover support for a trauma center for rape survivors in Sudan, economic and legal assistance for women in Central African Republic and better collection of medical evidence to prosecute rampant rape in the Democratic Republic of Congo. "Studies suggest that women's physical security and higher levels of gender equality correlate with security and peacefulness of entire countries," Clinton said. "But political leaders too often overlook women's knowledge and experience until it's too late to stop violence from spiraling out of control," she said. Archived Photo?: Hillary Clinton Publishing Date: Tue, 20/12/2011 - 14:55 Related material Clinton says deeply concerned by violence in Egypt Clinton says women sidelined in Egypt transition

Source URL (retrieved on 20/12/2011 - 15:27): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/559071 AFP Clinton: Egypt's treatment of women a 'disgrace' http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/559071

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Yahoo! Noticias EFE El Gobierno sirio firma el protocolo para el envío de observadores árabes al país

Por Agencia EFE (17:43) – hace 4 horas El Cairo, 19 dic (EFE).- Siria firmó hoy el protocolo propuesto por la Liga Árabe para el envío de observadores a su territorio, lo que abre la puerta al levantamiento de las sanciones económicas impuestas al régimen de Damasco por esta organización. El documento fue suscrito por el viceministro de Exteriores sirio, Faisal Maqdad, y por el subsecretario general de la Liga Árabe, Ahmed Ben Helli, en una ceremonia en la sede del organismo en El Cairo. Tras la firma, el secretario general de la organización panárabe, Nabil al Arabi, dijo en una rueda de prensa que "este documento es el marco jurídico de la misión de la delegación de observadores de la Liga Árabe que serán enviados a Siria para comprobar la aplicación de la hoja de ruta" de este organismo. También tendrán como misión "contribuir a la protección de los civiles sirios", agregó Al Arabi. El responsable adelantó que en los dos o tres próximos días su organización mandará un primer grupo de observadores, encabezados por el asistente del secretario general de la Liga Árabe, Samir Saif al Yazar, que incluirá a expertos en seguridad y administración, además de juristas. A ese primer grupo seguirán en el futuro otros especializados en derechos humanos y periodistas. Al Arabi destacó que la misión de observadores estará integrada por expertos de todos los países árabes. Pese a que la Liga Árabe había ofrecido levantar las duras sanciones económicas que impuso a Damasco a finales de noviembre a cambio de la firma del protocolo, Al Arabi no hizo ninguna mención a su cancelación. Aun así, una fuente diplomática árabe explicó a Efe que la rúbrica "significa la suspensión inmediata de las sanciones de la Liga Árabe y la vuelta de Siria a la organización". En paralelo a la firma en El Cairo, el ministro de Exteriores sirio, Walid al Moalem, aseguró en Damasco que no hubieran aceptado suscribir el protocolo si no se hubiesen tenido en cuenta las "reservas" del régimen sirio. Al Moalem afirmó en una rueda de prensa que ha habido enmiendas al documento, pese a que en un principio la Liga Árabe se había negado a aceptar las condiciones impuestas por Damasco. "El acuerdo es el comienzo de una cooperación entre Siria y la Liga Árabe, y los observadores que representan al mundo árabe son bienvenidos", subrayó.

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Sin embargo, advirtió de que la vigencia del protocolo es de un mes "que se puede renovar si ambas partes lo aceptan". Mualem dijo que su Gobierno no es responsable de ningún "estancamiento" en las negociaciones entre la Liga Árabe y Siria, y destacó que algunos países árabes, que no nombró, querían llevar el asunto al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU para aumentar la presión sobre el régimen sirio. Este fin de semana, en Doha, el grupo de contacto sobre Siria del organismo panárabe propuso que se pidiera al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU que adoptara su plan para dar una salida a la crisis. Estaba previsto que los ministros de Exteriores árabes se reunieran el próximo miércoles en El Cairo para decidir al respecto. Inmediatamente después de la firma, Al Arabi anunció que esa reunión quedaba cancelada como "muestra de la buena intención de la Liga Árabe hacia Siria". El que sí se reunirá mañana será el grupo de contacto de la Liga Árabe sobre Siria para estudiar la evolución de la situación. Más de 5.000 personas han muerto por la represión en Siria, entre ellas más de 300 menores, desde el inicio de las protestas antigubernamentales a mediados de marzo pasado, según los últimos datos de la ONU. http://www.google.com/hostednews/epa/article/ALeqM5gan1XjPQJ16_AirQ9lyUbtUS VYAg?docId=1677960

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LA FRAGMENTADA OPOSICIÓN SIRIA 19 de diciembre de 2011 Hélène Michou, Edén Sánchez y Javier Albarrán La división en la disidencia siria se traduce en una ausencia de liderazgo claro para los ciudadanos que se manifiestan contra el régimen de Assad.

AFP/Getty Images

El pasado 9 de noviembre de 2011, cuando acudían a una reunión en El Cairo con el líder de la Liga Árabe, Nabil al Arabi, varios representantes de la oposición interna de Siria fueron recibidos con huevos por parte de manifestantes sirios. Este desagradable acontecimiento ilustra perfectamente la situación de los opositores del régimen assadista, divididos en varias ramas que no consiguen unirse en pos de liderar la revolución. La cohesión interna es imprescindible: tanto para ofrecer una alternativa viable a un régimen que mata con impunidad como para presentar una cara unida a socios internacionales, quienes buscan tratar con un representante legitimo del pueblo sirio. Se disciernen dos ramas dentro de la oposición: la política, que lleva ocho meses formándose, y la militar, que está empezando a levantar la cabeza a base de deserciones. La oposición política consta de dos grandes fuerzas, el Consejo Nacional Sirio (CNS) y el Comité de Coordinación Nacional Sirio (CCNS). Ninguno de los dos puede erigirse como el único interlocutor de la oposición, tan diversa y tan fragmentada que unirla bajo un solo grupo representa el mayor reto. En tanto que el CCNS tiene más 328

legitimidad en la calle, el CNS goza de mas visibilidad a escala internacional, pero algunos activistas sirios le acusa de priorizar la internacionalización de su causa antes de la búsqueda de una solución doméstica. Unidos en su deseo de ver una destitución o expulsión de Bashar el Assad, el Consejo y el Comité difieren en lo de más: su composición, el dialogo con el régimen, su actitud hacia la intervención internacional y su hoja de ruta. El CNS, liderado por Burhan Ghalioun y considerado la oposición en exilio -tanto por su composición como por tener su base en Istanbul- agrupa a una serie de partidos políticos, al grupo de intelectuales de la llamada “declaración de Damasco”, a los Hermanos Musulmanes y a una serie de activistas kurdos y caldeos. Sin embargo, minorías como los alauítas, cristianos y drusos apenas cuentan con representación. Por su parte, el CCNS, un bloque de la oposición interna compuesto por trece partidos políticos de tendencia secular y nacionalista, está presidido por Hassan Abdel Azim y apoyado por históricos opositores como Michel Kilo, Fayez Sara y Samir al Eitta. El Comité también cuenta con el respaldo de tres coaliciones dentro del país, derivadas de los originarios comités locales creados por los activistas para publicitar el levantamiento: el Consejo Superior de la Revolución Siria (de tendencia islamista), la alianza Ghad y la Comisión General de la Revolución Siria. La ultima táctica de los Comités de Coordinación Local está siendo organizar una campaña de desobediencia civil a través de huelgas generales, el cierre de universidades y sit-ins. Habrá que ver si el régimen responderá a estos actos tomando las medidas drásticas que han caracterizó la represión de manifestaciones pacifistas hasta el momento. En cuanto al diálogo con el régimen, otra vez surgen acusaciones de irrelevancia dirigidas al CNS frente a una actitud mucho mas realista del CCNS. El último aboga por hablar con el régimen siempre y cuando este último retire a sus tropas de las calles, cese todo ataque contra los manifestantes y libere de las cárceles a los prisioneros políticos. Defiende la idea de que esta estrategia es la menos costosa para la futura transición política. El CNS rechaza el diálogo con el régimen argumentando que este sería utilizado para dividir a la oposición y incitar el sectarismo. De hecho, boicotearon una reunión de la oposición convocada por el régimen en Turquía. La actitud del CNS carece de realismo, según algunos sirios que afirman que Burhan Ghalioun “juega a la política” en círculos internacionales en vez de actuar para encontrar una solución con los actores locales. Su entrevista con el Wall Street Journal indica dicha actitud: Ghalioun da por hecho el apoyo Occidental y se muestra dispuesto a disminuir relaciones con Irán, Hamás y Hezbolá. El pueblo sirio, con una voz política recién encontrada y todavía sin confiar en la oposición, no aprecia que el CNS pretenda hablar por todos ellos, ni que priorice la política exterior sin tener condiciones domesticas propicias para implementarlo. Tanto el CCNS como el CNS se oponen en principio a la intervención militar extranjera, sin embargo, algunos miembros del Consejo verían con buenos ojos la injerencia. Como distinguió Ghalioun, no es igual usar la fuerza para obligar al régimen a respetar derechos humanos como para deshacerse de él. La opción de la imposición de una zona de exclusión aérea está visto con el precedente de Irak en mente y el conflicto de carácter sectario que generó. En cambio, la puesta en marcha de una zona desmilitarizada (que sea con el apoyo de tropas de la OTAN, Turquía o de países árabes), crearía así un refugio seguro para los desertores, que son cada vez más. El CCNS prefiere una protección internacional que incluyese a observadores internacionales, la entrada en Siria de medios de comunicación extranjeros y de 329

asistencia humanitaria, y sanciones más severas contra figuras clave del régimen. Para el CCNS el mayor temor se esconde en el posible sectarismo que una intervención militar dirigida por Turquía podría desencadenar. Los actuales acontecimientos sobre

el terreno podrían empujar hacia una militarización de la oposición

La fragmentación interna y la represión violenta no han impedido que la oposición desarrollara una visión post-Assad. Las rutas de trabajo, tanto del CCNS como del CNS, parecen bien definidas a día de hoy, por lo menos, en el plano teórico. El programa político del CCNS aboga por mantener un diálogo con el partido Baaz, reclutar a sus sectores más moderados para que contribuyan a la creación del nuevo sistema político, evitando así lo ocurrido en Irak, donde la exclusión de toda la estructura del Baaz llevó a una situación de inestabilidad muy fuerte. El CNS, por su parte, se centraría en el modelo de transición que está llevándose a cabo en Túnez y en Egipto, y trataría de forjar una república parlamentaria plural. Junto con el aparato militar se responsabilizarían de la gestión del país hasta celebrar unas elecciones libres bajo supervisión de observadores árabes e internacionales, con el fin de elegir una Asamblea Constituyente encargada de redactar una nueva constitución para el país, que luego sería votada por el pueblo en un referéndum. A los 6 meses se llevarían a cabo unos comicios parlamentarios libres de acuerdo con la nueva Constitución. Las minorías kurdas y asirías gozarían de los mismo derechos que el resto de los ciudadanos dentro del marco de la nueva Constitución. A pesar de los esfuerzos de la mayoría de la oposición para mantener el carácter pacífico de las revueltas, los actuales acontecimientos sobre el terreno podrían empujar hacia una militarización de la oposición. Cada vez hay más evidencias de que este hecho está produciéndose: el aumento de las deserciones, la creación del Ejercito Libre Sirio (ELS) a finales de julio, la absorción en septiembre del movimiento de oficiales libres y el recién firmado acuerdo entre el ELS y el CNS con el fin de coordinar su lucha contra el régimen de Damasco. Con su centro de operaciones en un campo de refugiados en la frontera con Turquía, según varios informes, su composición rondaría los 15.000 soldados. Dirigido por un Consejo Militar, compuesto por 10 miembros y encabezado por el ex coronel del Ejército Riad al Asaad, el ELS declara no tener ningún tipo de aspiraciones políticas más allá de su voluntad de acabar con el régimen y de proteger la revolución. Aunque no ha realizado operaciones a gran escala, simplemente tácticas de guerrilla sobre todo dirigidas contra vehículos destinados al transporte de refuerzos del Ejército sirio, su nacimiento marca un antes y un después en el panorama político de la oposición, hasta entonces liderado por los movimientos pacíficos no violentos. Los activistas explican que esta militarización de la oposición es una autodefensa por parte de los ciudadanos frente a la represión del Ejército sirio. Según la ONU y Human Rigths Watch, la tasa de victimas ha superado los 5.000. El ELS reclama a la comunidad internacional la creación de una zona de seguridad en el norte del país, con el fin de facilitar las deserciones en el seno del Ejército sirio, dotando a su vez al grupo de una zona bajo su control donde pudiese reagruparse, reclutar y adiestrar nuevos miembros.

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Es necesario plantearse, con el precedente del caso Libio en mente, a dónde podría llevar la creación de esta zona de seguridad. ¿Contribuirá a que la situación derivase en una guerra civil? Lo más probable es que dado la falta de cohesión de la oposición, el carácter cada vez más militarizado de varias de sus ramas y un régimen sin ninguna intención de cesar su represión violenta, la situación empeore antes de que aparezca cualquier mejora. Frente a un acertijo sin respuesta obvia, la comunidad internacional debe respetar la cautela: no apostar a ciegas a por el Consejo Nacional Sirio, sino más bien reconocer que otros grupos de activistas dentro del país son tal vez más representativos del pueblo. Lo único cierto es que tratar con la oposición es mejor que hacerlo con un líder que, según su entrevista con ABC News, pretende no ejercer control sobre sus fuerzas de seguridad, atribuye muertos a “errores personales” y bandas terroristas, y sigue rechazando los intentos de mediación. La oposición siria, siempre y cuando sea dotada de legitimidad doméstica, ofrece sin duda mejor homólogo con quien hablar. Artículos relacionados • Depende: Siria. Barah Mikail • Siria: ¿reformas o revolución? Natalia Sancha • Bashar al assad, la gran decepción. Hélène Michou • Mucho palo y poca zanahoria para Siria. Natalia Sancha

Hélène Michou, Edén Sánchez y Javier Albarrán, “La fragmentada oposición siria” 19 Dic. 2011, disponible en: http://www.fp-es.org/la-fragmentada-oposicion- siria?utm_source=SendBlaster&utm_medium=email&utm_term=SendBlaster&utm_content=ealerta&ut m_campaign=la%25fragmentacion%25siria

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Publishing Date: Mon, 19/12/2011 - 11:08

Brotherhood claims 37% of list-based seats in second phase of elections Author: Staff Reuters The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) has declared that its electoral lists won 37.2 percent of votes in the second phase of elections for Egypt's lower house, the People's Assembly. Only the second constituency in the Giza governorate has not yet announced the results of its vote count, according to the statement made by the FJP late Sunday. The FJP said it won a total of 3.17 million out of 10.86 million valid votes for seats contested through the list-based candidacy system. The FJP revealed it will compete in the runoffs for this phase with 47 candidates: 10 in Sharqiya, nine in Giza, four in Monufiya, six in Beni Suef, one in Ismailia, one in Suez, two in Aswan and four in Sohag. Turnout in the second round of Egypt’s parliamentary election reached 67 percent, according to Abdel Moez Ibrahim, the head of the high elections commission. Ibrahim was speaking at a news conference on Sunday. More than 12 million voters cast their ballots on Wednesday and Thursday in nine of the country's 27 provinces. The total number of eligible voters is almost 19 million. There will be a run-off in most of the constituencies next Wednesday, as few individual candidates managed to secure a majority of votes. Two-thirds of the new parliament's 498 seats are allocated to parties, with the remainder earmarked for independent candidates. The list led by the FJP won more votes than it did in the first round, a party source told Reuters on Sunday. The poll, held over six weeks, is the first since President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in February. Official results have not been released but party representatives watch the count and their predictions after the first round were largely accurate. Independent monitors have warned of electoral abuses, such as illegal campaigning outside polling stations. The first-round vote in one district of Cairo will be re-run after ballots were lost or damaged during counting. The elections commission has said that the violations have not undermined the vote's overall legitimacy. Related material Kerry says Brotherhood elections success unsurprising Brotherhood addresses the West after elections success

Source URL (retrieved on 19/12/2011 - 12:07): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/557366

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Publishing Date: Mon, 19/12/2011 - 11:14

Yet another form of 'resistance' Author: Steven Viney An exhibition entitled “Resistance" opened Saturday night, celebrating the third anniversary of Darb 1718, an art center in Old Cairo. Coincidentally, the opening date also marked the one-year anniversary of the day 26- year-old Tunisian fruit seller Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze, a symbolic act of defiance against state authorities after the confiscation of his vending cart. This event is considered the spark that ignited the wave of uprisings in the Arab world, many of which continue today. Closer to home, only a few kilometers from the culture center in Old Cairo, violent clashes continue between protesters and Egypt’s military. This fact certainly added anxiety to the experience of viewing the exhibition. The exhibition tries to capture the spirit of resistance through the works of six artists from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. “As Foucault says, resistance should be a natural part of everyday life, as it is required for us to evolve into stronger human beings with better ideas,” says Moataz Nasr El Din, the founder of Darb 1718 and an artist participating in “Resistance.” “This concept is new to Egypt, and I think we are now learning how to incorporate resistance into our culture and values.” The artwork on display offers engaging insights about the nature of resistance as a concept, and allows room for interpretation. One installation by Egyptian artist Karim al-Tobgy, entitled “The Revealer,” speaks to the importance of moral values when working to resist the status quo in an informed manner. The installation requires viewers to pick up a flashlight before entering a dark room where small flashlights are dangling from the ceiling. Each flashlight has a stencil fixed to it that illuminates a certain word on the wall in Arabic. The words include “Truth,” “Vision,” “Independence” and “Awareness,” symbolizing how the only way through the current darkness — particularly in relation to the current parliamentary elections, according to the the plaque on display — is to be guided by, and only by, such values. Another work features the words “The King is dead! Long live the King!” repeated and mirrored over and over again on a white wall. Iraqi artist Adel Abdin explains that in light of the Arab uprisings, this line in repetition signifies how powerful expressions of change and resistance eventually render themselves completely meaningless unless the substance of the semantics involved evolves alongside reality. In other words, being excited that the king is dead after he dies implies the king is still important, and hence a replacement will soon naturally surface. Nasr El Din’s work, entitled “We ... Need ... Education...,” is simply an empty chalk board surrounded by piles of dusty chalk with small speakers blaring screeching sounds 333

as if erasing the board. Ironically, written on the floor was the phrase “Please Don’t Cross,” intended to prevent people from walking over and touching the exhibit’s displays. When I returned 10 minutes later, the board had been covered in phrases such as “I’m prince man,” which was highly symbolic considering the installation’s title. Also on display are a series of pieces by graffiti artist Keizer, Abdin’s video of a naked woman being thrashed with ping-pong balls that was previously exhibited as part of the Hiwar show in October 2010, and a slow motion video by Saudi artist Faisal Samra of a man being exposed to extremely powerful winds, showing facial expressions of resistance. The opening night featured a performance by Italian artist Romina De Novellis, who performed a bizarre piece in the garden. She bathed different parts of her body in pots of water then handed cups of the used water to excited audience members. Most audience members appeared stargazed by the way the beautiful woman bathed herself. However, it seemed that De Novellis was trying to draw attention to the problem of human attraction to false values; or, how superficial charms often obscure the reality of that which we are given — the dirty remains of self-serving ideals. Whether or not this interpretation is correct, the performance was certainly engaging. Overall, “Resistance” is interesting both conceptually and artistically, leaving space for viewer interpretation that inspires new thoughts and perspectives. It also captures the resistance struggles that have been continuously affecting Egypt’s development since 25 January. “Resistance” is on display at Darb 1718 until the end of January 2012. Qasr al-Shamaa Street, al-Fakhareen, Old Cairo. The gallery is open Saturday through Wednesday from 10 am to 10 pm and Friday from 4 pm to 10 pm. Darb 1718 is closed on Thursdays. The participating artists are Adel Abdin from Iraq, Faisal Samra from Saudi Arabia, and Karim al-Tobgy, Karim Keizer, Moataz Nasr El Din and Gamal Ezz from Egypt. Archived Photo?: 'Resistance' exhibition Publishing Date: Mon, 19/12/2011 - 11:14 Related material 'Arna's Children': The life and work of Juliano Mer-Khamis Music post-revolution sounds like resistance

Source URL (retrieved on 19/12/2011 - 11:54): Steven Viney Yet another form of 'resistance'19/12/2011 - 11:14 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/557371

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Middle East

December 18, 2011 Last Convoy of American Troops Leaves Iraq By TIM ARANGO and MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT BAGHDAD — The last convoy of American troops drove into Kuwait on Sunday morning, punctuating the end of the nearly nine-year war in Iraq. As an indication of the country the United States is leaving behind, for security reasons the last soldiers made no time for goodbyes to Iraqis with whom they had become acquainted. To keep details of the final trip secret from insurgents — or Iraqi security officers aligned with militias — interpreters for the last unit to leave the base called local tribal sheiks and government leaders on Saturday morning and conveyed that business would go on as usual, not letting on that all the Americans would soon be gone. The crossing brought a close to a final troop withdrawal drawn out over weeks of ceremonies in Baghdad and around Iraq, including a formal if muted flag-folding ceremony on Thursday, as well as visits by Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, and a trip to Washington by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. The last troop movement out of Iraq, which included about 110 vehicles and 500 soldiers, began in darkness. Around 2:30 a.m., the convoy snaked out of Contingency Operating Base Adder, near the southern city of Nasiriya, and headed toward the border. As dawn approached on Sunday, the last trucks began to cross the border into Kuwait at an outpost lighted by floodlights and secured by barbed wire. “I just can’t wait to call my wife and kids and let them know I am safe,” said Sgt. First Class Rodolfo Ruiz just before his armored vehicle crossed over the border. “I am really feeling it now.” Shortly after enterng Kuwait, Sergeant Ruiz told the men in his vehicle: “Hey, guys, you made it.” Then, he ordered the vehicles in his convoy not to flash their lights or honk their horns. Many troops wondered how the Iraqis, whom they had worked closely with and trained over the past year, would react when they awakened on Sunday to find that the remaining American troops on the base had left without saying anything. “The Iraqis are going to wake up in the morning, and nobody will be there,” said a soldier who identified himself only as Specialist Joseph. He said he had emigrated to the United States from Iraq in 2009 and enlisted a year later, and refused to give his full name because he worried for his family’s safety. The reaction among Iraqis was muted, as it had been for weeks as the Americans packed up. Live images of the last convoy arriving in Kuwait were not shown on local television, as they were around the world. Some Iraqis were unaware on Sunday that the last of the American soldiers — aside from a vestigial force at the embassy — had left.

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“I just heard from you that they’ve withdrawn,” Mustafa Younis, an auto mechanic in Mosul, said to a reporter. “We’ve been waiting for this day since 2003. When they invaded us, we carried our machine guns and went out to fight them. We decided to do suicide operations against them. They committed many crimes, and we lost a lot of things because of them.” Some celebrated even before the final departure. On Saturday evening, Ahmed Haider, a teacher in the Khadimiya district of Baghdad, took his family out to a restaurant for a meal of pizza and sandwiches to mark the occasion. “I feel so happy,” he said. “This is the real happiness for all Iraqis, and I do not know why people are not making a big deal of it.” Of course, many Iraqis fear what comes next, and the withdrawal came against the backdrop of political crisis in Baghdad. A large group of mostly Sunni lawmakers announced a boycott of Parliament on Saturday in protest of a wave of arrests by the Shiite-dominated government that swept up a number of their aides and security guards. Several guards who work for Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, a top Sunni leader, have been arrested, and the government is said to be preparing a case against Mr. Hashimi on terrorism charges. Fearing that insurgents would try to attack the last Americans leaving the country, the military treated all convoys like combat missions. As the armored vehicles drove through the desert, Marine, Navy and Army helicopters and planes flew overhead, scanning the ground for insurgents and preparing to respond if the convoys were attacked. Col. Douglas Crissman, one of the military’s top commanders in southern Iraq, said Friday in an interview that he planned to be in a Black Hawk helicopter over the convoy with special communication equipment. “It is a little bit weird,” he said, referring to how he had not told his counterparts in the Iraqi military when the Americans were leaving. “But the professionals among them understand.” Over the past year, Colonel Crissman and his troops spearheaded the military’s efforts to ensure the security of Tampa, the long highway that passes through southern Iraq, which a majority of convoys passed through on the way out of the country. “Ninety-five percent of what we have done has been for everyone else,” Colonel Crissman said. Across the highway, the military built relationships with 20 tribal sheiks, paying them to clear the highway of garbage, making it difficult for insurgents to hide roadside bombs in blown-out tires and trash. Along with keeping the highway clean, the military hoped that the sheiks would help police the highway and provide intelligence on militants. “I can’t possibly be all places at one time,” Colonel Crissman said in an interview in May. “There are real incentives for them to keep the highway safe. Those sheiks we have the best relationships with and have kept their highways clear and safe will be the most likely ones to get renewed for the remainder of the year.”

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All American troops were legally obligated to leave by the end of the month, but President Obama, in announcing in October the end of military operations here, promised that everyone would be home for the holidays. Still, the United States will continue to play a role in Iraq. The largest American Embassy in the world is located here, and in the wake of the military departure it is doubling in size — to roughly 16,000 people, most of them contractors. Under the authority of the ambassador will be fewer than 200 military personnel, to guard the embassy and oversee the sale of weapons to the Iraqi government. History’s final judgment on the war, which claimed nearly 4,500 American lives and cost almost $1 trillion, may not be determined for decades. But as the last troop convoy crossed over, it marked neither victory, nor defeat, but a kind of stalemate — one in which the optimists say violence has been reduced to a level that will allow the country to continue on its lurching path toward stability and democracy, and in which the pessimists say the American presence has been a Band- Aid on a festering wound. “Things will go worse in Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal, on all levels — security, economics and services,” said Hatem Imam, a businessman in Basra. “We are not ready for this.” Duraid Adnan contributed reporting from Baghdad, and an employee of The New York Times from Mosul. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/middleeast/last-convoy-of-american- troops-leaves-iraq.html?scp=1&sq=iraq%20war%20judgement&st=cse

Politics

December 17, 2011

WHITE HOUSE MEMO Iraq, a War Obama Didn’t Want, Shaped His Foreign Policy By MARK LANDLER WASHINGTON — President Obama has made good on his campaign pledge to end the Iraq war, portraying the departure of the last troops as a chance to turn to nation- building at home. But from Afghanistan to the Arab Spring, from China to counterterrorism, the lessons of that war still hang over the administration’s foreign policy — shaping, and sometimes limiting, how the president projects American power in the world. The war that Mr. Obama never wanted to fight has weighed on internal debates, dictated priorities and often narrowed options for the United States, according to current and former administration officials.

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Most tangibly, the swift American drawdown in Iraq will influence how the United States handles the endgame in Afghanistan, where NATO forces have agreed to hand over security and pull out by 2014. The fact that the troops are leaving Iraq without a wholesale breakdown in security, some analysts said, may embolden a war-weary administration to move up the timetable for getting out of Afghanistan. It has also shifted the balance of power in Washington, from the military commanders, who were desperate to leave a residual force of soldiers in Iraq, toward Mr. Obama’s civilian advisers, who are busy calculating how getting them all home by Christmas might help their boss’s re-election bid. “There used to be a hot debate over even setting a timetable,” said Benjamin J. Rhodes, a deputy national security adviser. While he cautioned that Iraq is not a perfect precedent for Afghanistan, “there should be no doubt about our commitment to follow through on the timelines we set in Afghanistan,” he said. Mr. Rhodes, who wrote Mr. Obama’s foreign policy speeches during his 2008 campaign, said Iraq was a “dramatically underrepresented element of the way in which people look at Obama’s foreign policy.” As a candidate whose opposition to the war helped define him, Mr. Rhodes said, “Senator Obama constructed an entire argument of foreign policy, based on Iraq.” His argument had two central pillars: that Iraq had taken the United States’ eye off the real battle in Afghanistan, and that it had diminished the United States’ standing in the world. This led directly to two of the administration’s most significant foreign policy and national security projects: Mr. Obama’s lethal counterterrorism strategy and his recent series of diplomatic and military initiatives in Asia. The drone strikes and commando raids that the president recently boasted had killed “22 out of 30 top Al Qaeda leaders,” including Osama bin Laden, were honed in the night raids by American troops on militants in Iraq. Mr. Obama’s emphasis on restoring the United States’ place in Asia grew out of a post- Iraq “strategic rebalancing” pushed by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and the national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon. The war, they contend, sucked American time and resources from other parts of the world, allowing China to expand its sway throughout much of the Pacific Rim. In the early days of his presidency, as Mr. Obama weighed more troop deployments in Afghanistan, he was still heavily influenced by commanders like Gen. David H. Petraeus, who was fresh off his successful “surge” in Iraq and pressed for an ambitious counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. “Here was a general who, in Petraeus’s case, had turned around a situation dramatically in Iraq, and was offering to do it again,” said Bruce O. Riedel, who ran the White House’s initial policy review on Afghanistan. By 2011, however, Mr. Obama had developed his own views about the use of military force. His reluctant intervention in Libya — only after receiving the imprimatur of the Arab League, and then with limited military engagement — bore the hallmarks of a post-Iraq operation. In Syria, where a dictator in the Baathist tradition of Saddam Hussein has killed his own people, the United States has not considered a no-fly zone, let alone broader military intervention.

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“The larger legacy of Iraq was that the U.S. military cannot shape outcomes,” said Vali Nasr, a former senior adviser in the State Department. “That led to skittishness on our part about using the military.” Mr. Obama made much of his commitment to a multilateral foreign policy, in contrast to President George W. Bush’s unilateral invasion of Iraq. That, his advisers say, grew out of a conviction the United States needed to work with others and forge consensus to restore its moral standing. But it also reflects a sober economic reality: with more than $800 billion in costs from the Iraq war — and nearly $450 billion from Afghanistan — the United States can no longer afford another big, go-it-alone military campaign. “The impulse toward multilateralism is more complicated,” said Dennis B. Ross, who until last month was one of Mr. Obama’s senior Middle East advisers. “There is a desire, understandably, for our actions to have greater legitimacy on the world stage. But there is also an interest in burden-sharing and sharing the cost as well.” Some analysts argue that the administration’s multilateral approach owes less to Iraq than it does to traditional Democratic Party philosophy. “No doubt, Iraq contributed to his view that we should wield power less, should not act without U.N. resolutions and multilateral support, and should try to ‘engage’ with hostile regimes, but I suspect the president held those views years earlier,” said Elliott Abrams, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who worked in the George W. Bush and Reagan administrations. “That’s pretty standard stuff on the left,” he added. “Iraq made them more central to his actions as president, but I doubt it taught him much.” The Bush administration had hoped that Iraq would be a catalyst for democratic change across the Arab world. But there is little evidence that Iraq prepared the United States for the political changes that swept over the Middle East and North Africa this spring, eight years after American troops toppled Mr. Hussein. The Obama administration’s initial response to the upheaval in Egypt and elsewhere was halting, as it balanced its support for the protesters with its fear of losing strategic allies. Mr. Rhodes said Iraq’s legacy was visible in the administration’s insistence on homegrown, rather than externally imposed, democratic change. That is likely to mean coming to terms with rulers it views as less than ideal, like the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties, which made striking gains in Egypt’s recent parliamentary elections. “Iraq has taught us we can live with Islamists,” Mr. Nasr said. “We can live with a Maliki in Egypt,” he said, referring to Iraq’s Shiite prime minister, Nuri Kamal al- Maliki. “Iraq exorcised the way we latched on to secular dictators.” Mark Landler Iraq, a War Obama Didn’t Want, Shaped His Foreign Policy December 17, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/us/politics/iraq-war-shaped-obamas-foreign-policy-white-house- memo.html?ref=middleeast

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Publishing Date: Sun, 18/12/2011 - 19:30

Blog: Bouazizi's unfinished business Author: Abdel Rahman Hussein This blog was supposed to have been written for 17 December, but events in Cairo put it on the backburner, and indeed seem to provide a connecting thread to events on that same day a year ago. I was never really one for commemorating my birthday. Sure, it was a reason to see friends and family, but on a personal level it wasn’t something that resonated deeply. It was always just another day, a benchmark maybe but never a significant shift. On 17 December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi went to the office of the governor of Sidi Bouzid to meet him and ask for the return of his electronic scales, which had been confiscated by police earlier that day. He was turned away at the meeting, even though he threatened to set himself on fire if he didn’t meet the governor. He went to get a can of gasoline from a nearby petrol station and set himself alight. It was a story that filtered through on that day, my birthday. Of course, then it was a story in and of itself. No one knew it was a precursor of things to come. It was taken as a very symbolic gesture at the time. The young man burnt himself alive because he felt he had no other choice. Meanwhile, Arab leaders lived off illegal gains that belonged to the people they violently oppressed. Many seemed to have seen it that way as well. Within hours, protests began in Bouazizi’s hometown. I remember following the Sidi Bouzid hashtag on Twitter, likening the demonstrations in my mind to the 2008 Mahalla riots in Egypt. And then, ten days after Bouazizi died on 4 January, 23-year despot Zine El Abadine Ben Ali was ousted from power. People in the region were a bit shell-shocked. The questions began to be asked: Would this happen elsewhere? The oppression was broadly the same across the board; the frustrations and grievances were similar. Was Egypt like Tunisia? After Ben Ali had high-tailed it to Saudi Arabia, three Egyptians attempted to set themselves on fire in front of the cabinet. There was also unrest in Egypt at the time because of the Two Saints Church bombing in Alexandria. And police day was coming up on 25 January, and Egypt was a police state, like Tunisia had been before the revolution. We all know what happened next, but after Mubarak’s ouster 11 February, I began to reflect on Bouazizi’s death. I had ascribed the significance of my birthday to what he had done. Was his sacrifice imbued with greater significance because of what happened afterwards? Wasn’t the death of a man who felt he was at the end of his tether significant enough? Did a street vendor in Tunisia, someone who must have felt that he was inconsequential in the greater scheme of things — to the extent that he took his own life out of desperation — upset our understanding of how things work, because he became a catalyst for more things? Of course, he wasn’t the sole reason for all that happened. Decades of oppression and frustration were building up to this point, but the timing favored his final act. I’m sure 340

many more qualified than me will continue to speculate on why the uprisings happened in 2011, rather than a decade earlier or a decade later. However, what we need to take note of is the continual sacrifices of Arab people a year on. In Syria, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain … and yes, in Egypt too. On 17 December 2011, I joined the funeral procession of Sheikh Emad Eddin Effat, secretary general of Dar al-Iftaa, the first victim to be killed by the military attack on the cabinet sit-in in Qasr al-Aini. He was the first of ten killed so far. For three days now, the battle rages on after the military attacked the cabinet sit-in. The images and videos of military transgressions are numerous, but as of yet no one is being held accountable, just like events of Maspiro on 9 October and Mohamed Mahmoud on 19 November. This seemingly endless cycle of violence against protesters continues even after the dictators are gone, the propaganda wars continue and the lies continue. The deaths pile up and not one representative of the armed forces has been held to account. And maybe that’s why Bouazizi’s death remains a case of unfinished business. In Egypt the military ruled under Mubarak, and they rule still. Accountability, and more pertinently, justice, is still not upheld in Egypt. You can still kill and get away with it. Bouazizi was the start of something that is not yet finished. Archived Photo?: Mohamed Bouazizi Publishing Date: Sun, 18/12/2011 - 19:30

Source URL (retrieved on 19/12/2011 - 12:14): Abdel Rahman Hussein Blog: Bouazizi's unfinished business18/12/2011 - 19:30 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/556946

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December 18, 2011 States of Conflict: A Final Update By IAN LIVINGSTON, MICHAEL E. O’HANLON and AMY UNIKEWICZ

December 19, 2011 A VERSION of this chart has been appearing in the Op-Ed pages every few months for eight years. The first was published eight months after the invasion of Iraq, and data from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan were added in more recent years. Gains have been made in these three countries, but violence persists and peace is by no means assured. Nonetheless, with the end of the war in Iraq officially announced last week, this will be the last of the series.

States of Conflict: An Update (December 27, 2010) States of Conflict: An Update (January 3, 2010) The State of Iraq: An Update (December 29, 2008) The State of Iraq: An Update (December 22, 2007) The State of Iraq: An Update (December 20, 2006) The State of Iraq: An Update

Amy Unikewicz (December 14, 2005)

Of the three, Iraq has presented the most extreme swings. In the months after the invasion, the country was relatively quiet — at least on the surface — but then it exploded in violence. Since 2007, however, war-related violence has declined more than tenfold, even as the role of United States forces has gradually shrunk. That, along with accelerating economic progress, is the good news. The bad news is that violence persists. Politics remain unstable and there are signs of increasing sectarian division. This fall, the government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a Shiite, summarily arrested hundreds of former Baathists, many of them Sunnis. Fewer than 40 percent of Iraqis say they are hopeful about the future. Pakistan has seen some slight political progress since the military dictatorship ended in 2008. And the rise of the Pakistani Taliban appears to have been checked by the Pakistani Army. But extremist violence and assassinations continue, and civilian control of the country is weak. A recession — set off by the financial crisis in the United States

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— has set back the country’s economic trajectory. And elements in the government and security service appear to be playing a double, if not triple, game in Afghanistan. The United States has less and less confidence that Pakistan can be viewed as an ally. Afghanistan was relatively peaceful in 2003, when the recently deposed Taliban had yet to start a full-fledged insurgency. Since then the country has returned to a state of war. President George W. Bush, and to a greater extent President Obama, responded with a major increase in troop levels. The fruits of those efforts are finally emerging — nationwide, there were 20 percent fewer insurgent attacks in the latter part of 2011 than in the same months of 2010. But that statistic masks the fact that, in the east of the country near the Pakistani border, there were actually 20 percent more insurgent attacks in that period. And a culture of corruption — which American aid has often inadvertently reinforced — continues to infect almost every sector of business and government. Nonetheless, the average Afghan’s quality of life has improved. And the Afghan Army is increasingly competent, though still relatively small. Finally, Al Qaeda writ large is much weaker than it was eight years ago. More than half of its top leaders have been arrested or killed — including, this year, Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki. But we must keep a wary eye on it, as well as on related terrorist groups, like the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba. On balance, it has been an extremely painful and costly decade. But it does seem possible to conclude, with cautious optimism, that America is somewhat safer. And we are certainly closer than ever to ending our current round of overseas wars. — IAN LIVINGSTON is a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution and MICHAEL E. O’HANLON is a senior fellow there. Brookings will continue to compile much of this data at brookings.edu/afghanistanindex. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/opinion/states-of-conflict-a-final- update.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212&pagewanted=print

Iraq Barack Obama [[email protected]] Enviado domingo 18/12/2011 18:50 Alvaro --

Early this morning, the last of our troops left Iraq.

As we honor and reflect on the sacrifices that millions of men and women made for this war, I wanted to make sure you heard the news.

Bringing this war to a responsible end was a cause that sparked many Americans to get involved in the political process for the first time. Today's outcome is a reminder that we all have a stake in our country's future, and a say in the direction we choose.

Thank you.

Barack

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Hamas moves away from violence in deal with Palestinian Authority Islamic party that has controlled Gaza for five years is to shift emphasis away from armed struggle to non-violent resistance Phoebe Greenwood in Gaza City guardian.co.uk, Sunday 18 December 2011 19.57 GMT

A Palestinian woman wearing a Hamas headband waits for released Palestinian prisoners to cross into the West Bank city of Ramallah. Photograph: Nasser Shiyoukhi/AP Hamas has confirmed that it will shift tactics away from violent attacks on Israel as part of a rapprochement with the Palestinian Authority. A spokesman for the Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya, told the Guardian that the Islamic party, which has controlled Gaza for the past five years, was shifting its emphasis from armed struggle to non-violent resistance. "Violence is no longer the primary option but if Israel pushes us, we reserve the right to defend ourselves with force," said the spokesman, Taher al-Nounu. On this understanding, he said, all Palestinian factions operating in the Gaza Strip have agreed to halt the firing of rockets and mortars into Israel. The announcement on Sunday does not qualify as a full repudiation of violence, but marks a step away from violent extremism by the Hamas leadership towards the more progressive Islamism espoused by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. The approach was concluded at recent talks between Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal and Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, in Cairo. Senior delegations representing the two factions met again in the Egyptian capital on Sunday to forge ahead with efforts to form a reconciled Palestinian government.

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Iran recently cut its financial support to Hamas in a punitive response to moves within the Palestinian faction to relocate its exiled leadership, including Meshaal, from its base in Syria. Many among the Hamas rank and file have criticised their former ally, President Bashar Assad's violent assault on Syrian civilians. Hamas believes the events of the Arab spring, in which uprisings have thrown off the old autocratic order and ushered in democratic, moderate Islamic governments in Tunisia and Egypt, have changed the landscape of the Middle East and is repositioning itself accordingly away from the Syria-Iran axis that has sustained it for decades, closer to the orbit of regional lslamist powers like Turkey and Qatar. "European countries in particular see that the Muslim Brotherhood is a special kind of Islamic movement that is not radical. It could be the same with Hamas," said Nouno. In a further concession to international legitimacy, the Hamas leadership confirmed on Sunday that it could entertain discussions regarding a peace agreement with Israel if the Quartet of peacebroking powers agree to modify its preconditions. Hamas will accept the foundation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders but stands firm in its refusal to acknowledge the state of Israel. This softened tone on the international stage is not yet evident in Haniya's domestic rhetoric. Speaking at a rally in Kateeba Square, Gaza City, to mark the 24th anniversary of the foundation of the movement last week, the prime minister vowed to continue the "resistance". "The resistance and the armed struggle are the way and the strategic choice for liberating Palestinian land from the (Jordan) river to the (Mediterranean) sea," he said. The next step towards reconciliation will be made on Tuesday when representatives from all Palestinian factions meet in Cairo. Despite the process, officials within both Hamas and Fatah are sceptical that the effort will be successful. Hamas cites Abbas' insistence that Salam Fayyad continue as prime minister in a reconciled government as an obstacle to unity. Phoebe Greenwood Hamas moves away from violence in deal with Palestinian Authority18 December 2011 19.57 GMT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/18/hamas-moves-from-violence- palestinian/print

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La Vanguardia.com Internacional Primer año de la 'primavera árabe' Samir Raduan: "El ejército vela por que el país no vaya a la barbarie" Samir Raduan, ex ministro de Finanzas de Egipto, ha participado en Barcelona en un seminario sobre el futuro económico de las transiciones árabe Internacional | 18/12/2011 - 00:45h Alba Tobella Barcelona Samir Raduan: "El ejército vela por que el país no vaya a la barbarie" Samir Raduan, ex ministro de Finanzas de Egipto, ha participado en Barcelona en un seminario sobre el futuro económico de las transiciones árabe Internacional | 18/12/2011 - 00:45h Alba Tobella Barcelona Ministro del último gabinete de Mubarak, Samir Raduan resistió hasta julio en el gobierno transitorio en riña constante con Tahrir. Participó en Barcelona en un seminario del IEMed sobre el futuro económico de las transiciones árabe. ¿Qué balance hace del año? El cambio que ha habido en un año, mi generación no lo habría imaginado ni en 30 años. Los jóvenes han creado un momentum para la democracia, y tenemos elecciones de verdad. Usted ha afirmado que los jóvenes se irritan cuando se les acusa de la crisis económica. Desde el inicio de la revolución se han perdido más de 5.000 millones de euros, y se irritan cuando alguien les dice que mientras chillan en Tahrir no hacen nada productivo para el país. La mayoría todavía no está ni en el mercado laboral. Pero es más importante que pensemos en el futuro. Los islamistas tendrán un papel fundamental en este futuro. Parece que han ganado mucha influencia entre la gente. Una parte de ellos son moderados, pero la otra dice cosas que dan pavor. Habrá que hablar con ellos. Tras las elecciones, nuestra segunda lucha será la Constitución. La mayoría parlamentaria no debe ejercer una dictadura sobre su redacción. En Sudáfrica, Mandela dijo a su partido: "Muy bien, tenéis la mayoría, pero no sois el país entero". ¿Por qué debemos aceptar el resultado electoral? Porque queríamos democracia. Nos gustaría aceptarlo, pero no nos vamos a parar aquí. ¿El ejército aún tiene legitimidad para tutelar el proceso?

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El ejército quiere asegurarse de que el país no se encamina a la barbarie. Hay un vacío político producto de la desaparición del Partido Nacional Democrático de Mubarak. Alguien tiene que velar por nuestros valores, y el ejército lo hará hasta que termine la transición. Todos vemos que, al final del camino, se acabarán retirando de la vida política, como en Turquía. ¿Qué piensan en Tahrir? Están impacientes y quieren que el ejército desaparezca porque lo ven como una extensión del régimen de Mubarak. Los jóvenes ganaron la nueva democracia, pero luego no han sabido integrarse en el sistema ni crear un partido que los represente. ¿Se acabará la corrupción? El problema viene cuando el Estado y los negocios van de la mano. Debemos debatir su separación con los islamistas, que son seres humanos y pueden ser tan corruptos como los otros, incluso más, porque lo protegen todo con la norma de Dios. Alba Tobella Samir Raduan: "El ejército vela por que el país no vaya a la barbarie"18/12/2011 - 00:45h http://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20111218/54241234839/samir-raduan- ejercito-vela-pais-barbarie.html

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EDITORIAL Un año de revueltas La persistencia de la violencia dificulta las transiciones árabes a la democracia 18/12/2011 El ejército egipcio desalojó ayer a los manifestantes de la simbólica plaza de Tahrir, dejando un balance de diez muertos y casi dos centenares de heridos. Los incidentes, que coinciden con el desarrollo del dilatado proceso electoral en marcha en Egipto, demuestran que las esperanzas de quienes consiguieron la huida de Mubarak están siendo defraudadas por las nuevas autoridades. La revolución egipcia fue posible porque el Ejército decidió no actuar contra los manifestantes; ahora ese mismo Ejército pretende limitar el alcance de la revolución, y de ahí la creciente desconfianza y los enfrentamientos. Ha transcurrido un año desde que un humilde vendedor de frutas tunecino, Mohamed Bouazizi, se inmolara a lo bonzo para protestar contra la dictadura en su país. El gesto desesperado de Bouazizi desencadenó una formidable ola revolucionaria que derrocó al tirano de Túnez e inmediatamente después al de Egipto. A continuación, serían los de Libia y Yemen, y puede que no tarde en caer el de Siria, Bachar el Asad, donde la represión ha dejado más de cinco millares de víctimas. Un año es poco tiempo para saber cómo terminará un proceso que está remodelando por completo la realidad política de la región, y cuyas consecuencias sobre el equilibrio estratégico están lejos de haberse agotado. Túnez ha celebrado las primeras elecciones libres de su historia, en las que los islamistas han conseguido una mayoría relativa sobre una constelación de pequeñas fuerzas políticas de diverso signo. Esta victoria ha producido inquietud pese a las declaraciones conciliadoras del nuevo presidente, Moncef Marzouki. No es la única esperanza el que Túnez logre establecer un verdadero sistema democrático. El modelo de transición diseñado tras la huida de Ben Ali prevé la apertura de un proceso constituyente del que habrá de salir una nueva Carta Magna, y en el que los islamistas están obligados a pactar con otras fuerzas para aprobarla. Los islamistas también llevan la delantera en las elecciones egipcias, solo que, en este caso, y a la espera de que terminen las votaciones, los Hermanos Musulmanes y los salafistas podrían obtener la mayoría absoluta. A diferencia de Túnez, en Egipto existe cierta confusión acerca del modelo de transición previsto tras la caída de Mubarak. La Constitución vigente durante la dictadura fue objeto de mínimas reformas que permitieran mayor pluralidad, y el Ejército sigue desempeñando un papel excesivo que no parece que vaya a reducirse a la vista de acontecimientos como los que tienen lugar en la plaza de Tahrir. De confirmarse al concluir las elecciones, la rotunda victoria de los islamistas puede convertirse en un nuevo argumento, o en una nueva excusa, para que los cambios no vayan más lejos. El futuro de Libia es una incógnita como consecuencia de las fracturas políticas y regionales causadas por la guerra civil. También el futuro de Yemen, aunque la oposición al régimen de Saleh no degenerase en un conflicto abierto. Si algo parece demostrar el año de revueltas vivido en el mundo árabe es que las dificultades a las que se enfrentan las diversas transiciones, cada cual con sus especificidades, se multiplican 348

si la violencia hace su aparición. Esta constatación debería alentar una mayor implicación de las principales potencias en Siria antes de que el Ejército se fracture o de que algunos sectores de la oposición se dejen arrastrar a la resistencia armada. El Asad ha perdido cualquier atisbo de legitimidad para seguir al frente del país, y cada día que transcurre, cada nueva víctima que produce la represión, añade nuevas sombras sobre la inevitable transición. Los ciudadanos árabes empezaron a reclamar hace un año su derecho a vivir libremente, y han recorrido un largo camino en esa dirección por más que se acumulen las dificultades y las incertidumbres, según se puede comprobar en Egipto. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/ano/revueltas/elpepiopi/20111218elpepiopi _2/Tes

Internacional

LA TRANSICIÓN EGIPCIA El Ejército egipcio mata a diez manifestantes en El Cairo Los soldados persiguen por la calle a los opositores a la Junta Militar. Hay más de 300 heridos. El conflicto prendió ayer cuando un grupo de activistas trató de asaltar el Parlamento Nuria Tesón El Cairo 18 DIC 2011 - 02:12 CET200

Un manifestante muestra su mano manchada de sangre en El Cairo. / MOHAMMED ABED (AFP) “Os vamos a matar, estáis muertos”. No están escogidas al azar estas palabras pronunciadas por algunos de los militares que desalojaron este sábado a los manifestantes de Tahrir y prendieron fuego a las tiendas donde acampaban, antes de perseguirles con palos y piedras. Ya son diez, según el Ministerio de Sanidad, los muertos que han dejado estas dos jornadas de violencia en El Cairo y más de 300 los heridos, mientras los votos de las dos primeras jornadas de la segunda fase de las legislativas aún siguen contándose. La primera línea de policías militares pertrechados de antidisturbios es un hervidero. Los jóvenes intentaban convencerles de que cesen los ataques. Levantaban los brazos. Los soldados les indicaban con la mano que les iban a cortar el cuello. Uno de ellos arrancó a un chaval el móvil con el que grababa las amenazas y lo estampó contra el suelo haciéndolo añicos, los gritos iban en aumento y 349

pronto los bastones y las piedras empezaron a caer sobre los manifestantes que corrieron para salvar sus vidas hacia el otro lado del puente, alejándose de Tahrir. Un día más la represión del Ejército ha caído sobre los manifestantes que exigen que la Junta Militar que gobierna desde la caída de Mubarak traspase el poder a una autoridad civil. Durante toda la mañana se sucedieron los ataques con piedras por parte de soldados desde un edificio de Qasr el Ainy, la calle perpendicular a la del Parlamento, donde el viernes se inició la protesta y donde se encontraba la sentada pacífica instalada el 25 de noviembre y que fue dispersada a tiros y pedradas por los militares el viernes. Vestidos con pantalones de campaña y porras en el cinturón, pero sin camisa, de forma que se les pudiera confundir con matones de paisano, lanzaron piedras y adoquines a los manifestantes que se encontraban en la calle, en una esquina de la plaza de Tahrir. Finalmente una carga desde distintos puntos dispersó a los manifestantes, que corrieron en todas direcciones perseguidos por los palos y las piedras de los militares. “La libertad no es gratis”, alentaba uno de ellos a los que huían junto a él. En ese mismo momento, el nuevo primer ministro egipcio, Kamal Ganzury, negaba en una rueda de prensa cualquier tipo de acción represiva y responsabilizaba a los manifestantes de los disturbios. “Un joven fue golpeado y recibió un trato incorrecto, y los chavales tienen derecho a pedir justicia por esto. Pero después salieron jóvenes e incendiaron coches y dependencias del Parlamento y del Consejo de Ministros, sin la intervención de las Fuerzas Armadas”, afirmó el recién nombrado primer ministro. La Junta militar, a través de un comunicado, manifestó su “desolación” por los disturbios y anunció que indemnizará a las familias de los fallecidos. Este es su segundo manifiesto desde el inicio de los disturbios, después de que en la noche del viernes la Junta se exculpara de cualquier responsabilidad señalando que “los elementos que prestan seguridad se han contenido lo máximo posible”. Las piedras ensangrentadas sobre el puente de Qasr el Nil que da acceso a Tahrir, sobre el Nilo, daban prueba de esa “contención”, al igual que los testimonios de los informadores a los que les fueron confiscadas las cámaras o recibieron golpes o amenazas por grabar los desmanes. El primer ministro egipcio, Kamal Ganzury, responsabiliza a los manifestantes de los disturbios Líderes políticos de todas las tendencias han condenado la violencia y exigido una investigación. Los Hermanos Musulmanes, cuyo brazo político, el partido de la libertad y la Justicia se ha hecho con casi un 40% de los votos en disputa de la primera vuelta de las legislativas, insistían ayer en que “no se ha castigado a ninguno de los militares que ordenaron y llevaron a cabo estos crímenes”. En el acceso de Tahrir desde la calle que lleva al Parlamento, los militares construyen un nuevo muro de hormigón, como el que ya levantaron en Mohamed Mahmud, la vía donde hace tres semanas se desarrollaron los enfrentamientos que dejaron 40 muertos y más de mil heridos. Una metáfora perfecta de las relaciones entre la Junta militar y el pueblo egipcio. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/16/actualidad/1324051393_39607 7.html

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La Vanguardia.com Internacional Primer año de la 'primavera árabe' Los partidos religiosos triunfan en las urnas de Túnez, Marruecos, Egipto... | 18/12/2011 - 00:29h

Xavier Mas de Xaxàs Barcelona El 17 de diciembre del 2010, a las once y media de la mañana, una hora después de que la policía volviera a confiscarle el carro de verduras con el que se malganaba la vida, Mohamed Buazizi se prendió fuego frente al gobierno civil de Sidi Buzid, una ciudad de 40.000 habitantes en el centro de Túnez. Había llegado al final. Sin dinero suficiente para sobornar a los agentes, alimentar a su familia y pagar deudas, este hombre de 26 años había perdido hasta la dignidad. Poco después de su sacrificio, mientras yacía en la cama del hospital local, más muerto que vivo, con quemaduras en el 90% del cuerpo, decenas de personas se concentraron frente a la misma sede oficial, ahora con la verja y las ventanas cerradas, para lanzar las primeras consignas contra la dictadura de Ben Ali. Entre ellos, según se ve en el vídeo que Ali Buazizi, primo de Mohamed, grabó con su móvil, destaca un joven que gritaba: "Alá es el más grande". Desde entonces, desde ese primer grito, el islam se ha convertido en la principal fuerza política y social del norte de África. Los partidos islamistas han ganado las elecciones en Túnez y Marruecos, van camino de ganarlas también en Egipto y ser preponderantes en la nueva Jordania y la nueva Palestina, igual que lo son ya en la nueva Libia, donde la charia es la principal fuente de inspiración legislativa. Mohamed Buazizi tardó varios días en ser noticia y no lo hubiera sido sin el vídeo de su primo Ali y otros que se grabaron en las sucesivas concentraciones de protesta en Sidi Buzid. La prensa tunecina estaba amordazada y sólo servía al régimen, mientras que la europea apenas prestaba atención a Túnez, un país que sólo interesaba por el turismo, las empresas al servicio de las multinacionales, los centros de llamada y la pretendida lucha contra Al Qaeda. Ben Ali era un gran amigo de Francia, y Francia intentó ayudarlo hasta el final. Los vídeos, como el de Ali Buazizi, se propagaron por la red, en Facebook y YouTube. El eco multiplicó las protestas hasta que Ben Ali tuvo que prestar atención. Trasladó a Mohamed Buazizi a la mejor unidad de quemados de Túnez, fue a verlo, se hizo una foto para pasar por bueno y prometió a su madre que lo enviaría a Francia tan pronto como recuperara algo de fuerza. No pudo ser. Mohamed Buazizi murió el 4 de enero. Sus vecinos de Sidi Buzid, los primeros que salieron a la calle; el primer joven que gritó "Alá es el más grande" lo habían convertido en un líder, un símbolo en el que todos se veían reflejados. "Me ha liberado. Ahora sé que no volveré a tener miedo", me explicó un estudiante, una semana después, en el centro de Túnez, bajo los gases de la policía benalista.

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No era esta la intención de Buazizi. Si se prendió fuego fue porque una mujer policía lo había humillado, no porque quisiera hundir una dictadura o llevar a los islamistas al poder. Sin embargo, como ocurre siempre, son los seguidores los que transforman a un desesperado en un líder y son los seguidores los que convierten la protesta local en una revolución transnacional. Los islamistas tuvieron un papel marginal, subterráneo, en la revolución tunecina, como también lo tuvieron después en la egipcia. Pero la revolución tunecina no tenía líderes y Ennahda, sin hacer ruido, bajo el común denominador de los Hermanos Musulmanes egipcios y la intención de que Túnez fuera como Turquía, una república laica pero de marcada identidad islámica, se convirtió, gracias al dinero de las monarquías del Golfo, en la fuerza mejor estructurada del país. El movimiento, perseguido por la dictadura, dirigido desde el exilio por Rashid Ganushi, se convirtió en la opción más natural para la mayoría de los tunecinos. Fue, de calle, la fuerza más votada en las elecciones del pasado 23 de octubre: 40% de los votos, 89 de los 217 escaños de la Asamblea Constituyente. La principal explicación que daban sus electores para justificar el voto es que "los islamistas no roban". Los jóvenes laicos y progresistas que más habían arriesgado en la lucha que llevó, el 14 de enero, a la salida precipitada de Ben Ali –hoy exiliado en Arabia Saudí– se sintieron defraudados. Los que pudimos entrevistar a finales de octubre, gente como el ingeniero Mohamed Farhad o la abogada Dali Raya, advertían de que el desaliento puede ser muy grande si los islamistas no cumplen la promesa de pan para todos. Unas semanas después, en su residencia de Jerusalén, el presidente israelí, Shimon Peres, nos expuso una reflexión similar: "El gran problema del mundo árabe es la necesidad y el odio. El resto es política. Las revoluciones han aliviado el odio porque han aportado libertad, pero aún no han solucionado el desayuno de nadie". La precariedad ha mantenido alta la violencia en Túnez. Los asaltos a edificios públicos son recurrentes. Las oficinas de Ennahda reparten ayudas sociales, pero son parches insuficientes. El paro afecta a 800.000 personas, el 18,3% de la población –cinco puntos más que el año pasado–; el crecimiento está estancado, y las reformas económicas tardarán en dar resultados. El nuevo Gobierno islamista necesita ganar tiempo, y una de las primeras medidas anunciadas por el presidente, Moncef Marzuki, un opositor laico a Ben Ali, voz laica, ha sido la de vender los palacios del dictador y utilizar las ganancias para crear empleo. Los tunecinos odiaban la ostentación de Ben Ali y su esposa, y la venta es una medida populista que dará aire a los nuevos dirigentes. Marzuki ha pedido seis meses sin protestas, una tregua para "evitar el suicidio". No está claro que la consiga. Xavier Mas Primer año de la 'primavera árabe'. Los partidos religiosos triunfan en las urnas de Túnez, Marruecos, Egipto... 18/12/2011 - 00:29h http://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20111218/54242190545/primer-ano- primavera-arabe.html

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December 17, 2011 Repressing Democracy, With American Arms By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF SITRA, Bahrain WHEN President Obama decides soon whether to approve a $53 million arms sale to our close but despotic ally Bahrain, he must weigh the fact that America has a major naval base here and that Bahrain is a moderate, modernizing bulwark against Iran. Yet he should also understand the systematic, violent repression here, the kind that apparently killed a 14-year-old boy, Ali al-Sheikh, and continues to torment his family. Ali grew up here in Sitra, a collection of poor villages far from the gleaming bank towers of Bahrain’s skyline. Almost every day pro-democracy protests still bubble up in Sitra, and even when they are completely peaceful they are crushed with a barrage of American-made tear gas. People here admire much about America and welcomed me into their homes, but there is also anger that the tear gas shells that they sweep off the streets each morning are made by a Pennsylvania company, NonLethal Technologies. It is a private company that declined to comment, but the American government grants it a license for these exports — and every shell fired undermines our image. In August, Ali joined one of the protests. A policeman fired a shell at Ali from less than 15 feet away, according to the account of the family and human-rights groups. The shell apparently hit the boy in the back of the neck, and he died almost immediately, a couple of minutes’ walk from his home. The government claims that the bruise was “inconsistent” with a blow from a tear gas grenade. Frankly, I’ve seen the Bahrain authorities lie so much that I don’t credit their denial. Jawad al-Sheikh, Ali’s father, says that at the hospital, the government tried to force him to sign papers saying Ali had not been killed by the police. King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa has recently distanced himself from the killings and torture, while pledging that Bahrain will reform. There have indeed been modest signs of improvement, and a member of the royal family, Saqer al-Khalifa, told me that progress will now be accelerated. Yet despite the lofty rhetoric, the police have continued to persecute Ali’s family. For starters, riot policemen fired tear gas at the boy’s funeral, villagers say. 353

The police summoned Jawad for interrogation, most recently this month. He fears he will be fired from his job in the Ministry of Electricity. Skirmishes break out almost daily in the neighborhood, with the police firing tear gas for offenses as trivial as honking to the tune of “Down, Down, Hamad.” Disproportionately often, those tear gas shells seem aimed at Ali’s house. Once, Jawad says, a shell was fired into the house through the front door. A couple of weeks ago, riot policemen barged into the house and ripped photos of Ali from the wall, said the boy’s mother, Maryam Abdulla. “They’re worried about their throne,” she added, “so they want us to live in fear.” Mourners regularly leave flowers and photos of Ali on his grave, which is in a vacant lot near the home. Perhaps because some messages call him a martyr, the riot police come regularly and smash the pictures and throw away the flowers. The family has not purchased a headstone yet, for fear that the police will destroy it. The repression is ubiquitous. Consider Zainab al-Khawaja, 28, whose husband and father are both in prison and have been tortured for pro-democracy activities, according to human rights reports. Police officers have threatened to cut off Khawaja’s tongue, she told me, and they broke her father’s heart by falsely telling him that she had been shipped to Saudi Arabia to be raped and tortured. She braved the risks by talking to me about this last week — before she was arrested too. Khawaja earned her college degree in Wisconsin. She has read deeply of Gandhi and of Gene Sharp, an American scholar who writes about how to use nonviolent protest to overthrow dictators. She was sitting peacefully protesting in a traffic circle when the police attacked her. First they fired tear gas grenades next to her, and then handcuffed her and dragged her away — sometimes slapping and hitting her as video cameras rolled. The Bahrain Center for Human Rights says that she was beaten more at the police station. Khawaja is tough as nails, and when we walked alongside demonstrations together, she seemed unbothered by tear gas that left me blinded and coughing. But she worried about her 2-year-old daughter, Jude. And one time as we were driving back from visiting a family whose baby had just died, possibly because so much tear gas had been fired in the neighborhood, Khawaja began crying. “I think I’m losing it,” she said. “It all just gets to me.” Since the government has now silenced her by putting her in jail, I’ll give her the last word. I asked her a few days before her arrest about the proposed American arms sale to Bahrain. “At least don’t sell them arms,” she pleaded. “When Obama sells arms to dictators repressing people seeking democracy, he ruins the reputation of America. It’s never in America’s interest to turn a whole people against it.” I invite you to comment on this column on my blog, On the Ground. Please also join me on Facebook and Google+, watch my YouTube videos and follow me on Twitter.

NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF Repressing Democracy, With American Arms December 17, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/kristof-repressing-democracy-with-american- arms.html?_r=1&ref=opinion 354

December 17, 2011 Help Wanted By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN THE historian Walter Russell Mead recently noted that after the 1990s revolution that collapsed the Soviet Union, Russians had a saying that seems particularly apt today: “It’s easier to turn an aquarium into fish soup than to turn fish soup into an aquarium.” Indeed, from Europe to the Middle East, and maybe soon even to Russia and Asia, a lot of aquariums are being turned into fish soup all at once. But turning them back into stable societies and communities will be one of the great challenges of our time. We are present again at one of those great unravelings — just like after World War I, World War II and the cold war. But this time there was no war. All of these states have been pulled down from within — without warning. Why? The main driver, I believe, is the merger of globalization and the Information Technology revolution. Both of them achieved a critical mass in the first decade of the 21st century that has resulted in the democratization — all at once — of so many things that neither weak states nor weak companies can stand up against. We’ve seen the democratization of information, where everyone is now a publisher; the democratization of war-fighting, where individuals became superempowered (enough so, in the case of Al Qaeda, to take on a superpower); the democratization of innovation, wherein start- ups using free open-source software and “the cloud” can challenge global companies. And, finally, we’ve seen what Mark Mykleby, a retired Marine colonel and former adviser to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls “the democratization of expectations” — the expectation that all individuals should be able to participate in shaping their own career, citizenship and future, and not be constricted. I’ve been struck by how similar the remarks by Russians about Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who just basically reappointed himself president, are to those I heard from Egyptians about Hosni Mubarak, who kept reappointing himself president. The Egyptian writer Alaa al-Aswany said to me that Egyptians resented the idea that Mubarak would just hand power to his son Gamal as if the Egyptian people “were chickens,” who could be passed by a leader to his son. Last Sunday, a New York Times article from Moscow quoted the popular, imprisoned Russian blogger Aleksei Navalny as saying: “We are not cattle or slaves. We have voices and votes and the power to uphold them.” “The days of leading countries or companies via a one-way conversation are over,” says Dov Seidman, the C.E.O. of LRN and the author of the book “How.” “The old system of ‘command and control’ — using carrots and sticks — to exert power over people is fast being replaced by ‘connect and collaborate’ — to generate power through people.” Leaders and managers cannot just impose their will, adds Seidman. “Now you have to

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have a two-way conversation that connects deeply with your citizens or customers or employees.” Netflix had a one-way conversation about raising prices with its customers, who instantly self-organized; some 800,000 bolted, and the stock plunged. Bank of America had a one-way conversation about charging a $5 fee on debit cards, and its customers forced the global bank to reverse itself and apologize. Putin thought he had power over his people and could impose whatever he wanted and is now being forced into a conversation to justify staying in power. Coca-Cola repackaged its flagship soft drink in white cans for the holidays. But an outcry of “blasphemy” from consumers forced Coke to switch back from white cans to red cans in a week. Last year, Gap ditched its new logo after a week of online backlash by customers. A lot of C.E.O.’s will tell you that this shift has taken them by surprise, and they are finding it hard to adjust to the new power relationships with customers and employees. “As power shifts to individuals,” argues Seidman, “leadership itself must shift with it — from coercive or motivational leadership that uses sticks or carrots to extract performance and allegiance out of people to inspirational leadership that inspires commitment and innovation and hope in people.” The role of the leader now is to get the best of what is coming up from below and then meld it with a vision from above. Are you listening, Mr. Putin? This kind of leadership is especially critical today, adds Seidman, “when people are creating a lot of ‘freedom from’ things — freedom from oppression or whatever system is in their way — but have not yet scaled the values and built the institutional frameworks that enable ‘freedom to’ — freedom to build a career, a business or a meaningful life.” One can see this vividly in Egypt, where the bottom-up democracy movement was strong enough to oust Mubarak but now faces the long, arduous process of building new institutions and writing a new social contract from a democracy coalition that encompass Muslim Brothers, Christian liberals, Muslim liberals, the army and ultraconservative Muslim Salafis. Getting all those fish back and swimming together in one aquarium will be no small task — one that will take a very courageous and special leader. Help wanted. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Help Wanted December 17, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/friedman-help- wanted.html?ref=opinion

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Publishing Date: Sat, 17/12/2011 - 12:43

Clinton says women sidelined in Egypt transition Author: AFP US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Friday that women were being sidelined in the hoped-for transition to democracy in Egypt, including during the current parliamentary elections. "In Egypt, women have been largely excluded from the transition process and even harassed in the street," Clinton said in prepared remarks for a speech on women, peace and security. "The best-organized political parties supported few women candidates in the recent elections," she added, referring to the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. "And the positions of these parties on women's rights remain ambiguous at best." The Brotherhood and other Islamists, who won more than two thirds of the vote in the first round, are projected to win all three stages of the country's first elections since a popular uprising ousted Hosni Mubarak in February. The second round ended this week. "They should recognize that Egypt's revolution was won by men and women working together, and its democracy will only thrive by men and women working together," Clinton said. In July, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has been running the country since Mubarak's overthrow, announced that the women's quota in parliament established by the deposed leader would be abolished. In the previous parliamentary elections in 2010, women had a quota of 64 seats in the 445-member parliament, or around 13 percent. Publishing Date: Sat, 17/12/2011 - 12:43 Related material 700 women compete for candidacy in parliamentary elections A day of elections: Women at the front line in Alexandria

Source URL (retrieved on 18/12/2011 - 19:59): AFP Clinton says women sidelined in Egypt transition Publishing Date: Sat, 17/12/2011 - 12:43http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/554266

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Internacional LA PRIMAVERA ÁRABE "Nos han robado la revolución" La ciudad de Túnez donde arrancó la ‘primavera árabe’ vive con amargura el primer aniversario del inicio de la revuelta que echó del poder a Ben Ali Ignacio Cembrero Sidi Bouzid 17 DIC 2011 - 18:11 CET24

Familiares de víctimas de la revuelta, en Sidi Bouzid. / FETHI BELAID (AFP) La ciudad de Sidi Bouzid ha ganado una batalla, pero no ha salido de la marginación. Las autoridades tunecinas se inclinaban por celebrar el 14 de enero próximo el primer aniversario de su revolución, el arranque de la primavera árabe. Ese día las protestas en todo el país obligaron al dictador Ben Ali a huir y exiliarse en Arabia Saudí. “No queríamos que se nos robara la revolución”, explica Youssef Salhi, sindicalista de la UGTT y miembro del comité que organiza en Sidi Bouzid los festejos que conmemoran la revolución. “El plato fuerte de nuestro festival es este fin de semana, porque ayer sábado hace un año que todo empezó”, añade. “La capital y el Sahel [zona costera oriental] arrancaron la independencia de Francia en 1956, pero nosotros hemos conquistado la democracia”. Mohamed Bouazizi, de 26 años, vendedor ambulante de frutas y hortalizas, se inmoló ese día a las 11.30 ante la sede del Gobierno Civil de Sidi Bouzid, una ciudad de cerca de 100.000 habitantes —aunque aparenta bastantes menos—, a 285 kilómetros al sur de Túnez. Protestaba así contra las supuestas humillaciones que sufrió por parte de una policía municipal, Fayda Hamdi, que le volcó el carrito con la mercancía y le abofeteó. La versión inicial del incidente ha sido desde entonces matizada y la agente, juzgada y absuelta, trabaja ahora en dependencias municipales sin ser hostigada por la población cuando sale a la calle. Pero aquel suceso callejero provocó ese mismo día las primeras manifestaciones en esta ciudad olvidada del Túnez profundo, carente de infraestructuras y golpeada por el paro, que padece, según estimaciones privadas, el 48% de los adultos. La ciudad ha convencido al Gobierno para celebrar hoy el aniversario en vez del 14 de enero, el día que huyó Ben Ali Una semana después del suicidio de Bouazizi la revuelta se propagó por toda la provincia. Los eslóganes que coreaban los manifestantes se politizaron a partir del 28 de diciembre. Vociferaban “Zine [el Abidine Ben Ali], mentiroso, ¿dónde están tus 358

promesas para los jóvenes?”. Ese día cayeron las primeras víctimas mortales de una revolución que costó más de 300 muertos. A partir del 3 de enero las protestan se generalizaron en el centro y el oeste del país. El 11 llegaron a los suburbios de la capital y el 14 por la mañana decenas de miles de personas gritaron en la capital “dégage!” (lárgate) al presidente, que se dio a la fuga. ¿Qué ha cambiado en Sidi Bouzid un año después? Nestouri Khadraoui, 41 años, pone cara de desolación cuando escucha la pregunta. “Para nosotros nada ha cambiado”, contesta este miembro de una asociación de licenciados en paro. “Desde el punto de vista económico y social seguimos igual”, se lamenta. “Desde un punto de vista político es verdad que disfrutamos de libertad; la gente ha perdido el miedo y está incluso orgullosa”. Khadraoui habla en un café rodeado de jóvenes parados o que, como Moez, de 24 años, informático, se conforma con trabajar como camarero y ganar 7 dinares (3,8 euros) al día. “Las infraestructuras tampoco han mejorado”, prosigue Khadraoui. “Hay barrios enteros que carecen de agua corriente”, denuncia. Tras la revolución ha llegado la crisis, con la caída del turismo y de la inversión, y las arcas del Estado están casi vacías. A la frustración general por la mala racha económica se añade la de aquellos que se consideran protagonistas de la revolución y no han logrado el suficiente reconocimiento. Es el caso de Attia Athmouni, sexagenario, responsable local del Partido Democrático Progresista (PDP, izquierda moderada), una formación legal pero atosigada durante la dictadura. Tras la llegada de la democracia se ha incrementado la crisis, con la caída del turismo y de las inversiones “Aquí tiene la prueba”, afirma Athmouni mientras coloca sobre la mesa un informe policial, robado en la comisaría de Sidi Bouzid cuando fue asaltada, en el que se le describe como uno de los líderes de la revuelta. Acogía en su tienda las reuniones del comité que coordinaba las protestas, del que fue su portavoz, y estuvo desaparecido en dependencias policiales desde el 28 de diciembre hasta principios de enero. “Pese a todos nuestros sacrificios los islamistas nos han robado la revolución”, declara con amargura Athmouni. Ennahda (islamista) ganó en octubre, con el 41% de los sufragios, las primeras elecciones democráticas y “ahora son ellos los que dirigen el país” con un primer ministro, Hamadi Jebali, que ostenta el grueso del poder, se lamenta Athmouni, quien pese a su destacado papel no logró un escaño por Sidi Bouzid. “Los islamistas han cerrado el paso a la izquierda con regalos a la población más humilde y con falsas promesas sociales”, prosigue el sexagenario opositor. “Lo han hecho con el dinero que les llega de los países del Golfo, empezando por Catar”, recalca Ali Bouazizi, primo del joven que se inmoló, y que fue de los primeros que se echó a la calle hace un año. “Se han infiltrado en las mezquitas, en los colegios”, señala Athmouni. Pero la izquierda tiene también parte de responsabilidad en el éxito de sus adversarios. “Había que haber formado un amplio frente de progresistas y laicos para derrotar a Ennahda en las urnas en vez de acudir divididos” a los comicios, asegura. “Deberían haberse convocado las elecciones más pronto [transcurrieron diez meses desde el derrocamiento del dictador] antes de que las cámaras de la televisión Al Yazira se olviden de nosotros, los revolucionarios, para dedicarse a los barbudos; antes de que ellos tuvieran tiempo de organizarse”. 359

“No se hace la revolución para salir en la tele”, replica en tono áspero Sara Neji, profesora de instituto y militante de Ennahda en Sidi Bouzid. “Nosotros estábamos en la calle, concretamente yo y mi suegra, desde el primer día”, recuerda sentada en una salita de la sede de su partido, la más impoluta de cuantas vimos en la ciudad. “Ahora bien, estábamos allí con discreción porque si hubiéramos salido a cara descubierta la represión habría sido aún más dura”. Neji no desmiente que su partido haya hecho “regalos”, aunque prefiere llamarlos gestos de “caridad islámica”. “Durante años actuamos así con nuestros miles de presos políticos”. Cerca de 30.000 pasaron por las cárceles de Ben Ali durante sus 23 años de dictadura. “Ahora que ya están en libertad cumplimos con los preceptos de nuestra religión entregando productos de primera necesidad a los pobres y circuncidando gratis a sus hijos. En el fondo, todos aquellos que nos critican temen al islam”, sentencia. Salhi, el sindicalista, se muestra convencido de que “las fuerzas de progreso vencerán al oscurantismo. Su credibilidad se erosionará y nosotros seguiremos desarrollando la sociedad civil para que sepa defenderse del despotismo democrático. La revolución aún no ha concluido”. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/17/actualidad/1324141881_43749 9.html

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Internacional LA TRANSICIÓN LIBIA El secretario de Defensa de EE UU vaticina una larga transición en Libia Leon Panetta es el primer jefe del Pentágono que visita Trípoli. La lucha por el control de las milicias mantiene al país sumido en el caos. La ONU levanta las sanciones contra el banco central libio Libia se estanca en el caos Agencias Trípoli 17 DIC 2011 - 15:45 CET55

El secretario de Defensa de EE UU, Leon Panetta, ofrece hoy una conferencia de prensa en Trípoli junto al ministro ministro interino Abdurrahim el Keib (D). / ISMAIL ZITOUNY (REUTERS) Leon Panetta se ha convertido hoy en el primer secretario de Defensa estadounidense en pisar suelo libio. Y lo ha hecho para advertir a sus líderes de que el país -dominado durante 42 años por Muamar el Gadafi- se enfrenta a una larga y difícil transición mientras trata de unir a las milicias rivales que aún mantienen el caos en las calles de las principales ciudades. Pero también ha querido llevar un mensaje optimista: Washington está listo para ayudar en la transición, colaborando con el asesoramiento para establecer una fuerza de seguridad profesional y evitar la proliferación de armas en la población. No se ha discutido sobre venta de armas o equipos militares ni se ha informado de otro tipo de ayuda.

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"Esta será una transición larga y difícil, pero confío en que será exitosa", ha dicho Panetta en una conferencia de prensa tras reunirse con el primer ministro Abdurrahim el Keib y el ministro de Defensa, Osama el Juwali. La autoridad del Gobierno interino libio se ve desafíada cada día por las milicias que permanecen en las calles de Trípoli desde agosto, seis meses después del inicio de la revuelta contra Gadafi. Algunos de sus seguidores se retiraron, pero muchos -fuertemente armados- siguen en pie de lucha tres meses después de la muerte de su líder, tratando de mantener algo del poder del que disfrutaron durante décadas. "Tengo plena confianza de que (los líderes interinos) están tomando las medidas necesarias para llegar a todos estos grupos, reunirlos y que formen parte de una sola Libia y de un solo sistema de defensa", ha agregado Panetta. Los enfrentamientos entre las milicias y las tribus rivales amenazan con salirse de control ante la ausencia de un Gobierno en pleno funcionamiento y la falta de una fuerza nacional de seguridad. "Reunir a todas las fuerzas revolucionarias que lucharon, del este al oeste, asegurar las armas, enfrentarse al terrorismo, profesionalizar el Ejército y la Policía y desarrollar las instituciones de un Gobierno libre y representativo", fueron las principales dificultades a las que aludió. Mientras la incertidumbre sigue reinando en el país, el primer ministro Keib celebró la decisión del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas de levantar las sanciones impuestas al Banco Central libio y a una de sus subsidiarias, lo que permitirá la libre disponibilidad de decenas de miles de millones de dólares retenidos en el exterior, y que paliaran la dura crisis monetaria en Libia. El secretario de Defensa de EE UU vaticina una larga transición en Libia17 DIC 2011 - 15:45 CET55 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/17/actualidad/1324133142_823797.html

Publishing Date: Sat, 17/12/2011 - 17:33

Abul Ela Mady resigns from advisory council Egypt Independent Author: Egypt Independent Wasat Party Chairman Abul Ela Mady resigned on Saturday from the advisory council to the ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) because the SCAF ignored the council's recommendations on the cabinet sit-in violence. The recently formed 35-member civilian advisory council set several demands, including an immediate halt to the violence and an apology from the SCAF to the people. During the funeral of Sheikh Emad Eddin Effat, secretary general of Dar al-Iftaa, who died on Friday after being shot as army and security forces clashed with protesters, Mady said that the SCAF has primary responsibility for the violence, which has left at least 9 dead and hundreds injured. 362

Mady announced his resignation after military and security forces clashed with protesters again on Qasr al-Aini Street after the funeral. "We demanded that the military council immediately stop the use of violence against peaceful protesters, apologize for the aggression that took place against them, open an immediate investigation into all the officials responsible and announce the results within days, and compensate the families of the martyrs and wounded at the expense of the state," Mady told Al Jazeera Mubasher, adding that many advisory council members will resign if the SCAF continues to ignore the demands. Media reports said eight advisory council members, including Moataz Bellah Abdel Fattah and Ahmed Khairy, had already resigned in protest against the violence. Mansour Hassan, chairman of the advisory council, announced Friday that he would announce the names of the members who already resigned within 24 hours, as some resignations were not yet final. "If every one resigns in a crisis, who will solve these crises?" Hassan said. The advisory council's members have announced that they will suspend their meetings until the SCAF responds to their demands. Archived Photo?: Violent clashes between military and protesters Related material Thousands participate in funeral of 'martyred' Dar al-Iftaa official 8 dead, 299 injured in cabinet clashes

Source URL (retrieved on 17/12/2011 - 23:21): Abul Ela Mady resigns from advisory council17/12/2011 - 17:33 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/554991

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edi 17 DécCongrès du Conseil national syrien « Ne pas dévier de la voie pacifique » Samedi 17 Décembre 2011 • …appelle le chef de l’Etat Le président de la République, Mohamed Moncef Marzouki, a appelé dans une allocution qu’il a prononcée, hier, devant les participants au premier congrès du Conseil national syrien (opposition) à veiller à ne pas dévier de la voie pacifique de la révolution «son principal point fort» qui permettra de mobiliser davantage de sympathisants dans le monde et d’augmenter la pression sur le régime. M. Marzouki a mis en garde, à l’ouverture de ce congrès qui a débuté ses travaux hier soir, à Gammarth, contre les risques d’un conflit communautaire qui pourrait déboucher «sur une guerre civile coûteuse en vies et en ressources», soulignant dans ce contexte la nécessité de tirer profit des pressions exercées sur le régime pour s’enraciner davantage dans la rue et non pour exiger une intervention étrangère. Le président de la République a exhorté les consciences vives en Syrie «à tenir compte du fait que le sang versé est celui des enfants du peuple...et que les peuples ne peuvent vivre en esclavage...que le recours à la seule solution sécuritaire et militaire n’est que dilapidation de vies et de ressources». Il a indiqué au cours de ce congrès, qui a été interdit d’accès aux représentants des médias, que le peuple syrien est le seul qui est capable de créer des formes de résistance et de lutte et à poursuivre ses objectifs afin d’instaurer une citoyenneté libre et digne. Il a souligné que ce qui favorise une intervention étrangère est la violence du régime et non le caractère pacifique des protestations de rue et de l’opposition. http://www.lapresse.tn/17122011/42162/ne-pas-devier-de-la-voie-pacifique.html Au gré des jours http://www.lapresse.tn/au-gre-des-jours.html

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Publishing Date: Sat, 17/12/2011 - 15:45

Tunisians celebrate revolution anniversary Author: AFP

Thousands of Tunisians rallied on Saturday in celebration of the first anniversary of the popular uprising that toppled their long-standing dictator and unleashed the Arab Spring revolutions. Newly-elected President Moncef Marzouki joined the crowds in the town of Sidi Bouzid, where a roadside fruit-seller's altercation with a policewoman and his subsequent self-immolation on this day a year ago set off a wave of protests that have dramatically changed the Arab world. "Thank you to this land, which has been marginalized for centuries, for bringing dignity to the entire Tunisian people," said Marzouki, who was sworn in as president this week after the country's first post-revolution election. Mohamed Bouazizi, an unemployed university graduate, set himself on fire on December 17 last year to protest abuses under the 23-year regime of president Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali, sparking a revolt that ousted the strongman less than a month later. The fruitseller committed his desperate act in Sidi Bouzid, part of the neglected Tunisian interior long overlooked for investment by the former regime in the north African country, which held its first free elections in October. From dawn, Tunisians swarmed into Sidi Bouzid, where the streets were decked with Tunisian flags, pictures of people who died during the uprising and a giant photograph of Bouazizi. "I look around me and see many young people in the crowd who braved the bullets of Ben Ali's police last year to defend the values of freedom and dignity," human rights activist Sabrine Ammari told AFP. The popular uprisings that spread across the Arab world throughout 2011 led to the ouster of Ben Ali as well as the leaders of Egypt, Libya and Yemen and triggered months of deadly protests in Syria. Archived Photo?: Mohamed Bouazizi // Related material Special from Tunisia: Self- immolation by desperate youth sets off rare wave of protests Parliament speaker: Self- immolation result of psychological problems Source URL: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/554631

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Il faut créer un groupe de contact sur la Syrie | 17.12.11 | 13h30 C'est un signal que le pouvoir syrien aurait tort de prendre à la légère. Son dernier et plus fidèle allié, la Russie, perd patience. Au minimum, Moscou, en présentant jeudi 15 décembre à l'ONU un projet de résolution condamnant les violences en Syrie, adresse un avertissement à Damas : les tueries et autres abominations auxquelles se livre le régime de Bachar Al-Assad - 5 000 morts en neuf mois, selon les Nations unies - suscitent la colère d'un nombre croissant de pays. La Russie est sur la défensive. Elle a des intérêts stratégiques importants en Syrie, notamment une base maritime, à Tartous, principal débouché en Méditerranée pour la marine russe. Elle équipe l'armée syrienne, de pied en cap. Elle a doté le pays d'un système de défense antiaérienne ultrasophistiqué. Elle est familière d'un pouvoir syrien qu'elle a aidé et cultivé depuis les années 1970. Le texte suggéré par Moscou à l'ONU reste bien timide ; il met presque sur le même pied manifestants et forces de répression. Mais il marque une évolution : jusqu'alors, le Kremlin s'opposait à la moindre pression sur Damas. Visiblement, la diplomatie russe commence à réfléchir à l'après-Bachar Al-Assad, à des lendemains qui pourraient être plus proches qu'on ne l'imagine. C'est une excellente chose. Car, éminemment souhaitable, l'effondrement du régime syrien peut aussi déboucher sur une situation difficile. Mieux vaut s'y préparer. Ancien secrétaire général adjoint de l'ONU, l'Américain Michael Williams évoque cette semaine dans le Financial Times la possibilité d'une guerre civile. Cet ex-général des marines dresse une comparaison avec l'implosion de la Yougoslavie. Les deux tiers de la population syrienne sont des musulmans sunnites. Le régime s'appuie sur les minorités - chrétienne, druze, kurde et, surtout, alaouite, la secte musulmane à laquelle appartient la famille Al-Assad. Un affrontement intercommunautaire syrien n'épargnerait pas le Liban voisin, où le parti Hezbollah, l'un des derniers soutiens arabes du clan Al-Assad, exerce sa tutelle sur la communauté chiite. Qui sait ce que pourraient être les réactions en Iran et en Irak, où les régimes en place soutiennent toujours celui de Damas. Membre de l'OTAN entretenant de bonnes relations avec la Russie, la Turquie est en première ligne. Comme la Ligue arabe, elle appuie sans fard la nécessité d'un changement de régime en Syrie. Elle est amenée à jouer un rôle pivot dans les événements à venir. Mais compte tenu des enjeux - éviter le chaos, la guerre civile, la déstabilisation régionale -, un mécanisme de consultations entre toutes les puissances concernées serait le bienvenu. Il faut un groupe de contact sur la Syrie. Sous l'égide de l'ONU, ce groupe - Turquie, Ligue arabe, Union européenne, Etats-Unis, Russie, par exemple - aurait un double rôle : à la fois instrument de pression sur le clan Al-Assad et forum de préparation pour une transition la plus pacifique possible à Damas. http://www.lemonde.fr/imprimer/article/2011/12/17/1620044.html 367

Publishing Date: Fri, 16/12/2011 - 13:51

Is Egypt becoming another Pakistan? Author: Maamoun Fendi The past experience of three major players on the Egyptian political scene ― the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the US Embassy and Islamists ― suggests that Egypt may soon come to resemble Pakistan. But why Pakistan and not Turkey? Though many have long hoped to implement the Turkish model in Egypt, Pakistan ― not Turkey ― seems to be the most plausible outcome. In fact, Egypt may turn out a worse version of Pakistan. Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, the head of the ruling SCAF, worked as a military attache in Pakistan and has made no secret of his admiration for civil-military relationship there. In Pakistan, he believes, politics is the job of politicians but the military maintains the right to change the power equation whenever it wants, because state affairs are too important to be left completely in the hands of civilians. Over the last 40 or so years, Pakistan has seen military coups led by generals Zia-ul- Haq and Pervez Musharraf. In the Pakistani power equation, the army is the compass. US Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson is also experienced in Pakistani affairs, following years of work there at a time when political tensions between the two countries ― in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan ― were at their peak. Patterson is prepared to implement a similar plan in Egypt ― a currently unstable country that has important military and religious waves that need to be tamed to incorporate US interests into their agendas. Having successfully led a similar process in Pakistan, Patterson is the right woman for an Egypt that is transforming into another Pakistan, with the rise of the Salafi-led Nour and Brotherhood-led Freedom and Justice parties to power. Signs have emerged that the US is changing its stance toward rising Islamists. First, the US moved Patterson from Pakistan to Egypt. Then, US officials, including Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, expressed trust in the Brotherhood before the conduct of elections. Next, US Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, visited the FJP’s headquarters during his recent visit to Egypt, a gesture suggesting that the US is ready to deal with a Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt. Another reason why Egypt may evolve into another Pakistan is the fact that most religious waves in Egypt have, since the 1970s, been drawing on the writings of Pakistani thinker Abul Aala Maududi, who is closer in thought to Sayyed Qutb than he is to Hassan al-Banna. The normal process would be for Islamic ideas to spread from Arab countries ― the owners of the Arabic language and jurisprudence ― to non-Arabic-speaking countries, and not the opposite. Oddly enough, though, political Islamism originated in the Indian

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subcontinent and spread to Arab countries, such that the younger generations of Arabs currently do not realize that Maududi is not an Arab. We should therefore brace ourselves for the pakistanization of Egypt. Thinkers should get busy studying the Pakistani model instead of wasting their time examining a Turkish model that will never happen. Translated from Al-Masry Al-Youm Author: Maamoun Fendi Related News: Which Turkish model? Egypt post-Mubarak: Can Turkey’s army serve as a model?

Source URL (retrieved on 17/12/2011 - 23:24): Maamoun Fendi Is Egypt becoming another Pakistan? Fri, 16/12/2011 - 13:51 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/552851

Le pouvoir russe, contesté à Moscou, cherche à soigner son image à l'extérieur | 16.12.11 | 12h12 • Mis à jour le 16.12.11 | 15h03 Confronté en Russie à une contestation de rue qui, pour la première fois en dix ans, fragilise la légitimité de son pouvoir, Vladimir Poutine semble soucieux d'envoyer quelques signaux sur la scène internationale pour dissuader les critiques. Deux annonces concomitantes, faites jeudi 15 décembre, ont donné cette impression. La première : une promesse d'aides financières russes pour la zone euro, survenue alors que le président Dmitri Medvedev participait à Bruxelles à un sommet Union européenne- Russie où l'atmosphère était alourdie par le constat de multiples fraudes électorales lors des législatives russes du 4 décembre, ainsi que les arrestations d'opposants qui avaient suivi. Le second signal est survenu à l'ONU, où après des mois de blocage sur la Syrie, la diplomatie russe a soudainement mis sur la table un projet de résolution épinglant l'"usage disproportionné de la force par les autorités syriennes" et exhortant "le gouvernement syrien à cesser de réprimer ceux qui exercent leur droit à la liberté d'expression". Sans satisfaire, tant s'en faut, toutes les demandes des Occidentaux – puisque ce texte met sur un même plan les violences perpétrées par les forces de l'ordre syriennes et celles attribuées à des groupes en lutte contre le régime de Bachar Al-Assad – ce retournement russe traduit un souci manifeste de se sortir de l'ornière d'un isolement diplomatique qui risquait de devenir gênant en termes d'image. Moscou avait pu observer en effet ces derniers temps que son partenaire traditionnel à l'ONU, la Chine, s'était mise plus en retrait.

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Chose frappante, le geste russe, aussi dosé soit-il, survient à l'approche d'une nouvelle réunion, prévue samedi, de la Ligue arabe, consacrée à la crise en Syrie. La Russie, sans lâcher complètement son allié syrien – point d'appui majeur au Moyen-Orient avec lequel elle entretient d'importants liens militaires (livraisons d'armements) et différents calculs stratégiques (base navale russe de Tartous en Méditerranée) – semble ainsi soucieuse de ne pas se couper de l'organisation arabe régionale, dont le rôle n'a cessé de se rehausser. Le régime de Vladimir Poutine paraît ainsi rechercher à l'extérieur le moyen de neutraliser l'effet négatif produit par la vague de contestation politique qui le menace en interne. Il envoie un double message : l'un adressé aux Européens à propos de l'euro, dont la fragilité est présentée comme une préoccupation commune ; l'autre à l'ONU, où Moscou semble vouloir donner des gages de multilatéralisme. Le dossier de la Syrie avait donné lieu ces derniers temps à une série de commentaires cinglants des Occidentaux, en particulier de la France, en pointe pour la mobilisation contre le régime de Bachar Al-Assad: Moscou se voyait reprocher de mettre à mal toute l'autorité du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Le pouvoir russe semble chercher à sortir, par une forme de tactique des petits pas, d'un positionnement qui risquait de miner sa marge de manœuvre, à l'heure où d'autres dossiers demeurent des contentieux avec les Occidentaux : le bouclier antimissile de l'OTAN en particulier. L'aide russe offerte à la zone euro illustre la conviction de l'équipe au pouvoir à Moscou que les Européens se trouvent en position de faiblesse pour lui faire des reproches à propos de ses dérives autoritaires. La contribution russe pourrait s'élever à 20 milliards d'euros, parle biais du FMI, a indiqué jeudi un conseiller de la présidence russe. Natalie Nougayrède Le pouvoir russe, contesté à Moscou, cherche à soigner son image à l'extérieur16.12.11 | 15h03 http://www.lemonde.fr/imprimer/article/2011/12/16/1619734.html

Publishing Date: Fri, 16/12/2011 - 15:03

Syrian troops fire at protesters after prayers AP Author: AP BEIRUT — Syrian security forces opened fire on anti-government protests after Friday prayers at several locations around the country while the army sent reinforcements into the tense south where military defectors have recently launched deadly attacks on regime troops. The Local Coordination Committees and the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said one person was killed in the shooting in the restive central city of Homs, and a man who was wounded in the southern province of Deraa earlier in the day died his wounds.

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The Observatory said more than 200,000 people marched in different neighborhoods of Homs, denouncing President Bashar al-Assad's regime. The turnout could not be confirmed as Syrian authorities have banned most journalists from covering events on the ground. The Observatory also reported shooting near a mosque in the eastern city of Deir al- Zour but it was unclear if there were casualties there. The LCC said anti-government rallies took place after Friday prayers all across Syria — from Deraa to the suburbs of the capital Damascus, in Homs and Hama in the country's center, and to the north, in the city of Aleppo. The protests came a day after Syrian army defectors killed 27 government forces in Deraa in apparently coordinated attacks that were among the deadliest by rebel troops so far. Syria has seen a sharp escalation in armed clashes recently, raising concerns the country of 22 million is headed toward civil war. The UN raised its death toll for the Syrian uprising substantially this week, saying more than 5000 people have been killed since the revolt began. The LCC said troops deployed in different areas in Deraa on Friday, and that electricity was cut in several locations. Deraa, where the uprising began, has been among the most tense regions in Syria. Because of the turmoil, Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird said Thursday Canadians living in Syria should leave as soon as possible while commercial flights are still available. Washington issued a similar warning for US citizens in September. At the United Nations in New York, Russia began circulating a draft Security Council resolution Thursday it said was designed to resolve the conflict in Syria. The draft calls for an end to all violence. Russia has criticized opponents of Assad's rule for employing violent tactics. Western nations said the Russian draft did not go far enough, because it contained no sanctions against the regime. Assad, who inherited power from his father in 2000, has denied issuing orders to kill protesters. But New York-based Human Rights Watch said Thursday that dozens of military commanders and officials authorized or gave direct orders for widespread killings and torture. Archived Photo?: Protest in Homs, Syria Related material Russia proposes UN Security Council resolution on Syria Activists: Syrian defectors kill 27 soldiers

Source URL (retrieved on 16/12/2011 - 21:24): AP Syrian troops fire at protesters after prayers16/12/2011 - 15:03 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/552976

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12/16/2011 04:34 PM Press Freedom in Hungary Journalists Protest Manipulation with Hunger Strike A group of Hungarian journalists has been on hunger strike this week to protest against alleged manipulation in the country's state media. They say news reports have been edited in a misleading fashion for political reasons. Hungary's controversial new media law has been massively criticized since it came into force in January of this year. But one group of Hungarian journalists has gone to extreme lengths to protest against what they see as manipulation on Hungarian state television: They have been on hunger strike since Saturday. The action was prompted by a report on the public broadcaster MTV on Dec. 3 that showed the face of a former head of Hungary's Supreme Court, Zoltan Lomnici, blurred out for no apparent reason. The technique is normally used to protect the identity of people facing criminal charges. One of the strikers, Balazs Nagy Navarro, told the news agency AFP that the airbrushing gave the impression that Lomnici was a dubious character. Lomnici, who is regarded as a critic of the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, told the British non-governmental organization Index on Censorship that the airbrushing incident was "the most serious infringement of press freedom in the past 20 years." Insiders told Index on Censorship that the blurring incident was likely motivated by personal difference between Lomnici and senior management at a public television station. Nevertheless, the organization wrote on its website that the case "does highlight a decline in ethical standards at Hungary's public broadcasters" since the passing of the new media law. "Our strike will continue until ... the world realizes what is happening in Hungary under the label of 'press freedom': employees terrorized, programs manipulated or falsified," Navarro told AFP. "We are going to stay until things change, even if we risk hospital." Navarro is the head of a trade union that represents television employees at the state-run television station MTV and the founder of an organization called the Movement for Honest Reporting. In an interview with Hungary's Civil Radio that was posted on YouTube, Navarro also gave another example of alleged manipulation at the public broadcaster involving Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a prominent Green member of European Parliament. A news report had been edited so that it looked like Cohn-Bendit had avoided answering a question about his private life, when in fact he had answered it at length. Navarro claimed that the manipulation was because Cohn-Bendit had attacked Prime Minister Orban in the European Parliament. Power Grab On Thursday, the Associated Press reported that Gabor Elo, the director of Hungary's state news service, had been fired in reaction to the hunger strike. In addition, the editor- in-chief of the state news service, Daniel Papp, who had been responsible for the Cohn-

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Bendit report, had been transferred to another post. Navarro told the AP on Thursday that he and the other journalists would continue their strike until all the employees responsible had been dismissed. Orban's conservative Fidesz party, which has an outright majority in the Hungarian parliament, has been accused of engaging in a power grab since coming to power. Critics say it has been trying to take control of the county's independent institutions. In January of this year, the Hungarian government introduced a media law that has been massively criticized within Hungary and abroad for restricting press freedoms. Among other things, the law created a powerful new media authority whose board is appointed by the government. The body can impose large fines on broadcasters over vaguely defined offenses such as "breaching human dignity." Although Hungary has made some changes to the law, media freedom groups are still critical of the legislation. Last month, the Vienna-based International Press Institute (IPI) said that the law "remains highly troubling." dgs -- with wire reports

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,804299,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Press Freedom in Hungary: Prime Minister Launches New Offensive against Journalists (07/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,774480,00.html • The Goulash Archipelago: EU Remains Silent as Hungary Veers Off Course (08/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,780794,00.html • Media Law Controversy: Hungary's Orbán Gets Frosty Reception in European Parliament (01/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,740400,00.html • Muted Protests: Why Are European Companies Silent about Hungarian Media Law? (01/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,740294,00.html Related internet links • Index on Censorship: Airbrushing Row Highlights Media Law Failings http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2011/12/hungary-airbrushing-media-law- hunger-strike/ SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages.

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12/16/2011 02:46 PM The World from Berlin Without Iraq 'Arab Spring May Have Broken Out Earlier' The US has officially declared the war in Iraq to be over with a flag-casing ceremony in Baghdad. President Barack Obama said that America was leaving behind a "sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq." German commentators ask if the conflict, which lasted almost nine years, was worth the toll. In May 2003, then-US President George W. Bush stood on the deck of an aircraft carrier in front of a banner reading "Mission Accomplished" and announced that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. At the time, few would have imagined that it would take another eight years before the US officially declared the conflict over. On Thursday, the US military formally marked the end of the Iraq war with a no-frills ceremony in a fortified compound at Baghdad International Airport. The flag used by American forces in Iraq was lowered and symbolically cased to be taken back to the US. The around 4,000 American soldiers who remain in Iraq are due to leave by the end of the year. "To be sure the cost was high -- in blood and treasure of the United States and also the Iraqi people," Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said at the ceremony. "Those lives have not been lost in vain. They gave birth to an independent, free and sovereign Iraq." At a speech at Fort Bragg in North Carolina on Wednesday, President Barack Obama welcomed returning American soldiers home and spoke about the end of the conflict. "The war in Iraq will soon belong to history," he said. "Your service belongs to the ages." Obama admitted that Iraq was "not a perfect place" and that it faced many challenges. "But we're leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people," he said. "Because you sacrificed so much for a people that you had never met, Iraqis have a chance to forge their own destiny. … There can be no fuller expression of America's support for self-determination than our leaving Iraq to its people." Many in America and elsewhere will continue to ask, however, if freeing Iraq from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was worth the high cost of the war. The conflict, which began in March 2003 with a "shock and awe" assault on Baghdad, left almost 4,500 Americans and over 100,000 Iraqis dead. Around 30,000 American soldiers were wounded, many of them permanently maimed as a result of the notorious improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which were used against coalition forces. Today, the country is still racked by religious conflict, and there are fears that sectarian violence could flare up again. The country's political structures are weak and Iran continues to exert influence. On Friday, German commentators take a look at the end of the Iraq war. The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes:

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"During his election campaign, Obama would probably never in his wildest dreams have imagined that in December 2011, he as president would be praising Iraq as a beacon of democracy that shows the way for the troubled Arab world. Neither would he have imagined that he would see Iraq as a model for the peoples of the region who are seeking the right to democratic participation -- a model that justifies the costs of war and thus the American invasion. Barack Obama used to consider Bush's Iraq policies to be wrong and he rejected the war." "At the end of this month, the last American soldiers are to leave Iraq… They leave behind a country whose institutions are still weak, whose leaders are not exactly shining examples of integrity and which is not immune to the risk of disintegration. It is a country where the infrastructure does not work reliably, where Iran is seeking to expand its influence and which -- last but not least -- has security forces that are lacking in professionalism and which have dubious loyalties. But it is also a country that is no longer in the grip of a despot, whose rule cost hundreds of thousands of people, perhaps even millions, their lives." The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "Even nearly nine years after the events, it is hard to contain the outrage that boils up when one remembers the fabricated justification for the war and the way the conflict proceeded. On the contrary, the distance to the events makes it even clearer how George W. Bush vacillated in his justification for the war and how he combined weapons of mass destruction, al-Qaida terror and the dictatorship into a single threatening brew. The politically twisted logic behind the invasion was coupled with a botched military strategy that laid the ground for an orgy of violence and hatred." "At the time, al-Qaida wanted to take advantage of America's strength and make itself seem more important through a murderous crusade which it could stylize as resistance. The breathtaking provocation of 9/11 had the desired effect. Bush fell into the terrorists' trap, satisfying a national need for revenge by extending the war beyond Afghanistan and fighting injustice with injustice. America went to war in Iraq because it could -- because it was angry and incredibly powerful." "America's current decline is the logical consequence of the over-extension that was visible everywhere in the early 2000s, including its military strength, bloated budgets and promises of growth, its foreign policy ambitions and the verbal radicalism which ultimately promised to forcefully create democracy at gunpoint. With this form of extremism, America betrayed its own best ideals. And in the process the country lost its natural attraction, which historically had repeatedly given hope to freedom-seekers and those fleeing persecution." The left-leaning Berliner Zeitung writes: "Every American schoolchild knows today that George W. Bush's mission has not been accomplished. Iraq has not become the democracy that the neo-cons dreamed of, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein did not lead to democratization in the region and the regime in Tehran has not been weakened. On the contrary, Iran has more influence than ever in Iraq." "And what about the people who were liberated? For them, life eight years after the start of the war is still dangerous. Everyday life, characterized by shortages of water and electricity, abuses of power by the police and the threat of attacks, is unspeakably difficult. There is one fewer dictator in the world, and that's a good thing. And the US 375

has been able to contain the civil war that they unleashed. But the country that American troops are now leaving is not the 'sovereign and stable' nation that Obama spoke of in his speech at Fort Bragg. The US troops may indeed have conquered Baghdad in three weeks, but after eight years of occupation, they have still not won in Iraq." The left-leaning Die Tageszeitung writes: "The last nine years of the American presence in Iraq is further proof that the political balance of power within a country can not be changed by an external military intervention. What the US experienced in Iraq, Israel also experienced in the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. One can only hope that both have learned their lesson before they start planning military operations against Iran." "If anything, the Iraq war did not accelerate the greatest shift of political forces of all time in the Arab world, but delayed it. With its interference in Iraq, the US did lasting damage to the concept of democratization. Afterwards, Arab dictators were able to curb the democratic aspirations of their own populations by asking if they really wanted an Iraqi-style democracy. If it hadn't been for the Americans' intervention, the Arab Spring might have broken out years earlier." -- David Gordon Smith URL: Without Iraq 'Arab Spring May Have Broken Out Earlier'12/16/2011 02:46 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,804204,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: America Ends Its Mission in Iraq http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-76391.html • The World from Berlin: 'Never Before Has the World Been as Close to War with Iran' (12/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,801333,00.html • Freedoms at Risk: Arab Women Fight to Defend their Rights (11/29/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800447,00.html • Opinion: Ten Lost Years (09/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785280,00.html • Interview with Donald Rumsfeld: 'Do I Have any Regrets? Of Course I Do' (04/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,754847,00.html • Life after the Americans: Uncertainty Reigns as Baghdad Enters New Era (01/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,737791,00.html

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ft.com World Middle East & North Africa Politics & Society

December 16, 2011 7:20 pm The Arab spring: one year after By Roula Khalaf, Noah Browning, Abigail Fielding-Smith and Simeon Kerr

Mohamed Bouazizi doused his body with petrol and set himself alight one year ago Saturday, igniting a revolution in his own country, Tunisia, and spreading flames of revolt throughout the Arab world. The young fruit and vegetable seller from the poor town of Sidi Bouzid did not know that he would go down in history as the spark of a largely unforeseen political transformation that is reshaping the Middle East and north Africa. But if he is considered the most famous martyr of this awakening of Arab youth, many thousands of others have also given their lives to destroy corrupt and authoritarian regimes. According to the UN, 10,000-15,000 people died in Libya’s rebellion against the tyranny of Muammer Gaddafi alone and every day in Syria activists send reports of the men, women and children killed at the hands of security forces, in a death toll that the UN this week said had surpassed 5,000. Here are the stories of five of them.

Ahmed Bassiouny, Egypt Among the graffiti memorials that line the walls of Cairo’s Tahrir Square, it is hard to escape the black stencilled image of Ahmed Bassiouny. More ON THIS STORY Interactive Mapping Middle East unrest Cairo clashes continue into third day In depth Middle East protests In depth Libya in transition In depth Syria ON THIS TOPIC Violent clashes in Cairo Philip Stephens Highs and lows of democracy West urged to back change in Bahrain Arabs need education, says Israel minister

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IN MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS & SOCIETY Protests erupt in Cairo over police brutality Russia unveils UN resolution on Syria Regional upheavals test relative Saudi stability Egyptians head to polls as party rivalry sharpens As nationwide protests against the regime of Hosni Mubarak began to seethe in late January, the promise of change coaxed many of Egypt’s middle-class and educated youths to quit their comfortable lives for the streets. Bassiouny, a professor and digital artist, was among them. On the second day of Egypt’s uprising he announced on Facebook: “I have a lot of hope if we stay like this. Riot police beat me a lot.” Nevertheless, he returned to the protests. “If they want war, we want peace. I am just trying to regain some of my nation’s dignity,” he pledged. On January 28, one of the most violent days of the Egyptian revolution, security forces shot and killed Bassiouny. “He was just an ordinary man – it was his compassion that made him join the revolution,” is how his widow, Nadia Eid, remembers him, her two children at her side. “He could not stand to see violence being used against the protesters. He felt their pain and went out with them.” Estimated deaths, January 2011-present: 888

Hamza al-Khatib, Syria On April 29, 13-year-old Hamza al-Khatib and his family joined a protest march outside Deraa, cradle of Syria’s uprising. The boy did not come home that night. When he did return, just under a month later, it was as a corpse. Activists say that to get the body back the family had to pledge to bury him quickly. But video footage of a body quickly circulated on YouTube. His death came at a time when many were unsure whether the protest movement would survive or to what extent the regime would suppress it. The YouTube footage galvanised activists and tens of thousands signed up to a Facebook page entitled “We are all the child martyr Hamza Ali al-Khatib”. A coroner said the marks on his body were caused by decomposition. President Bashar al-Assad met Hamza’s father and in a recent interview insisted the child had not been tortured. “Hamza al-Khatib captured the imagination because he was a child, and because of the horrible state of his body when he returned,” said Nadim Houry, of Human Rights Watch. But “he’s a symbol of a much more rampant practice”. Estimated deaths, March 2011-present: 5,000

Muhammad Nabbous, Libya The citizen journalism of Muhammad “Mo” Nabbous shone a light through the cracks of the megalomaniacal rule which for decades had monopolised information in Libya. A former IT engineer, he bypassed a shutdown of the state-run internet servers by rigging

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a direct satellite connection for his revolutionary “Libya al-Hurra TV”, which he helped found in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. The channel beamed the first images of the city’s bloody protests to a world incredulous at Libya’s awakening. “I’m not afraid to die. I’m afraid to lose the battle,” Nabbous said. “That’s why I want the media to see what’s going on. At least if we die, so many people can witness it and protest from everywhere.” He was felled by a sniper’s bullet hours before a Nato intervention lifted the siege on Benghazi and contributed to the toppling of Gaddafi’s regime. Nabbous illustrated the sudden flickering to life of Libya’s long-dormant civil society. “Me, myself, I wasn’t damaged by the system that much,” he said. “But there are other people I can see suffering and they need more. And if my country is better, I’m going to be better.” Estimated deaths, February-October 2011: 10,000-15,000 Mapping the Middle East unrest

This interactive graphic maps the spread of the protests and assesses the current situation in each country Azizah Othman, Yemen In one of the Arab world’s most conservative countries, the first female martyr of a revolution that continues today demonstrated that women would no longer be silent. The death of Azizah Othman, a 25-year-old demonstrator, in late October was caught on video and prompted nationwide protests. In the days after her death, black-clad women surrounded the foreign ministry in Sana’a, the Yemeni capital, to call for justice. The video of her final moments shows her killer, a regime loyalist, pulling a scarf across his face and advancing towards protesters. Amid screams and cracks of gunfire, the camera turns to Azizah lying in a pool of blood, her veil fallen back to reveal her lifeless face. “The killing of women by this regime [was] a totally new phenomenon in Yemeni society,” Bushra Maqtari, a protest organiser in Azizah’s home city of Taiz, said this week. “She was the first female to pay the highest price for the sake of change. But there have been many after.” Estimated deaths, February 2011-present: at least 350

Karim Fakhrawi, Bahrain

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Karim Fakhrawi, owner of a prominent bookshop chain in Bahrain, was tortured to death during the darkest days of the security forces’ crackdown on pro-democracy protests. In mid-March the minority Sunni-led government cleared demonstrators from the Pearl roundabout, the epicentre of protests led by the majority Shia community. Over the next 10 weeks the security forces carried out arbitrary arrests, systematically abusing detainees amid what an independent commission of inquiry recently described as a “culture of impunity”. Fakhrawi presented himself at a police station on April 3 after a relative’s house was ransacked by police, apparently searching for the 50-year-old father of three. Ten days later his corpse was returned to his family. The authorities said he died of kidney failure and blood poisoning. But the independent inquiry found he had been tortured to death while in the custody of the National Security Agency, one of 35 deaths it investigated. An internal NSA investigation claimed Fakhrawi attacked two police officers, sustaining injuries in the ensuing brawl. The independent inquiry called the investigation ineffective. Estimated deaths, February-October 2011: 46 Profiles by Noah Browning, Abigail Fielding-Smith and Simeon Kerr Roula Khalaf et. al, The Arab spring: one year after December 16, 2011 7:20 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cdb2e4ea-27e1-11e1-a4c4- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gpb6GcUe

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ft.com Life&Arts FT Magazine December 16, 2011 8:45 pm Activists get connected By Julia Ioffe With more than 50 million users, Russia has the biggest internet audience in Europe. And recent protests show people are now discovering how powerful a tool online activism can be

Reuters Protesters for online movement Blue Buckets clash with police Two years ago, Dmitry Ternovskiy, a Russian small business owner, blogger, and hobby photographer, had a dream: he is skiing, and he runs into Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. The two men make each other’s acquaintance, at which point Ternovskiy asks the president for his autograph on the side of his camera lens. A week later, Ternovskiy found himself on the slopes above Sochi, where, he was told, the president also happened to be skiing. Intrigued by the coincidence, Ternovskiy made his way over to where Medvedev was passing and took a few pictures. To his even greater surprise, the president approached him, and Ternovskiy asked him to sign his camera lens. And, because things were already unfolding so bizarrely, Ternovskiy decided to take the opportunity to ask the president about something that had been bothering him for years: the pointless Soviet-era ban on photography in the Kremlin and Red Square. “Dmitry Anatolyevich [Medvedev] said this was stupid and within an hour, the news agencies were reporting that he had given the order to the head of the Federal Security Service [the Russian Secret Service] to lift this ban, which had been in place for 20 years,” Ternovskiy recalls, still marvelling at the cosmic strangeness of that day. More ON THIS STORY Bleak encounters A losing game Observations Turn off your phones, techies. Welcome to Burning Man Observations My identity crisis A local lad The run-in was not only broadcast on national television, it also provided the catalyst for a project Ternovskiy called A Country Without Stupidity. Chief among the inanities in his sights is something most tourists in Russia have encountered: the screaming security guard or elderly woman telling you that you cannot take pictures here, as if your photograph of that supermarket compromises Russian national security. Ternovskiy has used his blog to mobilise Russians to inform these guards and grannies that they are the ones in the wrong: by Russian law, photography is allowed almost everywhere. “Despite the fact that there is no legal basis to ban photography in all the

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places it’s banned, people will still tell you it’s forbidden,” Ternovskiy says, pouring himself a cup of thyme tea as we sit in a Moscow café. “It’s like a Soviet phantom limb. Back then, every person felt himself to be in the thick of a nest of spies, there were enemies all around, everything was banned. Unfortunately, we still see this alive and well in the minds of many people today.” Using his blog and Twitter, Ternovskiy has declared war on this archaic mentality. In the year since he launched A Country Without Stupidity, he has taught a growing number of sympathisers what to do if a guard in a train station tells you to delete that picture you just took: call the police, have them write a report, then write an official complaint to the Prosecutor General’s office. Thanks to Medvedev’s modernisation initiative, he points out, you can now file that complaint online. “It’s very simple and it uses legal methods,” Ternovskiy explains. “You don’t have to fight anyone, you don’t have to pitch a fit and yell at the guards. Just go home, and calmly register a complaint.” To everyone’s surprise, the prosecutor’s office stopped ignoring these complaints and began answering them – and finding in the complainants’ favour. This may seem like a strange fight, but in a country where abuse of authority and brazen shirking of the law has become an accepted part of the daily routine even in the smallest things, Ternovskiy’s battle is a novel attempt not to fall into the sort of complacency that makes this kind of grim reality possible in the first place. “It’s a small thing, yes, but Russians are so indifferent and so convinced that you can’t change anything here, that what we’re trying to show people is that sometimes you just need a little effort to change something,” Ternovskiy explains. “And then maybe the next time, when this person encounters a bigger problem, not just something stupid, he’ll know that he can act, and he’ll know how to.” With more than 50 million users, the Russian internet has this year become Europe’s biggest internet audience and Ternovskiy’s initiative is one of several that has used the explosion of the web in Russia to do something unheard of in its history: the mobilisation of civil society. “For many years, there was no means for people living here to do anything that relates to the organisation of society in any way,” says Anton Nossik, a pioneer of the Russian web and now the media director of SUP, the company that owns LiveJournal, Russia’s most popular blogging platform. “In Russia, it was always the state that was in charge of dealing with social issues, never the people. It’s a situation that, on the whole, has lasted here for about a thousand years.” The change came only recently, and only with the introduction of high-speed internet, first in the big cities, then in the countryside. Then came LiveJournal, which gave Russians a platform to discuss the things no longer being discussed in the state- controlled media. After that, the social networks – VKontakte, or Facebook for the urban elite – which Russians use more than any other people on the planet, connected like-minded citizens of a country spread across nine time zones. In the past year this trifecta – low-cost, hi-speed internet access, LiveJournal, and social networks – has given rise to a cluster of novel civic movements. One of the first was anti-corruption activist Alexey Navalny’s RosPil, which used crowd sourcing to spot corrupt government tenders. Then, using Yandex.Money, the Russian analogue of PayPal, he launched an online collection of funds to hire young lawyers to help him fight corrupt state corporations in court. His goal had been to raise Rbs3m (£61,000). As of May this year he had raised Rbs6.5m. The next frontier in this movement is apps. Ternovskiy is currently working with developers to create an app that allows users to document and

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send a complaint to the Prosecutor General’s office right from their phones. “We want people to act,” Ternovskiy says, explaining that, in the time it takes someone to come home and get in front of a computer, the desire to register an official complaint may easily pass. Another potential hit, given the talk of fraud in Russia’s recent parliamentary elections, is RUGolos, an application that allows voters to register how and where they voted. The idea is that, given the penetration of smartphones in Russia, the app can collect enough data to serve as an independent counterweight to official election results. Blue Buckets, another online movement, uses a different currency to achieve its aims: public shame. Loosely affiliated clusters of people have united in fighting the blue migalki, or sirens, which allow any car to which they are attached to circumvent all traffic laws. Predictably, they cause countless, often deadly, accidents, and given the sanctity of the car in Russia, they have become a major social irritant. Blue Buckets – named for the blue buckets activists tape to their car roofs as a spoof of these VIP sirens – gives people the means to fight back against the abuse of privilege. Drivers who capture this abuse – the VIP vehicle of a film director speeding in the oncoming lane, a bureaucrat turning on his siren to get to the dry cleaners – on camera, can submit the picture or video to Blue Buckets, which then disseminates it to its nearly 40,000 members and hundreds of thousands of monthly visitors to its LiveJournal page. Inevitably, this makes it into the news cycle, fuelling more rage. This summer saw a spate of such small but loud scandals over migalki, and Blue Buckets was behind most of them. “It’s the broken windows theory,” says Petr Shkumatov, one of the Blue Buckets coordinators, and a marketing specialist by day. “Since we’ve started the group, people have stopped being as brazen. A year ago, you saw these migalki everywhere but now they are more hesitant to turn on their discotheques,” he says, referring to the whoop of the sirens. “Of course, they’re allowed to by law, but the fact that society has become so angry at them, and they see the anger, has clearly been giving them pause.” The point of Blue Buckets is to disincentivise ostentatious prestige, which is still so comically common in contemporary Russia. “The problem of migalki is not solved through laws because the sirens play to a very natural desire to be above other people,” says Shkumatov. He sees the legacy of the Soviet Union at play here, too, and he and his co-conspirators at Blue Buckets have tried hard to keep the group as decentralised and organic as possible, in order to prevent it from becoming “an instrument for realising someone’s ambitions”. “The Soviet Union still exists in Russia because people are still repeating old patterns,” Shkumatov explains. “As soon as someone joins an organisation, he wants to become the general secretary of the Communist party.” In the past few days, the Russian blogosphere has proved to be a powerful tool in organising such sentiments. A day after disputed election results delivered both a victory and a defeat to the ruling, vaguely Soviet, United Russia party – it won a majority of seats in the Russian parliament, but lost 15 per cent compared with the 2007 electio7 – some 6,000 young people took to Moscow’s streets. As in the case of protests seen around the world, from Cairo to Zucotti Park, they had been brought there by Facebook and Twitter. And they were angry about what they had read on the internet, information that rarely makes it into the “official” Russian press. In absolute terms, it was not a large number – Moscow is a city of at least 11 million – but it flew in the face 383

of the conventional wisdom. Young Russians are thought to be apathetic and, even if they are not, rarely come out to protest, which they see as the realm of the shrill and the elderly. The anonymous KermlinRussia duo, who write a wildly popular parody of Medvedev’s Twitter account, recently teamed up with Zhgun, a graphic designer, to create a campaign ad on YouTube for a fictional party called “F****** Amazing Russia”. The premise of the party was to leave behind the bad guys – Putin, Medvedev, and their cronies – and to mobilise what one of the KermlinRussia writers called “the party of the internet.” Hundreds of thousands of people watched the YouTube video, but nothing seemed to happen – until it suddenly did. “The internet is the new politics,” one of the duo told me. “It was able to organise the first serious protest in many years.” Whether or not these protests continue as temperatures in Moscow drop is not clear, but they have already accomplished something very important: they have brought down the barrier between the online and offline worlds. When Navalny was arrested at the December 5 protest, thousands of his followers watched a live feed of the protest staged outside the police station where he was being held. At 4am on a weeknight, there were nearly four thousand viewers. When Navalny’s trace temporarily vanished, and when Navalny was brought into court and sentenced to 15 days in prison, it was Shkumatov who tweeted the proceedings to everyone who had not been allowed inside the courtroom: Shkumatov, too, had been arrested. On December 10, around 50,000 of the young urban elite came out in Moscow for the biggest anti-government protest since the fall of the Soviet Union. Tens of thousands protested in dozens of cities around Russia. Addressing the crowd, Shkumatov thanked them for coming out, “for showing them” – the Kremlin – “that you’re not cattle”. “You guys are so wonderful!” he said, while recording a video of the crowd with his phone. Julia Ioffe is the Moscow correspondent for Foreign Policy magazine and The New Yorker Julia Ioffe Activists get connected December 16, 2011 8:45 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/a4520742-2607-11e1-856e- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gpb6GcUe

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ft.com Life&Arts FT Magazine December 16, 2011 10:02 pm Who runs Russia? By Charles Clover Organised crime has long been big business in the country. But are mafiosi now enjoying protection by the state?

Some of Russia’s great mafiosi are buried under life-sized statues at Vagankovskoye cemetery Russians have an oddly reverential attitude about their gangsters. For a small fee, tour guides will lead you through Moscow’s Vagankovskoye cemetery, where mafiosi of means are buried – some under life-sized statues or headstones etched with a likeness of the deceased standing next to his BMW. You can tune into Radio Shanson, named after a style of folk music devoted to ballads about prison life, which is currently Moscow’s second most popular station. Or notice the traditional thief’s gesture known as the raspaltsovka, extending the index and little finger, now as ubiquitous as gold chains and Rolexes in Moscow’s nightclubs. But nothing demonstrates the veneration of all things gangster, like the untimely demise of a vor v zakone, or Russian mafia boss. More ON THIS STORY Mother of all TV shows 25 Russians to watch Who’s king of the castle? Russia’s migrants living on the edge Gillian Tett Power with grace In what has become almost a ritual, a high level razborka, or execution, will invariably lead the evening news. Announcers dwell lovingly on the details of the murder weapon, the getaway route, the model of Mercedes or Maybach that the victim was driving. Then

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comes the grainy CCTV footage or mobile phone photos of the deceased slumped over his steering wheel or prone outside the entrance to a lap-dancing club. Within 24 hours, television stations will have produced computer simulations of the attack, complete with CGI-style graphics. Ballistics experts will be discussing the properties of the weapons used and any cool gadgets involved in the operation. Footage will follow of balaclava-clad police commandoes kicking in doors and cuffing men with abnormally thick necks and lots of tattoos and scars; mugshots of the enemies of the victim, their mob aliases (“Tomato”, “Pussycat”, “Little Japanese”) and their possible motives. The next set-piece is the funeral, where the men with abnormally thick necks and tattoos and scars peering out from under black designer suits, congregate with absurdly large wreaths of flowers to bid farewell to the deceased. . . .

Maxim Gladki is a journalist who specializes in the mafia. Two months ago, businessman One of the purveyors of such death porn is Maxim Gladki. A freelance television journalist, Gladki is one of an army of reporters who specialise in the mafia, playing to their audience’s love of all things gangster and delivering exactly what is craved – the drama, gore, technological geekery, secret service acronyms and luxury branding, which accompany the typical Russian mafia hit. Mafia killings are fewer in number compared with the “wild west” days of the 1990s, but they are qualitatively different. Twenty years ago, killings were carried out mainly with knives, as firearms were prohibited in the USSR. Fifteen years ago, the mafia got around to using guns, but, according to Gladki, the “Rambo mentality” and “low level of professional ability” meant a lot of collateral carnage. These days, however, the level of professionalism is chilling. Snipers make head shots at hundreds of metres, or evade 10 security cameras on their escape, leaving behind an untraceable weapon. It does not take a genius to understand that new people have arrived on the scene. “Basically, the mafia has been taken over by the state,” says Gladki.

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The middle-aged Gladki’s career has traced the rise of Russia’s first mafiosi, the so called vory v zakone or “thieves in law”, from a quasi monastic order of gang leaders that ran life in the gulags under the USSR, through the wild west days of the capitalist 1990s, to the decade of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. “Now all the vory have gone to work for the FSB [the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB], and life has got duller,” conceded Gladki, over lunch at a coffee house around the corner from my office. Top ranking “thieves in law” now own legitimate businesses, drive armoured Maybachs, hang out with judges, politicians, and have policemen on their payrolls. But while Russia’s vory have started to go legit, the opposite has happened to Russia’s authorities. Indeed, the basic functions of organised crime – protection rackets, narcotics, extortion and prostitution, have increasingly been assumed by the Russian state. In a WikiLeaks cable, a Spanish judge – an expert on the Russian mafia, who has studied the mob for 11 years – told US diplomats that he considered Russia a “mafia state”, where “one cannot differentiate between the activities of the government and OC [organised crime] groups”. In my own experience researching crime in Russia, one often came across hybrid organisations made up of organised crime and law enforcement, though it was never quite clear who was telling whom what to do. Take the assassination of opposition journalist Anna Politkovskaya in 2006, for example; those arrested included a professional mafia hitman, an active duty FSB colonel and members of a police special surveillance unit, who are all currently awaiting a second trial. Another high-profile crime was the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in prison in 2009, whose fate was sealed after he accused police investigators of tax fraud amounting to $230m (£147m). All those involved are still free. Then there was this year’s scandal known as the “Moscow gambling affair” in the Russian press, in which the owner of an illegal gambling casino testified that he paid local prosecutors and police as much as 80 per cent of his profits, estimated by a court at Rbs770m (£15.6m), for a krysha, the Russian mafia’s notorious protection “roof”.

Ivan Nazarov, boss of an illegal casino, was involved in a gambling scandal and testified that he paid local prosecutors and police as much as 80 per cent of his profits for protection The gambling affair demonstrated just how cosy law enforcement and criminal gangs have become in Russia. Indeed, according to an interview with Ivan Nazarov, the casino operator, in Kommersant newspaper, after he had paid the prosecutor’s office no organised crime groups bothered him for protection money. 387

The gangster nostalgia that the public feels for the good old days of the vory may be a longing for a simpler time, when bandits took your wallet occasionally, but did not have a chair on top of the Lenin mausoleum watching the Victory Day parade. “All the old mafia groups are gone,” says Gennady Gudkov, deputy chairman of the security committee in the state Duma. “Today it’s the white-collar bureaucrats who sit on top of everything.” The real mafia, if one can call it that, is still a hidden presence lurking at the bottom of Russian society. To find it, I needed Gladki, the man many of Russia’s top mobsters trust to tell their stories.

Andrei Burlakov, the man fatally shot as he lunched in a Moscow restaurant with journalist Maxim Gladki His authority on the subject of the mob is unimpeachable. Just a week before I met with him, he was sitting across the table from Andrei Burlakov, a businessman involved in a messy dispute over the sale of a stake in Russia’s fifth-largest bank, the Bank of Moscow, and his wife. As the trio enjoyed their lunch, an assassin calmly walked up and shot Burlakov in the head; the bullet fragments seriously injuring his wife. Burlakov died hours later; the hitman simply melted into the lunchtime crowds. Most journalists whose lunch interview had been so brutally curtailed would have been given time off and counselling for post-traumatic stress. But in Russia, the treatment is simply a couple of shots of vodka and straight back to work. . . . Gladki has a few words of advice about the Russian mafia. “These are completely different people. I mean it. Be careful, they are ‘other’” he said, using the Russia word “Iniye” which one might use to describe vampires or extra terrestrials. “One day they’ll tell you they are going to strangle you. The next day you’ll see them and it’s like you’re one of the family.” Meeting him I raise the previous week’s “incident” somewhat gingerly, but Gladki, a journalist through and through, will have none of such sensitive posing. He knows what I am after, and his exuberance is infectious. While only a week has passed since his 388

lunch partner fell face first into his cappuccino with a bullet in his skull, Gladki describes the shooting with an irrepressible but slightly practised air, the way a violin collector might introduce you to a new Stradivarius. It turns out, for example, that mob killings involve an entire symbolic hierarchy. Alongside the straightforward objective of killing or maiming, assassinations are also freighted with meaning. “In assassinations, there are gradations of respect,” said Gladki. “The lowest is strangling. If you strangle someone, it is a sign of severe disrespect.” Using a pistol, he said, is “50/50” – kind of an OK, but not brilliant way to be killed. “And then there is the Kalashnikov. To be shot by a Kalashnikov assault rifle is the ultimate form of respect. It is a very good death for a Russian.” Based on the above analysis, Gladki has surmised that someone must have had a lot of respect for a man named Aslan Usoyan, nicknamed “Grandpa Hasan”, who was reckoned to be the highest ranking mafia boss in Russia. On September 16 2010, an assassin shot him in the stomach with a Kalashnikov. The hit was clearly an elaborate job. It had been planned for months: an apartment had been rented across the street from Usoyan’s son’s flat three months prior to the shooting; the sniper left his untraceable weapon in the third-floor room and managed to evade up to 10 security cameras in his getaway. The location of the shooting, in one of the most tightly protected neighbourhoods in Moscow, a mere 800m from the Kremlin’s walls, indicated the involvement of Russia’s special services, according to Gladki. When I try to get to the bottom of the attempted murder, however, I quickly get lost in a sea of Georgian surnames and mafia klichki or aliases. No one has the definitive version of who ordered the hit, and no one has yet been arrested. It was mainly blamed on Tariel Oniani, a Georgian rival with whom Usoyan had quarrelled over interests in Olympic building projects in Sochi, according to police investigators. True, Oniani was in prison at the time, having been arrested in 2009 for kidnapping, but in Russia that is generally not seen as an obstacle to carrying on the running of a criminal empire. However, one former police detective, who took part in his arrest in 2009, thinks it may have been an attempt by Usoyan’s security services protectors to extort more protection money from him. In the end, Usoyan was only injured, and reportedly has gone to ground somewhere in Russia’s south. Aslan Usoyan is one of the mafia’s old guard. An ethnic Kurd from Georgia who belongs to the Yezid faith, he has a ruddy complexion, jet black hair and a portly, garrulous demeanour, which befits the “Grandpa Hasan” nickname. He was first inducted into the ranks of the vory v zakone, according to a police dossier seen by the FT, after going to prison in 1984 for trafficking in fake gold coins. . . . During Soviet times, the vory were like a religious sect. The top echelons – so it is said – were not allowed to marry or have families, could not join the army, work for state institutions, own property or have any of the trappings of the wealth. Elaborate tattoos still spiral tapestry-like along their arms and torsos, recording their crimes and convictions, and signet rings denote rank.

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“The vory were supposed to live like Franciscan monks,” said Andrei Konstantinov, an expert on the Russia mafia and author of what is probably the most popular Russian language history of the subject, Bandit Petersburg. “They practically had to take a vow of poverty, even though they stole colossal amounts of money,” he says. Thieves were required by their code to put all their earnings into a common pool, to be used for the benefit of their comrades in prison. The problem with such a puritanical approach to being a gangster, though, is that it defeats the purpose if you do not get to keep what you steal. So it is unsurprising that the thieves’ code has been subjected to some modifications since the arrival of capitalism in Russia two decades ago. Gangsters now flash their wealth, have wives and families and are not afraid to be seen in the company of police, who today are more than likely contract employees. Amid the decadence in Russian society brought about by rapid oil wealth and hyper-consumption, it seems even the criminals have begun to lose their moral bearings. Indeed, it is now even possible to buy the status of vor v zakone, which used to be earned with stints in prison camps. Those who have come by their titles dishonestly, however, (ie not by engaging in a life of crime) are referred to as apelsini or “oranges”. Usoyan is one man who did not buy his title. Released in 1991, just in time for the arrival of capitalism in Russia, Usoyan took part in the explosion of wealth and corruption that fuelled the ascent of organised crime gangs across Russia to positions of unrivalled influence. Business could only be done if you paid your protection money, and in some cases gang-related murders were running at 10-20 a day. “It was like a conflict zone, like Iraq, on bad days here,” said Konstantinov. In 1996, Usoyan was arrested and charged with murdering a rival kingpin known as “Amiran”, but acquitted. Then in 1998, he survived an assassination attempt. The arrival of ex-KGB colonel Vladimir Putin as president in 2000, however, brought changes. Things quietened down; some of the former gang leaders are now dead or in prison (abroad as a rule, as they seldom stay behind bars very long in Russia). Others have taken part in the “great legalisation” as Konstantinov puts it, becoming legitimate businessmen. Still others remain mobsters, but it is clear that they have been given a degree of protection by the state, “in exchange for the occasional favour” according to Gladki. . . . Mark Galeotti, a Russian mafia specialist at New York University, says he is not a fan of the “Mafia state” hypothesis, in which organised crime is essentially inseparable from the Kremlin. However, he says it is undeniable that on occasion, one side will find a use for the other: “If we look at the extent to which organised crime does the bidding of the state the answer is that it happens in specific cases,” he said “The state can often set the rules because the state is clearly the biggest game in town.” Usoyan became the Russian mafia’s most powerful vor in 2006, when his partner, Zakhar Kalashov, a fellow Yezidi Kurd from Tbilisi and at the time reckoned to be the ranking vor in Russia, was arrested in the United Arab Emirates. Kalashov was extradited to Spain to face money laundering charges, of which he was ultimately convicted in 2010 and sentenced to nine years in prison. On three occasions in 2009-2010, US diplomats interviewed a Spanish prosecutor, who put Kalashov behind bars. According to the 2010 cable released by WikiLeaks, the 390

prosecutor “considers Belarus, Chechnya and Russia to be virtual ‘mafia states’ and said that Ukraine is going to be one”. The cable also states: “He summarised his views by asserting that the GOR’s [government of Russia] strategy is to use OC groups to do whatever the GOR cannot acceptably do as a government.” Kalashov and Usoyan are apparently still close. Spanish police intercepted Kalashov’s telephone conversations between June and November 2006, which showed that Usoyan gave instructions to Kalashov’s people to protect him and extract him from prison, according to a Spanish official. Further phone tapping in 2008 overheard two mafiosi talking to each other about Kalashov’s problems in Russia, but saying Usoyan was still supporting him. . . . Aslan Usoyan, however, insists he is a simple businessman. In 2006, Gladki actually managed to interview him for Russia’s Channel One state TV channel. The meeting was filmed secretly, after Kalashov’s arrest. Gladki, wearing a wire and being filmed from a long-range hidden camera, accosted the elderly Georgian at Vnukovo airport in Moscow. “It is said that Kalashov was the godfather, and you are second in command after him?” Gladki challenged. Usoyan seemed surprised, but, recovering, answered: “Not true. It was to someone’s advantage to blacken his name and take his property in Russia ... Shakro [Kalashov] built himself a palace in Tbilisi. One has to live more modestly.” “You don’t want to be the godfather?” “I am a pensioner, I live on a pension. I live modestly, I don’t touch anyone, I just mind my own business.” Even the police say they suspect Usoyan may have high-level protectors. A former investigator for UBOP, a recently disbanded anti-organised crime division of the interior ministry, says “We are 100 per cent convinced that behind Grandpa Hasan stands the FSB.” He recalls an investigation in 2009 where he entered Usoyan’s name and known aliases into Rozysk-Magistral, a police database tracking movement of specific individuals across Russia. He would have been notified if Usoyan bought any ticket to travel under any of his assumed names. “After a few weeks of not getting any reports, we suddenly found that he had somehow got into Kazakhstan. Then North Ossetia. But there was no paper. None of this was showing up on our grid.” The investigator, who asked that his name not be used, pursued this up the chain of command but “received discouraging signals”. He believes someone was protecting Usoyan, keeping his name out of the databases and giving him freedom of movement. “That could only have been the FSB,” he says. Grandpa Hasan remains an elusive mystery. Researching this article, I have tried to find him or a representative to talk to. Every time, they don’t show, or call with an excuse, or switch their phone off, sometimes for good. After all of my efforts, my notebook is still full of rumours and contradictions. The story of Grandpa Hasan and the mafia seems to personify the mystery of today’s Russia. Charles Clover is the FT’s Moscow bureau chief. Additional reporting by Victor Mallet. To comment on this article, please email [email protected] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b4b5a2aa-26cb-11e1-9ed3- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gpb6GcUe 391

ft.com Life&Arts FT Magazine December 16, 2011 10:12 pm Self-assessment, Putin-style By Andrey Kolesnikov Vladimir Putin is not necessarily clinging to power for the sake of it, but he’s under fire – and once Russians go in for the kill, there’s no letting go

Vladimir Putin, the man named by Forbes magazine as the second most influential person in the world, has attracted quite a stream of criticism lately. You can imagine how much stick he’d get if he occupied the No 1 slot. Most of the broadsides against Putin used to come from the west – at least they did until September 24 this year, when Russia’s current prime minister was all but crowned its next president at the United Russia party congress. Now Putin is under fire in his homeland, and we Russians don’t do things by halves: once we go in for the kill, there’s just no letting go. More ON THIS STORY Robert Shrimsley Outer space? Kinda been there, Dad … Robert Shrimsley Expecting a gift today? Hard luck Robert Shrimsley Now son, just one more test to go... Robert Shrimsley Choosing my words carefully Robert Shrimsley I hate to sound paranoid, but … This time, it’s in a different league from previous run-ins. In 2008, for instance, it was reported that Putin was getting divorced, was about to marry a 28-year-old gymnast and that his daughters had left Russia. When questioned on a visit to Italy, Putin quashed the rumours. Meanwhile, the owner of the Moscow newspaper that printed the allegations closed the paper down. It seemed as if Russia’s media would never recover. These days, it’s a story remembered only by journalists and Kremlin-watchers. What’s going on now is completely different. There have been no shocking revelations: indeed, the only thing revealed at the United Russia party congress is the true nature of Putin and Dmitry Medvedev – or rather, their hunger for power. The implications are far greater this time, however. Strange as it may sound, September 24 might just have marked the return of the kind of freedom Russians have not seen 392

since the days of Boris Yeltsin. A good internet posting can easily be read by hundreds of thousands – if not millions – of people, giving the blogosphere and print media an audience at least as big as the number of television viewers. (TV itself, meanwhile, has had nothing to say – though that will soon change as it is forced to compete with the internet and stop ignoring the mood of its audience.) I think I understand why Putin is clinging on. His goal isn’t power for power’s sake – that would be too simple. I think he has genuinely looked for a successor and simply hasn’t found one. At some point he decided no one else was up to the job. That’s how I see it. But I’m not the only one. The question came up when western journalists and Russia-watchers met recently at the Valdai Club (whose annual forums are a sort of Russian answer to Davos). Nikolai Zlobin, a senior research fellow from the Washington-based World Security Institute, pointedly asked Putin to spell out why there had been no new blood in Russian politics for so many years. “You’ve made yourself so central to the running of the country that no one can see how you could ever cease to be part of it,” Zlobin said. “It would fall apart without you – isn’t there something wrong with a system like that?” And what exactly, he was asked, was it about the present system that he so objected to? Zlobin reiterated that for the past few years there had been no new faces capable of rising to the challenge of Russian politics at a national level. Putin sounded surprised: “What do you mean ‘no new people’? What about Dmitry Medvedev?” “How can you call Dmitry Medvedev a fresh young face in politics?” Zlobin asked. “He’s already been the country’s president.” Putin seemed thrown. He paused. “Well, there is also,” he said, “...Dmitry Medvedev.” A while ago I too had a brief exchange with Putin in a corridor of Moscow’s “White House” – the main government building. I asked him several questions, and suddenly he looked at me and said: “Can you imagine? If I based my decisions on what people might say about me, I would never get anything done!” On matters of principle such as whether to seek another term as president, the only person Putin trusts is himself. It is a very long time since he has paid the slightest attention to what anyone else has to say. And that, in a nutshell, is the problem. Andrey Kolesnikov is a special correspondent for Kommersant newspaper. Translated from the Russian by Paul Gould http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/04710ea6-26cc-11e1-9ed3- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gpb6GcUe

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ft.com Life&Arts FT Magazine December 16, 2011 10:02 pm Russia’s migrants living on the edge By Isabel Gorst Central Asians from the former Soviet Union have long flocked to Russia for jobs and security, but society is increasingly turning on them, writes Isabel Gorst.

A Tajik worker chops window frames for firewood in a migrant settlement outside Moscow Three times a week at a quarter past three, Batyr goes to Moscow’s Kazansky railway station to meet the train from Tashkent. Smartly clad in a black leather jacket and winklepickerish shoes, the Uzbek youth stands out among the passengers laden with plastic luggage spilling on to the platform. “I can get you anything you want – passport, immigration papers, work permit,” he says, ignoring a group of policemen hovering nearby. “Just call my mobile. We can meet at any Metro station or anywhere you like.” More ON THIS STORY FT Magazine 20 years after the USSR Mother of all TV shows 25 Russians to watch Who’s king of the castle? Gillian Tett Power with grace Kazansky station is the hub for trains arriving in the Russian capital from former Soviet Central Asia. Its mock-medieval arrivals hall and warren of bustling underpasses are a favourite haunt of traders selling khogos – an Uzbek word meaning documents – to migrant workers, and anyone else who is interested. Over the past decade, there have been plenty who are. Russia is taking in migrants on an unprecedented scale to fill a growing hole in its work force. Among the largest group are Central Asians fleeing poverty and political oppression to earn money to support relatives at home. Official statistics are hard to come by but independent experts believe 394

at least 3 million migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are working in and around Moscow alone – most of them illegally. These largely poor and uneducated Central Asians will accept menial, low-paid jobs that Muscovites don’t want to do – slaving on construction sites, sweeping streets and hauling heavy loads at city superstores and markets. Once citizens of the same country bonded by a shared language and communist ideology, Central Asian migrants now live on the fringes of Russian society, hounded by police, exploited by employers and increasingly disliked by much of the population. . . .

Uzbek labourers queue in Moscow From the nearest bus stop, it is an hour’s walk to the shack Tahir has built in marshy scrubland outside Moscow’s ring road. Along the way the Tajik migrant scans the path for signs of police van tracks in the mud. “I have worked all over Russia ... there are homeless people everywhere,” he says. “For some reason the police always pick on us migrants.” Tahir, now in his late-forties, arrived in Russia in 2001 after fleeing the aftermath of a violent civil war that left Tajikistan in ruins. For the first few years he led an itinerant life, labouring at construction sites in Russia’s booming oil towns and building country houses for the new rich along the Volga river. Worn out and limping from a leg injury, he now picks up odd jobs in construction. In a good month he earns about $700 (£450) – a fortune in Tajikistan but barely enough to lead a normal life in Moscow, let alone leave spare cash to send home. Poverty has driven him into a life of petty corruption on the margins of society. “There are no jobs back there and it’s not going to change,” he says. “I have to live here to feed my family.” A bulldozer could make light work of Tahir’s rickety shack. The foundations are a jumble of kitchen sinks and lorry tyres, supporting walls of corrugated iron. In the middle a stove fashioned out of an old tin trunk belches smoke. A couple of policemen know about the place but Tahir pays them Rbs1,000 (£20) a month to turn a blind eye. It’s far cheaper than renting a room in Moscow. But a recent spat between Russia and Tajikistan could put an end to this precarious security. In November, the Kremlin flew into a fury when a Tajik court sentenced a 395

Russian pilot to eight-and-a-half years of hard labour for smuggling. In the name of a crackdown on illegal immigration, Russian police rounded up hundreds of Tajik workers. Tajikistan caved in and released the pilot even as the first migrants were deported. Nationalism is on the rise in Russia and the pilot case became a cause célèbre – the Kremlin had put tiny, impoverished Tajikistan in its place and taught illegal migrants a lesson. Russian commentators let rip about the threat migrants posed to the health, security and cultural identity of the nation. TV stations wrapped footage of revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and dire poverty in Tajikistan into their coverage of the scandal, portraying Central Asians as a dirty and dangerous lot. Last month, Gennady Onishchenko, Russia’s chief public health official, said a temporary ban on Tajik migrants should be considered to slow the spread of TB and HIV-Aids. . . .

Uzbeks arrive at the city’s Kazansky station Immigration is new to Moscow. Twenty years ago the city was populated almost entirely by Slavic Russians and it has struggled to adapt to the growing influx of migrants. Lev Gudkov, a sociologist who runs the Levada Center, a polling agency, says almost half of Muscovites are opposed to immigration and many would like to see all migrants forcibly deported. City officials have stoked racial tensions. “Claims that migrants are responsible for most of the crimes committed in Moscow are simply not true,” Gudkov says. Among migrant groups, Central Asians are the poorest, the most despised and the most visible because they usually work outdoors. Jobs tend to be divided by nationality. The Kyrgyz have most of the street-sweeping jobs in elite quarters of central Moscow where residents can afford generous tips and there are rich pickings from dustbins. Tajiks are known as good builders and are often employed to renovate apartments or do odd jobs at smart country houses outside the city. Traditionally, Uzbeks like trading and work in markets. Central Asian migrants now live on the fringes of Russian society, hounded by police Unable to pay for decent accommodation, Central Asian migrants cram into shabby rented rooms, despised by their Russian neighbours who have only recently escaped the confines of Soviet-era communal apartments. Others, like Tahir, squat in basements or demolished buildings, hoping to escape the eye of anyone who might report them to the authorities. Unlike migrants from the Caucasus, few Central Asians want to settle in Russia, says Gudkov. But they are not wanted by their governments at home, where they would only swell the ranks of the unemployed. Remittances account for more than one-third of the gross national product in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. “They are working here because 396

they have no other way to support their families. They try to stay in the shadows and avoid the attention of police,” he says. But xenophobia has recently spread to the general public. On November 4, when Russia officially celebrates National Unity Day, at least 7,000 Muscovites turned out to join the annual Russian March. They included skinheads in masks chanting racist slogans, Christian Orthodox fundamentalists, retired couples and parents with their children. Experts give a number of explanations. The loss of the Soviet empire has left older Russians with an overwhelming sense of low self-esteem, says Gudkov. “They blame the weakest social group – the migrants,” he says.

Uzbek cleaner in a Moscow hostel Young Russians, meanwhile, disappointed by the lack of opportunities, vent their frustration on the same group, according to Nataliya Zolotova, an expert on migrants at the Russian Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology. “Hating migrants is just a channel of dissatisfaction. The degradation of Russian education and healthcare has “given birth to the monster idea that migrants are the enemy.” Alexei Malashenko is a specialist in Central Asia at the Carnegie Moscow Center. He says a “hierarchy of hate” has developed among Russian xenophobes. “Migrants from the Caucasus are loathed, but they are also respected because they strike back when attacked,” he says. “Central Asians are hated as well, but they are less aggressive and no one is afraid of them. They are considered as lesser brothers and slaves.” Central Asians see being covered in bruises as an inescapable side-effect of living in Russia This pattern is also recognised by Vera Galperina who works at the Sova Center for Information and Analysis, an organisation that monitors hate crime in Russia. “Unless attacks result in murder or serious injury, Central Asian migrants rarely report racial violence to the police.” As a result, Central Asians are soft targets for attack. “What worries me most is that there are so few complaints – they see being covered in bruises as an inescapable side-effect of living in Russia.” This means that unscrupulous employers exploit Central Asian workers as a cheap, malleable source of labour. Illegal migrants are unlikely to complain about unpaid wages for fear their masters turn them over to the authorities. A group of forlorn-looking Tajik migrants waits in the anteroom of the Committee for Civil Assistance, an organisation that provides legal support for labour migrants. Anastasia Denisova, who advises on advocacy, says more than 400 people have come to the committee this year alone complaining about non-payment of wages – many of them

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representing whole teams. “Many migrants are really forced labourers. Employers give them an advance and then no more money is forthcoming,” she says. “Then they are trapped – they can’t pay to register, can’t send money home and can’t leave.” Sorbon Zhumakhonov came to the Committee for help after a brawl at a Moscow carwash almost cost him his life. It happened last summer when migrant workers demanded their wages and the boss, fearing a rebellion, called in the mob. “Four or five jeeps arrived and some thugs I did not recognise jumped out and started beating us up,” says the Tajik migrant, speaking in the flat tones of a person who has seen too much violence. “One of the men grabbed me by the neck, dragged me behind the pumps and broke my nose with the butt of his air gun. I tried to run but he shot me in the back at short range.” Moscow courts are inundated with cases involving the abuse of migrant labour, but few are settled in favour of migrants, according to Denisova. Zhumakhonov’s case will probably be no exception. The Committee has provided the migrant with a lawyer but the investigation has stalled. “It appears that there is some collusion between the [migrant’s] former employer and investigators,” she says. . . .

Uzbeks at work on the city’s streets As in European capitals a debate is under way in Moscow about how much immigration should be controlled. But in Russia’s case the discussion is more complicated because immigration controls are corrupt and policy makers feel compelled to satisfy so many conflicting interests. Moscow has set a target to lift the country’s population to 145 million by 2025 from the current level of 143 million. However, even if this goal is met the country will need to import at least 10 million workers in the coming decade to fill the gap in the labour force. “Moscow cannot survive without more migrants. There is no question about it,” says Gudkov. “The population is getting old, the labour market is growing and young Muscovites don’t want the low-status jobs that Central Asian migrants do.” Nataliya Orlova, chief economist at Alfa Bank, believes the migrant population will continue to grow unless the Russian economy totally collapses. Some firms have begun laying off Russian workers and hiring cheaper migrant labour as concern grows over the eurozone crisis. Meanwhile the threat of a breakdown in security in Central Asia as instability spills over from Afghanistan and Pakistan is encouraging more, not less migration from the region. “It’s better to live in a big oil-rich country like Russia than a poor country without oil like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,” she says.

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“Russia is caught in a trap,” says Malashenko. On the one hand the Kremlin has encouraged the “Russia for Russians” policy to unify the population and distract attention from social and economic ills. But at the same time the authorities realise they have to allow an inflow of low-cost migrant labour from Central Asia to keep economic growth on track. The fact that the Kremlin still clings to its past as a mighty Eurasian country adds an ideological dimension to the problem. “We cannot shut our borders to them for historic reasons,” says Ekaterina Egorova, deputy director of the Federal Migration Service. “Not long ago we were all one family.” But the cultural and ideological ties that once bound the peoples of Russia and Central Asia have disappeared since the Soviet Union collapsed. Many young Central Asian migrants do not speak Russian and find the culture alien. As Slavic Russians re-embrace Christian Orthodoxy, Central Asians are discovering their historic roots in Islam. And while officially Russia proclaims its tolerance of different religions, Malashenko warns that religion has begun to stoke tensions. “A few years ago nobody ever mentioned the religious identity of migrants. But now there is a growing perception that Muslim migrants are a threat,” he says. Russia’s Federal Migration Service has not yet begun to develop a policy to integrate migrants in society. Instead the service is focused on the battle against illegal immigration. “It’s not going to be easy,” says Malashenko. “Many enterprises, police and officials have a lot to lose.” Complex bureaucratic procedures introduced to keep track of migrants and their employers only serve to push both sides to the wrong side of the law, says Zotova. “There are so many layers and layers of permits – just like a Russian Matryoshka doll. The immigration problem is not really about migrants. It’s about the problem of Russia’s shadow economy.” Isabel Gorst is an FT correspondent based in Moscow http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/0d1569a0-2607-11e1-856e- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gpb6GcUe

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Internacional REVUELTA CONTRA EL ASAD Nuevo viernes de la ira en Siria Decenas de miles de personas se manifiestan en Homs en contra de Bachar el Asad Las fuerzas de seguridad se han mantenido esta vez al margen de las protestas Enric González Jerusalén 16 DIC 2011 - 18:13 CET Siria ha vivido un nuevo viernes de protestas contra el presidente Bachar el Asad. El Ejército y las fuerzas policiales siguen desplegados por el país, pero hoy se han mostrado más tolerantes con las manifestaciones. En Homs, por ejemplo, decenas de miles de personas han desfilado por las calles gritando “el pueblo quiere ejecutar al presidente”, y los soldados gubernamentales se han limitado a contemplar desde lejos los acontecimientos. La oposición interpreta que quizá El Asad intenta con su moderación enviar una señal de asentimiento a Rusia, que el jueves presentó en Nueva York un borrador de resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU en el que se pide el fin de la violencia. El Gobierno de Moscú, aliado del de Damasco, había bloqueado hasta ahora los esfuerzos del resto del Consejo de Seguridad (menos China) para conseguir una resolución de condena al régimen de Bachar el Asad por la brutalidad con que ha reprimido las protestas iniciadas en marzo. La ONU estima que desde entonces más de 5.000 personas han muerto. Estados Unidos y sus aliados europeos consideran que el borrador ruso no es aceptable porque equipara la violencia del Gobierno con la de la oposición y no incluye ninguna crítica a El Asad, pero piensan que la presentación del texto puede suponer un primer paso para el diálogo. Bajo el lema "la Liga Árabe nos mata", los manifestantes pidieron al organismo más dureza y agilidad en sus sanciones Las manifestaciones de hoy han sido convocadas bajo el lema “la Liga Árabe nos mata”, para exigir al organismo supranacional más agilidad y dureza en su programa de sanciones contra el régimen sirio. En Homs, uno de los bastiones de la oposición, han discurrido de forma pacífica: testigos presenciales aseguran, por teléfono, que los soldados han disparado al aire antes de que la gente saliera de las mezquitas, pero se han mantenido al margen en cuanto han empezado las marchas, separadas por barrios porque el Ejército mantiene puestos de control entre las distintas zonas de la ciudad. Los Comités de Coordinación local, que organizan las manifestaciones, indican sin embargo que en Homs se ha registrado un muerto. En otras ciudades, como la oriental Deir el-Zur, se han escuchado tiroteos, pero no existe constancia de víctimas. En Alepo, los suburbios de Damasco, Hama y Deraa también hubo manifestaciones sin especiales incidentes. En los alrededores de Deraa, junto a la frontera con Jordania, prosiguen las operaciones del Ejército en persecución de grupos de desertores, unidos a la oposición, que el jueves mataron en una emboscada a 27 miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad. Fuentes de la oposición aseguran que las

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fuerzas rebeldes, más o menos aglutinadas en el llamado Ejército de la Siria Libre, han matado a 45 soldados y agentes progubernamentales en los últimos tres días. Enric González Nuevo viernes de la ira en Siria16 DIC 2011 - 18:13 CET http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/16/actualidad/1324055486_18605 7.html

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Publishing Date: Fri, 16/12/2011 - 13:06

US, Egyptian military, Islamists engage in precarious dance Author: Max Strasser Maggie Hyde When Anwar Sadat abandoned Egypt’s alliance with the Soviet Union in the mid- 1970s, he forged an alliance with the United States government and military that would shape his country’s foreign policy for decades. Since then, officials in Washington have depended on a reliable ally in Cairo to support American interests in the Middle East. As a part of the same deal, American and Egyptian armed forces have enjoyed a familiar relationship and cooperation. But with former President Hosni Mubarak driven from office, the military holding power and Islamist movements dominating the ongoing parliamentary elections, Washington is struggling to develop a new policy in Egypt that will maintain as much of its influence in a rapidly evolving situation, with new political players. In the interim, it seems that the US, Egypt’s military and its ascendant Islamist forces are engaging in a precarious dance. The US’s uncertain posture has some Egyptians worried about what will come next in its relationship with the Western power. “I’ve never seen Americans so confused and worried as I have ever since January,” says Hisham Kassem, a liberal political analyst who is in regular contact with American officials. “I know that security and stability are American interests, not civil rights, in the coming period in Egypt." American officials are saying otherwise, though, emphasizing Washington’s commitment to democracy in Egypt regardless of the elections' outcome. “Now, in Egypt, new actors will be seated in the parliament, including representatives of Islamist parties,” US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on 6 December, a few days after it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party was poised to dominate the coming parliament. She also called for fair and inclusive elections, and said the United States expected those elected to uphold universal human rights, including women’s rights and freedom of religion, as well as maintain peaceful relations between Egypt and its neighbors. On 11 December, US Senator John Kerry, who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited Cairo, where he met with Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, newly appointed Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri and high-level representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood. “You can tell whom the American government thinks is the most important from the people Kerry met with and in this order: Tantawi, Ganzouri, the Muslim Brotherhood,” says Ziad Abdel Tawab, the deputy director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. “No civil society groups, no liberals were included.” “There’s a tension between broad principles and goals and who we’re being forced to work with,” says Steven Cook, a Washington-based fellow at the Council on Foreign 402

Relations. “The hope is that we’ll be able to secure our interests with a democratic Egypt.” That is precisely what has some Egyptians, like Kassem, worried. Americans “have both values and interests. When the two contradict, interests come first,” Kassem says, noting that when the revolution began in January, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton "changed her position three times within 36 hours.” Kassem and other secular forces worry that if the Brotherhood imposes restrictions on civil liberties — in areas such as women’s and minority rights — American officials will be happy to look the other way as long as the Islamist government cooperates on regional issues, like ensuring access to the Suez Canal and Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. Neither the Brotherhood nor the more conservative Salafis have yet taken power, but they appear to be on track, with the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party receiving around 40 percent of the vote in the first round of People's Assembly elections and the Salafi-led Nour Party list capturing around a quarter. And although both parties have officially stated that they intend to respect civil rights, many secular Egyptians have doubts. If the United States does ignore civil rights in favor of stability in Egypt, it would not be without precedent. Saudi Arabia, one of Washington’s closest allies in the region, is ruled by a theocratic monarchy that oppresses religious minorities, places stringent restrictions on women and commits a host of other rights violations. Officials in Washington rarely speak out against Riyadh. The Riyadh regime is reportedly influential in shaping the US's Egypt policy, with some observers close to the US administration alleging that Saudi Arabia is conditioning continued supply of oil to the West on Islamists being allowed to rise in the post- revolutionary democracies emerging in the Middle East. In another twist, the American government runs the risk of voter alienation and Congressional opposition if it collaborates with an Islamist government in Cairo. Domestic resistance could influence the administration’s decisions, particularly if the elected powers in Egypt decide to reassess its peace treaty with Israel. “It really depends on what kind of Islamist coalition it comes to be,” says Greg Aftandilian, a former State Department analyst on Egypt and an associate at the Middle East Center at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell. “If you have a coalition of the Muslim Brotherhood with liberal forces — that, I think, would be palatable to the United States.” If a government too extreme for American tastes is elected, the US might decide to rely on its three-decade-long military relationship and continue to work with the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). “There are long, deep ties,” says Aftandilian, between the two militaries. He adds that if the SCAF presides over successful parliamentary and presidential elections, and barring any gross instances of military violence, there will be no major changes to US policy in Egypt. The Egyptian military has been long seen by its US counterpart as a reliable partner whenever the region becomes unstable. For years American soldiers and generals have met up with their Egyptian counterparts in the desert for extensive cooperative training exercises known as “Brightstar.” Egypt is also of great strategic importance: It shares a 403

border with Israel, is centrally located in the Middle East, and has a deep-water harbor in Alexandria and the Suez Canal. In addition, the US government has given the Egyptian military between US$1 and $3 billion a year since 1979. But in light of the SCAF’s recent tactics used against protesters, including subjecting civilians to military trials, US military support is getting harder to justify. In October, military armed personnel carriers ran over protesters marching for Christians’ rights outside the Maspero state television building. And in November, military and police forces fired on protesters in and around Tahrir Square, and doused them with American- made tear gas. “The last week of November was a clarifying moment for the [Obama] administration,” Cook says of the violence used by Interior Ministry forces against protesters, leaving at least 45 dead. On 25 November, the White House released a statement saying, “The United States strongly believes that the new Egyptian government must be empowered with real authority immediately.” The statement was made quietly, released by the White House’s press department at 3 am, but the message was clear in urging the SCAF to step aside and allow the democratic transition to run its course. Marc Lynch, a professor of Middle East Studies at George Washington University who has advised the White House in the past, believes that statement wasn’t meant for Egypt's protesters. “It was directed at Tantawi,” he says. Still, many experts doubt that there will be any rift or criticism between the two anytime soon, even though some lawmakers in the US Congress are raising questions about the SCAF's human rights record. Most military experts believe the US will continue to aid the Egyptian military, using the closeness of the relationship to exert pressure behind the scenes. “The US will not be outspoken because we have a discreet relationship with the military,” says Andrew Exum, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC. Instead, he says, the US will continue a close, behind-the-scenes relationship through which they can communicate and apply pressure to Egypt’s military leaders. But to many Egyptians, this seems like the US is choosing the wrong side again, by not making civil rights a priority and relying on backchannels of communication. “The US is betting on the return of the old [Mubarak-era] situation" in which it can exert great influence behind the scenes, says Abdel Tawab. “I think that’s the wrong bet.” Show in newsticker: Senator John Kerry with Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi Related material Egypt warns of foreign meddling as US pushes on with democracy programs Will Saudi Arabia lead Egypt's counter-revolution? Report: US seeks to give less money to Egypt's military Source URL (retrieved on 16/12/2011 - 15:41): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/552701

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Publishing Date: Fri, 16/12/2011 - 13:10

Russia proposes UN Security Council resolution on Syria Author: AFP Russia on Thursday surprised the Western powers by proposing a UN Security Council resolution on the Syria crisis amid mounting international shock over the deadly crackdown. The resolution condemns the violence by President Bashar al-Assad's government and opposition groups, but proposes no sanctions. Europe and the United States welcomed the Russian initiative but said the proposed text was not tough enough on the Damascus government. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, however, Western nations would try to work with Russia in a bid to pass a first Security Council resolution on the crackdown, which the UN says has left more than 5000 dead. As a key ally of Syria, Russia has tried to head off Security Council intervention in the crisis. With China, it vetoed a council resolution proposed by European nations in October condemning Assad's action. Russia however called emergency talks of the 15-nation body on Syria to propose the new resolution which strongly condemns violence by "all parties, including disproportionate use of force by Syrian authorities," according to a copy obtained by AFP. It also raises concern over "the illegal supply of weapons to the armed groups in Syria." Western diplomats said they had no firm evidence of arms trafficking to Syria. Western envoys called the draft "unbalanced" because it put opposition violence on the same level as the crackdown by government forces, many of whom are starting to defect, according to rights groups. They also said there should be a total arms embargo and give clear support to Arab League sanctions against Syria. Russia's UN envoy Vitaly Churkin again rejected any talk of sanctions and even criticized the Arab League measures — though the draft does back Arab League efforts to negotiate a settlement. "It [sanctions] is a page from somebody else's book and we don't think that this has been a productive, useful move by the Arab League," he said. "The role of the Security Council should not be to fan the conflict in Syria," Churkin added. But he acknowledged some of the doubts raised in talks. "We said that we are looking forward to working with them in order to adopt a text, a resolution of the Security

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Council, which will really bring about an end to violence and crisis in Syria and help that country proceed on the path of political reforms." Western officials put up multiple objections but said the document was a basis for talks after months of division over how to handle Syria. "There are some issues in it that we would not be able to support. There's unfortunately a seeming parity between the government and peaceful protesters," Clinton said in Washington. "But we are going to study the draft carefully. It will have to be shared with the Arab League, which has taken the lead on the response to what's going on in Syria," Clinton said. "And hopefully we can work with the Russians who for the first time at least are recognizing that this is a matter that needs to go to the Security Council," she said. France's UN envoy, Gerard Araud, called the Russian move "extraordinary" and said it showed that Russia was feeling the international pressure over its support for Assad. He said the text "clearly needs many amendments because it is unbalanced. But it is a text on a basis on which we are going to negotiate." Araud and other envoys also said there could be no comparison between the government and opposition violence. "We have to really show that the violence has come from the Syrian regime, that it is the Syrian regime which has shot down thousands of demonstrators," Araud said. "Of course, after eight months of violence now, some demonstrators are shooting back, but we can’t simply put them back to back, and say that they are all 'acts of violence.'" Germany's UN ambassador Peter Wittig said the Russian text was an overdue sign that the council is now discussing Syria "in a serious manner" called the text "insufficient." He said the text would have to include references to a UN Human Rights Council recommendations for an independent commission of inquiry and give backing to all measures by the Arab League "not just selectively but all the decisions." Archived Photo?: Security Council imposes sanctions on Gadhafi Related material Activists: Syrian defectors kill 27 soldiers Arab foreign ministers to meet over Syria crisis

Source URL (retrieved on 16/12/2011 - 15:42): AFP Russia proposes UN Security Council resolution on Syria 16/12/2011 - 13:10 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/552726

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Publishing Date: Fri, 16/12/2011 - 15:28

Early second round results: FJP, Nour Party lists on top Al-Masry Al-Youm Staff Author: Al-Masry Al-Youm Staff Early results from the second round of People's Assembly elections emerging Friday suggested another landslide victory for Islamists. Vote counting began late Thursday night after polling stations closed. Overall counts for party list-based seats showed the Democratic Alliance list, led by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justicy Party (FJP) taking the most votes, followed by the Egyptian Bloc, Nour Party, Revolution Continues Coalition (RCC) and Wasat Party lists. Initial counts in Giza's third constituency, however, showed independent candidate for the professional single-winner seat Amr el-Shobaki surpassing the FJP-backed candidate. In the same district, the FJP candidate for the worker single-winner seat was just ahead of his opponent, Essam Bahei Eddin. Observers believe these results will necessitate a run-off election for single-winner seats in the third constituency. Supporters of the now-defunct National Democratic Party sparked disturbances after hearing the initial results, chanting against Shobaki and FJP candidates. The military intervened to contain the situation. Counts from Giza Governorate's first constituency showed that the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) list took the most votes, followed by, in order, the Nour, Wafd and Wasat party lists. FJP candidate Gamal al-Ashry so far received the most votes for the professional single- winner seat in Giza's second district, followed by Nour candidate Nasser Ouda. The contest was closer between Egyptian Bloc-backed candidate Eid Anwar and independent candidate Sayyed al-Manaei for the worker single-winner seat in Giza's first constituency. After initial results began to trickle out, FJP supporters in Talebeya chanted, “Count the votes, you will find them Islamic.” In Suez Governorate, initial results showed the Nour Party list surpassing the FJP list with nearly 50 percent of the vote. Other competing lists did not receive any significant number of votes. Initial results from Sohag Governorate indicated that the FJP list took 45 percent of the vote, followed by the Nour Party list with 35 percent and the Egyptian Bloc list with 20 percent. Sharqiya Governorate showed the FJP list taking the lead, followed by the Nour and Wafd party lists.

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In Monufiya Governorate, initial results in the second constituency showed the FJP list ahead, followed by the Nour and Wafd party lists. In Aswan Governorate, the FJP was in the lead followed by the Nour, Egyptian Bloc and Wafd party lists. In Beni Suef Governorate's first and second districts, FJP lists took 35 percent of the votes, and FJP-backed individual candidates took 40 percent of the governorate's single- winner seats. In Ismailia Governorate, initial results also showed the FJP and Nour Party lists finding success, followed by the Egyptian Bloc, Wafd Party, New Independent Party, Wa'iy (Consciousness) Party and RCC lists. Judges finished counting 90 percent of the votes in Beheira Governorate's first district, showing the FJP winning, followed by the Nour, Wafd and Egyptian Bloc lists. Observers expected the Nour Party list to win the most votes in Beheira's second district, where 62 candidates contested single-winner seats. Translated from Al-Masry Al-Youm Related material Polls resume Thursday in second round of elections In Monufiya, Islamists dominate electoral scene

Source URL (retrieved on 16/12/2011 - 18:35): Early second round results: FJP, Nour Party lists on top16/12/2011 - 15:28 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/552571

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ft.com World Middle East & North Africa

Politics & Society December 16, 2011 11:52 am Protests erupt in Cairo over police brutality By Borzou Daragahi in Cairo Dozens of Egyptian demonstrators clashed with military police at a sit-in protest next to the cabinet building on Friday morning just hours after the close of polls in the second stage of the country’s elections. Witnesses, cited by local media and state television, said the clashes erupted following allegations that security forces had abducted and badly beaten one of the demonstrators as he left the sit-in. Video footage showing his badly bruised face sparked anger. More ON THIS STORY Philip Stephens The highs and lows of democracy Egyptians head to polls as party rivalry sharpens In depth Egypt in transition Nour taps into anger at Egyptian elite Islamists get two-thirds of Egypt votes ON THIS TOPIC Brotherhood in fresh tensions with army Generals want say in Egypt’s constitution committee Puritan Islam’s poll gains alarm many in Egypt Egyptian activist shapes a media enterprise IN MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS & SOCIETY Russia unveils UN resolution on Syria Regional upheavals test relative Saudi stability Syrian activists expect assault on Homs Tunisia draws up transitional constitution Demonstrators have been occupying an area near the cabinet building in protest over the ruling military council’s appointment of Kamal Ganzouri as interim prime minister. Mr Ganzouri served in the same post under the deposed President Hosni Mubarak and is despised by many of the young people who led the uprising against his rule. Military police and demonstrators began throwing rocks, debris and Molotov cocktails at each other in the early hours of the morning. The news website Bikya Masr said one protester had been killed when his head was struck with a rock. Cars were set alight and smoke rose from the district. Security forces aimed water cannon at the protesters and set fire to their tents. Protesters also alleged that the plainclothes enforcers used by the previous regime to squash demonstrations had been deployed to arrest and haul away activists. State television said the clashes eventually stopped. But witnesses and video footage from the scene suggested they had resumed by noon, with protesters chanting: “The people want the downfall of the field marshal,” in reference to Field Marshall Mohammad Tantawi, head of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or SCAF. Massive demonstrations and days of street clashes erupted in central Cairo’s Tahrir Square last month after security forces attempted to squash a small protest against the power of the SCAF. The demonstrations died down as multi-stage elections for a new parliament got under way. Islamist parties leading the vote have vowed to challenge the authority of the military, which has hinted it could restrict the power of the 508-seat elected parliament. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03858d60-27d9-11e1-9433-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ghIVrW21 409

Alexandra Geneste Volte-face russe sur le dossier syrien | 16.12.11 | 11h55 • Mis à jour le 16.12.11 | 12h12

Le président russe Dmitri Medvedev à Damas, le 11 mai 2010.AFP/JOSEPH EID L'étau se resserre autour de Damas. Le plus fidèle allié du régime de Bachar Al-Assad au sein du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU vient d'opérer un véritable revirement, ouvrant la voie à une possible action de l'organe exécutif des Nations unies contre la répression sanglante en Syrie, qui sévit depuis plus de neuf mois. La Russie, qui préside ce mois le Conseil, a contre toute attente, présenté jeudi 15 décembre un projet de résolution condamnant la violence perpétrée "par toutes les parties, y compris l'usage disproportionné de la force par les autorités syriennes". Un geste diplomatique qui intervient alors que l'ONU fait état d'un bilan de plus de 5000 morts. "Cela ne peut plus durer. Au nom de l'humanité, il est temps pour la communauté internationale d'agir", avait déclaré la veille le secrétaire général des Nations unies, Ban Ki-moon. "Les Russes agissent toujours par surprise", lâche, un brin irritée, une source onusienne, avant d'affirmer : "La nouvelle en soi est positive, c'est le signe de leur disposition à envisager une action, mais nous devons rester prudents, nous ignorons tout de leurs réelles intentions." Pour justifier son geste, l'ambassadeur russe a fait remarquer, sarcastique : "Nous entendons des voix se plaindre de l'inaction du Conseil, mais aucune proposition n'est formulée." Nombreux sont les diplomates occidentaux à estimer que la Russie n'avait d'autre choix que d'agir, "Moscou était dans une position intenable, souligne l'un d'entre eux. En prenant l'initiative après des mois de procrastination, elle retourne la situation à son avantage aux yeux du reste du monde." En octobre, la Russie et la Chine, déterminées à ne pas laisser le "scénario libyen" se répéter, avaient opposé leur veto à

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un projet de résolution présenté par des pays européens condamnant les violences et menaçant de sanctions le régime syrien. Le projet russe prévoit que "rien dans cette résolution ne devra être interprété comme une autorisation d'interférence militaire quelle qu'elle soit, par qui que ce soit". L'ambassadeur de France à l'ONU, Gérard Araud, qui a estimé, lundi, que le silence du Conseil de sécurité, "moralement responsable des souffrances du peuple syrien", était un "scandale", a qualifié le revirement russe d'"événement extraordinaire", mais a jugé le projet de résolution "déséquilibré" et souligné qu'il méritait "beaucoup d'amendements". Le texte, qui s'inspire d'un projet russo-chinois distribué en septembre, "exhorte le gouvernement syrien à cesser de réprimer ceux qui exercent leur droit à la liberté d'expression, de rassemblement pacifique et d'association". Mais si l'ambassadeur russe Vitali Tchourkine insiste sur l'"impartialité" de son contenu, il n'en condamne pas moins les attaques perpétrées par des "groupes terroristes" contre les institutions et forces syriennes et place sur un même plan, en termes de responsabilité des violences, les forces de l'ordre et les manifestants. La surprise et l'incrédulité des diplomates occidentaux face à l'initiative russe ont vite tourné à l'exaspération. "Nous sommes prêts à travailler sur ce texte, a fait savoir le représentant permanent du Royaume-Uni, Michael Tatham, mais permettez-moi d'être clair : nous pensons qu'il faut une résolution qui soit à la mesure de la gravité de la situation sur le terrain (…) et le texte que fait circuler la Russie ne correspond pas à cela." Les délégations européennes du Conseil de sécurité (France, Royaume-Uni, Allemagne, Portugal), ont immédiatement chargé leurs experts de plancher sur les moyens d'amender le texte. "Nous allons maintenant entrer dans une longue séquence de négociations", explique un diplomate. Les Occidentaux souhaitent une mise à l'index explicite des forces syriennes, un embargo sur les armes, une référence au rapport de la haute-commissaire aux droits de l'homme de l'ONU, Navi Pillay, évoquant des crimes contre l'humanité, et le plein soutien à l'initiative du plan de paix de la Ligue arabe, qui prévoit l'imposition de sanctions et l'envoi d'observateurs étrangers en Syrie. Alexandra Geneste Alexandra Geneste Volte-face russe sur le dossier syrien16.12.11 | 12h12 http://www.lemonde.fr/proche- orient/article/2011/12/16/volte-face-russe-sur-le-dossier-syrien_1619726_3218.html#ens_id=1481132

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ft.com comment Columnists December 15, 2011 8:55 pm The highs and lows of democracy

By Philip Stephens

The story of 2011 has been of the advance of democracy and the failure of democracies. In the Arab world, tyrants have fallen on the region’s political awakening. In rich nations, elected leaders have been frozen in crisis. Welcome to another of the paradoxes of the new global disorder. I do not recall the advance predictions that the good news this year would come from the Arab street; nor that the bad news would see a Greek debt crisis turn into an existential threat to half a century of European integration. We are in an age that habitually defies the easy assumptions of the old order. The passing of two centuries of western hegemony will be an unpredictable and uncomfortable experience. More ON THIS STORY Egyptians head to polls as party rivalry sharpens In depth Egypt in transition Nour taps into anger at Egyptian elite Islamists get two-thirds of Egypt votes Arabs need education, says Israel minister ON THIS TOPIC West urged to back change in Bahrain Tunisia draws up transitional constitution UN tells Yemen’s new government to seek calm Outspoken cleric guides Arabs on revolution FROM PHILIP STEPHENS Was this the moment UK stumbled out of Europe? How long will Britain stay in the EU? Philip Stephens Now the Franco-German question Dos and don’ts for Cameron The tyranny many assumed to have been the natural state of affairs in the Middle East is crumbling. Successful uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have confounded the self- styled foreign policy realists.

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With a little help from demography, the visceral desire for individual freedom and human dignity has upended once impregnable regimes. For all the violence of his resistance, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad will probably be next. Autocratic leaders everywhere are now obliged to look anxiously over their shoulders. Inevitably, real life disappoints those who imagined that the young protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square could build overnight a shiny liberal democracy. Some are already lamenting how quickly spring has turned to winter. The Egyptian military is reluctant to surrender power and, given a chance, voters have preferred Muslim conservatives to twittering liberals. The road to democracy will be uneven. Americans and Europeans will not like some of the choices made by newly-emancipated citizens. But then the west still clings to its own double standards, cheering the uprisings in the Maghreb while hoping the autocrats cling on in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. History is on the side of political pluralism. Policymakers and commentators once proclaimed the world’s rising powers offered a new paradigm – capitalism would prosper alongside authoritarian politics. But the impulse for change is reaching beyond the Arab world. Chinese leaders are visibly anxious, their fear of social and political disorder heightened by the images of Tahrir and by a slowing world economy. The more strident the language from Tehran, the more apparent it is that the Iranian regime feels particularly vulnerable. The fall of Mr Assad would rob the mullahs of their most vital strategic ally. The green revolutionaries could return to the streets. Something fundamental has also changed in Russia’s political dynamic. Vladimir Putin’s tsarist ambitions were always hubristic. Now they may invite nemesis. Elections, of course, do not make democracies. Newly-enfranchised citizens in the Arab world face the task of building institutions to entrench the rule of law. What is required of Europe and the US is patience, aid and a willingness to accept there are other models of political pluralism. Of course, the west would be more comfortable if the new leaders combined social conservatism with secular political institutions. Turkey is not a bad model. It would be a better one if its prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, did not hanker, like Mr Putin, for a freehold on power. Indonesia can also offer some useful lessons in how democracy can be married to Islam. The important point is that the choices belong to Arabs. The big mistake for the west would be to define political Islam as an enemy. In any event, Europeans and Americans are in no position to offer lectures. Their own political systems are being strained to breaking point by economic adversity and the shifting balance of global power. The crisis engulfing Europe’s single currency now promises to drag the continent into depression. I have lost count of the number of summits called to save the euro. A week or so ago I was almost convinced that Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Nicolas Sarkozy were about to come up with a decisive plan. But Europeans have turned hesitation into an art form. The continent’s politicians have been imprisoned by a failure of nerve. By running scared of their electorates, leaders have denied themselves the space to identify their shared interests. It goes without saying that governments have to deal with deficits. It is equally obvious that they need growth. 413

The thread that runs across the Atlantic is one of popular disenchantment with political establishments. Whether it is fear of the bond markets or competition from rising economies, governments are trapped between global economics and local politics. Some blame the system. The single currency was always flawed; Washington has been paralysed by congressional gerrymandering. But you cannot leave out the personalities. Europe is governed by followers. Barack Obama once looked different. In the event, a big orator has turned out a small president. Europe next year holds the prospect of depressed living standards, rising unemployment and penny-pinching public services. The likely beneficiaries are populists of the right and left. This week I heard one senior politician remark that the organising forces in democratic politics may soon be fear and xenophobia. Europeans should know well enough the dark forces that can be unleashed by depressions. It is no good blaming democracy. As the well-worn saying goes, it is the worst of political systems save for all the others. If there is a bright spot in the sea of bleakness it is that autocrats everywhere have even more to fear from 2012. Philip Stephens The highs and lows of democracy December 15, 2011 8:55 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/516c12ac-2670-11e1-91cd- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ghIVrW21

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Internacional La Eurocámara veta el acuerdo de pesca con Marruecos por el Sáhara Estrasburgo considera que el convenio interfiere en los recursos de los saharauis La asesoría jurídica de la Eurocámara pide suspender el acuerdo pesquero con Marruecos Prorrogado el acuerdo de pesca con Marruecos El Polisario lanza una ofensiva contra el acuerdo de pesca entre la UE y Marruecos Ignacio Cembrero / Vicenç Moliné Túnez / Bruselas 14 DIC 2011 - 22:09 CET218 El Sáhara Occidental y la ecología han tumbado este miércoles el acuerdo pesquero entre la Unión Europea y Marruecos, el mayor de cuantos ha suscrito Bruselas, del que se beneficiaban fundamentalmente un centenar de pesqueros españoles, en su mayoría andaluces y canarios. El Parlamento Europeo votó en contra de la renovación, por otro año, del acuerdo de pesca. La decisión va en contra de la Comisión Europea y de los Estados miembros. Rabat reaccionó a la votación ordenando anoche a todos los barcos europeos que faenan en sus aguas, incluidas las del Sáhara, que las abandonen de inmediato. La Eurocámara se pronunciaba sobre un informe del parlamentario liberal finlandés Carl Haglund que puso en duda la legalidad del acuerdo porque conlleva escasas ventajas para la población autóctona del Sáhara, supone una “explotación excesiva de los recursos de pesca” de Marruecos y tiene un “magro resultado costo-beneficio”. La UE paga 36,1 millones de euros anuales a Rabat a cambio de 119 licencias para pescar en aguas marroquíes, 100 de las cuales pertenecen a barcos españoles. El acuerdo era por cinco años pero estaba prorrogado hasta febrero de 2012. La Comisión quería prorrogarlo un año más mientras negocia otro acuerdo. La UE paga 36,1 millones de euros anuales a Rabat a cambio de 119 licencias para pescar en aguas marroquíes, 100 de las cuales pertenecen a barcos españoles El informe de Hagklund coincide con los pronunciamientos de los servicios jurídicos del Parlamento Europeo, que la Comisión quiso pasar por alto. Varias ONG que simpatizan con el Frente Polisario, que lucha por la independencia de la antigua colonia española, llevaban meses haciendo campaña contra el acuerdo. La votación de la Eurocámara llenó de satisfacción al delegado del Polisario en Bruselas, Mohamed Sidati, quién alabó el “compromiso de la UE con los derechos humanos y el derecho internacional”. La comisaria de Pesca, la griega María Damanaki, reconoció que el apoyo al informe del finlandés manda “un fuerte mensaje al Gobierno de Marruecos de que debe comprometerse a hacer reformas en ese sentido”. En un intento de apaciguar los ánimos marroquíes, el Embajador de la UE en Rabat, Eneko Landaburu, recordó en un comunicado que la Eurocámara contradice la posición

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de la Comisión y los Estados. “Lo lamento en lo que afecta a nuestras relaciones con Marruecos”, concluye.

El rechazo de la prórroga compromete la firma de un nuevo acuerdo de pesca de larga duración con Marruecos. “No sabemos si un nuevo acuerdo de pesca es posible con Marruecos (...)”, declaró Damanki. “En todo caso, de aprobarse un acuerdo, tendría que incluir respuestas convincentes a temas clave como el desarrollo ambiental, beneficio económico y legalidad internacional”. El Ministerio de Medio Ambiente español comparte el disgusto de la Comisión. En un comunicado expresó su rechazo del resultado de la votación en la Eurocámara y su apoyo a la flota española. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/12/14/actualidad/1323896976_98877 8.html

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Thursday's papers: Second round brings more bitterness for Wafd Author: Sarah Carr Coverage of the second round of parliamentary elections dominates today’s press, with the party-run Al-Wafd in a bitter recriminatory mood, declaring that electoral violations by two of its opponents, the Freedom and Justice (FJP) and Nour parties, “darkened” the proceedings. The paper lists violations allegedly committed by the two parties ― whose lists won landslide victories in the first round of voting far outstripping the Wafd Party ― in the nine governorates that took to the polls yesterday, including the illegal distribution of campaign material to voters at polling stations and FJP supporters voting more than once. Al-Wafd's outrage continues on following pages. One headline declares that the Islamist parties “committed flagrant violations in the governorates despite the warning by [Supreme Council of the Armed Forces member] Ismail Etman.” Al-Wafd interrupts this lament to warn, “Millions of dollars are being spent to penetrate parliament and influence decision-making,” suggesting that this explains the rise of Shias and Salafis in Egypt. The United States, European Union, Iran and Gulf countries are all “searching for influential people in the country to serve their interests and realize their strategic goals” as an “alternative to traditional occupation,” according to the party paper. The article mentions in passing the ongoing legal investigation into the activities of prominent human rights groups, which many view as an attempt to discredit and intimidate civil society organizations. The Al-Wafd attack on Salafi groups continues with a full-page report in the shape of the Sinai Peninsula that says, “Salafis are Israel’s new excuse for occupying Sinai,” and, “Tel Aviv is trying to convince America that Egypt has lost control of the peninsula.” State-run Al-Ahram columnist Mahmoud Morad is also in an unforgiving mood about Islamist parties. He dissects the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in a column titled, “The Muslim Brotherhood ... what do they want?” Morad opens by referring to the Brotherhood as the mahzouza (“fortunate”) group, a play on mahzoura (“forbidden”), a term which state media used to refer to the Brotherhood when it was banned under then-President Hosni Mubarak. In fact, Morad says, the group should be described as “cunning and conniving,” in light of its history. “Looking back at the group’s history after its establishment in 1928, we will never find in its history any record of resistance against the British occupation ... At the same time the group planned and carried out assassinations of Egyptians, and when the war broke

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out in Palestine in 1948, it did not participate until after the Arab streets reached a boiling point and with pressure from its youth,” Morad says. Morad concludes by warning that “while [the Brotherhood] might have enjoyed some success for certain reasons, this won’t last. It must realize that it will not monopolize power and will not draw up the constitution alone.” Privately-owned Al-Shorouk runs an apt headline summing up the electoral schism between liberals and Islamists: “Giza: Galabeyas in Al-Bahr al-Azam [a working-class neighborhood] and casual wear in [middle-class] Dokki.” The story quotes laborer Reda Abu Awad, who says that he is voting for the Nour Party because “they are religious.” He is seconded by his brother-in-law Ahmed Abdel Hamid, who says that “they are better than the others” ― “without specifying who the others are,” the story’s author wryly notes. Al-Shorouk also reports on Nour Party grievances expressed during a rally in the Nile Delta city of Tanta. Nour spokesman Nader Bakkar is quoted as saying that “the media and liberals” are leading an “intense war” against Salafis and trying to make a “bogeyman” out of them by hunting out mistakes and taking statements out of context. “We are not guilty of anything and therefore do not need to defend ourselves,” the Nour spokesman is quoted as telling the rally. In what might be a surprise to Egyptians, Bakkar also said, “We can’t talk about damaging Egypt’s tourism industry because it doesn’t have one,” promising that Salafis will create a more “genuine” tourism industry. In a previous media appearance on satellite television, Bakkar advocated health tourism in Egypt and claimed that alcohol-free and Sharia-friendly luxury hotels were becoming increasingly popular globally. Head of Hayat Party Michael Mounir is depressingly pessimistic about Copts' chances for decent representation in the new parliament. Quoted in Al-Gomhurriya, Mounir says that Copts' chances of winning seats in parliament are “extremely weak” and that whoever wants them in the legislature should “give them real representation rather than giving one or two candidates token representation at the end of lists.” It seems that faithfully quoting National Democratic Party remnants is a habit that state- run Al-Gomhurriya just can’t break. One report carries a picture of former Culture Minister Farouk Hosni waiting in line to vote, quoting him as saying, “I’m going to vote for a liberal party that won’t accuse me of being an infidel and doubt my faith, but instead will treat me as a human being and not a child.” Egypt's papers: Al-Ahram: Daily, state-run, largest distribution in Egypt // Al-Akhbar: Daily, state-run, second to Al-Ahram in institutional size// Al-Gomhurriya: Daily, state-run// Rose al- Youssef: Daily, state-run// Al-Dostour: Daily, privately owned// Al-Shorouk: Daily, privately owned// Al-Wafd: Daily, published by the liberal Wafd Party// Youm7: Daily, privately owned// Al-Tahrir: Daily, privately owned// Freedom and Justice: Daily,

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published by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party// Sawt al-Umma: Weekly, privately owned// Al-Arabi: Weekly, published by the Nasserist Party Publishing Date: Thu, 15/12/2011 - 11:55 Related material Live updates: Polling stations close and the military guards ballots In Monufiya, Islamists dominate electoral scene Show in newsticker: Parliamentary poll: Second round

Source URL (retrieved on 15/12/2011 - 13:58): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/550581

14/12/2011 - 19:11

Advisory Council to amend military law, scrap military trials for civilians Author: Sara Nour Eldeen The Advisory Council has announced its intention to form a committee of legal experts to amend military law, particularly those articles allowing civilians to be referred to military tribunals. Amin Farahat, secretary general of the Advisory Council, said the body would lay down criteria for the formation of the Constitutional Committee, so as to achieve a national consensus. “The Constitutional Declaration did not grant the parliamentary majority the right to form that committee,” he explained. “The military council has the constitutional power to accept or refuse those criteria, or to relinquish its legislative power to an elected parliament to decide,” he said. Translated from Al-Masry Al-Youm Protester arrested by military police in Tahrir Square Archived Photo Publishing Date: Wed, 14/12/2011 - 19:11 Related material Activists continue their battle against military trials as SCAF releases detainees Amnesty renews calls for end of military trials, Emergency Law, protests ban

Source URL (retrieved on 15/12/2011 - 14:16): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/549736

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Op-ed Will a United Government Lead Yemen to Peace? Abubakr Al-Shamahi December 15, 2011

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Tawakkol Karman In the presidential palace in Sana’a, a new Yemeni cabinet has just been sworn in. For the first time in 33 years, however, President Ali Abdullah Saleh is nowhere to be seen. He has officially signed away his powers, setting up a potentially peaceful transfer of power to his deputy, Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. It was Hadi who was present at the swearing-in ceremony, exercising the ceremonial powers of a president. The new Yemeni government is split evenly between members of Saleh’s ruling General People’s Congress and members of the opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties, as well as independent opposition figures. The new government will face great difficulties in establishing itself, mainly because rival military factions still hold great sway in the country. However, it must be backed, as national unity is the only hope that the country has of avoiding a disastrous civil war. Since the protest movement began in Yemen in the early part of this year, Saleh has promised again and again to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative to step down and hand over power. While he delayed his departure, his troops fired upon unarmed protesters, killing hundreds. At the same time, deadly clashes took place across the country between pro-Saleh military units and pro-revolution military units and tribal fighters. This fighting has destroyed parts of Sana’a, Ta’iz and Arhab, as well as other towns and districts. In the past few months, there has been a very real fear that these clashes might be the start of a new civil war in Yemen, only 17 years after the conclusion of the previous one. The North-South split that caused the civil war in 1994 is rearing its ugly head again, with the Southern separatist movement taking advantage of dwindling government control to bolster its presence on the streets. In this difficult and unstable period, the country needs a government that represents everyone. The country needs change, but the revolutionary movement must also acknowledge that President Saleh has his supporters, and that they cannot be ignored if 420

there is to be any hope of a peaceful future. Post-2003 Iraq is a prime example of what happens when all those associated with the former ruling regime are shunned.

It is also important that Southerners have their grievances addressed. Their land and resources have been controlled too long by members of the Northern elite. The naming of Southerners in leading positions, including Vice President Hadi, Prime Minister Mohammed Basindwa and others is a positive first step in attempting to show that the perceived Northern domination of the South is over. Yemen’s most famous woman, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Tawakkol Karman, is not amongst the new ministers in the unity government, but three other women are, marking a record for any Yemeni government. While it may not seem much in this patriarchal society, the emergence of women at the forefront of the protest movement may be one of the country’s greatest legacies. The increased number of women in the cabinet reflects this step forward. Vice President Hadi is likely to be the only candidate in the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled for Feb. 21. If he wins, he will take power for a two-year transitional period. This period is vital for Yemen’s future. Hadi needs to assert his own authority, which will be extremely difficult, especially because he does not have any military or tribal power base. However, this can be turned into an advantage. As he has no overt ties to the previously warring factions, and has the support of the international community, the compromise candidate may be able to hold Yemen together long enough for the lengthy process of rebuilding the economy to start. The youth movement contains some of Yemen’s brightest minds. Convincing them to stay in the country and take part in the political process will be a major coup for the incoming government. Hadi, alongside the new Yemeni government, needs to show Yemenis that change has happened. This will be a challenge when some of those figures with ministerial posts have been part of the clashes. Therefore, the new government must ensure transparency and show that one of the main blights on Yemen—the endemic high-level corruption— can be fought. Yemenis need to move away from thoughts of revenge and instead focus on the country’s unity and work on issues like corruption, poverty and the water crisis. If a new government focuses on these issues, then Yemen could be well on the way to achieving the results that the Yemeni people have been calling for in protests the past 11 months. Abubakr Al-Shamahi is a British-Yemeni freelance journalist and editor of CommentMidEast.com, a platform for young people to write about the Middle East and North Africa. This article was originally published by Common Ground News Service: www.commongroundnews.org. Abubakr Al-Shamahi Will a United Government Lead Yemen to Peace? December 15, 2011 http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3851.cfm#down

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Accueil Proche-Orient La frustration des déserteurs syriens en Turquie Reportage | | 14.12.11 | 14h18 • Mis à jour le 15.12.11 | 07h35

Des militaires de l'Armée libre de Syrie, le 7 décembre 2011.AFP/RICARDO GARCIA VILANOVA Antakya (Turquie) Envoyée spéciale - Ils ne veulent pas trop l'avouer, mais l'heure n'est pas à l'optimisme chez les opposants syriens rencontrés en Turquie. Officiers dissidents de l'Armée libre de Syrie (ALS) et membres des réseaux de soutien à la "révolution pacifique", ils déplorent l'absence de soutien matériel à leur mouvement. Alors même que le régime syrien tente de justifier ses massacres par le "soutien étranger", notamment en armes, que recevraient les opposants, qualifiés de "bandes terroristes". Mardi 13 décembre, les forces de sécurité ont encore tué 17 personnes dans la province d'Idlib, tout près de la frontière, selon l'Observatoire syrien pour les droits de l'homme. L'organisation, basée à Londres, ajoute que des déserteurs ont tué en représailles sept membres des forces de sécurité lors d'une attaque contre un convoi. "Nous avons en Syrie trente à quarante morts par jour en moyenne depuis un mois, et Dieu seul sait ce qui se passe dans les prisons, mais il semble que cela va continuer encore, sous couvert de semblants de négociations avec Damas", soupire celui qui propose de se faire appeler Moustapha. Il se rend plusieurs fois par semaine dans le camp de l'ALS, sévèrement gardé par l'armée turque, où "plus de 80 officiers", confie-t- il, rongent leur frein, avec leurs familles, en attendant la création, hypothétique, d'une "zone sécurisée" au-delà de la frontière. "Depuis trois ou quatre semaines, assure Moustapha, la Turquie a changé : non seulement elle ne fournit toujours ni armes ni argent aux résistants, même secrètement, mais elle pose maintenant des obstacles." Fils de la vague d'émigrants syriens en Turquie du début des années 1980 après le soulèvement noyé dans le sang des Frères musulmans, Moustapha fut un des grands

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soutiens à la nouvelle vague, qui a vu quinze mille personnes originaires de la région d'Idlib se réfugier en juin dans les camps installés côté turc. Aujourd'hui, il dit avoir été obligé, sous pression turque, de fermer le compte bancaire qu'il avait ouvert pour l'ALS et qui figurait sur leur page Facebook. De son côté, Samir Al-Nashshar, un des dirigeants du Conseil national syrien (CNS), qui sert d'ombrelle à une majorité d'opposants syriens, a indiqué début décembre qu'il n'avait pu, lui non plus, ouvrir un compte pour le CNS à Istanbul, où il dispose d'un local toujours non officiel. C'est donc en espèces que Moustapha apporte aux officiers les "300 dollars (230 euros) par-ci, 1 000 dollars par-là" qu'envoient surtout des émigrés syriens, "alors qu'un fusil- mitrailleur coûte 1 500 dollars et un RPG (lance-roquettes), 5 000". "L'autre jour, les officiers nous ont demandé des chaussures de sport pour faire un peu d'exercice", précise-t-il, tournant en dérision les rumeurs de médias occidentaux sur l'entraînement qu'ils recevraient de la part de services secrets occidentaux, notamment français. Selon tous les témoignages recueillis, les seules armes et munitions de l'ALS sont celles de la contrebande, activité qui devient de plus en plus coûteuse en vies humaines. Joint au téléphone par Le Monde, le colonel Riad Al-As'ad, chef de l'ALS, s'est borné à rappeler ce qu'il a appelé le communiqué commun publié à l'issue de la visite de trois heures, en octobre, au camp des militaires, d'une délégation du CNS que Moustapha a en partie hébergée. "Les officiers, rapporte ce dernier, ont accepté d'obéir au CNS, avec un comité mixte de quatre membres chacun, et de suspendre ainsi leurs opérations en soutien aux efforts de la Ligue arabe. Mais bien sûr, ils ne peuvent pas contrôler toute la dissidence armée en Syrie..." Selon le lieutenant Abdel-Sattar Yunso, du "Conseil militaire" composé de huit membres de l'ALS, joint aussi par téléphone, " les opérations défensives continuent, par exemple contre les services de sécurité du régime qui massacrent et torturent ; mais on n'attaque plus les convois de l'armée" comme cela se faisait pour provoquer les désertions. Avouant que les officiers du camp ne peuvent en sortir que sous bonne garde turque, "à cause des réseaux que possède en Turquie le régime syrien" - qui y ont déjà enlevé un colonel dissident -, il n'accuse pas ses hôtes pour autant : "La Turquie ne peut pas faire plus sans mandat international. Mais il faudra bien que le monde se décide à la fin, sans se réfugier derrière notre prétendu caractère confessionnel ! C'est le régime qui l'est. Nous, nous sommes pour un Etat démocratique civil, et le Conseil militaire sera dissous dès la chute d'Assad !" Certains officiers dissidents réfugiés en Turquie n'ont pas rejoint le camp du colonel Al- As'ad tout en faisant partie de son "armée". Parmi eux, dit-on, un général, qui attendrait son heure. Ainsi que le capitaine Aytham Al-Kurdi, qui était le seul sunnite de son unité de défense antiaérienne. Devenu responsable d'un groupe de déserteurs à Hama, il s'explique : "S'il y avait une zone de sécurité, 80 % de l'armée déserterait. Beaucoup d'officiers, avec lesquels nous sommes en contact, ne peuvent le faire, car ils n'ont pu encore mettre leurs familles à l'abri. Mais si une décision était prise, nous avons des plans, nous sommes prêts à agir, assure-t-il. Sinon, à l'allure où nous progressons actuellement, en aidant par exemple les déserteurs à se retrouver, il faudra encore cinq ans pour venir à bout du régime... S'il devait rester des vivants en Syrie !" C'est pourquoi le capitaine se réjouit des efforts visant à élargir les bases de la révolution par un mouvement de désobéissance civile. "Nous le voulions depuis

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longtemps, car le danger est que les gens, lassés de demander une protection internationale, se défendent seuls. Ce sera la guerre civile. Nous en avons peur, car tout le monde alors interviendra : Al-Qaida, le Mossad (renseignement extérieur israélien), tout le monde..." Le capitaine veut pourtant voir aussi des évolutions positives, avec le fait, par exemple, qu'une grande majorité d'appelés choisirait désormais de se cacher au lieu de rejoindre l'armée. Et surtout, dit-il, la confiance si difficilement acquise au sein de réseaux d'opposants issus d'une société syrienne dans laquelle, comme le dit Moustapha, "chacun se méfiait de l'autre, même dans une même famille". "De mois en mois, on a filtré ceux en qui on a confiance", assure aussi le jeune Mohammed Fezoo. Jonglant entre téléphone et ordinateur dans un petit appartement d'une banlieue d'Antakya, il représente 25 activistes de la ville syrienne d'Idlib - ceux qui n'ont pas encore été tués ou emprisonnés - auprès de l'Union des coordinations de la révolution. Comme les manifestants qui défient les balles, il espère une "internationalisation" du drame syrien, à tout le moins en paroles, car "si le ton des pressions étrangères baisse, le régime va tuer encore plus", prévient-il. Sophie Shihab http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/12/14/la-frustration-des-deserteurs- syriens-en-turquie_1618352_3218.html

Wed, 14/12/2011 - 23:10

Mahfouz materials withdrawn from Sotheby's auction Author: M. Lynx Qualey The Sotheby's London auction house stopped the auction of a “highly significant” archive of materials by Egyptian Nobel Prize-winning writer Naguib Mahfouz Wednesday, responding to appeals by the laureate's immediate family, the Egyptian Culture Ministry and prominent authors. The Wednesday night announcement read: “While it is clear that Sotheby's consignor had purchased the Mahfouz manuscripts from a member of Naguib Mahfouz's family, other family members have within the last hour issued a challenge to that purchase. Sotheby's takes title issues very seriously and has, accordingly, withdrawn the papers from sale until this is resolved.” The archive, which was supposed to have gone on sale tomorrow, included family photographs, early manuscripts, late work and 100 pages of an unpublished novel titled “Story of the Sudan.”

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Neither Mahfouz's family nor their advocates in Cairo have yet seen the materials in question. However, Alyn Hine, a doctoral candidate at the School for Oriental and African Studies in London, saw the materials when he assessed the collection for Sotheby’s. “It’s always hugely exciting to hold in your hands the original writings of any significant author, especially one as highly regarded as Naguib Mahfouz,” he said. The Mahfouz manuscripts were particularly interesting, he said, because “his sketches of 'The Dreams’ show how badly his physical faculties were affected after the assassination attempt. Without wanting to sound too sentimental, I thought that you could see the courage and determination of the man in his shaky handwriting. The earlier manuscripts also gave an insight into how he worked, which I found very inspiring.” Hine thought the unpublished draft of “Story of the Sudan," which he speculated might be related to Mahfouz’s popular “The Cairo Trilogy,” would “be of more interest to scholars rather than readers as I know how frustrating it can be, as a reader, to read something that is incomplete. However, it would depend on what a skilled editor could achieve with the material.” Of all the materials, Hine said, “the ‘Sudan’ story and 'The Dreams’ manuscripts are the main items in the cache ... They both demonstrate how a great writer works, albeit in two entirely different ways. I think that someone familiar with Mahfouz’s biography would gain a great deal of insight into how he crafted his literary works by looking at those two manuscripts.” Publishing Date: Wed, 14/12/2011 - 23:10 Related material Sotheby's London to auction Naguib Mahfouz manuscripts In other words: A fresh take on Mahfouz translations Show in newsticker: Naguib Mahfouz collage

Source URL (retrieved on 15/12/2011 - 14:29): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/550201

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29 morts en Syrie, Ban Ki-moon presse la communauté internationale d'agir LEMONDE.FR avec afp | 14.12.11 | 20h45 • Mis à jour le 15.12.11 | 09h22

Manifestation lors de l'enterrement d'une victime des forces de sécurité syriennes à Kafr Zetan, non loin de Hama, le 20 novembre 2011.AFP/- Le secrétaire général de l'ONU, Ban Ki-moon, a pressé la communauté internationale d'agir concernant la Syrie, où les violences ont encore fait 29 morts mercredi 14 décembre, dont 21 civils, alors que la contestation du régime du président Bachar Al- Assad entre dans son dixième mois. "Plus de 5 000 personnes sont mortes en Syrie. Cela ne peut plus durer. Au nom de l'humanité, il est temps pour la communauté internationale d'agir", a déclaré M. Ban lors d'une conférence de presse. 21 CIVILS ET 8 SOLDATS Vingt et un civils ont été tués mercredi par les forces militaires et de sécurité en Syrie, dont onze dans la région de Hama, à 210 km au nord de Damas, selon un bilan provisoire de l'Observatoire syrien des droits de l'homme (OSDH) qui a précisé que des "affrontements entre déserteurs et soldats réguliers de l'armée" étaient en cours dans cette région. A Homs (Centre), cinq civils ont été tués par des tirs nourris de mitrailleuses, alors qu'à Idleb (Nord-Ouest) trois civils ont succombé à des tirs des forces de sécurité. Une femme irakienne a également péri sous les balles de tireurs embusqués à Zabadani, dans la province de Damas. Quatre autres personnes ont péri à Homs, "à la suite d'actes de torture ou de blessures reçues il y a quelques jours". Dans la matinée, huit soldats ont été tués dans la province de Hama lors d'une attaque menée par des déserteurs contre l'armée régulière à l'entrée du village d'Acharna, en riposte à la mort plus tôt dans la matinée de cinq civils visés dans leur voiture par les forces gouvernementales. 426

Les violences ont une nouvelle fois touché le Liban voisin. Deux personnes ont été blessées par des tirs d'une patrouille militaire syrienne entrée en territoire libanais. Cinq Syriens ont également été blessés par des tirs à Qousseir, une ville syrienne frontalière, et ont été transportés clandestinement au Liban pour être hospitalisés. DOUBLE VETO RUSSO-CHINOIS A New York, M. Ban a estimé "la situation très inquiétante". "J'espère que les Nations unies seront en mesure de prendre des mesures concertées", a-t-il ajouté. Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies n'arrive pas à se mettre d'accord sur une résolution condamnant la répression sanglante en Syrie, du fait de l'opposition de la Russie et de la Chine, qui disposent d'un droit de veto. Ban Ki-moon a indiqué qu'il avait transmis "ces derniers jours" au Conseil de sécurité un rapport du Conseil des droits de l'homme condamnant le régime de Damas pour les exactions commises en Syrie. Un double veto russo-chinois avait torpillé le 4 octobre un projet de résolution sur la Syrie et, depuis, les quinze pays membres du Conseil de sécurité n'arrivent pas à se mettre d'accord, la France ayant estimé que c'était "un scandale". Auparavant, le Conseil national syrien (CNS), qui regroupe la majorité des courants de l'opposition, avait de nouveau appelé la communauté internationale à protéger la population civile face à la répression sanglante de la contestation depuis le 15 mars. "Les membres du Conseil de sécurité […] doivent trouver de nouveaux moyens afin de protéger les civils en Syrie", a affirmé Bassma Kodmani, porte-parole du CNS, dont le premier congrès se tiendra du 16 au 18 décembre à Tunis. LE MOUVEMENT DE DÉSOBÉISSANCE CONTINUE Par ailleurs, la grève décrétée depuis dimanche par les militants pro-démocratie se poursuivait à Deraa, Homs, Hama, Idleb et Douma, ont indiqué des militants et des habitants. Sur leur page Facebook, les militants pro-démocratie ont appelé les Syriens à poursuivre un mouvement de désobéissance civile lancé la semaine dernière pour faire pression sur le régime Assad. "La deuxième étape a commencé, nous allons fermer nos portables pendant quatre heures les après-midi, bloquer les rues, aller au travail mais sans vraiment travailler", ont écrit ces militants, qui entendent "couper les moyens financiers du régime, avec lesquels il tue nos enfants". Lundi, "personne n'a voté aux municipales. La grève continue depuis dimanche et les élèves ne vont pas à l'école", a indiqué de son côté Hachem, un habitant de Kanaker, à 50 km au sud de Damas. Devant une commission de la Chambre des représentants américains, Frederic Hof, coordinateur des affaires régionales pour le Moyen-Orient au département d'Etat, a déclaré : "Notre point de vue est que ce régime est l'équivalent d'un mort-vivant." http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/12/14/29-morts-en-syrie-ban-ki- moon-presse-la-communaute-internationale-d-agir_1618636_3218.html

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12/14/2011 10:04 AM What the Salafists Want Egypt Faces a Hardline Islamic Future By Daniel Steinvorth The Islamist Muslim Brotherhood led the way in the first round of parliamentary voting in Egypt. Second place went to the even more hardline Salafist party al- Nour. The group would like to see the introduction of an ultra-conservative brand of Sharia -- and a ban on bikinis. It's a good thing that the visitor is a man. The sheikh doesn't speak with women. But then again, the reporter is a foreigner, which is also worrisome. There are so many prejudices about Islam in the West, says Sheikh Fawzi al-Sayeed. But perhaps, he adds, this conversation will help to spread the truth. Sayeed, 70, a serious-looking man with a full gray beard, is wearing sandals, a crochet cap and the traditional Egyptian garment called the Jellabiya. He invites his guest into the Al-Tawheed Mosque. It is 6:30 a.m., and those gathered inside have just completed their morning prayers. Now they are forming a half circle around their sheikh, who has taken a seat on a wooden chair in the middle of the room. The Al-Tawheed Mosque in the northern part of Cairo is a plain-looking building with no ornate columns or other decoration; no unnecessary details to distract the faithful from their devotion to God. As he does every morning, Sayeed asks his followers to reaffirm their devotion to the "true faith." He also asks them to film the interview that will follow the sermon with their mobile phones. It's purely a precaution, says the sheikh. Sayeed, an electrical engineer by trade, is one of Egypt's best-known Salafist imams. These days, it is not always easy to recognize the friends and the foes of Islam. Since the Salafist Al-Nour Party, or "Party of Light," came in second place in the first round of Egypt's parliamentary elections, just behind the Muslim Brotherhood, the world has been looking to Cairo with concern. The two groups captured about 60 percent of those seats assigned on the basis of candidate lists assembled by the parties. One third of the seats are reserved for individual candidates. It is the first phase ofthe 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, with the second round beginning on Wednesday. The election result confirms a clear trend, namely that wherever free elections have taken place in the Islamic Middle East in recent years, the religious parties have won: in the Gaza Strip in 2006, in Iraq in 2010, and in Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco in 2011. Shocking Showing But only in Egypt has such a radical group as the Salafists been able to establish itself as a party. This has serious implications, given that this is the most populous and culturally influential country in the Arab world; the revolutionary pulse that has been beating on Cairo's Tahrir Square for the last 11 months can be felt as far away as Libya and Syria, Iran and the Gulf states. The Salafists' strong showing hasn't just shocked many Egyptians, but especially the country's revolutionary youth, liberals and leftists, Coptic Christians and moderate Muslims. It was, after all, the Salafists who had agitated against the Copts and boycotted the revolution, on the grounds that it was infiltrated with "whores and 428

Zionists." And it was also the Salafists who, until now, had rejected free elections as "un-Islamic." And now they are coming into power as democrats? The Al-Nour Party was formed in the spring as a melting pot of various conservative and formerly militant groups. Its members were not exactly known for their democratic ambitions, but rather for their close ties to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Since the establishment of the "Party of Light," more than $100 million (€75 million) in campaign funds have allegedly made their way from the oil-rich, Wahhabite kingdom to the banks of the Nile. The Salafists' political ideas are as unadorned as their mosques. They are united by the desire to live their lives in accordance with the example set by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions almost 1,400 years ago. This extends to the Salafists' rules on clothing and beards, which require a face veil for women and a full beard, generally without a moustache, for men. In other words, the Salafists' aim is to return to the early days of Islam. But what is their program in Egypt? "You see," says Sheikh Fawzi, "the Islamic world still suffers from the great injustice that was done to the religion. And yet the solution is so easy: We must simply apply the Koran and Sharia to heal our country, just as it was commanded by God." Of course, he adds, this includes stoning adulterers and cutting off the hands of thieves. The question as to whether these might not be barbaric practices is one the sheikh finds uncouth. A Transitional Phenomenon During the campaign, leading members of the Al-Nour Party seemed as if they came from a different era; it was a sharp contrast to Egypt's liberal tradition. For instance, when party spokesman Abdul Munaim al-Shahat appeared on a TV talk show, he insisted that a divider be set up between himself and a female guest. In his most recent demand, he calls upon Egyptians to "destroy the temples!" He wants Egypt to finally put an end to the "idolatrous worship" of its pharaonic heritage. If Shahat had his way, sculptures, statues and portraits spanning 5,000 years of Egyptian history would be covered with a layer of chalk, and pharaonic street names would be Islamicized. Another member of the party leadership is calling for a ban on alcohol, even for Christians and foreigners, who can drink alcohol without punishment in most Gulf countries. He also wants to close beaches where Western women show too much skin and ban the wearing of bikinis. As an alternative, he suggests offering foreign tourists camel treks and ski instruction on sand dunes. Is it for this that the Egyptian youth took to the streets in late January? Is this why they overthrew autocratic former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak? No, says Amr Iss al-Rigal. "But this is merely a transitional phenomenon. We had a feeling that the religious groups would triumph at first -- because they, like the Salafists, have friends in the oil monarchies. And because they, like the Muslim Brothers, were long members of the opposition, which gave them time to organize." Rigal, 28, is standing on a busy street in Imbaba, a working-class neighborhood in Cairo. It is well after midnight, and he looks tired as he patiently endures the flurry of camera flashes coming from Egyptian journalists. A campaign banner bearing his likeness flutters above him, stretched between two trees. The words "Coalition of Revolutionary Youth" are written on the banner. The candidate poses for the 429

photographers one more time. It is his last press event of the day. "The democrats will prevail in the long run," says Rigal, with a defiant and self-confident smile. Cause Worth Fighting For The young lawyer is one of the heroes of the revolution. Everyone who fought on Tahrir Square knows him. In 2004, he joined a liberal party that challenged Mubarak in the 2005 presidential election, albeit unsuccessfully. In 2008, Rigal was among the protagonists of the "April 6 Youth Movement," which played an important role in launching the revolution -- with a Facebook group initially consisting of thousands, followed by tens and then hundreds of thousands of supporters. Rigal and his friends were among the first to protest on Tahrir Square, where they persevered, ran from police, chanted slogans and sang songs. He will never forget the magic of those days, and the realization that freedom is a cause worth fighting for, says Rigal. The former revolutionary has now turned into a candidate for parliament. And his prospects are good, even though he is campaigning directly against the Islamists in the poor Imbaba neighborhood. As the son of a bus driver, Rigal is familiar with the people who vote for the Islamists. And because his father was once a member of the radical group al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya, he also knows what makes the Islamists so successful. "They appeal to your religious feelings, to your conscience. They distribute meat and coal. But that isn't a platform. You don't create jobs just by being devout." Rigal says that whenever he has told voters about their political rights, about their right to participate in the democratic process, to education and to healthcare, they have almost always reacted with astonishment and curiosity. 'A Long Way from the Turkish Model' People like him, says Rigal, are even more suspect to the ruling military council than the Islamists. The army leadership could come to terms with the pragmatic and even increasingly opportunistic Muslim Brotherhood, as it has demonstrated time and again. The Salafists, says Rigal, did well under Mubarak, "because the threatening posture emanating from the militant groups enabled the regime to maintain its police apparatus and its emergency laws," says Rigal. "The democracy movement, by comparison, is uncontrollable, which the generals hate." Egyptians are waiting anxiously to see how the powerful Muslim Brothers and their "Freedom and Justice Party" will position themselves. Will they distance themselves from the Salafists and seek an alliance with liberal forces? Or will they join the Salafists to create an orthodox Islamic Egypt? Christians, liberals and secularists aren't the only ones tormented by the fear that Egypt could become an undemocratic country through democratic means. When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan traveled to Cairo in September, two months before the election began, the Muslim Brotherhood cheered his arrival. Then he gave a speech and said: "A secular nation respects all religions. Do not fear secularism." Suddenly the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer cheering, while the Salafists sharply criticized secularism, calling it the "work of the devil." It appears that Egypt's Islamists are still a long way from the Turkish model. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

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URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,803500,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • The Transparent State Enemy: Western Surveillance Technology in the Hands of Despots (12/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,802317,00.html • Freedoms at Risk: Arab Women Fight to Defend their Rights (11/29/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800447,00.html • Egypt Heads to the Polls: The Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for Power (11/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,800338,00.html • Tunisia Tastes Democracy: Early Results Point to Victory for the Islamists (10/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,793595,00.html • Halting Steps Toward Democracy: Arab Revolution Caught Between Euphoria and Despair (08/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,779071,00.html

12/14/2011 05:39 PM Discrimination Swells 'German Society is Poisoned' Social scientist Wilhelm Heitmeyer has been publishing studies on German attitudes for a decade. In a SPIEGEL interview, he discusses his latest results, which show that Germans' relationship to minorities and the disadvantaged has become increasingly hostile. SPIEGEL: Professor Heitmeyer, you have been studying the condition of the Germans for the last 10 years. How are we doing? Heitmeyer: Not very well. The growing social divide is corroding the sense of community, and society is poisoned. Social disintegration is dangerous, especially for disadvantaged groups. Substantial segments of society believe that they are more valuable than others. Only those who achieve something, who are useful and efficient, count for something. SPIEGEL: Hasn't that always been the case? Heitmeyer: Yes, but the principle of rationality, which has its place in the economy, has increasingly permeated our thinking, finding its way into living rooms, schools and social relationships. This application of economic principles to the valuation of human beings is inhumane. Immigrants, the homeless, the long-term unemployed, the disabled, all of these people are worth less than others according to these standards. SPIEGEL: Is this really worse in Germany than elsewhere? Heitmeyer: Status-based thinking is also widespread in Germany. This sets off a spiral of devaluation, especially in times of crisis. Someone who is afraid of moving down in 431

the world, or is worried about being rendered useless tomorrow, is more likely to denigrate weaker people, to prove to himself that there is still someone below him on the ladder. SPIEGEL: In your study, you measure the temperature curve of society with the somewhat cumbersome concept of "group-specific misanthropy." Why so complicated? Heitmeyer: Racism is certainly easier to grasp, but it isn't just people with foreign roots who are discriminated against in our society. The long-term unemployed, the homeless and the disabled are also devalued. If you belong to one of these disadvantaged groups, your chances of becoming integrated and recognized are very poor. SPIEGEL: Who are these people with such hostile attitudes? Heitmeyer: We tend to focus on young people, some of whom are violent and make the headlines. But it's the older people, those 60 and up, who have particularly hostile attitudes. This has consequences. SPIEGEL: Are grandma and grandpa teaching their grandchildren to hate foreigners? Heitmeyer: The attitudes of the older generation are indeed transferred to young people in many cases, because older people have a lot of credibility among young people. This has to be carefully analyzed against the background of an aging society. Youth programs don't do any good, either. SPIEGEL: The special aspect of your study is the long observation period. How have we developed in the last 10 years? Heitmeyer: It isn't uniform. But society is more divided today than it was 10 years ago. Xenophobia, racism and the denigration of the long-term unemployed are on the rise once again, especially after the crises that began in 2008. Some 92 percent of society believes that the rich are getting richer and the poor even poorer. SPIEGEL: Germany has just discovered that it is home to active right-wing terrorism. Were these individuals outside of society? Heitmeyer: I'm appalled that many, especially in the political establishment, act as if we were dealing with a few outsiders in an otherwise intact and humane society. But it isn't quite that easy to distinguish between good and evil. The terrorists (Uwe) Böhnhardt, (Uwe) Mundlos and (Beate) Zschäpe derived their justification for committing acts of violence from a reservoir of misanthropic attitudes in society. SPIEGEL: A reservoir? Can misanthropy be accumulated? Heitmeyer: The acceptance of violence and the willingness to commit violent acts among people with right-wing populist views increased by 16 percent from 2010 to 2011. This is everything but good news for social climate. SPIEGEL: How many people in Germany sympathize with the right-wing populists? Heitmeyer: About 10 percent of society has thoroughly right-wing views. SPIEGEL: How did you determine that? Heitmeyer: We confronted 2,000 people with the following statements: "To preserve law and order, we have to crack down on outsiders and troublemakers. I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country, because of the many Muslims in Germany. Many Jews are trying to use Germany's Nazi past to secure benefits today and make the 432

Germans pay for it." According to our criteria, a person who clearly agrees with six of these types of statements has right-wing populist views. In doing this, we are already applying a very strict standard. SPIEGEL: What has changed in the last 10 years for a foreigner living in Germany? Heitmeyer: He lives in a society that has skeptical to hostile opinions about Muslims, in particular. More than 50 percent of people surveyed today say that they would have a big problem moving into an area where many Muslims live. This is an increase of 6 percent in the last seven years. SPIEGEL: The debate over Thilo Sarrazin and his controversial book, "Deutschland schafft sich ab" ("Germany Does Itself In"), has shown that many members of the educated classes also hate foreigners. Doesn't education protect against xenophobia? Heitmeyer: Education is generally a safe buffer. But we have noticed that this buffer is disappearing. Many of those attending Mr. Sarrazin's readings were middle-class people in loden coats. We use the term "crude middle-class outlook" in this context. It is the contempt for those who are seeking to improve their social status. SPIEGEL: What triggers a misanthropic mood in the country? Heitmeyer: There are signal events, like Sept. 11, 2001, the introduction of the Hartz IV (welfare reforms) and the economic crisis. Such events unnerve people. One reaction is to denigrate the weaker members of society. But the gradual processes are also dangerous, because they are not the subject of debates, like disorientation, the economic attitudes I mentioned earlier and, most of all, the deflation of democracy. SPIEGEL: Don't we live in a vital democracy anymore? Heitmeyer: Our democracy is a functioning shell, as evidenced by low voter turnout. Our numbers show that many people have already given up. They no longer have any expectations of politics. SPIEGEL: Our impression is that democracy is actually quite vital. In Stuttgart and elsewhere, citizens are demanding more of a say. In Frankfurt, people are sleeping in tents to protest capitalism. This isn't exactly a deflation of democracy. Heitmeyer: Vitality and protests are indeed in evidence wherever there are emotionally exploitable events. But these are exceptions. Normally the people who really have a reason to protest lack the strength to do so. The fears of social decline and unemployment are destructive and crippling to people. SPIEGEL: But economic output is growing and unemployment is decreasing. Germans seem to be doing rather well, despite the financial and debt crisis. Heitmeyer: We are doing well, compared to the Greeks, the Spaniards and the Italians. That's comforting. But many things are also suppressed. In our surveys, people point out that even though society is not doing well, things are just fine in their personal lives. People tend to build a positive image of themselves to avoid being overrun by social uncertainty. SPIEGEL: Isn't it possible that people really are doing well? Heitmeyer: Our numbers show that people are very fearful of social decline and ostracism.

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SPIEGEL: If your numbers actually reflect the truth, how could the divide in society be closed again? Heitmeyer: We have to improve social equality and the equality of all people. Equality is just as important to human society as emotional and physical integrity. SPIEGEL: What constitutes the value of a human being? Heitmeyer: That's the €100,000-euro question. In a humane society, it is important that those sitting at the top of the ladder are treated the same as those at the bottom. Can someone at the bottom live a life of dignity? In Germany, human dignity is a supposedly untouchable value, but unfortunately that's not at all true anymore. SPIEGEL: How do elites treat the weak? Heitmeyer: Significant segments the elites and higher earners are increasingly withdrawing from a mutually supportive society. They claim the privileges of the establishment, and they fight against a minimum wage, the wealth tax and the inheritance tax, even though the policies of redistribution have been in their favor for years. This is class warfare from above. It shows that the core standards of this society are in great jeopardy. Some 64 percent of society believes that striving for justice is pointless. Solidarity and fairness, values that are vital to the cohesion of a society, are being eroded. SPIEGEL: And this can be blamed on the "authoritarian capitalism" you write about? Heitmeyer: Capital has been able to impose its maxims without obstruction for years. Social integration is not on the list of interests. Instead, the entrepreneurial self is in demand. This maxim has now penetrated into the way people think. SPIEGEL: But even the publisher of the center-right daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frank Schirrmacher, writes that the left could very well be right this time. Heitmeyer: The ship can't be turned around that quickly. Neo-liberal concepts have found their way into everyday life and are being used as weapons against disadvantaged groups. This pattern of thinking will not be thrown into disarray suddenly just because elites are realizing that things are threatening to blow up in their faces. SPIEGEL: The results of your research paint such a dark picture of our country that one could very well believe that Germany is on the verge of revolution. Heitmeyer: We don't want to be too pessimistic. We use scientific tools to combat whitewashing and indifference. I do not recognize a potential for unrest in Germany at the moment. Instead, I suspect that apathy and disorientation are on the rise. This is not a good sign for our country. On the whole, we lack any kind of vision on how things are to continue. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL: Wilhelm Heitmeyer Discrimination Swells 'German Society is Poisoned'12/14/2011 05:39 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,803521,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Suspect Remains Silent on Charges: Doubts Grow in Case Against Neo-Nazi Group (12/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,803654,00.html

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• Turkish Foreign Minister on Neo-Nazi Murders: 'Prejudice Is More Dangerous than Any Racist Terrorist' (12/13/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,803280,00.html • Occupy Vs. Ackermann: Protesters Confront Germany's Top Banker (11/23/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,799465,00.html • Hidden in Plain Sight: Facts and Myths about Germany's Far-Right Extremists (11/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,798682,00.html • The Chancellor's About-Face: How Merkel Warmed to a German Minimum Wage (11/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,796591,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Politicians Should Not Fear Direct Democracy' (11/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,800369,00.html • Muslims as a Mirror: Germany's Unhealthy Obsession with Islam (08/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,781577,00.html • German Interior Minister: 'German Identity Is Shaped by Christianity' (08/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,779032,00.html • No Kebab for Sarrazin: Divisive Author Chased Out of Immigrant District (07/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,775043,00.html

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ft.com Comment Opinion December 13, 2011 9:01 pm Turkey’s stance will seal the fate of Syria’s Ceausescu By Michael Williams When the leader of the rising power in the Middle East reminds a neighbour, and former close friend, of the fates of Adolf Hitler and Nicolae Ceausescu, that is a health warning to be heeded. So what are the chances of Bashar al-Assad taking the advice of his erstwhile friend, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan? In my experience, slim indeed. In meetings with Syria’s president in recent years I was struck by his Manichean outlook. After almost nine months of protests there is no indication that Mr Assad has any intention of introducing meaningful reforms. Indeed it would be entirely out of keeping with his character which, in the classic totalitarian mould, brooks no opposing views. If there is an East European leader he resembles it is Ceausescu. More ON THIS STORY Iran criticises Turkey’s ‘secular Islam’ Pressure on Syria as death toll mounts Hamas reconfigures engagement with Syria Syrian activists expect assault on Homs Gulfsands shuts down production in Syria IN OPINION Beppe Severgnini A word of advice for my emotional German friends Dominique Moïsi Britain’s need of Europe Jared Bernstein Mr Obama, some advice Richard Lambert RBS – a catalogue of disastrous decisions Like the ill-fated Romanian, Mr Assad is not a man to go quietly into the night. Neither will he follow Tunisia’s Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali and flee. In his case, I suppose the obvious destination would be Tehran. But as one Israeli general quipped to me, the first lady – the glamorous Mrs Assad profiled by Vogue on the eve of the revolt – is more used to the couture of Paris than Tehran. Anyway, to flee would mean failure. Like Hosni Mubarak and Muammer Gaddafi, he is more likely to tough it out – with dire consequences for him and his family. To understand Mr Assad remember that he and his father Hafez have held the country in their grip for 42 years. But the onset of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the Arab League and now Turkey mean that Syria’s already weakened economy is unlikely to stand the strains of external economic pressure and growing internal opposition. The risk, however, is that a victory for democracy in Syria may come at a considerable price. If Mr Assad is more like Ceausescu than other eastern European leaders, his country is more like Yugoslavia. Two-thirds of its population are Sunnis, but the regime draws its principal strength from minorities such as the Christians and the Druze and, above all, the heterodox Islamic sect, the Alawites. Over the years the oft- proclaimed secularism of the regime has been little more than a rejection of Sunni Arab nationalism. The worst case scenario is that Syria, like multi-confessional Yugoslavia, descends into chaos and civil war. That is the black cloud that hangs over not only Syria, but also the whole Levant.

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Neighbouring Lebanon, the most polyglot Arab county with Sunni, Shia and Christians mixed with Druze and Armenians, lives in fear that a descent into greater conflict within Syria will trigger discord in a country only just recovering from the 1975-90 civil war. Iraq too sees the situation in Syria as deeply destabilising and one that could reignite the Sunni/Shia conflict of recent years. But in Mr Erdogan, Mr Assad may have met his match. Turkey is growing more and more impatient with Mr Assad – and increasingly carries more weight in the region than the Arab League does. Turkey has provided refuge to Syrians fleeing the brutality of the regime, a platform for the opposition Syrian National Council and undisclosed assistance to the Free Syrian Army. The recent daring attack on the headquarters of the hated and feared Air Force Intelligence (which has more to do with torture than with aircraft) at Hasrata in the Damascus suburbs illustrated a growing resilience. Much is at stake in Syria. Were Mr Assad’s counter-revolution to succeed or even just be prolonged, it would be an enormous setback for the Arab Spring. The longer it continues, the greater the risk of sectarian conflict, with the Sunni majority turning against the small Alawite ruling class. The risk of sectarian conflict then migrating to neighbouring states is a substantial one. As legitimate regional voices, Turkey and the Arab League now have to convince India, Brazil, South Africa and China that Mr Assad has no future – as well as Russia, which on Tuesday called on the west to condemn the “armed, extremist part” of Syria’s opposition. The demise of one of the Middle East’s few secular regimes is fraught with complexity, particularly at a time when political Islam is on the rise. But the longer Mr Assad survives, the greater the misery he is likely to bequeath to his people and the region. The writer is a former UN undersecretary general in the Middle East. He is Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Chatham House Michael Williams Turkey’s stance will seal the fate of Syria’s Ceausescu December 13, 2011 9:01 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7fc4ba6a-0fbd-11e1-a36b- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gVKpNFgh

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ft.com World Middle East & North Africa Iran December 13, 2011 5:29 pm Iran criticises Turkey’s ‘secular Islam’ By Daniel Dombey in Istanbul and Najmeh Bozorgmehr in Tehran Iran has criticised Turkey’s secular system of government as an unsuitable example for countries in the Arab spring, in the latest sign of growing tension between the two regional powers. Ali-Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, told a press conference on Tuesday that Turkey’s model of “secular Islam” was a version of western liberal democracy and unacceptable for countries that he said were going through an “Islamic awakening”. More ON THIS STORY Istanbul business and finance Comment Sealing the fate of Syria’s Ceausescu Tehran welcomes Islamist poll victories Pressure on Syria as death toll mounts Editorial Red-hot Turkey ON THIS TOPIC Textile workers vent fury on Ahmadi-Nejad US groups told to reveal Syria, Iran links SEC offers Middle East trading insight Scandal puts Iranian banks on the defensive

IN IRAN Iran claims to have shot down US drone Iranian rivals stir anger against west UK vows action after Iran expels envoy France pushes for Iranian oil embargo By contrast Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, has travelled to Egypt and Tunisia championing his country’s secular institutions, which he argues allow a conservative, devout social outlook like his own to thrive. Rivalry between the two neighbours is intensifying as they lock horns over Ankara’s decision to host a Nato missile defence base and the fate of Syria’s president, Bashar al- Assad, as well as the future direction of the Arab spring. The two countries are economically interdependent and each has problems neighbours, so are keen to downplay tensions. But strains are growing, particularly over their broader ambition to project influence in the region. The tension, which underlines how much the Arab uprisings have transformed the region’s political landscape, comes little more than 18 months after Turkey defied its western allies and brokered a short-lived compromise deal on Iran’s nuclear programme, the height of its ambition to act as an interlocutor with Tehran. “They [Iran] support Assad no matter what… They are not happy with the defence shield. They are not happy with us getting involved in Iraq or Syria,” a Turkish official told the FT recently. He added that while the countries’ rivalry was rarely explicit, “it has always been there”. Turkey broke with Mr Assad months ago, complaining of broken promises in his regime’s crackdown on its opponents, and is now spearheading the international campaign for him to step down. But the loss of Iran’s main regional ally would be a 438

major setback to Tehran, not least because Syria provides Iran with a connection to Hizbollah, the Lebanese Shia militant group. But the tension between Ankara and Tehran also takes place against a much broader backdrop. Mr Velayati’s comments came two days after Hossein Ebrahimi, an Iranian member of parliament, became the second Iranian public figure in a matter of weeks to threaten Turkey over its missile defence radar base, saying that if Iran was attacked its first target would be the base being built in Malatya, Turkey. Top Iranian officials have told their Turkish counterparts not to take such comments seriously – but Iran makes clear its fury at what it regards as the threat the base poses. Turkish officials reply that the Nato programme does not specifically target Tehran – Iran’s name was excised from the programme’s goals after strenuous Turkish lobbying – and that Nato itself will not share radar information with Israel, Iran’s enemy. But since the US has made clear it will share such information, Ankara’s assurances have failed to placate Iran. The two countries have also been competing in Iraq, where last year Turkey championed the cause of Iyad Allawi, the secular Shia who sought to be prime minister, the post eventually retained by Nouri al-Maliki, who was given more support by Iran. This week Mr Maliki told the Wall Street Journal that he was more worried about the Turkey’s role in the region than that of Iran. By contrast, some Turkish analysts see Iran expanding its role in Iraq as it is put on the defensive in Syria. “We are also downplaying it, but the competition is ongoing, especially in Iraq,” said Suat Kiniklioglu, a former Turkish ruling party MP and the director of the Centre for Strategic Communication, an Ankara-based think-tank. “Once US troops are out this month, competition is likely to increase over Iraq and if Assad falls, Turkish-Iranian tensions might increase even further.” Daniel Dombey in Istanbul and Najmeh Bozorgmehr in Tehran Iran criticises Turkey’s ‘secular Islam’ December 13, 2011 5:29 pm http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/75843e66- 259f-11e1-9c76-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gVKpNFgh

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AMPLIACIÓN TURQUÍA La UE, una cabeza de turco de moda 13 diciembre 2011 Milliyet Estambul

Peatones caminando junto a las banderas turcas de la plaza Ulus en Ankara, Turquía. Bloomberg via Getty Images Cada vez son más numerosos los responsables turcos que, impulsados por la dinámica económica y política de su país, critican a una Unión Europea atascada en la crisis. Pero en opinión de un editorialista turco, esto no debe comprometer la voluntad de Ankara de adherirse a la UE. Sami Kohen Últimamente en Turquía se ha puesto de moda criticar a la Unión Europea. Estas críticas proceden incluso de personalidades políticas de alto nivel, ya sea de ministros o incluso del mismo presidente de la República, y siguen los pasos de los que atacan con dureza a la Unión Europea e incluso se burlan de ella. Esta nueva tendencia se ilustra con las declaraciones realizadas por el presidente Abdulá Gül durante su visita oficial a Reino Unido a finales de noviembre de 2011, en las que calificó a la UE con el término inglés "miserable", es decir, abatida, triste. En este contexto ha comenzado a desarrollarse la tendencia de tildar a la UE de “organización que desmiembra y se hunde”. Los que parten de esta premisa concluyen que una Turquía que “no deja de reforzarse ya no necesita a una Unión Europea que de todos modos está al borde del abismo”. Un complejo de superioridad ¿Podemos sacar la conclusión a partir de estas declaraciones de que la política del Estado turco con respecto a la UE está cambiando? Puesto que la UE es una organización “abatida” a punto de desplomarse, ¿por qué debería tomarse tantas molestias Turquía para pertenecer a ella? 440

A menos que este objetivo y la visión que la acompañan estén a punto de abandonarse, ¿por qué una Turquía que progresa a grandes pasos hacia la prosperidad querría unirse a un club así e interpretar en él una escena de “Los miserables”? Todos conocemos de sobra los motivos que han llevado a Abdulá Gül a realizar estas declaraciones. La actitud tan negativa que ha adoptado desde hace algún tiempo la UE hacia la adhesión de Turquía provocó una gran decepción en la opinión turca en general, pero también entre los más fervientes partidarios de la UE, que ya no ocultan su desilusión, su rencor y su desesperación. Los graves sobresaltos económicos y sociales que sufren los europeos mientras que nosotros estamos en plena ascensión económica y política generan este tipo de sentimiento. En este contexto, los reproches dirigidos a Europa son la expresión de una confianza en nosotros mismos que, en cierto modo, ha sustituido a un antiguo complejo de persecución. Pero cuando este estado de ánimo se transforma en un complejo de superioridad excesivo que minimiza a la Unión Europea, ataviada de calificativos inadecuados, se abre la vía al desaire del proyecto europeo entre nosotros y brinda nuevos argumentos a los europeos que se oponen a la adhesión de Turquía. La UE aún no está a punto de hundirse Es cierto que la UE está viviendo actualmente uno de los periodos más difíciles de su historia. La crisis financiera ha llevado al borde de la quiebra a los países débiles, pero también a los que tenían fama de prósperos y avanzados. Como es natural, esto provoca sacudidas sociales y políticas. Sin embargo, también es cierto que la Unión Europea aún no está a punto de hundirse ni de disolverse. Si bien Europa se muestra hoy como un ser “desafortunado” o “enfermo”, aún posee los medios para recuperarse y recobrar el poder que le falta hoy. Los responsables políticos turcos no ignoran esta realidad y son plenamente conscientes de la filosofía y de los valores que sigue encarnando la Unión Europea para Turquía. Por consiguiente, la opinión pública turca ante todo no debe interpretar las reacciones de sus responsables políticos como una renuncia al proyecto europeo. Y deberían hacer lo mismo los dirigentes europeos a los que irritan estas mismas reacciones. Sami Kohen La UE, una cabeza de turco de moda 13 diciembre 2011 http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/1283421-la-ue-una-cabeza-de-turco- de-moda

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12/13/2011 01:03 PM Turkish Foreign Minister on Neo-Nazi Murders 'Prejudice Is More Dangerous than Any Racist Terrorist' Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu recently came to Germany to meet with the families of those murdered by the neo-Nazi terror cell. In a SPIEGEL interview, he sharply criticized German investigators, who suspected the victims were involved in criminal activities, and warned of an upsurge in racism as a result of the economic crisis. SPIEGEL: Mr. Davutoglu, you spent five days in Germany and met with the families of all the victims of the neo-Nazi murder series. What did the family members tell you? Davutoglu: I already knew beforehand that this wouldn't be an easy trip, but frankly I had no idea how deeply distressed the families were about the way these murders were investigated. It revealed a mentality that troubled me very much. SPIEGEL: What do you mean? Davutoglu: Let's start with the first family I met, the family of greengrocer Süleyman Tasköprü, who was murdered in Hamburg in 2001. His father told me that when he arrived at the crime scene, Süleyman was still alive, and he held his son in his arms as he died. Immediately afterward, he was taken in for questioning -- and interrogated as a suspect. When he told me that, I thought it must surely be an isolated incident. SPIEGEL: And it wasn't? Davutoglu: No, similar things happened in almost all of the cases. In the attack in Kassel as well, the victim's father was at the crime scene, an Internet café, after the murder. He saw his son and asked the neighbors for help. But while the neighbors were taking care of his son's body, the father was brought to the police station and interrogated for nine hours. Nine hours! We all know that family members suffering this kind of trauma need support, they need to be with their families, they need to be able to share their pain with others. SPIEGEL: Did you describe these details to the German politicians you met with over the past days? Davutoglu: Yes, I told this to President (Christian) Wulff, and I'm grateful to Chancellor (Angela) Merkel, Interior Minister (Hans-Peter) Friedrich and my German counterpart, (Foreign Minister) Guido Westerwelle, for their response and their determination to help the families. But I believe such positive declarations alone are not enough. SPIEGEL: What are you asking for instead? Davutoglu: The case of Abdurrahim Özüdogru, a tailor murdered in Nuremberg in 2001, provides an example of what it's all about. His daughter was 12 years old at the time, and she was summoned to the police station to give DNA samples a total of 10 times. The girl, now a woman, told me, Mr. Minister, I went to school here, I speak German like a German, as it happens I'm even blonde. What else am I supposed to do to

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integrate into German society? How could anyone think I had anything to do with my father's murder? In the end, Germany's integration debate has always been about what the Turkish people here still need to do (to integrate into society). These cases show that both sides need to work on integration. SPIEGEL: German authorities attribute the delay in solving this series of murders to the fact that the murderers never publicly confessed to their crimes. The German media, SPIEGEL included, were likewise following other leads. Did you yourself, or did Turkish diplomats or Turkish authorities, ever suspect far-right terrorists might be behind these murders? Davutoglu: No, the German government has jurisdiction over these cases. Turkey's intelligence service can't get involved at all. What happened here are crimes that go against all German and European values. The victim in Kassel even happened to be a German citizen, incidentally. The murderers' intention wasn't to create propaganda but to spread fear among Turks. They wanted Turks to leave the country. SPIEGEL: After your conversations over the last few days, would you say they succeeded? Davutoglu: If the prevailing opinion in this country is really that Turks are such a barbaric people that they simply murder each other just like that, and that they habitually do so over a döner business or a drug deal, then that is a prejudice more dangerous than any racist terrorist. You can do something about a terrorist, you can fight a terror cell. But fighting this sort of prejudice is far more difficult. When five people died in an arson attack in Solingen in 1993, there was a great deal of solidarity (with the Turkish community). But I think we failed at that point, unfortunately, to openly address all the issues we should have. SPIEGEL: Is Germany a xenophobic country? Davutoglu: I wouldn't say that. One German I talked to pointed out that the individuals accused of these murders come from a region of the country where they have hardly any contact with foreigners. I believe that Germans who interact with Turks on a daily basis are not nearly as affected by these prejudices. SPIEGEL: But your criticism is directed not only at the accused murderers, but also at the police and the one-sided nature of their investigation. Davutoglu: That's true. Why did the investigators never take into serious consideration that these could be terrorist attacks? I'm not a criminologist, but I've now met all eight of the Turkish families and none of them gives the impression of being involved in criminal dealings. More than that, in fact, so far as I know none of the victims had any sort of criminal record. The investigators must have asked themselves how that fitted together. SPIEGEL: What impression are you taking back with you to Turkey? Davutoglu: I see in my travels that Europe is undergoing a serious economic crisis. Unemployment in Europe is high, and may continue to rise. It's common in such crises for those who feel themselves to be the original inhabitants of a country to blame others, usually immigrants, for their plight. Such phases often give rise to xenophobia, which would not necessarily be directed only at Turks; it might affect black Africans, Pakistanis or Algerians. Europe experienced a serious economic crisis in 1929 as well. But Europe today is far more culturally diverse than it was then. If the current economic 443

crisis impacts this continent as forcefully as it did then, the danger is considerable. I don't want to be overly dramatic, but I am really very concerned. Politicians must be prepared in case this happens. Interview conducted by Bernhard Zand

URL: Ahmet Davutoglu Turkish Foreign Minister on Neo-Nazi Murders 'Prejudice Is More Dangerous than Any Racist Terrorist'12/13/2011 01:03 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,803280,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Neo-Nazi Terror Cell: Suspicions Destroyed Lives of Victims' Relatives (12/13/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,803275,00.html • Blind to Extremism: How Germany Overlooked the Threat from the Right (11/21/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,798935,00.html • Network of Evil: Twenty People May Have Helped German Terrorists (11/21/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,798995,00.html • The Brown Army Faction: A Disturbing New Dimension of Far-Right Terror (11/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,797569,00.html

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Ajouté le : 13-12-2011 Moncef Marzouki : "Hamadi Jebali sera chargé mercredi du poste de chef du gouvernement"

L'élu à l'Assemblée nationale constituante et Secrétaire général du parti du Mouvement "Ennahdha" Hammadi Jebali sera désigné, demain mercredi, au poste de chef du gouvernement, a annoncé M. Moncef Marzouki, président de la République. Il a, également, appelé les présidents des partis à se concerter au sujet de la composition du nouveau gouvernement. Lors d'une conférence de presse tenue, mardi, au Bardo, à la suite de sa prestation de serment, il a formé l'espoir devoir les Tunisiens qui ont fait preuve de rationalité, amorcer la prochaine étape qui est pleine de défis, en étant animés d'un esprit victorieux. http://www.lapresse.tn/13122011/41971/moncef-marzouki-hamadi-jebali-sera-charge- mercredi-du-poste-de-chef-du-gouvernement.html

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Ajouté le : 13-12-2011 Sitôt élu, Moncef Marzouki : « Conscient de l’ampleur de la responsabilité… »

• Le nouveau président de la République remercie les constituants qui ont voté pour lui et ceux qui ne l’ont pas fait • M. Marzouki prête, aujourd’hui, serment et s’adresse au peuple A l’issue de la proclamation par le président de la commission chargée du décompte des voix et du contrôle de l’opération de vote au sein de l’Assemblée nationale constituante, Mahmoud El May, des résultats de l’élection par les constituants du président de la République, qui a donné vainqueur Mohamed Moncef Marzouki, avec 153 voix, le Président de la République élu s’est dit «conscient de la confiance placée en sa personne par les constituants et le peuple tunisien», considérant cette responsabilité comme étant «un rêve pour tout être humain». Il a ajouté en s’adressant aux membres de l’Assemblée : «Je serai, toujours, conscient de la lourde mission qui m’a été assignée et l’ampleur de la responsabilité qui m’a été dévolue par le peuple tunisien». M. Marzouki a, ensuite, adressé un message aux membres de la Constituante qui n’ont pas voté en sa faveur, dans lequel il a précisé avoir bien saisi la raison de leur refus de soutenir sa candidature à ce poste, déclarant : «Je vous dit que la démocratie ne saurait exister sans majorité et minorité, ni sans majorité et opposition. Votre message est clair ! L’avenir nous dira si nous avions raison ou tort... et nous serons contrôlés.»

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Il a, en conclusion, indiqué que son élection au poste de président de la République à la majorité des voix des membres de l’Assemblée constituante a marqué «un moment historique dans l’histoire de la Tunisie et dans sa propre vie», scandant «vive la Tunisie». Le président de la Constituante, Mustapha Ben Jaâfar, avait auparavant considéré la victoire de Moncef Marzouki comme étant le reflet d’une volonté claire de l’Assemblée à l’investir d’une telle responsabilité, ajoutant qu’avec l’élection de Marzouki au poste de président de la République, la Tunisie s’engage résolument sur la voie de la démocratie. M. Ben Jaâfar a, par ailleurs, annoncé que conformément à l’article 9 de la loi portant organisation provisoire des pouvoirs publics, adoptée par l’Assemblée constituante, le 10 décembre courant, le nouveau président de la République prêtera serment aujourd’hui, mardi, à 9h00, au siège de l’Assemblée, où il s’adressera au peuple tunisien, avant de prendre ses fonctions au Palais de Carthage lors d’une cérémonie officielle. Il convient de préciser que Moncef Marzouki a été élu président de la République par l’Assemblée constituante à la majorité de 153 voix sur les 202 voix exprimées, avec 44 bulletins blancs, 2 abstentions et 3 voix contre.

M. Moncef Marzouki, digest M. Moncef Marzouki qui a été élu, hier, président de la République par l’Assemblée nationale constituante, est né le 7 juillet 1945 à Grombalia. Professeur de médecine et militant politique, opposant historique du régime déchu, Moncef Marzouki est président du Congrès pour la République (CPR) depuis le 25 juillet 2001. Il a fait ses études secondaires en Tunisie et au Maroc avant de bénéficier d’une bourse universitaire en France où il obtient le Doctorat en médecine de la faculté de Strasbourg. Il est ancien interne des hôpitaux en neurologie. De retour en Tunisie en 1979, il s’engage comme militant à la Ligue tunisienne pour la défense des droits de l’Homme (Ltdh) fondée en 1977. Il est élu membre de son comité directeur en 1985 et vice-président en 1987, puis élu à l’unanimité président de la ligue en 1989. Il présenta sa candidature à l’élection présidentielle du 20 mars 1994 afin de «dénoncer la mascarade électorale et la loi en vigueur interdisant toute candidature non validée par le régime de Ben Ali». Arrêté, il est emprisonné jusqu’en juillet 1994, libéré par la suite grâce à l’intervention personnelle de Nelson Mandela. Il a été interdit de voyage pendant plusieurs années. M. Marzouki est membre du comité directeur de l’organisation arabe des droits de l’Homme au Caire et membre actif de la section tunisienne d’Amnesty international. Il est président de la commission arabe des droits de l’Homme de 1996 à 2000 et porte- parole du conseil national pour les libertés en Tunisie du 10 décembre 1998 au 16 février 2001. Licencié de son poste de professeur de médecine à la faculté de Sousse, il est contraint à l’exil pendant 10 ans en France où il exerce différentes fonctions comme professeur associé et médecin. Ecrivain bilingue, il a publié 16 livres en arabe et 4 en français traitant de médecine communautaire, d’éthique, des droits de l’Homme et de la démocratisation dans les pays arabo-musulmans.

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En 2001 il crée le Congrès pour la République (CPR), parti non reconnu par le régime déchu et qui a été légalisé au lendemain de la révolution du 14 janvier. Le 18 janvier, Moncef Marzouki rentre de son exil et annonce sa candidature à la présidence de la République. Elu membre de l’Assemblée nationale constituante aux élections du 23 octobre 2011, dans la circonscription de Nabeul II, M. Marzouki est le candidat de la coalition tripartite formée, au lendemain des élections du 23 octobre, par le Mouvement Ennahdha (89 sièges), le CPR (29 sièges) et Ettakattol (20 sièges). Il est marié et père de deux enfants.

Constituante : Les 9 candidats déboutés Neuf membres de l’Assemblée nationale constituante ont présenté leur candidature au poste de président de la République : - Wahid Dhiab - Fraj Sellami - Mohamed Wassif - Mouaouia Belhaj - Ahmed Ben Nefissa - Mohamed Gadour - Mohamed Majdoub - Sadok Ferchichi - Abdefattah Gargouri

Les félicitations de Bouteflika Le président algérien, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a adressé un message de félicitations à M. Moncef Marzouki, à l’occasion de son élection, hier, par l’Assemblée nationale constituante, président de la République Tunisienne. M. Bouteflika a exprimé dans un message, rapporté par l’Agence de presse algrienne, ses meilleurs vœux à Moncef Marzouki, lui souhaitant plein succès dans ses nouvelles fonctions, afin de réaliser les aspirations du peuple tunisien au progrès et à la prospérité. Il a ajouté en substance : «Je saisis également cette occasion pour vous faire part de ma ferme détermination à œuvrer à la consolidation des liens de fraternité et des relations de coopération privilégiées unissant les deux pays dans l’intérêt de nos deux peuples frères.»

http://www.lapresse.tn/13122011/41921/conscient-de-lampleur-de-la- responsabilite.html

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A.DERMECH Ajouté le : 13-12-2011 Transition démocratique La Tunisie inventera son propre modèle La Tunisie est-elle capable de réussir sa transition ? A-t-elle besoin d’un modèle préétabli, les spécialistes de la Banque européenne de reconstruction et de développement (Berd) sont-ils venus donner les leçons qu’il faut aux Tunisiens et leur tracer la voie à suivre ? Les Tunisiens sont-ils en mesure d’imaginer leur propre modèle de migration d’un régime totalitaire vers une démocratie pluraliste et qui a le mérite d’être consensuelle en cette période truffée de défis à relever par la Tunisie post- révolutionnaire ? Ces interrogations et d’autres ont été au cœur d’un séminaire organisé, hier, par la Berd en collaboration avec l’Utica sur le thème : «Favoriser la croissance et l’investissement pendant la transition». Et les intervenants au nom de la Berd, de la Croatie de s’employer à souligner qu’ils ne sont pas venus «en donneurs de leçons ou en porteurs de sagesse» et qu’ils sont convaincus «que la Tunisie dispose des atouts nécessaires pour réussir le plus important tournant de son histoire, à condition que les réformes requises soient engagées à temps et conduites sur la base de normes scientifiques et rigoureuses». Ainsi, M. Ivan Miklos, vice-Premier ministre de la Slovaquie, a-t-il donné un aperçu sur les conditions dans lesquelles son pays à réussi à réaliser «la meilleure croissance économique en Europe de l’Est grâce précisément à la justesse des réformes engagées pendant la période de transition». Créer sa propre approche de transition Economiste à la Banque européenne de reconstruction et de développement (Berd), Erik Berglof est de ceux qui pensent que chaque pays «se doit d’imaginer sa propre transition en prenant en compte ses spécificités et ses réalités aux plans interne et externe. «La Tunisie, qui a déjà montré qu’elle s’est engagée sur la voie de la réussite en organisant des élections libres, démocratiques et transparentes, dispose de tous les moyens pour éviter les problèmes auxquels l’Europe de l’Est s’est trouvée confrontée lors de son passage d’une économie dirigée à une économie de marché». Pour Wided Bouchamaoui, présidente de l’Utica, «l’entreprise est au cœur du mouvement de transition démocratique et elle est pleinement engagée dans sa mission de citoyenneté, parce qu’intimement convaincue que la transition est une démarche globale où le politique, le social et l’économique s’interfèrent et se conjuguent pour asseoir les bases d’un environnement propice à la libération des énergies, à la délivrance des initiatives et à la valorisation du travail dans son sens le plus noble». Et la présidente des patrons d’ajouter : «La vision de l’entreprise est claire et loin de poser des conditions ou des préalables, nous estimons que la sécurité, l’apaisement du climat social et la garantie du fonctionnement des services publics sont les priorités les plus pressantes de la classe politique dirigeante».

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«Un vaste chantier de réformes, souligne-t-elle encore, attend la Tunisie et il pourra s’étendre aux axes majeurs du modèle économique que la Tunisie ambitionne d’édifier». Idées, analyses et orientations que partage, dans une large mesure, Wafa Sayadi, présidente du Centre des jeunes dirigeants d’entreprises (CJD), qui considère que les Tunisiens ont un défi majeur qu’ils ont le devoir de relever ensemble, dans un climat de dialogue, de concertation et de consensus: créer leur propre modèle de transition démocratique et de développement économique. «Et les jeunes sont appelés à jouer un rôle fondamental dans cette gigantesque et exaltante entreprise, car, il ne faut jamais l’oublier, la révolution du 14 janvier 2011 a été l’œuvre des jeunes et la concrétisation de ses objectifs doit être également l’œuvre de cette même jeunesse qui n’a de leçons à recevoir de personne ou de modèles importés à suivre», a-t-elle martelé. «Le futur de notre transition dépendra de la sauvegarde des emplois existants, de la création d’autres postes et de la répartition équitable des richesses engendrées par la croissance», ajoute-t-elle. «Je suis intimement convaincue que la révolution a été le chef-d’œuvre de notre jeunesse patriotique et créatrice. Faisons confiance à notre jeunesse et donnons-lui les moyens d’étonner le monde. De leur côté, nos jeunes sont appelés à s’imposer sur la scène économique par leur imagination, leur créativité et leur aptitude à accompagner les innovations qui marquent quotidiennement la vie économique et politique dans le monde», a-t-elle conclu son intervention fort appréciée par l’assistance. La continuité sera assurée Fort de son expérience étendue à plus de 50 ans en tant qu’acteur agissant au sein du paysage politique national et usant de réparties alliant l’humour aux rappels historiques utiles, plus que jamais, en cette période de confusion et de tumulte, Béji Caïd Essebsi, Premier ministre du gouvernement de gestion des affaires courantes, a notamment souligné : «La continuité sera assurée dans la mesure où le prochain gouvernement est conscient des problèmes posés et que son objectif principal est de résoudre le nombre des chômeurs qui est passé de 500.000 à 700.000». «La Tunisie doit rester un pays ouvert à l’extérieur et les engagements pris par le gouvernement de transition avec le G-8, les pays du Golfe arabe et les USA en vue du soutien à la stratégie arrêtée pour le quinquennat 2012-2016 doivent être respectés», a-t- il précisé. Et Béji Caïd Essebsi de rappeler une idée qu’il a déjà développée à plusieurs reprises : «Il n’y aura pas de printemps arabe si l’expérience tunisienne ne réussit pas». Il n’a pas manqué de faire part de sa conviction intime selon laquelle «aujourd’hui que l’excuse du provisoire n’a plus droit de cité, le prochain gouvernement créera l’environnement favorable à l’investissement parce qu’il n’y a pas d’autre solution». Il est à préciser que les travaux du séminaire se sont poursuivis sous forme de panels ayant trait à «la promotion de la croissance et de l’emploi par le développement des petites et moyennes entreprises, à l’investissement dans la sécurité alimentaire», à «la préparation de l’avenir par une gestion durable de l’énergie», à «l’amélioration de la compétitivité par l’innovation», etc. http://www.lapresse.tn/13122011/41927/la-tunisie-inventera-son-propre-modele.html 450

ESPAÑA Y MARRUECOS: EL INICIO DE UNA ETAPA INCIERTA 12 de diciembre de 2011 Antonio Navarro [4] Con los populares en Madrid y los islamistas en Rabat se intuyen futuras tensiones entre ambos países.

AFP/Getty Images “Nuestra voluntad es mantener buenas relaciones con España, pero con Rajoy puede que sea más complicado”. Lo ha dicho Abdelilá Benkirane, el flamante nuevo primer ministro del Gobierno de Marruecos y secretario general del islamista moderado Partido Justicia y Desarrollo. Tras la amplia victoria electoral del PJD en las elecciones legislativas adelantadas del pasado 25 de noviembre, es la primera vez que un islamista lidera uno de los gabinetes del reino alauita de Marruecos. Al otro lado del Estrecho, el Partido Popular, el otrora archienemigo de Rabat, acaba de lograr asimismo la mayoría absoluta en los comicios generales. Jorge Moragas, coordinador de Presidencia y Relaciones Internacionales del PP, el hombre encargado en los últimos meses de preparar el terreno a Mariano Rajoy en la siempre compleja relación con Marruecos, tendía la mano a los líderes del país vecino: “El próximo gobierno de España trabajará

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con el marroquí en un clima de cooperación y amistad”. “España y Marruecos son mucho más que vecinos”, remataba. ¿Pura retórica o prevención ante una etapa que augura nuevas tensiones? Un año ha pasado desde la multitudinaria marcha organizada en Casablanca por el régimen para defender la marroquinidad del Sáhara Occidental a raíz de los episodios violentos registrados en un campamento de protesta levantado en los alrededores de El Aaiún. El desalojo forzoso de la reivindicación popular por parte de las autoridades marroquíes provocó la condena de numerosas autoridades europeas. En Casablanca, los participantes en la marcha patriótica, que estaba encabezada por el secretario general del nacionalista Partido Istiqlal y primer ministro a la sazón, Abbas El Fassi, entonaron en numerosas ocasiones la consigna “PP, enemigo de Marruecos”. El ex jefe del Ejecutivo magrebí acusaba al Partido Popular español y a Mariano Rajoy en particular –que había reprobado la actitud titubeante del presidente Rodríguez Zapatero durante la enésima crisis en la ex colonia española– de estar detrás de la resolución de condena por los hechos de El Aaiún emitida por la Eurocámara en Estrasburgo. “Rajoy atenta contra la integridad territorial de Marruecos (…) Así se descubre el espíritu colonial de sus partidarios”, escribía Abbas El Fassi. Como entonces, con un gobierno nacionalista en Rabat, la cuestión saharaui es la más sensible de cuantas componen la agenda conjunta de Marruecos y España. Lo ha repetido el ya ex ministro de Exteriores marroquí, Taieb Fassi Fihri: “El 90% de nuestra relación con España depende de su actitud sobre el Sáhara”. Moragas, que ya fraguó en septiembre de 2010 en Marrakech una reunión reconciliatoria con representantes del PP y el propio El Fassi, anticipó en una entrevista al diario El País el pasado agosto que la posición del Gobierno de Rajoy sería sensiblemente distinta en relación con el Sáhara Occidental a la de los ejecutivos socialistas: “Fue absurdo abandonar el principio de la neutralidad activa, que hunde sus raíces en los albores de la transición (…) Nuestra idea es volver a esa posición centrada y ajustada a la legalidad internacional, [que] contempla evidentemente la celebración de un referéndum de autodeterminación”. El diplomático popular acusaba a Zapatero de haber adoptado una tesis “francesas, las más cercanas a los marroquíes”. A priori, pues, Madrid será menos aquiescente a partir de ahora con las tesis de Rabat. Marruecos pretende lograr el respaldo definitivo a sus planes de regionalización avanzada para la que fuera colonia española hasta 1975, que los socialistas saludaron en diversas ocasiones. A pesar de las declaraciones de Moragas, lo cierto es que pocas certezas hay sobre la posición que mantendrá hacia el vecino del sur Mariano Rajoy, enfrascado en la acuciante crisis económica doméstica. Todo apunta a que América Latina y la Unión Europea serán los ejes prioritarios de su política exterior. Especialmente significativo es que quizás el hombre más capacitado en las filas populares para preservar las relaciones con Rabat, Gustavo de Arístegui, no haya sido siquiera candidato a las Cortes Generales en los últimos comicios. Algunos observadores apuntan, no obstante, a que Arístegui, diplomático y especialista en el fenómeno yihadista –está además casado con una ciudadana marroquí y bien relacionado en Rabat–, podría ser designado por Rajoy embajador en el país vecino. Por el momento, las primeras declaraciones del nuevo primer ministro marroquí sobre sus relaciones con España invitan a un optimismo moderado. “Con Rajoy comparto la barba y su posición respecto al matrimonio homosexual”, espetaba con ironía Benkirane al diario español El Mundo recién confirmado en su nuevo cargo. “De alguna forma

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somos el PP de Marruecos”, afirmaba en otra entrevista el presidente del Consejo Nacional del PJD, Saaddine el Otmani. Los líderes de Justicia y Desarrollo tratan en las últimas semanas de presentarse ante la opinión pública como una fuerza moderada y respetuosa con las libertades individuales y la democracia, lejana de planteamientos radicales, cuyo único interés inmediato es combatir la pobreza, la corrupción y el analfabetismo. Una formación que quiere mostrarse cercana incluso, como ha salido de boca del propio Benkirane –a pesar de que el propio líder militó en el islamismo radical en su juventud-, a la democracia cristiana europea y, desde luego, al Partido Justicia y Desarrollo de Turquía (AKP), que dirige el primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan. En cualquier caso, a pesar del cambio de signo político el Gobierno marroquí, la política exterior seguirá estando en manos del monarca, como vuelve a consagrar la nueva Constitución aprobada en referéndum el pasado uno de julio. Tras el éxito de las primeras manifestaciones inspiradas en la Primavera Árabe en todo el país –aunque nunca fueran masivas– demandando el fin del absolutismo monárquico y de la corrupción en el seno del establishment –el mazjén–, Mohamed VI impulsaba en una jugada precipitada pero hábil la aprobación de una nueva Carta Magna llamada a democratizar las estructuras del Estado. La celebración de los comicios legislativos anticipados del 25 de noviembre y la victoria islamista moderada –de los que el rey siempre ha desconfiado– culminaban de alguna manera un proceso con el que la monarquía pretende ganar crédito y tiempo.

Mohamed VI sabe, pues, que necesita de adhesiones internas y apoyos exteriores. Pero no es improbable que el nuevo Como ocurrió con la crisis de Melilla en gobierno del islamista Benkirane el verano de 2010 –cuando diversos trate de hacer méritos ante la colectivos del norte de Marruecos monarquía de Mohamed VI con llamaron a boicotear el suministro futuras fricciones con España terrestre a la ciudad española– o las manifestaciones a favor del régimen convocadas a raíz de los episodios de El Aaiún, encender los ánimos patrióticos constituye aún un recurso efectivo. A pesar de que las negativa realidad socioeconómica de Marruecos (posición 130 en el Índice de Desarrollo Humano de las Naciones Unidas, el último del norte de África), la popularidad de la monarquía y la estabilidad del régimen no sufren serias amenazas. Es previsible que Marruecos seguirá avivando la tensión, como viene ocurriendo en los últimos años, con España en las áreas más sensibles: la soberanía de Ceuta y Melilla, la irrenunciable posición de Rabat respecto al Sáhara Occidental, los acuerdos de pesca, la inmigración ilegal, la estabilidad jurídica de las empresas españolas en el país o la lucha contra el yihadismo violento: una manera que se ha mostrado eficaz para lograr que la voz y los intereses de Rabat sean oídos y respetados en Madrid y en Bruselas. También en París y Washington. Un arma útil para la negociación. Son muchos, empero, los intereses comunes compartidos por Madrid y Rabat. Ambos países están condenados a entenderse. Francia y España son los principales socios comerciales de Marruecos y han sido, además, los grandes impulsores del Estatuto Avanzado que Rabat firmaba con Bruselas en 2008 para la integración paulatina del país vecino en la órbita económica comunitaria. La delicada coyuntura que atraviesa la economía española hace previsible que Marruecos ocupe un discreto segundo plano en

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la agenda gubernamental en los próximos meses. Pero no es improbable que el nuevo gobierno del islamista Benkirane trate de hacer méritos ante la monarquía de Mohamed VI con futuras fricciones con España. Cómo será la respuesta del nuevo Gobierno popular representa aún una incógnita. Lo único claro es que el tobogán podría ser una metáfora válida de las relaciones hispano-marroquíes. Y que, como siempre, tras la tempestad volverá la calma. Artículos relacionados • Depende: Partidos islamistas en el nuevo mundo árabe. [5] Haizam Amirah Fernández y Silvia Moreno • Marruecos: Unas elecciones para que nada cambie. [6] Antonio Navarro • Ceuta/Melilla y Marruecos. [7] • ¿Un vecino islamista? [8] Álvaro Tizón

Source URL: http://www.fp-es.org/espana-y-marruecos-el-inicio-de-una-etapa-incierta Links: [1] http://www.fp-es.org/temas/politica-exterior [2] http://www.fp-es.org/regiones/africa-magreb [3] http://www.fp-es.org/regiones/asia [4] http://www.fp-es.org/autor/antonio-navarro [5] http://www.fp-es.org/depende-partidos-islamistas-en-el-nuevo-mundo-arabe [6] http://www.fp-es.org/marruecos-unas-elecciones-para-que-nada-cambie [7] http://www.fp-es.org/ceuta-melilla-marruecos [8] http://www.fp-es.org/un-vecino-islamista

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Syria: 5,000 dead in violence, says UN human rights chief Navi Pillay says at least 300 children are among the dead as US ambassador Susan Rice urges security council to act Associated Press guardian.co.uk, Monday 12 December 2011 22.50 GMT

More than 5,000 people have died in the nine-month-long Syrian uprising, UN human rights chief Navi Pillay said on Monday. Pillay, the UN high commissioner for human rights, told reporters on Monday that she told security council members of the dramatic increase in deaths during an afternoon briefing. The death toll used by the UN in recent weeks has been around 4,000. Pillay said she recommended that the council refer Syria to the International Criminal Court, the permanent war crimes tribunal, for investigation of possible crimes against humanity. Pillay said that at least 300 children are among the dead, and there are thousands of people in detention. She noted that the last time she briefed the council on Syria, in August, the death toll was at about 2,000. US ambassador Susan Rice said Pillay's briefing "underscores the urgency of the present moment." "Through condemnations issued by the UN general assembly and human rights council and bold steps taken by the Arab League and the government of Turkey, international bodies are starting to match their severe disapproval of Syria's bloody crackdown with concrete steps to bring it to an end," Rice said. "It is past time for the UN security council to do the same." The representatives of France, Britain and Portugal also said it was time for the council to take strong action on Syria. "Today, Navi Pillay placed security council members on notice of the scale of the tragedy unfolding in Syria," said Philippe Bolopion, UN director for Human Rights Watch. "History will judge harshly those who still choose to look the other way," he said. "Inaction is not an option any more."Last month, Russia and China vetoed a western- backed UN security council resolution condemning the bloodshed in Syria. "The only way to resolve the situation in Syria is through a Syrian-led political process, and that means dialogue," Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin said. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/12/syria-5000-dead-violence-un

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12/12/2011 03:35 PM The Web vs. Putin Taking on Russia's Old Guard with New Technology By Benjamin Bidder, Christian Neef and Matthias Schepp The disputed elections in Russia have unleashed a wave of rage and sparked the largest anti-government protests since the end of the Soviet Union, organized via the Internet. The Kremlin seems powerless to stop the online activists as Russians lose their fear. For the first time, Vladimir Putin seems vulnerable. Ilya Varlamov was in his early 20s when he landed his first $3 million contract. Today, the 27-year-old is head of an information technology company in Moscow that creates intricate three-dimensional architectural models for its clients. His office has all the trappings of success: an Apple computer flanked by an iPhone and modern Russian art hanging on white walls. It was Varlamov who gave shape to the future Olympic stadium in the city of Sochi where Russia will host the 2014 Winter Games. That was a government contract -- one of many that have made him a wealthy man. Varlamov is one of the winners under Vladmir Putin's ongoing 11-year reign. He likes to travel to the West when he goes on vacation. In interviews, he carefully avoids saying anything negative about Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin or President Dmitry Medvedev. It was the same story when Medvedev, who loves to pose with his iPad for photographs, broke his promise that there would be "no censorship on the Internet as long as I am in the Kremlin." Varlamov held his tongue for a long time, but now that's over. Russia Wakes Up The fraudulent election on Dec. 4 seems to have jolted the country out of its slumber, and the Russian people appear to be overcoming their fear of the regime and of control and repression. Now, the new Russia is combating the old one: Blogs and other online campaigns are exposing the lies propagated on TV and the oppression inflicted by the police and intelligence agencies, while Twitter users are protesting against the hackers that the Kremlin allegedly hired to silence reports of electoral fraud. Varlamov, who gives his staff instructions via smart phones and computers, recently hired 20 journalists to run the Ridus news website, which is critical of the regime. The reporters and editors sit in an open-plan office where numerous laptops sit on natural wood tables. Scribbled notes and drawings cover the walls. One of these depicts the logo of the government-controlled television station NTV under a pile of excrement. Eleven years ago, Putin had natural gas giant Gazprom take over the network, which was critical of the government at the time. Ever since then, NTV has been broadcasting propaganda on the Kremlin's orders. Varlamov's staff provide an alternative to the official line. On the Ridus portal, anyone can publish news, opinions and photos.

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"I now only believe what I can see with my own eyes," says Varlamov, adding that this motivated him to spread the news about the uproar against the Kremlin and mingle with the Muscovites protesting against Putin. A One-Man News Agency Over 57,000 people subscribe to his Twitter feed. During the protests, Varlamov became a kind of one-man news agency. "Clashes and brawls. Gas sprayed," he tweeted from central Moscow. When thousands of demonstrators gathered there, he broadcast the protest live on one of his websites. Half a million viewers were watching. "I show people what the TV networks refuse to," he says. With his words, he touches on the very core of the worst legitimation crisis in the otherwise smooth political career of former KGB officer Putin. How much of what the prime minister says do people still believe? Even more important: What don't they believe anymore? Times have changed. The idealized world of inexpensive public housing and successful anti-corruption initiatives depicted on TV now clashes with a counter-version presented by bloggers. Today, an increasing number of new websites reveal to Russia's 60 million Internet users how the parliamentary election was rigged in favor of Putin's United Russia party. These days it should be clear to everyone that the election does not reflect the current mood in the country. According to official results, United Russia received nearly 50 percent of the votes, the Communists garnered 19 percent, and two puppet parties came in with 13 and 12 percent, respectively. Other political factions are not represented at all: the nationalists, whose "Russia for Russians" slogan enjoys broad support -- and the narrow segment of the population consisting of pro-Western democrats, who are well-educated and thus essential to the modernization of this giant country. Only just a few months ago, Putin achieved popularity ratings that were twice as high as those enjoyed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Putin seemed unassailable -- but that has changed. His party lost 15 percent, over 12 million votes, compared to the last parliamentary election in 2007. Independent election observers believe that, at least in larger cities, a correct count would have given United Russia 10 to 15 percent fewer votes than the already disappointing result. On Saturday, tens of thousands of people protested against the alleged electoral fraud across Russia in the biggest anti-government rallies since the end of the Soviet Union. The biggest protests were in central Moscow. Police estimated the size of the crowd at 30,000 people, but organizers claimed that as many as 100,000 people took part. In St. Petersburg, around 7,000 people took to the streets, and demonstrations took place in over 60 other cities. Police showed unusual restraint, with only about 100 arrests across the country, a low figure by Russian standards. On Sunday, President Medvedev appeared to respond to Saturday's demonstrations by announcing on his Facebook page that he had ordered a probe into the electoral fraud allegations. Feeling Betrayed The macho politician Putin is starting to falter: Could it be that this man, who controls vast quantities of natural resources and currency reserves, is facing something far worse than a difficult campaign for the presidential election in three months? Could he be chased from power like an Arab autocrat?

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"The czar is suddenly wearing no clothes," notes Victor Erofeyev, who is probably Russia's best-known living author. The revolutionary year 2011 with its protests has now also arrived in calm Russia, he says. And fellow Russian author Eduard Uspensky remarked that, although it was impossible to combat the scrupulousness and insolence of Putin's party, "we can show these people that no one needs them anymore." The Russians have apparently followed this advice. This time around, many are upset about things that they used to accept with a shrug of the shoulders. Putin has become a kind of eternal Brezhnev for many of them -- a symbol of the stagnation that plagues the country. President Medvedev, who, at least for a while, embodied the hopes of the liberal intelligentsia, has been reduced to a puppet figure, docilely allowing himself to be shoved aside, making way for Putin to resume the presidency. The tactical maneuver of a tandem leadership for the purpose of maintaining power didn't work. In fact, it has played into the hands of opposing forces and fueled the resistance of the disenchanted who now feel betrayed by Medvedev. Now, for the first time since General Alexander Lebed challenged President Boris Yeltsin in the 1996 election, a possible rival has entered the political stage, someone who is capable of rousing the enthusiasm of many Russians -- the 35-year-old corporate lawyer and blogger Alexey Navalny. 'I Hate Putin for Looting the Country' The Kremlin has been afraid of him ever since Navalny exposed shady deals worth billions in a state-owned corporation. The regime repeatedly tried to discredit the activist, who briefly studied in the US, as a lackey of the West. On the day of the parliamentary election, Navalny tweeted virtually by the minute to report on electoral fraud, and the following evening he gave a speech in which he spoke of the "crooks and thieves" in the government. Shortly thereafter he was arrested -- an event that can also be seen on YouTube. Even while he was on his way to the court, which would later sentence him to 15 days in jail, he sent greetings to his supporters via Twitter. Navalny is the exact opposite of the technocrats that Putin has surrounded himself with. He is an online politician and, on top of that, a real man -- what the Russians call a muzhik. He doesn't belong to the liberals who are seen as weaklings in Russia; he is a nationalist who doesn't even have qualms about marching through the streets of Moscow with fascists. Navalny's rhetoric is belligerent. "I hate Putin and his close advisers for looting the country. Sooner or later we will punish them," he told SPIEGEL, speaking in his spartanly furnished office before he was arrested. Over the past few years, Russia's leadership has grown used to the idea of being able to control and manipulate the public. Putin's "political technologists" launched smear campaigns whenever it served their purposes; they created political parties only to allow them to die again soon thereafter. Disgusted or merely bored with the endless re-runs of the same old political show, an increasing number of Russians see Navalny as the face that they have been yearning for. The Russian edition of Esquire magazine even put a photo of the hero on its glossy cover. However much Russia has changed over the past two decades, its politicians remain largely the same -- geriatric and gray oppositional figures from yesteryear. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, now 67, has already lost three presidential elections. Vladimir Zhirinovsky's nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia now serves as 458

nothing more than a stage for the one-man show of its once feared leader. And in the office of the democratic Yabloko party, which failed to clear the 7 percent hurdle to secure seats in the State Duma, a poster from 1996 is still hanging on the wall. Online Struggle A man like Navalny would be a hopelessly marginalized figure, if not for a decisive change that has taken place since the 2007 election: The battle for public opinion is now being fought where the Kremlin can't dictate the rules: online. One of the world's largest machines of repression is largely powerless against the new digital world. Russia's domestic intelligence agency, the FSB, has over 350,000 staff members, while the Interior Ministry has 200,000 troops at its disposal. Equipped with armored cars and helicopter gunships, they have been trained to crush demonstrations -- but they cannot prevent Web-based reports of ballot box stuffing. Over 1.9 million YouTube viewers watched a representative of electoral commission Number 2501 as he made row after row of check marks, presumably for United Russia. It doesn't make matters any better when Putin's press spokesman announces a fresh start and speaks of "Putin 2.0," as if the prime minister just needed an update. "The new Putin software isn't compatible with the old processor," says blogger and radio commentator Matvei Ganapolsky. "We have to replace the entire computer." In view of his dwindling popularity, Putin is breathing life into old stereotypes of Russia's enemies to draw attention away from his own failures. This can be best observed in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is surrounded by EU member states. Kaliningrad is one of three large cities in which the governing party has been voted out of office and beaten at the polls by the Communists. They won here with 30 percent of the vote, while Putin's United Russia party only received 25 percent. After the election defeat, the governor of the region was summoned to deliver a report to the Kremlin, as if the government in Moscow were not responsible for the mood in the country. On Wednesday evening, outraged young people chanted in the center of old Kaliningrad: "Putin is a thief!" and "Our patience is over!" On the town square, the news quickly spread that the Russian general staff had just stationed S-400 anti-aircraft missiles in the region of Kaliningrad. These weapons are capable of shooting down NATO aircraft and missiles. President Medvedev also threatened to have additional attack missiles deployed in reaction to the failed negotiations with the Americans on a joint European missile defense system. It was certainly no coincidence that Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov presented the S-400 only three days after the election. Indeed, it was a symbolic act. 'We're Still Standing' Some 100 kilometers (60 miles) east of Kaliningrad, Putin's rhetoric doesn't even seem to work anymore with World War II veterans. When a number of them met last week in Sovetsk, a town on the eastern border of the exclave, a new distance to the regime could also be observed among the old-timers. "We've lived here on the border in fear all our lives," said 80-year-old Zinaida Rutman. "This fear was often artificially stirred up by our own leaders -- always when they wanted to regain the loyalty of the people." Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin activists have launched a wave of bot attacks to drown out the opposition's tweets. By last Friday evening 50,000 people had signed up for a

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demonstration on Saturday via the social networks VKontakte and Facebook. The FSB called on VKontakte operators to shut down forums used by the opposition. "Out of principle, we don't do something like that," tweeted Pavel Durov, the head of VKontakte, a short time later. "I don't know how this will end for us, but we're still standing." The Russians are in the process of losing their fear. Translated from the German by Paul Cohen URL: Benjamin Bidder, Christian Neef and Matthias Schepp The Web vs. Putin Taking on Russia's Old Guard with New Technology12/12/2011 03:35 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,803164,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: Russians Protest Electoral Fraud http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-76151.html • Photo Gallery: Opposing Putin 2.0 http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-76149.html • The World from Berlin: Vladimir Putin's Russia 'Is Decaying' (12/06/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,802049,00.html • Missile Defense Spat: A New Arms Race Looms between Russia and US (12/06/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,801961,00.html • A Disappointing Landslide: Poor Election Showing Weakens Putin (12/05/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,801665,00.html • Russian Opposition Leader: 'Putin Wants To Govern for the Rest of His Life' (12/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,800546,00.html

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Syrian opposition: Deadline nears for Homs

residents to stop dissent or face attack By the CNN Wire Staff 2011-12-12T07:05:56Z CNN.com

The Syrian government has given activists in the flashpoint city of Homs a 72-hour- deadline to halt demonstrations. (CNN) -- Syrian residents in the city of Homs face a looming deadline to stop anti- government protests, hand in weapons and surrender defecting military members by Monday night -- or face attack by the government forces, an opposition leader said. Syrian forces gave a 72-hour warning, said Lt. Col. Mohamed Hamdo of the Free Syrian Army, an opposition group consisting of defected Syrian military personnel. Activists on the ground said the ultimatum was issued on Friday for Homs, which has been a center of the popular uprising. The Syrian government has not acknowledged such a deadline on state-run media. On Monday, state TV painted a picture of normalcy, with reports of local elections under way across the country. The state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) noted that more than 3,000 candidates are vying for seats in the Homs region alone. It billed the elections as part of the "process of building institutions, promoting democracy and achieving the comprehensive reform process led by President Bashar al-Assad." But reports of violence across Syria on Monday suggested the conflict was far from over. Fierce clashes broke out between security forces and defectors in the cities of Daraa and Idlib, according to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The organization collects information from people in different parts of the country, The Local Coordination Committees of Syria, a network of opposition activists in the country, said gunfire and tanks centered on checkpoints in the Daraa. Meanwhile, the military has dug trenches around Homs, Hamdo said, and a 461

humanitarian crisis is unfolding as the reported deadline nears. The Syrian National Council, the country's leading opposition movement, had earlier warned of a potential bloodbath in Homs at the hands of the Syrian regime. The council said evidence from activists on the ground "indicate that the regime is paving the way to commit a massacre in order to extinguish the revolution in Homs and to discipline, by example, other Syrian cities that have joined the revolution." Residents in Homs are grappling with a lack of basic needs, Hamdo said. "There is no electricity, water, or communication whatsoever now and the communication breakdown has extended even closer to the Turkish border," he said. The Syrian government denied reports of water and electricity being out in the city, according to SANA. Opposition figures launched a nationwide anti-government strike Sunday, which they called the "strike of dignity." The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said people in Homs and neighboring towns widely joined the strike. But on SANA, the Syrian government quoted people across the country as saying there was no strike and no sign of a strike. Reports of deaths between demonstrators and government forces have escalated over nine months as protesters demand democratic elections and the end of President Bashar al-Assad's regime. Al-Assad has been in power since 2000; his father, Hafez, ruled Syria for three decades. The United Nations said this month that more than 4,000 people have died in Syria since the crackdown began in mid-March. The death toll from violence across Sunday alone reached 23, according to the opposition Local Coordination Committees of Syria (LCC). Five of the dead were children, the group said. SANA, meanwhile, reported that the "bodies of 13 martyrs from the army, security and police forces" were taken "to their final resting place." Four were from Homs. CNN cannot independently confirm events because the Syrian government restricts access of international media to the country. Throughout the Syrian uprising, government officials have described some opposition fighters as armed terrorists and gang members. The Arab League announced it will hold emergency meetings this week in Cairo. In a statement on Egypt's state-run MENA news agency, an Arab League official said leaders will "discuss the Arab response to a message from Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem to approve the signing of an agreement on an Arab League observing mission to Syria with conditions." World leaders have widely condemned Syria's crackdown and called on it to halt violence against the opposition. On Saturday, France expressed its concerns about events in Syria, and warned against Syria launching a military operation against the city of Homs and its population, the French Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

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Al-Assad's regime has denied targeting peaceful protesters. The regime's actions have outraged world powers and sparked sanctions by the Arab League, Turkey, the United States and the European Union. Israeli President Shimon Peres on Sunday described Syria's president as a "killer," implicitly comparing him to Libya's ousted ruler Moammar Gadhafi. "The world decided -- including the Arab world -- to intervene when a leader is beginning to kill his own citizens," Peres told CNN in an interview. "It happened in Libya; it's happening in Yemen; it's happening by the Arab League, for the first time in their experience. They decided to put pressure on an Arab state because the leader is killing his people." CNN's Hamdi Alkhshali, Amir Ahmed and Richard Quest and journalist Mohamed Fadel Fahmy contributed to this report.

Syrian opposition: Deadline nears for Homs residents to stop dissent or face attack 2011-12-12T07:05:56Z http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/12/world/meast/syria- unrest/index.html?eref=ft

Publishing Date: Sun, 11/12/2011 - 10:56

Kerry says Brotherhood elections success unsurprising Author: Al-Masry Al-Youm Staff US Senator John Kerry said Saturday that the success of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in the ongoing parliamentary elections is not surprising. The first phase of elections for Egypt’s lower house, the People's Assembly, started on 28 November. Results have shown the FJP claiming the most seats, followed by the Salafi-led Nour Party and then the liberal Egyptian Bloc. In a meeting Saturday with FJP leaders in Cairo, Kerry urged Egyptian political forces to focus on stimulating the economy and sustaining the current democratic experiment. Kerry stressed that he respects the will of Egyptian voters. Earlier on Saturday, Kerry, who heads the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, met with Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, head of the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri. This is the FJP's third meeting with a US official in three months. FJP President Mohamed Morsy ruled out the possibility of the party making drastic changes to the constitution or the laws regulating relations with investors.

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Morsy added that there has been a consensus over many constitutional principles, most importantly citizenship, public freedoms and civil rights. He highlighted the need for changes to the presidential powers granted by the constitution. Morsy said he does not want to pre-empt the panel that will be elected by the parliament to draft the next constitution. In a press conference held at the US embassy in Cairo on Saturday, Kerry called Islam a “peaceful religion,” adding that Egypt is on the right path to democracy. He noted that the struggling economy is Egypt's biggest challenge and urged Egyptian cooperation with the International Monetary Fund. Kerry voiced concerns that changes to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel would impact the economy, investment, and tourism. Translated from Al-Masry Al-Youm John Kerry Archived Photo?: Publishing Date: Sun, 11/12/2011 - 10:56 Related material US Senator says America welcomes Egypt election results Politicians not surprised by Islamists' electoral success US senator Kerry: Economy is Egypt's main problem

Source URL (retrieved on 19/12/2011 - 12:10): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/543116

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TRIBUNA: SHLOMO BEN AMI El golpe revolucionario de Egipto SHLOMO BEN AMI 11/12/2011 El desarrollo de las revoluciones depende de muchos factores, entre ellos la estructura socioeconómica de cada país, sus tradiciones históricas concretas y, a veces, el papel de las potencias extranjeras. Por consiguiente, nunca se esperó que la primavera árabe fuera a ser un proceso lineal ni una versión en Oriente Próximo de las revoluciones democráticas no violentas que vivió Europa Central en 1989. Egipto es un ejemplo. La estructura de las revoluciones en las sociedades no industrializadas ha incluido casi siempre una sucesión de oleadas revolucionarias y contrarrevolucionarias. La caída del viejo régimen bajo el peso de una rebelión popular no suele ser más que el comienzo de una lucha por controlar en qué dirección va a avanzar la revolución. El movimiento sin líderes de jóvenes egipcios indignados que ocupó la plaza de Tahrir en febrero de 2011 estaba impulsado por dos grandes motivos de protesta: decenios de humillación a manos de Gobiernos autoritarios y la impaciencia generalizada ante la promesa de una "transición democrática" basada en un tortuoso proceso de reforma que nunca afectaba a la estructura de poder fundamental. Del mismo modo, la nueva agitación en las grandes ciudades de Egipto refleja la indignación popular por el hecho de que el Ejército se haya apoderado de la revolución y por la humillante "transición" tutelada por el Consejo Militar Egipcio y el mariscal de campo Hussein Tantawi. En febrero de 2011, las masas de la plaza de Tahrir querían una revolución, pero ahora parece evidente que los oficiales egipcios orquestaron un golpe de Estado. Sacrificaron al expresidente Hosni Mubarak para salvaguardar la vieja estructura de poder, en la que el ejército era un pilar central. Los generales que gobiernan Egipto comparten la desconfianza de Mubarak en la capacidad de los ciudadanos normales de engendrar una democracia viable, y mucho menos que proteja sus intereses. Por consiguiente, el Consejo Militar alargó desesperadamente el periodo de transición y estipuló que la futura constitución no debía prever ningún tipo de control parlamentario del Ejército, cuyo presupuesto está fuera del alcance de las instituciones democráticas. Pero lo más significativo es quizá el deseo de los generales de emular el viejo modelo turco del Ejército como guardia pretoriana del orden constitucional laico. Lo irónico, por supuesto, es que ese modelo ya se ha abandonado en Turquía. La insistencia de los generales en que la constitución les confiriera el poder de definir las amenazas contra la seguridad -incluidas las amenazas políticas- es inaceptable para los egipcios liberales, y es un mensaje, dirigido a los Hermanos Musulmanes, de que el Ejército puede volver a usar cualquier pretexto para designarlos como amenaza pública. Si se salen con la suya, los "hombres a caballo" de El Cairo convertirán Egipto en una democracia tutelada bajo la amenaza constante de un golpe militar. Cualquier democracia árabe digna de tal nombre está obligada a respetar las estructuras sociales y, por tanto, el papel de la religión en la sociedad. El miedo a los islamistas no puede seguir sirviendo de excusa para despreciar las exigencias de libertad política, como hizo Occidente en Argelia en los primeros años noventa, cuando respaldó un

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sangriento golpe militar que negó a los islamistas una clara victoria electoral. El precio que pagó Argelia por la interrupción del proceso democrático fue una guerra civil brutal en la que murieron cientos de miles de argelinos. No cabe duda de que la tarea de conciliar una sociedad devota con los valores de la democracia laica es un empeño difícil. Pero Turquía y, esperemos, Túnez, son ejemplos dignos de ser seguidos. Además, no está nada claro que los Hermanos Musulmanes estén destinados a convertirse en la principal fuerza política de Egipto durante los próximos años, como temen muchos. La importancia actual de los Hermanos nace de su aura de ser la única fuerza de oposición que sobrevivió a la represión de Mubarak, aunque solo fuera porque las mezquitas eran los únicos clubes políticos que el régimen no podía cerrar. En una democracia abierta, el poder de los islamistas se verá diluido irremediablemente por la competencia de una gran variedad de formaciones políticas y sociales. La decisión de los generales egipcios, en la primera fase de la revolución, de ceder a las presiones estadounidenses y sacrificar a Mubarak demuestra que no actúan al margen de la comunidad internacional. Es cierto que la Administración de Barack Obama rehuyó el papel destacado que el expresidente George W. Bush había querido tener en la promoción de la democracia árabe. Obama se limitó a reaccionar a los acontecimientos, sin influir en ellos. Sin embargo, tanto en Egipto como en Túnez, en los primeros momentos de sus respectivas revoluciones, Estados Unidos fue fundamental a la hora de limitar la libertad de actuación del Ejército. La primavera árabe no es solo una revuelta contra los dictadores árabes; es también un enérgico acto de desafío a la complicidad de Occidente con los tiranos de la región. El comportamiento de Estados Unidos, hasta ahora, ha sido penosamente desigual. En Egipto y Túnez desempeñó un papel importante en el momento crucial, cuando hubo que derrocar los viejos regímenes. El rescate de Libia se debió sobre todo a sus vecinos europeos; y, en todo el Golfo y Siria, Estados Unidos prácticamente ha abandonado a los opositores democráticos a su suerte. Las brutales medidas tomadas contra los manifestantes que exigen el fin del Gobierno militar en Egipto deben animar a Estados Unidos a dejar claro al Ejército que es urgente volver a una vía de transición que desemboque en un Gobierno civil. Permitir que los militares -cuyo principal benefactor es Estados Unidos- repriman las demandas populares de libertad y dignidad puede condenar todo el proceso revolucionario y, con él, lo que quede de la frágil credibilidad de Estados Unidos entre los pueblos árabes. SHLOMO BEN AMI (Shlomo Ben Ami fue ministro de Exteriores de Israel y en la actualidad es vicepresidente del Centro Internacional para la Paz de Toledo. Es autor de Cicatrices de guerra, heridas de paz: la tragedia árabe-israelí. © Project Syndicate, 2011. Traducción de María Luisa Rodríguez Tapia.) Shlomo Ben Ami El golpe revolucionario de Egipto11/12/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/golpe/revolucionario/Egipto/elpepiopi/2011121 1elpepiopi_4/Tes

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TRIBUNA: JUAN GOYTISOLO 'Otoño en París' En el cincuentenario de la matanza de argelinos anticolonialistas en la parisina plaza de L'Étoile, un filme de Jacques Panijel recupera su memoria. Reconocer la culpa de aquella odiosa redada honraría a la República JUAN GOYTISOLO 11/12/2011 El pasado 17 de octubre, cuando salía de una boca de metro en Étoile, ignoraba del todo que se cumplían exactamente 50 años de un acontecimiento que marcó profundamente mi vida: la noche en la que la Plaza de la Estrella se tintó de amarillo y recreó en el ánimo de los allí presentes una resucitada y siniestra Étoile jaune. Fue el titular de Le Monde, en un quiosco de la Avenida Friedland, el que reabrió las puertas de la memoria y me proyectó a 1961 en un vertiginoso salto atrás. A fines de los cincuenta del pasado siglo asistía como un modesto aprendiz venido de un mundo subdesarrollado a las veladas de sobremesa en el domicilio de Marguerite Duras y de su pareja de entonces, Dionys Mascolo, en las que un grupo selecto de intelectuales de izquierda -Robert Antelme, Maurice Blanchot, Edgard Morin, Maurice Nadeau...- discutía de sus opciones de compromiso con la causa independentista argelina y con el núcleo duro de sus activistas, los llamados porteurs de valises, discípulos o colaboradores de Sartre y de la redacción de Les Temps Modernes. Como escribí en otra ocasión, figuraba entre ellos la novelista Madeleine Alleins: defensora apasionada de la lucha anticolonialista, pertenecía al entonces célebre reseau Jeanson, un grupo clandestino de ideas marxistas o inspiradas por Frantz Fanon, que procuraba un sostén logístico a la Federación del Frente de Liberación Nacional argelina en la metrópoli. Sus miembros ocultaban dinero, armas, material de propaganda y a los militantes perseguidos por la policía en sus domicilios y en los de sus amistades cercanas. Un buen día, Madeleine Alleins se presentó en casa y nos preguntó a Monique Lange y a mí si estábamos dispuestos a custodiar temporalmente los fondos de la organización. Monique aceptó sin vacilar y Madeleine Alleins acudió días después con un maletón cargado de billetes que depositamos en el estante superior de una alacena junto a la puerta de entrada del piso de Rue Poissonnière. Por espacio de unos meses, la activista telefoneaba al despacho de Monique en Gallimard y le comunicaba en clave una cifra, que ella me transmitía a su vez y yo me encargaba de meter la cantidad indicada en un gran sobre y la entregaba a nuestro enlace a la hora fijada cuando sonaba puntualmente el timbre. Concluida la custodia de los fondos de la organización, la causa independentista argelina no desapareció de nuestro horizonte. Mientras el acoso a la inmigración magrebí, el toque de queda y las rattonades (incursiones violentas de las fuerzas del orden contra los norteafricanos) se extendían como una gangrena, las reuniones en los domicilios de Edgard Morín o Robert Antelme mantenían viva la llama del fervor anticolonialista. Maurice Péju -cuyo excelente libro sobre lo acaecido el 17 de octubre acaba de salir de forma póstuma a la luz después de acumular melancólicamente el polvo- era al parecer uno de los hombres de confianza del fugitivo Francis Jeanson e informaba a los simpatizantes de la estrategia política del FLN. EI Manifiesto de los

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121, encabezado por Sartre y Simone de Beauvoir -un llamamiento a la deserción de los militares franceses que suscribieron mis amigos más próximos, incluidas Monique y Florence Malraux- fue el detonante de una movilización intelectual que no cesó sino con la firma de los Acuerdos de Evian y el reconocimiento de la independencia de Argelia. Pero vuelvo a lo sucedido el 17 de octubre. Días antes, llegó a nuestros oídos la noticia de que el FLN preparaba una respuesta pacífica masiva al toque de queda impuesto a la población argelina y que abarcaba de hecho a la de Túnez y Marruecos (en la noche colonialista todos los moros son pardos). Alguien, no recuerdo quién, nos puso al corriente de que la fecha fijada era ese 17 de octubre cuyas imágenes de fantasmal violencia se grabaron en mi memoria con cruel nitidez. En compañía de un corresponsal argentino de France Presse, fuimos primero a pie a la plaza de la Ópera, tomada totalmente por la policía: hileras de agentes con casco antidisturbios y armados de cachiporras canalizaban el flujo incesante de los magrebíes que subían disciplinadamente la escalera de la boca del metro y los empujaban al interior de los furgones que cortaban el tráfico en todas las avenidas circundantes. Al poco, nos llegó el aviso de que la concentración masiva de quienes desafiaban el toque de queda sin otras armas que su dignidad y coraje se situaba en l'Étoile. Allí, en las vastas aceras de la rotonda que rodea la plaza propiamente dicha, batallones compactos de norteafricanos con los brazos cruzados tras la nuca, ofrecían un espectáculo que retrotraía a las imágenes de las redadas nazis durante la Ocupación. Resueltos, impertérritos, barridos crudamente a brochazos por los focos giróvagos de la policía, aguardaban el momento de ser introducidos a culatazos en los coches celulares hacia un destino desconocido. Entre los testigos de la tropelía, divisé a algunos periodistas y colaboradores de l'Express, France Observateur y Les Temps Modernes. Lo que entonces ignorábamos es que la policía, siguiendo las instrucciones del prefecto Maurice Papon, iba a entregarse a una orgía sangrienta en la que perecieron un centenar y pico de manifestantes. Docenas de estos fueron arrojados al Sena sin que la prensa censurada de la época pudiera establecer un balance preciso de los cadáveres rescatados. La matanza permaneció enterrada en la memoria colectiva no obstante la labor de historiadores como Jean Luc Einaudi, de novelistas como el autor de Meurtres pour mémoire y de cineastas como Rachid Bouchareb, cuya película desdichadamente no he visto. Con motivo del cincuentenario de esos atropellos, varios filmes documentales denuncian hoy la barbarie llevada a cabo en nombre de la supuesta misión civilizadora europea en África y el Magreb: apaleamiento a muerte de manifestantes inermes; ejecuciones de un balazo a quemarropa; apriscamiento de los detenidos en el Palacio de los Deportes; reedición del Vel d'Hiv... Con 50 años de retraso, Francia recobra la memoria y bochorno de aquellas brutalidades gracias al filme Otoño en París de Jacques Panijel, cuya difusión, como la del libro de Péju, no ha sido posible hasta ahora. A quien tenga oportunidad de verlo, sus imágenes de insostenible violencia se superponen a la belleza serena de l'Étoile, con sus palomas, turistas y paseantes ociosos, una Estrella, repito, que por espacio de unas horas se tiñó de amarillo. Y no está de más recordar que fue el mismo Maurice Papon, el prefecto de policía de infame memoria, quien facilitó el traslado de resistentes y judíos de Burdeos a París durante la Ocupación nazi y cuyo destino final fue a menudo el de los campos de exterminio. 468

La historia reitera sus ciclos: los verdugos son a veces los mismos y solo las víctimas cambian. Reconocer la culpa de aquella odiosa redada honraría a una República cuyos proclamados valores son una libertad, igualdad y fraternidad de universal validez. Juan Goytisolo 'Otoño en París', 11/12/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Otono/Paris/elpepiopi/20111211elpepiopi_12/T es ENTREVISTA: Tawakkul Karman Premio Nobel de la Paz "Europa es cómplice de la represión yemení" ALBERTO D'ARGENZIO 11/12/2011

Tawakkul Karman agradece los aplausos en un acto en la Universidad de Michigan en noviembre.- ANGELA J. CESERE (AP)

"No tenemos el petróleo de Libia o Irak, no somos Egipto ni Túnez. Nadie ve lo que pasa en Yemen" "El presidente Saleh me ha amenazado y lo hace con mucha más gente. Pero no dejo a mi pueblo" Está nerviosa. Sus dedos se mueven rápidos sobre el iPad, buscan en la Red, sus ojos devoran la pantalla hasta que logran ver y comprender lo que pasa a miles de kilómetros, en su país. Y lo que pasa en Yemen huele todavía a represión y sangre. "Mirad, las tropas de Saleh bombardearon ayer la ciudad de Taizz" (la segunda del país). "Dicen que están atacando a rebeldes, pero bombardean a civiles", exclama, con voz emocionada y ritmo entrecortado. Es Tawakkul Karman, de 32 años, periodista y 469

premio Nobel de la Paz, la más joven galardonada con el Nobel en la historia y la segunda mujer que recibe esta distinción en el mundo árabe. Distinguida el pasado octubre por el jurado de Oslo por su papel en la primavera árabe junto a otras dos mujeres, las liberianas Ellen Johnson Sirleaf y Leymah Gbowee, a Karman la llaman la madre de la revolución y ella no pierde de vista a su débil criatura. "Saleh", continúa Karman, "sigue atacando a la gente que protesta pacíficamente. Allí no hay rebeldes, hay gente que quiere libertad". Es el comienzo de diciembre. Karman, madre de tres hijos y fundadora de la organización Mujeres periodistas sin cadenas, está de paso por Bruselas invitada por la Federación Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (FIDH), junto a Ezzedine el Asbahi, jefe del Centro de Formación e Información sobre Derechos Humanos de Yemen. El presidente Alí Abdalá Saleh acababa de firmar en Riad, el 23 de noviembre, el plan propuesto por el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG) que prevé que abandone el poder después de 33 años de absoluto libero arbitrio. Ha dejado la silla a su vicepresidente, Abd Rabo Mansur Hadi, que ejercerá el poder hasta las elecciones presidenciales del 21 de febrero de 2012. Pero Saleh no ha renunciado sin más: a cambio ha recibido un salvoconducto internacional, la impunidad para él y los que le son más próximos. Pregunta. Saleh ha prometido irse. Habrá elecciones. ¿Qué está cambiando para Yemen? Respuesta. De momento no cambia nada, el régimen sigue con su actitud criminal día tras día, y si esto ocurre también es responsabilidad de la comunidad internacional y de los países del Golfo. Estos países han entregado a Saleh una prórroga, un tiempo extra para poder golpear, atacar y matar sin riesgo de ser juzgado. Saleh es un asesino, lleva 33 años de poder danzando sobre las cabezas de las serpientes, es decir, tomando el pelo a todos. Antes lo hacía dentro, ahora lo hace fuera de Yemen. Los ha engañado y le han concedido más espacio y margen de maniobra: el acuerdo que firmó en noviembre es una estupenda oportunidad para tomarle el pelo a todos. Mientras no se complete el proceso de transición, Saleh seguirá matando y haciendo lo que quiera. Si la sangre corre en Yemen es responsabilidad de la comunidad internacional. Pero tengo la absoluta certeza de que al final el pueblo yemení ganará su batalla. P. Los partidos de la oposición a Saleh han aprobado el acuerdo... R. La firma del acuerdo es un error que los políticos no quieren ver. Los manifestantes, los defensores de los derechos humanos, vemos este error y lo denunciamos: hay que eliminar la impunidad, empezando por la creación de una comisión de investigación independiente. No basta con decir que la violencia tiene que terminar tal y como prevé la resolución 2014 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. P. ¿Qué más piden a la comunidad internacional y, en concreto, a Europa? R. Antes de la iniciativa del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo, la UE había actuado bien, después se ha perdido. Europa tiene la responsabilidad moral, como paladina de los derechos humanos, de defender a los civiles yemeníes. El Parlamento Europeo y la Alta Representante para la Política Exterior Catherine Ashton tienen que denunciar que la firma del acuerdo es un error, es un acto políticamente engañoso que concede una protección extra al régimen y no a los civiles. Aparte de la comisión de investigación independiente, pedimos a Europa que actúe para que el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU congele los bienes de Saleh y de su familia, así como que tome medidas concretas 470

para el embargo de armas. El patrimonio familiar del presidente se utiliza para comprar armas, reprimir al pueblo yemení y seguir matando. Además, la comunidad internacional debe llevar a Saleh ante el Tribunal Penal Internacional y presionar para que el Gobierno actúe contra la corrupción (según el informe 2011 de Transparencia Internacional, Yemen está a la cola a nivel mundial en cuanto a transparencia: de 183 países ocupa el puesto 164, es decir, es el decimonoveno país más corrupto). P. Europa, aunque con retrasos, ha incluido a toda la familia de Asad y sus generales en una lista negra; lo mismo hizo con Gadafi, ha presionado a los regímenes de Túnez y El Cairo. ¿Por qué cree que no quiere actuar contra Saleh? R. La pregunta es por qué dan la posibilidad a Saleh de matar, por qué no intervienen. No tenemos el petróleo de Libia o Irak, no somos Egipto ni Túnez, no somos estratégicos como Siria, nadie quiere ver lo que pasa en Yemen, somos víctimas de la geografía. Así que en Yemen los civiles mueren dos veces: golpeados por las balas y por el silencio de la comunidad internacional. Veinticinco millones de yemeníes, el 70% de ellos mujeres y niños, están diciendo a Europa que su silencio y su falta de compromiso para juzgar y punir a quien mata equivale a ser cómplice. También Turquía, hiperactiva en el frente sirio, libio y egipcio, no dice nada sobre Yemen. Fui a la Embajada turca en Nueva York, pero no tuve respuestas. P. Usted habla de congelar los bienes de Saleh. ¿Dispone de una estimación de cuánto y qué tienen él y su familia en Europa? R. La UE y las demás instituciones internacionales cuentan con más información que nosotros. Tenemos algunos datos básicos sobre activos, patrimonios, cuentas bancarias y depósitos y propiedades en Francia, Alemania, Suiza, Dubai y Bahréin. Pero seguro que hay más. Hemos pedido un listado de los miembros del régimen involucrados en casos de corrupción para que se pueda actuar no solo contra Saleh, sino también contra sus acólitos. P. ¿Qué ha cambiado en estos meses de revolución en la sociedad civil yemení? R. La sociedad civil está tomando iniciativas importantes no solo para la protección de los ciudadanos sino también para el desarrollo del país. Pedimos justicia, lucha contra la corrupción, reformas económicas... Las ONG están desarrollando un papel crucial y la revolución está creando vínculos, conexiones importantes entre organizaciones, está uniendo a la sociedad yemení entre ella misma. El poder de la juventud crece, el poder de las mujeres aumenta... Esta es la verdadera voz de la gente, la fuerza de la revolución, la escenificación del futuro que quiere el pueblo, empezando por el derecho de expresión y de manifestación, la igualdad. Jóvenes y mujeres están demostrando que son capaces de crear este nuevo Yemen. Al mismo tiempo es importante subrayar el papel de la sociedad civil internacional, la única que puede recoger, denunciar y amplificar lo que pasa en mi país. P. Dicen que Saleh la amenazó por teléfono. ¿Eso es cierto? R. Sí, me ha amenazado y sigue haciéndolo, y lo hace con mucha más gente. Amenaza, tortura, mata. Pero no tengo miedo. No dejo a mi pueblo. Volveré por nuestra sociedad.- Alberto D'argenzio Tawakkul Karman Premio Nobel de la Paz "Europa es cómplice de la represión yemení"11/12/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/Europa/complice/represion/yemeni/elpepusoc dmg/20111211elpdmgrep_5/Tes 471