Forty-First Annual

World Affairs Institute

November 18, 2011 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Briefing Paper

The World Affairs Institute is a Community Service Project of the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh and Rotary International

World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh 2640 BNY Mellon Center • 500 Grant Street • Pittsburgh, PA 15219-2510 412-281-7970 • fax 412-281-1795 email: [email protected] • www.worldpittsburgh.org © 2011 World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh

The Arab Awakening: A Call for Change in the Middle East and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

CONTENTS

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...…..1

A Survey of American Interests in the Middle East Since 1945…………………………………………………………………….2

Underlying Causes of Revolt..……………..……….……………………………………………………….………………………….4

Revolts Across the Arab Region………….……..…………………………………………………………………….……………….6

Tunisia.…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………....6

Egypt..…………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………..…….....6

Yemen...…………………………………………………………………………..……………………………..……………...7

Saudi Arabia...…………………………………………………………..……………………………..……………………….8

Key Articles from The New York Times ………………………………………………………..…………………………..10

Spotlights on the Impact of Social Media and Women Protestors on the Arab Awakening……..………………..…………...12

American Foreign Policy Consequences……………………………………………………………………………..…...………...14

Map from The Economist May 10, 2011.

Introduction

The Middle East, locally dubbed “the mother of the world” for its contributions to global culture and history, today exhibits conflict in virtually every state. In North Africa, autocrats have been deposed by youth-driven social movements in Tunisia and , while in the Gulf countries monarchs have clung to power, making rapid changes to social programs to meet citizen demands. Syria and Libya are experiencing widespread civil unrest. In the far reaches of the region, chaos plagues as the state moves towards civil war, while Saudi Arabia weighs this conflict on its shared border and manages domestic protests. In Bahrain, the government has assaulted and arrested citizens, as well as physicians who treated protestors and government loyalists alike, all in an effort to keep the monarchy in power. These extremely diverse conflicts in 2011 led to a significant spike in both regional violence and revolutionary fever, and taken together have been labeled the Arab Awakening . These uprisings have also been referred to as the , the Arab Rebellions, and the Arab Revolutions.

The Arab Awakening undoubtedly changes inter-Arab diplomacy, but also challenges long-standing actors such as the United States to reconsider its role in the Arab world. For American interests, a difficult balancing act between supporting liberalization and upholding traditional alliances means that any political or military action must be carefully recalculated. Developing a widespread policy is almost impossible due to the diversity of countries in the region and rapidly changing political and social situations. The U.S. will have to carefully consider its next moves in the Middle East. In the process, it will have to reassess relationships that previously were crafted to maintain regional stability. It is very difficult today to determine what states will look like in the near future, and even more challenging to anticipate where they will be in the coming decades. This background paper will discuss American interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), diagnose the underlying causes of the Arab Awakening revolts, depict the events as they occurred, and assess American policy moving forward. Sidebars will address a range of issues related to the Arab Awakening and related events.

A note to readers: This paper focuses on developments which are rapidly unfolding. The authors encourage readers to utilize the resources in the back of this text and the Institute blog at www.WAIpittsburgh.wordpress.com for the most up- to-date information about the region.

Arab countries find themselves weighed down by long-serving regimes and high rates of unemployment.

With the ouster of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Egyptians were emboldened and Freedom of the were able to force from office. With many of these leaders press is often tied to serving decades at a time, with growing young populations and tough other forms of economic conditions, the entire region is experiencing political upheaval. freedom and democracy in a country. Every year the watchdog group Freedom House produces a report of 195 countries, and ranks them on a scale of zero to 100, with zero as the most free and 100 as the least .

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discuss oil sales to the U.S., creating a standing place in A Survey of American Interests American foreign policy for oil producing states. in the Middle East Since 1945 Henceforth, a special economic and political association came to exist between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, as well Since 1945, American foreign policy in the Middle East as with members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum has focused on three key areas: acquiring oil from the Exporting Countries (OAPEC.) Persian Gulf states; securing the state of Israel; and limiting anti-Western forces and sentiments throughout While actively developing relationships in the Arab world, the region, including post-September 11, 2001 pursuits to the U.S. also supported the 1948 creation of the state of combat terrorism. The actors targeted by these policies Israel, thereby fundamentally positioning itself between have changed over time – from combating Soviet Arab and Israeli interests. The Zionist founders of Israel influences in the region to the present struggle against Al- sought a secure, self-determining, and sacred homeland Qaeda and Islamic militantism – yet, these three central based on religious writings in the Torah , the Jewish holy issues continue to frame American strategy in the region. book, as well as based upon their collective experience as victims of genocide during the Holocaust. In the Arab At the end of World War I, Western influences permeated world, resentment over American support for a Jewish the Middle East as the concept of the “nation-state” was nation-state abounded, particularly because the idea of abandoned in favor of French and British spheres of an Islamic nation-state has been demonized in the West, imperial influence, later known as the mandate period. and due to the great number of Palestinians who fled from This precedent shaped U.S. policy, particularly in the Israel to the Arab states in 1948 and in the years after. post-World War II period, as the United States joined European nations in injecting national interests into The 1950s and 1960s marked a change colonial status, regional dialogues determining state independence and as European direct rule dwindled, to independent Arab sovereignty. states. During the Cold War period, the Soviet sphere of influence – particularly the relationship between the American foreign policy interests in the Middle East have Soviet Union and Iran – prompted American concerns been directly related to the region’s significant about competition for Middle East oil supplies. As the concentration of oil reserves, which account for between U.S.-Soviet rivalry played out in the developing world, two-thirds and three-fourths of the world’s shares. The American foreign policy interests focused dually on Soviet beginning of America’s so-called “oil addiction” dates to containment and balancing European regional interests. this period, during which the Allied powers focused on As Arab leaders realized that they could benefit from obtaining access to the region’s petroleum. At the close of politically manipulating Western and Soviet actors against World War II in 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt one another, inter-Arab tensions heated up as states personally met with Saudi Arabian King Abdul Aziz to received weapons from both parties. Soviet-supplied pan- Arabist leader former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser established a bolder stance against Israel. This position agitated European, American, and Israeli interests, and eventually led to the 1956 Suez Crisis.

One may think that the Suez Crisis, in addition to numerous wars fought between the Arabs and Israelis, would disrupt oil sales to the U.S. However, the largest disruption to the U.S. oil supply came later, serving as a political statement by members of the OAPEC. In 1973, as a reaction to American support for Israel’s position in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem, OAPEC oil producers cut production by five percent, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait later making more significant cuts. Soon after, nearly all members of the larger Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), including countries in Latin America, refused to sell oil to the U.S. until it ceased its support of Israel. However, the mutually beneficial nature of the OAPEC-American relationship was exemplified when American support for Israel continued, and as of January 1974, the OAPEC countries had returned to their original production amounts, later increasing production an additional 10% as relations normalized.

King Saudi Arabian King Abdul Aziz (left) and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt meet in 1979 was a significant milestone for American 1945. Photo courtesy of the National Archives. involvement in the region due to a series of political 2 © 2011 W ORLD A FFAIRS C OUNCIL OF P ITTSBURGH

developments which took place that year. These developments set the stage for deeper U.S. military and strategic involvement in the region during the 1980s. First, American President facilitated the signing of an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty by then-Egyptian President and Israeli Prime Minister . Elsewhere in the region, Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power in Iran after a revolt ousted U.S. ally Mohammed Reza Shah, and in Iraq, Saddam Hussein became president. Later in 1979, in post- revolution Iran, university students took 53 Americans hostage for 444 days, heightening tensions between the U.S. and the new Islamic republic. In Saudi Arabia, Islamic militants took over the Grand Mosque in the holy city of Mecca, foreshadowing tensions between such groups and the Saudi Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (left), U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin make a monarchy in the years to come. three-way handshake at the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. (1979) Photo from The Carter Center Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan incited American covert operations to airplane hijackings, resulting in airline crashes into the support Afghan militants with weapons and aid to be World Trade towers in New York City and the Pentagon used against the rival superpower. These militants would in Washington, DC, as well as in a rural Pennsylvania later establish the Taliban government, which allowed the field. This large-scale attack pushed American policy to radical Islamic network al-Qaeda to base operations focus heavily on combating terrorism within the Middle within the state. This tumultuous year greatly diversified East, and in 2001 and 2003, the U.S. launched wars in American interests in the region, yet U.S. foreign policy Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. priorities continued to include operations that secured oil, supported Israel, and curbed anti-American sentiments In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. was and actions. The myriad of challenges that stymied challenged to respond to a fundamentally-changed geo- Washington’s ability to act effectively and successfully in political environment. The Middle East remains a vexing the Middle East during the 1980s became even more challenge. Yet, this region is central to U.S. interests and complex in the 1990s and following the 9/11 terrorist to worldwide security and stability. The U.S. is attacks. simultaneously embroiled in conflict in the region and trying to serve as an “honest broker” in promoting peace. In 1990, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, along with the other As noted by Robert Malley and Peter Harling in the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council including Bahrain, September/October 2010 edition of Foreign Affairs , “the Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, U.S. is currently juggling many competing and at times were drawn closer together following the Iraqi invasion of incompatible interests.” Currently, U.S. foreign policy Kuwait. In an effort to defend Kuwaiti oil fields, the U.S. seeks to curb Iran’s clout in the region while stationed troops in Saudi Arabia, and fought the Persian simultaneously creating stability in Iraq. The U.S. Gulf War from this position. After nearly six months, Iraqi continues to align itself closely with Israel, focusing on forces fled Kuwait and the war ended in February 1991 state security, with Arab states forging partnerships to without deposing Saddam Hussein from power. The ensure a steady supply of oil, and finally with pro- American military’s continued presence in Saudi Arabia American allies throughout the region who discourage particularly inflamed Saudi-born al-Qaeda leader Osama extremism. Yet, just as the U.S. is trying to exert bin Laden. pressure in the region, it is perceived to be far less dominant than in the past. In the late 1990s, al-Qaeda operatives staged attacks on American outlets abroad, including the bombing of the USS Cole and American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The group also launched a first attack on the World Trade Center in New York City. On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda enacted a series of simultaneous

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their search for employment. Unemployment creates Underlying Causes of Revolt personal problems as well: without an income, marriage

The recent revolts in the Arab world dominate the proves impossible, stunting the social and familial American foreign policy agenda, and understanding the prospects of young men and women. Marriage causes of the uprisings makes it easier to foresee their constitutes the opportunity for adult independence, and long-term effects on the region and on American those who remain unwed live with their families in a interests. Due to the complexity of the region and each of period of “waithood,” or a lull before full transition into its individual conflicts, establishing the commonalities adult life. among the Arab countries proves vital to determining how these events fit together. Though on a state-by-state In addition to a large youth population, the basis the uprisings look very different, there are a disengagement of military and social elites from state number of common challenges which are found in the leadership ripened conditions for revolt. Dictators, who region’s protests. typically have limited ideology and a thirst for wealth and power (such as Libyan Muammar el-Qaddafi, Syrian First, and perhaps foremost, bulges in the youth Bashar al-Assad, Tunisian Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, population contribute to large numbers of educated, but Egyptian Hosni Mubarak, and Yemeni Ali Abdullah often unemployed, young adults in the MENA region. The Saleh) established a tradition of providing social elites area has the highest concentration of young people in with contracts, special positions, and monetary gifts to the world. As of 2005, nearly 95 million youths (15-24 maintain favor and domestic legitimacy. This obvious years of age) lived in the Middle East. In Egypt alone, corruption and abuse exploited foreign aid and economic 60% of the population is under 30 years of age, while in growth, and caused unemployment and a shrinking of the Saudi Arabia, 38% of the country’s 25.7 million people middle class. Some scholars suggested that to maintain are 14 years old or younger. According to the United these perks, state militaries would shoot on their own Nations Development Programme’s Egypt Human citizens, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia. However, Development Report 2010, “…the failure to control when elites no longer benefited from their relationship population growth has resulted in a serious loss in with state leadership, or the state’s actions became too productivity and an accompanying decline in real wages radical and illegitimate, they ceased supporting them. and stagnation in the standard of living of those Similarly, when military elites felt that a rogue political employed in the public and private sectors.” This leader jeopardized their position or endangered national statement certainly resonates throughout the region, security, they were likely to distance themselves from the where population growth has been significant and wages government to maintain power, as was the case with remain meager. both the Tunisian and Egyptian military establishments.

As of 2008, total enrollment in primary schooling across Another definitive condition for the Arab Awakening was the region reached nearly 100% among males, and 91% the creation of citizen coalitions, which have appeared in among females. 97% of this group completes primary all countries involved in the revolts. Though military and school, and 95% of that group seeks some type of social elites may disengage from the state to spur revolt, secondary schooling. However, much of this education is sub- standard, taught by ill-equipped teachers, focused on skills that are largely irrelevant in the job market, and mostly inaccessible for poor and rural segments of the population, particularly women and girls.

Even with university degrees, students in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Bahrain are less likely to be employed than those with only primary and secondary education. Youth unemployment rates currently reach nearly 20% in many MENA states. While this largely frustrated population contributes to the organization of many of the Awakening’s most popular opposition movements, they remain susceptible to co- optation by extremist groups during

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citizens from a variety of socio- economic, religious, and ethnic stripes engage with one another to express their discontent. Considering the great deal of sectarian strife present in MENA countries, forming diverse coalitions becomes all the more vital to overhauling the state apparatus. For example, Egyptian Christians were outraged by a 2011 New Year’s Day church bombing in carried out by Islamic extremists, yet weeks later joined with members of the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the protests against Mubarak due to their common struggles against the state.

Likewise, the momentum of youth coalitions conceived prior to the Arab revolts has played an active role in mobilizing networks to combat the state. and applied similar diplomatic force to leaders throughout The Egyptian Coalition of January 25 Youth , a the region. combination of workers movements, human rights activists, and youth protestors, organized the By extension, international media attention amplified demonstrations that ultimately ousted Mubarak from protestors’ issues. In the Arab Awakening, Doha-based power. Their leadership allowed other groups to join in television networks al-Jazeera and al-Jazeera English protest, and brought Egyptians from all backgrounds into provided live coverage of demonstrations and the streets. Similar groups appeared throughout nearly government reactions, particularly in Egypt, Syria, Libya, all Arab states, many employing non-violence tactics and Tunisia. This service conveyed valuable information adopted from foreign resistance groups, such as the to protestors, allowing them to learn from each other’s Serbian group Otpor! As evidenced throughout the experiences and to project their messages in the global region, the willingness of citizens to leverage their arena. However, Arab critics of the news service suggest collective capacity against the state marks a crucial that the agency, due to its affiliation with the Qatari emir, condition for successful revolt. have pushed a liberal agenda reflective of life inside Qatar, serving to condemn conservative Arab rulers. Furthermore, international support for revolts pressured Throughout the Arab Awakening, al-Jazeera reporters autocratic state leadership to limit its armed forces from have been beaten and jailed, and stations have been attacking citizens. The international community refused suspended or closed in many states. Commentators note to support dictators militarily or diplomatically to that while the revolts did not occur because of al- encourage change. Throughout the protests, the U.S. Jazeera , they certainly would not have progressed so and Western allies called for reform, and ultimately quickly without the network’s influence in the region. denounced many Arab leaders. Libya served as an example in which the international community had clearly Finally, food shortages fueled resentment towards the denounced Qadaffi’s actions. Near the beginning of the state, representing the worst of citizen dissatisfaction, crisis, the imposed sanctions on Libya government corruption, and social inequality in years due to concerns about war crimes against citizens, while prior to the Arab Awakening. Regional food prices rose the Arab League instituted a no-fly zone over the country. 32% in 2010, creating a dire situation for hungry MENA Later the United Nations pushed harder, authorizing families. In Yemen, nearly nine million citizens have been North Atlantic Treaty Oragnization-led American and struggling to meet basic food needs, meaning that one in European air strikes to enforce the no-fly zone. Leaders three people are food insecure, and 50% of children from the African Union visited Qadaffi to talk about a suffer stunted growth from malnutrition. During the crisis peaceful transition, yet his refusal to step down and on- in Libya, ongoing attacks in the city of Misrata have going violence against his own citizens finally prompted deprived citizens of basic food and water. Food scarcity the International Criminal Court to issue a warrant for his has come to symbolize the stark contrast between those arrest on charges of war crimes. The international living in poverty and wealth, fueling revolutionary community progressively pressured Qadaffi to resign, tensions among the poor and famished.

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Revolts in the Arab Region

From a distance, the Arab revolts seem to have developed suddenly and without warning. In reality, the mounting pressures of daily life created the conditions for revolt. When coupled with a variety of key revolutionary acts, riots began throughout the region, dramatically altering the political landscape. This section will provide a timeline featuring case studies on how events in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia unfolded. In addition, key articles from The New York Times will highlight the conflict in Syria and Libya.

This list of countries is not comprehensive, however, these states have shaped the narrative of the revolts, and their stories touch upon key areas of U.S. interest in the region. Additional information on developments throughout the region are explored further on the companion website available at www.WAIpittsburgh.wordpress.com.

Tunisia

Before serving as the catalyst country that empowered a region to stand in revolt against its corrupt leaders, Tunisia had long endured the rule of President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. His presidency began on November 7, 1987, in affiliation with the Constitutional Democratic Rally Party. The current Tunisian constitution does not stipulate term limits, and the sitting president appoints his prime minister, thus controlling most of the political process.

Throughout the reign of Ben Ali, Tunisians faced many of the same struggles that challenged fellow Arab citizens across the region. The median population is 30 years of age, illustrating an obvious youth bulge in the population. Citizens were widely educated but very few were gainfully employed. Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia maps courtesy of geology.com Unlike many places in the Arab world, Tunisia had a middle class and a functioning private business sector. ultimately took his wares, he lit himself on fire in front of However, the draining effects of nepotism and corruption, the municipal offices that denied his request to take legal particularly on the part of First Lady Leila Trabelsi and action against the officers. He was severely burned. her extensive network of relatives in every sector of the economy and business, created hostility among citizens Bouazizi’s act spurred Tunisians throughout the country struggling to find work. to protest government corruption and to voice citizen dissatisfaction. Bouazizi’s death on January 4, 2011, For one Tunisian citizen, 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi, further inflamed protestors against Ben Ali and the the pressure of governmental abuse was too much. Tunisian government. As demonstrations became more Bouazizi, an educated fruit seller, worked as the sole violent, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia with his wife and supporter of his family in the town of Sidi Bouzid. family on January 14, 2011. He was tried in absentia and Rampant police exploitation of citizens meant that found guilty of embezzlement and misuse of public funds. officers routinely issued fines and confiscated proprietors’ Interim President Fouad M’Bazaa has led the state since wares on bogus charges. For example, Bouazizi had January 17, 2011. Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi has been fined nearly two months’ wages in the months scheduled elections for October 23, 2011, during which before the incident that led to his death. On December citizens will vote on a new body to re-write the 17, 2010, after a police woman and her male colleagues constitution, and later, will oversee legislative and publicly humiliated him, physically assaulted him, and presidential elections.

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society and government. Social elites with ties to the Mubarak regime, particularly through business and political dealings, make up the small affluent upper class, while most Egyptians struggle for access to basic necessities.

After the fall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali in early January 2011, Mubarak found himself at the nexus of long- standing domestic discontent, regional revolutionary fever, and internal, tech-savvy dissenters with access to youth networks, particularly through the social networking website Facebook. Pre-existing groups such as the used Facebook, text messages, and the video sharing website YouTube to organize a large scale protest in on January 25, 2011. Calling themselves the Egyptian Coalition of January 25 Youth , a variety of revolutionary organizations joined together to call for Mubarak’s resignation. The protests grew, and on January 28, 2011, the powerful and well-organized Islamic opposition group the Muslim Brotherhood committed their efforts as well.

Violent clashes erupted between state police and anti-Mubarak organizers into early-February 2011. The Egyptian military eventually joined the struggle on behalf of the protestors, and on February 11, 2011, Mubarak stepped down, handed power to national army commanders, and retreated to his Egypt Sharm el-Sheikh villa on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. The military quickly suspended the constitution and abolished both houses of parliament. Parliamentary After the Tunisian people drove Ben Ali from power, elections were scheduled for September 2011, but have Egyptian revolutionaries were inspired to embark on yet to be held. Presidential elections will follow. Mubarak, revolts within their own state. However, pressure on the along with his two sons, went to trial on August 3, 2011, Egyptian government and President Hosni Mubarak had facing charges of corruption and intentionally killing been building for some time. In the year before the unarmed protestors. There has not yet been a decision. revolts, three main events turned public opinion against the government: First, former International Atomic Energy Agency director general and Egyptian opposition Yemen leader Mohamed El Baradei returned to Egypt ahead of Revolts in North Africa have not been lost on those living scheduled upcoming elections, spurring calls for reforms. in the farthest reaches of the Middle East, such as Second, Alexandria resident Khaled Said was beaten to Yemen. However, Yemen’s situation features a host of death by state police outside of an Internet café, causing issues not present in Tunisia or Egypt, such as public outrage. Third, a New Year’s Day church bombing killed 21 in Alexandria, prompting sectarian clashes and complaints from Coptic Christians that the government did not provide them with proper security.

Citizen complaints akin to those waged against Ben Ali routinely surfaced during Mubarak’s 30- year reign. Egypt is another victim of the youth bulge; the median population age had declined to nearly 24 years of age. Recent years have been accompanied by small scale economic growth, yet 20% of Egyptians still live in poverty, while many others barely reach subsistence levels. Unemployment figures are grim, averaging 9.5%. Corruption, particularly the use of a wasta (“connection” in Arabic) infiltrates every aspect of

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complicated tribal conflicts and the influence of terrorist mostly Sunni population and serves as the Custodian of organizations. Due to its colonial history, Yemen was the Two Holy Mosques. Life in Saudi Arabia is plagued previously divided into two northern and southern states by similar issues as its Arab counterparts. The population until the creation of the Republic of Yemen on May 22, median age is 25. A 2010 unemployment estimate 1990. President Ali Abdullah Saleh had led Northern suggests unemployment to be at nearly 11%. King Yemen since 1978 and the Republic of Yemen since Abdullah has tried to create reforms within the kingdom, 1990. favoring democracy and improving the lives of citizens while balancing the wishes of Wahhabist Islamic After the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, violence began in fundamentalist desires to keep Western influences out of the Yemeni capital of Sana’a as a reaction to high the Hejaz, or holy area surrounding Mecca and Medina. unemployment, corruption, and a worsening economy. Protests began in January in the city of Taiz by young Recent investments in higher education have benefited left-wing dissidents, who utilized sit-ins to protest the many young Saudis, in addition to aid packages such as government. Saleh had been considered a U.S. ally the Ninth Five-Year Development Plan, which allocated because of his access to intelligence about al-Qaeda $385 billion to projects including human resources, forces within the country, such as American born al- health and social services, economic resources, Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. For his information Saleh transportation, communication, and housing through had received large amounts of U.S. aid. However, 2014. The kingdom committed an additional nearly $36 because he used al-Qaeda as a bargaining chip within billion towards citizen services at the start of the Arab Yemen, for example, often freeing jailed members, he Awakening. These funds consisted of housing loans, pay became a risk to American and Saudi interests. Today, increases for employees, aid to the poor, and charitable jihadists are said to be widely present in areas of south donations, as well as the approval of new housing Yemen near Aden in the governorate of Abyan, and the complexes, unemployment assistance, and bonuses for government can do little to stop them. Saudi Arabia government employees. remains concerned about al-Qaeda’s growing influence and numbers in Yemen. Additionally, tribal lines are more The kingdom and the U.S. enjoy a close allegiance. The defined than ever as citizens attempt to maintain order basis of the relationship revolves around the sale of oil, a and security in the midst of chaos. mutual interest in eliminating al-Qaeda and Islamic extremism from the Gulf, and curbing the Iranian political Though the republic remains unified within Yemen, and nuclear ambitions. However, the monarchy does not politics prove to be anything but cohesive. In addition to emulate many American sentiments regarding Saleh’s General People Congress Party, a number of democracy. For example, in late July 2011, the opposition groups exist within Yemen. The Houthis (a government proposed a law called Penal Law for group of Zayadi Shia Muslims from Saada in northern Terrorism Crimes and Financing Terrorism , which Yemen who are possibly backed by Iran), Al-Qaeda in declares that authorities could detain people "potentially the Arabian Peninsula, Islah (the Islamic opposition indefinitely" without charge or trial, and could also group), the Joint Meeting Party (the largest opposition imprison citizens for a minimum of 10 years for party in the opposition coalition), and the Southern questioning the integrity of the King. While this law is Movement (a southern secessionist group), all oppose proposed to combat terror in the country, it could also be Saleh’s leadership. manipulated against Saudi citizens seeking reform.

These groups have made it difficult for Saleh to maintain power, and a firefight between the al-Ahmar tribe and Saleh’s forces nearly led his death. On June 3, 2010, a bomb exploded in Saleh’s palace mosque, seriously burning and wounding the president. The following day, Saleh sought treatment in Saudi Arabia, where he has remained, though he has maintained power from afar with plans to return to Yemen. Now more than ever, the variety of opposition groups, general lawlessness outside of the capital Sana’a, extreme violence by the government against the people, and the outside influences of Saudi Arabia and Iran on tribal groups make the revolts more likely to disintegrate into a civil war. Saudi Arabia

In 1932, the Arabian Peninsula was unified as the House of Saud under King Abdul al-Aziz. Today his son, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, rules the

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As seen on nytimes.com

Updated Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Conflict Rages in Libya as Nations Security Council voted to Gaddafi Attempts to Maintain authorize military action, a risky Power from Afar foreign intervention aimed at averting a bloody rout of the rebels by loyalist forces. On March 19, American and Libya, an oil-rich nation in North European forces began a broad Africa, spent more than 40 years under campaign of strikes against Colonel the erratic leadership of Col. Muammar Qaddafi and his government, el-Qaddafi before a revolt pushed him unleashing warplanes and missiles in a from power in August 2011 after a six- military intervention on a scale not Photo reprinted from Istock.com month struggle. seen in the Arab world since the Iraq war. of Misurata. By August, they were In February 2011, the unrest sweeping making territorial gains in the country’s east and west. Colonel Qaddafi rejected through much of the Arab Prior to the bombing campaign, the calls to leave power in spite of world erupted in several Libyan cities. Obama administration intensely defections by subordinates, increased Though it began with a relatively debated whether to open the mission economic and political isolation and organized core of anti-government with a new kind of warfare: a NATO air assaults. The rebels opponents in Benghazi, its spread to cyberoffensive to disrupt and even themselves suffered from internal the capital of Tripoli was swift and disable the Qaddafi government’s air- spontaneous. Colonel Qaddafi lashed defense system, which threatened dissension and lack of training. out with extreme violence. Soon, allied warplanes. But administration though, an inchoate opposition officials and some military officers Six months of inconclusive fighting managed to cobble together the balked, fearing that it might set a gave way within a matter of days to semblance of a transitional precedent for other nations, in an assault on Tripoli that unfolded at a government, field a makeshift rebel particular Russia or China, to carry out breakneck pace. By the night of Aug. army and portray itself to the West and such offensives of their own. They were 21, rebels surged into the city, meeting Libyans as an alternative to Colonel also unable to resolve whether the only sporadic resistance and setting off Qaddafi’s corrupt and repressive rule. president had the power to proceed raucous street celebrations. with such an attack without informing Expectations grew that Colonel Momentum shifted quickly, however, Congress. In the end, American Qaddafi’s hold on power was crumbling and the rebels faced the possibility of officials rejected cyberwarfare and used as rebels overran his heavily fortified being outgunned and outnumbered in conventional aircraft, cruise missiles compound on Aug. 23 and finally what increasingly looked like a and drones. established control after days of bloody mismatched civil war. Then as Colonel urban street fighting. The rebels struggled in the days that followed to Qaddafi’s troops advanced to within By late May, the weeks of NATO restore order and services to Tripoli, 100 miles of Benghazi, the rebel bombing seemed to put the momentum while Colonel Qaddafi’s whereabouts stronghold in the west, the United back on the side of the rebels, who remained unknown. broke a bloody siege of the western city

The absence of the now fugitive Colonel Qaddafi and the growing influence of Islamists in Libya raises hard questions about the ultimate character of the government and society that will rise in place of Qaddafi’s autocracy. The Transitional National Council, which has promised to assemble a new cabinet, has thus far been unable to overcome regional disputes over the composition of the group or to persuade the militias that seized Tripoli to give up their arms.

(The New York Times , Libya - Revolution (2011), Accessed September 19, 2011. http:// topics.nytimes.com/top/news/ international/countriesandterritories/libya/ index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=libya&st=cse)

From The New York Times, October 18, 2011 © The New York Times. All rights reserved. Used under license. Photo reprinted from Istock.com

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As seen on nytimes.com

Updated Wednesday, October 12, 2011

The Son of the “Lion of Damascus” Proves Difficult to Tame: Assad Responds Forcefully to Citizen Uprisings in Syria

The wave of Arab unrest that started with the Tunisian revolution of January 2011 reached Syria in mid- March, when residents of a small southern city took to the streets to protest the torture of students who had put up anti-government graffiti.

President Bashar al-Assad, who inherited Syria’s harsh dictatorship from his father, Hafez al-Assad, at first wavered between force and hints of reform. But in April, just Photo reprinted from Istock.com days after lifting the country’s decades-old state of emergency, he In July, the Obama administration, in a The same month, a semblance of civil launched the first of what became a shift that was weeks in the making, war erupted in Homs, Syria’s third- largest city, where armed protesters series of withering crackdowns, turned against Mr. Assad but stopped were calling themselves sending tanks into restive cities as short of demanding that he step down. security forces opened fire on By early August, the American revolutionaries. Since the start of the uprising, Homs has been one of Syria’s demonstrators. ambassador was talking of a “post- Assad” Syria. most contested cities. In the targeted killings, the rival security checkpoints Neither the violence nor Mr. Assad’s and the hardening of sectarian offers of political reform — rejected as As the assaults on restive cities sentiments, Homs seemed to offer a shams by protest leaders — brought an continued, cracks emerged in a tight- dark vision that could foretell the end to the unrest. Similarly, the knit leadership that has until now future of Syria’s uprising as both the protesters have not been able to rallied its base of support and government and the opposition readied withstand direct assault by the maintained a unified front. But by the themselves for a protracted struggle military’s armored forces. fall, Syria’s economy was crumbling over the endurance of the four-decade under the pressure of sanctions and the dictatorship. unrest, with its currency weakening, The conflict is complicated by Syria’s its recession expanding and its tourism ethnic divisions. The Assads and much industry wrecked — a serious blow to a Increasingly convinced that President of the nation’s elite, especially the regime whose legitimacy has relied on al-Assad will not be able to remain in military, belong to the Alawite sect, a economic success. power, the Obama administration small minority in a mostly Sunni began to make plans for American country. policy in the region after he is gone. In In early October, in what seemed to be coordination with Turkey, the United the most serious attempt to bring States has been exploring how to deal Syria’s crackdown has been together a fragmented opposition, condemned internationally, as has with the possibility of a civil war Syrian dissidents formally established among Syria’s Alawite, Druse, President Assad, a British-trained the Syrian National Council. The doctor who many had hoped would Christian and Sunni sects, a conflict group’s stated goal was to overthrow that could quickly ignite other tensions soften his father’s iron-handed regime. President Assad’s government. But no direct intervention has been in an already volatile region. Members said the council included proposed, and support for protesters representatives from the Damascus has been balanced against fears of Declaration group, a pro-democracy (The New York Times , Syria - Protests instability in a country at the heart of network; the Syrian Muslim (2011), Accessed September 19, 2011. so many conflicts in the world’s most Brotherhood, a banned Islamic http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/ volatile region. political party; various Kurdish international/countriesandterritories/syria/ factions; the Local Coordination index.html?scp=1&sq=Syria% By October, estimates for the death toll Committees, a group that helps 20Revolution&st=cse ) ranged above 2,900, and human rights organize and document protests; and From The New York Times, October 18, groups said that well over 10,000 other independent and tribal figures. 2011 © The New York Times. All rights people had been arrested. reserved. Used under license.

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Tweets from the Arab Street How did the Arab world utilize social media and the Internet to organize protests?

The Arab Awakening caused a collective shudder within the leadership of many nations, particularly those where the conditions were also primed for revolt. Out of fear of seeing protests rise within their own countries, many governments sought to strengthen security and tighten censorship in an effort to preserve power and order. Specifically, governments attempted to control social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube as a means of stopping protestors from organizing meetings and demonstrations.

Throughout North Africa, social media played an enormous role in mobilizing protests. In Tunisia, the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi was eventually put onto YouTube by a family member seeking to promote revolt against President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Likewise, the Egyptian April 6th Youth Movement broadcast its messages on YouTube and utilized its Facebook page to draw protes- tors into the streets. The Egyptian government responded by making cellular telephone providers turn off service to stifle Tweets (messages on Twitter) and text messages. The Internet was also restricted to diminish protestors, something that largely had an in- verse effect as tempers flared over the state’s actions.

In Syria and Bahrain, two states still deeply embroiled in conflict, protesters have tried desperately to use social media to expose gov- ernmental oppression. Videos of state police brutality have leaked from Syria onto the Internet, giving the world a citizen perspective on the revolts, particularly since the foreign press is barred from reporting from Syria. In Bahrain, citizens actively used social media to criticize the monarchy, and were successful because of the large number of educated, tech-savvy citizens. However, many are now self-censoring in light of the government’s violent crack- downs on protestors in the capital Manama’s Pear Roundabout Facebook Fact and in nearby hospitals where doctors insisted on treating protes- Over 50 percent of surveyed Egyptians and tors and monarchy-loyalists alike. Tunisians said that government blocking of Internet and Facebook made citizens more Throughout Africa, many governments routinely practice Internet determined to revolt. censorship to disenfranchise citizens. In Ethiopia, one of the con- tinent’s worst offending states, “the Ethiopian government blocks Facebook Fact a range of political opposition websites, as well as independent During 2011, there was a 30 percent overall increase in Arab Facebook users, with 2 million news sites reporting on the country and the sites of a few human Egyptian users joining the website between rights organizations. Ethiopia's Internet infrastructure is state- January 2011 and April 2011. owned, leaving control of it entirely at the hands of the govern- ment,” according to al-Jazeera . Most Popular Trending Hashtags on Twitter in the Arab World In China, Internet censorship is not a new phenomenon, but after #egypt 1.4 million the events of the Arab Awakening protests, the government has #jan25 1.2 million cracked down more heavily. With the world’s largest number of Internet users, censorship has become a serious issue within #libya 990,000 Chinese society that has cut the population off from the rest of #bahrain 640,000 the world. In early January 2011, the government made plans to #protest 620,000 block Internet calling, and reinforced blocks on sites such as Facebook and Twitter. In other parts of Asia, North Korea has Top 5 Tweeting Arab States tightened its grip on citizens, ensuring that they are only able to 1.1. Qatar Qatar access the state Internet platform and that only authorized offi- 2.2. Bahrain Bahrain 3.3. U.A.E. U.A.E. cials can utilize the real World Wide Web. 4.4. Kuwait Kuwait 5.5. Egypt Egypt

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Women and the Arab Awakening Female opposition protestors mobilized the Arab world… but will their concerns heard at the highest levels?

In Egypt, women of all religions have been participating in contemporary protests since 1919, the year of the country’s independence for Britain. Prior to that, women and men joined in voicing their discontent for French and British oversight. Today, women continue to be highly influential protests. A spokeswoman for the April 6th Youth Movement , Asmaa’ Mahfouz, became one of the revolt’s most memorable faces as she passionately called for the initial protests via a YouTube video posted on the Internet. However, even though women are visible in daily life in Egypt, they are rarely elevated to high governmental offices or other positions of power. During the Mubarak regime, there was a quota for women’s representation in government. Moving forward, women’s groups have called for continued and increased representation. Their insistence for full participation may pave the way towards fully claiming their legal rights in the future.

Activist Asmaa’ Mahfouz. Photo from BikyaMasr Newspaper

Saudi Arabia is notorious for its poor record on women’s rights. Two of the most prominent slights include barring women from driving and voting. One example in the call for rights concerns the Women2Drive campaign, a movement which hopes to earn Saudi women the right to drive cars. The movement began when Manal Al Sharif, a 32-year-old Saudi woman, was detained for two weeks after driving and posting a video of herself defying the driving ban on the Internet. In the video, Al Sharif says women need to learn how to drive in order to protect themselves and their families. In Saudi Arabia, women are not banned from driving, but are unable to obtain a driver’s license. Recently, female drivers were sentenced to 10 lashings, but the sentence was revoked and the ban still goes unchanged. Recently however, shortly after the sentencing of the female driver, women were granted the right to vote in local elections. This step gives Saudi women more agency, and with some progressive members of the royal family supporting their bid to drive, it seems that Saudi women are making progressive steps towards equality. Activist Manal Al Sharif. Photo from BikyaMasr Newspaper

Perhaps one of the most overt changes after the Arab Awakening are the number of women candidates who are running for office in local and national elections. In Egypt, Bothaina Kamel has begun to campaign as a contender for the presidency. In Tunisia, a legal ruling has mandated that an equal number of male and female candidates must be offered for elected offices. Perhaps pressured by regional challenges, Algeria has recently raised its quota for the number of female candidates in office. A number of women are running in the Federal National Council in the United Arab Emirates, though they have to campaign carefully to avoid harassment. In other parts of the region such, as Saudi Arabia, women are still barred for running for office until 2015 when new election laws take effect. Many experts suggest that the biggest challenge for women winning elections will be breaking the stereotype that they belong in their homes as wives and mothers. Trailblazing women such as 2011 Winner of Yemen are helping to break such barriers. Activist and Nobel Laureate Tawakkol Karman. Photo by Jonathan Saruk, The New Yorker

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a safeguard for public opinion, without which stability is American Foreign Policy Consequences unlikely.

The United States will have to refine its foreign policy Furthermore, aid can help to reinvigorate floundering agenda in light of the Arab Awakening. Projecting the economies, such as that of Egypt. One way to encourage outcome in any specific state proves difficult, and thus a financial jumpstart would be to create a climate that is this paper proposes addressing overarching issues for positive for business as a way to interact with the private American consideration to be more useful. The success sector. Local entrepreneurs are vital to creating jobs and of democratic revolts throughout the Middle East lies can serve as community leaders. The best economic within the interests of the U.S., yet it remains entirely policies will also seek an end to poverty, and provide possible that even with large amounts of Western rural populations with access to credit opportunities. support, the uprisings may still fail. Additionally, making aid organizations transparent in their reporting of funds spent ensures that contributors see Moving forward, there are a few things that the U.S. can begin considering immediately to help ensure the success of the Arab uprisings. These include: administering Western assistance to states throughout the Middle East and North Africa to tackle a number of post-revolt issues; using “smart power” foreign policy initiatives to manage changing American interests in the region; and emulating regional power players to identify possible partners moving forward in policy creation and implementation. By addressing this host of issues, mostly using Egypt, (the most populous Arab state, as a case study), the U.S. can begin hypothesizing about the region’s uncertain future.

First, applying Western assistance to the Middle East proves essential in helping the region to recover; however, aid must be utilized in multiple ways. Financial assistance (such as the $150 million exactly where their donations go, and thus, are more pledged by Secretary Clinton to stabilize Egypt) is of the likely to continue their support. utmost importance. Another way to begin tackling this task immediately includes “bringing the international Using aid to fund public safety initiatives and combat donor community together [and] provid[ing] the blueprints insecurity exemplifies a worthwhile avenue for for future donor commitments and priorities,” according to assistance. Supporting institutions focused on judicial, the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network. financial, and health initiatives spur stability, human Additionally, constructing aid packages that are specific security, and economic success. Making long-term to the desires of the indigenous population and their funding commitments to states that govern justly creates governments serves the goal of foreign assistance, which monetary incentives for countries to be safe and secure . should create “a strengthened compact between citizens In sum, applying Western aid provides a life-raft for and their governments,” said the same organization’s states still entrenched in or emerging from the revolt report. In each of these ways, Western financial period. Allocating resources carefully, and in ways contributions play a significant role in providing financial reflecting the wishes of the indigenous population, will be support to countries in the revolt and post-revolt period. of paramount importance to any efforts to stabilize the Middle East. Next, aid should assist in forming modern and democratic police and security forces. To ensure this, Aid aside, American policy makers must consider how resources should be adequately divided between military smart power — a strategic balance of hard and soft interests and citizen institutions. According to the power — can be applied in the reordering of the Middle Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network , “U.S. East. Geoffrey Aronson of the Foundation for Middle East assistance to militaries in transition should incentivize the Peace has outlined a number of observations about the separation of military and political decision making, while changes in the region. He argues that the framework of the technical expertise provided to nascent political smart power provides perspective on possible American parities should aim to institutionalize civilian control of the foreign policy avenues moving forward. First, people in military.” Supporting the establishment of civil institutions, the region have clearly recognized that forced democracy as well as ensuring that the political mechanisms of the does not serve as a good model, but rather as a country are dissimilar from the military apparatus, creates cautionary tale about what outside forces should not do in the region. The U.S. has learned to balance hard and

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soft power, particularly after the situation in Iraq, with an , anger at the U.S. and Israel was less pronounced emphasis on what building democracy entails: than resentment of the subservience of Egyptian leaders encouraging full citizen participation, developing to their policies, namely the blockade of Gaza.” functioning institutions, and allotting for a great transitional period. In listening to Arab voices, the U.S. might also watch the activities of regional power players, such as Turkey (a The relationship between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the U.S. ally and a well-connected third party actor in the U.S. has reached an tense crossroad. Both Saudi Arabia region). While Turkey’s position in the Middle East is in and its neighbor Bahrain have Sunni monarchies who many ways dissimilar to the United States, its actions rule over Shia-majority populations. Saudi Arabia during the Arab revolts may provide some guideposts for assisted Bahrain in forcefully putting down its Shia-led U.S policymakers. As a member of NATO, Turkey is part internal revolts, which Iran likely helped to back. Both the of the Western bloc as well as a rising leader in the U.S. and Iran recognized that the Saudi monarchy will Islamic world with the election of the conservative Justice act to protect its royal Sunni brethren. The monarchy’s and Development Party, or the AKP. Turkey also has actions have increased the possibility of an Iranian-Saudi trade and economic interests in its Arab neighbors, regional Cold War. This would present new challenges to similar to American strategic oil interests. It has the U.S. regarding the use of soft power on allies in the employed soft power against neighbors such as Syria, region. The U.S. has been called out in the international but has been subject to criticism in the international community for subjectively applying pressure for community because of its treatment of the Kurdish democracy and human rights in the region, and Saudi population, which is in some ways similar to the Arabia’s actions have exemplified this. The U.S. will disapproval that America has faced for its slow and carefully calculate how far they can allow an ally to go in wavering response to the Arab Awakening. To reiterate, protecting its sovereignty before compromising the Turkey and the U.S. both have complex and differing American foreign policy agenda. President Barack relationships within the region, but the U.S. should Obama applied smart power very carefully to the Saudi consider Turkey’s actions — and the way that they are situation, and avoided losing an important ally. It is also perceived — as the protests continue to unfold. likely that the Obama administration has realized that military intervention in Iran could be costly. Finally, and perhaps most importantly in considering the United States’ role in the Arab revolts, Washington’s This also brings up an important observation regarding current policy in the Middle East mostly focuses on the notion of pan-Arabism, or the unity among Arabs due addressing its own interests in the region. For example, to their shared language, culture, and geography. It China has been critical of America’s policy during the seems that any pre-existing sentiments of pan-Arabism Arab Spring as centering on “small” issues, such as have evaporated. After endorsing the presence of NATO Libya, which it considers a less mature conflict and troops in the region and suspending Libya from its ranks, lacking a strategic plan to measure success. Other foci, it proves difficult to ascertain how the Arab League will such as wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been react to other dissenting states, such as Syria. For the immensely costly to the United States. U.S., supporting the wishes of the Arab League is a good use of soft power, as it is the only regional body to speak To assess how effective America’s Middle East policy is, for the Arab world. Similarly, participating in hard power there are a number of factors to consider. Weighing the exercises through NATO remains wise because it financial costs for the current American policy may be a ensures that no unilateral action will be taken, which way to assess how strategic such efforts are. Another could further damage American’s image in the way could be to consider the “hearts and minds” cost of international community. U.S. involvement. For example, how important is it for America to be well liked in the Middle East? Further yet, Furthermore, the Arab revolts provide an opportunity for how does the United States’ role in the Palestinian-Israeli the U.S. to reflect on its policies on Palestine, and to peace process reflect on the U.S.? Should the U.S. consider if calls for democracy in the region are embark on adaptations in policy and action to prepare applicable to the Palestinian question. As a form of soft leadership for future large-scale changes in the region, power, the U.S. could address the lack of a credible such as another series of events like the Arab framework for negotiations, and truly hear the voices of Awakening? citizens in Arab republics who are undoubtedly concerned about the Palestinian question and their If you were a policy strategist, would you change U.S. Palestinian counterparts. policies in the Middle East? If so, how? How do you see U.S. policy affecting the outcome of the Arab According to the New York Times , “All across the region, Awakening? As you prepare for the World Affairs popular uprisings have most insistently looked inward, at Institute , think creatively about the American approach issues of democracy, social justice and dignity. But for to, and influence on, the regional conflicts that are the many, dignity is a notion defined both individually and Arab Awakening. For updated information, visit collectively. And even in the most idealistic moments of www.WAIpittsburgh.wordpress.com . the Arab revolts, the weakness of their own governments was often a focus of protesters’ ire. In Tahrir Square in

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WEBSITES U.S. G OVERNMENT INTERNATIONAL A GENCIES

Central Intelligence Council International Monetary Fund https://www.cia.gov/index.html www.imf.org

U.S. Agency for International Development United Nations www.usaid.gov www.un.org

U.S. Department of Defense World Bank Group www.defense.gov www.worldbank.org

U.S. Department of State World Economic Forum www.state.gov www.weforum.org

U.S. Institute of Peace World Trade Organization www.usip.gov www.wto.org

The White House WORLD N EWS www.whitehouse.gov The Associated Press National Intelligence Council www.ap.org www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_home.html BBC World Service REGIONAL N EWS www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice

Al-Jazeera (Pan-Arab, Qatar) The Guardian http://english.aljazeera.net/ www.guardian.co.uk

Al-Masry Al Youm (Egypt) International Herald Tribune www.almasryalyoum.com/en www.iht.com

The National (U.A.E.) www.thenational.ae RESEARCH O RGANIZATIONS

The Daily Star (Beirut) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research www.dailystar.com.lb www.aei.org

Yemen Times (Yemen) The Brookings Institution www.yementimes.com www.brookings.edu

The Saudi Gazette (Saudi Arabia) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace www.saudigazette.com.sa http://carnegieendowmentorg

The Jordan Times (Jordan) Center for Defense Information www.jordantimes.com www.cdi.org Center for Strategic and International Studies Gulf Daily News (Bahrain) www.csis.org www.gulf-daily-news.com Council on Foreign Relations Al Hayat (London) www.cfr.org www.daralhayat.com/morenews/english GlobalSecurity.org Khaleej Times (U.A.E.) www.globalsecurity.org www.khaleejtimes.com/index00.asp The Heritage Foundation Arab Times (Kuwait) www.heritage.org www.arabtimesonline.com New America Foundation www.newamerica.net

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