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Morocco 2014: the Return of Authoritarianism

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Morocco 2014: the Return of Authoritarianism Geographical Overview | Maghreb Panorama Morocco 2014: The Return of Authoritarianism Maâti Monjib (PJD) heading the coalition seems to have definitively Professor come to terms with royal hegemony over the execu- Mohammed V University, Rabat tive branch. It thus relinquished a democratic inter- pretation of the 2011 Constitution granting the exec- utive branch substantial powers while turning various Geographical Overview | Maghreb Geographical Overview 2014 was the third year of the Benkirane administra- royal powers – formerly discretionary – into limited tion. The cabinet led by him resulted from the early powers. After this reshuffle, control over key minis- elections brought on by the 20 February Movement tries such as those of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and protests (the Moroccan version of the so-called Education by palace officials has made the little pow- ‘Arab’ Spring) occurring over the course of 2011. er held by the Prime Minister dwindle even more. This is the first time in Moroccan history that an Isla- This return to pre-2011 monarchic authoritarianism mist party independent from the monarchy is head- has been accompanied by an increase in the weight ing the government. In any case, Benkirane, a mod- of security agencies in decision-making processes. erate conservative leader, only managed to stay at This is implicitly justified by the real threats to the the head of the coalition government during the sec- country by extremist groups, whether loyal to Daesh 176 ond half of 2013 by making significant political con- or al-Qaeda. Some two thousand Moroccans, a cessions to the pre-Arab Spring establishment, par- large part of them bearing European passports, are ticularly insofar as sharing power with the royal participating in the combats in Syria, Iraq and other palace camp. The Arab context (the military coup in battlefields such as the Sahel. This regression by Egypt, bloody civil wars bogging down Syria, Libya Morocco after the democratic progress made in and Yemen, an unprecedented anti-change diplo- 2011 and 2012 is part, as stated above, of a gener- matic offensive in the very wealthy Saudi Arabia, al regression occurring in all the Arab Spring coun- supported by the United Arab Emirates and Ku- tries except Tunisia. wait…) has profoundly shaken the fragile post-Arab The PJD, which had won the early 25 November Spring political balance in Morocco. The head of 2011 election thanks to its slogan for change “Did- government’s party, which had won the 25 Novem- da Al Istibdad wal Fassad!” (Against despotism and ber 2011 elections with drums beating and trumpets corruption!), now tends to justify the lack of convinc- sounding when the Arab Spring euphoria was at its ing results in the sphere of political and social apogee, has thereafter been on the defensive. De- change by insisting on Morocco’s vital need for sta- spite several attempts during its first year in power, it bility. This concept was recurrent in 2014 in state- has thus not managed to carry out its socioeconom- ments by the head of government, who is also the 2015 ic programme, perceived by its supporters as fa- secretary general of the PJD. Such an orientation vourable to the poorest sectors, as well as to the distances it even more from the forces comprising struggle against corruption and the rentier economy. the backbone of the pro-democratic demonstrations leading to the elections that brought it to power. In- deed, three leftist parties – the Unified Socialist Par- Stability over Change ty (PSU), the Ittihadi National Congress Party (CNI) Mediterranean Yearbook and the Socialist Democratic Vanguard Party (PADS) In fact, as of the cabinet reshuffle in late 2013 and – formed a federation on 23 March 2014 with a view Med. Med. IE throughout 2014, the Justice and Development Party to fight for a parliamentary regime where the King would rule without governing. In the same dynamic Hamid Chabat, the Secretary General of Istiqlal, the aiming to bring together all those disappointed by most important parliamentary opposition party, ac- the failure of the 2011 reform promises, some fifty cused the leader of PJD of working for Daesh (the Panorama political and civil society leaders met in Rabat on Islamic State) and Mossad. 6 April. Among them were important non-parliamen- tary leftist leaders such as Mohamed Sassi and Ab- dellah El Harrif, leaders of the powerful moderate Austerity and Social Safety Nets Islamist association, al-Adl Wal Ihsan (AWI), such as Abdelwahed Mutawakkil, as well as activists of the Insofar as the economy, the productive machine im- 20 February Movement such as Widad Melhaf and proved its performance but the Benkirane Administra- Fouad Abdelmoumni. The aim of the meeting was to tion continued to take austerity measures, such as explore paths towards entente between religious energy subsidy cuts (a decrease of approximately and secular movements in order to continue action 20% in public funding allocated to the Compensation for political change while maintaining civil peace. Fund, whose official goal is to keep prices of essential commodities to levels affordable to the population). | Maghreb Geographical Overview Such measures have had painful consequences on Benkirane’s popularity is intact in the social level, leading in particular to a rise in the public opinion. The latter cost of living for the poor and middle classes. increasingly perceives him as The International Monetary Fund announced that Mo- rocco has failed to protect the middle class and that someone wishing to do good for his the lower classes are not benefiting from economic country but foiled by the system’s development. By the same token, the 2014 UN Hu- elites, who fear for their interests man Development Report ranked Morocco 129th out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index. The relatively low morale of Moroccan families fol- 177 The Political Discourse in 2014 Reached lows the same lines, according to the 2014 report by an Unprecedented Level of Populism the official High Planning Commission. Households are rather pessimistic as to the country’s capacity to The opposition parties in Parliament, consisting pri- find solutions to the problem of unemployment and marily of the Party for Authenticity and Modernity regarding their own ability to save. (PAM), the Istiqlal Party (PI) and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which are, we must keep in mind, close to the palace, continue their scathing The International Monetary Fund criticism of the PJD and its leader. Benkirane’s regu- announced that Morocco has failed lar and apparently anti-system outbursts before Par- to protect the middle class and that liament, in which he attacks the opposition, have the lower classes are not benefiting gained the population’s attention and caused end- less verbal sparring matches and polemics but are from economic development also a godsend for the head of government. Indeed, Benkirane’s popularity is intact in public opinion. The In his traditional Throne Day Speech in late July, the 2015 latter increasingly perceives him as someone wish- King likewise mentioned social injustice and the re- ing to do good for his country but foiled by the sys- sulting tension, while implicitly blaming the govern- tem’s elites, who fear for their interests. The opposi- ment. He stated: “I, like the Moroccan people, ask tion takes advantage of the government’s weak myself in astonishment: where is this fortune? Have results insofar as economic and social reform to at- all Moroccans enjoyed it or did it only affect certain tack its head using the same populist register. Thus sectors?”1 Mediterranean Yearbook 1 Throne Day Speech by Mohammed VI on 30 July 2014 (: Med. ) IE Slightly over a week later, the Head of Government Over the course of 2014, nearly perfect relations seemed to reply to the sovereign, stating during the with Spain emerge, the latter seeming to benefit from Panorama Afro-American Summit in Washington DC that in Mo- the estrangement with Paris. By the same token, King rocco, it is the King who governs and not the PJD.2 Mohammed VI’s trip to Washington in late 2013 and Under these conditions, three trade union centres his meeting with Barack Obama expressed a positive friendly with the parliamentary opposition organised a note in US-Moroccan relations that lasted through- general strike on 23 September with relative success. out 2014. But the government refused to accede to their de- The crisis with France, which began in February mands, which were essentially of a socio-economic 2014 and did not end until early 2015, is the most order and particularly included a demand for raising serious crisis Morocco has had with the former colo- the lowest salaries. The government justified itself by nial power in a quarter of a century. The cause was recalling the crushing weight of debt service and the the summoning of Morocco’s head of counter-espi- repercussions of the economic crisis that struck some onage by French courts following complaints made of the country’s most important economic partners by people living in France who claimed to have been Geographical Overview | Maghreb Geographical Overview – namely, the European Union and the United States – arrested and tortured by Moroccan secret service. several years ago, eventually reaching Morocco. As soon as the summons was presented at the resi- In any case, in order to limit the impact of the stated dence of the Moroccan ambassador to France, Ra- reforms on low revenue, the government proceeded bat unilaterally suspended judiciary cooperation be- to establish a minimum income for widows with mi- tween the two countries and reduced its security nors in their charge as well as divorced women with- cooperation with Paris to a minimum.
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