Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Comments

No Rivals to the King WP The Limits to Political Reform in Morocco’s “Enlightened Authoritarianism”

Isabelle Werenfels and Ilyas Saliba S

In Morocco it is still the king who defines the boundaries of political discourse and action. The palace is increasingly placing obstacles in the path of its strongest adver- sary, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD). This was seen most recently in the difficult and protracted coalition negotiations following the October 2016 parliamentary elections. At the same time, pressure on civil society critics is steadily intensifying. The inherent promise of political reform in Morocco’s compara- tively inclusive model is increasingly eroding and gradually substituted with the promise of economic modernisation, potentially undermining the very bases of the kingdoms domestic stability. It is thus also in Europe’s interests for Morocco to uphold the pro- gress it has achieved through the political reforms of recent decades.

On March 15th 2017, King Mohammed VI ahead of the royalist Authenticity and of Morocco withdrew Abdelilah Benkirane’s Modernity Party (PAM). The PJD also did mandate to form a new government. In the well in the 2015 local and regional elec- five months since October 2016 the popular tions. As prime minister, Benkirane pulled serving prime minister and PJD leader had off the delicate balancing act of cutting failed to establish a viable coalition. Due to subsidies without it leading to major pro- the election results he would have needed tests, but he occasionally deviated from the support from parties close to the palace. Yet king’s line by criticising Russia’s role in the king’s chosen replacement, PJD stalwart Syria and condemning the king’s entourage and former foreign minister Saadeddine El for clinging on to their privileges and pre- Othmani, succeeded in breaking the dead- serving their hegemonic role in politics and lock within just a few days. This suggests the economy. Benkirane’s rise and prelimi- that the “palace” – the king and his patron- nary fall demonstrate that the Moroccan age network of advisors, business elites, system, where the constitution makes the bureaucrats and “royalist parties” – had king both “Commander of the Faithful” been working to rid itself of it’s increasing- and head of state, has no room for a second ly troublesome adversary. charismatic leader. The PJD increased its parliamentary rep- However, under the 2011 constitutional resentation under Benkirane, remaining reform, the king must choose a representa-

Ilyas Saliba is a research fellow at the research unit Democracy & Democratization Berlin Social Science Centre (WZB) SWP Comments 17 Dr. Isabelle Werenfels is Head of the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP May 2017

1 tive of the strongest party to form a govern- established political actors. The PJD is well ment. Hence, the palace had little choice aware that it would be able to achieve little but to integrate the PJD. As an experienced for its supporters in opposition, and thus diplomat and intellectual, the new prime credible opposition would be politically minister Saadeddine El Othmani is the costly. Any fundamental criticism of the antithesis of Benkirane, whose popularity king’s dominant role in the state and the is rooted in his ability to communicate with economy prompts state harassment and the “ordinary people”. Othmani, regarded repression. This is evident, for example, in as reserved and consensus-seeking, made the discriminatory treatment of members major concessions to the palace to establish of the – officially unrecognised – Islamist his coalition. movement Al Adl Wal Ihsane. But the palace also has an interest in keeping the PJD on board, as the moderate Tight Constraints on Competition Islamist party plays a crucial role in stabi- The PJD holds none of the key ministries lising the political system by including the in its new government, which is a coalition religiously conservative echelons of society including several pro-palace technocratic within the existing institutions. This likely ministers in addition to three conservative prevents individual radicalisation due to royalist parties – the National Rally of In- the party’s reach and strong organisational dependents (RNI), the Popular Movement cohesion. The PJD’s effective mobilisation (MP) and the Constitutional Union (UC) – of its supporters also ensures electoral turn- and two left-wing parties loyal to the palace: out levels that are at least halfway accept- the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) able; this is important to maintain a and the Party of Progress and Socialism democratic appearance. As such, the PJD (PPS). The recently founded royalist PAM, boosts the national and international which came second in the parliamentary legitimacy of Moroccan institutions. elections, and the liberal nationalist Istiqlal Moreover, the party’s liberal economic together form the opposition. In this con- policies satisfy the needs of the palace, stellation, the PJD is now even more strongly which is the country’s central economic fenced in by pro-palace forces in the formal actor. The reductions in fuel and gas sub- political institutions. Moreover, with the sidies implemented by the PJD during the socialist-secular USFP a traditionally anti- last parliament are part of a palace strategy Islamist party is part of the new PJD-led of budget consolidation and concessions in government. The king’s intervention and the face of long-standing demands by inter- the inclusion of anti-islamist heavyweights national donors. In other words, here the in the government coalition is causing PJD helped the palace to implement an substantial friction within the PJD, and is unpopular project. This is symptomatic of undermining Othmani’s internal support. the “division of labour” established by the So why is the PJD still playing along, palace in the Moroccan system. given that the palace has worked persis- tently since 2012 to weaken it? The regional political climate in the Middle East and The Moroccan Model North Africa certainly plays an important While the elected government is respon- role. The military coup against Egyptian sible for the daily business of government, President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 the palace controls all matters of strategic set off a witch-hunt against the Muslim importance: religion, foreign policy, and Brotherhood and those perceived closed to defence and security, as well as migration it. The PJD, though not targeted directly, policy and energy and infrastructure. The has responded by working even harder to palace maintains absolute authority over normalize its relations with palace and the all aspects relating to the Western Sahara

SWP Comments 17 May 2017

2 conflict, which continues to determine the Rif continued throughout the spring the king’s domestic and foreign policy of 2017. As disparate and singular as these priorities. protests appear, their structural causes In recent years, the palace has been able are similar: lack of reforms, rampant cor- to achieve visible progress in almost all the ruption, and socio-economic grievances, aforementioned strategic areas. Morocco especially very high youth unemployment obtained membership of the African Union levels. in January 2017 despite Algerian and South Even if the growing protests are not African objections, and it is garnering grow- going to topple the monarchy, they point ing African support for its annexation of to grievances undermining what has to date Western Sahara. The palace has also scored been an adaptable and functioning system. recent successes with its renewable energy Increasing repression and simultaneous expansion, cooptation of leading Salafists marginalisation in institutional processes into the political system, and a migration are creating growing incentives for reform- policy, which is creating laws and struc- minded forces and civil society activists to tures for immigration from Sub-Saharan bring their supporters onto the streets. Africa to Morocco. Popular confidence in the elected institu- Compared with other states in the Middle tions is evaporating in the face of repeated East and North Africa, Morocco enjoys a high palace interventions, as exemplified by the degree of political inclusion and stability. choice of prime minister. In conjunction with the domestic and for- By ostentatiously displaying its power eign policy successes mentioned above, it is over the PJD, the palace is walking a fine no surprise that Europe regards Morocco’s line: what is intended as controlled “enlightened authoritarianism” as a broad weakening of the party may result in com- success and a captivating alternative to pletely discrediting it vis-à-vis its constitu- the Tunisian democratisation model. Most ency. In doing so, the palace undermines importantly it appears to guarantee sta- the system’s inclusiveness and may push bility, contrasting sharply with Libya’s disgruntled PJD-followers toward groups descent into civil war, Egypt’s repressive outside the formal political system. military regime and Algeria’s unpredictable In 2011, as Arab dictators fell and Moroc- authoritarianism. What is often overlooked cans also took to the streets to voice their is that the Moroccan model is encountering grievances, King Mohammed initiated polit- growing pressures, due to demographic and ical reforms to give people an outlet for socio-economic developments – and in their anger. But since 2012 the palace has response is becoming increasingly less increasingly met protests with repression. inclusive. Regime-critical civil society actors, such as independent human rights groups, find themselves on a tighter leash, with counter- The Limits of Inclusion terrorism frequently serving as an excuse It is unclear to what extent this model of to curtail liberties. Academics, journalists governance will prove workable in the fore- and activists experience intimidation, while seeable future. A series of protests shook expulsions of foreign journalists, activists Morocco in 2016: against education reforms, and organisations are on the rise. For some for better public services, and in October years, local and international observers 2016 after police involvement in the grue- have been reporting growing infringements some death of a fishmonger in Al Hoceïma, of political and civil liberties in Morocco. a town in Morocco’s neglected Rif region. With the new constitution of 2011, the Anger over the latter incident spread across king made a political promise of reforms that the whole country and forced the king to has only partially been fulfilled. Although order an inquiry. Nevertheless, protests in progress has been made on decentralisa-

SWP Comments 17 May 2017

3 tion, elected institutions and the courts ruled that the agreement on trade in agri- have gained little additional authority and cultural and fishery products between the autonomy. In fact, signs from the palace EU and Morocco cannot apply to Western suggest a retrenchment of the political Sahara (a position confirmed by a Euro- reform process. Hardliners apparently re- pean Court of Justice ruling in late 2016). gret the constitutional concessions, such Rabat’s outrage over the ruling further as decentralisation, judicial independence, narrowed the EU’s already modest options the strengthening of parliament and the for influencing developments within appointment of the prime minister from Morocco. the ranks of the strongest party. Nonetheless, foreign policy actors in There are indications that the palace is the EU and its member states must not close increasingly moving away from the Moroc- their eyes to developments in Morocco. can model of enlightened authoritarianism. A modernisation project that comes with Under this model the monarchy has opted shrinking political spaces is unlikely to pre-

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und for inclusion and cooptation of a steadily serve domestic stability in the long term. Politik, 2017 growing spectrum of actors into the formal Hence, it makes little sense to measure All rights reserved political process since the late 1990s, while Morocco’s reform process and stability These Comments reflect in parallel gradually reducing repression. against prevailing regional conditions and the authors’ views. In doing so, it managed to successfully safe- to praise it as a shining example of democ- SWP guard the stability of both state and regime. racy and human rights. Instead problematic Stiftung Wissenschaft und The palace’s more recent initiatives are developments, such as reprisals against Politik German Institute for concerned less with promises of political regime critics, must be pointed out. International and reform; instead they prioritise modernisa- Given the EU Commission’s 160 million Security Affairs tion with headline-grabbing infrastructure euros in budget aid in 2016 and running Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 projects such as high-speed rail and gigan- development projects with a volume of over 10719 Berlin tic solar power plants. a billion euros, Europe is not an irrelevant Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 All this poses the question whether the player in Morocco. Still, it is questionable www.swp-berlin.org palace may be moving towards a less inclu- whether strengthening political condition- [email protected] sive “developmental dictatorship” model ality in the current situation would have ISSN 1861-1761 that justifies a lack of political and civil positive effects on the transformation pro- Translation by Meredith Dale rights as the price for progress in moderni- cess or the human rights situation. How- sation and the prospect of a rising standard ever, making (pre-emptory) concessions, (Updated English version of SWP-Aktuell 25/2017) of living. This would fit not only with the such as ending cooperation with critics of nature of the palace’s domestic political the palace, would send the wrong message interventionism, but also with the coun- as well. try’s investment partnership with China Instead European support for civil and its growth-led turn to the African society actors, elected bodies and executive continent. institutions not directly controlled by the palace needs to be stepped up, in order to strengthen the independence and credibil- Options for Europe ity of democratically elected institutions. Internal developments in Morocco are highly In the longer term, such support could have relevant to Europe for obvious reasons, as a positive influence on the stalled political they are related to European key concerns, reform process and contribute to ongoing namely counter-terrorism and migration. stability. The existence of a political coun- The preservation of the inclusive and stabi- terweight to the palace is the best guaran- lising Moroccan model is consequently in tee that Morocco will find its way back onto Europe’s interest. Brussels’ diplomatic rela- the road to political reform and expand tions with Rabat, however, have been at a inclusion once again. nadir since 2015, when a European Court

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