Demobilization in Morocco: the Case of the February 20 Movement by © 2018 Sammy Zeyad Badran
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Demobilization in Morocco: The Case of The February 20 Movement By © 2018 Sammy Zeyad Badran Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Chairperson: Dr. Hannah E. Britton Co-Chairperson: Dr. Gail Buttorff Dr. Gary M. Reich Dr. Nazli Avdan Dr. Alesha E. Doan Date Defended: 31 May 2018 ii The dissertation committee for Sammy Zeyad Badran certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Demobilization in Morocco: The Case of The February 20 Movement Chairperson: Dr. Hannah E. Britton Co-Chairperson: Dr. Gail Buttorff Date Approved: 31 May 2018 iii Abstract This dissertation aims to understand why protests lessen when they do by investigating how and why social movements demobilize. I do this by questioning the causal link between consistent state polices (concessions or repression) and social movement demobilization. My interviews with the February 20 Movement, the main organizer of mass protests in Morocco during the Arab Spring, reveals how ideological differences between leftist and Islamist participants led to the group’s eventual halt of protests. During my fieldwork, I conducted 46 semi-structured elite interviews with civil society activists, political party leaders, MPs, and independent activists throughout Morocco. My interviews demonstrate that the February 20 Movement was initially united, but that this incrementally changed following the King’s mixed-policy of concessions and repression. The King’s concessionary policies convinced society that demands were being met and therefore led to the perception that the February 20 Movement was no longer needed, while repression highlighted internal divides. The King’s calculated mixed-policy approach killed this social movement by delegitimizing it, in addition to internally fracturing it. This dissertation will show how the February 20 Movement became a divided movement that could not uniformly respond to a series of concessions and repression. iv Acknowledgments I am particularly thankful for my wife, Mar, for your encouragement and support. Thank you for always supporting me and allowing me to achieve my goals. I feel blessed to have been able to complete this dissertation alongside my son, Noor. Thank you for reminding me to close my computer and take play-breaks. I am thankful for my supportive parents – thank you for all that you do for me. I also want to thank my brothers and sister-in-law. You all helped me through my academic career and I appreciate you all so much. This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance of my advisors, Hannah Britton and Gail Buttorff. Your advice, insights, and general guidance were invaluable. You both worked tirelessly with me through revisions and pushed me to challenge myself and think critically. Through your efforts and dedication, I learned to develop and improve my own research, teaching, and advising. I am also very thankful for committee members: Gary Reich, Nazli Avdan, and Alesha Doan. I feel lucky to have you all on my committee. This dissertation was made possible by various funding sources. I am extremely appreciative to the Fulbright Student Program, which funded my fieldwork for this dissertation. I appreciate the assistance and guidance from the Moroccan-American Commission for Educational and Cultural Exchange and especially James Miller. I am indebted to the Kansas African Studies Center for generously funding my language training through multiple FLAS fellowships. The Doha Institute of Graduate Studies and the Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies funded a unique opportunity to present my work at the 2018 Arab Graduate Student Conference in Doha. I would also like to thank the University of Kansas Sociology Department for granting me the E. Jackson Baur Award for Research and Study of Social Conflict and Conflict Resolution. v Finally, I would like to express my indebtedness to my interviewees and all of my Moroccan friends. I am touched by the hospitality and kindheartedness shown by you all. I appreciate all of the support from the Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas and I especially value the support I received from my colleagues and professors. vi Table of Contents Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. ix Chapter One: The February 20 Movement and The Arab Spring .......................................... 1 The February 20 Movement ........................................................................................................... 3 The Case of Morocco ...................................................................................................................... 6 Social Movement Theory and Demobilization ............................................................................. 10 Concessions and Repression: A Theory ....................................................................................... 12 Methodology ................................................................................................................................. 15 Significance of the Moroccan Case .............................................................................................. 17 Outline of Dissertation .................................................................................................................. 19 Chapter Two: Reforms, Repression, and Frames ................................................................... 23 Framing and Problem Depletion ................................................................................................... 26 Table 2.1: Frames ......................................................................................................................... 30 Trajectories of Demobilization ..................................................................................................... 30 Figure 2.1: Relationship Between State Policy and Protests ........................................................ 31 The ‘Reformist, Moderate, and United’ Movement ..................................................................... 34 Table 2.2: F20’s United Frames, February – March 2011 ........................................................... 35 The King’s Stick After Carrot Approach: March – May 2011 ..................................................... 38 Depleting Grievances Through Concessions .......................................................................................... 38 Table 2.3: F20’s Demands and the March 9 Speech .................................................................... 40 Smearing F20 and The Continued Framing Crisis ................................................................................ 41 Direct Repression ................................................................................................................................... 47 The Referendum Campaign: F20 Without a Unified Frame: June - July 2011 ............................ 55 Table 2.4: F20’s ‘Revolutionary-Republican’ Frames, After March 2011 .................................. 60 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 64 Chapter Three: Signaling Change Through Elections ............................................................ 67 The Signaling Role of Authoritarian Elections ............................................................................ 69 Opposition Islamists and Royalist Parties .................................................................................... 77 The 2011 General Election Results: Signaling Change ................................................................ 84 Table 3.1: 2011 Elections Results ................................................................................................ 87 vii After the PJD Victory: Internal Divides ....................................................................................... 91 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 95 Chapter Four: Structure and Coalitions: The Tactical Standstill of F20 ............................. 98 F20’s (Lack of) Structure ............................................................................................................ 101 F20’s Initial Tactic: Brushing Ideology Under the Rug ............................................................. 104 Contentious Alliances and the Formation of Factions within F20 ............................................. 109 F20’s Divided Strategy and Fracture .......................................................................................... 116 Internal JCO Cooptation ...................................................................................................................... 117 F20’s Tactical Rigidity ......................................................................................................................... 120 JCO’s Withdrawal and F20's ‘End’ ..................................................................................................... 124 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 127 Chapter Five: The Future of Contention