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Número 94

ANEXO IX

Alvaro Espina Vocal Asesor 24 de Enero de 2012

ENTRE EL 1 DE SEPTIEMBRE Y EL 15 DE OCTUBRE DE 2011 BACKGROUND PAPERS:*

1. La excepción del Golfo, Fp de Ana Echangüe …11 2. Un final infeliz para Yemen, Fp de Carles Schmitz…14 3. Depende: Siria, Fp de Barah Mikail…18 4. El gran patio trasero de Rusia, Fp de Mikhail Metzel…23 5. What’s the future for Facebook revolutions?, Political Bookworm by Jeffrey C Alexander…27 6. Egypt trip update, Tale University by Jeffrey Alexander…29 7. What President Obama must do to save Egypt’s democracy, http://ccs research.yale.edu by Jeffrey C Alexander…36 8. Shmuel Noah (SN) Eisenstadt, ASA Footnotes …40 9. The performance of politics, http://www.asanet.org by Jeffrey C Alexander…42 10. In Tunisia, waiting for the morning after, The New York Times by By HDS Greenway…45 11. Alarmante Egipto, El País.com…47 12. Popular candidate worries secular Tunisians, Spiegel OnLine by Mathieu von Rohr…48 13. The military has gone too far, Almasryalyoum …52 14. A massacre at the hands of the authorities, Almasryalyoum by Karima Kamal…54 15. Don’t be blind to Erdogan’s flaws, Financial Times by Gideon Rachman…56 16. Sanctions pose growing threat to Syria’s Assad, The New York Times by Nada Bakri…59 17. Cairo killings raise heat on military, Financial Times by Heba Saleh…62

18. Egypt’s military rulers make a (nother) mess, Financial Times by Roula Khalaf…65 19. Maspero violence raises questions about military’s fitness to run Egypt, Almasryalyoum by Noha El Hennawy…66 20. No es la religion, es la política, El País de Enric González Jerusalén…69 21. Cairo clashes leave at least 24 dead, The Guardian by Jack Shenker and Barry Neild…71 22. Foster consensus to build the new Egypt, Almasryalyoum by Michal Meyer Resende…73 23. The economics of the Arab spring, Financial Times by Roula Khalaf…75 24. Iraq, siding with Iran, sends essential aid to Syria’s Assad, The Washington Post by Joby Warrick…80 25. Political exclusion of whom?, Almasryalyoum by Amr el Shobaki…83 26. Why is Erdogan attacking Germany’s foundations?, Spiegel On Line by Jurgen Gottschlich …84 27. A veces, ganan los malos, Fp de Charles Schmitz…87 28. SCAF agreement is no susprise, Almasryalyoum by Akram …91 29. Del alfiler al elefante, El País de Lluis Bassets…93 30. Syrian insurrection set to gather momentum, The Guardian by Martin Chulov…95 31. Is Israel its own worst enemy? The New York Times by Nicholas D Kristof…97 32. Russia, China veto Syria resolution at the United Nations, The Washington Post by Colum Lynch…99

33. In Egypt, a dreamer continues lonely protest, The Washington Post by Leila Fadel…101 34. Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syrian regime, The Guardian …105 35. Loud marching music droened out the inferno, Spiegel On Line …108 36. In Egypt, concessions by military on politics, The New York Times by David D Kirkpatrick…110 37. Syrian dissidents form council, hope to win greater international support, The Washington Post by Liz Sly…112 38. The dilemma of liberal discourse in Egypt, Almastyalyoum by Nadine Avdalla…115 39. Key Syrian city takes on the tone of a civil war, The New York Times by Anthony Shadid…117 40. The bankers and the revolutionaries, The New York Times by Nicholas D Kristof…120 41. La revolución árabe se estrella en Yemen, El País de Angeles Espinosa…123 42. ¿Palestina ganó?, Project Syndicate by Sholomo Ben- Ami…126 43. Stern words change nothing int the middle east, Spiegel On line …128 44. Egypt warns US on attaching conditions to military aid, The Washington Post by Mary Beth Sheridan…131 45. US ambassador to Syria accosted by pro Assad in Damascus, The Washington Post by Joby Warrick…132 46. Saleh says he won’t step down until rivals are out, The Washington Post by Sudarsan Raghavan…133 47. Land without peace: why Abbas went to the UN, The Washington Post by Charles Krauthammer…136 4

48. Activitst in Arab world vie to define Islamic state, The New York Times by Anthony Shadid…138 49. La matanza de Abu Salim fue el origen de esta revolución, El País de Francisco Peregil…141 50. Saleh advierte de una guerra civil en Yemen si él abandona el poder, El País de CET…145 51. Arabia Saudí se blinda frente a la primavera árabe, El País de Angeles Espinosa…146 52. A vueltas con el Golfo, El País de Angeles Espinosa…149 53. A Questionable form of freedom for North Africa, SpiegelOn Line by Clements Hoges…152 54. Egyptian presidential hopefuls criticize slow pace of change, The Washington Post by Leila Fadel…157 55. Averting a civil war in Syria, The Washington Post by Editorial…159 56. As scorn for vote grows, protests surge around globe, The New York Times by Nicholas Kulish…160 57. The Arab 1989 revisited, Open Democracy by Kristina Coates…164 58. Egypt’s revolution: patchwork of sweeping reform?, Almasryalyoum by Samir Morkous…174 59. An international plan to eradicate dictatorship, The Washington Post by Mark Palmer…176 60. Europe’s oil embargo leaves Syria urgently seeking new customers, The New York Times by Clifford Krauss…178 61. Fearing change, many Christians in Syria back Assad, The New York Times …181 62. Israel’s false friends on the US right, Financial Times by Simon Schama…184

63. In Syria, defectors form dissident army in sign uprising may be entering new phase by Liz Sly…186 64. Saudi Monach grants women right to vote, The New York Times by Neil MacFarquhar…188 65. Abbas appeals to the world’s conscience, Spiegel On Line by Ulrike Putz…192 66. Nuevas elecciones en el golfo Pérsico a la sombra de la primavera árabe, El País.com de Angeles Espinosa…195 67. Aisha Gadafi rompe el silencio pactado con las autoridades de Argel, El País.com de Ignacio Cembrero…196 68. Abbas desafia ante la ONU a Netanyahu y a EEUU, El País.com de Antonio Caño…198 69. Full transcript of Abbas speech at UN General Assembly …200 70. Las grandes potencias intentan que las partes se sienten a negociar, El País.com…207 71. El mundo tiene la palabra, El País.com de Javier Valenzuela…209 72. El presidente Saleh vuelve a Yemen en pleno conflicto civil, El País.com de Angeles Espinosa…211 73. Hartos de trampas, El País.com de José Ignacio Torreblanca…212 74. Palestinians formally request UN membership, The New York Times by Neil MacFarquhar…214 75. Yemen president’s return could inflame violence, opponents warn, The Guardian by Associtated Press…216 76. Europe divided on Palestinian question, Spiegel OnLine by Carsten Volkery…218 77. Pakistan backed attacks on American targets, US says, The Washington Post by Karen DeYoung…220 6

78. At United Nations, a last-minute push for Mideast talks, The Washington Post by Joby Warrick…223 79. Palestinians ready to put statehood on backburner in favour of peace talks, The Guardian by Chris McGreal…225 80. Western finance bodies face challenges in funding Arab spring countries, The New York Times by Matthew Saltmarsh…228 81. Estados Unidos coordina con Turquía la transición en Siria, El País.com de Antonio Caño…232 82. Obama pide garantías de que la transición libia impedirá el extremismo religioso, El País.com de Antonio Caño…233 83. Las tropas de Saleh golpean con fuerza el epicentro de la protesta, El País.com de Angeles Espinosa…235 84. US is quietly getting ready for Syria without Assad, The New York Times by Helene Cooper…237 85. Tumult of Arab spring prompts worries in Washington, The New York Times by Steven Lee Myers…240 86. America and the Palestine vote, Financial Times by Gideon Rachman…243 87. Israel should back a Palestinian state, Financial Times by Philip Stephens…244 88. Islamists’ growing sway raises questions for Libya, The New York Times by Rod Nordland…247 89. La sharia, según Libia, El Pais.com de Francisco Peregil…251 90. Recordadme cuando caiga el régimen, El País.com de Ignacio Cembrero…253 91. Syrian activist Ghiyath Matar’s death spurs grief, debate, The Washington Post by Liz Sly…255

92. EU politicians slam Turkey’s anti-israel course, Spiegel OnLine by Annett Meiritz…258 93. When the Singapore sling meets the Arab spring, Financial Times by David Pilling…261 94. Veto a State, lose an Ally, The New York Times by Turki Al-Faisal…263 95. Wealthy nations, global lenders pledge $58 billion to Arab countries to encourage democracy, The Washington Post by Associated Press…265 96. Beyond Cairo, Israel sensing a wider siege, The New York Times by Ethan Bronner…267 97. How 9/11 triggered America’s decline, Spiegel on Line by Gregor Peter Schmitz…270 98. Ten lost years, Spiegel OnLine by Jacob Augstein…272 99. A new start for Libya, The New York Times …275 100. Los amigos occidentales de Gadafi, Project Syndicate de Arnold Cassola…276 101. Finding hope in Libya, The New York Times by Nicholas D Kristof…278 102. Entre el 11-S y la primavera árabe, Project Syndicate de Omar Ashour…280 103. What’s wrong with the Palestinians appealing to the UN?, Spiegel On Line…283 104. Libyan leaders fear Gaddafi may flee south across the border into Niger, Guardian.co.uk by Lizzy Davies…286 105. After 9/11, getting beyond us-and-them, Financial Times by Wendell Steavenson…288 106. Libyan army convoys flee across Sahara carrying looted cash and gold, Guardian.co.uk by David Smith…291

107. Israel, Turkey and Greece, Financial Times by Gideon Rachman…294 108. La gente ha despertado en Israel, El País.com de Ana Garralda…296 109. Rusia rechaza el embargo petrolero de la UE a Siria, El País.com de Miguel González…298 110. La sharia aflora en la trasición libia, El País.com de Juan Miguel Muñoz…299 111. Trípoli, seis meses después, El País.com de Bernard-Henri Levy…302 112. US is appealing to Palestinians to stall UN vote, The New York Times by Steven Lee Myers…304 113. A Libyan prisoner lives to tell his story, Sunday Review by Nicholas D Kristof…307 114. EU to embargo Syrian oil, Europe and the World by De Volkskrant…309 115. M15 former chief decries war on terror, Guardian.co.uk by Richard Norton-Taylor…310 116. No, 9/11 did not change the world, Financial Times by Philip Stephens…311 117. In Libya, former enemy is recast in role of ally, The New York Times by Rod Nordland…314 118. Islamic arbitrators shadow german lax, Spiegel On Line by Maximilian Popp…317 119. It’s often a dictate of power, Spiegel On Line…320 120. Tripoli’s sudden fall revealed rotten heart of Gaddafi’s regimen, The Washington Post by Simon Denyer…322 121. Russia recognizes Libyan rebels as country’s leaders ahead of world conference on Libya, The Washington Post by Associated Press…325

122. Libia: tras la Guerra, los negocios, Presseurop …328 123. A sociological odyssey: they comparative voyage of SN Eisenstadt, Journal of Classical Sociology by Edward A Tiryakian…331 124. Connected histories, power and meaning: transnational forces in the construction of collective identities by Luis Roniger…331 125. Deciphering transcendence and the open code of modernity: SN Eisenstadt’s comparative hermeneutics of civilizations by Ilana f Silber…332 126. An appraisal of Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt’s global historical sociology by Wilfried Spohn…332 127. SN Eisenstadt: A sociological giant by Roland Robertson…333 128. The dialogue of civilizations: an Eisenstadt legacy by Donald N Levine…333 129. Axial civilizations, multiple modernities, and Islam by Said Amir Arjomad…333

*Índice elaborado por Francisca Simón Gil

LA EXCEPCIÓN DEL GOLFO Ana Echagüe Octubre 2011 La UE se equivoca al tragarse de buen grado la farsa de reformas en Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Bahréin y Arabia Saudí.

AFP/Getty Images Las noticias sobre las elecciones en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos (EAU) y Bahréin quedaron empequeñecidas por el inesperado anuncio del rey Abdulá de Arabia Saudí de que las mujeres podrán votar y presentarse como candidatas en las elecciones municipales previstas para dentro de cuatro años, así como que podrán incorporarse a la Majlis al Shura, la asamblea consultiva formada por designación. La Unión Europa, si se da por enterada, seguramente se limitará a dar un chasquido de aprobación ante los acontecimientos. Las relaciones entre la UE y los Estados del Golfo son todavía escasas, centradas en cuestiones económicas y comerciales, y asombrosamente alejadas del tipo de partenariados que se ofrecen a los Estados mediterráneos en los que se proclama que la reforma política es un objetivo fundamental. De todas formas, tampoco es que Bahréin o los EAU figuren mucho en las noticias. Ni que se espere que los resultados de los comicios vayan a cambiar nada. En ambos casos, lo que se votó fue la composición de unos órganos consultivos con poder legislativo real. En los EAU, un colegio electoral compuesto por 130.000 ciudadanos cuidadosamente seleccionados (que representan aproximadamente al 10% de la población nacional) votaban a 20 de los 40 miembros del Consejo Federal Nacional (CFN); los otros 20 son designados. En Bahréin había elecciones parciales para decidir 14 de los 18

escaños de la cámara baja del Parlamento (para los otros cuatro se presentaron unos únicos candidatos) que el grupo de oposición al Wefaq dejó vacantes cuando dimitió en masa en febrero, en señal de protesta por la violencia con la que se habían reprimido las manifestaciones en el país. ¿Por qué celebrar elecciones para órganos que carecen de cualquier poder real? ¿Por qué permitir que voten las mujeres mientras se les sigue obligando a estar bajo la tutela de sus parientes masculinos y se les prohíbe conducir? Todo forma parte de una fachada que protege no sólo a los regímenes gobernantes sino también a sus adláteres europeos. Una fachada que intenta crear la ilusión de que esos regímenes están avanzando poco a poco, a un ritmo seguramente marcado por el carácter conservador de sus sociedades, hacia más reformas políticas, más disposición a rendir cuentas y más apertura. El truco está en mostrar justo la voluntad de reforma suficiente para obtener apoyos. Es una farsa que la UE se traga de buen grado porque ha decidido que el Golfo constituye una realidad paralela, una excepción, en la que las aspiraciones de las rebeliones árabes no merecen que se las apoye. Los recursos energéticos, la riqueza financiera y los intereses de seguridad militan contra la defensa de los derechos cívicos y políticos.

El miedo a la propagación de las Hoy, el rey Abdulá decide revueltas árabes ha hecho que los conceder el voto a las mujeres de regímenes del Golfo oscilen entre la la misma manera que ayer represión y las concesiones, mientras decidió aplazar las elecciones la Unión mira hacia otro lado. Por municipales dos años ejemplo, en los EAU, al mismo tiempo que el número de personas con derecho a voto se multiplicaba exponencialmente, de unos 7.000 en 2006 a casi 130.000, dos días después de los comicios, cinco activistas políticos comparecieron ante el tribunal acusados de insultar en público a los gobernantes del país. Los detuvieron después de que entregaran al Gobierno una petición firmada por más de 100 ciudadanos en la que exigían que todo el mundo pueda elegir el CFN. En Bahréin, una dura operación policial que acabó con 34 personas muertas, más de 1.400 detenidos, 3.600 despedidos de su trabajo, acusaciones de tortura y cuatro muertes en comisaría, fue seguida por mansos gestos conciliatorios, incluidos un Diálogo Nacional que la oposición despreció por considerarlo una patraña, y una Comisión Independiente de Investigación (que debe presentar sus conclusiones a finales de octubre). En ambos países, se recurrió a importantes desembolsos de dinero para evitar o mitigar las peticiones de reforma. Lo mismo ha ocurrido en Arabia Saudí, donde la primera reacción ante las revueltas fue un programa de gastos de 130.000 millones de dólares (unos 95.000 millones de euros), seguido de unos gestos más bien esquizofrénicos que van desde las restricciones a los medios de comunicación y la concesión de más poder a las instituciones religiosas conservadoras a la decisión recién anunciada de otorgar el voto a las mujeres. No es de extrañar que los ciudadanos de la región no se molesten en votar. Sólo el 28% de los ciudadanos con derecho a voto acudió a las urnas en los EAU, y en 12

Bahréin la participación fue aún menor, de alrededor del 18%. ¿De qué sirve votar a unas instituciones que no tienen poder? Pero, sobre todo, ¿por qué entrar en un juego en el que las reglas se establecen con tanta arbitrariedad? Lo que les dan se lo pueden muy bien quitar de aquí a un par de meses o de años. Hoy, el rey Abdulá decide conceder el voto a las mujeres de la misma manera que ayer decidió aplazar las elecciones municipales dos años. Hasta que a los habitantes del Golfo se les trate como ciudadanos provistos de derechos y obligaciones, y no como súbditos a los que se hacen o se revocan concesiones, será difícil que los gobernantes puedan consolidar su legitimidad. La UE hace mal en alimentar ese sentimiento de excepcionalismo del Golfo. No hay una salida fácil; la estabilidad sólo se conseguirá mediante las reformas políticas y la reconciliación social. Artículos relacionados ¿Es la familia real saudí la solución? Guillaume FourmontLos señores del reino. Christopher DavidsonArabia Saudí, protegida por el oro negro. Guillaume Fourmont http://www.fp-es.org/la-excepcion-del-golfo

UN FINAL INFELIZ PARA YEMEN Charles Schmitz Septiembre 2011 A veces, ganan los malos.

AFP/Getty Images

El pasado mes de junio, cuando el presidente yemení Alí Abdalá Saleh se fue a Arabia Saudí para que le trataran sus heridas, casi todos los observadores pensaron que la crisis política de Yemen iba a resolverse en favor de la oposición y los revolucionarios que ocupaban las calles. Si Saleh –que había sufrido graves quemaduras durante un ataque a su mezquita presidencial— no moría, por lo menos se quedaría como prisionero de los saudíes, que llevaban tiempo intentando que dimitiera. Pocos pensaron que iba a regresar. Y dentro de Yemen, las fuerzas partidarias de Saleh estarían debilitadas sin su presidente, por lo que se despertaron muchas esperanzas entre los opositores. Un Gobierno de transición supervisaría nuevas elecciones que darían paso a una nueva era. Eso creían. Durante un verano sangriento, el clan de Saleh demostró que era muy capaz de mantenerse aferrado a su poder político. Los hijos y sobrinos del Presidente, que ocupan cargos fundamentales en los servicios de seguridad y el Ejército, provocaron conflictos

de forma agresiva. Estallaron luchas esporádicas en todo el país: en Taíz, Saná, Arhab, Abyán, Adén y otros lugares. En Saná, la mayoría de las víctimas de los combates fueron civiles. Los seguidores de Saleh parecían casi disfrutar provocando a los desertores del Ejército que se habían pasado al bando de Alí Mohsen al Ahmar, el general que se unió a los revolucionarios en marzo y prometió protegerlos. Las agresiones a civiles no solo pretendían enviar un mensaje a los rebeldes, sino dejar al descubierto la debilidad de las fuerzas de Ahmar. Ni siquiera la alianza de todos los grupos opuestos a Saleh –la Primera División Acorazada de Ahmar, los revolucionarios callejeros, las fuerzas aliadas con el jefe tribal Sadeq al Ahmar (que no tiene ninguna relación con Alí Mohsen al Ahmar) y los partidos de la oposición política yemení— parecía capaz de inclinar la balanza de poder en su favor. No hubo elecciones, y la oposición no pudo formar un Gobierno de transición, a pesar de intentarlo. Y Saleh no murió de sus heridas. Como invitado de Arabia Saudí, se recuperó y, a lo largo del verano, empezó a ejercer sus funciones presidenciales y a reunirse en el hospital con algunos otros altos funcionarios yemeníes que también habían resultado heridos en el ataque. Las autoridades occidentales se apresuraron a tratar de manipular los hechos sobre el terreno y se entrevistaron con el vicepresidente, Abd al Rab Mansur al Hadi, como si el poder real de Yemen estuviera en sus manos. Oficialmente, Hadi era el jefe del Estado en funciones, pero Ahmed Saleh, hijo del dictador y comandante de la Guardia Republicana, le impidió la entrada en el palacio presidencial y le obligó a trabajar en su casa, una clara señal de quién mandaba. No obstante, Hadi tuvo su utilidad para los estadounidenses. Con su experiencia militar y sus conexiones locales, consiguió agrupar a las fuerzas locales y dar la vuelta a la situación frente al asalto por tierra de Al Qaeda en la provincia de Abyán. Hadi prometió cooperación y aseguró a los estadunidenses que Yemen no permitiría que Al Qaeda se aprovechase de la crisis del país. Las informaciones procedentes de Abyán dicen que los lanzamientos aéreos de Arabia Saudí y EE UU fueron cruciales para mantener con vida la Brigada Mika 25, una fuerza leal sitiada durante tres meses por guerrilleros en Zinjibar, la capital de la provincia de Abyán. (Saleh dio las gracias a estadounidenses y saudíes por su apoyo en la guerra contra Al Qaeda en un discurso pronunciado poco después de regresar a Saná). Estados Unidos y Europa querían que Hadi fuera más allá y pusiera en práctica el acuerdo del Golfo, que exigía la dimisión de Saleh un mes después de la firma y un Gobierno de transición que convocara nuevas elecciones. Deseaban un pacto político que resolviera la crisis y la consiguiente inestabilidad de Yemen, que estaba impidiendo abordar el problema del grave deterioro de su economía. Pero el clan de Saleh imposibilitó cualquier acuerdo político y sometió a los manifestantes a disparos de francotiradores o a bombardeos al azar, casi como para probar que podía actuar impunemente contra sus adversarios. Por fin, a mediados de septiembre, llegó la noticia de que Saleh había autorizado a Hadi a negociar un pacto basado en el acuerdo del Golfo. Parecía que había esperanza de una solución política. Sin embargo, siguiendo una espiral ya demasiado habitual, la violencia estalló casi de inmediato y frustró la perspectiva de acuerdo.

Los orígenes de esta última ola de violencia son confusos. Las tropas leales al Gobierno abrieron fuego contra los manifestantes en Saná. Eso está claro, pero parece que los manifestantes estaban dejando sus posiciones para avanzar hacia el palacio presidencial, y que las tropas de Alí Mohsen al Ahmar estaban aprovechando la marcha para ganar terreno militar. En Yemen, muchos han acusado a Ahmar de haber instigado esta oleada de combates por miedo a quedar fuera de un acuerdo político negociado. Fuera cual fuera la causa del estallido, los feroces combates mataron a más de 100 personas, sobre todo manifestantes, pero también muchos soldados, en los choques entre las unidades leales y las desertoras. Entonces, en un giro totalmente nuevo, Saleh apereció con el rey Abdulá de Arabia Saudí en lo que parecía una visita de Estado oficial. De pronto daba la impresión de que los saudíes, que habían trabajado para conseguir que Saleh dimitiese en primavera, habían decidido darle su respaldo oficial. Pocos días después, volvió por sorpresa a Saná. La versión oficial es que Saleh volvió para supervisar un acuerdo político; dijo que el diálogo era la única solución y que volvía con una rama de olivo y una paloma de la paz. Sin embargo, nada más producirse el regreso, estalló una nueva ola de violencia, porque los leales al presidente quisieron dejar claro que cualquier acuerdo político seguiría las condiciones impuestas por él. El distrito de Hasaba, donde vive Sadeq al Ahmar, jefe de la confederación tribal Hashid, volvió a ser blanco de ataques. También asaltaron, al parecer, la casa de su hermano, Himyar al Ahmar, en el lujoso barrio de Hadda, y asimismo el cuartel general de la Primera División Acorazada de Alí Mohsen al Ahmar. En la Plaza del Cambio volvieron a abrir fuego intenso contra los manifestantes pacíficos. O los partidarios de Saleh se sentían envalentonados y capaces de exigir una solución militar, o estaban intentando debilitar a sus adversarios. da la impresión de que los Arabia

En público, Saleh proclama su Saudí han cambiado su posición y compromiso de paz. El domingo, 25 de vuelven a apoyarle de manera tácita septiembre, renovó su lealtad al acuerdo del Golfo y reiteró que el vicepresidente podía firmarlo en su nombre. Pero, a estas alturas, esas son promesas huecas. La oposición yemení y los revolucionarios en la calle se niegan a aceptar cualquier Gobierno de transición en el que participe Saleh, precisamente porque el presidente lleva mucho tiempo mostrando que sabe ceder a las presiones populares y, al mismo tiempo, hacer realidad sus propios planes en sus propios términos. Eso es lo que parece estar haciendo ahora. En tres ocasiones ha prometido firmar el acuerdo del Golfo, y en tres ocasiones ha cambiado de opinión en el último minuto (en una de ellas, se echó atrás con el embajador de Estados Unidos sentado a su lado y esperando a ser testigo de la firma). Desde su propio punto de vista, Saleh ha sobrevivido no solo a un intento de asesinato, sino a una campaña de difamación política apoyada por toda la comunidad internacional, incluidos los fundamentales saudíes. Pero da la impresión de que los Arabia Saudí han cambiado su posición y vuelven a apoyarle de manera tácita. ¿Por qué va a dimitir ahora? Las autoridades estadounidenses están hartas de la insolencia de Saleh y, en los dos primeros días posteriores a su regreso, anunciaron oficialmente que querían que pusiera en marcha un Gobierno de transición y después dimitiera. El rey Abdulá también pidió a Saleh que dimitiera al día siguiente de que dejara el reino para volver a Saná. 16

La posición de estos dos países resulta cómica ante la realidad política en Yemen. Los responsables estadounidenses, desde luego, reconocerán los hechos consumados de Saleh y le apoyarán, para que complete su mandato y llegue a 2013 e incluso más allá. Saleh no solo ha desbaratado el intento de EE UU de crear unos hechos consumados que consistían en un Gobierno de transición sin él, sino que ha creado otros que le posibilitarán permanecer en el poder sin tener en cuenta los lugares comunes que suelten Estados Unidos y Arabia Saudí, aunque sean sinceros. Una vez más, Saleh se las ha arreglado para ser la única salida viable. Eso significa que Yemen no va a disfrutar de ningún acuerdo político y que la violencia continuará. Los revolucionarios en las calles no se rendirán, y Alí Mohsen al Ahmar y los hermanos Ahmar se prepararán para soportar un largo conflicto; no tienen otra alternativa. Mientras tanto, la economía –y, por consiguiente, una crisis humanitaria creciente– seguirá empeorando. En el norte, ya existen campos de refugiados de los años del conflicto con los Houthis; en el sur están apareciendo otros nuevos como consecuencia de los combates en Abyán. Los líderes yemeníes parecen empeñados en conservar el poder a toda costa, incluso aunque su pueblo se muera de hambre, siempre que ellos se salven. La única esperanza es que se produzca alguna otra sorpresa política inesperada que desemboque en un Gobierno de transición y unas elecciones legítimas. Dada la ventajosa posición de Saleh en un país profundamente resquebrajado y dividido, es una esperanza muy débil.

Artículos relacionados • Días de caos en Yemen. Lourdes Romero • Yemen: un terremoto fértil para Al Qaeda. Edward Burke • Yemen: bienvenidos a 'Qaedastán'. Gregory Johnsen • Yemen, el conflicto olvidado Javier Martín • ¿Qué se lee en Yemen? Elisabeth Eaves http://www.fp-es.org/un-final-infeliz-para-yemen Depende

DEPENDE: SIRIA Barah Mikail Septiembre 2011 La situación actual de Siria, que todavía puede cambiar, puede deberse a cómo se han sobrevalorado algunos clichés relacionados con el país. Su realidad es mucho más compleja de lo que se está diciendo y la confianza al régimen parece ser mucho más fuerte de lo que se habría esperado. Ésa es la razón de que gran parte de las versiones que se están desarrollando deban ser relativizadas.

AFP/Gettyimages

Siria es un país sectario Un mito. Ésta es una de las quimeras que todavía están empujando a muchos analistas y observadores a interpretar los acontecimientos que están sucediendo en Siria como si las principales decisiones importantes estuvieran en manos de única comunidad —los alauíes, una rama del chiísmo, a la que pertenece el presidente Bashar al Assad—. Pero la realidad es más difícil de explicar. Obviamente, Al-Assad ha sido fiel al legado de su padre, y parece haber dejado la mayoría de los puestos de su aparato de seguridad en manos de funcionarios alauíes. Pero al mismo tiempo, esta situación no ha conducido a un sistema nacional absolutamente sectario. En realidad, si Siria estuviera tan dividida, habría más probabilidades de ver a los suníes sirios (el 75% de la población) volverse contra los alauíes u otras comunidades en nombre de su posición contraria el régimen.

Aunque el Gobierno y el grupo de asesores del presidente están muy lejos de estar formados solo por alauíes, la realidad social del país hace necesario relativizar este enfoque sectario. Si bien es cierto que la riqueza está concentrada en las ciudades más importantes (Damasco, Alepo, Hama, que son todas urbes de mayoría suní), quien viaje por el resto del país se percatará de que incluso las áreas de mayoría cristiana están en general más desarrolladas que las alauíes. De hecho, en Siria prevalece la desigualdad, y el Ejecutivo es en gran medida responsable de esta situación. Pero, por otro lado, estas mismas desigualdades recaen sobre grandes sectores de la población, sea cual sea su religión. Y la misma situación se repite en lo que se refiere a las élites, en las que alauíes, suníes y cristianos también han sido beneficiarios de corrupción y nepotismo. La resistencia de Siria a la presión se debe al apoyo de los chiíes de Irán No. Este es otro cliché del que se habla generalmente sin que esté probado por evidencias serias. En realidad, la fuerte relación que mantienen Siria e Irán se remonta a comienzos de la década de los 80, cuando se produjo la guerra entre Irak e Irán después de la Revolución Islámica iraní. En aquel momento, casi todos los países árabes de Oriente Medio decidieron expresar su solidaridad con Irak, que fue quien comenzó las hostilidades contra su vecino. Estos países, empezando por los Estados del Golfo, temían la capacidad del ayatolá Jomeini para conducir al resto de la región a una similar tendencia revolucionaria. También temían que las características chiíes de la Revolución Iraní pudieran alentar a los chiíes árabes (el 70% de la población de Bahrein, el 60% de los iraquíes y el 15% de los saudíes) para que actuaran del mismo modo. Pero la decisión de Damasco de expresar su solidaridad con Teherán no se debió a ningún tipo de movimiento intersectario, y la ascendencia alauí del entonces presidente sirio Hafez al Assad no significaba que él personalmente sintiera ninguna fascinación hacia el modelo iraní. La relación estaba construida sobre consideraciones estratégicas, ya que ambos Estados compartían una común aversión a Estados Unidos, Israel y “las políticas imperialistas pro occidentales” en general. Al mismo tiempo, tanto Al Assad como Jomeini creían que ponerse del lado de Bagdad equivalía a alinearse con las posiciones estadounidenses, que, según pensaban, no podrían llevar nada positivo para la región a largo plazo. Esto explica por qué estos dos países han conservado su relación desde esa época y han apoyado juntos en particular a los actores contrarios a los israelíes de la región (Hamás en los territorios palestinos, Hezbolá en Líbano…). Nada prueba hasta el momento que exista ningún tipo de sumisión siria a la voluntad de Irán a causa de consideraciones sectarias o religiosas, especialmente dado que las creencias de los chiíes iraníes son diferentes a las convenciones alauíes (los chiíes de Irán consideran, desde un punto de vista teológico, que los alauíes forman parte de una secta ilegítima que no tiene mucho que ver con la ortodoxia y la religión). Por tanto, pensar que la capacidad de resistencia de Damasco es debida al respaldo logístico que ofrece Teherán no tiene mucho sentido. El Gobierno sirio ha demostrado que tiene medios suficientes para desarrollar estrategias “anti insurrección”. Pero por otro lado, sí puede hallar 19

grandes beneficios en el dinero y las inversiones que Irán está desarrollando en su suelo, ya que contribuyen a aligerar el impacto de las duras sanciones económicas a las que está sometido. Las revueltas en Siria son espontáneas y abarcan distintas ideologías Desacertado. Después de que tunecinos y egipcios se libraran de sus líderes por sí mismos, muchos observadores han pensado que lo mismo podría ocurrir rápidamente en Siria. Pero todas estas expectativas se han demostrado equivocadas. De hecho, al revés de lo que sucedió en esos dos países, donde el resentimiento contra Ben Alí y Mubarak era intensos, el régimen sirio todavía se beneficia de un amplio apoyo popular. Si éste no fuera el caso, los diez millones de habitantes de Damasco y Alepo tendrían que salir a las calles y expresar su apoyo a los manifestantes de las otras ciudades (Deraa, Deir ez Zor, Homs o Hama) y entonces probablemente no pasaría mucho tiempo antes de que el régimen cayera. Pero lo que parece predominar es que —en paralelo a los temores que albergan la mayoría de sirios cuando se trata de pensar en cualquier tipo de escenario post Bashar (sectarismo generalizado, sumisión del país a las exigencias de Occidente, pérdida de medios persuasivos de resistencia contra Israel…)— gran parte de ellos todavía cree que las exigencias generales de reformas por parte de los manifestantes han ido acompañadas por amplias interferencias extranjeras. Por ejemplo, el papel de Jordania, Arabia Saudí, Qatar y Líbano de Hariri en Siria son denunciados por mucha gente, como puede verse en los eslóganes de los manifestantes favorables al Gobierno. Según ellos, todos estos actores y países quieren librarse del Ejecutivo sirio a causa de sus posiciones a favor del nacionalismo árabe en general. Por otra parte, que la Administración de Al Assad insista en la existencia de una teoría de la conspiración, el contenido de las imágenes y noticias que difunde relacionadas con el desmantelamiento de células islamistas y la existencia de tráfico de armas, así como la agenda de reformas que ha propuesto por sí mismo, producen un efecto “positivo” sobre la población siria. Ésta siente que algo se mueve en el país, aunque no sea de una forma lo suficientemente rápida y abierta. Y cree también que, considerando el clima sectario desde que las manifestaciones comenzaran a producirse en marzo, preferirían seguir siendo gobernados por un Gobierno fuerte —aunque los cambios lleguen lentamente— que moverse con rapidez hacia el llamado escenario democrático que podría tanto reforzar el surgimiento de un Estado pro saudí y pro estadounidense dirigido por suníes, como presentar el riesgo de convertir el país en algo parecido al sectario Irak post Saddam. La impermeabilidad de Siria a las presiones occidentales es debida a la naturaleza autoritaria del Estado Nada que ver con la realidad. Mucha gente considera que las demostradas posturas políticas arcaicas de Siria son debidas en gran medida a su propio proceso de coreinización del norte. Sería totalmente falso considerar que el país presenta cualquier evidencia seria de modernidad, ya que, a pesar de la ráfaga de

liberalización económica que ha soplado desde el año 2000, sigue estando sometido a la burocracia y su política exterior está determinada por la ideología (fundamentalmente por su agenda anti occidental, israelí e islamista). Pero al mismo tiempo, su gran reticencia a tratar directamente con Occidente tiene mucho más que ver con los temores de que una relación estrecha pudiera llevar a una sumisión total a sus demandas políticas, comenzado por una normalización de las relaciones con Israel que no se vería compensada por la devolución de los Altos del Golán, ocupados desde 1967. De hecho, Siria considera que la agenda occidental no tiene nada que ver con sus intereses nacionales. Por el contrario, los países y los líderes que han tenido un vínculo estrecho con Occidente no siempre se han beneficiado de éste, como ha quedado de manifiesto con la caída de los mandatarios de Irak, Túnez y Egipto, que no pudieron confiar en sus aliados occidentales para su supervivencia. En este contexto, y considerando que el propio Gobierno sirio se ha visto sometido a intensas presiones en el pasado reciente (2006-2008) sin que finalmente llegara a caer, Al Assad ha llegado a la clara conclusión de que, por muy fuertes que sean las presiones que reciba, lo mejor sigue siendo no hacerles caso. Por ejemplo, Bashar se ha enfrentado a una gran presión occidental durante los últimos años, ya que algunos de sus homólogos le pedían que cortara las relaciones que mantenía con Irán, Hamás y Hezbolá a cambio de compensaciones económicas y políticas. Pero Siria se negó a hacerlo, y el resultado es que una gran parte de las reticencias occidentales para intervenir militarmente en los asuntos del país son en parte causadas por los temores a las represalias que entonces sufrirían por parte de los aliados tradicionales sirios. Obviamente, estos elementos reafirman al Gobierno en su voluntad de ceñirse a la estrategia que ha estado desarrollando hasta ahora. Y, en el otro lado, los Estados occidentales se encuentran en una posición que en realidad no les permite ir más allá de las sanciones y una dura retórica, especialmente en un contexto en el que dos de los respaldos de Siria —Rusia y China— han dejado claro que vetarían cualquier resolución contundente, al menos en las circunstancias actuales. La posible caída de Bashar al Assad preocupa a muchos gobiernos regionales Ahora ya no. Esto pudo haber sido así al comienzo de las revoluciones árabes. Cuando la mayoría de los Gobiernos de la región temían que cualquier nueva caída de un líder árabe presentara un nuevo riesgo serio y directo para ellos. Pero desde entonces las cosas han cambiado, y ahora parece como si varios países regionales —todos los Estados árabes del Golfo, más Jordania, y, hasta cierto punto, Marruecos— han comprendido que la actual oleada podría ser para ellos una oportunidad de cambiar al régimen de Bachar al Assad y minar las estrategias de sus aliados. Ésa es la razón de que, aunque resulten muy difíciles de probar, las acusaciones relacionadas con la interferencia indirecta de alguno de estos países en los asuntos de Siria es algo que se debe de tomar en serio. Es más, parece que la mayoría de ellos estarían a favor de una intervención militar directa liderada por Occidente, ya que consideran que sería un modo eficaz de

frustrar los planes de Irán en la región y de tener a Damasco más fácilmente sometida a sus propias demandas y a su agenda política. Todos estos elementos no justifican en absoluto la inmovilidad siria cuando se trata de tomar seriamente en consideración las exigencias de cambio que expresan los manifestantes. A pesar incluso de que no constituyen una clara mayoría numérica en el país, la voluntad de reforma que manifiestan los manifestantes sirios es legítima y real, y cada caída de una nueva víctima en el campo, ya sea en el bando del Gobierno o el de sus oponentes, no está de ningún modo justificada y debería motivar una investigación y la exigencia de responsabilidades. En este sentido, la restricción de Siria a la entrada de periodistas en el país o su negativa a permitir que las comisiones de derechos humanos investiguen sobre el terreno, son los puntos que deberían centrar la atención de la llamada comunidad internacional, de modo que se pudiera avanzar desde la opacidad a la transparencia. Pero al mismo tiempo, puede resultar inteligente rebajar las expectativas en relación a lo que está sucediendo en el país, ya que la realidad dista mucho de lo que se está diciendo y la confianza al régimen parece ser mucho más fuerte de lo que cualquiera de los Estados occidentales o árabes de la región habrían esperado.

Artículos relacionados • Siria: ¿reformas o revolución? Natalia Sancha • Bashar al assad, la gran decepción. Hélène Michou • Mucho palo y poca zanahoria para Siria. Natalia Sancha • Abrir la puerta a Damasco. Jessica Mathews • La chiización de Siria. Stuart Reigeluth y Abdel Rahman al Haj • Salafismo 'importado'. Natalia Sancha http://www.fp-es.org/depende-siria

EL GRAN PATIO TRASERO DE

RUSIA

MIKHAIL METZEL/AFP/Getty Images

Un gran tour por la increíble diversidad de las antiguas repúblicas soviéticas. - Suzanne MerkelsonDe los Estados motores del libre mercado en el Báltico a los países de la meseta de Asia Central enfrentados a la presencia de grupos de insurgencia islámica, las 15 ex repúblicas soviéticas presentan una abundancia de contradicciones que una vez pudieron resultar tan inconcebibles como el propio colapso de la URSS hace 20 años: democráticos y autoritarios; cristianos, musulmanes y vehemente seculares; impacientes por unirse a la eurozona y también por aliarse con China; atados a su pasado soviético y, aún así, ansiosos por dejarlo atrás.

RUSIA Los rusos han estado sometidos a un “sube y baja” político y económico desde la disolución de la Unión Soviética. El primer ministro, Vladimir Putin, ha sido la fuerza dominante del país desde que asumiera la presidencia en 2000, supervisando el desarrollo de una postura agresiva en el extranjero y de una corrupción y una represión política crecientes en casa. Pero el despliegue de arrogante reafirmación nacionalista y su énfasis en el orden público han demostrado ser populares, y con las elecciones de 2012 acercándose en el horizonte, parece probable que Putin y su protegido el presidente Dmitri Medvedev sigan consolidando su poder.

Mientras Rusia y los otros antiguos Estados soviéticos deben hacer frente a desastres medioambientales, agitación política, tensiones étnicas y apuros económicos, como escribió David Hoffman en el número de julio/agosto de 2011 de Foreign Policy, cuando nos referimos a la caída de la Unión Soviética, “también merece la pena recordar lo que no salió mal. Tras la implosión soviética, podría haber sido mucho peor”.

Fotografía: Jóvenes activistas pro Kremlin bailan frente a un retrato de Medvedev y Putin en un campamento de verano cercano al Lago Seliger, unos 500 kilómetros al noroeste de Moscú, el 1 de agosto. Nashi es el mayor de un

grupo de movimientos juveniles creados por Putin para fomentar la lealtad ideológica al Kremlin. Cuenta con unos 10.000 miembros.

VYACHESLAV OSELEDKO/AFP/Getty Images

KAZAJISTÁN Gracias a su enorme riqueza energética, la economía de Kazajistán ha crecido rápidamente desde la caída de la Unión Soviética, y el país se enorgullece ahora de contar con un PIB per cápita mayor que el de Rusia. No obstante, el presidente Nursultán Nazarbayev se ha aferrado al poder durante 21 años y muestra pocos signos de querer renunciar a él en un futuro cercano. Freedom House continúa clasificando a Kazajistán como “no libre”.

Fotografía: Un berkutchi kazajo lanza su águila real durante el festival tradicional de caza en Nura el 4 de diciembre de 2010. La pequeña localidad de Nura, uno de los lugares favoritos para la cría de aves de presa en Asia Central.

VYACHESLAV OSELEDKO/AFP/Getty Images

KIRGUIZISTÁN El diminuto y remoto Kirguizistán se ha enfrentado a problemas relacionados con la corrupción generalizada, los conflictos étnicos y la lucha que mantienen Estados Unidos y Rusia por defender su influencia en el país desde que éste alcanzara la independencia. En 2010, un levantamiento popular forzó al presidente Kurmanbek Bakiyev a abandonar el cargo y precipitó una campaña de violencia étnica contra las minorías uzbeka y tayika

Fotografía: Soldados quirguises depositan flores en la Tumba del Soldado Desconocido, en el centro de Bishkek, el 9 de mayo de 2010, para conmemorar el 651 aniversario de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

AFP/Getty

TAYIKISTÁN Tras lograr su independencia en 1991, el gobierno de Tayikistán, que contaba con el apoyo de Moscú, ha sido testigo del ascenso de un movimiento islamista de oposición. En respuesta, el presidente Emomali Rahmon, antiguo apparatchik soviético, impuso una década de secularismo forzado y continúa temeroso ante el espectro de un floreciente fervor religioso entre los tayikos. Los hombres que lucen barbas son detenidos de forma aleatoria, a las mujeres se les prohíbe asistir a los servicios religiosos, a los jóvenes que estudian en países islámicos como Egipto e Irán se les ha llamado para que regresen y, más recientemente, a los menores de 18 años se les ha prohibido la entrada a las mezquitas.

Pero alejar a Dios de la plaza pública no ha contribuido a ayudar a la sociedad y a la economía moribundas del país. Tayikistán lucha ahora con problemas como una extendida adicción a las drogas, crisis alimentarias y de energía y las repercusiones de la guerra civil que siguió a la independencia. El radicalismo islámico está creciendo en parte debido a la insurgencia talibán en el vecino Afganistán.

Fotografía: La estatua, de 12,5 metros de altura, del fundador del estado soviético, es levantada de su pedestal en Khujand, la segunda ciudad más grande de Tayikistán, para ser trasladada a un parque en las afueras de la ciudad

MAXIM Marmur / AFP / Getty Images. UZBEKISTÁN El líder de Uzbekistán en la época soviética, Islam Karimov, no ha hecho otra cosa que endurecer su autoritario control del poder 20 años después de la caída del régimen comunista. Su dominio sobre la enorme riqueza energética del país y sus vínculos con potencias regionales como China e India se traduce en que Karimov realmente se enfrenta a pocas amenazas importantes. Su reinado ha venido marcado por un sello de especial crueldad: sus oponentes políticos son encarcelados y torturados con regularidad -en 2003, dos prisioneros políticos fueron puestos a hervir hasta que murieron- y en 2005, las tropas de Karimov masacraron a cientos de manifestantes pacíficos. Fotografía: Un hombre de Uzbekistán sostiene una taza de té en Tashkent, ciudad en la que se han producido varias explosiones y que el presidente Karimov ha utilizado para justificar el etiquetado de sus oponentes políticos como “terroristas islámicos”.

DMITRY KOSTYUKOV/AFP/Getty Images

TURKMENISTÁN El líder de Turkmenistán en su época soviética, reconvertido luego en presidente, Saparmurat Niyazov, más conocido como “Turkmenbashi”, utilizó los años posteriores a la independencia para fomentar un culto a su persona de proporciones épicas, llegando al punto de rebautizar los meses del año con su nombre y los de los miembros de su familia. Cuando Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, ex dentista y más tarde viceprimer ministro de Niyazov, asumió la presidencia tras la muerte de este en 2006, colocó al país en la senda de la modernización económica, abriendo sus ricas reservas de gas natural a la inversión extranjera, especialmente de China. Sin embargo, los cambios en política económica de Berdimuhamedov no han venido acompañados por reformas políticas. Fotografía: Un comerciante de ganado turcomano conduce sus camellos en el mercado de Tolkuckhka, a las afueras de la capital, Ashgabat, el 6 de julio de 2008. Turkmenistán anunció recientemente sus planes para construir instalaciones con el fin de preparar y procesar leche de camello para su comercialización. El mercado global para la leche de camello se estima en 10.000 millones de dólares http://www.fp-es.org/el-gran-patio-trasero-de-rusia?page=0,0

Posted at 11:21 AM ET, 10/13/2011 What’s the future for Facebook revolutions? By Jeffrey C. Alexander

About this blog: Was Egypt’s winter revolution a theatrical performance on the stage of Tahrir Square? In some respects, it was, says Jeffrey C. Alexander in his new book “Performative Revolution in Egypt,” published last month by Bloomsbury. Alexander, a professor of sociology at Yale and author of “The Performance of Politics: Obama’s Victory and the Democratic Struggle for Power,” examines the revolution and argues that in the square the protesters created a microcosm of the democacy they hoped to bring to Egypt. It was this political drama, Alexander says, that ultimately swayed the army and ushered in radical change at the top. Mixed into the drama was the power of communications in the Internet age, with many dubbing the Egyptian revolt a Facebook revolution. Here, Alexander assesses the impact of social networks on the outcome in Egypt and the role of the Internet in future potential uprisings. ------Dictators and revolutionaries may disagree about whether new media are a positive force for revolution or an invitation to global chaos. Recent events in North Africa and the Middle East have suggested both are correct. Egypt’s recent revolution clearly demonstrates that the effectiveness of the Facebook/Twitter “phenomenon” is determined by who is using it for what purpose. The story of the winter revolution of January 25 was how democratic idealism can be projected from a relatively narrow core-group to an audience of tens of millions. Tahrir Square became a stage upon which democratic revolution played out. Inspiring scenes were uploaded into digital communication devices, projected to satellites and sent back again all over the earth. Egypt’s dictator could not prevent the unfolding drama from being widely displayed. As the drama was projected outside Egypt into global civil society, Western viewers demanded that governments warn the Egyptian army not to intervene. These images of righteousness, martyrdom, and civil self-control also won over the enlisted men and officers in the Army. Yet that democratic enthusiasm ran into a brick wall once the 27

generals succeeded Mubarak as the ruling power. Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has not made good on its promise to safeguard the democratic transition, and instead employed Internet, Facebook, and Twitter to control communication and project misleading information into the public square. For instance, on Fridays, when Egypt’s democratic activists go to Tahrir Square to chant the week’s list of National Demands, the scene is not visible in the army’s social media or in the state-controlled national TV. Yet, even as the military uses the new media to maintain official invisibility, the revolutionaries employ it to record their opposition, videoing police brutality on cellphones and sending out Tweets organizing the weekly rituals in Tahrir Square. It’s effective. The military only pretends not to listen. Those who are performing revolution in Libya and Syria, and who might imagine it in Saudi Arabia or Iran, have and will encounter more difficulties, not only from armies that feel freer to employ violent force but from media environments that are more constrained. Egypt was the most wired nation in the Arab world, with 25 million people having access to social media or the Internet. Revolutionary leaders had experience creating Facebook pages in the commercial world, and Egyptian citizen-audiences were skilled in responding and employing them. In no other Arab country are activists and citizens experienced in this way. After Egypt, moreover, governments are aware of the Internet’s power. It can no longer function as a surprise weapon. If both sides, the entrenched interests and the revolutionaries, are equally seeking to propagandize using Twitter, the Internet might become less a medium for effective performance than a Tower of Babel. Internet and social media will continue to provide invaluable platforms for mounting performances that challenge dictatorial states. But now that dictators also employ the new media, revolutionary performances must find new ways to keep their own communications secret while responding to government lies in public way. In the age of internet revolution that Egypt launched, he who controls social messaging will control the revolution. By Jeffrey C. Alexander | 11:21 AM ET, 10/13/2011 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/political-bookworm/post/whats-the-future-for- facebook-revolutions/2011/10/12/gIQAhdtXhL_blog.html Publication Date: October 2011 Pages: 144 DOI: 10.5040/9781780930862 American sociologist Jeff Alexander examines what was new about Egypt's Spring revolution. Why was it so compelling to watch, and what made it so effective and does it have implications for democratic movements internationally. Using international news reports and translations of the social media pages that brought Egyptians flocking onto Tahrir Square, Alexander uncovers the narrative of a revolution that was scripted by its organizers, as both a moral statement and a media and digital statement. He sees it as a theatrical performance, designed to reveal to the key protagonists what a civil, egalitarian society might look like, by showing it in microcosm on the Square. Ultimately, he argues, it was the sight of the protestor's behaviour that swayed the army, and brought about regime change. 28

From the author of the widely acclaimed 2010 book: The Performance of Politics: Obama's Victory and the Democratic Struggle for Power, this powerful intervention into the debate on the Arab Spring is a must-read for those curious about how social media are fundamentally changing global politics. http://ccs.research.yale.edu//alexander/articles/ Yale University - Center for Cultural Sociology Jeffrey Alexander Blog from Cairo, Egypt 16 Sep 2011 – Egypt Trip Update I am back from Egypt and am in the process of compiling the data I collected. I will prepare a journal article in the coming months based on the 20-plus interviews I made during my four days in Cairo, which adds up to about 30 hours of tape. I’ve also used the blogs and some other, more recent material to develop a more condensed overview of my sense of what’s going on in Egypt right now, and to make a recommendation of how the U.S. should help this process along. I attach that brief piece here. Jeffrey Alexander, Egypt Op Ed Piece Cairo Journal Day 1 Western media accounts of post-revolutionary Egypt are dominated by old and tired pre-revolutionary stereotypes, clichés about the seemingly inevitable renewal of oriental despotism and fundamentally irrational, power-hungry Islam. Media attention has largely shifted to the new battle fronts and victories of the Arab Spring. In the little news about Egypt that does surface, one encounters a static picture of the military government as an immovable, frightening force crushing a desperate, disparate, rapidly disappearing straggle of activists, with the scheming Muslim Brotherhood waiting quietly in the wings, ready to seize power through the shams of elections. When I came to Cairo and spoke with the diverse groups of people engaged in the struggle to bring democracy to Egypt, it quickly became evident that these images are indeed misleading stereotypes. They scarcely do justice to the fragile, combustible, but immensely exciting and still very hopeful situation that is revolutionary Egypt today. I have deliberately described present-day Egypt as revolutionary rather than post- revolutionary. While the eighteen day uprising ended on February 11th, the revolution actually has continued in the seven months since, creating upheavals that ripple powerfully through every corner of this all-important Middle Eastern society. What activists have learned, in fact, is that the Revolution will have to be made twice. The first revolution was in Tahrir Square; the second is happening now, in the cultural and institutional life of the wider society. The first revolution cut off the head of the Leviathan state, but the body of the Leviathan, in the shape of the Supreme Military Council, remains. The authoritarian state may be headless, but it has shape and material force. Compared with Mubarak’s persistent but increasingly hapless efforts to gain public legitimacy, the military state has a little public presence; it is silent rather than discursive, seemingly unconcerned with performative presence or

cultural power. It keeps its machinery behind the scenes, but its actions are public and its power is dangerous. The first revolution chopped the head off the Egypt’s dictatorship. The second revolution has learned that to kill the dictatorship more is needed. It must drive a stake through the headless Leviathan’s vicious heart. Or, at the very least, cage the beast and force the Army to return to its cave. The second revolution pits the democrats’ cultural and communicative skill against the military state’s silent deployment of material power. Shifts in language are one sign the second revolution is succeeding. The term “civil society” is omnipresent, the biggest and most popular term in Egypt today. The revolutionary youth are determined to spread it to the working classes, religious minorities, and peasants. The Muslim Brotherhood promises to become part of the big tent of an Egyptian civil society in its own religious way. Even the military argues it is protecting civil society by repressing it. The greatest energy source of this great civil revival remains the carrier group of courageous, mostly elite who formed the core of the first revolution’s eighteen days. Most of the leading activists have stayed the course. Their lives transformed by the winter upheaval, they left comfortable jobs and dramatically shifted plans and careers. Before 25 January, the only female Presidential candidate told me, Egyptians felt like one another’s enemies. Egypt was filled with hostility and aggression, from the streets to the media and culture. “Tahrir” changed that, creating a new stream of “fellow feeling,” an expansive solidarity whose hopes and dreams extend to all ranks of the society. Among these core activists, numbering not more than two hundred mostly young men and women, there is still a sense of unleashed utopia, a feeling of immense possibility. The challenge that these activists face is how to institutionalize these newly fervent ideals. It is much more difficult than the effervescence and relief of the February 11th victory suggested. In those early days, most Egyptians hailed the Army as a revolutionary partner, for it had sheathed its blade, refused to do Mubarak’s bidding, and allowed the revolution to happen. What gradually became apparent in the seven months since is that the Supreme Military Council that silently rules Egypt is anything but “democracy in transition.” Yes, it is organizing parliamentary elections for November, but, meanwhile, it engages in reflexive, seemingly habitual autocratic actions. Claiming to cleanse Egypt of disorder, to keep a lid on dangerously centrifugal forces, its motives are secret, its deliberations opaque, its relations with the diverse groupings that compose Egyptian society carried out in a heedlessly anti-civil way. There are no military press conferences, no explanations for its actions, none of the semblance of democratic justification that preoccupied the Mubarak regime. The most alarming manifestation of the military’s unsheathed sword is the Military Tribunals. Demonstrations of utterly arbitrary repression, they have also become the decisive lesson in why the revolution must be made twice. Beginning during January 28th and escalating in the months since, the military has arrested thousands of activists, from journalists reporting on demonstrations to the lawyers trying to defend them. The victims of this arbitrary detention are said to number as many as 12,000. They have been secreted away by the military, kept out of the public eye, separated from family and legal representation, subjected to short trials and sentenced to weeks, months, and sometimes years of imprisonment. 30

In March, when activists began to confront the shocking return to political repression, the bloom was still on the military rose, and few among the broader Egyptian public were willing to listen. This gradually changed. People came to realize that if this blatantly anti-civil exercise in political repression were allowed to unfold unimpeded, it would become impossible to exercise democracy, no matter what formal elections decided. Demands for the rule of law, for a free and independent judiciary that would resist state authority became central to the second revolution. “Against Military Tribunals” has become the most conspicuous, most widely supported theme and demand of the democracy campaign. Last week, 10,000 persons demonstrated outside the Supreme Court building, as justices pondered new administrative procedures and legal organization. This week, in a highly unusual public event, seven leading presidential candidates issued a joint statement demanding the withdrawal of the Military Council from state power no later than February of next year. The powerful symbolic gesture was organized behind the stage by Wael Ghonim, the young former Google executive who played a leading role in the first revolution and, since then, has largely refrained from entering the public scene. The second revolution in Egypt has also ignited new formers of class struggle, with strikes emerging in every occupational struggle. These confrontations are economic effects of the political revolution, presenting long overdue accounts that will come due if, and when, a newly responsive democratic state is brought into existence. For now, however, the second revolution is, above all, a struggle for legality, transparency, and fairness. It highlights the fact that civil society needs more than noble sentiments and solidary feeling. It must also create powerful regulative institutions, legal rules that can control power and independent courts and responsible police officials to back them up. That such a struggle for regulatory power can take place at all demonstrates that the other, more cultural part of the civil sphere, the institutions concerned with communication, are in certain critical respects already in place. There is now a vast and intricate network of public communication, more than a dozen new cable television stations, satellite channels, hundreds of blogs, and continuous, widely accessible and influential face-book communication. There is also extraordinarily energetic civil association, sit-ins in Tahrir Square, in schools and universities, confrontations in factories, and the creation of political parties. A new democratic consciousness is abroad in the land, and it is spreading like wildfire. Against all this, the Military Council is training its fire extinguisher. Despite its material power, however, it seems doubtful that the military can put the fire out. Cairo Journal Day 2 How does public opinion work in dictatorship that isn’t able to dictate? When democratic opinion is thriving and robust but when the democratic institutions don’t exist? When civil society is filled with intensive communication, but there is no way for the civil sphere, filled to brimming with idealistic demands for justice, to regulate the state, when the public can’t elect new representatives or threaten power holders with humiliation, threats backed up by the rule of law? This is the situation of Egypt today. Since the defeat of ancient Pharonic Egypt by Assyrians, Persians, and Greeks, Egypt had been ruled by foreigners. In 1952, in the Colonels’ Coup, Abdel Nassar seized control from the British. He brought self-rule back to Egypt, aggressively nationalizing everything in sight. But for the next six

decades, self-rule meant being governed by former soldiers whose command of the army guaranteed their dictatorial control of the state. It is easy to understand why, throughout most of this time, the Egyptian public was passive, abject before the power of its own state. The public finally founds its voice during the winter revolution earlier this year. When that uprising ended, on February 11, the dictator was gone, but the soldiers and army remained, minus a new head of state. The Egyptian public has become ever more impatient and demanding. It laid low a dictator and his political regime, and disrupted the geography of social time. But its demands have not yet been met. By stepping back and not responding to Mubarak’s demands for repression, the army allowed the revolutionary performance to unfold. After the revolutionaries’ hard-earned success, the soldiers stepped in to “hold the fort,” promising to act only as a transitional government, to organize the first free elections and then allow the brick-by-brick building of democratic institutions to proceed. Most of the revolutionaries accepted this promise in good faith. Now they feel betrayed. Some have come to believe that leaving Tahrir Square on February 11th was a mistake. They should have stayed until not only Mubarak but the military itself was forced to step down, with real representatives of the insurgent civil sphere put into place. So there has been the need for a second revolution. The movement now continues as a cultural revolution, a pulsating, expanding democratic consciousness that is demanding the creation of new institutions. How does public opinion speak without the franchise? It speaks as a “movement” that crystallizes civil sentiments. The core of this Egyptian movement is a few hundred activists from “The Eighteen Days.” They have become even more realistic since February 11th, more aware of the hostile military as an anti-democratic enemy and of the institution building upon which democracy depends. The activists are leaders but they are also conduits for a public rapidly undergoing crystallization. There are now some 90 professional syndicates — unions of doctors, lawyers, judges, teachers, and dozens of all sorts of professional group. Independent unions of factory workers are emerging alongside the government controlled organizations of the old regime. Neighborhood committees first organized to protect urban areas when Mubarak withdrew his police forces now march through the streets to remind unelected city councils of the concern of real people. There are dozens of new parties and a whole raft of newly independent newspapers and television stations. From this cauldron “National Demands” emerge and circulate on a regular weekly basis. They are agreed upon by face-to-face and cyber-meetings among leaders of major constituencies, circulated by the increasingly professional and closely watched new media of communication, and thrown down as a gauntlet every Friday by mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square. What is nailed to the door by Egypt’s new “protestants” reflects the hard-won common denominator among the specific demands of particular groups. There will be no “national” demands for Sharia law, for socialism, for a living wage, for the abolition of the treaty with Israel. About such issues there are deep disagreements. What all parties can agree on is the need to create the basic structures of the civil sphere that can create a more democratic state.

The form in which the National Demands is revealing. They are presented as demands for “purification.” These are the chants that ring out every Friday in Tahrir Square: • “The People demand the purification of the Interior” – the independence of the police. • “The People demand the purification of the judiciary” – the independence of the courts. • “The People demand the purification of the media” – the independence of the national TV. The winter revolution made civil ideals sacred and polluted Mubarak as dirty and profane. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that succeeded him now occupies the same polluted place. SCAF sustains the old and corrupted institutions of the repressive state. It is the purification of these institutions that the people demand. Egypt’s regulatory institutions must be shifted from the repressive to the liberated side, reconstructed from bottom up in a democratic way. There are other National Demands that focus on particular laws, ministries, officials, and events. • “The People demand the end of the emergency laws” – laws abrogating democratic rights on the books since Nassar instituted them in 1952. • “The People demand the Cabinet resign” – the ministers Mubarak appointed during the midst of the winter crisis had remained in place. • “The People demand that officials from the old regime be tried” – that Mubarak, his trusted staff, and people who ordered deadly violence in the Battle of the Camel (January 28) be brought to justice in a public way. Every Friday, a holy day and a holiday in this largely Muslim country, the public is transformed from a symbolic subject in democratic discourse into something physical and concrete. “The People” become tens of thousands of living and breathing persons assembled at a particular time in a particular space. Tahrir Square was made into the symbolic center of the democratic revolution during The Eighteen Days. It remains the public forum, the polis of the Egyptian Revolution. The civic ritual unfolds here every Friday. In this performance of democracy, newly empower citizens throw down the gauntlet of National Demands at the feet of the SCAF state. SCAF responds, reluctantly, partially, minimally, seeming to listen, as if it really were a beacon of civil responsibility. Sometimes it makes small concessions on Wednesday or even Thursday, to take some of the steam out of the Friday ritual manifestation. In reality, however, the concessions must be forced. It is a matter of the people’s symbolic power, of how they can wage intensive performative struggles that often take on a violently physical form. SCAF sends police into the Friday crowds with gas and sticks and bullets, sometimes rubber, sometimes probably not. The people respond not just by repeating their verbal demands but by literally fighting back. “We gave them a good beating,” a 28-year old revolutionary woman proudly boasts to me about the response at one of the most significant Friday confrontations, and she adds, “we made videos of their brutality.” The video recordings circulate in lightning speed among the new media of communication. SCAF blithely denies such evidence of anti-civil rule by calling the policemen rogues, disclaiming responsibility for police action.

This gerrymandered process of democratic “communication and control” is imperfect to say the least! Still, it has rung some significant victories from the SCAF state. The old cabinet was forced to resign. Those who ordered violent repression during the Battle of the Camel — ten high government officials and ten more from Mubarak’s then reigning New Democratic Party – were arrested and put on trial. And, most tellingly and symbolically, a degradation ceremony has finally been visited on the former dictator himself and his once all-powerful son. They were arrested, brought back to Cairo, and are now on trial. These successes have given the Egyptian public a sense of the regulative power that citizens can wield against the state in a democratic regime. But the principal “purifications” that must be made to bring that civil power into being have not yet been made. Neither the police, the courts, nor the national television have been allowed to become independent. Nor have the Emergency Laws been rescinded. The National Demand that is now the dominant campaign of the second Egyptian revolution sums this paradoxical and deeply dangerous situation up: “No to the Military Tribunals.” SCAF not only retains the power in principle to do as it wishes, a power inevitable in such a transitional period, but it has continually brought this power to bear in repressive and anti-democratic ways. Some 12,000 democratic activists have been arrested, many during the weekly civil rituals. Some are tortured and let go, others remain in prison. Journalists are routinely brought into police quarters, intimidated, and their operations threatened with being shut down. All of which has made it crystal clear that the arbitrary deployment of state power will not be stopped until the army steps aside. That’s why the three-day meeting of the seven Presidential candidates is so important. Under the prodding of the Wael Ghonim, they have come together to put aside their differences, and their future political struggles, to agree on one more National Demand. SCAF must disappear no later than February, 2012. SCAF announced only recently that Parliamentary elections will take place at the end of November. From the MP’s elected, in some proportion that has not yet been decided, a hundred person constitution writing committee will be convened. After the new Constitution is written and approved, later in 2012, there will be Presidential elections. What the Egyptian public understands is that none of this will matter if the army remains in place, even as a shadow power behind the scenes. • The People demand that SCAF must go! This is the final purification that must take place. 5 Responses to “Jeffrey Alexander Blog from Cairo, Egypt” 1. Tom Crosbie Says: September 16th, 2011 at 3:05 pm Out of curiosity, have your contacts had anything to say re. the Israeli embassy protest and anger at the Israel border skirmish (sept 13)? Does Israel (do we) have anything to fear from a successful second revolution– or only its failure? Enjoyed the post, keep them coming. 2. Jeff Alexander Says: September 16th, 2011 at 5:45 pm

Not only do Egyptians share the widely-spread Middle Eastern Arab anger at “Zionism,” but they associate the cold peace between Israel and Egypt with Mubarak’s hated dicatorship. The paradoxical binary discourse of civil society, which excludes as it includes, makes it likely that a more democratic Egypt will, if only initially, be more anti-Israeli in its foreign policy, and its expressive passions, than was the anti-democratic one. Yet, the last thing the revolutionary democrats in Egypt want is to enter into a dangerous, possibly military confrontation with Israel; they are resentful of the military and its budget and want to turn the nation’s attention to civil issues of inclusion, equality, and expression. One indication of this: Most of the democratic activists believe that it was the military government itself that secretly triggered the embassy attack, which became a pretext for the Army to issue a whole series of new repressive measures. 3. Philip Smith Says: September 19th, 2011 at 2:54 pm Your response to the prior posting by Tom Crosbie raises the interesting question of the capacity of the leadership to exert pragmatic control over forces of populism. Reading your blog I get the sense of a culturally unstable revolution in which an educated, metropolitan elite have emotionally invested in the discourse of civil society and a romantic/democratic narrative – but many Egyptians haven’t. It’s like a top balancing on its point and only staying up as it is still madly spinning. There are other codes and narratives still in the field, some religious and others favoring themes like ‘stability’ or ‘national strength’ over ‘rights’ or ‘freedom’. These are problematic from the perspective of the activists. Is this an accurate picture?. If so this raises a bunch of questions. (1) To what extent can the ‘second revolution’ be driven by ideals rather than some sort of realpolitik compromise between these various visions of the nation, each with underlying code variation? This second path might work but it will also perhaps lead to disenchantment. (2) Nasser was able more or less unite the country and neutralize the Muslim Brotherhood due to his charisma and virtuoso performative capacities, taking bullets from the British, living in a modest bungalow and so forth. I’m wondering if a democratic grass roots movement will be disadvantaged in that there is a need to talk, to debate and to do all kinds of things so as to live up to its own codes. It is hard to make this stuff performatively compelling (eg. ‘tedious’ UN Climate Change conferences) unless it can be converted into a huge ritual moment (eg. the meeting of the Estate General in the French Revolution) rather than ‘politics as usual’. 4. Maria Rovisco Says: September 19th, 2011 at 6:51 pm Your entries for day 1 & 2 of your Cairo Journal are fine pieces of academic writing and offer a very intriguing account of an unfolding ‘second revolution’ in Egypt, but the entries do not read as a journal at all! There is little sense of how what you see, hear and experience in the streets of Cairo actually informs your own thinking and reporting of the events. The voice we hear so far is that of the omniscient narrator – ‘one who can see things which individual characters cannot see and who is in all places at once’. 5. Peter Meylakhs Says: October 1st, 2011 at 1:48 pm 35

I think two words ‘uncertainty’ and ‘unanticipated consequences’ are the best characteristics of the situation. For me, as s Russian born in the 20th century fear of revolution (I mean not velvet revolutions) is in my genetic code (forgive me this joke with biological determinism). In February 1917 (so called ‘bourgeois revolution’) there were so many high hopes and everybody drank toasts for freedom and democracy so it would be hard to imagine (maybe not so hard for some) that these hopes would be dashed in a matter of months (1917 October Bolshevik coup). What followed everybody knows. I think that the situation is so fragile and there are so many factors in Egyptian situation that I would not make any prognoses. The Egyptian military acts ugly, of course, but what would happen if mob full of hatred took power we don’t know. As to Jeff’s remark that anti-Israeli pogroms were organized by the military itself it is unverifiable as any conspiracy theory. But it’s not the point. As Jeff himself claims in his works successful performance must have resonance with popular feelings, and we know that performance was successful, so it does not matter much from this perspective, who actually started the pogroms. Anti-Israeli sentiments are widespread from top to bottom in Egypt, and even if the elites understand the armed confrontation with Israel is a disaster they may follow the people’s mood (even in full knowledge) and start at least some skirmishes. I don’t know what’s going to happen, the only thing that is clear for me that Israelis may fear any scenario. http://ccs.research.yale.edu/pubs_research/directors_pubs/alexander/jca_cairoblog/

The Military Must Go: What President Obama Must Do to Save Egypt’s Democracy Jeffrey C. Alexander The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is training its fire extinguisher on Egypt’s revolution. It seems doubtful that this new and unexpected military dictatorship can put the fire out, but it certainly is hell bent on trying . The first Egyptian revolution unfolded for eighteen days in Tahrir Square, from January 25 to February 11. The second has been happening ever since. The first revolution cut off the Leviathan’s head, but its body remains. Compared with Mubarak’s persistent but hapless efforts to gain public legitimacy, the SCAF state has little public presence, but it exercises powerful material force. In the honeymoon after February 11th, most Egyptians, revolutionaries included, hailed the Army as a revolutionary partner. It had sheathed its blade, refused Mubarak’s bidding, and allowed the revolution to happen. Since then, Egypt has changed its mind. SCAF has been unfaithful. It’s organizing parliamentary elections for November, but in the meantime it has unleashed one spasm of repression after another. SCAF claims to be cleansing Egypt of dangerous disorder, but its true motives are secret, its deliberations opaque, and its negotiations with civil society deceptive. Its military edicts are communicated on Facebook. There are no press conferences and public explanations. Egypt’s new military rulers want dismiss the democratic simulacrum that preoccupied the Mubarak regime.

Most alarming is the Military Tribunals. SCAF has arbitrarily arrested thousands of persons, from journalists reporting on demonstrations to the lawyers trying to defend them, from elite bloggers to ordinary people who have just happened to be in the way. Numbering 12,000, these victims have been secreted away, separated from family, denied legal representation, subjected to short trials, and sentenced to weeks, months, and sometimes years of imprisonment. About 9000 are now serving sentences in prison, and the identities of a majority of them remain unknown. After intensive public protests, 1500 persons have been issued suspended sentences, and 750 more have been declared innocent and released. The second revolution pits the communicative and cultural skills of the revolutionaries against SCAF’s administrative and police power. “Against Military Tribunals” has become an omnipresent public theme, the most conspicuous demand of the democracy campaign. Two weeks ago, 10,000 persons demonstrated outside the Supreme Court building, as justices pondered new administrative procedures and legal organization. Struggling for the rule of law does not take place only in the streets. It also assumes a political form. Last week, in an unprecedented display of unanimity, seven leading presidential candidates demanded that SCAF step down no later than February 2012. These leaders represented more than forty disparate political parties, from Muslims to secularists, from liberals to conservatives, from capitalists to revolutionaries. 43 party representatives met with SCAF to demand liberalizing changes in election laws governing the November voting. They did not get everything that they wanted, but they pushed the military to allow significant change. The second Egyptian revolution has also triggered open economic conflicts. Local and national strikes have broken out in schools, factories, and hospitals. Bus drivers are threatening to walk off the job, and professional associations are forming and demanding their rights. The outcomes of these struggles in the street, in politics, and in work places are being decided not by military force but by public opinion. There is now a public sphere in Egypt, an intricate network of communication that includes widely read independent newspapers, a dozen satellite TV stations, hundreds of blogs, and continuously accessible tweeter and Facebook sites. This web of communication allows extraordinarily energetic civil association. Neighborhood committees that emerged during the revolution to protect urban areas now march through the streets demanding unelected city councils listen to their concerns. NGO’s dedicated to educating new citizens are springing up both from corporate elite and the grassroots. A new democratic consciousness is abroad in the land, and it is spreading like wildfire. Out of this caldron weekly “National Demands” are crystallized. They are agreed upon in face-to-face and online meetings among leaders of major constituencies, circulated by the new media of communication, and thrown down as a gauntlet every Friday in mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square. There will be no “national” demands for Shariah law, for socialism, for a living wage, for the abolition of the treaty with Israel. About such issues there are deep disagreements. What all parties do agree on is the need for the civil structures of democracy to be put into place.

The form in which these National Demands are put forward is revealing. They are presented as demands for purification. These are the chants that ring out every Friday in Tahrir Square: “The People demand the purification of the Interior” – the independence of the police. “The People demand the purification of the judiciary” – the independence of the courts. “The People demand an end to the Emergency laws” – the end to arbitrary arrests and special military and police courts. “The People demand the purification of the media” – the independence of the national TV. The winter revolution made the civil sacred and polluted Mubarak’s dictatorship as dirty and profane. SCAF now occupies the same polluted place. It is the purification of the old and corrupted institutions of the repressive state these institutions that people are demanding. Every Friday, a holy day and a holiday in this largely Muslim country, the public is transformed from a symbolic into a physical thing. “The People” become tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of persons who assemble and protest in Tahrir Square. The Square remains the polis of the Egyptian Revolution. The weekly civic ritual unfolds here. SCAF feels compelled to respond to these weekly rituals, reluctantly and partially, seeming to listen, as if the junta really were a beacon of civil responsibility. Frequently, however, SCAF sends police into the Friday crowds with gas and sticks and bullets, sometimes rubber, sometimes not. The people respond not just with verbal protests but by fighting back. “We gave them a good beating,” a 28-year old revolutionary woman proudly boasted to me, adding “we made videos of their brutality.” Such video documentation circulates at lightning speed among the new media. SCAF blithely denies the evidence, calling the policemen rogues and refusing to take responsibility. This gerrymandered public power has rung some victories from the SCAF state. Mubarak’s’ old cabinet was forced to resign. Those who ordered violent repression during the February 4th Battle of the Camel -- ten high government officials and ten more from Mubarak’s then reigning New Democratic Party – were arrested and put on trial. A degradation ceremony has been visited upon the former dictator and his son. They were arrested, brought back to Cairo, and are now on trial. Pointing to the success of the protest movement, a radical socialist leader told me, “The whole of the old regime is in jail, and not one of the political activists who overthrew it.” Still, the most important “purifications” have not yet been made. Neither the police, the courts, nor national TV have yet been unshackled from state power. Nor have the Emergency Laws been rescinded. Most of those imprisoned by the Military Tribunals still have no name. SCAF announced only recently that Parliamentary elections will take place at the end of November. In a manner not yet decided, a constitution writing committee will be convened, and sometimes later in 2012 there will be the election of a new president. None of this will matter if SCAF remains a shadow power behind the scenes.

The task of caging this beast can and must be helped along by the United States. The Pentagon maintains close relations with its Egyptian counterpart, and the U.S. Congress funds Egypt’s military in a big way. President Obama made use of these levers to help the first Egyptian revolution succeed. The American President must now help the second revolution in the same way. He must warn SCAF to get out of the way. Americans must join with Egyptians to force one final purification: “The People demand that SCAF must go!” http://ccs.research.yale.edu/documents/public/1112/Egypt%20Op-Ed.pdf

ASA Footnotes March 2011 Issue • Volume 39 • Issue 3 Obituaries Shmuel Noah (S.N.) Eisenstadt 1923-2010 In the course of his intellectually extraordinary and social adventurous life, Shmuel Noah (S.N.) Eisenstadt was a central actor in the three dramatic phase shifts that marked post-World War II sociological theory. Each was propelled by dramatic, world- historical changes in Western culture and institutions and their relation to the greater world. During the 1950s, Eisenstadt was a brilliant member of Talcott Parsons’ functionalist school. During the climate of postwar expectations for a peaceful and triumphant modernity, he wrote about incorporation and assimilation, in The Absorption of Immigrants (1955), and in From Generation to Generation (1956) neatly historicized the hope that peer groups allow new generations not only emotional independence from parents but moral creativity vis-à-vis traditions. In the decades that followed, the postwar consensus splintered and polarized and Parsonian hegemony was challenged. Eisenstadt absorbed these challenges without abandoning his filial loyalties, not only to Parsons but to his personal mentor Edward Shils. In 1976, Eisenstadt wrote (with Curelaru) that "despite many claims to the contrary, especially by opponents, the structural-functional school was neither uniform nor unchanging," and that, "within this school," not only were there "many internal controversies" but also many "openings." Some of the most intriguing openings were being made by Eisenstadt himself. For example, in his historical and comparative analysis The Political System of Empires (1963) differentiation is viewed as creating problems, not adaptation, and voracious new forms of domination. In the essay with which Eisenstadt introduced his edited collection, Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building (1968), while placing Weber squarely into the Parsonian camp, he insists that cultural values, rather than providing stability, actually trigger disruptive struggles for personal fulfillment and collective identity. In the late 20th century, the zesty cocktail of Weberian Realpolitik and Shilsian luminosity carried Eisenstadt into a third phase. He became engaged in a vast imaginative effort to reveal the historical logic of a major evolutionary transformation. This "Axial age" breakthrough was now thoroughly sociologized, its ramifications systematically thought through in a radically cultural way. Eisenstadt’s theory of the Axial Age put intellectuals in the driver’s seat, decentralizing the material and ideal interests of class and status groups. Eisenstadt historicized the project of criticizing the world; the Frankfurt school mistook critical theory as a universal law of reflection. What he discovered was a way to express the vulnerability of the modern project and the tenuousness of its meaningful order. The Western hue of his earlier writings gradually disappeared, transformed by a new sensibility that was more responsive to inner-directed

spiritual, moral, and symbolic concerns. One sees a relativization of rationality (1991), a responsiveness to the rebirth of religious consciousness (1983), a new orientation to emerging Asian society (Eisenstadt and Ben-Ari 1990). There was a shift in emphasis from the "challenges" of social change and modernity to the "dilemmas" they pose, from a focus on the central role of "organization" to the energizing force of "ideas," from the role of "entrepreneurs" as key agents to the critical position of "intellectuals," and from "system" to "civilization" as the primary referent of social collectivity. For this fully matured Eisenstadt, institutionalization is no longer the resolution of conflict through organizational means, but the attempt to make earthly a transcendental ideal. Compared with his classical and modern predecessors, Eisenstadt later conceived of value institutionalization in a fundamentally new way. While the later Eisenstadt took his profound interest in the meaning of modernity from Weber and Parsons, he no longer shared his mentors’ fascination with the uniqueness of modernity in its western form. Expanding his horizons to China, Japan, and India, Eisenstadt insisted on the idea of multiple modernities. He understood that every post-Axial civilization is modern in its own way. They can have capitalism, democracy, bureaucracy, law, and science; their cultures may be filled with tensions and their emotional lives fragmented and split. At the same time, the institutions, meanings, and emotions of the great civilizations will still seem different and distinct. To understand the twisting pathways that have allowed global understanding and, at the same time, ensured contemporary frission—this is what Eisenstadt’s ambitious research program into multiple modernities was about. In close cooperation with area specialists, anthropologists, historians, and humanists, it inspired the immensely productive later years of his life. As a human being, Shmuel Eisenstadt embodied his own intellectual paradigm. He was a gentleman of cosmopolitan manners, complex imagination, and critical mind. He was an inveterate traveler between Chicago and Budapest, Uppsala and Tokyo, Jerusalem and Konstanz. He was a mastery of irony who never got entangled in pedantic details and who kept an elegant distance from the slaves of methodological virtue. Not only was he at home everywhere, but it often seemed that everywhere was his home. In the thousands of lectures that he presented in every corner of the world, Shmuel rarely used notes, though sometimes he took a blank paper to the lectern "in order to calm the hosts." He could be breathtakingly erudite and full of hauteur. Usually, however, Shmuel was easygoing, folksy, and earthy. He laced his lectures with jokes, whimsical paradoxes, and digressive asides. His gift for synthesizing different, seemingly antagonistic strains in a debate were legendary, and it was his openness and sensitivity to interdisciplinary dialogue that inspired so many to join him in his intellectual endeavors. Yet, as amicable and charming as he was in person, his scholarly judgment was uncompromising and occasionally even merciless, right up to the very end. For all his globe trotting and cosmopolitanism, Shmuel Eisenstadt remained a prototypically Jewish intellectual who liked surreal jokes and the sarcastic heightening of reality. He was closely associated with the newly founded state of Israel and with the moral heritage of his first teacher, Martin Buber, and he 41

considered the rightward political developments in Israeli society with alarm. He resisted the temptation of attractive offers from the world’s most prestigious American and European universities, though he made frequent long-term visits. The Chinese Academy of Science elected him its "Man of the Year," and he received the highest honors to which a sociologist can aspire. Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt was born in Poland in 1923. He narrowly escaped the terror of German occupation, immigrating first to America, soon after to Israel. After completing his studies with Buber, he quickly rose to professor in sociology at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where he lectured until his retirement in 1989. He had lost relatives in the death camp of Nazi Germany, yet Germany became—with Sweden and Switzerland—his favorite host country in Europe. His friendly and sympathetic relationship with German sociologists provided a remarkable example of the new ties between German and Israeli academics, and a personal demonstration of how post-Axial culture continuously inspires the renewal of universalism and hope. Shmuel Eisenstadt has left us, but these values, which he generously shared and crystallized in multiple modernities, remain. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Yale University and Bernhard Giesen, Konstanz University http://www.asanet.org/footnotes/mar11/obit_0311.html#obit_3

The Performance of Politics Obama's Victory and the Democratic Struggle for Power Jeffrey C. Alexander

ISBN13: 9780199744466ISBN10: 0199744467 Hardback, 384 pages Description Contemporary observers of politics in America often reduce democracy to demography. Whatever portion of the vote not explained by the class, gender, race, and religious differences of voters is attributed to the candidates' positions on the issues of the day. But are these the only--or even the main--factors that determine the vote? The Performance of Politics develops a new way of looking at democratic struggles for power, explaining what happened, and why, during the 2008 presidential campaign in the United States. Drawing on vivid examples taken from a range of media coverage, participant observation at a Camp Obama, and interviews with leading political journalists, Jeffrey Alexander argues that images, emotion, and performance are the central features of the battle for power. While these features have been largely overlooked by pundits, they are, in fact, the primary foci of politicians and their staff. Obama and McCain painstakingly constructed heroic self-images for their campaigns and the successful projections of those images suffused not only each candidate's actual rallies, and not only their media messages, but also the ground game. Money and organization facilitate the ground game, but 42

they do not determine it. Emotion, images, and performance do. Though an untested senator and the underdog in his own party, Obama succeeded in casting himself as the hero--and McCain the anti-hero--and the only candidate fit to lead in challenging times. Illuminating the drama of Obama's celebrity, the effect of Sarah Palin on the race, and the impact of the emerging financial crisis, Alexander's engaging narrative marries the immediacy and excitement of the final months of this historic presidential campaign with a new understanding of how politics work. Features Presents a new explanation to why Obama won and McCain lost that draws on meaning and performance, not issues or policies Reviews "In an extraordinary analysis of real breadth and depth, Jeffrey Alexander challenges us to re-think Barack Obama's election as president. Political observers have focused too much on the plain demographic facts of 2008, and too little about how and why those facts came to be. Reflect on the performance that takes place on a grand stage, Alexander advises, and we'll see the big picture."--Larry J. Sabato, author of The Year of Obama, and Director, Center for Politics, University of Virginia "This is a work of dazzling brilliance and imagination. It sparkles with new insights that go well beyond standard interpretations of electoral politics. Especially to be treasured is its keen understanding of civil society and the importance of moral meaning and symbolism in public life."--Robert Wuthnow, Professor and Department Chair of Sociology, Princeton University "Revealing himself to be de Tocqueville's true heir, Jeffrey Alexander draws a sweeping and daring portrait of the heroes, villains, fools, and mavericks who peopled the 2008 American presidential campaign. For Alexander, political elections are serious and dramatic moments of cultural meaning-making, in which the boundaries of civil society are forged and challenged. The Performance of Politics is riveting, taking the reader instantly back to those heady days of the 2008 campaign and, in the process, bringing sociological theory vividly to life."--Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Gil and Frank Mustin Professor of Sociology, Swarthmore College "This book is a 'Making of the President 2008' with brains. The entire cast, Obama, Hillary, McCain and Palin enter this compelling narrative in the jaws of an unexpected Wall Street collapse. Uncompromisingly intelligent, yet a compulsive read."--Scott Lash, Professor and Director of Centre for Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London "Jeffrey Alexander's intriguing argument in The Performance of Politics, a meticulous review of the 2008 campaign, is that his fellow sociologists have overemphasized impersonal social forces at the expense of the theater of public life--the way politician perform "symbolically." It's a prosaic call for a more poetic (or at least aesthetic) understanding of politics. Ideology must connect viscerally, or it doesn't connect at all. Liberalism, like any idea or product, can succeed only if it sells."The New York Times Book Review "Representing a study of politics through a lens of cultural sociology, Alexander presents original theoretical arguments on the democratic struggle for power in America, and in the process provides a new explanation for Obama's historic victory." -- Contemporary Sociology 43

Product Details 384 pages; 12 b/w illus., 2 b/w halftones; 6-1/8 x 9-1/4; ISBN13: 978- 0-19-974446-6ISBN10: 0-19-974446-7 About the Author(s) Jeffrey C. Alexander is Lillian Chavenson Saden Professor of Sociology at Yale University, and a Director of the Center for Cultural Sociology. He is also the author or editor of numerous books, including The Civil Sphere (OUP 2006) and The Meanings of Social Life (OUP 2003). http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Politics/AmericanPolitics/?view=usa&ci=9780199744466

October 12, 2011 In Tunisia, Waiting for the Morning After By H.D.S. GREENWAY I.H.T. OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR TUNIS — The political ads are entitled “The Morning After,” and one shows a waiter in an empty seaside restaurant. The tourists have all fled and business is off, suggesting the fate of the country should the Islamists come to power. Another shows a mother with a head scarf comforting her children, complaining that her husband has left her and now may want four wives, whereas Tunisian men are presently limited to one. Yet another spot shows a decidedly secular young lady whose job will now be filled by a man, she fears, and another shows a student regretting that he slept through the elections that the Islamists have just won. With a constituent assembly to be elected on Oct. 23, these negative ads, aired on TV and the Internet, clearly target the Islamist-leaning Al Nahda (Renaissance) party, led by the 70-year-old Rachid Ghannouchi, who returned here from exile following the fall of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The ads are the Tunisian equivalent of the famous spot that Lyndon B. Johnson’s campaign aired of a little girl picking daisy petals with a mushroom cloud rising behind her, suggesting what might happen if Barry Goldwater were elected president in 1964. The liberal and secular parties are clearly worried that Al Nahda, with a substantial lead in the polls, will garner the most votes in Tunisa’s first real election since independence from France in 1956. For Al Nahda is much better organized than its secular rivals. Tunisia’s electoral process appears more chaotic than the more staid expressions of the people’s will in Europe and America. Some 11,000 candidates in more than 100 political parties, some of them hardly more than parties of one, are competing for 217 seats in a constituent assembly that will draw up a new constitution, form a parliament and choose a president. This is democracy in the rough, “and whoever wins decrees the fate of Tunisia for many years go come,” says a political scientist, Hamadi Redissi. With 50 percent undecided, almost anything could happen. But this is not a winner- take-all election. Assembly members will be seated according to which party lists receive the most votes, and even if Al Nahda wins, the secular parties, in coalition, could outnumber the Islamists. Tunisia is the most industrialized country in Africa after South Africa, and people seem more worried about high unemployment and a faltering economy than they are about social issues. Tunisians living abroad will be allowed to vote, and secularists worry that Tunisians living in Europe may be more Islamist than their countrymen here. The hand of Islam lies more lightly on the land in Tunisia than in many Muslim countries, with wine grown and consumed and women decidedly emancipated. What, then, explains Al–Nahda’s popularity? Some say it is that the Islamists have suffered more, having been jailed and their political activity banned so harshly under Ben Ali. Others say it is that the Islamists stand for values and are less corrupt than their secular brothers.

Najib Chebbi, a soft-spoken and dignified man who heads the leading secular party, the Progressive Democratic Party, told me that although Tunisians in their hearts may admire the Islamists, in their heads voters believe that the secularists can do a better job creating jobs and modernizing the country. Or so he hopes. Ghannouchi has been painting himself and his party as Islamic moderates similar to the Justice and Development Party of Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Al Nahda says it won’t introduce Shariah law or polygamy, or enforce head scarves, or unravel the equality of women. But the secularists fear that Al Nahda is only hiding its Islamic agenda. American political consultants flock to elections such as these nowadays, and I ran into John Aristotle Phillips, chief executive of Washington-based Aristotle, a company that has advised political clients in fledgling elections from Eastern Europe to the Khyber Pass. But Aristotle and the others have their work cut out for them here because Tunisia’s election commission, in an effort to guarantee a level playing field for all the candidates, has severely restricted how political parties can get their message out. For a while parties could advertise on TV and radio, but then that was banned. Billboards were allowed, then banned. Posters are restricted to certain size and they can only be posted on designated walls. For all of that, democracy has more chance of succeeding in Tunisia than almost anywhere in the Arab world because of its well-developed middle class, high literacy rate, civil society and relatively homogeneous population. Laws protecting women’s rights are the strongest in the region. Yet if the polls are anywhere near the mark, it is also clear that Islamists will have more to say here on the morning after than they’ve ever had before. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/opinion/13iht-edgreenway13.html?src=recg

EDITORIAL Alarmante Egipto Los generales deben acelerar su salida del poder y reafirmar su compromiso con la democracia 12/10/2011 Cuando los generales egipcios descabalgaron al tirano Hosni Mubarak, en febrero, anunciaron que se retirarían en seis meses, tras la celebración de elecciones parlamentarias y presidenciales. El calendario era ingenuo: no se liquida de la noche a la mañana una dictadura de 30 años y se instaura una democracia mínimamente creíble. Pero a la luz de los acontecimientos en el más poblado e influyente país árabe -y a pesar de las reiteradas declaraciones de sus integrantes- todo indica que la Junta Militar está abdicando de aquel compromiso inicial, que respondió a las aspiraciones de la calle, sustituyéndolo por una inquietante acomodación al poder y unos métodos que en algunos aspectos recuerdan ominosos tiempos pasados.

Ejemplo lacerante son los gravísimos disturbios de El Cairo, con la muerte de casi una treintena de personas en el ataque brutal del Ejército contra una protesta de cristianos coptos por la quema de uno de sus templos, en el sur, a manos de fanáticos musulmanes. Como Mubarak, los generales han permitido una matanza anunciada, a consecuencia de la cual ha dimitido el ministro de Finanzas. Como Mubarak, prometen castigar, pero no lo hacen, a los extremistas que fomentan la violencia sectaria. Otros signos alarmantes confirman la deriva castrense: desde volver a llevar a civiles ante tribunales militares hasta revivir la legislación de emergencia que justificó los excesos del dictador depuesto.

La nueva agenda electoral fijada por la Junta expresa este estancamiento democrático. Las votaciones a las dos Cámaras del Parlamento se celebrarán escalonadamente entre noviembre de este año y marzo de 2012. Una comisión de notables redactará después una nueva Constitución, que deberá ser ratificada en referéndum antes de que haya elecciones presidenciales, presumiblemente a finales del año próximo. El proceso, que los partidos exigen acelerar, podría mantener al Ejército al timón hasta bien entrado 2013.

La peor tentación a que pueden sucumbir los generales egipcios, beneficiarios históricos de toda prebenda, es la de instalarse en un poder que no les pertenece. Egipto, por su condición de modelo árabe, exige una transición rápida y ejemplar. Los progresos de estos ocho meses deben ser consolidados con un calendario político simple y razonable. La Junta tiene que disipar la creciente percepción entre sus compatriotas de que no se conforma con que se le agradezcan los servicios prestados. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Alarmante/Egipto/elpepuopi/20111012elpepiop i_2/Tes

10/11/2011 04:37 PM The Smiling Islamist Popular Candidate Worries Secular Tunisians By Mathieu von Rohr Free elections are set to take place for the first time next week in Tunisia, the country that set the Arab Spring in motion. The strongest party could turn out to be that of Rashid al-Ghannushi, an Islamist who returned to his country from exile in London, in a developement that worries many secular Tunisians. The elderly gentleman with the chubby cheeks and gray beard will probably never be a great speaker, and yet his followers have once again gathered by the thousands. For months now, his aides have carted him from amphitheaters to sports halls, the masses loudly cheering his leaden speeches and stiff gestures as though he were the charismatic leader he most certainly is not. Rashid al-Ghannushi, 70, is the leader of the moderate Islamist Ennahda Party. Today he is speaking to people in Sidi Bouzid, the town which gave birth to the Tunisian uprising last December. Ghannushi praises the martyrs of the revolution, talks about Islam and freedom, and smiles a grandfatherly smile while his bodyguards stare grimly into the audience. It is Saturday, Oct. 1, the first day of official campaigning for the Tunisian election. Ever since he returned from exile in London at the start of the year, Ghannushi has been the main political attraction in his homeland. Hearing him speak, it's hard to understand how this professorial sounding man moves so many people, why he commands so much respect, or stirs up so much hatred. But when the Tunisian people go to the polls in their first free election on October 23, nearly everything will center around him. On this day, the future of Tunisia and the soul of the country will be determined. The country that became the first in the Arab world this year to shake off its dictator -- in this case the corrupt Zine El Abidine Ben Ali -- will also be the first to let its people elect their representatives for a constitutional assembly. For this reason, the outcome of the election will also be a message to the entire Arab world. Moderate Islamist Party Message Of course, Tunisia isn't really ready for free elections. Neither the state nor the media or the people themselves. The raw force of revolution can't possibly develop into civil awareness this quickly; a repressive state cannot become liberal overnight. And the press, prevented for so long from reporting on anything of substance, must also learn that wildly spreading rumors isn't journalism. Nevertheless, no other Arab country has better prospects for a successful democratic process than Tunisia. In contrast to Egypt, the last remaining forces of the former regime do not seem particularly powerful. And in contrast to Libya, Tunisia has a well- educated and homogenous population. Ghannushi's visit to Sidi Bouzid is deeply symbolic. It was there that a fruit vendor set himself on fire in protest ten months ago, thus sparking the flame of dissent across the 48

country. Ghannushi has traveled to the place where it all began, the conservative interior of Tunisia, where social unrest developed into a popular revolution. His party hopes for an overwhelming victory in the area. Some 6,000 have turned out to see him, a crowd the size of those he has often addressed in recent months. As he tours the interior in the days ahead, he will attend one mass rally after another, pushing the message he and his spokesmen have been repeating ever since his return: The Ennahda Party is a moderate political group comparable to Turkey's ruling moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) or Germany's center-right Christian Democrats. At this point, nobody can be certain whether this is true or not. Radical Party Past Ghannushi's political awakening began in Syria in the 1960s. He is close to the Muslim Brotherhood and has in the past praised the suicide bombers of the Palestinian Hamas organization. In 1991, radical members of his movement sprayed members of the ruling party with acid. In the 1980s, they planted bombs in hotels. According to Ghannushi's writings, Islamic democracy is unthinkable unless it is based on Shariah law. Many of these details have long since past, and many who have spoken with him since the Arab Spring are told he is a moderate who doesn't want to impose his religious beliefs and advocates equal rights for women. One of his daughters is a lawyer, the other a journalist. Ghannushi likes to talk about Turkey's Islamists, to whom he feels a special kinship. But his enemies accuse him of being two-faced, refusing to believe he could have changed so dramatically during his exile in London. When Ghannushi's plane touched down in Tunis on January 30, two weeks after Ben Ali was deposed, some compared it to the return of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini to Tehran from his exile in 1979. The Tunisian authorities were so nervous about the event that they tried to prevent journalists from taking pictures of Ghannushi exiting the plane at the airport. Thousands of his supporters had come to welcome him home, and in their euphoria they nearly crushed him as he tried to make his way through the terminal. In the midst of the huge crowd, the man who had been wrenched from the tranquility of his study in London looked anything but happy, his eyes wide open with fear. Ghannushi's return was a triumph for Tunisia's Islamist movement. Persecuted by the country's authorities for decades, they had never before been seen in such numbers. Secular Tunisians Worried Ghannushi was accompanied by dozens of exiled members of his party on the flight from London to the Tunisian capital. There was deep satisfaction in his face as he sat in his window seat, looking forward to his homecoming. In an interview he described himself as a democrat and someone who would never force women to wear a headscarf, giving an innocuous grandfatherly smile. That evening, Ghannushi received his followers at his brother's house in the Menzah VI district of Tunis, and the man they call "the Sheikh" was surrounded by his closest confidantes. They sensed that now everything was possible. But many secular Tunisians were worried and wondering whether his rise would be the price of the revolution. 49

Tunisia is the most liberal country in the Arab world. Equal rights for women are enshrined in the current constitution, and women enjoy greater social, professional and sexual freedoms than their counterparts in any other Islamic country. Alcohol is available throughout the country and the bare-breasted Western tourists on Tunisia's beaches are somewhat leniently tolerated. The man who instilled this worldly attitude was Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba. After the retreat of French colonial forces in 1956, Bourguiba created a state based on French ideas. Bourguiba was not a religious man, and he called on his people to fight the country's underdevelopment instead of obeying the strictures of Ramadan. He even allowed himself to be filmed drinking orange juice in broad daylight -- in breach of the obligation to fast from dawn to dusk during the Islamic holy month. Tunisia has been shaped by a Francophile and often French-educated elite living in its coastal regions. All educated people speak French, and among them it's fashionable to drop entire French sentences into Arab conversations. Economic ties with France make up almost a third of the country's economic output. "We Tunisians are Arabs who would like to be Europeans," says journalist Mongi Khadraoui from the al-Chourouk daily newspaper. Old Ideological Battle It is this elite that Rashid Al-Ghannushi despises, and it is their values he has vowed to fight. Secular President Bourguiba was Ghannushi's nemesis. Bourguiba had Ghannushi sent to jail for 11 years, sentenced to hard labor and finally given the death penalty for his Islamist activities. Whatever his specific political aims for the future may be, the cultural battle he is waging is decades old. It is also a battle against the legacy of colonialism and for a return to the country's Arab Islamic roots. This June Ghannushi went on a campaign trip to Bizerte in the north of the country accompanied by his son Moadh, who grew up in London. Moadh sums it up as follows: "The French created an elite in this country that wants to emulate their former colonial masters, that feels uncomfortable with its Arab identity and passes this insecurity on to the people." By contrast, he adds, Ennahda wants to create a modern state based on Tunisian culture that is closer to the common people. On this day Ghannushi sat under a parasol at a Bizerte ampitheater while some 8,000 people waited to hear him speak. Meanwhile a young woman -- in a hijab as strict as any to be seen on a Gulf TV soap opera -- passionately lamented the plight of the Palestinian people, her voice cracking dramatically. Only then did Ghannushi come to the microphone. "I greet women; the pillar of the family," he said. "It is they who propped up our movement." And he added, "The hijab is a basic principle of Islam, but we greet all revolutionary women. In Tunisia we have people who pray and those who do not. I hope the latter will do so tomorrow." During this particular trip to Bizerte the fact that many Tunisians are not devout Muslims proved unavoidable for Ghannushi. On a day he met with a group of businessmen he hoped to convince of his party's socially-oriented capitalism, the regulars at the hotel bar had already started drinking early in the morning. The image of the drunk men staggering past the Islamists seemed absurd. Does he intend to ban alcohol? Would he continue to allow beach tourists into the country? Ghannushi says the Tunisians themselves should be asked what they want.

After all, he adds, there are other kinds of tourism than vacations by the sea. And he smiles his Sphinx-like smile again. Economy May Dominate Election Ennahda will undoubtedly make a strong showing in the elections. Some polls suggest Ghannushi's party will garner 20 to 30 percent of the vote, making it the largest party in parliament. But the reliability of these polls is questionable. Ennahda is the best organized political party, with hundreds of local and youth groups that have been active for months, and what seem to be large financial reserves -- though their unclear origin has been the topic of heated debate. Although the Islamists played only a minor role in the revolution, their politicians are seen as credible because many of them were persecuted and/or tortured in the past. But even if Ennahda won the election, a coalition of secular parties could dominate the new constitutional assembly. Polls put two liberal parties close behind the Islamists, including the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), headed by Ahmed Néjib Chebbi, a member of the secular elite who is possibly Ghannushi's greatest political rival. In spite of all the fuss over the cultural battle being waged between Tunisia's Islamists and secularists, the election will be strongly influenced by another topic entirely -- the economy. The dire social problems that led to the revolution have dramatically worsened this year. Growth has plunged from an average annual rate of 4.5 percent to around 0.3 percent, tourism revenues are down 40 percent, and the country's high unemployment level continues to rise. The greatest danger now is that the Tunisian people will feel cheated of the fruits of their revolution and take to the streets once more. Ghannushi has promised voters that if his party wins, Tunisia could experience an economic boom like that in Turkey, his shining example. After all, that country too is governed by Islamists. Translated from the German by Jan Liebelt

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,791018,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: Election Approaches in Tunisia http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-73833.html • 'Only the Poor Are Left': Civilians Abandon Sirte ahead of Rebel Onslaught (10/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,789626,00.html • Return of the Islamists: A Questionable Form of Freedom for North Africa (09/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788397,00.html • Literature After the Revolt: Arab Writers 'Should Not Be Invisible Anymore' (09/15/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785689,00.html • Erdogan's 'Dangerous Macho Posturing': EU Politicians Slam Turkey's Anti-Israel Course (09/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,786204,00.html • Arab League Head Nabil Elaraby: 'What's Wrong with the Palestinians Appealing to the UN?' (09/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,784815,00.html

• Halting Steps Toward Democracy: Arab Revolution Caught Between Euphoria and Despair (08/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,779071,00.html

Al-Masry Editorial The military has gone too far Tue, 11/10/2011 - 13:08 The recent violence at Maspero was the worst in Cairo since the mass street protests in January that overthrew Hosni Mubarak. As bereaved families and friends mourn their losses, and sympathizers come together in support of the victims, the events raise crucial questions about how it all happened and where Egypt stands eight months after the popular uprising that swept Mubarak from power. The frustrations of Egypt’s Copts have been brewing for a long time. They have legitimate grievances: restrictions on the building of churches, discrimination in government jobs, and a lack of adequate political representation. Attacks against churches have also intensified over the past few months, provoking widespread anger and condemnation from Egypt’s Coptic community. The latest attack on a church in Aswan two weeks ago, which triggered the recent protests, was at least the fourth one since Mubarak’s ouster. On Sunday night, what started as a peaceful assembly by (mostly Coptic) demonstrators was quickly met with excessive force by the military and police. By the end of the night, at least 25 civilians were dead and over 200 wounded. The causes of all the deaths have yet to be determined, but numerous eyewitnesses, including an Al-Masry Al-Youm reporter, described chaotic gunfire and armored military vehicles storming through dense crowds, a scene captured on video. Meanwhile, Egyptian state television, whose headquarters looks over the site where most of the clashes took place, chose to incite violence rather than provide unbiased coverage of the unfolding events. News broadcasters accused "armed Coptic protesters" of physically antagonizing Egyptian military personnel, and commentators encouraged citizens to take to the streets to defend of the army. Surely enough, by nightfall protesters were being attacked in the streets by young men with stones, clubs, even firearms, and chanting anti-Coptic slogans. The army watched on. All those responsible for Sunday’s violence against protesters should be held accountable – and fast. Still, the events point to deeper challenges in the transitional period that demand a candid reflection on where the Egyptian revolution stands today. Sectarianism is a real problem in Egypt that pre-dates the revolution and must be genuinely addressed; instead, it has been recklessly aggravated by those in power who, at once, insist they are anchors of stability. The military’s claim to upholding order quickly dissolved on Sunday as authorities allowed – possibly even encouraged – disorder and the stoking of religious hatred. This goes against the principles of the revolution – freedom, dignity and equality – and represents a threat to Egyptian democracy as a whole, not just to Copts. 52

Sunday night’s events were marked by many firsts: It was the first time the army attacked a Christian demonstration, the first time soldiers may be directly implicated in the killing of protesters, and the first time a sectarian crisis can boil over into wider discontent with military rule. But the deadly violence was also an example of ongoing political failures under the Egyptian military’s leadership. Since taking over power, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has failed to address many legitimate grievances raised by Egyptians; it has failed to ensure that peaceful protests are not exposed to sabotage or violent crackdown; it has failed to protect places of worship and hospitals from mob violence. Most importantly, the SCAF has shown itself incapable or unwilling to foster a political environment where legitimate demands can be addressed through existing laws and state institutions. Instead, grievances are left to fester, and when public anger escalates the military and police resort to force and intimidation. While yesterday’s crackdown may have been distinguished by the heavy toll it inflicted, the mentality behind it was nothing new. Mubarak’s regime always viewed Egypt as inherently unstable, a place that needed to be held in check by a heavy-handed security apparatus. It often favored coercive tactics over meaningful political channels to solve its problems, an attitude that helped bring about its demise. In the new Egypt, that lesson seems to be lost upon those in charge. The SCAF must stop behaving like the guardian of the Egyptian revolution that stands above any criticism. It does not. While some Egyptians may have given the SCAF a mandate to guide the transition to democracy, nobody has granted it license to monopolize the political process and silence its opponents, especially through the use of force. Democracy is complex business that requires the collective efforts of all segments of Egyptian society and all shades of its political spectrum. More than anything, Sunday’s events are a painful reminder that Egypt needs an elected government as soon as possible that can begin to address the country’s many social and political problems in an open and just fashion. Only then can Egyptians begin to make a decisive break with their authoritarian past and chart a more democratic future. Over the past few months, at critical junctures, the army has delayed this process rather than advance it. On their own, the general’s cannot lead Egypt to democracy. For that, Egypt will need real civilian representatives chosen by the people. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/503904

A massacre at the hands of the authorities Author: Karima Kamal Mon, 10/10/2011 - 20:24

Can the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) now claim it decided not to open fire on Egyptians during the revolution? Can it make such a claim after what happened on the evening of 9 October? Or was the SCAF only talking about Egyptian Muslims when it pledged not to shoot at Egyptians? The horrific events that took place on this sad Sunday evening must not pass without identifying the aim behind it, as well as the plan by which it was carried out. According to Muslim activist eyewitness accounts, which made use of various online social media to expose the reality of what actually happened on the ground, the Copts did not initiate the attack on the armed forces, but rather, the armed forces attacked the Copts with unprecedented brutality. No one can deny that what took place on 9 October was a major shift with regard to the dynamics of sectarianism in Egypt. For this was the first massacre of Copts at the hands of the Egyptian state, represented by the authorities currently ruling the country – the SCAF, in other words – with the support of state media outlets. Does anyone believe the standard media discourse and government statements saying this was an attempt by "external forces" to harm Egypt? Doesn’t the fact that the media was conveniently present from the start of these events reveal that this was a laid-out plan and that state media outlets were waiting to mislead the public by claiming the Copts initiated the attack on the armed forces, as well as appealing to citizens to rise up to defend the armed forces against the attacking Copts? Meanwhile, satellite TV stations broadcast footage of armored vehicles speeding back and forth, running over Copts and crushing them to death, while state media outlets declared the death of two army soldiers, completely ignoring the deaths of over 20 Copts. Does anyone believe this was a spontaneous scenario and that the appeal to Muslims to support the army against the Copts was not a premeditated plan to push Islamists, not only in the direction of protesting while chanting Islamic slogans, but also to chase Copts through the streets, and to check the identity of those they encounter to determine whether they are Muslim or Christian? Why are Islamists and Salafis allowed to condemn Christians on TV, while the Muslim activists who took part in the protest to demand equal human rights are not given the same rights? These Muslim activists joined the protest following the series of attacks on churches, the most recent of which was the Marenab Church attack, which the media and authorities went so far as to claim did not occur.

We are now without a doubt witnessing an escalation, which cannot be solely attributed to the state simply aligning with its religious affiliation. We are now facing a scene in which armored vehicles are running over Copts, while the media calls on Muslim citizens to support it against the Copts, who allegedly initiated the attack on the unarmed army soldiers, who were there to protect them. Will the perpetrators once again get away without punishment, as in all past sectarianism incidents, particularly those following the revolution, especially since the culprit is the ruling authority? Will the dead Copts be buried without a forensic examination, which would expose the crime of converting the victim into the perpetrator in the eyes of the Muslim public? I'm not asking Christians to raise their voices for the world to hear their cries against the beginnings of an ethnic cleansing and the incitement of civil war against them. Rather, I am calling on the Muslims to do so, especially those whose online accounts of what actually happened expose the authorities’ political agenda. Can anyone imagine what will happen to Egypt in the coming days? I doubt any of us has an answer to this daunting question. Unfortunately, only the SCAF has the answer. After all, it was the SCAF who wrote the scenario and carried it out, and only they know how their scenario will develop in later stages. As for those of us who believe that Egypt is for all Egyptians, Muslims and Copts alike, all we know is that this is no longer the case. Featured news: Show in Featured news Author: Karima Kamal Related News: A firsthand account: Marching from Shubra to deaths at Maspero At Coptic Hospital, Christians hysterical over lost relatives 'Honorable citizens' refuse to blame military for Maspero violence http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/503772

ft.com comment Columnists October 10, 2011 10:08 pm Don’t be blind to Erdogan’s flaws By Gideon Rachman

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s admirers stretch from the Arab street to the western salon. In the Middle East, the Turkish prime minister is regarded as a courageous champion of the Palestinians. Many western intellectuals also admire Mr Erdogan, believing he has made Turkey a model for an Arab world in turmoil. At home Mr Erdogan has won three successive elections, presided over an economic boom and enacted important social reforms – in particular the expansion of healthcare to cover the whole population. Internationally he has changed a Turkish foreign policy that was over-focused on the west – and turned his country into a major player in the wider region. Modern Turkey excites interest and admiration because it seems to show it is possible to combine Muslim piety with modernity, prosperity and democracy. More ON THIS STORY Trust issues add to Turkey’s EU apathy Editorial Talking Turkey Turkish gas hunt off Cyprus stokes tensions Global Insight Turkey looks to punch above its weight Turkey shows assertive side to neighbours The trouble is that all these dazzling achievements risk blinding Mr Erdogan’s admirers to their hero’s flaws – flaws that are becoming more pronounced as his second decade in power approaches. The prime minister is becoming more autocratic at home and more reckless overseas. Taken too far, these flaws could endanger Turkey’s democracy and its security.

In important respects Mr Erdogan’s record so far has strengthened Turkish democracy. He has expanded minority rights, particularly for the Kurds. Turkey also used to be prone to regular military coups, but that danger has receded. The Erdogan government has arrested senior generals for their alleged involvement in a coup plot and the military seems now to be sullenly compliant with the country’s elected government. However the backlash against the alleged coup plot has become so widespread that it has swept up many people who are probably innocent of any wrongdoing – but who now languish in jail, awaiting trial or in, some cases, charges. It is not just military people who have been arrested. According to the International Press Institute, there are now considerably more journalists in prison in Turkey than in China. In Istanbul recently I watched a rally by journalists who were supporting their imprisoned colleagues. This is not something that would be tolerated in Beijing. But there is no doubt, talking to Turkish journalists, that they are now operating in a climate of fear. The autocratic side of the Erdogan era may become more pronounced. The prime minister has said he will step down after his third term in office. But he seems intent on moving on to the presidency – and on amending Turkey’s constitution to endow the presidency with more extensive powers. If he succeeds, Mr Erdogan would be looking at almost 20 years in power – casting him as Turkey’s answer to Vladimir Putin. Mr Erdogan’s fans in the west are inclined to overlook much of this because they see Turkey as a model for the Islamic world. One western diplomat says: “Turkey under Erdogan can be very difficult to deal with, but if you told me there was a chance that Egypt would end up looking like Turkey I’d accept it in a heartbeat.” But Turkey’s regional role is not all positive. As he becomes more confident, Mr Erdogan is also becoming more willing to court confrontation. (That was mirrored recently by his bodyguards, when they beat up members of the UN security staff in New York.) If things go badly wrong, Turkey could find itself facing conflict on three fronts before the end of the year – with Cyprus, with Israel and with the PKK insurgency based in Iraq. Mr Erdogan has threatened to use the Turkish fleet to escort “aid flotillas” to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza – and to disrupt Cyprus’s efforts at gas exploration. Turkish bombers have been pounding PKK bases in Iraq and a land incursion is a distinct possibility. Mr Erdogan’s recent tour of the Middle East summed up the ambiguity of what he represents. In Cairo he held up Turkey’s secular model as a potential model for Egypt – suggesting that Turkey could indeed show the Middle East how to separate mosque and state. In a speech in Libya, however, the Turkish leader played to the most conspiratorial instincts of the Arab street, hailing the Libyan revolution but suggesting that Britain and France had intervened militarily for commercial reasons. It was a piece of dazzling hypocrisy, given that Mr Erdogan 57

had accepted a human rights prize from Muammer Gaddafi less than a year ago – and initially opposed Nato intervention in Libya, partly to protect Turkish commercial interests. It is still entirely possible that Mr Erdogan will leave a very positive legacy. If things work out well he could be Turkey’s equivalent of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, the much lauded former president of Brazil. The biographies of the two men are strikingly similar. Both emerged from humble origins, served spells in prison and became the political voice of groups that had traditionally been shut out from power. Both men are associated with economic booms and with the emergence of their nations as models for the wider region – and increasingly as global players. But there are also important differences. Mr Lula da Silva pursued a foreign policy that sought always to reassure Brazil’s neighbours. After less than a decade in power, the Brazilian leader stepped aside – resisting the temptation to amend the constitution to prolong his stay in office. Like Nelson Mandela, he knew when to go. Unfortunately there is little indication that Mr Erdogan has the same self-restraint or humility. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/017fe8ae-f32b-11e0-8383-00144feab49a.html#axzz1aMvSGkGJ

Middle East October 10, 2011 Sanctions Pose Growing Threat to Syria’s Assad By NADA BAKRI

Muzaffar Salman/Associated Press A souvenir shop in Damascus. International sanctions have weakened Syria's tourist economy. BEIRUT, Lebanon — The Syrian economy is buckling under the pressure of sanctions by the West and a continuing popular uprising, posing a growing challenge to President Bashar al-Assad’s government as the pain is felt deeply by nearly every layer of Syrian society. With Syria’s currency weakening, its recession expanding, its tourism industry wrecked and international sanctions affecting most essential sectors, the International Monetary Fund now expects Syria’s economy to shrink this year, by at least 2 percent. Through nearly seven months of protests and a brutal crackdown that has killed more than 2,900 people, Mr. Assad and his political supporters have demonstrated a cohesiveness that has surprised even his critics. Differences that may exist have stayed inside a ruling clique that draws on Mr. Assad’s own clan and sect, and the security services have yet to fracture. But analysts in the region and officials in Turkey and the United States say the faltering economy presents a double blow to a government that had once relied on its economic successes as a crucial source of legitimacy. As many Syrians, poor and rich, feel the effects of the revolt in their daily lives, a sense of desperation is echoed in the streets, even in Damascus and Aleppo, the country’s two largest cities and economic centers. Analysts also point out that Syria could use sanctions to rally its people against a common threat. While neither has risen up like other Syrian cities, complaints are growing, and American and Turkish officials say they believe that the merchant elite in both cities will eventually turn against Mr. Assad.

“I can no longer afford to buy anything for my family,” said Ibrahim Nimr, an economic analyst based in Damascus, the capital. “I am not making any more money. I am facing difficulties, and I don’t know what to do.” A businessman in Damascus, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal, said: “People are not buying anything they don’t need these days. Just barely the necessities.” American and Turkish officials say that a collapse is not imminent and that the government can probably survive through the end of the year. But they now believe it is possible that the toll of the sanctions and protests could bring down Mr. Assad in 6 to 18 months. “We’re all waiting for the thing that will crack them,” an Obama administration official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “And it will be the economy that will wake everybody up, both those who support him, and Assad and his circle.” Revenues from oil and gas exports, which account for up to a third of state revenues and are the single biggest source of foreign currency, will dry up at the beginning of November, when a European Union ban on imports will fully come into force. The unrest has paralyzed the tourism industry, which brings in $7.7 billion a year. Several hotels in Damascus said they did not have any bookings for now or anytime in the future, and some hotel owners said that they closed down in the summer because they could no longer afford to pay salaries and bills. An owner of a small candy shop in Souk al-Hamidiyeh, an old market in the heart of Damascus, said that he had not seen a single tourist since March, when the uprising against Mr. Assad began. “And it doesn’t look like we will see tourists anytime soon,” the owner added. Dik al-Jin, one of the oldest restaurants and the most popular site for weddings and parties in Homs, a city in central Syria where the uprising has the semblance of a civil war, also shut down because of a lack of customers, soon after the demonstrations broke out. But uncertainties persist over the international strategy to put pressure on the Syrian economy. American and European officials have debated whether the sanctions will end up hurting average Syrians more than the leadership. Some analysts have contended that the government may try to paint itself as a victim and court support by casting the sanctions as a contest of “us against them.” Indeed, in the 1990s in Iraq, which was hit by comprehensive sanctions, popular anger was often directed at the United Nations and the West, not the government of Saddam Hussein. For now, and in spite of the fraying economy, the government seems buoyed by a sense of confidence over having blunted some of the mass protests this summer in cities like Hama and Deir al-Zour. Syrian officials also have faced sanctions before, only to weather them and seek to rehabilitate themselves once conditions in the region shift. Syrian officials also received a lift when China and Russia vetoed a resolution in the United Nations Security Council that condemned the violent oppression of antigovernment demonstrators last week. “I do agree that they’re more confident now than before,” the American official said. 60

In recent months, Syrian officials in the Ministry of Economy and Trade and the Ministry of Finance have dismissed in published remarks the effects of sanctions on the economy and foreign currency reserves. In September, Mohammad al-Jleilati, the finance minister, said that the country had $18 billion in foreign currency reserves, enough to secure imports for two years. Though most experts disputed the figure, they added that given the lack of transparency, it was hard to determine the amount. But the economic impact appears greater than in past crises, and officials in Turkey, once a crucial trading partner with Syria, are preparing to impose their own sanctions. The Syrian government’s own figures underline a waning sense of faith in the economy. Recent statistics published by the Syrian Investment Agency, a state-run firm that oversees investment in Syria’s infrastructure, transportation and agriculture sectors, pointed to a decrease in consumer and investor confidence. The agency reported that 131 licenses for private investment projects were issued in the first half of the year, a decrease of 40 percent compared with the first six months of last year. Assets in Syria’s five largest banks dropped by nearly 17 percent in the first half of 2011, while deposits in Lebanese banks operating in Syria were down by 20 percent from 2010, according to a report released by Lebanon’s Byblos Bank. So far, Syrian officials, who appear to be bewildered by the uprising and how to cope with it, have announced a series of measures that most experts say are likely to deepen the crisis. Among these steps was a decision last month to ban imports of many consumer goods to protect Syria’s foreign currency reserves. The step created such a domestic and regional uproar over price increases that the government revoked it a week later. Another decision was approving a budget of $26.53 billion, a 58 percent increase over last year’s budget and the highest in Syria’s history. “Where are they going to bring that money from?” asked Nabil Sukkar, a former World Bank official who now runs an independent research institute based in Damascus. “That is a big question mark. We now have less revenues. No one outside is going to help us. We have reserves, but they are being drawn down.” There were unconfirmed reports from inside Syria that employees in some public institutions were asked to contribute the equivalent of $10 every month to a special fund that goes to the government. For years, Mr. Assad portrayed himself as a modernizer, and a newfound consumerism in Damascus and Aleppo seemed to mark a break with the drearier years associated with his father’s three decades of rule. In April, only a month after the uprising started, the International Monetary Fund forecast growth rates of 3 percent for 2011 and 5.1 percent for 2012. “We were on our way to move toward a strong economy,” said an economic expert based in Damascus, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. “We started seeing an increase in foreign and local investments. The momentum was on until we were hit by crisis. Unfortunately, I am very pessimistic.” Anthony Shadid and Hwaida Saad contributed reporting. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/world/middleeast/sanctions-pose-growing-threat- to-syrias-president-assad.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

ft.com World Middle East & North Africa October 10, 2011 7:13 pm Cairo killings raise heat on military By Heba Saleh in Cairo

Reaching out: Coptic Christians see the coffins of some killed on Sunday brought into Cairo’s Abbassiya Cathedral for a funeral mass on Monday Dressed in black, Teresa Youssef crouched sobbing and banging on the wooden coffin adorned with a large photograph of a young man, outside the morgue at the Coptic Hospital in Cairo. “Get up, Mina,” she cried, to the 20-year-old in the coffin who was killed by a bullet which burst his lungs. “He was a lion. He had no weapon but he defended us when we were attacked.” Mina Danial was one of some 25 people, mostly Coptic Christians, killed on Sunday evening when Egyptian military police used force to disperse a demonstration by thousands angered by the burning of a church in the south of the country. The violence, in front of the television building in downtown Cairo, was the bloodiest in the country since the popular uprising which ousted Hosni Mubarak, the former president, in February. By Monday morning 17 bodies lay in the morgue of the Coptic Hospital, some with bullet wounds, others with smashed heads and limbs after armoured vehicles, driven by military police, ploughed into demonstrators to disperse them. “They shot at us and the armoured vehicles shook the ground under us as they crushed people,” said Ms Youssef, one of the demonstrators. “We tried to pull our friends out by their feet but we could not.” More ON THIS STORY Editorial Religion, tolerance and Egypt’s tumult Video Christians clash with Egypt police World blog Egypt’s military rulers make a(nother) mess Analysis The economics of the Arab spring In depth Egypt in transition The violence in central Cairo has shocked Egyptians and brought renewed calls for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which has ruled the county since the fall of Mr Mubarak, to speed up the transition to elected rule. The council on Monday ordered an investigation into the violence, while Pope Shenouda, the head of the Coptic church, alleged that unknown individuals infiltrated the demonstration to provoke the army to attack the Christians.

In the current atmosphere of mistrust, many Egyptians believe remnants of the former regime are intent on derailing the revolution. Others put the blame on the army. “The military council is the main reason for what happened last night,” said Ahmed Maher, head of April 6, one of the youth groups which launched the revolt against the former president. “They are using the same tactics used by Mubarak to address sectarian problems [by failing to take action against Muslims who burnt down the church in Upper Egypt.] State television was essentially inciting against the Christians. We need to transfer authority to an elected government as soon as possible.” The military council initially said it wanted to leave power after six months, during which parliamentary and presidential elections would be held. It now appears the generals will be in power at least until the end of 2012, when a new president is due to be elected. Although the army is still popular and many Egyptians view the council as the last remaining protection against chaos, their management has come under mounting criticism. Analysts say the generals’ lack of political experience and their authoritarian inclinations are at the root of the problems in Egypt, rather than a conspiracy to cling to power. The end of dictatorship has unleashed demands and pent-up anger from many sectors of Egyptian society. Permit hurdles The building of churches has long been a flashpoint for sectarian unrest in Egypt, writes Heba Saleh in Cairo . Permits are issued by presidential decree and often take years to arrive. The main problem, Copts complain, is that requests have to be approved by the security agencies at the local level before a permit can be issued. Demands for churches are usually stuck at this stage. The difficulties mean that Christians often resort to subterfuge to build places of worship. They might obtain a permit for a healthcare facility or a nursery, but work secretly on altering the construction to include a prayer hall. Workers and civil servants have staged strikes for higher pay and ultraconservative Muslim groups have emerged. Sectarian tensions have risen, with more attacks against churches. The normally quiescent Christians have also been emboldened to demand their rights. The military has used increasingly authoritarian methods to maintain its grip, referring thousands of civilians to military courts for summary trials and reviving Mr Mubarak’s hated emergency law and widening its scope. On Sunday night, the security forces entered the offices of two independent television channels overlooking the demonstration to take them off air. Hisham Kassem, a political analyst, said the violence could have been prevented if the authorities had taken action against those who burnt the church in Aswan that sparked the demonstrations and against the provincial governor who made statements to the press which appeared to justify the attack. “We do not have trained people in the army or the police capable of dispersing demonstrations peacefully,” he said.

“The solution has to be preventive by applying the law, not by using the methods of Mubarak. There is no joking with these [sectarian] issues. The country could go up in flames and history will place the blame with the council.” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b6ab5c00-f35c-11e0-b98c-00144feab49a.html#axzz1aMvSGkGJ

ft.com comment blogs The World Egypt’s military rulers make a(nother) mess October 10, 2011 2:53 pm by Roula Khalaf Egypt’s rulers are making a dangerous mess of the political transition. Long before the latest violence against Christian demonstrators – which left 24 people dead on Sunday night in Cairo – the military council which ousted Hosni Mubarak was losing the confidence of many of the activists who had seen it as their saviour. On the surface, Monday’s violence was a reflection of the sectarian tensions that have flared up since the fall of the Mubarak regime, as attacks on churches by ultraconservative Muslims have escalated. But they quickly turned into a condemnation of the military council ruling the country since the toppling of Mr Mubarak – and the Christian protesters were joined by Muslims. “The people want to bring down the field marshal,” chanted the crowds, in reference to Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the top military officer. So what did the army do? According to witnesses, military vehicles rammed into the crowds, crushing some of the protesters, and taking a page out of the dirty book of the leader they had dislodged. The tone adopted by state media, which called on people to rush to the army’s rescue, was shocking. The tone adopted by the prime minister, Essam Sharaf, who blamed a “dirty conspiracy” for the violence, was reminiscent of Mubarak-era propaganda. It is not completely clear how the bloody events of Monday night unfolded and the military council has now called for a probe. But the council’s credibility has taken another blow, and shattered even further claims that its aim is to take Egypt towards a democratic transition. Many Egyptians longing for a return to a normal life see in the army the only trusted institution. But increasingly politicians are raising doubts about the army’s real intentions. The political transition which was supposed to take six months has now been extended to about two years. There are persistent rumours that part of the delay has to do with the military’s attempts to carve a constitutional role for itself long after it hands power to a civilian government. However much Egyptians crave stability after months of turmoil, they did not get rid of one dictatorship to welcome another. http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2011/10/egypts-military-rulers-make-another- mess/#axzz1aN9xjrGm

Maspero violence raises questions about military's fitness to run Egypt Mon, 10/10/2011 - 22:42

Author: Noha El-Hennawy Sunday’s bloody attack on a Coptic-led protest stands as fresh evidence of the incompetence of Egypt’s military rulers, who might lead the country towards “catastrophic” scenarios, experts contend. “This [incident] reflects an unprecedented failure in running the country during the transitional period,” said Khalil al-Anani, a UK-based Egyptian political analyst. “Since 11 February, the country has been going from worse to worst.” “If the military stays in power for much longer, the country might head towards more violence, and social peace will be in jeopardy,” added Anani. On Sunday, violence erupted as thousands of Christian demonstrators were marching towards Maspero to protest against discrimination. The march came on the heels of an attack on a local church by Muslims in the Upper Egyptian province of Aswan last month. Stones were thrown back and forth, and eventually the military and the Central Security Forces intervened. At least 25 people, including three military officers, were killed. Tear gas and live ammunition were deployed to disperse the crowd and armored vehicles were seen running over protesters. In the meantime, the state-owned TV channels reported that Copts were attacking the military. An anchor had reportedly called on people to take to the streets and protect the military from Coptic demonstrators. Although the military has previously committed human rights violations in dispersing other anti-establishment protests, this is the first time army officers have been directly implicated in killing civilians. Yet, Anani refuses to pinpoint any sectarian connotation in this paradox. “What happened is not sectarian, nor religious, but it is a reflection of a failure to manage the crisis, which eventually led to the excessive use of violence against peaceful people,” said Anani. Yet, not everyone agrees with Anani’s reading. For Karima Kamal, a columnist, last night’s violence proves that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is reproducing the same sectarian policies of Hosni Mubarak's regime, which discriminated against Christians. “The SCAF's performance on the sectarian portfolio has been really bad since the revolution. They are dealing with the matter the same way Mubarak was. What new regime are we speaking of?” Wondered Kamal. 66

Under Mubarak, Copts voiced a plethora of grievances, including hurdles to the construction of churches and discrimination in the distribution of public offices. Under Mubarak's rule, Copts were often subjected to similar attacks, including attacks by radical Muslims on churches, which were sometimes set on fire. Shortly before Mubarak’s fall, on New Year ’s Eve, a terrorist attack on a Coptic church in the Mediterranean city of Alexandria caused widespread outrage among Christians. Thousands of Copts took to the streets and clashed with the police, accusing the government of failing to protect churches. Yet, the fall of the 83-year-old former pilot did not necessarily mark the end of sectarian violence. Several incidents, mostly blamed on Salafis, erupted in Cairo and Upper Egypt. In May, at least 12 people were killed and a church was set in fire in Imbaba. Earlier, radicals were blamed for demolishing a church in a rural area south of Cairo and for cutting off the ear of a Christian man in Qena. Except for the Imbaba clashes, in most incidents, the military did not bring the culprits to justice and preferred to use customary reconciliation procedures to solve disputes between Muslims and Christians. In the meantime, the SCAF failed to pass long- awaited legislations that would ease the restrictions on the construction of churches and criminalize discrimination. With what is believed to be half-solutions, “the military has given a clear sign that Copts are easy targets,” said Kamal. “We have reached the climax… We will either have a civil war or rational people will be able to take the country in the right direction,” she added. The SCAF issued a statement on Monday expressing sorrow over the incident and paying condolences to victims’ families. It also announced that it had asked the cabinet to form a fact-finding commission to investigate the incident. Earlier, Prime Minister Essam Sharaf addressed the nation in a televised speech blaming the violence on hidden local and foreign hands that seek to threaten Egypt’s stability and thwart the transition to democracy. State-owned media reported that 25 suspects had been identified and were being interrogated. However, this conspiracy-theory-based explanation failed to convince most observers. “This weak speech given by the prime minister is not even up to the standards of Mubarak’s speeches,” said Sameh Fawzi. “Please identify these foreign hands. We cannot live with this conspiracy for long.” The Coptic question stands as one of the most sensitive dossiers locally and internationally. On the international level, discrimination against Copts has been one of the main sources of embarrassment for Egypt. The US State Department's annual International Religious Freedom Report always criticized Mubarak’s regime for not treating Muslims and non-Muslims equally. In early 2011, Catholic Pope Benedict XVI's called on Western governments to protect Egypt’s Christian minority, which constitutes nearly 10 percent of the total population. The statement was seen by Mubarak’s regime as a flagrant attempt at meddling in domestic affairs. The US Embassy in Cairo issued a statement earlier today reading: “We are deeply concerned by the violence between demonstrators and security forces in Cairo… We express our condolences to their families and loved ones.“

“We note Prime Minister Sharaf's call for an investigation, and appeal to all parties to remain calm,” added the statement emailed to local journalists. In the meantime, the embassy press office denied earlier reports quoting US foreign minister Hillary Clinton as saying that the US could send troops to protect churches in Egypt. Although the scenario of foreign intervention seems far-fetched now, Kamal Zaker, a Christian intellectual warned that it might eventually happen if Egypt’s new rulers failed to heal the root causes of the Coptic community's problems. “What I really fear is that if local solutions fail, the door will be open to international solutions, and Egypt will be headed down the same path as Iraq,” said Zakher, who himself opposes any internationalization of the problem. Funeral mass of Maspiro victims http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/503818

Internacional No es la religión, es la política Bajo la apariencia de tensión religiosa, en Egipto se dirime el modelo de sociedad.- El miedo entre la población favorece a los militares en el poder Enric González Jerusalén 10 OCT 2011 - 19:37 CET17

Cristianos coptos se enfrentan a fuerzas de seguridad egipcias en El Cairo (Egipto) / EFE Ninguna dictadura sobrevive si la sociedad no tiene miedo. Las veteranísimas dictaduras árabes son expertas en fomentar el miedo a enemigos exteriores o interiores, y cuentan con una importante ventaja: en Oriente Próximo los enemigos, externos e internos, existen. La confusión entre intereses estratégicos e intereses religiosos, endémica en la zona, contribuye a facilitar el trabajo del dictador. Detrás de cualquier conflicto aparentemente religioso se esconden intereses políticos, y los disturbios en Egipto no deberían ser una excepción a la norma. La gran mayoría musulmana suní y la cada vez más minoritaria comunidad cristiana conviven en Egipto desde hace 13 siglos, sin grandes dificultades. En los barrios cristianos residen musulmanes, muchos niños cristianos acuden a la escuela pública con los musulmanes y la tolerancia mutua constituye uno de los rasgos históricos de la sociedad egipcia. Pero los estallidos de violencia son relativamente frecuentes. Para explicarlos conviene tener en cuenta dos factores. Uno, el dinamismo del integrismo islamista de los llamados salafistas, que ya no se sienten representados por los Hermanos Musulmanes y para los que la simple presencia cristiana constituye una blasfemia. Dos, la ya citada manipulación política: no hay nada como un buen conflicto religioso para distraer la atención del público y lubricar la demagogia. Durante el “renacimiento” egipcio, en la primera mitad del siglo XX, la comunidad cristiana (que por entonces rondaba el 25% de la población) adquirió un extraordinario protagonismo económico y social. La “belle époque” del liberalismo representado por el

partido Wafd hizo, sin embargo, muy ricos a los ricos y muy pobres a los pobres, y coincidió, no casualmente, con una monarquía que dependía de los intereses coloniales británicos. El 10 de junio de 1952, cuando una multitud procedente de los barrios más míseros incendió hoteles, teatros y todo lo que en El Cairo se relacionaba con Occidente y la modernidad, marcó un antes y un después para los cristianos, identificados con el colonialismo y, debido a la cercanía de pasado y presente en el mundo árabe, con los cruzados medievales. El régimen militar de Gamal Abdel Nasser socializó la economía, lo que perjudicó en especial a los cristianos, aunque el principal enemigo del nuevo régimen fueran los Hermanos Musulmanes. El sucesor de Nasser, Anuar Sadat, combinó una compleja alianza táctica con los islamistas (que acabaron matándole por firmar la paz con Israel) para reforzar su poder. De forma inevitable, los cristianos coptos, tendentes a considerarse a sí mismos como los auténticos egipcios frente a los “invasores” musulmanes (“copto” significa “egipcio”), quedaron marcados por un sentimiento de discriminación. La baja natalidad y la alta emigración redujeron la comunidad copta al actual 8%. Paralelamente, la cooperación tácita de los Hermanos Musulmanes con el régimen militar y el rechazo de amplios sectores musulmanes a la nueva “modernidad” egipcia, identificada con la sumisión ante Estados Unidos e Israel y con la liberalización patrocinada por Hosni Mubarak, dieron alas al integrismo de los salafistas (casi tan minoritarios, por otra parte, como los coptos). Ese es el contexto de cualquier tensión religiosa en Egipto. Y resulta insuficiente para explicar la violencia de los dos últimos días. Otros elementos, más puntuales, ayudan a hacerse una idea de qué ocurre y por qué. Primero, los manifestantes coptos eran unos pocos miles. Segundo, contra ellos cargaron grupos violentos cuya vestimenta y arreglo capilar no tenía nada que ver con los salafistas. Tercero, el Ejército se empleó con una brutalidad desmesurada. La actuación de matones aparentemente incontrolados es una constante desde que el régimen de Mubarak (el mismo de la actual Junta militar) empezó a tambalearse, y sobran evidencias de que esos matones reciben órdenes de la policía, cuando no son policías ellos mismos. Es fácil provocar a una minoría religiosa que, como la copta, se siente desfavorecida. Y es fácil deducir que los disturbios en pleno centro de El Cairo y el miedo que suscitan entre la población favorece a unos militares cada vez más atrincherados en el poder. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/10/10/actualidad/1318268268_45 5334.html

Cairo clashes leave at least 24 dead Military police blamed for using excessive force as protest march by Christians over church attack erupts into violence Jack Shenker and Barry Neild guardian.co.uk, Sunday 9 October 2011 23.18 BST At least 24 people were killed in clashes between police and Coptic Christians in Cairo on Sunday Link to this video

At least 24 people have been killed and more than 200 injured in the centre of Cairo after a protest over an attack on a church erupted into the worst violence since the 18- day uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak as president of Egypt in February. Trouble began when a demonstration against the attack in southern Egypt was reportedly met by gunfire close to the state television building. Fighting spread to Tahrir Square and surrounding streets. Hospitals where the wounded were being treated also came under attack.

An Egyptian hurls stones at security forces in Cairo. Photograph: Abdelhamid Eid/EPA State television announced that a curfew was being imposed on the city's downtown area and Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the February uprising that overthrew the former president. The curfew would last from 2am to 7am (midnight to 5am GMT) on Monday. Appealing for calm after more than 1,000 security force personnel were deployed, interim prime minister Essam Sharaf said: "What is taking place are not clashes between Muslims and Christians but attempts to provoke chaos and dissent." "The only beneficiary of these events and acts of violence are the enemies of the January revolution and the enemies of the Egyptian people, both Muslim and Christian" Coptic Christians make up approximately 10% of the Egyptian population, and some have been fearful that Egypt's ongoing political turmoil could allow ultra-conservative Islamists to flex their muscles and inspire a crackdown on social minorities. There has also been criticism of the army for being too lenient on previous attacks against Christians, with many witnesses accusing soldiers of being actively complicit in last night's bloodshed. Egyptian troops are among the dead following the violence, which comes after several outbreaks of sectarian tensions this year

"We were marching peacefully," said Talaat Youssef, a 23-year-old Christian trader. "When we got to the state television building, the army started firing live ammunition," he added. Another protester, Essam Khalili, said: "Thugs attacked us and a military vehicle jumped over a sidewalk and ran over at least 10 people," he said. Online, Egyptians queued up to blame the ruling military council for fomenting the violence, accusing army generals of using social instability as an excuse for cracking down on freedom of expression. "Let there be no doubt, today's killings are committed by #SCAF [the ruling military council]. They are the killers," wrote one Twitter user. State television put the number injured in the violence at 150, saying three of those killed were soldiers. More than four vehicles were set on fire and TV footage showed protesters breaking windows of parked cars and army personnel carriers driving towards crowds. "What happened today is unprecedented. Seventeen corpses were crushed by military trucks," human rights activist Hossam Bahgat said. In May, twelve people were killed in clashes between Christians and Muslims after rumours that Christians were holding a woman who had converted to Islam. The incident led the country's ruling military council to order the drafting of new laws to criminalise sectarian violence. • This article was amended on 10 October 2011. The original headline referred to the violence in Cairo as 'riots'. This has been changed to more accurately reflect the story http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/09/egypt-protests-cairo-clashes/print

Foster consensus to build the new Egypt Author: Michael Meyer-Resende Publishing Date: Sun, 09/10/2011 - 13:21

These days, one of the most important questions for Egypt’s transition is apparently being settled between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the political parties: how exactly should parliament elect the constituent assembly that will draft a new constitution? The importance of the issue cannot be overstated. The constituent assembly will be tasked with re-designing the Egyptian state to respond to demands for democracy. If successful, the assembly will lay the foundations for a new Egypt, the same way that South Africa’s constitution-making process hailed a new dawn for the country. The constituent assembly will be the real prize of the parliamentary elections that are scheduled to begin at the end of November. Yet until now it has not been clear precisely how parliament should elect the seminal body. The SCAF's constitutional declaration (Article 60) indicates that the elected members of parliament should elect the 100 members of the constituent assembly, but does not address the crucial details. Which electoral system should be used for this purpose? Should there be a requirement for a super-majority, for example that constituent assembly candidates would need the backing of at least two-thirds of MPs? Should the members of the constituent assembly represent different segments of society? There are demands for the constituent assembly to have a broad composition, including a minimum allotment for women, Copts, and those from other religious groups and specific occupations. Indeed, such stipulations can be found in many constitution- making processes over the last decade. Yet, while this is an important means to achieve a broad-based body, in terms of political outlook of the constituent assembly this is not the decisive question. Women, minorities, farmers, workers and other groups do not have a uniform political orientations. They are as pluralistic in their views as any other group of the population. One can find Salafi, Islamist, liberal or leftist women, workers or farmers. In other words, a constituent assembly that includes these groups may be broad-based, but this is no guarantee that it is pluralistic. For political pluralism the key question is how the constituent assembly will be elected. Article 60 implies that parliament will elect members by a majority vote. That would mean that a parliamentary majority of 50 percent plus one could potentially determine the entire composition of the constituent assembly. In that case parliament would essentially become a filter through which the expression of newfound pluralism in the parliamentary elections would be reduced. The law is also short on details. There are many ways in which the members of parliament can vote for the 100 members of the Assembly. Each MP can have one vote or up to 100 votes, each "seat" of the constituent assembly can be filled individually, or there can be a vote for all 100 in one go. Some of these models would reduce the risk of a one-sided assembly, but they would be complex and make the electoral process highly unpredictable.

The easiest way to prevent the emergence of a partisan constituent assembly would be the requirement of super-majority selection. Indeed, in recent months civil society organizations and parties have demanded that the constituent assembly be elected by a super-majority of two-thirds or three-fourths of all MPs. The cabinet drafted such plans but never officially put them on the table. A super-majority requirement is worth considering for several reasons. If elected by a super-majority the assembly would be more likely to reflect the political pluralism of parliament. The election of middle- ground candidates, who are acceptable to a broad majority, would be encouraged. Such a composition would be more conducive to reaching consensus on an eventual draft constitution. The work of the assembly would be less in risk of being marred by controversy over its composition. A super-majority requirement would make it likely that constituent assembly membership would essentially be negotiated and agreed upon among a large majority of MPs. The vote would then merely "ratify" the outcome of such negotiations, making the voting process less antagonistic. Carrying the logic of consensus a step further, it could already be agreed that the constituent assembly will have to adopt its draft of a constitution by supermajority. The time for such agreements is now, when no party yet knows for certain its electoral support. A consensual process of forming the constitution-drafting body would create a constructive environment contributing to wide acceptance of its results. It would have the additional benefit of reducing the stakes of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Losing them would not amount to a complete loss of influence on the composition of the constituent assembly. Lowering the stakes would be welcome for an electoral process already concerned about possible violence. Opinion polls show that Egyptians desire a democratic state but they fear the instability and deep divisions that democratic transitions can create. Writing rules that favour consensus is one way to respond to the desire for a democratic and stable new Egypt. Michael Meyer-Resende is the Executive Director of Democracy Reporting International, a Berlin-based not-for-profit NGO promoting political participation. Featured news: Show in Featured news Author: Michael Meyer-Resende Related News: A little fear, a lot of worry Five constitutional principles http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/503194

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After the dawn Troubled economics of the Arab spring

October 9, 2011 7:47 pm The economics of the Arab spring By Roula Khalaf, Heba Saleh and Abeer Allam A jittery Egyptian cabinet and a push for retribution against business are making investors despair

Egyptian protesters in Tahrir Square, Cairo On the face of it, it was a statement of the obvious. When Hazem el-Beblawi, Egypt’s new finance minister, warned at the end of last month that lawsuits against foreign businesses were shaking market confidence in the country, he was expressing the sentiment of many investors. Additional remarks that the Arab spring had not been a boon for the economies of the region were also seemingly unsurprising. Not, however, in Cairo. In the Egyptian capital his comments provoked a furore, with outrage pouring in online and in calls to television chat shows. How dare the minister criticise what popular opinion considers necessary justice against the corruption of the

Hosni Mubarak era, or cast doubt on the achievements of the revolution that this year deposed the long-time president, the people charged. More On this story Egyptian stocks falls after deadly clashes In depth Egypt in transition Turmoil hits Egypt’s foreign currency reserves Editorial Fog on the Nile Egypt’s academics fight for democracy

Essam Sharaf, the prime minister, posted on his Facebook page on Monday in an attempt to calm the outcry, saying Mr Beblawi had no intention of undermining the revolution, which he insisted “We are all proud of.” The controversy testifies to the testy mood in post-revolution Egypt, a country in a state of ferment since the February ousting of Mr Mubarak, the most important political change in the Arab spring sweeping the Middle East and north Africa. Newly won freedoms have led to an explosion of demands for retribution against former officials and businessmen, further bruising a battered economy – and have generated social expectations that are colliding with the current economic reality. As the Arab world’s largest nation struggles to restore normality, many within Egypt and abroad fear that the inability to deliver the economic dividend is threatening an already fragile political transition. Pledges of tens of billions of dollars of financial support have been made by western and Arab governments mindful of the need for a stable Egypt, though little of the funds has been disbursed and much is in the form of long-term development assistance. In the short term, however, overcoming the economic impact of change after three decades of Mr Mubarak’s rule, and in a country in which 40 per cent of the population lives below or near the poverty line, is proving daunting. Unlike many of its oil-rich neighbours, Egypt has a diversified economy with a large domestic market. Located at the crossroads of Asia, Africa and Europe, it has often been singled out as having the potential to become a regional powerhouse. But along with a lack of vision under Mr Mubarak, the country has been held back by bad economic management, excessive bureaucratic control and poor education. The uncertainty of the revolution meant the economy contracted 4.2 per cent in the first three months of this year and the unemployment rate shot up to 12 per cent from 9 per cent. Investment has ground to a halt and tourist numbers have plummeted. Foreign direct investment inflows, which peaked at an annual $13bn before the 2008 global 76

financial crisis, have evaporated. Egypt has, meanwhile, lost one-third of its foreign exchange reserves. The International Monetary Fund expects a slow recovery and continued balance of payments pressures. Mr Sharaf’s administration, which took over in March, has failed to quell strikes that have hit public and private factories and ports as emboldened trade unionists seek to boost their pay and get rid of unpopular managers. Mr Beblawi’s comments were an attempt to calm foreign investors’ jitters, amid an avalanche of lawsuits from workers fired years back and court orders challenging Mubarak-era contracts. “The revolution has branched out into mini-revolutions throughout our investments in Egypt,” complains a big Arab investor whose five-star hotel was occupied in August by staff demanding a pay rise as well as the replacement of the manager. It has not helped investors that the generals now ruling Egypt have little economic (or indeed political) experience. Some of the top brass in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces are said to have been opposed to the liberalisation of the economy during the Mubarak years. Of greater immediate concern, however, is that their stewardship has been hesitant and confused, seeking at once to satisfy popular demands and revive economic growth, but achieving neither. One of the generals’ first acts was to raise public sector wages by 15 per cent, a much needed increase in a country where years of fierce food price inflation have eroded purchasing power. Less praised, however, was their decision to give 450,000 contract workers permanent jobs, adding a longer-term burden to future budgets. Some steps were quickly reversed. In an effort to meet demands for increased social spending, the government drafted an expansionary budget for the fiscal year that started in June. To help plug a predicted 10.6 per cent deficit – up from 8.6 per cent last year – it negotiated a $3bn standby facility from the IMF. Three weeks later, however, Egypt turned down the loan because the military council did not want to lumber its successors with debt. Cairo also scrapped plans for a $2.2bn loan from the World Bank. The budget was trimmed back and the projected deficit reduced to the 2010 level. Yet as the heavy cost of domestic borrowing becomes more apparent, officials now say they might go back to the international institutions after all. “The hesitancy has an impact,” says Nada Farid, economist at Beltone Financial, an investment bank. “The mere fact that you change the deficit figure down a few days after announcing it shakes confidence.” Ahmad Galal, managing director of Cairo’s Economic Research Forum, compares the military rulers’ dilemma to someone tossing and turning in bed in search of a comfortable sleeping position. “For 30 years there was a stable arrangement: no one bothered to think which side of the bed to sleep on,” he says of Mr Mubarak’s rule. “Now we’re starting all over again and finding the right position.” The stability that Mr Mubarak offered, however, concealed a growing malaise and sapped the real potential of a $225bn economy with its mismanagement and corruption. In the last five years of the Mubarak era, with much growth coming from tourism, textiles and construction, the annual increase in real gross domestic product averaged 6 per cent. But that was still short of what Egypt needs to absorb the 650,000 entrants into the workforce each year. Promoting the liberal policies that underpinned this growth, moreover, had much to do with advancing the political prospects of Gamal Mubarak, 77

the former president’s son and at the time his apparent heir, who was the champion of a reform-minded economic team in government. The policies also benefited the rich, many of them the young Mr Mubarak’s friends, and did little to close the income gap. In the wake of the revolution, Egyptians have sought revenge against the Mubarak cronies, triggering a series of criminal actions against ministers and businessmen including Ahmed Ezz, the steel magnate who was the chief strategist of the former ruling party and engineered its victory in heavily rigged elections last year. Mr Ezz was sentenced last month on corruption charges to 10 years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of $110m. He is appealing against the conviction. “Businessmen fear they could be next even if they are innocent of any wrongdoing,” says a senior banker in Cairo. The construction sector has been hard hit after activists launched legal challenges to the land holdings of some big developers, alleging that these were obtained from ministers cheaply in sweetheart deals, often without competitive bidding. Business chiefs say cabinet ministers now suffer a “shaky hands syndrome”, reluctant to make any decisions for fear of future punishment. Past privatisations too have come under scrutiny. A court in Cairo ruled last month that three industrial companies sold over the past 20 years should be returned to the state because of irregularities during the privatisation process. The economic uncertainty created by the legal challenges has been exacerbated by deteriorating security and a shifting political agenda. The police are still smarting from their humiliation during the revolution when they failed to quell the protests and stood accused of killing demonstrators. The subsequent lack of efficient policing has brought higher crime levels, with armed gangs robbing motorists and attacking factories and warehouses. The initial timetable for the political transition was six months, after which the military authorities were supposed to hand over power to a civilian government. Parliamentary elections are, however, due only at the end of November and the generals now suggest that a president who will take over from them might not be elected before the end of next year. “We have no clarity on how [the new Egypt] will be governed, by whom or what discourse will frame the new political agenda,” say HSBC analysts in a recent report. Elections will also bring a strong emphasis on “enhancing social justice”, they note, which would chime with popular expectations but might disappoint those hoping to see an acceleration of economic reform. Masood Ahmed, in charge of the Middle East and central Asia at the IMF, says policymakers in Cairo now face the additional challenge that the worsened world economic outlook will impact on the recovery of tourism and investment flows. An immediate priority is to ensure adequate financing to protect the economy over the next year. But he says it is also important to begin addressing the medium-term agenda, such as reforming the subsidies system that is a big drag on the budget, and putting in place policies for higher and more inclusive growth, including easier financing and regulation for smaller companies that now struggle to secure bank credit. As Egypt’s new rulers try to balance the conflicting pressures, analysts argue that both the generals and the people have to keep in mind the big picture – that the country is in the midst of a historic change and that change comes with a price. “People are impatient

– everyone was telling them economic growth is high, life is wonderful and they didn’t see it; now they say ‘it’s our turn’ and I understand,” says Mr Galal of the ERF. “But during a major change in society it would be a mistake to compare what you have to what you had before,” he adds. In Egypt’s transition – which was set in motion in rather more peaceful a manner than elsewhere in the region and was in many ways less tumultuous than similar upheavals elsewhere in the world – “the economic cost is much lower than the cost paid by others”...... Tunisia: Elections are just first step Youth joblessness was one of the main triggers of Tunisia’s January revolution. Since then, amid strikes and rural roadblocks, with investments on hold and European holidaymakers staying away, unemployment has climbed higher. The employment ministry says that by the end of this year, a record 19 per cent of the workforce could be out of a job, writes Eileen Byrne. These jobseekers, numbering around 700,000, will include about 10,000 whose jobs disappeared in instability following the revolution, 150,000 new entrants to the job market (including 80,000 graduates) and tens of thousands who arrived home from war- torn Libya. It is hoped, however, that jobseekers and businesses may find opportunities in a newly liberalised economy in the neighbour to the south, as the conflict there ends. Tunisian policymakers are resigned to the reality that investment in their own country – whether foreign or domestic – is unlikely to pick up significantly until they too have a stable elected government. The official forecast for growth in gross domestic product this year has been adjusted downwards to zero, and even this could prove optimistic after the economy contracted 2 per cent in the first half. The main political parties appear to have understood the need for urgency. In September they agreed on a road map that implies there will be an elected parliament and government in place before the end of 2012. The vote for a constituent assembly on October 23 is the first step along this road. Spending on accommodation, goods and services by thousands of middle-class Libyan refugees cushioned the impact of a catastrophic summer for tourism, where receipts were more than 40 per cent down on last year. The sector faces a winter season still overshadowed by political uncertainty, although Mehdi Houas, the tourism minister, points out that during the first nine months “we managed to welcome 3.2m tourists without incident”. The crisis is also raising questions as to whether Tunisia should move on from the cheap-and-cheerful model that had boosted numbers. Ahead of the election, wildcat strikes and roadblocks appear to be abating and the UGTT union federation is backing the interim government on the need for stability. More than 150,000 youths are receiving a new jobseekers’ allowance, a further 50,000 are in apprenticeship schemes or paid internships and 34,000 civil service posts are being created. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9565ebac-f0d0-11e0-aec8- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1aMvSGkGJ

Iraq, siding with Iran, sends essential aid to Syria’s Assad By Joby Warrick, Sunday, October 9, 1:36 AM More than six months after the start of the Syrian uprising, Iraq is offering key moral and financial support to the country’s embattled president, undermining a central U.S. policy objective and raising fresh concerns that Iraq is drifting further into the orbit of an American arch rival — Iran. Iraq’s stance has dealt an embarrassing setback to the Obama administration, which has sought to enlist Muslim allies in its campaign to isolate Syrian autocrat Bashar al- Assad. While other Arab states have downgraded ties with Assad, Iraq has moved in the opposite direction, hosting official visits by Syrians, signing pacts to expand business ties and offering political support. After Iraq sent conflicting signals about its support for Assad last month, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki spoke firmly against regime change in Syria in an interview broadcast on Iraqi television Sept. 30. “We believe that Syria will be able to overcome its crisis through reforms,” Maliki said, rejecting U.S. calls for the Syrian leader to step down. His words echoed those of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who weeks earlier proposed that Syrians should “implement the necessary reforms by themselves.” On other issues as well, the Maliki government in recent months has hewed closer to Iran’s stance — Iraq, for example, has supported Iran’s right to nuclear technology and advocated U.N. membership for Palestinians — as the U.S. military races to complete its troop withdrawal over the coming months. Few policy objectives are more important to Iran than preserving the pro-Tehran regime in Syria, longtime Middle East observers say. “This is Iran’s influence, because preserving the Assad regime is very much in Iran’s national interest,” said David Pollock, a former adviser on Middle East policy for the State Department during the George W. Bush administration. “Iran needs Iraq’s help trying to save their ally in Damascus.” U.S. officials acknowledged disappointment with Iraq over its dealings with Assad, while noting that other Middle East countries also have been reluctant to abandon Assad at a time when the outcome of the uprising remains uncertain. “The Iraqis should be more helpful, absolutely,” said a senior administration official involved in Middle East diplomacy. Some of the proposed financial deals with Syria, however, “turn out to be a lot of talk,” said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to candidly discuss sensitive issues.

U.S. intelligence officials predict that Syria’s uprising will eventually topple Assad, most likely after the mounting cost of sanctions causes the business elite to turn against him. But the timeline for change is far from clear. The Obama administration hailed a decision in August by three Persian Gulf Arab states — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain — to recall their ambassadors to Damascus to protest Assad’s violent suppression of anti-government demonstrators. And Turkey — like Iraq, a major trading partner with Syria — has repeatedly denounced the crackdown and has established Syrian refugee camps and hosted meetings of opposition groups. Iraqi leaders also have criticized Assad’s brutality, as, indeed, Iran’s Ahmadinejad has done in public remarks. But Iraqi officials have refused to call for Assad’s ouster, or accept Syrian refugees, or even offer symbolic support for the anti-Assad opposition. Instead, the Iraqis have courted trade delegations and signed pipeline deals with Syria. “Iraq is sending a lifeline to Assad,” said Andrew Tabler, a Syria expert and author of “In the Lion’s Den,” a portrait of Syria under the autocrat. Middle Eastern experts note that Maliki — a Shiite Muslim who lived in exile in Syria for nearly 15 years — has strategic and sectarian reasons for avoiding a direct confrontation with Assad. Members of Iraq’s Shiite majority and Syria’s ruling Alawite Shiite sect share a common worry about Sunni-led insurgencies. Some Iraqis fear that a violent overthrow of Syrian Alawites will trigger unrest across the border in Iraq. But other experts say Iraq’s support for Syria underscores the influence of Iran, which has staked billions of dollars on ensuring Assad’s survival. Pollock, the former State Department adviser, said Iraqi leaders fear repercussions from Iran and its Syrian protege as much they covet increased revenue from trade. “Iran is certainly important behind the scenes, and the Iraqis know the Iranians are looking over their shoulders,” said Pollock, now a researcher for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank. Pollock noted that Iranian-backed cleric Moqtada al-Sadr — a firebrand Iraqi Shiite with tens of thousands of devoted followers — has publicly backed Assad, calling him a “brother.” Iraqi leaders know that hostility toward Syria could invite reprisals against politicians and ordinary civilians in Baghdad, or perhaps against the estimated 1 million Iraqi refugees living in Syria, he said. Still, U.S. officials have privately expressed disappointment over Baghdad’s reluctance to take a more forceful stance against Syrian brutality, which millions of Iraqis witness daily on Arab-language cable news networks. Only in mid-September, after six months of worsening violence, did the Iraqi government issue a statement that appeared to call for Assad’s ouster. In that statement, on Sept. 20, Iraqi spokesman Ali al-Moussawi was quoted as telling New York Times reporters in Baghdad that Iraq had privately urged Assad to step down. “We are against the one-party rule and the dictatorship that hasn’t allowed for free expression,” Moussawi was quoted as saying. But less than 24 hours later, the Iraqi government began to backpedal. The same spokesman, Moussawi, told reporters on Sept. 21 that Iraqi leaders had never called for Assad’s resignation and said he had been misquoted. “It was neither the nature nor the followed discourse of the Iraqi government to intervene in the affairs of other countries,” Moussawi said. 81

Maliki’s broadcast interview Sept. 30 reflected a further retreat. While calling for an end to violence, the prime minister rejected regime change as destabilizing and said the crisis should be resolved gradually through reforms. Assad has survived by relying on hard-currency reserves and Iranian loans to maintain subsidies for Syria’s military and business elites, ensuring their continued loyalty and preventing the further spread of the country’s pro-democracy uprising, which took hold in March. Faced with international sanctions — including a new European Union ban on oil imports — Syria also has found support from Iraq and other neighbors as it scrambles to refill its hard-currency coffers, now hemorrhaging at a rate estimated at $1 billion a month. Iraq and Syria, which share historical and cultural ties, have long been trading partners, and smuggling in border towns has generated immense profits even during times of war. Scores of private traders regularly ferry tons of diesel fuel and other goods in vans and pickup trucks, specially modified with heavy suspensions that cause their backsides to jut out like monster trucks at a car show. Officials in both countries are cracking down on the black market in favor of legitimate ventures, particularly in the energy field. In early August, as other Arab countries were recalling their ambassadors to Syria, Iraq put on an unusual tour for 100 of Syria’s top government and business leaders. The visitors, led by Syria’s trade minister, were shown factories and refineries and applauded by Iraqis eager to cut deals with their Syrian neighbors. The week-long visit yielded a new pact designed to boost a soaring bilateral trade that already tops $2 billion a year and will solidify Iraq’s status as Syria’s biggest trading partner. Iraqi Trade Minister Khayrullah Babakir, praising the pact, spoke of a new focus on “empowering the private sector in both countries.” There was no mention of sanctions, or of the Syrian uprising. Staff researcher Julie Tate and staff writers Greg Miller and Liz Sly contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iraq-siding-with-iran-sends- lifeline-to-assad/2011/10/06/gIQAFEAIWL_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

Political exclusion of whom? Author: Amr el-Shobaki Publishing Date: Sat, 08/10/2011 - 10:42

There has been increasing talk about excluding former members of the now-disbanded National Democratic Party (NDP) from political life, with some saying they should be prevented from participation in upcoming elections. Meanwhile, others say only certain members of the NDP should be targeted. Political exclusion is one of the most dangerous issues that face societies undergoing democratic transformation. Even though Eastern European countries excluded several leaders of formerly ruling communist parties and Latin American countries brought military leaders to trial for torture and murder crimes, successful experiments with political exclusion in emerging democracies was not haphazard. In such cases, only leaders proven to have been directly involved in corruption were excluded. In the example of Iraq, where the country plunged into civil war after the Ba’ath Party was completely rooted out needs to be considered. In countries that made a successful transition to democracy, specific criteria were invariably established for political exclusion to forestall attempts at settling accounts with political opponents, like the case in Iraq. The scenario in Iraq could potentially be repeated in any other country where there are no sufficient legal or political precautions to prevent the process of political exclusion from turning into a tool to exact revenge on the basis of personal grievances. In failed cases, accusations of belonging to the fallen regime or the counter-revolution have been used as ready-made charges to bring down enemies. Egypt possesses a golden opportunity to pass this stage if it implements the process of political exclusion carefully, particularly since change in Egypt came through a popular protest rather than a foreign invasion or a military coup. Additionally, the uprising brought down the regime, but not the state, unlike traditional revolutions which broke out over the past 40 years. Egypt needs a process of political exclusion that will only screen out those who are currently detained pending investigations or have been indicted for their involvement in rigging elections and corrupting political life. Former MPs who gained their membership in either house of parliament through fixing election results should also be banned from political activity. Those whose membership of the NDP is only a hereditary affair, passed on to them by their parents and grandparents, should not be excluded from politics. They are victims of successive Egyptian regimes, rather than makers of their failed policies. Egyptians must be proud that for the first time since Mubarak took power they are bringing to justice corrupt moguls such as steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz and other similarly corrupt figures. At the same time, Egyptians should not hold other members of the former regime - who may have made minor mistakes themselves - accountable for the much larger mistakes of the leaders. Source URL (retrieved on 11/10/2011 - 14:41): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/502887 83

10/06/2011 03:39 PM A Calculated Offensive Why Is Erdogan Attacking Germany's Foundations? By Jürgen Gottschlich in Istanbul Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is leveling targeted attacks against German political foundations, accusing them of supporting the Kurdish PKK. But the foundations view the attacks as merely part of a calculated plan to criminalize legal Kurdish organizations. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is well-known for the tough and occasionally undiplomatic tone he uses with foreign politicians. The most recent to experience his wrath was Israel's government. But now Erdogan is attacking German political foundations with a presence and projects in Turkey -- and in no uncertain terms. Erdogan is accusing several foundations of supporting the "Kurdish terrorist organization PKK," the Kurdistan Worker's Party. Several days ago, he spoke of a single foundation, accusing it of collaborating with local officials of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) -- a legal political party that managed to win 36 seats in the Turkish parliament in June -- and of issuing loans to companies with PKK ties. At a press conference on Wednesday, Erdogan went even further. He alleged that German foundations are using loans to Kurdish BDP officials to get aid to the PKK. "The German foundations have unfortunately been doing similar things for a long time, but German officials have yet to respond to Turkish complaints," he said. In other words, Erdogan was no longer concerned about a single foundation, it was now "the German foundations" in general. In Turkey, it is no minor matter to be charged with supporting the PKK -- especially when the man leveling the charge is the prime minister himself. In such cases, state prosecutors are quick to draw up an indictment like the ones that have put thousands in jail on similar charges. Cries of Dismay Appalled representatives of German political foundations are rejecting the accusations. For example, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, a think tank associated with Chancellor Angela Merkel's center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has labeled the claims as "absurd." Officials in both Turkey and Germany with the Heinrich Böll Foundation, which is aligned with the Green Party, said the accusations "are lacking any basis in fact," adding that "foundations don't issue loans nor do they finance any infrastructure projects." Eberhard Pohl, Germany's ambassador to Turkey, has made similar statements in recent days. He has stated that any loans issued to municipalities or to support infrastructure measures in Turkey can only come from KfW, Germany's government-owned investment bank, or the German development organization GIZ. Granted, in addition to supporting a number of different projects in other Turkish cities, the GIZ has backed

ones bringing new sewer tunnels and wastewater treatment plants to the southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakir, which has the largest population of Kurds. But it has always only done so after getting the approval of the responsible Turkish ministries. He said it is simply impossible that money was channeled from the projects to the PKK. Representatives of foundations also pointed out that they cannot legally provide any loans in Turkey. A Complicated History At first glance, it seems puzzling that Erdogan would be launching such a massive attack on German foundations at this point in time. Still, conflicts revolving around German political foundations are nothing new in Turkey. The involvement of foreign organizations in Turkish affairs has always been a thorn in the side of many, particularly with Turkish nationalists. Already in 2002, the foundations were forced to defend themselves against accusations of espionage and of having sought to destroy the Turkish economy. At the time, the charges had to do with foreign support for a citizen's initiative opposing a gold mine on Turkey's western coast that was using cyanide to leak gold out of rock. The matter ultimately found its way before the Ankara State Security Court, which acquitted foundation representatives tried on espionage charges. The foundations continue to work with mostly civil-society groups and, of course, also with some based in predominately Kurdish areas. The Heinrich Böll Foundation primarily supports projects related to women's issues, but it also engages in talks with politicians from the Kurdish opposition. Foundation CEO Ralf Fücks defends these activities as being the only way to foster dialogue aimed at a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Undercutting Foreign Support Ulrike Dufner, the head of the foundation's office in Istanbul, views Erdogan's current accusations as an attempt to "stir up nationalist emotions." In fact, she believes the attack is targeting the civilian Kurdish opposition much more than German foundations themselves. Ralf Fücks, who happens to be in Turkey at the moment for talks, backed her opinion, saying: "Erdogan intends to criminalize all collaboration with the Kurdish BDP, the Kurds' legal civilian opposition." It is a view that seems to be supported by the fact that, in two days alone earlier this week, 150 Kurds with ties to the BDP -- including mayors and municipal representatives -- were arrested. The charges are always the same: allegedly being a member of a secret PKK organization trying to use legal means to wrestle control in predominantly Kurdish areas and erect a parallel structure to the state. Over the last two years, a total of 4,000 Kurds have been arrested on these charges. At the moment, roughly 3,000 cases are being heard involving predominantly elected Kurdish municipal politicians. "The government's strategy is evidently to cut off these Kurds from international support," Fücks said, adding that this is the actual reason behind attacks on the foundations. For that reason, Dufner considers it unlikely that state prosecutors will be showing up in her office any time soon. "On its merits," she said, "the charges are just too weak for that."

URL: Jürgen Gottschlich A Calculated Offensive Why Is Erdogan Attacking Germany's Foundations? 10/06/2011 03:39 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,790296,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Violence Escalates in Turkey: Kurds Fear New Civil War May Be Brewing (10/05/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,790033,00.html • Erdogan's 'Dangerous Macho Posturing': EU Politicians Slam Turkey's Anti- Israel Course (09/14/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,786204,00.html • The Sultan of Istancool: Is Erdogan's Success Pulling Turks Away from Europe? (06/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767427,00.html • Turkey's 'Realm of Fear': A Former Judge Takes on Erdogan's Heavy Hand (04/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,758101,00.html • Erdogan Urges Turks Not to Assimilate: 'You Are Part of Germany, But Also Part of Our Great Turkey' (02/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,748070,00.html • SPIEGEL 360: Our Full Coverage of Turkey http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/turkey/

UN FINAL INFELIZ PARA YEMEN Charles Schmitz [4] Septiembre 2011 [3]

A veces, ganan los malos.

AFP/Getty Images

En Saná, la mayoría de las víctimas de los combates fueron civiles. Los seguidores de Saleh parecían casi disfrutar provocando a los desertores del Ejército que se habían pasado al bando de Alí Mohsen al Ahmar, el general que se unió a los revolucionarios en marzo y prometió protegerlos. Las agresiones a civiles no solo pretendían enviar un mensaje a los rebeldes, sino dejar al descubierto la debilidad de las fuerzas de Ahmar. Ni siquiera la alianza de todos los grupos opuestos a Saleh –la Primera División Acorazada de Ahmar, los revolucionarios callejeros, las fuerzas aliadas con el jefe tribal Sadeq al Ahmar (que no tiene ninguna relación con Alí Mohsen al Ahmar) y los partidos de la oposición política yemení— parecía capaz de inclinar la balanza de poder en su favor. No hubo elecciones, y la oposición no pudo formar un Gobierno de transición, a pesar de intentarlo. Y Saleh no murió de sus heridas. Como invitado de Arabia Saudí, se recuperó y, a lo largo del verano, empezó a ejercer sus funciones presidenciales y a reunirse en el hospital con algunos otros altos funcionarios yemeníes que también habían resultado heridos en el ataque. Las autoridades occidentales se apresuraron a tratar de manipular los hechos sobre el terreno y se entrevistaron con el vicepresidente, Abd al Rab Mansur al Hadi, como si el poder real de Yemen estuviera en sus manos. Oficialmente, Hadi era el jefe del Estado en funciones, pero Ahmed Saleh, hijo del dictador y comandante de la Guardia Republicana, le impidió la entrada en el palacio presidencial y le obligó a trabajar en su casa, una clara señal de quién mandaba. No obstante, Hadi tuvo su utilidad para los estadounidenses. Con su experiencia militar y sus conexiones locales, consiguió agrupar a las fuerzas locales y dar la vuelta a la situación frente al asalto por tierra de Al Qaeda en la provincia de Abyán. Hadi prometió cooperación y aseguró a los estadunidenses que Yemen no permitiría que Al Qaeda se aprovechase de la crisis del país. Las informaciones procedentes de Abyán dicen que los lanzamientos aéreos de Arabia Saudí y EE UU fueron cruciales para mantener con vida la Brigada Mika 25, una fuerza leal sitiada durante tres meses por guerrilleros en Zinjibar, la capital de la provincia de Abyán. (Saleh dio las gracias a estadounidenses y saudíes por su apoyo en la guerra contra Al Qaeda en un discurso pronunciado poco después de regresar a Saná). Estados Unidos y Europa querían que Hadi fuera más allá y pusiera en práctica el acuerdo del Golfo, que exigía la dimisión de Saleh un mes después de la firma y un Gobierno de transición que convocara nuevas elecciones. Deseaban un pacto político que resolviera la crisis y la consiguiente inestabilidad de Yemen, que estaba impidiendo abordar el problema del grave deterioro de su economía. Pero el clan de Saleh imposibilitó cualquier acuerdo político y sometió a los manifestantes a disparos de francotiradores o a bombardeos al azar, casi como para probar que podía actuar impunemente contra sus adversarios. Por fin, a mediados de septiembre, llegó la noticia de que Saleh había autorizado a Hadi a negociar un pacto basado en el acuerdo del Golfo. Parecía que había esperanza de una solución política. Sin embargo, siguiendo una espiral ya demasiado habitual, la violencia estalló casi de inmediato y frustró la perspectiva de acuerdo. Los orígenes de esta última ola de violencia son confusos. Las tropas leales al Gobierno abrieron fuego contra los manifestantes en Saná. Eso está claro, pero parece que los manifestantes estaban dejando sus posiciones para avanzar hacia el palacio presidencial, 88

y que las tropas de Alí Mohsen al Ahmar estaban aprovechando la marcha para ganar terreno militar. En Yemen, muchos han acusado a Ahmar de haber instigado esta oleada de combates por miedo a quedar fuera de un acuerdo político negociado. Fuera cual fuera la causa del estallido, los feroces combates mataron a más de 100 personas, sobre todo manifestantes, pero también muchos soldados, en los choques entre las unidades leales y las desertoras. Entonces, en un giro totalmente nuevo, Saleh apereció con el rey Abdulá de Arabia Saudí en lo que parecía una visita de Estado oficial. De pronto daba la impresión de que los saudíes, que habían trabajado para conseguir que Saleh dimitiese en primavera, habían decidido darle su respaldo oficial. Pocos días después, volvió por sorpresa a Saná. La versión oficial es que Saleh volvió para supervisar un acuerdo político; dijo que el diálogo era la única solución y que volvía con una rama de olivo y una paloma de la paz. Sin embargo, nada más producirse el regreso, estalló una nueva ola de violencia, porque los leales al presidente quisieron dejar claro que cualquier acuerdo político seguiría las condiciones impuestas por él. El distrito de Hasaba, donde vive Sadeq al Ahmar, jefe de la confederación tribal Hashid, volvió a ser blanco de ataques. También asaltaron, al parecer, la casa de su hermano, Himyar al Ahmar, en el lujoso barrio de Hadda, y asimismo el cuartel general de la Primera División Acorazada de Alí Mohsen al Ahmar. En la Plaza del Cambio volvieron a abrir fuego intenso contra los manifestantes pacíficos. O los partidarios de Saleh se sentían envalentonados y capaces de exigir una solución militar, o estaban intentando debilitar a sus adversarios.

En público, Saleh proclama su compromiso de paz. El domingo, 25 de da la impresión de que los Arabia septiembre, renovó su lealtad al acuerdo Saudí han cambiado su posición y del Golfo y reiteró que el vicepresidente vuelven a apoyarle de manera tácita podía firmarlo en su nombre. Pero, a estas alturas, esas son promesas huecas. La oposición yemení y los revolucionarios en la calle se niegan a aceptar cualquier Gobierno de transición en el que participe Saleh, precisamente porque el presidente lleva mucho tiempo mostrando que sabe ceder a las presiones populares y, al mismo tiempo, hacer realidad sus propios planes en sus propios términos. Eso es lo que parece estar haciendo ahora. En tres ocasiones ha prometido firmar el acuerdo del Golfo, y en tres ocasiones ha cambiado de opinión en el último minuto (en una de ellas, se echó atrás con el embajador de Estados Unidos sentado a su lado y esperando a ser testigo de la firma). Desde su propio punto de vista, Saleh ha sobrevivido no solo a un intento de asesinato, sino a una campaña de difamación política apoyada por toda la comunidad internacional, incluidos los fundamentales saudíes. Pero da la impresión de que los Arabia Saudí han cambiado su posición y vuelven a apoyarle de manera tácita. ¿Por qué va a dimitir ahora? Las autoridades estadounidenses están hartas de la insolencia de Saleh y, en los dos primeros días posteriores a su regreso, anunciaron oficialmente que querían que pusiera en marcha un Gobierno de transición y después dimitiera. El rey Abdulá también pidió a Saleh que dimitiera al día siguiente de que dejara el reino para volver a Saná.

• Conflictos • Oriente Medio

Source URL: http://www.fp-es.org/un-final-infeliz-para-yemen Links: [1] http://www.fp-es.org/temas/conflictos [2] http://www.fp-es.org/regiones/oriente-medio [3] http://www.fp-es.org/septiembre-2011 [4] http://www.fp-es.org/autor/charles-schmitz [5] http://www.fp-es.org/dias-de-caos-en-yemen [6] http://www.fp-es.org/yemen-un-terreno-fertil-para-al-qaeda [7] http://www.fp-es.org/yemen-bienvenidos-a-qaedastan [8] http://www.fp-es.org/yemen-el-conflicto-olvidado [9] http://www.fp-es.org/que-se-lee-en-yemen

SCAF agreement is no surprise Author: Akram Ismail Publishing Date: Thu, 06/10/2011 - 14:49

The agreement concluded between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and 13 political parties on Saturday has been met with heavy criticism from Egyptian activists and youth coalitions. After the meeting, convened by the generals to discuss the parties’ growing frustration with the new electoral law and the transition period, participants came under intense fire on social media and independent news outlets. Some critics even went so far as to accuse the participants of treason. Revolutionary activists responded as though they were surprised by the meeting. But really, what were we to expect? Over the past few months, Egypt’s political forces have failed to reach any consensus on how to move forward in the interim period. They’ve failed to agree on a political project that represents the demands of the revolution and that would give them some leverage in guiding the transitional period alongside the SCAF. Instead, conservative political forces - Islamists, social conservatives, remnants of the former ruling National Democratic Party, and some traditional parties from the Mubarak era - drummed up support for the March referendum on constitutional amendments and since then have pushed for adopting the SCAF's vague road map for a transfer of power. The outcome of the referendum has provoked intense conflict between political parties and groups, undermining any chance for a revolutionary consensus on a plan for the interim period. Moreover, the referendum has created a space for political battles that are isolated from the demands of the revolution. The Egyptian revolution's chief goals were to dismantle the oppressive security apparatus, restructure corrupt state institutions and remake the social system to serve millions of poor Egyptians. Instead of continuing the fight for these basic demands, conservative political forces have devoted most of their energy to debating how the constitution will be drafted and the arrangements for the elections. And yet, they still haven’t been able to reach an agreement on either of these issues, giving the SCAF an opportunity to impose its views. On the streets, the revolution is intensifying, with strikes and sit-ins spreading to factories and schools. Egypt’s social contradictions are boiling over, and institutional corruption, poor living standards and the collapse of social services are all being exposed and challenged. Meanwhile, conservative political powers remain myopically focused on the constitution and elections in what seems to be a battle to inherit Mubarak's regime. Before blaming the parties that signed the agreement with SCAF, perhaps we should consider how they’ve contributed to narrowing the political discussion to issues of process - for example, who is eligible to run in which electoral districts, who will choose the constituent assembly that drafts the new constitution - while abandoning the general demands of the revolution. As these forces begin to jostle over the shape of the

new regime, one worries that the parliamentary elections will give them an opportunity to launch a full assault on the revolution. Now, the critical question is whether or not the parliamentary elections will bring together a constellation of political forces capable of addressing the demands of tens of thousands of protesters and strikers who continue to fight for a decent living and a better future. No matter it’s composition, Egypt’s new regime will only establish its legitimacy through a bold and democratic social and political accord that takes into account the demands of all segments of Egyptian society. Failing that, Egyptians may find themselves facing one of two scenarios: a restoration of the police state or a revolutionary escalation. Will the Emergency Law and attempts to restore Mubarak’s authoritarian state put a stop to the ongoing upheavals and finally halt the spread of the revolution? Or will protests reach a tipping point in the coming phase causing our political leaders, especially conservatives, to realize that this is a genuine revolution from below that requires novel changes to the way Egypt is run? Akram Ismail is an independent writer and activist with the Association of Progressive Youth. He is a member of the editorial board of el-Bosla magazine. Featured news: Author: Akram Ismail Related News: Ruling council's proposed timetable ignites fears of military president A little fear, a lot of worry

Source URL (retrieved on 11/10/2011 - 14:32): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/502407

Internacional Del alfiler al elefante Este blog se ocupa principalmente de temas internacionales, con especial referencia a Europa y a la política exterior española. Pero también a Estados Unidos, Oriente Próximo, China y todo cuanto venga a cuento de la conversación con los lectores. 'Del alfiler al elefante' es un homenaje a Manuel Vázquez Montalban.

Doble e infame veto Por: Lluís Bassets | 06 de octubre de 2011 La superpotencia derrotada de la Guerra Fría y la superpotencia ascendente del siglo XXI han trazado una raya en la arena. Hasta aquí hemos llegado. El momento es dramático. Moscú y Pequín sacan pecho justo cuando Washington y Bruselas demuestran mayores dificultades para gobernarse, gobernar el mundo y rescatar a las economías occidentales del pozo. Es una demostración de la debilidad de unos y de la pujanza de los otros, un momento del desplazamiento de poder en el mundo, del que las revueltas árabes son el último y más espectacular avatar. Detrás de las superpotencias clásicas también sacan pecho las aspirantes, los emergentes: Brasil, India y Suráfrica. A costa de los sirios, que sufren lo indecible bajo la bota de un régimen criminal: 2.700 ciudadanos fallecidos en los seis meses de revuelta, millares de heridos, detenidos y torturados, decenas de miles de refugiados en Turquía, Líbano y Jordania. La discusión y el debate en el Consejo de Seguridad sobre Siria ha sido la segunda vuelta, con resultado adverso, de las resoluciones sobre Libia, que permitieron la intervención área de la OTAN y el derrocamiento de Gadafi. Rusos y chinos han rechazado una aguada resolución largamente negociada por los europeos contra el régimen de Bachar el Asad, en la que ni siquiera se hablaba de sanciones y todo se limitaba a advertencias, reproches y buenos deseos. Los argumentos de los rusos, que como es habitual son los que han llevado la voz cantante, son terribles y devastadores para los revolucionarios árabes que quieren deshacerse de los autócratas: simetría entre régimen y oposición, a la que también se responsabiliza de la violencia; exclusión abierta de cualquier intervención internacional; rechazo ya no a cualquier régimen de sanciones sino a las meras presiones; y reconducción de la acción internacional a las arcangélicas recomendaciones de diálogo y de reformas. No hay hipocresía alguna, al contrario. En todo caso, cinismo. Es una exhibición de fuerza y una advertencia. La responsabilidad de proteger, consagrada por Naciones

Unidas en 2005, recibe un duro revés después de aquel éxito inesperado en el caso de Libia. Regresan al galope los principios de no injerencia y de respeto a la soberanía nacional. Moscú y Pekín se sienten más que insatisfechos por la aplicación de las resoluciones contra el régimen de Gadafi. Sostienen que no se ha protegido a la población civil de los ataques del coronel sino que todo se ha hecho para cambiar el régimen. Por la cuenta que les trae como países violadores de los derechos humanos y sin escrúpulos a la hora de acudir a la fuerza, cortan por lo sano la posibilidad de una expansión del principio de la responsabilidad de proteger. Es también un recordatorio a Washington respecto a su reiterado uso del derecho de veto para defender al gobierno de un país como Israel, vecino y enemigo nada menos que de Siria, protegido y aliado histórico de Moscú desde los tiempos gélidos del mundo bipolar. Rusia y China han utilizado el derecho de veto para frenar a los occidentales en Siria. Es un hito en la evolución de las revueltas árabes: las dos superpotencias han sacado el lápiz para marcar el mapa. Lo hizo ya anteriormente Arabia Saudí con su intervención armada en Bahrein. Europa y Estados Unidos, en un instante excepcional de acierto geopolítico, lo consiguieron también con los bombardeos de la OTAN en Libia. No es frecuente el uso del derecho de veto conjuntamente por parte de dos países en el Consejo de Seguridad. Esta rara pareja lo ha utilizado en tres ocasiones nada gloriosas, que marcan una línea de conducta en defensa de las dictaduras y un inquietante sendero para el siglo XXI. En 2007, Rusia y China rechazaron una resolución que pedía el respeto de los derechos humanos y la liberación de los presos políticos, entre ellos de Aung San Suu Kyi, en Birmania; en 2008 evitaron un régimen de sanciones y el embargo de armas contra el presidente de Zimbabue, Robert Mugabe; y ahora sortean cualquier apercibimiento a Siria por la represión desencadenada contra las protestas ciudadanas. Brasil, Suráfrica e India no han querido dejar solos a chinos y rusos: situados junto a Estados Unidos y Europa, la votación hubiera arrojado doce votos a favor y dos en contra, con la abstención obligada de Líbano, suficiente para salvar a Assad pero con un alto precio simbólico para Rusia y China, que igual hubiera cambiado su voto. Los emergentes también esperan sacar su tajada geopolítica de los cambios y de la debilidad europea y estadounidense, y a la vez no enemistarse innecesariamente con los ganadores del envite. La infamia del veto doble ha llevado a Alemania, propensa a desmarcarse como si fuera un emergente más, a votar con Washington y los otros países europeos y dejar así un incongruente mensaje después de abstenerse en la resolución contra Gadafi. Europa es débil, pero al menos esta vez existe. http://blogs.elpais.com/lluis_bassets/2011/10/doble-e-infame-veto.html

Syrian insurrection set to gather momentum UN failure to pass sanctions resolution against Assad's regime has convinced some that diplomacy cannot protect them Martin Chulov in Beirut and Ewen MacAskill in Washington guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 5 October 2011 19.24 BST An armed insurrection inside Syria looks set to gather momentum after the failure to pass a UN resolution against president Bashar al-Assad's regime, according to dissidents in two key Syrian cities. Activists from Homs and Hama, where mostly peaceful protests over the past six months have lately become more aggressive and armed, say the failure of the US effort to threaten sanctions against Syria has convinced some that diplomacy cannot protect them. "There's no way out of this except to fight," said an activist from Homs. "For the people of Homs the international community are not with us and we know that for sure. Russia and China will continue to protect Assad and as long as that happens, he will hunt us down." Britain, France and the US are expected to seek a fresh resolution on Syria before the UN Security Council after Russia and China on Tuesday night vetoed a draft that threatened sanctions, a security council source said. The veto by Russia, supported by China, provoked the biggest verbal explosion from the US at the UN for years, with its ambassador Susan Rice expressing "outrage" over the Moscow and Beijing move. Rice also walked out of the security council, the first such demonstration in recent years. While walk-outs are common at the UN general assembly, they are rare in the security council. "It will not go away," the source said. "It will not be next week. We don't have a date. But there are a number of ways the security council can get back to this." The vote was 9-2 in favour, with four abstentions: South Africa, India, Brazil and Lebanon. Rice, who before joining the Obama administration established a reputation as an outspoken critic of the failure of the west to intervene in humanitarian crises round the world, said after the vote: "The United States is outraged that this council has utterly failed to address an urgent moral challenge and a growing threat to regional peace and security." Without naming Russia and China but making it clear they were the target of her words, she said: "Let there be no doubt: this is not about military intervention. This is not about Libya. That is a cheap ruse by those who would rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than stand with the Syrian people."

She added: "This is about whether this council, during a time of sweeping change in the Middle East, will stand with peaceful protestors crying out for freedom – or with a regime of thugs with guns that tramples human dignity and human rights. "We deeply regret that some members of the council have prevented us from taking a principled stand against the Syrian regime's brutal oppression of its people." The resolution had been weakened considerably since the original text was circulated to the 15 security council members in early August seeking to impose sanctions. The draft resolution on Tuesday only said the security council would "consider its options" in 30 days' time if Assad failed to stop the violence and seek a peaceful settlement of the crisis. It said the options would include sanctions. To further water down the resolution in an attempt to make it more acceptable to Russia and China, there was no hint of military intervention. In Homs, where government forces are routinely clashing with armed members of the opposition – many of them former soldiers who defected with their weapons – outgunned protesters are now openly seeking weapons from outside the country. "We know that we will not see Nato jets above the skies of Damascus," said one Homs resident. "It is us against them. No one else will help us." In Beirut, where aid supplies to Homs and Hama are co-ordinated, aid workers said they had been receiving more requests for weapons than for food or medicine. "Of course we can't help with this. But it shows how much their priorities have changed." http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/05/syrian-insurrection-un-resolution- assad?CMP=EMCGT_061011&

October 5, 2011 Is Israel Its Own Worst Enemy? By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF For decades, Palestinian leaders sometimes seemed to be their own people’s worst enemies. Palestinian radicals antagonized the West, and, when militant leaders turned to hijackings and rockets, they undermined the Palestinian cause around the world. They empowered Israeli settlers and hard-liners, while eviscerating Israeli doves. These days, the world has been turned upside down. Now it is Israel that is endangered most by its leaders and maximalist stance. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is isolating his country, and, to be blunt, his hard line on settlements seems like a national suicide policy. Nothing is more corrosive than Israel’s growth of settlements because they erode hope of a peace agreement in the future. Mr. Netanyahu’s latest misstep came after the Obama administration humiliated itself by making a full-court diplomatic press to block Palestinian statehood at the United Nations. At a time when President Obama had a few other things on his plate — averting a global economic meltdown, for example — the United States frittered good will by threatening to veto the Palestinian statehood that everybody claims to favor. With that diplomatic fight at the United Nations under way, Israel last week announced plans for 1,100 new housing units in a part of Jerusalem outside its pre-1967 borders. Instead of showing appreciation to President Obama, Mr. Netanyahu thumbed him in the eye. O.K., I foresee a torrent of angry responses. I realize that many insist that Jerusalem must all belong to Israel in any peace deal anyway, so new settlements there don’t count. But, if that’s your position, then you can kiss any peace deal goodbye. Every negotiator knows the framework of a peace agreement — 1967 borders with land swaps, Jerusalem as the capital of both Israeli and Palestinian states, only a token right of return — and insistence on a completely Israeli Jerusalem simply means no peace agreement ever. Former President Bill Clinton said squarely in September that Mr. Netanyahu is to blame for the failure of the Middle East peace process. A background factor, Mr. Clinton noted correctly, is the demographic and political change within Israeli society, which has made the country more conservative when it comes to border and land issues. Granted, Mr. Netanyahu is far from the only obstacle to peace. The Palestinians are divided, with Hamas controlling Gaza. And Hamas not only represses its own people but also managed to devastate the peace movement in Israel. That’s the saddest thing about the Middle East: hard-liners like Hamas empower hard-liners like Mr. Netanyahu.

We’re facing a dangerous period in the Middle East. Most Palestinians seem to feel as though the Oslo peace process has fizzled, and Israelis seem to agree, with two-thirds saying in a recent poll published in the newspaper Yediot Aharonot that there is no chance of peace with Palestinians — ever. The Palestinians’ best hope would be a major grass-roots movement of nonviolent peaceful resistance aimed at illegal West Bank settlements, led by women and inspired by the work of Mahatma Gandhi and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. A growing number of Palestinians are taking up variants of that model, although they sometimes ruin it by defining nonviolence to include stone-throwing and by giving the leading role to hotheaded young men. The Israel Defense Forces can deal with suicide bombers and rockets fired by Hezbollah. I’m not sure that they can defeat Palestinian women blocking roads to illegal settlements and willing to endure tear gas and clubbing — with videos promptly posted on YouTube. Mr. Netanyahu has also undermined Israeli security by burning bridges with Israel’s most important friend in the region, Turkey. Now there is also the risk of clashes in the Mediterranean between Israeli and Turkish naval vessels. That’s one reason Defense Secretary Leon Panetta scolded the Israeli government a few days ago for isolating itself diplomatically. So where do we go from here? If a peace deal is not forthcoming soon, and if Israel continues its occupation, then Israel should give the vote in Israeli elections to all Palestinians in the areas it controls. If Jews in the West Bank can vote, then Palestinians there should be able to as well. That’s what democracy means: people have the right to vote on the government that controls their lives. Some of my Israeli friends will think I’m unfair and harsh, applying double standards by focusing on Israeli shortcomings while paying less attention to those of other countries in the region. Fair enough: I plead guilty. I apply higher standards to a close American ally like Israel that is a huge recipient of American aid. Friends don’t let friends drive drunk — or drive a diplomatic course that leaves their nation veering away from any hope of peace. Today, Israel’s leaders sometimes seem to be that country’s worst enemies, and it’s an act of friendship to point that out. • I invite you to visit my blog, On the Ground. Please also join me on Facebook and Google+, watch my YouTube videos and follow me on Twitter. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/opinion/kristof-is-israel-its-own-worst- enemy.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

Russia, China veto Syria resolution at the United Nations By Colum Lynch, Wednesday, October 5, 3:44 AM UNITED NATIONS — Russia and China cast a rare double veto at the U.N. Security Council on Tuesday to block a U.S.- and European-backed draft resolution condemning Syria for its brutal crackdown on protesters. The veto marked a defeat after months of European-led diplomatic efforts to impose sanctions on Damascus for unleashing a violent response to the protests against President Bashar al-Assad. Syria’s U.N. ambassador, Bashar al-Jaafari, reacted to the veto with a smile and thanked the “voices of the wise” who had confronted what he characterized as colonial and military aspirations of Western powers that are “doomed to failure.” The vote triggered an angry reaction from Susan E. Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who walked out of the Security Council meeting in protest during the Syrian envoy’s statement, in which he accused the United States of being a “party to genocide” through its support of Israel on the council. The British envoy, Mark Lyall Grant, walked out some time after Rice. “The United States is outraged that this council has utterly failed to address an urgent moral challenge and a growing threat to regional peace and security,” Rice said, with unusual emotion. “Several members have sought for weeks to weaken and strip bare any text that would have defended the lives of innocent civilians from Assad’s brutality.” France’s U.N. ambassador, Gerard Araud, vowed that this “veto will not stop us” from pressing for Syria to end a crackdown that has killed nearly 3,000 people. Rice said the council’s split provided a stark illustration of which countries support the aspirations of pro-democracy demonstrators in Syria and across the Arab world. The draft garnered nine votes on the 15-member council, the minimum needed for adoption, as Brazil, India, Lebanon and South Africa expressed unease with the West’s push for sanctions by abstaining. The five permanent members each have a veto. Speaking after the vote, Russia’s U.N. envoy, Vitaly I. Churkin, and China’s U.N. ambassador, Li Boadong, expressed concern that the resolution would have served to exacerbate tensions in Syria and could have served as a pretext for possible regime change there. The clash comes weeks after the council agreed on a statement, generally considered less forceful than a resolution, condemning Syria’s conduct. The council’s European members had initially pressed for a much tougher resolution, including an arms embargo. The watered-down draft blocked by Russia and China “strongly condemns the continued grave and systematic human rights violations by the

Syrian authorities.” It accused the regime of carrying out “arbitrary executions,” torture and disappearances. The draft demanded that Syria “cease the use of force against civilians,” release political prisoners and grant other “fundamental freedoms.” If Syria failed to comply, it said, the council would have to consider “other options,” a veiled reference to sanctions. © The Washington Post Company http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russia-china-block-syria- resolution-at-un/2011/10/04/gIQArCFBML_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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In Egypt, a dreamer continues lonely protest By Leila Fadel, Wednesday, October 5, 3:28 AM CAIRO — Rasha Azb, tired and disheveled, walked up a dimly lighted, winding staircase to the three-bedroom apartment she shares with her mother, brother and sister. She quickly grabbed some clothes, ate, kissed her nieces and prepared to leave again. Azb, a 28-year-old activist, hadn’t been home in 10 days. But there was another protest to attend, and Azb felt the familiar pull — a blend of exhilaration and obligation. There is always another protest. For 18 days this winter, hundreds of thousands of Azb’s fellow Egyptians joined her in demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square that accomplished the unthinkable, forcing the ouster of the country’s autocratic leader of nearly 30 years, Hosni Mubarak. But in the months since the revolution, Azb’s struggle has gone back to what it was before the uprising: a lonely fight that few in Egypt are inclined to join against a seemingly implacable foe. The youths who once were hailed for leading the revolution as national saviors and true voices of the Arab street are now seen by many as a nuisance, clogging traffic and spoiling the economy. Even Azb’s brother tells her she’s wasting her time. And yet to Azb, the stakes remain every bit as high as they were in February, when Mubarak fell. With the military in charge and elections on the way, this is the moment when Egypt will either live up to the ideals of those who fought and died for freedom, or revert to the old ways. “Why are you silent?” she screams at passersby during demonstrations in the streets of the capital. “Do we have human rights yet?” Her call is met with shrugs, or worse. Azb is a dreamer, not a realist. She swears incessantly but is moved to tears by injustice. She screams for the end of military rule and for compensation and justice for the families of slain protesters. But when pressed on what exactly would satisfy her, she has no answer. ‘Time to come home’ In the family’s small apartment, with cracked walls and laundry hanging from the balcony, Ahmed Azb watched with resignation one recent day as his sister repacked her orange backpack in preparation for a return to Tahrir. He was worried about her but also annoyed. The protests disrupt daily life, hurting the family business — a car repair shop that brings in about $500 a month. Now that

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Mubarak is gone and on trial, Ahmed Azb doesn’t understand what more demonstrations will achieve. “Tahrir is the center of the city, and if it stops life, it’s not a good thing,” he said. “We’re going to suffer, and freedom can’t come from vandalism and destruction.” Rasha’s mother is frustrated but proud of her stubborn daughter. She doesn’t understand why her daughter won’t get married and have children, why she won’t fix her curly hair, which is always pulled into a tight bun, or exchange her uniform of jeans, a T-shirt and sneakers for a dress. She never knows whether Rasha will come home bruised or perhaps end up in jail again. “It's enough. It’s time to come home,” Sabr Azb told her daughter. “You can’t change everything.” Rasha Azb rolled her eyes. In her mind, people flowing into the streets, civil disobedience and, in some cases, rock-throwing are all necessary to force the hand of authority. “If the revolution stops now, we’ll take 100 steps back,” she said, sitting in her childhood bedroom, where the sheets are covered with cartoon hearts. “I have to keep my eyes open all the time so no one steals this revolution.” Her walls are adorned with Che Guevara portraits and posters in support of Palestinian rights. Bookcases sag under the weight of hundreds of books, and an armoire overflows with newspaper clippings that recount important events in her life of activism. Before she became involved in politics in 1997, she convinced her tradition-minded family that, although a woman, she would strike her own path in life. She stopped donning a head scarf in high school, though the rest of the women in her family wear one. Azb spends her days with other activists, many of them the children of upper-crust families who learned about socialism and injustice in college classes. She learned about those concepts in her neighborhood, where the poor don’t have the money or the government connections to right the wrongs against them. She makes fun of the elite, saying they are too soft and out of touch in a country where millions live at or below the poverty line. Azb shares her views in a column she writes for the al-Fagr independent news weekly. Her pieces are harshly critical of the nation’s military leaders; sometimes her editor tries to tone down her work. She prints fliers to publicize protests. She has thrown rocks at the country’s former security chief as he was being carted off from yet another postponed trial, where he faces charges of killing protesters. And she has spent nights in the morgue to help the family of a slain protester obtain their loved one’s body without signing papers that called the death accidental. Many Egyptians, eager for stability, treat Azb and the others disrupting traffic as a bother. She dismisses those people as members of the “party of the couch” — those who never act but reap the benefits of others’ sacrifices. “My brother is like most Egyptians. He wants to work, eat, sleep and raise his children,” she said while driving away from home in her beat-up Fiat, the side mirror dangling, the fender smashed and the interior filled with protest fliers and posters. “He thinks 102

freedom will come to his door. He doesn’t know that people are dying for that freedom.” ‘A long journey’ Rasha Azb is among those who have risked everything. During parliamentary elections in 2005, she tried to enter a polling station to monitor suspected fraud. When state security forces refused her admission and confiscated her ID card, she swore at them and threw stones — unthinkable defiance at the time. Security agents followed her, but neighborhood residents who were impressed by her bravery at the polling station protected her. “By herself she had a mini-uprising,” said her friend Diana al-Assi, recalling the episode. “She acts completely from her soul, because her mind is scared and her heart hurts.” Azb was first moved to activism in 1998, when she distributed leaflets that criticized a four-day U.S. bombing campaign against Iraq. She later organized protests condemning the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. At a 2000 protest in support of the Palestinians, Azb said, she was pushed down, punched and kicked by state security. “It was the first time I’d been beaten, and it stung. But I realized that it was a long journey and I had to stand up for myself and stand up against the authorities,” she said. Her anger, first directed at the United States and Israel, grew to include her own government. In 2006, she was swept up with dozens of others at a protest for constitutional reform and jailed for 33 days, accused of attempting to topple the government and insulting the president. When Mubarak stepped down in February, Azb ran to the streets outside the presidential palace to celebrate and cry. It was a dream realized. But in the weeks and months that followed that moment of triumph, she realized that not much had changed. On March 9, she was detained for four hours when army officers violently cleared protesters from a sit-in in central Cairo. She was taken to the nearby Egyptian Museum, handcuffed and blindfolded. She was kicked, punched and hit with the butt of a rifle, she said. “We did the revolution so this wouldn’t happen,” she said, referring to what she endured that day. “It was more painful than any beating that came before, because it showed nothing had changed.” ‘Like an unplugged grenade’ In July, when protesters reoccupied Tahrir Square and promised to remain encamped until accused Mubarak-era officials and police were tried, Azb sat with other activists in the maze of tents. They crowded around a laptop to craft a statement urging residents in poor and middle-class neighborhoods to join the sit-in. Azb wanted to write that the military was “complicit” in trying to slow down trials for Mubarak and his “gang.” “We have to be politically correct,” another young female activist told her. “We don’t want to drive people away.”

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“We have to tell the truth and pay the price,” Azb responded. Even among seasoned activists, Azb has long been willing to push further than others are willing to go. “She’s like an unplugged grenade. Sometimes it comes in handy, and sometimes it can be dangerous,” said Assi, her friend. Lately, Azb has spent time protesting outside the Israeli Embassy, demonstrating in favor of labor rights and railing against the military for what she sees as a continuing effort to co-opt the revolution. But on balance, is she having an impact? Do the dreamers have a place in the new Egypt, or did their moment pass in February? Is now the time for the realists to take charge? Maybe her protests have forced the courts to put a bedridden Mubarak on trial. Maybe they’ve kept the heat on a military council that would otherwise run roughshod over individual rights. Maybe they’ve helped to ensure that the parliamentary elections due this year are held in a reasonably fair and open manner. To Khallad Abu Zeid, the protesters are certainly having an impact on Egypt, and it’s not a good one. “There’s no stability and no investors. They’re scared to get into anything,” said the contractor and architect. The activists who want to continue to push for change, he said, are “bad for business.” The military appears to have come to the same conclusion. Last month, protesters broke into the Israeli Embassy, ransacked part of the building and forced the staff to flee. (Azb participated in the protest but said she was not involved in storming the building.) Soon after, the ruling military council opted to expand its powers under emergency law — a key Mubarak-era tool for suppressing dissent. Even before that, troops had dismantled the tents in Tahrir Square, beaten protesters and forced them out. Police armed with batons and shields now work in shifts to make sure that no one returns to the square. Azb has had to continue her battle elsewhere, but she’s unbowed. “The dream is the only real weapon,” she said. “The dream itself is the only thing capable of changing the path of the people.” Special correspondents Sulafeh Al Shami and Ingy Hassieb contributed to this report. © The Washington Post Company http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/in-egypt-a-dreamer-continues- lonely-protest/2011/08/10/gIQATzF9LL_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syrian regime Anger from Europe and US as two security council powers argue implied threat of sanctions will not bring peace Associated Press guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 5 October 2011 04.16 BST

Russia and China have vetoed a European-backed UN security council resolution that threatened sanctions against the Syrian regime if it did not immediately halt its military crackdown against civilians. The resolution would have been the first such legally binding move adopted by the security council since President Bashar Assad's military began using tanks and soldiers against protesters in mid-March. The UN estimates there have been more than 2,700 deaths. The European sponsors of the resolution had tried to avoid a veto by watering down the language on sanctions three times, to the point where the word "sanctions" was taken out. The eventual vote was 9-2 with four abstentions: India, South Africa, Brazil and Lebanon. It is the first double veto by Russia and China since July 2008 when they rejected proposed sanctions against Zimbabwe. In January 2007 they both vetoed a resolution against the Burmese regime. Russia's UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, told the council after the vote that his country did not support the Assad regime or the violence but opposed the resolution because it was "based on a philosophy of confrontation", contained "an ultimatum of sanctions" and was against a peaceful settlement. He complained that the resolution did not call for the Syrian opposition to disociate itself from "extremists" and enter into dialogue. China's ambassador, Li Bandong, said his country was concerned about the violence and wanted reforms but opposed the resolution because "sanctions, or threat of sanctions, do not help the situation in Syria but rather complicates the situation". France's UN ambassador, Gerard Araud, called the veto "a rejection of the extraordinary movement in support of freedom and democracy that is the Arab spring" and commended "all of those who fight against the bloodthirsty crackdown in Syria". Britain's UN ambassador, Mark Lyall Grant, said the veto "will be a great disappointment to the people of Syria and the wider region that some members of

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this council could not show their support for their struggle for basic human rights". "By blocking this resolution, the onus is now on those countries to step up their efforts and persuade the Syrian government to end the violence and pursue genuine reform," he said. The US ambassador, Susan Rice, said: "The courageous people of Syria can now clearly see who on this council supports their yearning for liberty and human rights, and who does not." "Those who oppose this resolution and give cover to a brutal regime will have to answer to the Syrian people – and, indeed, to people across the region who are pursuing the same universal aspirations. The crisis in Syria will stay before the security council and we will not rest until this council rises to meet its responsibilities." Rice accused Russia and China of wanting to sell arms to the Syrian regime rather than stand with the Syrian people – an accusation vehemently denied by Russia. From the outset of the Syrian uprising, the council has been split. Western members, backed by some African and Latin American nations, demanded an end to violence, and when it was not heeded they pushed for security council action, including the threat of sanctions. On the other side Russia and China, along with Brazil, India and South Africa, pressed for more time for the Assad government to implement reforms and for political dialogue with the opposition. It took four months of arguments between supporters and opponents of Assad's regime for the security council to issue a presidential statement in August condemning the escalating violence. Britain, France, Germany and Portugal, backed by the US, then pressed for a council resolution calling for an immediate arms embargo and other sanctions. But Russia, China, India, South Africa and Brazil have argued the UN resolution authorising the use of force to protect civilians in Libya was misused by Nato to justify months of air strikes against Muammar Gaddafi's regime. They expressed fear a new resolution might be used as a pretext for armed intervention in Syria. The final watered-down document called for Syria to end all violence, respect rights and freedoms, and let in the media and human rights investigators – or, after 30 days, the security council will "consider its options, including measures under article 41 of the charter of the United Nations". Article 41 authorises the council to impose non-military measures such as economic and diplomatic sanctions. The defeated draft strongly condemned "the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian

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authorities" and called on all states "to exercise vigilance and restraint" in supplying weapons to Syria. Syria's UN ambassador, Bashar Ja'afari, the last speaker after the vote, criticised "the prejudice in certain western capitals against our country" and insisted a comprehensive package of pro-democracy reforms was being implemented by the government. Without naming the US, Ja'afari said it had used its security council veto 50 times since 1945 to protect Israel and deny the Palestinians their rights. Therefore, he said, it could be considered a party to "genocide, as this language is tantamount to turning a blind eye and supporting the Israeli massacres in occupied Arab lands." As he spoke, US diplomats, led by Rice, walked out of the council chamber. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/05/russia-china-veto-syria- resolution?CMP=EMCGT_051011&

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10/03/2011 12:01 PM A Libyan Massacre 'Loud Marching Music Drowned Out the Inferno' In 1996, guards at Moammar Gadhafi's notorious prison Abu Salim near Tripoli massacred more than 1,200 inmates. Survivor Jumaa al-Shalmani told SPIEGEL about the horrific events. Jumaa al-Shalmani, 47, was a political prisoner for 15 years in former Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi's Abu Salim prison, which was notorious for torture. He survived a massacre there in 1996. Shalmani describes his memories to SPIEGEL editor Volkhard Windfuhr, who met him in Benghazi, Libya .

Finally I can tell my story, after 15 years of painful silence, out of fear of the Gadhafi regime. I was one of 14 prisoners who survived the massacre in which exactly 1,206 of my fellow prisoners died in late June 1996. Gadhafi's men shot me and turned me into a cripple. The events were burned deeply into my memory. We ate almost nothing for three days. The guards humiliated us every day. They wouldn't let us sleep, and they beat us, spat at us and urinated on us. On that Thursday, June 27, 1996, one of them ventured into our cellblock by himself. The prisoners' rage exploded and half a dozen men jumped on him. I was just able to prevent them from killing him. They gagged him and locked him into a dark cell that stank of feces and decay. Search teams combed the cells, but they couldn't find the guard. Then six prisoners were tortured to death and their bodies were thrown into the corridor. There were more attacks on the Friday. And more dead. I spent almost the entire day in my cell. The guards still hadn't found their colleague. It was clear to me that they would exact horrible revenge. I prayed to Allah and begged for mercy. 'A Hand Grenade Exploded' On the Saturday, the loudspeakers blared at 6 a.m., ordering us to appear for roll call. That had never happened before. They had found the guard. Dead. Armed men shouted at us: "Out to the yard!" One of them kicked me in the genitals. I doubled over in pain. I stumbled, confused, through the hallways and out into the yard. A hand grenade exploded less than 15 meters in front of me and to the right. There was blood everywhere. For a moment I thought: This is the prison revolt we've been waiting for. But then I noticed that the grenades were coming from above. There were armed men standing on the prison wall. There must have been more than 100. They shouted "Allah, kill the dogs" and shot into the crowd. Loud marching music drowned out the inferno. A bullet hit me in the heel. While I mustered the last of my strength to crawl into a corridor, the massacre continued. I lost consciousness. When I woke up I was lying on a stretcher. A guard pushed me into an ambulance. He wasn't one of the sadists. He told me to pretend I was dead. Most of the ambulances were just carrying corpses on that day.

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I met 13 other survivors at the hospital. We were told to swear that we would never say anything about the mass murder, or they would kill our families. I was released in 2006, but this is the first time I have been able to talk about this. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,789633,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: Libya's Abu Salim Prison http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-73565.html • 'Only the Poor Are Left': Civilians Abandon Sirte ahead of Rebel Onslaught (10/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,789626,00.html • Return of the Islamists: A Questionable Form of Freedom for North Africa (09/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788397,00.html • Justice and Revenge in Tripoli: Libyans Struggle Along Path Toward Reconciliation (09/13/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785839,00.html

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Middle East

October 2, 2011 In Egypt, Concessions by Military on Politics By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK CAIRO — Egypt’s interim military rulers have apparently agreed to allow foreign election observers and to let political parties take a greater role in creating a permanent government. The concessions come as the military rulers seek to shore up public support, amid mounting criticism that their management of the transition has been opaque and inconsistent. Top military officers signed the agreement over the weekend with leaders of about a dozen political parties, including at least two Islamist groups — one founded by the Muslim Brotherhood and another by Muslim traditionalists known as Salafis. Among other things, the agreement sets out a transition timetable that could put off the election of the next Egyptian president until 2013 or later. Last week, the military said elections for a new Parliament would be held in stages beginning in late November and ending in early 2012. “No later than the first week of April 2012,” the agreement said, the Parliament’s two chambers will choose a panel to draft a new Constitution, a process that is likely to take at least a year. Most analysts here expect the new Constitution to lean toward a strong Parliament and perhaps a prime minister, with a relatively weak president. “Doors will be then open for the registering of presidential candidates in the next day after approving the new Constitution,” the agreement said, implying an election date in late 2013 or 2014. In the weekend agreement’s most concrete concession, the military rulers appeared to reverse themselves on foreign election monitors. Military officers had said over the summer that they would be barred as an intrusion on Egyptian sovereignty. Several people who have talked to military officials said that the officers objected to election “monitors” because they believed the word denoted supervision or control, but that “observers” from nongovernment organizations would be welcome. The most far-reaching part of the weekend agreement may be the guiding principles it sets down for drafting the Constitution, a political flashpoint here. Liberals have proposed a binding preconstitutional bill of rights to prevent a potential Islamist majority from limiting individual freedom in the name of religious morality. Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, object to that idea as undemocratic. Others, meanwhile, say they worry that the military will build in a role for itself as a guarantor of a secular state.

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The weekend agreement appears to prevent the military from setting ground rules unilaterally or defining its own role. It provides for “agreement on a set of principles to be adopted by all the signatory parties when drafting the new Constitution,” and adds, “Those principles are to be considered an informal code of ethics endorsed by the parties.” Mustafa al-Naggar, one of the political leaders involved in the weekend meeting, called the principles “a bill of honor” and said in a note on his Facebook page that “everyone will commit to abide by it after the elections, during the choice of the Constitution- drafting committee and the drafting of the Constitution.” The agreement provides for two-thirds of the seats in Parliament to be filled by party lists through proportional representation, and one-third by individual candidates elected in head-to-head races. Candidates on party lists could run individually as well. The agreement includes an endorsement for the embattled military leaders, saying that the signers “have declared their full support of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ decisions and appreciate the efforts made by the military for a safe and sound transition of power.” On Friday, thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square on the day that the military had once called a deadline for the handover of power to civilian rule, a reminder of how taking control of the country has worn away the military’s popularity since it forced President Hosni Mubarak from power eight months ago. Political activists denounced the dozen parties who signed the agreement. Heba Afify contributed reporting. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/world/middleeast/military-gives-ground-on- politics-in-egypt.html?ref=world

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Syrian dissidents form council, hope to win greater international support By Liz Sly, Monday, October 3, 3:55 AM CAIRO — Syrian dissidents meeting in Istanbul on Sunday announced the formation of a council uniting most of their country’s fractious opposition groups, a step that activists hailed as a potential breakthrough in the months-long standoff between a largely leaderless protest movement and the government of President Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian National Council aims to represent the opposition in dealings with the international community and to offer an alternative to Assad, something that has been lacking since ordinary Syrians began swarming the streets in March to stage anti- government demonstrations. At a time when protesters in some areas are increasingly resorting to weapons, activists said they hoped that the creation of a unified opposition body would breathe fresh life into the protests and encourage international support for an uprising whose complexities have deterred significant action by world powers. What form that support should take is one issue on which there is still no consensus, with many protesters inside Syria increasingly calling for NATO intervention and many exiled dissidents remaining adamantly opposed to foreign intercession. But many activists said they are relieved that the Syrian opposition can now claim a semblance of unity after months of bickering and numerous false starts. Syrians nationwide took to the streets to proclaim support for the council. “Finally, after 40 years of oppression and six months of bloodshed, we have a united opposition,” said Yaser Tabbara, a Syrian American lawyer who is a member of the council and helped organize the effort. “The international community has been waiting awhile for an alternative to the Assad regime and a body it can negotiate with and talk to. This is it.” The announcement was made by the Paris-based academic Burhan Ghalioun, a rising star in the opposition movement who enjoys widespread support among youth activists in Syria in part because of his secularism and his perceived political independence. The council aims to “achieve the goals of the revolution to topple the regime, including all of its components and leadership, and to replace it with a democratic pluralistic regime,” he said in a statement read to journalists. It will not, council members stressed, attempt to duplicate the role of the Libyan Transitional National Council, which was swiftly formed as an alternative government in the weeks after the Libyan revolt began. The Syrian council will serve as a form of parliament to debate and formulate opposition policy, with an inner council of seven members, yet to be chosen, rotating the presidency among themselves, they said.

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A representative council Western diplomats have frequently identified the lack of a unified opposition movement as one of the Syrian uprising’s biggest obstacles. Without a coherent opposition or any clear sense of who or what would replace Assad, world powers and many ordinary Syrians have been reluctant to throw their weight behind efforts to unseat him, fearful of a power vacuum in the strategically located nation. Several previous efforts to form such a body had faltered on disagreements between Islamists and secularists, expatriate figures and street protesters inside Syria, elderly dissidents and the youth activists who have provided what little leadership exists in this mostly spontaneous revolt. But the newly formed council appears to have brought together representatives of most of the diverse assortment of groups that have emerged to challenge the Assad government. Included in the 190-member council are members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the traditional dissidents known collectively as the Damascus Declaration and the three main groups representing protesters inside Syria — the Local Coordination Committees, the Syrian Revolution General Commission and the Supreme Council of the Syrian Revolution. Roughly half of the members come from inside Syria, and members of the Kurdish, Christian and Alawite minorities are also represented. “This is the real deal,” said Shakeeb al-Jabri, an activist in Beirut who refrained from supporting previous iterations of an opposition council because they were not sufficiently representative of the youthful revolutionaries inside Syria. “I'm optimistic because finally we have a comprehensive council that we can say legitimately represents the revolution. This will reinvigorate the protesters and give us a voice with the international community.” Rift emerges on way forward Whether the council will succeed in finding a unified voice is in question, however. There is no consensus on the increasingly contentious questions of whether the protest movement should acquire arms or whether it should call for foreign military intervention along the lines of the NATO mission that helped topple the Libyan regime. The statement read by Ghalioun called for the continuation of “peaceful” resistance to Assad and rejected foreign intervention, though he urged the United Nations to do more to protect Syrian civilians. But a sharp divide is emerging between protesters inside Syria, who are increasingly calling for NATO intervention as the government presses ahead with its military offensive against them, and those living abroad, who still hope that nonviolent resistance will eventually succeed in toppling the regime. “The situation is deteriorating rapidly on the ground. It’s a war, and the people inside are calling for all the help they can get,” said Radwan Ziadeh, a Washington-based dissident who is on the council. He said he thinks a majority of Syrian dissidents now support military intervention, but he foresees bitter wrangling within the council. “Some are lobbying for it, and some are against it, but those against it are very few,” he said. “This will be the most difficult decision for the council to take,” he said. ‘We really feel we are alone’ 113

The announcement of the council came a day after the Syrian government declared it had crushed resistance in yet another town, Rastan, which had become a center for defecting soldiers seeking to organize an armed rebellion against the government in the name of the Free Syrian Army. Rami Abdelrahman of the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said 17 people were killed in the five-day offensive. In Homs, a central city near Rastan where violent confrontations have been escalating, activists said they welcomed the formation of the council, but on the condition that it presses for greater international intervention. “The Syrian National Council is a very good step, but we need more movement from the international community,” said an activist contacted by Skype who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he fears for his safety. “We really feel we are alone. We feel no one is helping us. And after all the bloodshed we have seen, we want any kind of help.” © The Washington Post Company http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syrian-dissidents-form-council- hope-to-win-greater-international- support/2011/10/02/giqamswrgl_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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The dilemma of liberal discourse in Egypt Author: Nadine Abdalla Publishing Date: Sun, 02/10/2011 - 14:43

The passage of time seems to reinforce the belief that liberal powers that are pushing for the establishment of a civil state remain unable to reach out to ordinary Egyptians. This is a serious problem that threatens to undermine the future of the Egyptian Bloc, a liberal political coalition, and its ability to to achieve satisfactory results in the upcoming elections. On the ground we are faced by a paradox: Even though the vast majority of Egyptians who refrain from political participation support the establishment of a civil state, they categorically reject liberal discourse. Why is that? The problem lies in the fact that liberals have failed to formulate a fresh vision for a “conservative liberal” discourse that reconciles their call for a civil state with the values of Egyptian society. Egyptians will not lend an ear to any discourse that warns them against the perils of the religious state and sings the praises of the civil state. Rather, they want to be reassured that their religion will remain untouched and their values upheld. Instead, liberal powers have adopted an arrogant discourse, forgetting that success requires gradual change that can push the society forward in baby steps. Proposing sweeping change to the values of the society will only serve to squish liberal forces into the margins of the society. Perhaps the success of the moderately liberal Wafd Party in the 1990s provides the best model path. Furthermore, liberals are unable to formulate a discourse that reflects the national identity of Egyptians. The discourse of Egyptian liberals mimics that of Western liberalism, which grants broad personal freedoms to individuals. Egyptians, though, would be more receptive to a non-Western version of liberalism that recognizes the uniqueness of their culture. Liberal values that organize the relationship between the state and religion and call for the respect of the other are not foreign to Egyptians, in fact, Egyptians instinctively live by those values. They only hope someone will envisage a moderate liberal vision that is more expressive of their society. Liberal discourse also does not seem to be able to link its calls for a civil state to a better standard of living or social justice, both of which concern the majority of people. Democracy that does not lead to a better life does not merit its own defense. The inability of liberals to communicate with Egyptians, combined with Egyptians' fear of their aspired civil state, has thrust liberals into lost battles -

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such as calling for drafting the constitution before elections – that have sought to achieve quick victories to reassure themselves that their liberal vision will be protected. A civil society will make way for a civil state - not the other way around. The ability of these liberal forces to formulate a new discourse that appeals to an audience that has largely abstained from political engagement will be key to determining their future impact on the Egyptian state. Source URL (retrieved on 11/10/2011 - 14:38): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/501253

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October 1, 2011 Key Syrian City Takes On the Tone of a Civil War By ANTHONY SHADID This article was reported by a correspondent for The New York Times in Homs, Syria, and written by Anthony Shadid in Beirut, Lebanon. HOMS, Syria — The semblance of a civil war has erupted in Homs, Syria’s third- largest city, where armed protesters now call themselves revolutionaries, gun battles erupt as often as every few hours, security forces and opponents carry out assassinations, and rifles costing as much as $2,000 apiece flood the city from abroad, residents say. Since the start of the uprising in March, Homs has stood as one of Syria’s most contested cities, its youth among the best organized and most tenacious. But across the political spectrum, residents speak of a decisive shift in past weeks, as a largely peaceful uprising gives way to a grinding struggle that has made Homs violent, fearful and determined. Analysts caution that the strife in Homs is still specific to the city itself, and many in the opposition reject violence because they fear it will serve as a pretext for the government’s brutal crackdown. But in the targeted killings, the rival security checkpoints and the hardening of sectarian sentiments, the city offers a dark vision that could foretell the future of Syria’s uprising as both the government and the opposition ready themselves for a protracted struggle over the endurance of a four-decade dictatorship. “We are done with the protesting phase,” said a 21-year-old engineering student here who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. “We’ve now entered a more important phase.” Homs is a microcosm of Syria, with a Sunni Muslim majority and minorities of Christians and Alawites, a heterodox Muslim sect from which President Bashar al- Assad draws much of his leadership. Six months of protests and crackdown here have frayed ties among those communities, forging the conditions for urban strife. An armed opposition is battling security forces in the most restive neighborhoods. Insurgents have tried to protect the same peaceful protesters the government has relentlessly sought to arrest. Tension has grown so dire that members of one sect are reluctant to travel to neighborhoods populated by other sects. Men in some parts of the city openly carry weapons. Perhaps the most dramatic facet of the struggle is a series of assassinations this past week that have left nearly a dozen professors, doctors and informers dead in a paroxysm of violence that echoes the sectarian vendettas still besetting Iraq. Unlike the uprising’s 117

early days, when the government exercised a near monopoly on violence, fear is beginning to spread in the other direction, as insurgents kill government supporters and informers, residents say. One of those killed was Dr. Hassan Eid, the chief of thoracic surgery at the National Hospital here and an Alawite from Al Zuhra, one of a handful of neighborhoods where his sect makes up a majority and where buildings and streets are still plastered with the portraits of Mr. Assad. He was shot to death in front of his house as he headed off to work, residents said. Al Ouruba, a government-aligned newspaper, called him a “symbol of dedication” and said he treated victims of the violence “without discriminating between any of them.” But in Sunni Muslim locales, residents called him a government informer who helped security forces detain the wounded who were treated at his facility. By nightfall, a hint of triumphalism echoed in parts of the city, as some people celebrated his death. “He was responsible for the death of many young men,” said a 65-year-old resident of Homs, who gave his name as Rajab. “He was killed because he deserved it.” Soon after dawn the next day, gunfire erupted as children went to school. “They shot Abu Ali,” an old man who collects garbage and cleans the streets in the neighborhood said a short time later. Abu Ali, the name most knew him by, was another informant, the residents said. “The guys were aware of him a long time ago,” said an activist in his late 40s who gave his name as Abu Ghali. “But now it’s different. He kept reporting, so they had to kill him. I don’t think he died right away though.” Abu Ghali added that it was not difficult to get information on informers. “You can do anything with money,” he said. “You just bribe an officer, and be generous with him, and you can get all you want.” The killings took place during two bloody days in Homs, a city along the Orontes River and not too far from the historic medieval castle Krak des Chevaliers. Residents said that after Abu Ali died, three Alawite teachers were killed at a school in the neighborhood of Baba Amr. (Government newspapers did not confirm those deaths.) In the afternoon, Mohammed Ali Akil, an assistant dean at Al Baath University in Homs, was found dead in his car on a highway. Students said he had shown support for the uprising and criticized Mr. Assad’s leadership in his lectures. “It is true that we were scared during your lectures, but you were a wonderful professor,” a student posted on Facebook. “May you rest in peace. We won’t forget you.” Near the Lebanese border — where residents say weapons flow across a porous border from Turkey, Saudi Arabia and even Qatar — Homs strikes an odd posture. Many of its Sunni residents are at once fearful and proud, empowered by their opposition to dictatorship. Many Alawites are terrified; they are often the victims of the most vulgar stereotypes and, in popular conversation, uniformly associated with the leadership. In Alawite villages, only government television is watched. To do so in Sunni neighborhoods amounts to treason. There, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya are the stations of

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choice. Suspicions give currency to the wildest of rumors; in one, a female butcher in Homs named Um Khaled asks the armed gangs to bring her the bodies of Alawites they capture so that she can cut them up and market the meat to her customers. Centuries-old connections between sects still knit together the city, even as the suggestion of civil war threatens to sever them forever. The countryside, residents say, is roiled by far more sectarian hatred. Government checkpoints separate Sunni from Alawite. “One side kills an Alawite, the other kills a Sunni,” a 46-year-old activist said. The uprising’s overall toll has been grim: By the United Nations’ count, more than 2,700 people have died. The revolt still draws much of its strength from the countryside, and the two largest cities, Aleppo and Damascus, remain relatively quiescent. Though protests have flagged lately, Homs has stayed defiant. Armed men often protect the perimeter of protests in places like Bab al-Sbaa, Khaldiya and Baba Amr, where some stores are shut and buildings are scarred by broken windows and bullet holes. Some of them have carried out the assassinations of informers, or “awayniyeh,” as they call them. Others scout government checkpoints and occasionally set up their own, temporary versions. “They have rocket-propelled grenades and Kalashnikovs,” said a driver in his late 50s who lives in the neighborhood of Khaldiya. “They should be armed,” he added. “They protect us.” A woman who gave her name as Suleima lives on Al Joura Street in Baba Amr. She earns a living by preparing kibbe, a dish of minced meat with cracked wheat, for wealthier clients in other neighborhoods of Homs. For three days, gunfire kept her inside her house and telephones were down. “You never know when they will start shooting again,” she said. Angry and exhausted, she professed neutrality in a conflict that makes such a notion ever more difficult. “Neighbors accuse me of being with the regime, so I laugh,” she said at her house, which she shares with her daughter. “What on earth did this regime give me? Absolutely nothing. But neither did the revolutionaries. I work, I eat. If I don’t work, I starve. At least I worked before. Now I’m at home, hardly leaving it, and hardly making a living.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/middleeast/homs-syria-spirals-down- toward-civil-war.html?hp

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- Opinion October 1, 2011

The Bankers and the Revolutionaries By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF AFTER flying around the world this year to cover street protests from Cairo to Morocco, reporting on the latest “uprising” was easier: I took the subway. The “Occupy Wall Street” movement has taken over a park in Manhattan’s financial district and turned it into a revolutionary camp. Hundreds of young people chant slogans against “banksters” or corporate tycoons. Occasionally, a few even pull off their clothes, which always draws news cameras. “Occupy Wall Street” was initially treated as a joke, but after a couple of weeks it’s gaining traction. The crowds are still tiny by protest standards — mostly in the hundreds, swelling during periodic marches — but similar occupations are bubbling up in Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Washington. David Paterson, the former New York governor, dropped by, and labor unions are lending increasing support. I tweeted that the protest reminded me a bit of Tahrir Square in Cairo, and that raised eyebrows. True, no bullets are whizzing around, and the movement won’t unseat any dictators. But there is the same cohort of alienated young people, and the same savvy use of Twitter and other social media to recruit more participants. Most of all, there’s a similar tide of youthful frustration with a political and economic system that protesters regard as broken, corrupt, unresponsive and unaccountable. “This was absolutely inspired by Tahrir Square, by the Arab Spring movement,” said Tyler Combelic, 27, a Web designer from Brooklyn who is a spokesman for the occupiers. “Enough is enough!” The protesters are dazzling in their Internet skills, and impressive in their organization. The square is divided into a reception area, a media zone, a medical clinic, a library and a cafeteria. The protesters’ Web site includes links allowing supporters anywhere in the world to go online and order pizzas (vegan preferred) from a local pizzeria that delivers them to the square. In a tribute to the ingenuity of capitalism, the pizzeria quickly added a new item to its menu: the “OccuPie special.” Where the movement falters is in its demands: It doesn’t really have any. The participants pursue causes that are sometimes quixotic — like the protester who calls for removing Andrew Jackson from the $20 bill because of his brutality to American Indians. So let me try to help. I don’t share the antimarket sentiments of many of the protesters. Banks are invaluable institutions that, when functioning properly, move capital to its best

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use and raise living standards. But it’s also true that soaring leverage not only nurtured soaring bank profits in good years, but also soaring risks for the public in bad years. In effect, the banks socialized risk and privatized profits. Securitizing mortgages, for example, made many bankers wealthy while ultimately leaving governments indebted and citizens homeless. We’ve seen that inadequately regulated, too-big-to-fail banks can undermine the public interest rather than serve it — and in the last few years, banks got away with murder. It’s infuriating to see bankers who were rescued by taxpayers now moan about regulations intended to prevent the next bail-out. And it’s important that protesters spotlight rising inequality: does it feel right to anyone that the top 1 percent of Americans now possess a greater collective net worth than the entire bottom 90 percent? So for those who want to channel their amorphous frustration into practical demands, here are several specific suggestions: ¶Impose a financial transactions tax. This would be a modest tax on financial trades, modeled on the suggestions of James Tobin, an American economist who won a Nobel Prize. The aim is in part to dampen speculative trading that creates dangerous volatility. Europe is moving toward a financial transactions tax, but the Obama administration is resisting — a reflection of its deference to Wall Street. ¶Close the “carried interest” and “founders’ stock” loopholes, which may be the most unconscionable tax breaks in America. They allow our wealthiest citizens to pay very low tax rates by pretending that their labor compensation is a capital gain. ¶Protect big banks from themselves. This means moving ahead with Basel III capital requirements and adopting the Volcker Rule to limit banks’ ability to engage in risky and speculative investments. Another sensible proposal, embraced by President Obama and a number of international experts, is the bank tax. This could be based on an institution’s size and leverage, so that bankers could pay for their cleanups — the finance equivalent of a pollution tax. Much of the sloganeering at “Occupy Wall Street” is pretty silly — but so is the self-righteous sloganeering of Wall Street itself. And if a ragtag band of youthful protesters can help bring a dose of accountability and equity to our financial system, more power to them. I invite you to comment on this column on my blog, On the Ground. Please also join me on Facebook and Google+, watch my YouTube videos and follow me on Twitter. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/opinion/sunday/kristof-the-bankers-and-the- revolutionaries.html?src=ISMR_AP_LO_MST_FB WAR.HTM

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L Jason Polan

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Internacional LA PRIMAVERA ÁRABE La revolución árabe se estrella en Yemen El presidente Saleh se aferra al poder mientras apoya a Washington contra Al Qaeda. Los jóvenes temen una guerra civil tras ocho meses de protestas Saleh advierte de una guerra civil en Yemen si él abandona el poder Ángeles Espinosa Saná 1 OCT 2011 - 19:41 CET7

La amenaza de una guerra civil se cierne sobre Yemen / Khaled Abdullah (REUTERS) El corazón de Saná, como el de Yemen, está dividido. A un lado de la calle Al Zubeiri, el principal eje comercial de la capital, se encuentran los soldados de la Guardia Republicana, a las órdenes del hijo del presidente. Al otro, los de la Primera División Acorazada, que se pasaron a la revolución junto a su jefe, el general Ali Mohsen. Pero las tablas son solo aparentes. Ocho meses después de que se iniciara el movimiento popular contra Ali Abdalá Saleh, el astuto mandatario ha logrado capear el temporal y hay signos de que se está consolidando tanto política como militarmente. “No, no es cierto que el presidente esté ganando la partida”, protesta Ayub Abdalá, un estudiante de Comercio de 21 años, en el terreno liberado en el que se ha convertido la acampada por el cambio. Ayub, que duerme en su casa pero viene todos los días, se muestra convencido de que más pronto o más tarde “la revolución”, como los yemeníes llaman a la protesta popular, “va a conseguir su objetivo”. Igual que él, varios miles de entusiastas mantienen viva a diario la llama del descontento, que los viernes moviliza a centenares de miles. Y sin embargo, las dos últimas semanas han sido descorazonadoras. El intento de los activistas de extender su protesta más allá del puñado de calles que ocupan en los aledaños de la Universidad de Saná, al oeste de la ciudad, se topó con una

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brutal respuesta de las tropas leales al régimen (muy superiores en potencia de fuego) y dejó 83 muertos. Durante los días siguientes, esa cifra se duplicó. Cuando parecía a punto de estallar una guerra civil, el repentino regreso de Saleh desde Arabia Saudí cambió la ecuación. El presidente, que permanecía en el país vecino desde el atentado que casi le cuesta la vida el 3 de junio, rompió un pacto no escrito con los mediadores internacionales. EE UU, la UE y el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG) esperaban que su estancia en Riad facilitara una transición pacífica del poder según un plan preparado antes del ataque, que él mismo aceptó y luego se negó a firmar. Incluso ahora asegura que está de acuerdo con el proyecto y que quiere irse, pero a renglón seguido añade condiciones imposibles. La última, que se retiren de la calle las fuerzas de sus dos principales rivales políticos y personales, las tropas del general Ali Mohsen y la milicia del jeque tribal Hamid al Ahmar. "El presidente no está ganando la partida", protesta un estudiante en Saná “Son tácticas dilatorias. No se quiere ir”, concluye un embajador europeo que en abril puso todas sus esperanzas en la hoja de ruta apadrinada por el CCG. “Es hora de alcanzar una solución”, aseguraba por su parte el enviado especial de la ONU, Jamal Benomar, el viernes por la noche, horas antes de abandonar Saná con las manos vacías.

Manifestación antigubernamental en Saná el pasado 11 de julio / Khaled Abdullah (REUTERS) Tanto Benomar como los diplomáticos extranjeros temen que el encastillamiento de Saleh precipite la temida guerra civil. Sin embargo, el presidente se mueve como pez en el agua en situaciones de crisis. Por un lado, trata de convencer a EE UU de que es imprescindible en la lucha contra Al Qaeda y que sin él, Yemen se sumirá en el caos. “No parece una casualidad que hayan matado ahora a el Aulaki”, apunta un activista, convencido de que el mandatario trata de anotarse puntos ante Washington. Por otro, Saleh intenta explotar las divisiones de la oposición, un conjunto de grupos variopintos, con intereses opuestos, y que solo comparten el deseo de desbancarle del poder. De hecho, tanto entre los opositores como entre los miembros del régimen hay partidarios y contrarios al plan para una transición pacífica. Mientras que el vicepresidente, el ministro de Exteriores y uno de los principales asesores de Saleh son favorables a que firme y se retire de la vida política, el general Ali Mohsen y el jeque Hamid no tienen demasiado interés en un acuerdo del que no sacan beneficio. 124

Para algunos activistas, esos dirigentes, que representan los poderes tradicionales del Ejército y la tribu, han secuestrado su protesta. “Están retrasando el triunfo de la revolución”, lamenta Rana Jarhum sin perder la esperanza. Ante la fuerza de las armas, pesa poco el apoyo de los desprestigiados partidos políticos a la solución dialogada que también prefieren los jóvenes. “El día de los 83 muertos, los soldados de Ali Mohsen dieron un pretexto a las fuerzas de Saleh para atacarnos. Al final, perdimos el terreno conquistado y pagamos por sus errores”, se queja Mohamed al Usta. “Si no fuera por Ali Mohsen, no estaríamos aquí”, le recuerda Mohamed Shoufan, en referencia a la protección que el general disidente ofrece a los manifestantes. "No es casualidad que hayan matado ahora a El Aulaki", alega un activista En lo que todos están de acuerdo es que no quieren a otro rojo en el poder, en referencia al significado en árabe de Ahmar, el nombre de la tribu a la que pertenecen tanto el presidente como el general Ali Mohsen y el jeque Hamid. Por ahora, no parece cercano el día en que vayan a conseguirlo. HTTP://INTERNACIONAL.ELPAIS.COM/INTERNACIONAL/2011/10/01/ACTUAL IDAD/1317490863_463981.HTML

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WAR AND PEACE ¿Palestina ganó? Shlomo Ben-Ami 2011-09-30

TEL AVIV – El espectáculo sombrío del aislamiento de Israel durante el debate de las Naciones Unidas sobre la condición de estado palestina marca el tsunami político que los críticos del primer ministro Benjamin Netanyahu advirtieron podría llegar si Israel no proponía una iniciativa de paz audaz. Pero, más importante aún, los discursos en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas pronunciados por los dos rivales, Netanyahu y el presidente palestino, Mahmoud Abbas, demostraron que cualquier iniciativa para volver a llevar a las partes a la mesa de negociaciones podría resultar inútil. Los discursos no conducen a la paz, pero pueden estropear sus perspectivas. Tanto Netanyahu como Abbas volvieron a demostrar de qué manera la política que rodea "el proceso de paz" se impuso a la causa de la paz. Ambos líderes exhibieron una indiferencia absoluta por las principales preocupaciones del otro, y complacieron a sus potenciales electores -entre ellos Hamas y los colonos israelíes-, dejando en claro, urbi et orbi, que las brechas que separan sus posturas son tan insalvables como siempre. Netanyahu en ningún momento admitió los pecados de la ocupación, ni siquiera supo manifestar una mínima expresión de empatía con la tragedia palestina de despojo y dispersión. La marcha de la locura israelí que implica la expansión de sus asentamientos en Cisjordania no mereció ni un atisbo de introspección de su parte. Por cierto, el llamado a la paz de Netanyahu seguirá siendo hueco mientras él siga considerando que la solución a las legítimas preocupaciones de Israel por la seguridad requiere una ocupación continua de porciones considerables del futuro estado palestino. El Valle del Jordán y las colinas de Judea y Samaria son, sin duda, activos estratégicos para un país que mide de ancho lo mismo que una avenida de Manhattan de largo. Sin embargo, la desmilitarización, el despliegue de fuerzas internacionales y acuerdos de seguridad rígidos podrían ofrecer una respuesta. Ya no se puede considerar las preocupaciones por la seguridad como una licencia para la expansión territorial. Ansioso por ofrecer sus lecciones de historia elementales, Netanyahu se niega a admitir la validez de una perspectiva clave. En lugar de interpretar la victoria de Israel en la Guerra de los Seis Días de 1967 como un permiso para anexar territorio, ese triunfo debería ser visto como un hito que hiciera posible la paz con todo el mundo árabe si Israel renunciara a las tierras árabes ocupadas. Este principio fue estipulado por la iniciativa de paz árabe de 2002, y se tuvo en cuenta previamente en la paz de Israel con Egipto y Jordania.

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De modo que todo aquel que aspire a ayudar a las partes a llegar a un acuerdo necesita considerar el hecho de que las fronteras territoriales son sólo un aspecto de este conflicto -y no necesariamente el más contencioso-. A diferencia de la paz de Israel con Egipto (y, es de esperarse, su paz con Siria), el conflicto palestino-israelí está arraigado en algo más que una disputa territorial. Como demostró el debate de las Naciones Unidas, lo que está en juego es un choque de narrativas nacionales irreconciliables. Egipto tuvo que otorgarle a Israel sólo reconocimiento político, pero a los palestinos se les está pidiendo que reconozcan la legitimidad moral de Israel aceptando los vínculos judíos con la Tierra Santa y, por ende, admitiendo el reclamo milenario de los judíos de un estado en una tierra que los palestinos consideran históricamente propia. Ni una palabra, ni una omisión, en el discurso de Abbas en las Naciones Unidas fueron accidentales. Lo que más sorprendió fue lo abiertamente displicente que se mostró frente al argumento nacional más elemental de Israel. Habló de la Tierra Santa como la cuna del Cristianismo y el hogar de altares sagrados del Islam, pero intencionalmente ignoró las raíces bíblicas del judaísmo y a Jerusalén como el hogar de reyes y profetas hebreos. Para los israelíes, esa omisión revela la reticencia de hasta los palestinos más moderados a abrazar la existencia de un estado judío. La negativa por parte de Abbas de reconocer a Israel como un estado judío -con el argumento de que, si lo hace, estaría traicionando al 1,5 millón de ciudadanos palestinos de Israel- confirmó una preocupación israelí clave y alimentó los temores de los escépticos de una agenda palestina a largo plazo que se mantiene oculta y que está destinada a descartar directamente el estado judío. Esto quizá desaliente a los pacifistas israelíes -y envalentone a los belicistas en su insistencia de que ningún progreso hacia la paz es posible sin la aceptación inequívoca de Israel como la tierra nacional judía por parte de los palestinos. En consecuencia, el mensaje implícito de Abbas de que Israel nunca ofrecerá un trato justo a su minoría árabe reforzará el liderazgo de Netanyahu como el defensor acérrimo del interés nacional contra los soñadores ingenuos de la izquierda. Netanyahu no tiene más que presentar los argumentos de Abbas como una prueba de que, para los palestinos, la paz con Israel es sólo la primera etapa en una estrategia mayor que tiene como objetivo una Palestina, que abarque la totalidad de Israel, con una mayoría árabe. Aún si, como se espera, el Consejo de Seguridad rechaza el pedido de los palestinos de ser miembros plenos de las Naciones Unidas y Palestina termina quedándose con un estatus de observador en la Asamblea General, Abbas ya puede cantar victoria. Logró corregir el equilibrio de poder con Israel y Estados Unidos movilizando el vasto respaldo que la causa palestina genera en la comunidad internacional. De no haber sido por su iniciativa frontal en las Naciones Unidas, el Cuarteto (las Naciones Unidas, Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y Rusia) no se habría vuelto de repente tan hiperactivo a la hora de buscar una fórmula que lleve nuevamente a las partes a la mesa de negociaciones. Pero no esperen sentados. Nada surgirá del accionar del Cuarteto si las partes no cambian su actitud. En las negociaciones por la paz, las partes tienen que considerar valientemente las preocupaciones genuinamente vitales del otro. Y los potenciales mediadores, por su parte, ya no pueden ser simplemente "facilitadores"; tienen que considerarse a sí mismos partes interesadas -y estar preparados para ejercer presión y apelar a la persuasión-. Si se los deja a su libre albedrío, los israelíes y los palestinos nunca alcanzarán un acuerdo de paz integral. Shlomo Ben Ami fue ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Israel y hoy se desempeña como vicepresidente del Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz. Es el autor de Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/benami58/Spanish

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09/29/2011 03:44 PM The World from Berlin 'Stern Words Change Nothing' in the Middle East Before the US vetoes the Palestinians' bid for national recognition at the US Security Council, it wants Israelis and Palestinians to talk. But both sides have dug in their heels. The Israelis announced a new round of settlement building on Tuesday, a surprise move the US has condemned. German commentators want to see more than warnings from Washington. Israelis and Palestinians have spent the last week posturing over the prospect of new peace talks, which US officials were hastily trying to arrange before an awkward showdown over the Palestinians' bid for recognition by the United Nations. The US has promised -- against the tide of world opinion -- to veto the request in the Security Council, but it prefers to avoid a veto debate by nudging Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table. A surprise announcement on Tuesday that Israel would green-light new settlements in east Jerusalem seemed to throw a monkey wrench into Washington's plan. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Tuesday called it "counterproductive to our efforts to resume negotiations." She added that "we have been here before, over many years." 'A Ruse' But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the notion that building 700 new housing units in Jerusalem's Gilo neighborhood was provocative. "We already gave at the office," he said this week in an interview with the Jerusalem Post. Israel, he said, had attempted a settlement freeze for 10 months starting in November 2008, a month or so before a major military incursion into the Gaza Strip. He argued that the settlement-freeze idea was "a pretext (Palestinians) use again and again, but I think a lot of people see it as a ruse to avoid direct negotiations." Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas rode a wave of popularity in the West Bank after making his formal -- and arguably quixotic -- request before the UN last Friday. "We have confirmed to all that we want to achieve our rights through peaceful means, through negotiations," he told a cheering crowd in Ramallah on Sunday. "We will not accept (negotiations) until legitimacy is the foundation and they cease settlement completely." All of which leaves the Americans, the peace talks, and the Mideast Quartet of peace negotiators (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) pretty much nowhere. Conservative German commentators are silent on Thursday, but disappointment from the left is hard to miss. The left-leaning daily Die Tageszeitung writes:

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"Prime Minister Netanyahu's speech before the UN General Assembly last week carried the controversial Israeli leader's popularity in Israel to a new high. His coalition is stable. He can look into the new year with confidence, unconcerned about a UN vote in favor of a Palestinian state. American support (in the UN) is secure. The tragic inconsistency of Washington's Middle East policies is that they don't punish the side that contradicts American doctrine -- not the Israelis, in other words, who proceed with new settlement plans despite clear warnings by President Barack Obama, but the Palestinians, who lose more land with each new settlement." The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "The Israeli side has tipped its hand (over peace negotiations) with its announcement of new settlement construction. ... Observers who see the move as an outrage against the spirit of the Quartet are right. Observers who act astonished are naïve. Above and beyond his rhetoric of peace, Netanyahu has always pursued politics that create 'facts on the ground.'" "The Palestinian side is not terribly different. Palestinians may have a strong interest in a sovereign state, and President Mahmoud Abbas and his camp have worked noticeably hard, on every level, to achieve one. But an interest in mutual peace is harder to discern. A peace treaty would mean sacrifice for the Palestinians just as it would for the Israelis -- and in the Palestinian case it would mean abandoning the right of return. So far no Palestinian leader has managed to convince his people to accept this sacrifice." The left-leaning Berliner Zeitung writes: "The Gilo neighborhood is not the weightiest problem in this conflict, but re- starting the peace process is an urgent necessity. The Quartet does not want to set any preconditions for talks -- entirely according to the wishes of Prime Minister Netanyahu. Meanwhile, though, Netanyahu goes about cementing his own goals in the ground of east Jerusalem. The Palestinians can't be expected, under these conditions, to step starry-eyed into peace talks." "Meanwhile, the US will put all its weight behind an effort to keep Mahmoud Abbas from winning formal recognition for a Palestinian state from the UN. It would seem more plausible if the West also imposed some kind of veto against Israeli settlement policies. Stern words alone change nothing." -- Michael Scott Moore URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,789083,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Poker With UN Votes: Europe Divided on Palestinian Question (09/22/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787889,00.html • A Plea for the Palestinian Cause: Abbas Appeals to the World's Conscience (09/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788154,00.html

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• Last-Minute Divisions: Europe Fails to Unite on Palestinian Question (09/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788835,00.html Related internet links • Jerusalem Post: Netanyahu Interview http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=239645 SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages.

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Egypt warns U.S. on attaching conditions to military aid By Mary Beth Sheridan, Friday, September 30, 2:09 AM A new source of friction has emerged between the United States and one of its top Mideast allies, with Egyptian officials expressing alarm about a move by the U.S. Senate to link military aid to Egypt’s performance as a democracy. The Senate bill would withhold up to $1.3 billion in U.S. aid for 2012 until the secretary of state certifies that Egypt has held democratic elections and is protecting freedoms of the press, expression and association. Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohammed Kamel Amr warned about the consequences of such a move during meetings this week with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and White House officials. “We called on them to intervene,” said a senior Egyptian official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss diplomatic exchanges. Those U.S. officials “know the value of the partnership between the United States and Egypt and how much such conditions and language would be detrimental to future cooperation.” Egypt has been the second-largest recipient of U.S. aid since it signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and the military assistance has been viewed as near-sacrosanct. But the Senate move shows the potential changes afoot in the relationship in the wake of the February uprising that toppled President Hosni Mubarak. Clinton assured Amr that the administration opposes the Senate conditions, which the Appropriations Committee approved this month. “We will be working very hard . . . to convince the Congress that that is not the best approach to take,” Clinton said at a news conference Wednesday.

“We support the democratic transition, and we don’t want to do anything that in any way draws into question our relationship or our support,” she said. The Obama administration says the aid has given Washington leverage at key moments — such as when the Egyptian army had to decide whether to crack down on the burgeoning revolution. The military aid has also undergirded the peace treaty with Israel, U.S. officials say. The Egyptians say that they will hold free elections but that the Senate measure sends a bad signal at a delicate time. The military is in power during the run-up to elections, a turbulent period that has included continued protests and an attack by demonstrators on the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. “If you insert new conditions, hinting at the fact the military aid might be touched in the future, this signals to the Egyptian military [that] the United States is not as solidly behind us as we think,” the Egyptian official said.

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Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), head of the Appropriations subcommittee on foreign aid, said that the Egyptian people and their military leaders had agreed on the need for democracy. “The days of blank checks are over, and it is in the mutual interest of the Egyptian people and the United States to reinforce these rights as conditions for our aid,” he said in a statement. Egypt has also complained about an increase in American democracy aid to nongovernmental groups. U.S. officials say the assistance is aimed at training aspiring politicians on the nuts and bolts of elections. Correspondent Leila Fadel in Cairo contributed to this report. © The Washington Post Company

U.S. ambassador to Syria accosted by pro- Assad mob in Damascus By Joby Warrick, Friday, September 30, 2:17 AM A tomato-hurling mob assaulted the U.S. ambassador to Syria and several aides Thursday as they arrived for a meeting with an opposition leader, an incident the State Department later said was deliberately staged by Syrian officials. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton sharply condemned the attack on Ambassador Robert S. Ford, who U.S. officials say was trapped for more than an hour when the mob besieged the Damascus office building where the meeting occurred. No Americans were hurt, but several embassy cars were badly damaged. “This attempt to intimidate our diplomats through violence is wholly unjustified,” Clinton told reporters at a Washington news conference. A formal complaint was lodged with the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who Clinton said must “take every possible step to protect our diplomats.” The White House also denounced the attack, which spokesman Jay Carney termed “an ongoing campaign to intimidate and threaten diplomats attempting to bear witness to the brutality of the Assad regime.” The outspoken Ford, whose criticism of government repression has repeatedly rankled Syria’s leaders, first came under attack as he arrived in a Damascus office building for a private meeting with an opposition figure, according to a State Department account. News accounts identified the man as Hassan Abdul-Azim, once the head of Syria’s outlawed Arab Socialist Democratic Union Party. A crowd, described by witnesses as numbering about 100 people, chanted slogans and hurled food at the ambassador as he arrived for the meeting. Afterward, some in the mob battered embassy vehicles while others tried to force their way into the building.

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“They tried to break down the door of my office but didn’t succeed,” Abdul-Azim told the Agence France-Presse news agency. It was the second attack on a Western ambassador in a week, coming days after French Ambassador Eric Chevallier was pelted in similar fashion as he departed a meeting with a Greek Orthodox clergyman in Damascus. That incident also sparked allegations that the Syrian government was inciting mob violence against Western diplomats. Ford has become a frequent target of criticism by Assad’s government since July, when he made a surprise visit to the restive city of Hama to meet with participants in anti- government demonstrations there. Soon afterward, the U.S. and French embassies came under attack by rock- and vegetable-throwing Assad supporters, some of whom managed to climb over a fence into the U.S. compound before being driven off by guards. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-ambassador-to- syria-accosted-by-pro-assad-mob-in- damascus/2011/09/29/giqa65hl8k_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

Saleh says he won’t step down until rivals are out By Sudarsan Raghavan, Published: September 29 SANAA, Yemen — Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh declared Thursday that he would not step down as long as his key rivals remain in influential positions, potentially dashing U.S. hopes for a peaceful transition of power. Saleh also said that the United States was playing a previously unknown role in assisting Yemeni forces fighting an al-Qaeda affiliate in southern Yemen, underscoring U.S. concerns that the political vacuum here could allow Islamist militants to deepen their grip and create a haven from which to attack the United States and its allies. Saleh made his comments in a nearly 20-minute interview with The Washington Post and Time magazine Thursday. It was his first interview since his return to Yemen last Friday from Saudi Arabia, where he was treated for burns and other injuries suffered in a June attack on his presidential compound in Sanaa. On Thursday, Saleh sat in a large room inside the compound, along with top advisers. Deep scars marked his face. He wore a traditional tribal headdress and gold-colored medical gloves, the type typically worn by burn victims. He appeared in good health and spirits, smiling and peppering the conversation with doses of humor. Saleh said that a political transition plan crafted by Yemen’s Persian Gulf neighbors made clear that “all elements” causing tensions in Yemen need to be removed. That meant his main rivals — Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who turned against Saleh and joined the nation’s now eight-month-old populist uprising, and the Ahmar clan, a powerful tribal family not related to the general — could not be allowed to run for elections or hold political office or a military command if he steps aside, Saleh said.

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“Because if we transfer power and they are there, this will mean that we have given into a coup,” he said. “If we transfer power, and they are in their positions, and they are still decision-makers, this will be very dangerous. This will lead to civil war.” Saleh’s defiant stance underscored the deepening animosities between him and his rivals, which could torpedo the gulf Arab initiative. Hamid al-Ahmar, the tribal family’s billionaire scion who has expressed interest in the presidency, wields enormous political power in the main opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting Parties. Mohsen, once Saleh’s confidant and strongest ally, still commands much of Yemen’s military and is revered by his soldiers. Their forces engaged in fierce clashes against forces loyal to Saleh and his family last week; more than 150 people were killed and scores injured — mostly youth activists who seek to end the president’s 33-year-long rule. On Thursday, tribesmen loyal to the Ahmars clashed with tribesmen loyal to Saleh in the capital’s Hassabah enclave. The violence has been accompanied by an escalation in sharp rhetoric in recent days between Yemen’s warring sides, ratcheting up tensions in this Middle Eastern nation, the region’s poorest. On Thursday, Saleh strongly hinted that Mohsen and the Ahmars, along with Yemen’s political opposition, might have played a role in the attempt to assassinate him. The government, he said, is waiting for the results of a U.S. investigation into the attack, which Saleh said could be completed by the end of the month. If Mohsen and the Ahmars are implicated in the attack, they would face prosecution, Saleh vowed. When asked why government security forces were violently suppressing protesters with heavy machine guns, mortars and snipers, he blamed Mohsen and the Ahmars. “They are the ones who attack the military bases, the civilians and the protesters — the protesters that are moving around the city with the protection of Ali Mohsen and the Ahmars, using armed people. And they assassinate protesters from behind so they can blame the state,” Saleh said. In a telephone interview, Mohsen denied the allegations, calling Saleh “a liar” who could not be trusted. “His return to the country shows that he carries with him a revengeful soul,” Mohsen said. “Unfortunately, the president is not absorbing that the whole nation is incapable of living with him.” Several members of the Ahmar family could not be reached for comment, but they have in the past denied Saleh’s allegations and have been equally critical of his rule. Hamid al-Ahmar was the first prominent figure to demand that Saleh step down. Despite lashing out at his rivals, Saleh reiterated that he was still committed to the gulf Arab initiative. He denied that he was stalling in order to remain in power. He said that Yemen’s vice president, whom he authorized to negotiate with the Joint Meeting Parties, was waiting for the opposition to be more flexible. “This is a misunderstanding. We are willing within the next hours and next days to sign it, if the JMP comes closer” to reaching an agreement, Saleh said. “We don’t want to prolong it. And we don’t want this crisis to continue.”

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Still, Saleh warned that he was not prepared to leave Yemen without a stable transition of leadership. “What is important to [the JMP] is to remove the president from power and the country would then go through chaos,” he said. He branded the opposition, especially al-Islah, Yemen’s largest opposition party, which includes members of the country’s Muslim Brotherhood, as Islamists who support al- Qaeda-linked militants. JMP officials have denied the allegations. On several occasions, Saleh mentioned the U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism alliance. “We are fighting the al-Qaeda organization in Abyan in coordination with the Americans and Saudis,” he said without elaborating. Yemeni forces are engaged in fierce battles to retake territory lost to al-Qaeda-linked militants, who have taken over large swaths of the southern province of Abyan, including its capital, Zinjibar. Saleh also warned the United States, which has denounced the violence and called for him to step down soon, to be patient. “I am addressing the American public. I want to ask a question: Are you still keeping your commitment in continuing the operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda?” he asked. “If yes, that will be good. But what we see is that we are pressed by America and the international community to speed up the process of handing over power. And we know where power is going to go. It is going to al-Qaeda, which is directly and completely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.” Special correspondent Ali Almujahed contributed to this report. © The Washington Post Company http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/saleh-says-he-wont-step-down- until-rivals-are-out/2011/09/29/giqapu9u7k_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Land without peace: Why Abbas went to the U.N. By Charles Krauthammer, Friday, September 30, 1:47 AM While diplomatically inconvenient for the Western powers, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s attempt to get the United Nations to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state has elicited widespread sympathy. After all, what choice did he have? According to the accepted narrative, Middle East peace is made impossible by a hardline Likud-led Israel that refuses to accept a Palestinian state and continues to build settlements. It is remarkable how this gross inversion of the truth has become conventional wisdom. In fact, Benjamin Netanyahu brought his Likud-led coalition to open recognition of a Palestinian state, thereby creating Israel’s first national consensus for a two-state solution. He is also the only prime minister to agree to a settlement freeze — 10 months — something no Labor or Kadima government has ever done. To which Abbas responded by boycotting the talks for nine months, showing up in the 10th, then walking out when the freeze expired. Last week he reiterated that he will continue to boycott peace talks unless Israel gives up — in advance — claim to any territory beyond the 1967 lines. Meaning, for example, that the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem is Palestinian territory. This is not just absurd. It violates every prior peace agreement. They all stipulate that such demands are to be the subject of negotiations, not their precondition. Abbas unwaveringly insists on the so-called “right of return,” which would demographically destroy Israel by swamping it with millions of Arabs, thereby turning the world’s only Jewish state into the world’s 23rd Arab state. And he has repeatedly declared, as recently as last week in New York: “We shall not recognize a Jewish state.” Nor is this new. It is perfectly consistent with the long history of Palestinian rejectionism. Consider: ●Camp David, 2000. At a U.S.-sponsored summit, Prime Minister Ehud Barak offers Yasser Arafat a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza — and, astonishingly, the previously inconceivable division of Jerusalem. Arafat refuses. And makes no counteroffer, thereby demonstrating his unseriousness about making any deal. Instead, within two months, he launches a savage terror war that kills a thousand Israelis. ●Taba, 2001. An even sweeter deal — the Clinton Parameters — is offered. Arafat walks away again. ●Israel, 2008. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert makes the ultimate capitulation to Palestinian demands — 100 percent of the West Bank (with land swaps), Palestinian statehood, the division of Jerusalem with the Muslim parts becoming the capital of the new Palestine. And incredibly, he offers to turn over the city’s holy places, including

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the Western Wall — Judaism’s most sacred site, its Kaaba — to an international body on which sit Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Did Abbas accept? Of course not. If he had, the conflict would be over and Palestine would already be a member of the United Nations. This is not ancient history. All three peace talks occurred over the past decade. And every one completely contradicts the current mindless narrative of Israeli “intransigence” as the obstacle to peace. Settlements? Every settlement remaining within the new Palestine would be destroyed and emptied, precisely as happened in Gaza. So why did the Palestinians say no? Because saying yes would have required them to sign a final peace agreement that accepted a Jewish state on what they consider the Muslim patrimony. The key word here is “final.” The Palestinians are quite prepared to sign interim agreements, like Oslo. Framework agreements, like Annapolis. Cease-fires, like the 1949 armistice. Anything but a final deal. Anything but a final peace. Anything but a treaty that ends the conflict once and for all — while leaving a Jewish state still standing. After all, why did Abbas go to the United Nations last week? For nearly half a century, the United States has pursued a Middle East settlement on the basis of the formula of land for peace. Land for peace produced the Israel-Egypt peace of 1979 and the Israel- Jordan peace of 1994. Israel has offered the Palestinians land for peace three times since. And been refused every time. Why? For exactly the same reason Abbas went to the United Nations last week: to get land without peace. Sovereignty with no reciprocal recognition of a Jewish state. Statehood without negotiations. An independent Palestine in a continued state of war with Israel. Israel gave up land without peace in south Lebanon in 2000 and, in return, received war (the Lebanon war of 2006) and 50,000 Hezbollah missiles now targeted on the Israeli homeland. In 2005, Israel gave up land without peace in Gaza, and again was rewarded with war — and constant rocket attack from an openly genocidal Palestinian mini-state. Israel is prepared to give up land, but never again without peace. A final peace. Which is exactly what every Palestinian leader from Haj Amin al-Husseini to Yasser Arafat to Mahmoud Abbas has refused to accept. Which is why, regardless of who is governing Israel, there has never been peace. Territorial disputes are solvable; existential conflicts are not. Land for peace, yes. Land without peace is nothing but an invitation to national suicide. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/land-without-peace-why-abbas-went-to-the- un/2011/09/29/giqacaoi8k_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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September 29, 2011 Activists in Arab World Vie to Define Islamic State By ANTHONY SHADID and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK CAIRO — By force of this year’s Arab revolts and revolutions, activists marching under the banner of Islam are on the verge of a reckoning decades in the making: the prospect of achieving decisive power across the region has unleashed an unprecedented debate over the character of the emerging political orders they are helping to build. Few question the coming electoral success of religious activists, but as they emerge from the shadows of a long, sometimes bloody struggle with authoritarian and ostensibly secular governments, they are confronting newly urgent questions about how to apply Islamic precepts to more open societies with very concrete needs. In Turkey and Tunisia, culturally conservative parties founded on Islamic principles are rejecting the name “Islamist” to stake out what they see as a more democratic and tolerant vision. In Egypt, a similar impulse has begun to fracture the Muslim Brotherhood as a growing number of politicians and parties argue for a model inspired by Turkey, where a party with roots in political Islam has thrived in a once-adamantly secular system. Some contend that the absolute monarchy of puritanical Saudi Arabia in fact violates Islamic law. A backlash has ensued, as well, as traditionalists have flirted with timeworn Islamist ideas like imposing interest-free banking and obligatory religious taxes and censoring irreligious discourse. The debates are deep enough that many in the region believe that the most important struggles may no longer occur between Islamists and secularists, but rather among the Islamists themselves, pitting the more puritanical against the more liberal. “That’s the struggle of the future,” said Azzam Tamimi, a scholar and the author of a biography of a Tunisian Islamist, Rachid Ghannouchi, whose party, Ennahda, is expected to dominate elections next month to choose an assembly to draft a constitution. “The real struggle of the future will be about who is capable of fulfilling the desires of a devout public. It’s going to be about who is Islamist and who is more Islamist, rather than about the secularists and the Islamists.” The moment is as dramatic as any in recent decades in the Arab world, as autocracies crumble and suddenly vibrant parties begin building a new order, starting with elections in Tunisia in October, then Egypt in November. Though the region has witnessed examples of ventures by Islamists into politics, elections in Egypt and Tunisia, attempts in Libya to build a state almost from scratch and the shaping of an alternative to Syria’s dictatorship are their most forceful entry yet into the region’s still embryonic body politic.

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“It is a turning point,” said Emad Shahin, a scholar on Islamic law and politics at the University of Notre Dame who was in Cairo. At the center of the debates is a new breed of politician who has risen from an Islamist milieu but accepts an essentially secular state, a current that some scholars have already taken to identifying as “post Islamist.” Its foremost exemplars are Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey, whose intellectuals speak of a shared experience and a common heritage with some of the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and with the Ennahda Party in Tunisia. Like Turkey, Tunisia faced decades of a state-enforced secularism that never completely reconciled itself with a conservative population. “They feel at home with each other,” said Cengiz Candar, an Arabic-speaking Turkish columnist. “It’s similar terms of reference, and they can easily communicate with them.” Mr. Ghannouchi, the Tunisian Islamist, has suggested a common ambition, proposing what some say Mr. Erdogan’s party has managed to achieve: a prosperous, democratic Muslim state, led by a party that is deeply religious but operates within a system that is supposed to protect liberties. (That is the notion, at least — Mr. Erdogan’s critics accuse him of a pronounced streak of authoritarianism.) “If the Islamic spectrum goes from Bin Laden to Erdogan, which of them is Islam?” Mr. Ghannouchi asked in a recent debate with a secular critic. “Why are we put in the same place as a model that is far from our thought, like the Taliban or the Saudi model, while there are other successful Islamic models that are close to us, like the Turkish, the Malaysian and the Indonesian models, models that combine Islam and modernity?” The notion of an Arab post-Islamism is not confined to Tunisia. In Libya, Ali Sallabi, the most important Islamist political leader, cites Mr. Ghannouchi as a major influence. Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader who is running for president in Egypt, has joined several new breakaway political parties in arguing that the state should avoid interpreting or enforcing Islamic law, regulating religious taxes or barring a person from running for president based on gender or religion. A party formed by three leaders of the Brotherhood’s youth wing says that while Egypt shares a common Arab and Islamic culture with the region, its emerging political system should ensure protections of individual freedoms as robust as the West’s. In an interview, one of them, Islam Lotfy, argued that the strictly religious kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the Koran is ostensibly the constitution, was less Islamist than Turkey. “It is not Islamist; it is dictatorship,” said Mr. Lotfy, who was recently expelled from the Brotherhood for starting the new party. Egypt’s Center Party, a group that struggled for 16 years to win a license from the ousted government, may go furthest here in elaborating the notion of post-Islamism. Its founder, Abul-Ela Madi, has long sought to mediate between religious and liberal forces, even coming up with a set of shared principles last month. Like the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, he disavows the term “Islamist,” and like other progressive Islamic activists, he describes his group as Egypt’s closest equivalent of Mr. Erdogan’s party. “We’re neither secular nor Islamist,” he said. “We’re in between.” It is often heard in Turkey that the country’s political system, until recently dominated by the military, moderated Islamic currents there. Mr. Lotfy said he hoped that Egyptian 139

Islamists would undergo a similar, election-driven evolution, though activists themselves cautioned against drawing too close a comparison. “They went to the streets and they learned that the public was not just worried about the hijab” — the veil — “but about corruption,” he said. “If every woman in Turkey wore the hijab, it would not be a great country. It takes economic development.” Compared with the situation in Turkey, the stakes of the debates may be even higher in the Arab world, where divided and weak liberal currents pale before the organization and popularity of Islamic activists. In Syria, debates still rage among activists over whether a civil or Islamic state should follow the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad, if he falls. The emergence in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria of Salafists, the most inflexible currents in political Islam, is one of the most striking political developments in those societies. (“The Koran is our constitution,” goes one of their sayings.) And the most powerful current in Egypt, still represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, has stubbornly resisted some of the changes in discourse. When Mr. Erdogan expressed hope for “a secular state in Egypt,” meaning, he explained, a state equidistant from all faiths, Brotherhood leaders immediately lashed out, saying that Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey offered no model for either Egypt or its Islamists. A Brotherhood spokesman, Mahmoud Ghozlan, accused Turkey of violating Islamic law by failing to criminalize adultery. “In the secularist system, this is accepted, and the laws protect the adulterer,” he said, “But in the Shariah law this is a crime.” As recently as 2007, a prototype Brotherhood platform sought to bar women or Christians from serving as Egypt’s president and called for a panel of religious scholars to advise on the compliance of any legislation with Islamic law. The group has never disavowed the document. Its rhetoric of Islam’s long tolerance of minorities often sounds condescending to Egypt’s Christian minority, which wants to be afforded equal citizenship, not special protections. The Brotherhood’s new party has called for a special surtax on Muslims to enforce charitable giving. Indeed, Mr. Tamimi, the scholar, argued that some mainstream groups like the Brotherhood, were feeling the tug of their increasingly assertive conservative constituencies, which still relentlessly call for censorship and interest-free banking. “Is democracy the voice of the majority?” asked Mohammed Nadi, a 26-year-old student at a recent Salafist protest in Cairo. “We as Islamists are the majority. Why do they want to impose on us the views of the minorities — the liberals and the secularists? That’s all I want to know.” Anthony Shadid reported from Cairo, and Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Cairo, Tunis and Tripoli, Libya. Heba Afify contributed reporting from Cairo. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/world/middleeast/arab-debate-pits-islamists- against-themselves.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

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Internacional LAS CARAS DE LA NUEVA LIBIA “La matanza de Abu Salim fue el origen de esta revolución” Mohamed Jalil Koafi es ingeniero aeronáutico. Sobrevivió a la masacre en la prisión libia donde el régimen mató en 1996 a más de 1200 presos Francisco Peregil Misrata 29 SEP 2011 - 16:35 CET1

El expreso de la prisión donde la fuerzas del régimen de Gadafi mataron en 1996 a más de 1200 reclusos cuenta su experiencia Mohamed Jalil Koafi cree que el origen de la revuelta que estalló el pasado 17 de febrero en Bengasi hay que buscarlo en la parte más oscura de la historia reciente de Libia: la desaparición de 1270 presos el 28 de junio de 1996 en la cárcel tripolitana de Abu Salim. De la noche a la mañana toda aquella gente se evaporó. Los familiares siguieron llevándoles comida durante mucho tiempo, pero el Gobierno no decía nada sobre ellos. Al cabo de unos cinco años empezó a rumorearse que los 1270 habían muerto fusilados durante dos horas de ametrallamiento. Pero no había pruebas, ni juicio, ni investigación pública, ni testigos oficiales. Hasta que la pasada semana el Gobierno interino de Libia aseguró haber descubierto una explanada donde, supuestamente, se encuentran los huesos de las víctimas. Fueron los familiares de aquella gente quienes empezaron a manifestarse en silencio hace más de dos años, con las fotos de sus deudos, pidiendo una aclaración y un juicio justo. Y fueron ellos el germen de las protestas que estallaron el 17 de febrero en Bengasi. Mohamed Jalil Koafi estaba allí el día de la matanza. Había entrado a los 24 años en 1989 y salió en 2000 con 35. Ni con su familia quería hablar sobre Abu Salim. Cuando uno le escucha entiende por qué. “De joven estudié durante seis años ingeniería aeronáutica en Perth, una ciudad escocesa a unos 80 kilómetros de Edimburgo. Fui becado junto a otros diez compañeros por la compañía nacional Libian Arab Airlines. Con nosotros venía un agente de inteligencia. Todos éramos conscientes de eso, mandaban a uno con cada promoción de estudiantes que salía. Pero nosotros no hacíamos nada ilegal. Había un movimiento de oposición a Gadafi en Reino Unido. Era solo un movimiento político, publicaban una revista y nos mandaban a los estudiantes algunos ejemplares.

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Los familiares llevaron comida a los presos durante años , pero el Gobierno no decía nada sobre ellos Al cabo de seis años, cuando terminamos la carrera y regresamos a Libia, los espías habían redactado informes en los que decían que nos habían visto sentados con los opositores. Y eso era cierto. Porque algunos de ellos eran nuestros amigos en Libia, mucho antes de viajar a Escocia. Y otros eran incluso familiares. Pero nosotros nunca tuvimos ninguna actividad política. Un día me llamó la policía secreta. Me dijeron que tenía que personarme en la oficina central en Trípoli, a unas tres horas en coche desde Misrata. Una vez allí, me pusieron en un coche con dos personas y me mandaron directamente a la cárcel de Abu Salim, en Trípoli. No me decían de qué me acusaban. Antes de entrar en el recinto me taparon la cabeza con una capucha, para que no viera las instalaciones militares donde se encontraba la cárcel. Los presos no habían visto el sol en siete meses. En las celdas apenas se podía respirar Me metieron en una habitación donde había una cama y unas esposas en la pared. Me esposaron sin poderme mover de la cama. Había mucha sangre en las paredes. Olía mal, había sobras de comida. Yo oía a la gente gritar y llorar desde otras habitaciones. Una noche sentí necesidad de ir al baño. Empecé a gritar llamando al guardia. Uno de ellos vino y me dijo: -Aquí no puedes moverte cada vez que quieras: solo podrás hacerlo dos veces, una por la mañana y otra por la noche. Pero como eres nuevo, esta vez te llevaré. Me cubrió la cabeza y me quitó las esposas. Yo caminaba a tientas, a veces me chocaba con las paredes y él se reía y a veces me guiaba con la mano. En cuanto pude entrar en el baño al bajarme los pantalones me dijo: -¡Venga, fuera! ¡No tengo tiempo para ti! Y yo le dije: -¡Pero si acabo de llegar! -Ese no es mi problema, sal ya. A los cuatro días me trajeron algunos papeles en blanco, me dieron un lápiz y me dijeron: La primera vez que pude hablar con mi familia fue después de tres años. Ellos no sabían dónde estaba yo -Escribe la historia de tu vida. Desde el momento en que naciste hasta ahora. Pero me rompían los papeles a cada rato. -Lo que queremos que escribas es lo que has hecho en contra del Gobierno. ¿Tienes pistolas? ¿Hay algún grupo ayudándote dentro de Libia? A los diez días me llevaron a una oficina donde encontré a dos personas sentadas que iban a investigar mi caso. Uno preguntaba y otro escribía: sobre mi estudios, mi familia, mi tribu,… Hasta que me dijeron: -Háblanos de tu relación con la oposición en el Reino Unido. Yo les dije que no tenía ninguna relación con ellos. Entonces empezaron las torturas. Me golpeaban con una especie de látigo hecho con varios cables de la luz entrelazados. Después de tres o cuatro días, les dije: 142

-Escribid lo que queráis y lo firmaré. A la semana me llevaron al interior de Abu Salim. Siempre con la cabeza cubierta. Abrieron la celda, me quitaron la capucha y vi a unos 16 hombres. Estaban todos muy pálidos, con mucha barba, el cabello muy largo, la ropa muy sucia… No habían visto el sol en siete meses. Apenas se podía respirar. Había una pequeña ventana y mucha humedad, porque cada uno quería lavar su ropa y la colgábamos dentro de la celda. A los tres meses me sacaron a un patio cubierto con barrotes y por fin pude ver el sol. Otros se llevaron diez meses sin verlo. La comida siempre eran macarrones o arroz. En la celda teníamos una garrafa. La usábamos para echar agua y lavarnos, pero también para echar los alimentos que nos daban. Porque no teníamos ni platos, ni tenedores ni cucharas. Así que el mismo recipiente con que nos aseábamos nos servía de plato. La primera vez que pude hablar con mi familia fue después de tres años. Ellos no sabían dónde estaba yo. A los cuatro años de estar en prisión, me dejaron ver a mis padres. Los funcionarios de la prisión dos dijeron que habían venido fuerzas especiales de fuera para matar a los presos Recuerdo que seis o siete meses antes de la matanza, tal vez un año antes, unos seis presos intentaron escapar. Tres lo lograron. Y a los otros tres los cogieron fuera, los trajeron y los torturaron. Cambiaron al director de la prisión y el nuevo quiso empezar castigándonos a todos para que escarmentáramos. Nos quitaron toda la ropa y las mantas. Empezaron a pasarnos lista por la mañana, tarde y noche… La comida, que ya era escasa, lo fue aún más. Y las celdas se llenaron de más gente. No permitieron visitas durante seis meses. Dejaron de sacarnos al patio a tomar el sol. En la prisión había seis bloques. Yo vivía en el segundo. En el número cuatro, algunos compañeros llevaban solo un año. Pero habían sido detenidos con armas y municiones. Y pensaron que si había gente como yo, que llevaba ocho años encerrado sin ni siquiera haber cometido ningún delito, ellos se pasarían toda la vida allí. Así que cuando un guarda vino a distribuir la comida, lo golpearon, le quitaron las llaves y empezaron a liberar al resto de presos. Pero a nuestro bloque no pudieron llegar porque los guardas empezaron a dispararles. Así que nos quedamos encerrados. Eso era el 27 de junio. Oíamos un montón de tiros desde el techo. Oímos que había alguna gente herida, otros muertos. Y entonces, vino gente del Gobierno a hablar con ellos con los altavoces. Nosotros estábamos encerrados, pero supimos que les dijeron: -Traednos a los heridos y los llevaremos al hospital. El resto, permaneced en vuestras celdas y resolveremos vuestros problemas mañana. La revuelta había empezado a las cinco de la tarde. A las cuatro de la madrugada, un militar muy grande rompió el candado de nuestra celda, porque las llaves las tenían nuestros compañeros, y empezó a ordenarnos que saliéramos. -Traed solo los zapatos y una manta. Nos sacaron fuera, a una explanada donde había miles de soldados bien armados rodeando la prisión. Nos ordenaron que volviéramos la cabeza hacia un muro. Pensábamos que nos iban a fusilar a todos. Después de media hora nos llevaron a otro edificio del recinto. Era una cárcel para militares que hubiesen cometido delitos. Y allí nos encerraron. Me levanté al día siguiente a las diez de la mañana. Era el 28 de junio de 1996. Entonces, a las once de la mañana oímos una gran explosión, como una bomba 143

o granada. Y después, un montón de tiros de diferentes armas y municiones. Estuvieron sonando durante dos horas, sin cesar. A la una de la tarde, a esa hora exacta, pararon. Sacaron a algunos compañeros de mi bloque para limpiar la otra prisión. Los cuerpos habían sido retirados. Pero ellos vieron las marcas de las balas. Muchísimas marcas. Al cabo de tantos años, algunos de los prisioneros habían trabado amistad con los funcionarios. Y ellos le dijeron: -Nosotros no los matamos. Vinieron fuerzas especiales de fuera. Y algunos de nosotros hemos tenido que sacar los cadáveres de aquí, pero no los hemos matado nosotros. Yo conocía a la mayoría de los que murieron. Había unos cuatro ciegos. Había ancianos, uno de ellos de más de ochenta años. Había un chaval que el primer día que entré en la prisión tenía 16 años, sin barba. Lo habían metido ahí junto a su padre. Había cinco hermanos. Y seis hermanos de Misrata. Había también cuatro hermanos, varias familias de tres hermanos y muchas de dos hermanos. Todos ellos murieron. También murió mi amigo íntimo Abdul Nabi el Asga. Estudiamos juntos en Escocia y nos metieron en la misma celda. Teníamos la misma edad, pero él se comportaba como si fuera mi hermano mayor. Cuando me veía triste siempre venía a consolarme. Todo el mundo en la prisión lo quería. Pero la historia más tremenda que vi ahí dentro es la de un hombre al que trajeron porque… Concéntrese bien en lo que voy a contarle, preste mucha atención: Ese hombre se llamaba Salim Baiou y tenía otro hermano que se llamaba Alí Baiou. Eran de Bengasi. La policía buscaba a una persona que se llamaba igual que su hermano, Alí Baiou. Dos agentes llegaron por la noche a la casa de Salim y le dijeron: -Estamos buscando a Alí Baoiu. -Mi hermano está trabajando en el desierto con una compañía petrolera. -Pues te vienes tú y no te vamos a soltar hasta que no aparezca tu hermano. Lo llevaron a Trípoli. Al día siguiente, el hermano apareció en Bengasi. Y lo mandaron a Trípoli. Los trasladaron juntos a la cárcel de Ein Zaara. Y en Bengasi, después de una semana, cogieron a la persona que buscaban. La policía de Bengasi llamó a la de Trípoli y le dijo: -Soltad a Ali que ya tenemos al que andábamos persiguiendo. ¡Y soltaron al hermano, pero se olvidaron de Salim! Estuvo once años encerrado, igual que yo. Antes de soltarme me hicieron firmar un documento en el que se decía que si volvía a actuar contra el Gobierno, sería ejecutado. El papel decía: “No menciones nada que hayas visto o vivido en la prisión. Si lo haces, serás encarcelado de nuevo”. Salí con mucho miedo. Me casé después, tuve cuatro hijos y ahora regulo el tráfico aéreo en Misrata. Estoy inmensamente feliz porque ha triunfado esta revolución, que lucha por las mismas cosas por las que lucharon mis compañeros de Abu Salim”. HTTP://INTERNACIONAL.ELPAIS.COM/INTERNACIONAL/2011/09/29/ACT UALIDAD/1317289670_227611.HTML

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Internacional Saleh advierte de una guerra civil en Yemen si él abandona el poder El presidente yemení asegura que no se irá a no ser que lo hagan también sus principales rivales "Sería como ceder a un golpe de Estado", afirma Saleh Avisa a Estados Unidos de que su marcha dejaría Yemen en manos de Al Qaeda Yemen se hunde en la violencia por la vuelta de Saleh EDITORIAL: Yemen, en caída libre El País Madrid 30 SEP 2011 - 10:07 CET

Foto publicada por el Gobierno de Yemen el jueves en la que se ve al presidente Ali Abdalá Saleh reunido con clérigos en Saná. / YEMENI PRESIDENCY OFFICE (EFE) El presidente de Yemen, Alí Abdalá Saleh, ha advertido contra el peligro de una guerra civil en su país si la nueva oposición al régimen, formada por sus antiguos aliados, concurre a unas elecciones en caso de que él abandonara el poder. En una entrevista con la revista Time y The Washington Post, el presidente afirma que no se irá si no se marchan también sus opositores. Saleh explica en la entrevista que el plan presentado por el resto de monarquías del Golfo para diseñar una transición pacífica en el pequeño país tenía previsto que “todos los elementos” que causan las tensiones en Yemen serían apartados. Saleh advierte de que no cumplir esta condición dará lugar a una guerra civil. El principal rival de Saleh es ahora el general Alí Moshin y el clan Ahmar, que se volvió contra el presidente y se puso al frente de la revuelta popular iniciada en Yemen al calor de la primavera árabe. Saleh se niega a dejar el poder si a Ahmar se le permite concurrir a las elecciones o mantener su rango militar. “Si esto sucediera, significaría que hemos cedido ante un golpe de Estado”, dijo Saleh.

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Estas son las primeras declaraciones del presidente Saleh tras su regreso a Yemen, hace hoy justamente una semana, después de tratarse en Arabia Saudí de las heridas y las quemaduras sufridas en un ataque contra la residencia presidencial en Saná el pasado mes de junio. Saleh aún tiene cicatrices en el rostro. El presidente prometió investigar si Ahmar está relacionado con el intento de asesinato de él y su familia. Asimismo, culpó al general de la represión violenta de las protestas. Según el presidente de Yemen, Estados Unidos está ayudando a las fuerzas de seguridad del país a combatir el nuevo frente de Al Qaeda en el sur. El martes pasado, el ministro de Defensa de Yemen sufrió un ataque terrorista en esta zona. “Me dirijo al público americano”, dice Saleh en la entrevista. “Quiero hacer una pregunta: ¿mantienen aún su compromiso de continuar las operaciones contra los talibán y Al Qaeda? Si es así, está bien. Pero lo que vemos es que nos presiona América y la comunidad internacional para acelerar el proceso de cambio de poder. Y sabemos a dónde va ese poder. Va a Al Qaeda, que está directa y completamente relacionada con los Hermanos Musulmanes”. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/09/30/actualidad/1317369780_79855 0.html

Internacional Arabia Saudí se blinda frente a la 'primavera árabe' La mayoría de los saudíes consideran una farsa las elecciones locales de hoy El rey saudí indulta a la mujer condenada por conducir 'Más reaccionario, imposible', por JAVIER VALENZUELA Ángeles Espinosa (ENVIADA ESPECIAL) Riad 29 SEP 2011 - 18:01 CET3

Un saudí busca su nombre en el listado de votantes. / FAYEZ NURELDINE (AFP) El colegio electoral de Al Manaz, al sureste de Riad, estaba vacío a las dos de la tarde. De los 2.024 votantes registrados, apenas un centenar habían pasado por las esmeradas instalaciones. Veinte minutos después, sólo un médico con el pijama hospitalario se había acercado a depositar su papeleta. Y el panorama era similar en otros centros de voto en todo el país. La falta de entusiasmo de los saudíes en estas segundas elecciones municipales desde 2005 ha puesto en evidencia las contradicciones de una monarquía 146

absoluta que desea presentar una imagen más acorde con las exigencias del siglo XXI, pero cada vez está más alejada de las preocupaciones de sus súbditos. “Estas elecciones no le importan a nadie. Solo se celebran de cara a la galería para que nuestras autoridades puedan decir a los mandatarios extranjeros que han empezado un proceso democrático y que los saudíes no estamos interesados en la democracia, que no está en nuestra cultura”, declara una profesora universitaria recogiendo un sentir muy extendido. Prueba de ello es el escaso número de saudíes que se han registrado para votar. De acuerdo con el jefe de la Comisión Electoral, Abdulrahmán Dahmash, son 1,2 millones de hombres, ya que las mujeres no estarán autorizadas a hacerlo hasta la próxima convocatoria, en 2015. En total 400.000 votantes más que en 2005, pero apenas una cuarta parte de los que podrían hacerlo en un país con 27 millones de habitantes, de los que un tercio son trabajadores extranjeros. “No conozco a ningún hombre que se haya registrado”, admite la profesora. “Incluso quienes no se preocupan por los derechos de la mujer han criticado las elecciones por la falta de contenido que tienen los consejos municipales”, añade. De hecho, los que se crearon tras anteriores comicios no han tenido ningún poder. Las siguientes elecciones, previstas para 2009, se retrasaron sine die. Hasta que al rebufo de las revueltas árabes se resucitaron la pasada primavera. Apenas 1,2 millones de saudíes se han registrado para votar, una cuarta parte de los votantes potenciales “Es como un juguete que se le da a un niño. Sabemos que esto no es la verdadera democracia”, asegura un activista. Como resultado, destacados intelectuales han boicoteado la cita y dos importantes organizaciones (la Asociación Nacional de Derechos Humanos y la Asociación de Periodistas) se han negado a servir como observadores, según el diario Arab News . Sin embargo, a pesar de esa falta de representación de la que los saudíes son plenamente conscientes, de las altas cifras de paro (entre 450.000 y dos millones de personas, según las fuentes) y de la corrupción, Arabia Saudí no se ha contagiado de las revueltas que desde enero sacuden el mundo árabe. Moataz Salama, del Centro Al Ahram de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos de El Cairo, acaba de publicar un informe en el que defiende que el reino es “inmune a la revolución” porque los ciudadanos tienen pocos motivos para pedir cambios, la monarquía tiene legitimidad histórica y tribal, además de disponer de recursos financieros y la comunidad internacional, en especial EE UU, apoya el status quo.

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Mujeres saudíes fotografían a sus hijos durante una ceremonia para celebrar el Día de la Independencia de Arabia Saudí, el pasado 23 de septiembre. / FAHAD SHADEED (REUTERS) “No se pueden predecir esas cosas”, señala Eman al Nafyan, una de las más destacadas blogueras saudíes. “Mire lo que ha pasado en Siria y los artículos que defendían que allí no habría revueltas porque Bachar el Asad era muy popular y además no era pro estadounidense”, recuerda. Christopher Boucek, investigador sobre Oriente Próximo en el Carnegie Endowment para la Paz Internacional, también discrepa. “Arabia Saudí no es inmune y no se librará por completo de la primavera árabe”, afirmaba en un reciente coloquio. Pero en su opinión, el reino “está mejor preparado para hacer frente al reto, gracias a su comunidad religiosa y sus recursos financieros”. De hecho, el pasado marzo, cuando el contagio parecía inminente, no solo el rey Abdalá anunció estímulos económicos por valor de 75.000 millones de euros, sino que los ulemas emitieron fetuas que declaraban ilegales las protestas contra el régimen, que no por ello dejó de desplegar enormes efectivos policiales. Solo se produjeron manifestaciones significativas en la Provincia Oriental, donde la minoría chií reclamaba la liberación de un grupo de presos políticos. La liberación de los presos políticos sería, según varios analistas locales, un potencial detonador de la protesta El asunto de los presos políticos sería, según varios analistas locales, un potencial detonador de la protesta. “Por un lado, las autoridades les están convirtiendo en héroes al mantenerlos encerrados durante años sin juicio; por otro, sus familiares están organizados y han perdido el miedo”, explica un defensor de los derechos humanos. Significativamente, el Gobierno cierra su página de Facebook cada vez que alcanza los 10.000 seguidores, algo que ya ha sucedido en cuatro ocasiones. Por lo demás, aunque de momento los estímulos económicos solo han servido para provocar un repunte inflacionario, la realidad es que los saudíes viven mejor que la mayoría de sus vecinos. “Sin duda la situación económica influye [en que no haya revueltas]”, admite Muna Abu Sulayman, activista social y embajadora de buena voluntad de la ONU. “Los jóvenes no quieren correr riesgos porque esta es una sociedad muy estable y segura”, apunta. Otras fuentes opinan que tienen miedo y afirman que existe una campaña de intimidación contra aquellos que se muestran muy activos en las redes sociales o hablan con la prensa extranjera. En cualquier caso, no es la posibilidad de una revuelta social lo que preocupa a los observadores, sino el relevo en la corona. El rey Abdalá ha cumplido 87 años. Su medio hermano y heredero, el príncipe Sultán, de 83 años, acaba de salir del hospital en EE UU, donde ha estado recibiendo tratamiento en los últimos meses, pero aún no ha regresado al país. En cualquier caso, según los documentos del Departamento de Estado filtrados por Wikileaks, desde 2009 los diplomáticos estadounidenses le consideran incapacitado para gobernar ya que al parecer sufre de Alzheimer.

MÁS INFORMACIÓN Como invitar a alguien a servirse de una bandeja vacía Catálogo del cambio Las mujeres saudíes tendrán derecho a votar y a ser elegidas La

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policía saudí frena la protesta de familiares de presos políticos "No es la 'abaya', estúpido" Los "trabajadores esclavos" de Arabia Saudí El siguiente hermano y ministro del Interior, el príncipe Nayef, con 78 años, tampoco es mucho más joven, lo que pone sobre el tapete la necesidad de pasar el testigo a la siguiente generación, la de los nietos de Abdelaziz Ibn Saud, el fundador del reino. “No me creo la versión oficial de que la decisión va a tomarse en el Consejo de Familia”, confía una saudí que observa con preocupación ese paso. Según la rumorología local, las diferentes ramas familiares están tomando posiciones y hay una lucha de poder en palacio. “Son demasiados y alguno va a tener que bajarse del avión”, añade gráficamente la interlocutora. A esta mujer no le preocupa quién gane (“incluso con un ultraconservador, saldremos adelante”), sino que la disputa interna desestabilice el país. Es el mismo temor que se susurra en las cancillerías extranjeras. http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2011/09/29/actualidad/1317280245_91816 2.html

Internacional A vueltas con el Golfo A vueltas con el Golfo se refiere al puñado de países que rodean este Golfo que los iraníes llaman Pérsico y los árabes, Arábigo. El blog busca reflejar una región que además de tener petróleo es también un lugar de contrastes entre modernidad y tradición, pobreza y riqueza, inmovilismo político y ansias de reforma. Publicado el 29 de septiembre de 2011 De sorpresas y reformas Por: Ángeles Espinosa

Hace tiempo que la idea de escribir un blog me rondaba la cabeza. Muchos amigos y compañeros me lo sugerían con insistencia. “Hay muchas cosas que nos cuentas que no tienen cabida en tus crónicas”, me decían. Sin embargo, dudaba. Con la proliferación de bitácoras, ¿alguien tendrá tiempo para leer una más? Supongo que dependerá de que interese lo que cuente y, al parecer, existe una gran curiosidad por esta parte del mundo tan manoseada por las noticias diarias como desconocida en su cotidianidad.

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Durante los seis años que viví en Irán me sorprendió la sorpresa que causaban las más simples de mis actividades. “¿De verdad tienes que taparte la cabeza aunque seas extranjera?”, me preguntaba insistentemente un colega. “Sí, hasta para bajar a echar la basura”, le respondía cada vez para su perplejidad. Otra amiga me miraba incrédula cuando le decía que mi marido y yo volvíamos andando a casa a la una de la mañana tras haber cenado en casa de una documentalista que vivía en nuestro mismo barrio. ¿No era un país tan peligroso? A menudo la peligrosidad política, no tiene nada que ver con la inseguridad ciudadana. Al contrario, las dictaduras suelen ser lugares muy seguros para quienes no se implican en la contestación política. De la misma forma, a este lado del Golfo Pérsico / Arábigo a donde me he trasladado a vivir, la gente tiene aspiraciones muy similares a las nuestras aunque a menudo queden enterradas bajo la losa de las tradiciones o de nuestros propios estereotipos. Arabia Saudí, donde me encuentro al iniciar este blog, es el mejor ejemplo de ello.

He venido a cubrir unas medio elecciones municipales, en las que sólo puede participar la mitad de la población adulta (los hombres) y sólo se elige a la mitad de unos consejos municipales que además tienen escasos poderes más allá de aprobar el presupuesto de cada localidad. Habrá quienes piensen que no merece la pena dedicar un minuto de nuestro tiempo a esa farsa. Sin embargo, dadas las dificultades de acceso a este país, es una gran oportunidad para tomar el pulso a una sociedad que pese a las apariencias, está cambiando. El anuncio por el rey Abdalá de la extensión de los (escasos) derechos políticos a las mujeres ha vuelto a poner sobre la mesa una de las principales anomalías de este país. Durante años justificada en una controvertida y radical interpretación del islam, la segregación y discriminación que sufren las saudíes no tiene parangón en ningún otro país del mundo, incluidos todos aquellos cuya población es mayoritariamente musulmana. Cierto que el gesto tiene más de titular que de contenido. “Es como invitar a alguien a servirse de una bandeja vacía”, me confiaba gráficamente una feminista local (sí, también aquí hay feministas aunque sus objetivos no necesariamente coincidan con los de nuestras feministas). Pero también es verdad, que envía un mensaje muy poderoso a quienes se opone a esos (¿inevitables?) avances, escudados en la cultura, las tradiciones o la religión. Y no han faltado las cartas al director en los periódicos locales que, sin atreverse a cuestionar la decisión

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real, han advertido de lo que ven como un peligro: “¿Por qué las mujeres no luchan también para ser teólogas islámicas? Parece que sólo pelean por cosas terrenas, estén permitidas o no”, advertía un lector. Muchos comentaristas han especulado estos días sobre las credenciales reformistas del rey Abdalá y el posible efecto de la llamada Primavera Árabe. Cuando le entrevisté en junio de 2007, tuve la impresión de reunirme con un hombre cordial, extremadamente curioso para su edad y con los pies en el suelo. A diferencia de los dirigentes iraníes, el monarca me dio la mano sin remilgos (ya lo había hecho en una audiencia anterior) y se mostró más abierto a responder a mis preguntas que los asesores que las habían revisado previamente. Su discurso resultó razonable, pero no eclipsó el hecho de que me encontraba ante un monarca absoluto cuyo principal objetivo es mantener el poder en manos de su familia de la forma menos costosa posible. Las cautelosas reformas, cuando se producen, tienen ese propósito. http://blogs.elpais.com/a-vueltas-con-el-golfo/2011/09/de-sorpresas-y- reformas.html HHTTP://BLOGS.ELPAIS.COM/A-VUELTAS-CON-EL-GOLFO/2011/ L

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09/28/2011 11:33 AM Return of the Islamists A Questionable Form of Freedom for North Africa By Clemens Höges and Thilo Thielke The autocrats are gone, but who will inherit power in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt? Islamist influence is significant across the region and conservative political groups are flexing their muscles. The coming months will determine just how much democracy North Africa can support. Ammunition crates, now empty in the wake of recent heavy fighting, are stacked outside the military barracks at the Tripoli airport. One of the victors, wearing military fatigues, is sitting in a luxurious leather armchair inside the building. He presses his combat boots into the thick carpet, his facial features as rigid as if they had been sculpted. The man speaks intently. He wants to make sure that each of his sentences is recorded on video, and that nothing is misunderstood. For years, American and British intelligence agencies hunted Abdel Hakim Belhaj, the commander of the Libyan rebels' Tripoli brigade, believing him to be a terrorist and ally of then al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. They also reportedly had him abducted, which led to his being tortured with syringes and ice-cold water. Now though, the West and many in Libya are paying close attention, and are listening to his every word. "In reality, our group had nothing to do with al-Qaida at the time," says Belhaj, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan and the former head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which, persecuted by the regime of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, took refuge in Afghanistan for years. Belhaj, the battle-hardened Islamist, is now the commander of all rebel troops in the Libyan capital. His men drive around in their pickups, outfitted with automatic weapons while the civilian heads of the rebellion seek to map out a path for their country's future. Belhaj says that the power lies "in the hands of the Libyan people," and that Libyans can now decide democratically how they wish to live their lives. "We want a secular country," he adds. But many Libyans don't believe a word the Islamist is saying. Deep Differences There is, after all, more at stake today than merely the question of who is currently in power. It is about shaping Libya's future. The Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa are over, and in the wake of the change of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, a coalition of Islamists and secular insurgents has emerged victorious in Libya. But now that the war is almost over, the deep differences between the two groups are becoming more apparent. As in Tunisia and Egypt, it will soon become apparent how democratic the new Libya can be. Will it develop along the lines of the Turkish model, for which Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently campaigned on a celebrated trip through the Arab world? Or, on the other end of the spectrum, will it model itself after the Iranian theocracy?

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The old dictators were convenient for the West, because they kept the Islamists under control. But now that the people have liberated themselves, their new freedoms apply to everyone, including the Islamists and jihadists who want to see Sharia law introduced in their respective countries. They are demanding their share of power, which is hardly likely to be small. The Islamists' brigades fought well in Libya. Indeed, even decades before the revolutions in North Africa, they were the best-organized opposition in the three countries. Their leaders were locked up, tortured and killed. The Islamists paid a heavy price, which has made their supporters tough. They also have greater financial resources than other opposition groups, partly because of support from Gulf sheikhs like the leader of Qatar. A constitutional convention is to be elected in Tunisia in four weeks, and polls show that the religious Nahda Party could capture 20 to 30 percent of the vote. This would likely give the Islamists more power than any secular party. Sizeable Potential This comes as no surprise, since the Islamists have the largest election campaign war chest, they fund scholarships and social projects, they are omnipresent and preach piety. Women are already complaining about being attacked in broad daylight. When a film critical of religion was shown in Tunis, Islamists stormed out of the theater and physically assaulted the owners. Observers in Egypt believe that the Islamists there -- the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists -- hold a similar potential among voters. The Muslim Brotherhood, now calling itself the Freedom and Justice Party, already wants to establish strict rules for foreign women wearing bikinis on Egyptian beaches. Members of the Salafist sect have established a number of different parties. When the two groups organized a joint rally on Tahrir Square in Cairo, tens of thousands showed up to demonstrate for an Islamic state. Some are blaming the Salafists for a recent rise in arson attacks on Coptic Christian churches in Egypt. The situation in Libya is much more chaotic than in the two neighboring countries, partly because the rebels are still fighting the last remaining Gadhafi loyalists. Nevertheless, the National Transitional Council, headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and the so-called Executive Committee, under the chairmanship of Mahmoud Jibril, have presented roadmap to democracy which calls for the election of a 200-member national congress in about eight months. Within a year, the congress would draw up a constitution, organize a constitutional referendum and eventually hold free elections. Military leader Belhaj already feels powerful enough to counter Jibril, who serves as the de facto prime minister. Belhaj, in fact, is trying to oust Jibril from his position. Charges of Corruption But the two most influential Libyan Islamists are probably the Salabi brothers. Ismail Salabi commands one of the toughest rebel brigades in Benghazi. His brother Ali, considered one of the country's religious leaders, travels back and forth between Libya and Qatar, the Arab nation on the Persian Gulf that supplied the rebels with weapons and trained its fighters.

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The Salabis have already tried several times to discredit members of the National Transitional Council with charges of corruption. Ali Salabi claims the council is filled with "radical secularists" who are trying to sideline the religious groups before elections, and that Jibril wants to usher in a "new era of tyranny and dictatorship." The Islamists now plan to establish a religious party. If they do not do well in the election, however, says Ali Salabi, they will still respect the will of the people. Salabi insists that he believes in democracy. But many distrust radicals like the Salabis, especially since the murder of Abdul Fattah Younis. Gadhafi's former interior minister, Younis joined the rebels days after the rebellion began, and, as their commander-in-chief, developed their army. His was one of three bodies were found near Benghazi on July 28. To this day, it remains unclear who shot Younis and his two companions and then burned the bodies, although suspicions point to the Islamists. Fathi Bin Issa, editor-in-chief of the new Tripoli newspaper Arus al-Bahr, is sitting in his long, narrow office, a room bathed in cold fluorescent light. The red, black and green flag of the new Libya hangs next to his desk. Bin Issa was the spokesman of the rebels shortly after they captured the capital, and his editors now write regular features about the Islamists. He says that he received several death threats only last week, with callers threatening to blow up his office. Good Connections and an Agenda "There are people here who are trying to build a Libyan Hezbollah," says Bin Issa. "There is a great risk that they will assume power." In some neighborhoods, says the journalist, religious edicts, or fatwas, have already been issued banning women from going out in public alone. He also says that some beauty salons have been shut down, and that members of a self-proclaimed religious police have started appearing in the streets. "These people have good connections, and they have an agenda. That's what makes them so dangerous." In Bin Issa's opinion, everything now depends on how civilian society reacts to the changes. "If we are unable to repel these people, we could see conditions like those in Iran or under the Taliban," says Bin Issa. The supporter of the revolution believes that his fellow Libyans are not in favor of radical Islam. "Here in Libya, women work as pilots and judges, and they have been instrumental in bringing about change. Our Islam is moderate." Colonel Ali Ahmed Barathi, 53, is the new chief of the military police in Tripoli. His headquarters once housed the notorious 32nd Brigade, a group that practiced torture and was headed by Gadhafi's son Khamis. The barracks is on the outskirts of Tripoli, where Colonel Barathi is sitting in his office at an enormous desk. He is wearing the obligatory sunglasses and has the rough hands of a professional soldier, and yet Barathi is soft- spoken. The officer is from Benghazi, where he joined the rebels immediately. "I stood in front of my unit and said that I intended to switch sides. It was left up to each soldier to decide whether to join us. The entire unit defected." Skirmishes with Islamists Barathi isn't worried about the Islamists' activities. "Libyans don't want to be ruled by these people. Even Belhaj has recognized this and has been reserved in his comments."

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But then he talks about skirmishes with Islamists and says that his men broke apart an entire unit of Islamists at the beginning of the rebellion. "The Islamists were isolated by the tribes, which wanted no part of them. After we had given them the ultimatum to either fight by our sides or lay down their weapons, many turned over their weapons, while others defected." The dispute between Islamists and secular Libyans could even have a positive outcome -- true pluralism -- hopes Aref Nayed, the coordinator of the so-called stability team of the rebel government. A wealthy IT entrepreneur, Islamic scholar and philosopher, Nayed is often found in the lobby of the Hotel Corinthia along the Tripoli shoreline, along with many of the country's political leaders. An elegant man with a neatly trimmed beard, Nayed studied in Canada and the United States, and has worked in Italy. He is adept at maneuvering between opposing fronts. 'Keeping Society Together' After Pope Benedict XVI incited religious Muslims against the Catholic Church with an awkward speech in 2006, Nayed was one of 138 Muslim scholars to sign a letter initiating reconciliation talks. When Nayed joined the National Transitional Council, the Vatican announced that it was pleased to see that an "old friend" had become a key figure in Libya. Nayed dreams of a compromise between secular and Islamist Libya, an arrangement that could become a model for the Arab world, one in which Islamists would be recognized as a political force, even while women occupied cabinet posts. None of this, says Nayed, would be contradictory to the tenets of Islam. Council head Abdul Jalil, a very devout Muslim, also supports a compromise. Abdul Jalil envisions a moderate Islamic democracy with a legal system based on Sharia. Besides, says Nayed, it is so much the political leaders but Libya's tribes "that are keeping society together." While he enthusiastically quotes ancient philosophers, the weapon in his waistband slips out from under his expensive jacket. His narrow belt isn't strong enough to hold the heavy 9-mm piston. "I have no idea how to use it," Nayed mutters. He says that his bodyguards insisted that he carry the gun, so that he would not be unprotected when going out in public. A large photo of murdered General Younis hands on Martyr's Square -- known as Green Square until the rebels arrived -- in downtown Tripoli. The rebel general knew how to use his weapon, but it didn't do him any good. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL: Clemens Höges y Thilo Thielke Return of the Islamists A Questionable Form of Freedom for North Africa 09/28/2011 11:33 AM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788397,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: The Influence of Islam in North Africa http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-73280.html • Shrinking Influence: Germany's Woeful Security Council Record (09/21/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787322,00.html

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• Literature After the Revolt: Arab Writers 'Should Not Be Invisible Anymore' (09/15/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785689,00.html • Sarkozy and Cameron in Libya: Heroes for a Day (09/15/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,786527,00.html • Justice and Revenge in Tripoli: Libyans Struggle Along Path Toward Reconciliation (09/13/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785839,00.html • Life After the Despot: Libya Settles Uneasily Into Life After Gadhafi (09/05/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,784369,00.html

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Egyptian presidential hopefuls criticize slow pace of change By Leila Fadel, Thursday, September 29, 12:18 AM CAIRO — Under a timetable that sets Egypt’s first post-revolution parliamentary elections for next spring, Egypt’s interim military rulers could remain in power for at least another year. The prospect of prolonged military rule has many presidential hopefuls criticizing the slow pace of change since the winter uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak from his nearly 30-year rule. The military council took power in February when Mubarak stepped down and is setting the election schedule. While parliamentary elections are set to end in mid-March, it is not yet clear when a presidential election will be held. So far, no one knows what type of government Egypt will have, what powers the new president will have and whether the country will be a parliamentary or presidential system. The rules for campaigning are still based on a 2005 law tailored to Mubarak’s rule. The newly elected parliament is expected to hold its first sessions in March and choose a committee to write the constitution, a task that must be completed within a year. With no elected government in place to deal with foreign countries or to be held accountable by the population, the economy will be further stalled and the security situation will remain unstable, said Amr Moussa, a front-runner for the presidency. “It’s not quick enough,” said Moussa, the former head of the Arab League. Moussa said the presidential vote should follow the parliamentary balloting by only a month or two. “It should not wait a full year. . . . When will the presidential elections be set? I don’t know — some talk about August, some talk about November.”

Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood who is running for president as an independent, agrees that a presidential election needs to come soon. “Presidential elections should start immediately after parliamentary elections are complete, and they should be simultaneous with the writing of the constitution,” he said. “It would mean the end of military interference in the country’s political affairs. They can go back to their barracks and let the newly elected parliament and president deal with the constitution and lead Egypt through its transitional period.” The military leadership’s lack of experience in ruling a nation is hurting Egypt’s transition, he said. “Nothing but an elected government will be accepted. Both the people and political powers are ready to take to the streets again if the need arises,” he said.

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A military analyst close to the ruling council said that despite the military leaders’ desire to transfer power, they cannot until the new constitution is in place and the president has been elected. The earliest date for a presidential election would be in September 2012, he said. “They do not want to have problems. Their plan is to leave with the minimum damage,” said retired Gen. Sameh Seif al Yazal, an Egyptian military and intelligence expert. “They want to hand over power quickly, but as per the schedule we see now, they have to stay until the end of next year.” The military’s attempts to restore stability during the transition have been criticized by leading activists from Egypt’s 18-day uprising. The top demand of the protesters was to end the emergency law that allowed authorities to arrest Egyptians for no reason. Instead, the council has expanded that law. It has arrested more than 10,000 people and tried them in hasty military proceedings, practices that critics say are human rights abuses. But the government did continue to meet one of the protesters’ key demands on Wednesday, when Egypt’s former information minister, Anas al-Fiqi, was convicted of corruption and sentenced to seven years in prison. State television chief Osama el- Sheikh was also found guilty and sentenced to five years, according to state media. They join a growing number of Mubarak officials who have been convicted on corruption-related charges. Mubarak and his interior minister, Habib al-Adli, are on trial in the killing of more than 800 protesters during the uprising. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/egyptian-presidential-hopefuls- criticize-slow-pace-of- change/2011/09/28/gIQAU2xU5K_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Averting a civil war in Syria By Editorial, Wednesday, September 28, 1:55 AM FOR MONTHS the United States and its allies have grappled with how to respond to a mass movement of peaceful protests in Syria and the government’s despicably violent response to them. Too slowly, the Obama administration has moved from urging dictator Bashar al-Assad to implement reforms to imposing sanctions and calling for him to step down, while seemingly embracing a strategy of “leading from behind.” Now it appears the administration and other outside powers could soon be faced with a very different situation: war between Mr. Assad’s dwindling forces and a rebel army made up of military defectors and volunteers. That would require a stronger, quicker and more forward-leading U.S. response. A number of news reports in the past week have cited diplomats and Syrian sources as saying that armed resistance to Mr. Assad’s assaults on the population has begun to appear — including in the central towns of Homs and Rastan (where heavy fighting was reported Tuesday) and near the Turkish and Iraqi borders. The New York Times quoted an unnamed U.S. official as estimating there had been 10,000 defections from the Army and security forces, and that several hundred of these had joined one of two rival movements — the Free Syrian Army and Free Officers Movement. The appearance of such forces is not to be welcomed, even by those hoping for an end to the Assad regime. Violence will push extremists to the forefront, justify even more brutal repression by the government and possibly transform what has been a broad pro- democracy movement into a sectarian war. Fighting could spread to Syria’s neighbors, including Lebanon and Iraq, and invite intervention — covert or otherwise — by outside powers, beginning with Iran. But as a State Department spokesman pointed out Monday, the incipient rebel movements are an inevitable “act of self-preservation” against “a regime that continue[s] to use violence against innocent, peaceful demonstrators.” The administration is right to hold Mr. Assad responsible for provoking civil war, but the question is what can be done about it. There are some obvious first steps, including urging the organized Syrian opposition, which recently formed a national council, to reject violence at an upcoming meeting in Istanbul. Syria’s neighbors should seek to choke off arms supplies to the regime — as Turkey is doing. Some fighting might be averted if safe zones for Syrians fleeing government persecution were established along the borders, either with Turkey or Iraq. In the end, the only way to avert a Syrian civil war may be for Mr. Assad’s regime to collapse. Having ruled out armed intervention of its own, the outside world can’t force this outcome; but the United States could drop its back-seat approach and lead a more aggressive effort to raise the pressure on Mr. Assad. The administration can press Russia, China and the Arab League to endorse tougher sanctions, and urge Turkey to break with the regime and provide protection for refugees. It would be far easier for the United States to act energetically now than to deal with the crisis that a real civil war would create. 159

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/averting-a-civil-war-in- syria/2011/09/27/gIQA0Qoy2K_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

World September 27, 2011 As Scorn for Vote Grows, Protests Surge Around Globe By NICHOLAS KULISH MADRID — Hundreds of thousands of disillusioned Indians cheer a rural activist on a hunger strike. Israel reels before the largest street demonstrations in its history. Enraged young people in Spain and Greece take over public squares across their countries. Their complaints range from corruption to lack of affordable housing and joblessness, common grievances the world over. But from South Asia to the heartland of Europe and now even to Wall Street, these protesters share something else: wariness, even contempt, toward traditional politicians and the democratic political process they preside over. They are taking to the streets, in part, because they have little faith in the ballot box. “Our parents are grateful because they’re voting,” said Marta Solanas, 27, referring to older Spaniards’ decades spent under the Franco dictatorship. “We’re the first generation to say that voting is worthless.” Economics have been one driving force, with growing income inequality, high unemployment and recession-driven cuts in social spending breeding widespread malaise. Alienation runs especially deep in Europe, with boycotts and strikes that, in London and Athens, erupted into violence. But even in India and Israel, where growth remains robust, protesters say they so distrust their country’s political class and its pandering to established interest groups that they feel only an assault on the system itself can bring about real change. Young Israeli organizers repeatedly turned out gigantic crowds insisting that their political leaders, regardless of party, had been so thoroughly captured by security concerns, ultra-Orthodox groups and other special interests that they could no longer respond to the country’s middle class. In the world’s largest democracy, Anna Hazare, an activist, starved himself publicly for 12 days until the Indian Parliament capitulated to some of his central demands on a proposed anticorruption measure to hold public officials accountable. “We elect the people’s representatives so they can solve our problems,” said Sarita Singh, 25, among the thousands who gathered each day at Ramlila Maidan, where monsoon rains turned the grounds to mud but protesters waved Indian flags and sang patriotic songs. “But that is not actually happening. Corruption is ruling our country.” Increasingly, citizens of all ages, but particularly the young, are rejecting conventional structures like parties and trade unions in favor of a less hierarchical, more participatory system modeled in many ways on the culture of the Web.

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In that sense, the protest movements in democracies are not altogether unlike those that have rocked authoritarian governments this year, toppling longtime leaders in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Protesters have created their own political space online that is chilly, sometimes openly hostile, toward traditional institutions of the elite. The critical mass of wiki and mapping tools, video and social networking sites, the communal news wire of Twitter and the ease of donations afforded by sites like PayPal makes coalitions of like-minded individuals instantly viable. “You’re looking at a generation of 20- and 30-year-olds who are used to self- organizing,” said Yochai Benkler, a director of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. “They believe life can be more participatory, more decentralized, less dependent on the traditional models of organization, either in the state or the big company. Those were the dominant ways of doing things in the industrial economy, and they aren’t anymore.” Yonatan Levi, 26, called the tent cities that sprang up in Israel “a beautiful anarchy.” There were leaderless discussion circles like Internet chat rooms, governed, he said, by “emoticon” hand gestures like crossed forearms to signal disagreement with the latest speaker, hands held up and wiggling in the air for agreement — the same hand signs used in public assemblies in Spain. There were free lessons and food, based on the Internet conviction that everything should be available without charge. Someone had to step in, Mr. Levi said, because “the political system has abandoned its citizens.” The rising disillusionment comes 20 years after what was celebrated as democratic capitalism’s final victory over communism and dictatorship. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, a consensus emerged that liberal economics combined with democratic institutions represented the only path forward. That consensus, championed by scholars like Francis Fukuyama in his book “The End of History and the Last Man,” has been shaken if not broken by a seemingly endless succession of crises — the Asian financial collapse of 1997, the Internet bubble that burst in 2000, the subprime crisis of 2007-8 and the continuing European and American debt crisis — and the seeming inability of policy makers to deal with them or cushion their people from the shocks. Frustrated voters are not agitating for a dictator to take over. But they say they do not know where to turn at a time when political choices of the cold war era seem hollow. “Even when capitalism fell into its worst crisis since the 1920s there was no viable alternative vision,” said the British left-wing author Owen Jones. Protests in Britain exploded into lawlessness last month. Rampaging youths smashed store windows and set fires in London and beyond, using communication systems like BlackBerry Messenger to evade the police. They had savvy and technology, Mr. Jones said, but lacked a belief that the political system represented their interests. They also lacked hope. “The young people who took part in the riots didn’t feel they had a future to risk,” he said. In Spain, walloped by the developed world’s highest official rate of unemployment, at 21 percent, many have lost the confidence that politicians of any party can find a solution. Their demands are vague, but their cry for help is plaintive and determined. 161

Known as indignados or the outraged, they block traffic, occupy squares and gather for teach-ins. Ms. Solanas, an unemployed online journalist, was part of the core group of protesters who in May occupied the Puerta del Sol, a public square in Madrid, the capital, touching off a nationwide protest. That night she and some friends started the Twitter account @acampadasol, or “Camp Sol,” which now has nearly 70,000 followers. While the Spanish and Israeli demonstrations were peaceful, critics have raised concerns over the urge to bypass representative institutions. In India, Mr. Hazare’s crusade to “fast unto death” unless Parliament enacted his anticorruption law struck some supporters as self-sacrifice. Many opponents viewed his tactics as undemocratic blackmail. Hundreds of thousands of people turned out last month in New Delhi to vent a visceral outrage at the state of Indian politics. One banner read, “If your blood is not boiling now, then your blood is not blood!” The campaign by Mr. Hazare, 74, was intended to force Parliament to consider his anticorruption legislation instead of a weaker alternative put forth by the government. Parliament unanimously passed a resolution endorsing central pieces of his proposal, and lawmakers are expected to approve an anticorruption measure in the next session. Mr. Hazare’s anticorruption campaign tapped a deep chord with the public precisely because he was not a politician. Many voters feel that Indian democracy, and in particular the major parties, the Congress Party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, have become unresponsive and captive to interest groups. For almost a year, India’s news media and government auditors have exposed tawdry government scandals involving billions of dollars in graft. Many of the protesters following the man in the white Gandhian cap known as a topi were young and middle class, fashionably dressed and carrying the newest smartphones. Ms. Singh was born in a village and is attending a university in New Delhi. Yet she is anxious about her future and wants to know why her parents go days without power. “We don’t get electricity for 18 hours a day,” she said. “This is corruption. Electricity is our basic need. Where is the money going?” Responding to shifts in voter needs is supposed to be democracy’s strength. These emerging movements, like many in the past, could end up being absorbed by traditional political parties, just as the Republican Party in the United States is seeking to benefit from the anti-establishment sentiment of Tea Party loyalists. Yet purists involved in many of the movements say they intend to avoid the old political channels. The political left, which might seem the natural destination for the nascent movements now emerging around the globe, is compromised in the eyes of activists by the neoliberal centrism of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. The old left remains wedded to trade unions even as they represent a smaller and smaller share of the work force. More recently, center-left participation in bailouts for financial institutions alienated former supporters who say the money should have gone to people instead of banks. The entrenched political players of the post-cold-war old guard are struggling. In Japan, six prime ministers have stepped down in five years, as political paralysis deepens. The two major parties in Germany, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, have seen tremendous declines in membership as the Greens have made major gains, while Chancellor Angela Merkel has watched her authority erode over unpopular bailouts. 162

In many European countries the disappointment is twofold: in heavily indebted federal governments pulling back from social spending and in a European Union viewed as distant and undemocratic. Europeans leaders have dictated harsh austerity measures in the name of stability for the euro, the region’s common currency, rubber-stamped by captive and corrupt national politicians, protesters say. “The biggest crisis is a crisis of legitimacy,” Ms. Solanas said. “We don’t think they are doing anything for us.” Unlike struggling Europe, Israel’s economy is a story of unusual success. It has grown from a sluggish state-dominated system to a market-driven high-tech powerhouse. But with wealth has come inequality. The protest organizers say the same small class of people who profited from government privatizations also dominates the major political parties. The rest of the country has bowed out of politics. Mr. Levi, born on Degania, Israel’s first kibbutz, said the protests were not acts of anger but of reclamation, of a society hijacked by a class known in Hebrew as “hon veshilton,” meaning a nexus of money and politics. The rise of market forces produced a sense of public disengagement, he said, a feeling that the job of a citizen was limited to occasional trips to the polling places to vote. “The political system has abandoned its citizens,” Mr. Levi said. “We have lost a sense of responsibility for one another.” Ethan Bronner contributed reporting from Tel Aviv, and Jim Yardley from New Delhi. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/world/as-scorn-for-vote-grows-protests-surge- around-globe.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

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The Arab 1989 revisited Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, 27th September 2011 The establishment and deepening of a democratic culture is a long-term project and is intergenerational. As divisions open up between the elites and the street as well as within the elites, the events of 2011 across the Middle East and North Africa represent a powerful first step in a larger process of transformation. About the authors Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is a Research Fellow at LSE Global Governance. His latest book, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era (Hurst & Co.) is published on May 23, 2011. David Held is professor [17] of political science at the London School of Economics, co-director of Polity Press [17], and general editor of Global Policy [17]. Among his many books are Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus(Polity, 2004); Models of Democracy [17] (3rd edition, 2006); Globalization Theory: Problems and Controversies [17](Polity, 2007); and Cosmopolitanism: Ideas and Realities [17] (Polity, 2010) In our previous article in openDemocracy [18], published on the day of Mubarak’s fall in February, we argued that the emerging Arab Spring overlapped with 1989 in important ways. We wrote that the uprisings sweeping across the Middle East portended a political transformation as significant as 1989 in Eastern Europe, and that economic stagnation and the failures of corrupt and repressive autocratic regimes intersected with a disenchanted youthful population wired together as never before. Yet we also identified a number of significant differences between developments in 1989 and 2011, in particular the lack of a common vision for the transformation of the Middle East. Assessing the situation seven months later, as the initial peaceful demonstrations in Tunis and Cairo have given way to a messy and uncertain pathway of transition, civil conflict in Libya, Yemen and Syria and a totalitarian crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain, does our earlier argument hold, or is it in need of revision? In this new article, we will review the course of the Arab Spring in three steps: 1) looking at the key country developments; 2) comparing and contrasting these developments and looking for common patterns and differences; 3) returning to the big themes of revolution and transformation. The course of events since the dramatic ousting of Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak from power in Tunisia and Egypt, and subsequently Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, suggest that we may be witnessing a transition of elites rather than a democratic revolution. Elsewhere, autocratic regimes are fighting hard for their survival and Saudi Arabia is spearheading a counter- revolutionary pushback in the Gulf States while attempting to manage the direction of change elsewhere. Moreover issues of social justice and the redistribution of wealth away from embedded networks of patronage and ‘crony capitalists’ remain largely untouched. Thus, as spring and summer turn to autumn, the progression of the Arab Spring appears very uneven and likely to produce highly differentiated outcomes, but should nevertheless be seen as a transformative first step in a long-term process of change. * * * 164

Although the trajectory (and outcome) of protest differs in each country, reflecting diverging regime-types and levels of resource endowment that condition how polities absorb the pressures for change, four broad categories emerge. These are: countries where largely non-violent transitions have already taken place (Tunisia and Egypt), others where persistent protests may yet lead to greater degrees of constitutional rule and political plurality (Jordan and Morocco), states marked by sustained violence as regimes fight for their survival (Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria), and the resource- rich countries of the Gulf that are leading an authoritarian counter-charge against the Arab Spring (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). The defining feature of the remarkable ousting of longstanding autocratic rulers in Tunisia and Egypt was the military’s refusal (for the most part) to open fire and crush the protestors. Faced with a choice of backing a beleaguered autocrat or attempting to violently repress the demonstrations, military elites eventually opted for the latter, giving the Presidents no option but to step down. In both countries, the former ruling parties (the RCD in Tunisia and the NDP in Egypt) have been dissolved, but the path toward constitutional and political reform has been controversial and strewn with obstacles. Initial controversy in Tunisia centred upon the timing of elections to a Constitutional Assembly, originally scheduled for 24 July but subsequently postponed until 23 October. Heated debates between the twelve main parties of the transition commission over the length of the move to democracy eventually resulted in agreement on 15 September for a one-year period for writing a constitution and holding parliamentary elections. Tunisia’s [19] relatively small and well-educated population means it is perhaps the best-placed state affected by the Arab Spring to undertake a successful (and gradualist) shift to democratic rule. There is greater pessimism about Egypt’s [20] political transition, where the military leadership under Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi have been attempting to discredit the pro-democracy movement by accusing them of accepting foreign donations, following a ‘foreign agenda,’ and delaying a return to normalcy following the February revolution. Outbursts of great violence have further marred a fraught and fractious move into the post-Mubarak era. On 29 June, more than 1000 demonstrators in Tahrir Square were injured in clashes with police while, on 9 September, a further 1000-plus protestors were injured while attempting to besiege and storm the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. The two episodes highlighted, firstly, public anger at the grip of the ruling military council on the speed and direction of reform, and secondly, the potential unravelling of the geopolitical settlement bequeathed by the Mubarak regime to a restless population. On the first point, governing power passed to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in February, and it suspended the Constitution, dissolved parliament, and announced a six-month period of military rule until elections could be organised. On 19 March a constitutional referendum gained 77% approval for a package of reforms and democratic safeguards. They included presidential term-limits, judicial supervision of the electoral process, and restrictions on the ability of the president to declare emergency rule. However, the reforms were criticised by substantial elements of the political and popular opposition as neither going far nor fast enough toward ending military rule. Parliamentary elections originally slated for September were postponed until 21 November, and SCAF angered activists by barring international monitors from the vote. Democracy campaigners express concern for the vulnerability of the democratic process and point out that the real revolution – covering issues of social

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justice and redistribution of wealth - will require stripping away the ‘crony capitalists’ and vested interests that mostly survived the ousting of the old regime. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel represented the cornerstone of regional geopolitics since the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978. Successive Egyptian presidents (Sadat and Mubarak) cooperated with Israeli security demands, in part through the controversial sealing of Egypt’s border with Gaza. This alienated much Egyptian opinion which regarded the Mubarak regime as complicit in the blockade of Gaza and the suffering of the Palestinian people. Following the removal of the Mubarak ‘safety valve’, tensions flared with a series of attacks on the Egypt-Israel gas pipeline in the Sinai Peninsula. They escalated further on 18 August, when gunmen from Sinai infiltrated southern Israel and killed eight Israeli soldiers, leading to reprisals that killed six Palestinians allegedly linked to the attack and three Egyptian security officers. In the aftermath of the 9 September demonstrations, the Egyptian Ministry of Culture banned Al Jazeera from broadcasting and stopped new satellite television permits. Officially justified as combating ‘media unruliness,’ the moves reflected SCAF concern at the damaging perception of the image of Egyptian police resorting to violence to protect Israeli interests from Egyptian demonstrators. A second category of states inhabit a ‘halfway house’ whereby persistent levels of protests have neither ended nor escalated into civil uprisings. In Jordan, almost weekly protests have occurred in Amman and other major cities that occasionally have led to small-scale confrontations with the security services. King Abdullah reacted by dismissing the government on 1 February, and its successor rapidly unveiled a package of measures that included salary increases for civil servants and the military, and reductions in the price of food, fuel and staple goods. This notwithstanding, protestors continued to call for greater political freedoms and accelerated moves toward a constitutional monarchy. Moreover, Jordan’s request to join the Gulf Cooperation Council in May suggests a desire to strengthen the monarchical bulwark against the participatory demands of the Arab Spring. The successful deflection of discontent in Jordan [21] (at least for the time being) contrasted with an accelerating pace of protest in Morocco [22]. Tens of thousands of demonstrators expressed dissatisfaction with King Mohammed’s 9 March promise of comprehensive constitutional reform. Instead, they called for greater political changes, including legislative elections, an independent judiciary, and an end to corruption. Troublingly, the security services adopted a zero-tolerance policy toward pro- democracy and pro-reform demonstrations, with escalating street clashes and rising police violence in May and June. These peaked with demonstrations of more than 60,000 people in Rabat and Casablanca on 5 June against police brutality. The King responded by speeding up constitutional reforms that were approved by a hastily- arranged referendum on 1 July, giving the prime minister and parliament more executive authority and calling for parliamentary elections in November 2011 instead of September 2012. These measures seemed to avert a tipping-point whereby the demonstrations adopted a momentum and trajectory of their own. There is nevertheless a danger that stop-gap or partial measures leave unresolved the basic divergence of expectations between authoritarian regimes bent on limiting concessions and opposition movements advocating deep and meaningful shifts in the source and distribution of power. Tellingly, the reforms implemented by the King fell short of the protestors’ demands in

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March, and illustrated the gulf between top-down and bottom-up visions of reform. In both Jordan and Morocco, it remains to be seen whether (and how) these differing viewpoints can be reconciled into a consensual settlement for political reform. In the third category of cases this threshold has already been crossed. Opposition in Libya [23] rapidly escalated into a nationwide uprising against Colonel Gaddafi’s 42- year rule. The regime’s brutal response demonstrated one of the lessons absorbed by dictators from the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings – that mercenary military personnel have fewer qualms about shooting at civilian demonstrators (this also was a feature of the Bahrain Defence Force’s crushing of protests). Gaddafi’s past record as an international pariah, and the concern that government forces might commit appalling massacres in rebel-held areas to regain control, led to the mobilisation of an international coalition to provide humanitarian protection to the rebels. NATO-led air strikes began on 19 March while a National Transitional Council (NTC) formed in Benghazi to provide a political voice to the rebels. Although the 17-member NATO coalition encountered stubborn resistance that lasted longer than anticipated, the regime finally imploded on 20-22 August, leaving pro-Gaddafi forces dug-in but isolated in one or two remaining towns. External military intervention of a very different sort also occurred in Bahrain [24]. Initial pro-democracy demonstrations brought together Sunni and Shiite protestors demanding political reform and an end to social and economic inequalities. This burgeoning social movement panicked the ruling Al-Khalifa family whose grip depended on the sectarian politics of divide-and-rule. Faced with the possible downfall of a ruling family, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened militarily to save the Al-Khalifa from their own population on 14 March. This was followed by a brutal crackdown as the Bahraini regime [25] mercilessly closed down all avenues of dissent, going so far as to arrest doctors and lawyers for treating or representing detainees. Although the state of emergency rule was lifted on 1 June, an inconclusive National Dialogue and flawed Independent Commission of Inquiry merely widened the divisions within a society polarised between an enraged opposition and implacably repressive government. Saudi nervousness over the instability in Bahrain stemmed partly from its determination to prevent a fellow ruling family from falling, but also because of the unfolding crisis on its southern border with Yemen [26]. There, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the great survivor of Middle East politics, suffered a steady loss of support from the military and tribal pillars that underpinned his 33-year rule. Despite recurring hints that he would step down, Saleh clung to power even as his base of support narrowed to little more than the presidential palace in Sana’a. Key allies, such as General Ali Mohsin Al- Ahmar and the powerful Hashid and Bakil tribal confederations, abandoned Saleh, while Saudi and US support ebbed away. Street fighting for Sana’a and other cities in late-May was followed by the attack on the presidential palace on 3 June that caused Saleh’s medical evacuation to Saudi Arabia. His son Ahmed Ali remained in the palace in Sana’a backed by the Special Security Forces and National Security Bureau controlled by cousins Yahya and Ammar, while the fragile opposition bloc fragments. Flashpoints of violence, such as the sniper attacks by forces loyal to Yahya Saleh on protestors in Sana’a on 18 September which killed 26 people and injured more than 300, continue, as the flailing regime clings to power. Saleh's surprise return to Yemen on September 23 is unlikely to alter the balance of forces, with further protest and violence inevitable. 167

The final example of violent confrontation is Syria [27], where the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad has bloodily suppressed pro-democracy demonstrations but failed to extinguish them altogether. This has given way to a stalemate whereby neither the state security forces nor the opposition can muster sufficient strength to settle the issue. As is the case in Libya and Yemen, the Syrian security forces have shown a willingness to inflict mass killing to put down demonstrators. This has stimulated memories of the 1982 massacre of up to 20,000 people in Hama ordered by Assad’s father, as the cities of Baniyas, Homs and Dera’a have been besieged by government forces. The overwhelming violence used against demands for political reforms and civil rights isolated Syria within the regional and international community. It led the US to impose sanctions on Assad and senior Syrian officials in May, while in August Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah forcefully called for regime change. The powerful Saudi-owned pan- Arab media outlets have vehemently opposed Assad’s crackdown, particularly following the ‘Ramadan Massacre’ on 31 July. Quite distinct from the three categories above is the condition of the resource-rich Gulf States [28]. While not immune from pressures for political reform, oil and gas reserves have shielded the regimes in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait from the Arab Spring. Officials have largely sought to pre-empt any unrest by lavishing their citizens with cash handouts and economic inducements. A case in point is Saudi Arabia’s announcement of a massive $130 billion welfare package unveiled in two decrees in February and March, involving the creation of 60,000 new jobs in the (already-bloated) Ministry of Interior, the setting of a minimum wage in the public sector, a one-off bonus for civil servants, and the construction of 500,000 new houses for disadvantaged Saudi youth. These measures may dampen calls for change, but are not fiscally sustainable, and they directly undermine strategies of economic diversification and productivity enhancement. They also put off the day of reckoning when even these states will have to implement sensitive political and painful economic reforms. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also emerged as the leaders of a counter-revolutionary resistance group against change. They clamped down hard on domestic dissent, arrested prominent activists and closed down what political space and civil society existed. This has damaged the reputation of the UAE in particular, owing to its high-profile global ‘branding’ partnerships with leading western cultural and educational institutions. Meanwhile they spearheaded the mooted expansion of the Gulf Cooperation Council to include Jordan and Morocco, reinforcing sceptics’ views of the organisation as a club of (Sunni Arab) monarchs battling against the tide of history, and leading one former US official to remark that GCC stood for the Global Counterrevolution Club. * * * What patterns of commonality or difference explain the various trajectories and outcomes of protest described above? Across the region, a number of underlying dynamics of discontent lay behind the outbreak and rapid spread of the Arab Spring. These included the intersection of a better-educated youth population with highly- developed social networking skills and widely shared perceptions that authoritarian governments simply could not address deep-rooted social and economic stagnation. Eroding regime legitimacy among the young – for whom older post-colonial discourse meant little in the face of daily struggle to find employment and make ends meet - facilitated the fusion of political and economic discontent. A profound intergenerational gap opened up between the youth and the gerontocracies unable to comprehend the

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nature and scale of contemporary challenges in a networked world connecting people and ideas as never before. Above all, the revolutionary mobilisation occurred around universal concepts of personal and political freedom, justice, dignity and self-respect, rather than around Arabism or Islamism. A qualitative difference between the Arab Spring and previous bouts of political unrest was its largely leaderless nature. This reflected the power and utilisation of social networking and other online and communicative technologies. Sites and drivers of protest moved decisively beyond the careful parameters of official opposition constructed by ruling elites to maintain a veneer of participatory pluralism. Its ‘headless’ character was critical both to the mass mobilisation around the universal values of freedom, justice, dignity and human rights in Tunisia and Egypt, and to the emergence of large-scale opposition in the face of intense regime suppression in Libya and Syria. Aside from demolishing simplistic western stereotypes reducing political appeal to a binary choice between concepts of Arabism and Islamism, the indigenous, bottom-up nature of the protests gave them powerful local legitimacy. Another game-changing legacy of the Arab Spring is its shattering of the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. The latter has been the mantra of almost every post-colonial regime in the Middle East and North Africa and looks set to endure for the foreseeable future in Saudi Arabia and some of the other Gulf States. However, its popular rejection (and support for alternatives) in Middle East countries means that one-party rule based on brute force alone is no longer sustainable, even if embattled regimes are prepared to fight for its survival in the short-run. Instead, successor (or reformed) governments will need to construct new sources of legitimacy based on the principles of consent rather than coercion. This will be particularly important as they grapple with the potentially- disruptive challenges of institutional restructuring and confront the enormous economic and demographic problems at hand. It will not be easy to address the immense socio- economic challenges of rampant unemployment, corruption, and perceived economic marginalisation. Successor regimes will be vulnerable to the heightened expectations of a public eager for betterment, and to the inevitable disappointment and disillusionment should material circumstances fail to significantly or rapidly improve. In the countries that have undergone a change of leadership, two major divisions have emerged. The first is divisions between the elites and the street. This is most evident in Yemen. Former allies of Saleh only abandoned him after the momentum created by the massive demonstrations in February and March. The highest-profile defector, Ali Mohsen, had previously been feared even more than Saleh himself in his capacity as Yemen’s top-ranking military commander. Although Yemen’s political factions coalesced into the Joint Meeting Parties coalition, they coexisted uneasily alongside the demonstrators, who accused the parties of attempting to seize control and shape the protests in their interest. The same bifurcation between the demonstrators and the elites – many still embedded in the ousted regime’s networks of power and patronage – underlies the tensions between SCAF and the Tahrir protestors outlined in the previous section. In the run-up to the November election, a succession of planned large-scale labour strikes will test the potency and depth of the gap between the people and the (new) regime. The second division is that within the elites as they grapple over the succession. This is also evident in the intra-elite machinations in Yemen but it is most pronounced in Libya. Tensions simmered between members of the NTC who had served in senior

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positions within Gaddafi’s Libya (including its chairman, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, and military head, Abdul Fatah Younis) and longstanding opponents of any engagement with the regime, between rival rebel brigades in Benghazi, Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains in western Libya, and between the NTC and an influential Islamist faction headed by Abdul Hakim Belhaj. Younis’ assassination on 28 July and Belhaj’s call (as military commander in Tripoli) for Jibril’s resignation in early September visibly articulated the fissures in the rebel movement, threatening its cohesion and suggesting that the battle for control in post-Gaddafi Libya may only be just beginning. Difficulties in forming a post-revolutionary cabinet incorporating NTC and Islamist figures are a portent of the splits that lie ahead. Both instances listed above illustrate some of the challenges and obstacles to democratic transition. The largely leaderless nature of the initial demonstrations insulated them from party weaknesses and constraints in the struggle to oust their leaders. However, this initial strength will likely become a liability if it prohibits the formation of political parties or organisations that can counter and dilute the influence of the powerful vested interests bent on maintaining the status quo. The fact that the transformative change originated outside the formal political organisations means demonstrators and activists risk playing a reduced and more confused role compared to previous examples of democratic transition. Hence, the leaderless weapon that proved so effective in overcoming the authoritarian legacy of segmented societies may become the Achilles Heel in the attempts to embed and take further the initial gains. Set against this backdrop, new authoritarian networks are mobilising and collaborating in a bid to contain the revolutionary fervour and shape it in acceptable directions. This in part reflects the fact that it is easier to rally around a common theme of opposition to a dictatorial leader than to articulate an alternative vision that appeals to all ideological strands and participants. Complex – and divisive – core issues concerning political orientation, approaches to development, minority rights and, not least, the balance between state and religion, were temporarily put aside in the mass gatherings in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Change Square in Sana’a, and the Pearl Roundabout in Manama. The question of what next – the ‘day after’ conundrum – has illustrated the durability of authoritarian legacies in the face of contested identity and religious and ideological fragmentation. Indeed, the successful example of a regime blunting and destroying a putative revolution (in Bahrain,) saw the Al-Khalifa adopt selectively violent and highly sectarian tactics that divided the opposition, exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions, and made horizontal mobilisation virtually impossible. On a region-wide basis, a form of counter-revolutionary pushback has been projected by Saudi Arabia. Saudi policy has been more nuanced that a simple opposition to any form of change, evidenced by official (if belated) support for a change of leadership in Yemen, Libya and Syria. Instead, policy-makers in the Kingdom have sought to channel the contours of unrest in ways that support their regional interests. This has been especially the case in their southern neighbour, Yemen, but elsewhere, pronouncements that Gaddafi and Assad had forfeited their ruling legitimacy by resorting to mass violence represented an attempt to distance the Kingdom from the tyrannical maintenance of power through coercion alone. Such pronouncements also divert regional and international attention from Saudi Arabia’s military intervention to crush the uprising in Bahrain, and provision of multi-billion dollar economic incentives to Egypt, Jordan and Oman.

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The high-profile role of Qatar and (to a lesser extent) the UAE in enabling the Libyan rebels to topple Gaddafi constituted a further example of the Gulf States attempting to channel revolutionary fervour in their interest. Their activist Libya policy provided them a welcome breathing space from the pressures generated by the Arab Spring that had been erupting uncomfortably close to home. It allowed the GCC states to position themselves against a repressive regime and make a high-profile stand against tyranny. Qatar, especially, aligned its support for the protection of human rights and democratic expression with the (western-led) international community. With the UAE having intervened in Bahrain in support of authoritarian rule, and in Libya in support of opposition to authoritarian rule, it underscored how the same concept of intervention can mean very different things in different contexts. * * * The course of events since February indicates elements of consensus and division in three constituencies – within the countries affected directly by the Arab Spring, within the west, and within the international community as a whole. It is still far from clear, and also too early to tell, if the Arab revolution will transition toward democratisation and the consolidation of its institutions and values. Significant obstacles remain unresolved in states weakened by the legacies of authoritarian rule, lacking autonomous civil society organisations and freely independent political parties, and unsure of the relationship between the citizen and the state inherent in concepts of citizenship. Reading the situation in terms of a narrowly procedural definition of democracy provides a misleadingly optimistic snapshot. In September alone, three of the most autocratic Gulf States are holding elections, to municipal councils in Saudi Arabia, to a toothless Federal National Council (lacking legislative power and featuring a limited and hand-picked electorate by the rulers) in the UAE, and in parliamentary by-elections to replace the opposition MPs who resigned in protest at the crackdown in Bahrain. But these elections do not mean that the Gulf is democratic, nor do they signify that the ruling families are prepared to cede or redistribute any meaningful power and decision- making authority. The elections in Tunisia and Egypt later in the autumn will provide a more legitimate test of the strength of participatory mechanisms and direction of public opinion in the post-revolutionary moment. Democratic transition is about much more than the mere conduct of elections, important though these are. They are about internalising and embedding concepts of social justice, inclusion and cohesion as a starting-point for reformulating the relationship between the state and its citizens. The development of a substantive democratic culture and the maturation of the political system will inevitably be a long process, as it has been elsewhere in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Multiple transitions need to occur on political, economic and social levels. The broad swathes of Arab societies that came out in support for the ending of authoritarian rule will need to maintain their commitment to reform in the face of lingering political violence by regime and non-state actors alike. The evidence from the ‘colour revolutions [29]’ in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 illustrates how revolutionary activists can become co-opted into the networks of elite-controlled political and economic power they sought to overthrow. This brings us to the crux of the issue – is the Arab Spring shaping up to be a true revolutionary moment or merely a change of elites that simply reproduces the inherited structures of power? Beyond the removal of the person of the dictator and his immediately family (most notably his sons), can the broader regime of 171

‘crony capitalists’ and networks of patronage be removed? Is the military a part of the ‘old regime’ and can it be trusted to oversee the move toward democracy, as, for example, in Egypt? Can a counter-elite emerge to challenge the existing elite, as has happened (democratically and without a revolution) in Turkey after 2002? How will the successor regimes cope with the massive socio-economic challenges, such as unemployment and economic exclusion, and with the inevitable disillusionment when people’s material situation fails to improve overnight? And will the international community support all countries in transition, rather than cherry-picking support where it is in their interests (such as Libya) and condoning state-repression where it is not (such as Bahrain)? These issues will only become clearer in the longue duree. What has happened so far in the Arab Spring should be read cautiously but should not be analysed too negatively, notwithstanding the challenges listed above. For the establishment and deepening of a democratic culture is a long-term project and is intergenerational. The events of 2011 across the Middle East and North Africa represent a powerful first step. The fall of autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and possibly Yemen and Syria is a key element of a larger process of transformation. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, is this the end of the beginning or the beginning of the end? A definitive guide will only become apparent in the years to come, and it is the case that what began as a popular revolution in January and February now looks increasingly like a case of elite transition. However, the genie has been let out of the bottle, and the transformative impact of new media and methods of communication is enabling citizens across the Arab world to reclaim the public sphere and shape public discourse around notions of accountability, justice, and freedom. These are powerful forces that have decisively shattered the barriers of fear that propped up tired and elderly autocrats for years and decades. Here, the participatory pressures and demands for political and economic freedom and reform are essential building blocks in the enabling environment that will sustain any eventual democratic transition. The galvanising effect of the outpouring of popular power and fury with the status quo means there is at least no going back to what went before; the exact nature of the structures that replace it remains to be seen.

Source URL: http://www.opendemocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen-david- held/arab-1989-revisited Created 09/27/2011 - 09:08 Links: [1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity [2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/democracy-and-government [3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/conflict [4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/international-politics [5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/oman [6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/morocco [7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/saudi-arabia [8] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/bahrain [9] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/yemen [10] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/libya [11] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/egypt [12] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/tunisia

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[13] http://www.opendemocracy.net/freeform-tags/social-innovation [14] http://www.opendemocracy.net/freeform-tags/arab-awakening [15] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/kristian-coates-ulrichsen [16] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/david-held [17] http://www.opendemocracy.net/http [18] http://www.opendemocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen-david-held-alia- brahimi/arab-1989 [19] http://www.opendemocracy.net/amanda-sebestyen/tunisia-brief-encounters-part-1 [20] http://www.opendemocracy.net/tom-francis/egypts-legal-revolution [21] http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/mohammed-hussainy/jordan- demands-democracy-not-disintegration [22] http://www.opendemocracy.net/valentina-bartolucci/moroccan-exception-and- kings-speech [23] http://www.opendemocracy.net/mark-taylor/libyas-challenge-democracy-under- gun [24] http://www.opendemocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen/bahrain-evolution-or- revolution [25] http://www.opendemocracy.net/christopher-m-davidson/bahrain-crisis-of- monarchy [26] http://www.opendemocracy.net/olga-aymerich/yemen-kidnapped-revolution [27] http://www.opendemocracy.net/vicken-cheterian/syria%E2%80%99s-broken- spring-damascus-report [28] http://www.opendemocracy.net/kristian-coates-ulrichsen/gulf-states-studious- silence-falls-on-arab-spring [29] http://www.opendemocracy.net/vicken-cheterian/arab-revolt-and-colour- revolutions [30] http://opendemocracy.net/license/c

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Egypt’s revolution: Patchwork or sweeping reform? Author: Samir Morkous Publishing Date: Tue, 27/09/2011 - 16:58

Egyptian revolutionary struggle represents a continuing state of revolt that has extended over eras throughout which Egyptians strove to overcome oppression and backwardness to establish a new, fairer and more equitable reality, and to allow for participation in a state that respects citizenship rights. This extended struggle received fresh momentum at the beginning of this year with the 25 January popular protests. We should have no qualms about drawing on historical experiences to adjust the path of our revolution, particularly with the myriad of analyses on the Egyptian political scene, which often drown out other serious attempts at systematic research and serious analysis. At this historical moment, we need to contemplate matters in a fashion that allows a secure political transition on a scientific basis. There are certain questions that we should answer as we build our new Egypt: What is the motive for change? Which powers have carried out the revolution? Which goals have they achieved and which remain to be achieved? Answering these questions requires understanding that change must be in the form of radical transformation in societal structures, including values, ideas, orientations and policies. Genuine change entails the introduction of core changes to the old regime and the installation of another one with fresh ideas and policies in all areas. This new regime should have novel objectives, methods, techniques and content, as well as new economic, political and cultural powers to replace the old ones, against which the revolution erupted. Put differently, at this historical moment, where on the revolutionary path do we stand? Have we managed to introduce change to our overall economic, political, cultural, intellectual, educational and artistic structures? Or, have we at least taken a step towards the creation of a comprehensively new regime? The project to establish a new Egypt – which I suppose is the goal of change – is still in the pipeline. I believe that ongoing discussions are still restricted to tiny details and haggles that demonstrate that old habits are still looming.

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The project for revolutionary change is caught between two contradictory alternatives: the inception of enhanced policies formulated by a team of bureaucrats and technocrats; or the setting up of a fully fledged development project led by genuine forces of change. A choice has to be made between old and new, but faltering at this stage often hampers advancement. source URL (retrieved on 11/10/2011 - 14:35): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/499993

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An international plan to eradicate dictatorship By Mark Palmer and Patrick Glen, Wednesday, September 28, 1:51 AM Moammar Gaddafi’s fall is the latest in a trend that began with the uprisings in Tunisia last winter that sent Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali skulking into exile and toppled Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak the following month. Movements toward reform saved other despots: King Mohammed VI of Morocco instituted constitutional reforms, while Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir promised not to seek the presidency in 2015. Against the backdrop of these successes, however, the Arab Spring has had bloody setbacks. Protests in Bahrain and Jordan were violently suppressed. In Syria, Bashar al- Assad’s regime has killed thousands of the brave citizens who have turned out to protest since March. Beyond that region, dictators who continue to oppress include the Castro dynasty in Cuba; the Lukashenko regime in Belarus; Zimbabwe’s independence-leader- turned-tyrant, Robert Mugabe; and the isolationist and paranoid regimes in Burma and North Korea. Simply put, international law has failed to keep up with the challenges posed by dictatorial regimes. The 20th century was, to an uncomfortable degree, defined by the depredations and mass slaughters perpetrated by dictators. And thus far there are few indications in the 21st century that history’s lessons have been absorbed. More often than not, international institutions stand by while political rights are eviscerated and mass killings are committed by regimes desperate to retain power. Many applauded the 2009 indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of Sudan’s Bashir, the first of a sitting head of state, yet he remains president and no country through which he has traveled has tried to arrest him. Libya’s Gaddafi has been indicted for crimes against humanity, but there seems to be little prospect of his answering the charges. What we think of as “international law” is a patchwork of conventions that deal with issues raised by dictatorships in a piecemeal, ineffective fashion. The Convention Against Torture, for instance, addresses politically motivated degrading treatment and torture, while the Genocide Convention targets the worst abuses a dictator could commit. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights delineates a base line of rights that must be protected but offers no clear mechanism by which to vindicate violations. The definition of crimes against humanity, as noted in the ICC’s Rome Statute, could be used to reach many of the abuses a dictator could commit, but the ICC’s efficacy is limited by jurisdictional requirements and the principle of complementarity. This patchwork leaves outside the purview of international institutions many political crimes a dictator would be likely to commit, while punishing certain heinous acts only once they have crossed an acceptably unacceptable threshold. What the international community needs is a framework that makes clear such forms of governance are violating international law. 176

The clearest way forward would be through a convention targeting dictatorship as an international crime. Rather than treating dictatorship as an ancillary issue in the prosecution of other crimes, this would focus attention on the types of atrocities and oppression in which dictators engage. These crimes include the curtailment of certain civil liberties — such as the freedoms of association, speech and press — state interference with institutions such as the judiciary and electoral bodies, and oppressive regulation of personal autonomy. Moreover, nations could incorporate this criminalization into domestic law, providing an additional forum in which to publicize violations and prosecute violators. This step would not represent a dramatic or elitist Western intervention in the internal politics of foreign nations. The rights already guaranteed by international law, under such conventions as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, serve as the framework of liberal democracy. A prohibition on dictatorship would simply provide a way to vindicate these rights in international or domestic forums. The Arab Spring and the march away from dictatorship over the past half-century undercut any claim that the rough outlines of democracy are somehow the province of the West. The final form may differ from the Middle East to Africa, just as democracy does not look the same in Washington, Paris and New Delhi. Yet that does not undermine the assertion that the fundamental core of democracy, the protection of political and civil rights by government, is something for which all people yearn. Eradicating dictatorship would make the world safer for all. It would lift the yoke from the necks of millions still laboring under authoritarian and dictatorial rule. And it would be the clearest vindication of the rights enumerated in the U.N. Charter in 1945. To paraphrase Gaddafi’s borrowed line, it is time to relegate regimes such as his to the dustbin of history. Mark Palmer, ambassador to Hungary from 1986 to 1990, is the author of “Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World’s Last Dictators by 2025.” Patrick Glen, a lawyer in Washington, is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/an-international-plan-to-eradicate- dictatorship/2011/09/21/gIQAv8Oy2K_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Middle East

September 27, 2011 Europe’s Oil Embargo Leaves Syria Urgently Seeking New Customers By CLIFFORD KRAUSS and NEIL MacFARQUHAR Syria is scrambling to find foreign buyers for its oil because of the tightening grip of a European embargo that has severely impeded Syrian oil sales, a vital source of earnings for Damascus. The effects of the oil embargo were beginning to pinch Syria as the United Nations Security Council renewed its efforts on Tuesday to issue a resolution condemning the repression of pro-democracy demonstrators there, although continued Russian opposition to any Security Council sanctions means the measure is unlikely to include any, diplomats at the United Nations said. Even without international sanctions coming from the United Nations, Europe and the United States have imposed their own. Syria normally exports about only 100,000 barrels of crude daily, but earnings from that oil have become more important to an economy battered by months of political unrest. Nearly all of the exports went to Europe until the European Union imposed sanctions this month, depriving the regime of President Bashar al-Assad of a quarter of its earnings denominated in foreign currency. The last oil cargo loaded from a Syrian port was on Friday, and potential buyers are unable to finance purchases of Syrian crude so far because of the sanctions, said Andrew Lipow, president of Lipow Oil Associates, a Houston consulting firm, and former Amoco trader. With the world economy slowing and Libya poised to begin exporting some oil again over the next month, supplies on the world market have become more plentiful in recent weeks, so there is no great urgency for an Asian buyer to do business with Syria, oil experts said. Syria has requested that foreign oil companies operating in Syria cut back production because excess crude is filling the country’s storage capacity. Some of those companies have already stopped their operations in Syria anyway — in order to comply with the sanctions. But oil experts say it is only a matter of time before the Syrians will be able to sell at least some of the oil, although they may have to sell at a discount. “There is almost certainly someone who will buy it,” said Michael C. Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a consulting firm. “In the past there have been trading companies that would launder oil for Iraq or Iran, for

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example. Some countries will buy gasoline from Caribbean refiners without knowing the origin of the oil.” Ayham Kamel, a Middle East analyst at Eurasia Group, another consulting firm, said one Indian oil company had already been contacted by the Syrians and was considering making purchases. Whether Syria is eventually able to sell its oil may depend on how hard the United States and Europe pressure Asian countries to abstain from buying. It may also depend on how strongly protests in Syria continue, since Asian buyers may not want to be perceived as backing a losing government, especially after the victorious rebel forces in Libya have said they will favor countries that supported them and not the Qaddafi government during their rebellion. Foreign oil companies operating in Syria include Royal Dutch Shell, the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation of India, Total of France and the China National Petroleum Corporation. Bill Tanner, a Shell spokesman, said the company had stopped production in Syria and was not supplying “any refined products to the Syrian government.” Before the oil embargo, Syria sold nearly two-thirds of its exports to Italy and Germany, with almost all of the rest going to France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Turkey. Shipping to Asia would cost the country at least $3 a barrel more in transportation costs. At the United Nations, four European members of the Security Council — Britain, France, Germany and Portugal — negotiated the language of a draft resolution on Syria, trying to test the limits of what Russia would accept, diplomats said. Until now, the Security Council has been able to issue only two statements about the uprising in Syria, falling short of the support needed for a full resolution, its strongest instrument. The decision to try again emerged from a meeting last Friday of the foreign ministers from the five permanent members on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. “Politically speaking, morally speaking, it will be progress, because we cannot accept the silence of the Security Council when we see the violence and repression in Syria,” Alain Juppé, the French foreign minister, said in an interview after the meeting. In his speech to the United Nations on Monday, the Syrian foreign minister, Walid Moualem, portrayed the government as having been on the brink of introducing reforms when a rebellion inspired by foreign radicals forced Syria to put aside change to maintain a united country. He warned that international sanctions would harm the daily lives of ordinary Syrians. Russia and China, as well as other emerging powers currently on the Security Council — India, Brazil and South Africa —were dismayed that the tough

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resolution passed on Libya in March was used as justification for the NATO bombing campaign. They appear determined not to allow a recurrence. Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, defended Syria in his speech on Tuesday before the United Nations, calling on the opposition to work with the Assad government. “It is inadmissible to boycott proposals on a national dialogue, stir up confrontation and provoke violence,” Mr. Lavrov said, “while neglecting albeit late but still achievable reforms proposed by President Bashar al-Assad.” He added, “It is important to encourage the authorities and the opposition to start negotiations and agree on the future of their country.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/world/middleeast/europes-oil-embargo- forces-syria-to-urgently-seek-new-customers.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print

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September 27, 2011 Fearing Change, Many Christians in Syria Back Assad By THE NEW YORK TIMES SAYDNAYA, Syria — Abu Elias sat beneath the towering stairs leading from the Convent of Our Lady of Saydnaya, a church high up in the mountains outside Damascus, where Christians have worshiped for 1,400 years. “We are all scared of what will come next,” he said, turning to a man seated beside him, Robert, an Iraqi refugee who escaped the sectarian strife in his homeland. “He fled Iraq and came here,” said Abu Elias, looking at his friend, who arrived just a year earlier. “Soon, we might find ourselves doing the same.” Syria plunges deeper into unrest by the day. On Tuesday, government troops attacked the rebellious town of Rastan with tanks and machine guns, wounding at least 20 people. With the chaos growing, Christians visiting Saydnaya on a recent Sunday said they feared that a change of power could usher in a tyranny of the Sunni Muslim majority, depriving them of the semblance of protection the Assad family has provided for four decades. Syria’s Christian minority is sizable, about 10 percent of the population, though some here say the share is actually lower these days. Though their sentiments are by no means monolithic — Christians are represented in the opposition, and loyalty to the government is often driven more by fear than fervor — the group’s fear helps explain how President Bashar al-Assad has held on to segments of his constituency, in spite of a brutal crackdown aimed at crushing a popular uprising. For many Syrian Christians, Mr. Assad remains predictable in a region where unpredictability has driven their brethren from war-racked places like Iraq and Lebanon, and where others have felt threatened in postrevolutionary Egypt. They fear that in the event the president falls, they may be subjected to reprisals at the hands of a conservative Sunni leadership for what it sees as Christian support of the Assad family. They worry that the struggle to dislodge Mr. Assad could turn into a civil war, unleashing sectarian bloodshed in a country where minorities, ethnic and religious, have found a way to coexist for the most part. The anxiety is so deep that many ignore the opposition’s counterpoint: The government has actually made those divisions worse as part of a strategy to ensure the rule of the Assad family, which itself springs from a Muslim minority, the Alawites. “I am intrigued by your calls for freedom and for overthrowing the regime,” wrote a Syrian Christian woman on her Facebook page, addressing Christian female protesters. “What does freedom mean? Every one of you does what she wants and is free to say what she wants. Do you think if the regime falls (God forbid) you will gain freedom? Then, each one of you will be locked in her house, lamenting those days.”

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The fate of minorities in a region more diverse than many recognize is among the most pressing questions facing an Arab world in turmoil. With its mosaic of Christians and Muslim sects, Syria has posed the question in its starkest terms: Does it take a strongman to protect the community from the more dangerous, more intolerant currents in society? The plight of Christians in Syria has resonated among religious minorities across the Middle East, many of whom see themselves as facing a shared destiny. In Iraq, the number of Christians has dwindled to insignificance since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, driven away by bloodshed and chauvinism. Christians in Egypt worry about the ascent of Islamists. Christians in Lebanon, representing the largest minority by proportion in the Arab world, worry about their own future, in a country where they emerged as the distinct losers of a 15-year civil war. This month, Lebanon’s Maronite Catholic patriarch urged Maronites, the largest community of Christians in the country, to offer Mr. Assad another chance and to give him enough time to carry out a long list of reforms that he has promised but never enacted. The comments by the patriarch, Bishara Boutros al-Rai, prompted a heated debate in Lebanon, which lived under Syrian hegemony for 29 years. A prominent Syrian (and Christian) opposition figure offered a rebuttal from Damascus. But Patriarch Rai, who described Mr. Assad as “a poor man who cannot work miracles,” defended his remarks, warning that the fall of the government in Syria threatened Christians across the Middle East. “We endured the rule of the Syrian regime. I have not forgotten that,” Patriarch Rai said. “We do not stand by the regime, but we fear the transition that could follow. We must defend the Christian community. We, too, must resist.” It is a remarkable insight into the power and persuasion of fear that the status quo in Syria these days remains preferable to many. The United Nations estimates that more than 2,600 people have died since the uprising erupted in mid-March in the poor southern town of Dara’a, and, given the desperation of some, even activists warn that protesters may resort to arms. Estimates of arrests run into the tens of thousands. Some Christians have joined the ranks of the uprisings, and Christian intellectuals like Michel Kilo and Fayez Sara populate the ranks of opposition figures. An activist in Damascus recalled over coffee at the upscale Audi Lounge how a Christian friend found himself hiding in the house of a conservative Muslim family in a town on the outskirts of Damascus. His friend was marching in a demonstration, along with others. When security forces arrived at the scene, shooting randomly at people, they ran for cover, hiding in the nearest houses and buildings, he said. When the tumult was over, his new host asked him what his name was. Scared, he thought for a moment about lying, but worried that he might be asked for his identification papers, he told the truth. To his surprise, the host and his family and all those hiding in the house began cheering for him. He had joined their ranks. The formula often offered of the Syrian divide — religious minorities on Mr. Assad’s side, the Sunni Muslim majority aligned against him — never captured the nuance of a struggle that may define Syria for generations. Even some Alawites, the Muslim sect from which Mr. Assad draws most of his leadership, had joined protesters. When a few 182

came to the central Syrian city of Hama to join huge demonstrations in the summer, they were saluted by Sunni Muslims with songs and poetry. But while the promise of the Arab revolts is a new order, shorn of repression and inequality, worries linger that Islamists, the single most organized force in the region, will gain greater influence and that societies will become more conservative and perhaps intolerant. “Fear is spreading among us and anyone who is different,” said Abu Elias, as he greeted worshipers walking the hundreds of stone steps worn smooth over the centuries. “Today, we are here. Tomorrow, who knows where we will be?” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/world/middleeast/fearing-change-syria-christians- back-bashar-al-assad.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

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ft.com Comment The A-List Simon Schama, September 27, 2011 America • Foreign Policy • Middle East Israel’s false friends on the US right It’s the eve of Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year, so in the interest of a happy one amidst the gathering global gloom can I make a request of Republican Christian evangelical politicians professing to be Friends of Israel? Next time the temptation to sound off on the best interests of the Jewish state strikes, CAN IT! Israel has enough on its plate without being exploited as campaign fodder by blowhards who, every time, they open their mouths on the subject reveal their shocking ignorance of its past history, present political reality and future security. According to Mitt Romney, Barack Obama has “thrown Israel under the bus”. Was he even listening to the president’s speech at the UN? To what, precisely could even the most hard line defender of Israeli foreign policy take exception, exactly? Or take Governor Rick Perry who lately has used every opportunity available, to denounce president Obama’s Middle East policy as some sort of betrayal of the Jewish state. This new-found vocalisation comes hard on Mr Perry’s response to a question about the potential for the Taliban to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons that consisted of comments so inanely incoherent that by comparison they made Sarah Palin look like Henry Kissinger. Somebody in Mr Perry’s entourage has discovered the phrase “moral equivalence” as the Governor can’t stop using it every opportunity he gets to assert that president Obama treats Palestinian grievances and Israeli concerns with impartiality. Just setting aside the fact that no-one in Israel (and in the Jewish community world wide) would deny that Palestinians have suffered tragically over the past half century, Mr Perry’s assertion that president Obama treats rocket attacks by Hamas and Jewish settlement construction on the West Bank as “equivalent” threats to peace is manifestly absurd and unfounded. But then Mr Perry – and others among the evangelicals aspiring to the White House like Michelle Bachmann – share the fundamentalist vision of the settlers themselves that they are fulfilling a Biblical covenant on the “Land of Israel” when they evict Palestinian villagers, demolish their houses, bulldoze their olive groves and embitter the possibility of any future co-existence of the two peoples in their own respective states. Mr Perry is fond of calling president Obama “naive” but every time he opens his mouth on this subject he reveals his comical unfamiliarity with what has actually been happening in Israeli-Palestinian relations over the past twenty years. Insisting on “direct negotiations” between the parties, he fails to notice that that is exactly what happened at Oslo and at Sharm el-Sheikh. In both cases the Palestine Liberation Organisation formally recognised Israel’s right to exist and to live in peace and security within mutually-agreed borders. When he upbraids president Obama for saying that the starting point of those frontiers ought to be the Green Line of 1967; that has been exactly the position of Israeli and US governments (including Republican administrations) for a long time; with adjustments made through territorial swaps. That was the basis on which Ehud Olmert - not exactly a pinko peacenik – and Tzipi Livni negotiated with Mahmoud Abbas and Fayyad Salam in 2008.

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If not made on the basis of the 1967 frontier, then it is incumbent on the likes of Mr Perry, Mr Romney and Ms Bachmann to say where secure boundaries might lie that would not involve the permanent Israeli occupation of the West Bank, inhabited as it is by a large Palestinian population? No Israeli government with any sense of a secure future – from Menahem Begin to Ariel Sharon to Olmert – has clung to the dangerous fantasy of annexation, involving as it must either the the subjugation of a permanently alienated population or their catastrophic and immoral displacement. But of course there are those among the most feverishly intransigent and irredentist Jewish settlers who dream and speak of nothing else and, like the Christian evangelicals, invoke the scriptural covenant promising “Judea and Samaria” to the Jews as enough of a warrant on which to base foreign and domestic policy. They represent the Israel Mr Perry, and Ms Bachmann have in mind when they purport to defend its future. There is of course, another Israel entirely, increasingly impatient with the settlers and with the ultra-orthodox who bear none of the burdens of serving in the military, yet sustain their religious schools from public funds while the rest of Israel’s people live in increasing economic distress as the furious mass demonstrations against Benjamin Netanyahu’s government made abundantly clear. But to the likes of the radio ranter Glenn Beck who had the chutzpah to present himself as “restoring courage” to Israel (I hadn’t noticed that it had lost it) near the Western Wall in August, those hundreds of thousands of Israelis must have been stooges of the “hard left”. According to polling done by the Harry Truman Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in May 2010, a clear and growing majority of Israelis are willing to dismantle the majority of West Bank settlements as part of a comprehensive peace policy. To Texas evangelicals like Pastor John Hagee who led the prayer assembly that kicked off Mr Perry’s campaign, and who presides over Christians United for Israel, this secular, tolerant, pragmatic, culturally daring ethnically diverse Jewish nation is not the authentic Israel at all. When Tel Aviv stages a massive and spectacular gay pride march, it turns into Sodom and is in the same state of “rebellion” against God’s commandment that Mr Hagee in his Jerusalem Countdown asserted had been the origin of anti- semitism. (Ah, so it’s the fault of the Jews, I see). This, of course, is the real divide in the politics of the Jews, as in the politics of Muslims and the politics of the US: between zealots and pragmatists; between those who ultimately shape their policy in accordance with revelation and those who depend on reason. When Mr Perry says “as a Christian I have a directive to support Israel”, we know that it’s the Campaign Manager Up There who is whispering in his ear. If these were normal times and he was just another doctrinally-driven fundamentalist we could leave him, and rest of the evangelical tribe to their own imaginings. But they are aspiring to the Presidency of the United States and are in a position, even before the campaign gets going in earnest, to do terrible harm to the people they profess to hold so close to their hearts. So leshana tova to you Governor Perry but if you want to give the Jews anything approaching a Happy New Year, for God’s sake give it a rest. The writer is a professor of history at Columbia University and best-selling author of books about America, Britain and Israel. http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2011/09/27/israels-false-friends-on-the-us-right/#axzz1z2ffuqg6 185

In Syria, defectors form dissident army in sign uprising may be entering new phase By Liz Sly, Monday, September 26, 12:33 AM WADI KHALED, Lebanon — A group of defectors calling themselves the Free Syrian Army is attempting the first effort to organize an armed challenge to President Bashar al-Assad’s rule, signaling what some hope and others fear may be a new phase in what has been an overwhelmingly peaceful Syrian protest movement. For now, the shadowy entity seems mostly to consist of some big ambitions, a Facebook page and a relatively small number of defected soldiers and officers who have taken refuge on the borderlands of Turkey and Lebanon or among civilians in Syria’s cities. Many of its claims appear exaggerated or fanciful, such as its boasts to have shot down a helicopter near Damascus this month and to have mustered a force of 10,000 to take on the Syrian military. But it is clear that defections from the Syrian military have been accelerating in recent weeks, as have levels of violence in those areas where the defections have occurred. “It is the beginning of armed rebellion,” said Gen. Riad Asaad, the dissident army’s leader, who defected from the air force in July and took refuge in Turkey. “You cannot remove this regime except by force and bloodshed,” he said, speaking by telephone from the Syria-Turkey border. “But our losses will not be worse than we have right now, with the killings, the torture and the dumping of bodies.” His goals are to carve out a slice of territory in northern Syria, secure international protection in the form of a no-fly zone, procure weapons from friendly countries and then launch a full-scale attack to topple the Assad government, echoing the trajectory of the Libyan revolution. In the meantime, the defected soldiers are focusing their attention on defending civilians in neighborhoods where protests occur, while seeking to promote further defections, he said. If the group achieves even a fraction of those aims, it would mark a dramatic turning point in the six-month standoff between a government that has resorted to maximum force to suppress dissent and a protest movement that has remained largely peaceful. There is still scant evidence that the defectors are anywhere close to presenting a serious threat to Assad. Diplomats and activists say it is clear that the Free Syrian Army does have a presence in several locations, including the central city of Homs, the remote northern area of Jabal Zawiya near the Turkish border, and the eastern town of Deir al- Zour.

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There have been frequent reports of firefights between defected soldiers and the regular army in these areas, but the numbers involved do not appear to be as large as the Free Syrian Army claims. “I don’t think the numbers are big enough to have an impact one way or another on the government or on the contest between the protesters and the government,” said U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford, speaking by telephone from Damascus. “The vast majority of protests are still unarmed, and the vast majority of protesters are unarmed.” There are nonetheless signs that the Free Syrian Army is expanding and organizing as reports of violent encounters increase. The group has announced the formation of 12 battalions around the country that regularly post claims on the group’s Facebook page, including bombings against military buses and ambushes at checkpoints. One of the most active units is the Khalid Bin Walid Brigade in Homs, where the presence of hundreds and perhaps as many as 2,000 defected soldiers is believed to be responsible for an intensified government offensive over the past two weeks in which neighborhoods have been shelled and dozens of civilians have died. According to defected soldiers and local activists, soldiers there are abandoning their units on a near-daily basis, encouraged in part by a tactic that involves ambushing patrols, shooting their commanders then convincing the rank and file to switch sides. The brigade also serves as a defense force in neighborhoods opposed to the government, guarding streets while protests take place and attacking the militias, known as shabiha, that are an integral part of the government’s efforts to suppress dissent. “We only kill them in self-defense,” said a captain in the brigade, interviewed via Skype, who requested that his name not be used, to protect his family from retribution. He and other defected soldiers say they have Kalashnikovs, rocket-propelled grenades and antiaircraft guns and can count on a steady supply of ammunition secured from sympathetic soldiers within the military. News reports of arms seizures on both the Lebanese and Iraqi borders suggest weapons are also being smuggled from neighboring countries. Though several activists and defected soldiers offered similar accounts of the Free Syrian Army’s activities, verifying them is impossible, because the Syrian government refuses to allow foreign journalists access to the country. The Free Syrian Army has an interest in amplifying its activities to encourage defections. Activists committed to preserving the revolt’s pacifism have a stake in playing down its relevance. The only admission by the government that defections are taking place has come in the form of a televised “confession” by one of the most prominent defectors, Lt. Col. Hussein Harmoush, who disappeared under mysterious circumstances in Turkey in late August then surfaced two weeks later on Syrian state television denouncing the opposition. Defections are not new, but until now most have consisted of small groups of disgruntled soldiers fleeing orders to shoot civilians, then taking refuge in local homes, where they are hunted down and captured or killed, often along with those who sheltered them.

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The phenomenon was causing so many civilian casualties that protest organizers this summer appealed to soldiers to not defect until they could count on sufficient numbers to make a difference, said Wissam Tarif, an activist with the human rights group Avaaz. Soldiers with the Free Syrian Army say they are hoping that point has now been reached. Large-scale or high-ranking defections are still unlikely, because the overwhelming majority of the officer corps belongs to Assad’s minority Alawite sect, said a defected first lieutenant who has taken refuge in the Lebanese border town of Wadi Khaled and makes frequent clandestine visits to Homs to support the Free Syrian Army’s activities. But among ordinary Sunni conscripts, frustration is building after six months of battling protesters. Many thousands of soldiers are deserting their units and going home simply because they want to see their families, said the officer, who uses the pseudonym Ahmad al-Araby to protect his family. Asaad, the dissident general, predicted that the sectarian imbalance within the army will ultimately tilt the battle in the defectors’ favor. “Ninety percent of the soldiers are Sunni, and their morale is bad,” he said. “Every day they are defecting, and the regime is in a panic because they know they are being destroyed from within.” Http://Www.Washingtonpost.Com/World/Middle-East/In-Syria-Defectors-Form- Dissident-Army-In-Sign-Uprising-May-Be-Entering-New- Phase/2011/09/24/Giqakef8wk_Story.Html?Wpisrc=Nl_Headlines

Middle East September 25, 2011 Saudi Monarch Grants Women Right to Vote By NEIL MacFARQUHAR King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia on Sunday granted women the right to vote and run in future municipal elections, the biggest change in a decade for women in a puritanical kingdom that practices strict separation of the sexes, including banning women from driving. Saudi women, who are legally subject to male chaperones for almost any public activity, hailed the royal decree as an important, if limited, step toward making them equal to their male counterparts. They said the uprisings sweeping the Arab world for the past nine months — along with sustained domestic pressure for women’s rights and a more representative form of government — prompted the change. “There is the element of the Arab Spring, there is the element of the strength of Saudi social media, and there is the element of Saudi women themselves, who are not silent,” said Hatoon al-Fassi, a history professor and one of the women 188

who organized a campaign demanding the right to vote this spring. “Plus, the fact that the issue of women has turned Saudi Arabia into an international joke is another thing that brought the decision now.” Although political activists celebrated the change, they also cautioned how deep it would go and how fast, given that the king referred to the next election cycle, which would not be until 2015. Some women wondered aloud how they would be able to campaign for office when they were not even allowed to drive. And there is a long history of royal decrees stalling, as weak enactment collides with the bulwark of traditions ordained by the Wahhabi sect of Islam and its fierce resistance to change. In his announcement, the king said that women would also be appointed to the Majlis Al-Shura, a consultative council that advises the monarchy on matters of public policy. But it is a toothless body that avoids matters of royal prerogative, like where the nation’s oil revenue goes. “We refuse to marginalize the role of women in Saudi society,” the king said in an address to the Shura, noting during the five minutes he spent on the subject that senior religious scholars had endorsed the change. Even under the new law, it was unclear how many women would take part in elections. In many aspects of life, men — whether fathers, husbands or brothers — prevent women from participating in legal activities. Public education for women took years to gain acceptance after it was introduced in 1960. King Abdullah, the 87-year-old monarch who has a reputation for pushing reforms opposed by some of his half-brothers among the senior princes, said the monarchy was simply following Islamic guidelines, and that those who shunned such practices were “arrogant.” Some analysts described the king’s choice as the path of least resistance. Many Saudis have been loudly demanding that all 150 members of the Shura be elected, not appointed. By suddenly putting women in the mix, activists feared, the government might use the excuse of integration to delay introducing a nationally elected council. Political participation for women is also a less contentious issue than granting them the right to drive, an idea fiercely opposed by some of the most powerful clerics and princes. Even as the king made the political announcement, activists said that one prominent opponent of the ban, Najla al-Hariri, was being questioned Sunday for continuing her stealth campaign of driving. Mrs. Hariri has been vociferous in demanding the right as a single mother who cannot afford one of the ubiquitous foreign chauffeurs to ferry her children to school. In recent weeks, a woman even drove down King Fahd Expressway, the main thoroughfare through downtown Riyadh, activists said. Municipal elections in the kingdom are scheduled for Thursday, but the campaign is almost over and the king said that women would be able to nominate themselves and vote “as of the next session.” Introduced in 2005, the municipal 189

councils have proved disappointing for those who had hoped they would create more political change. Saudi Arabia remains an absolute monarchy. Fouad al-Farhan, once jailed briefly for his blog critical of the monarchy, led a slate of young Saudis from the cosmopolitan commercial capital of Jidda, determined to run in this year’s municipal elections to use whatever democratic openings they might afford for change. When the final list of candidates was posted weeks ago, his name had been unceremoniously removed — without anyone from the Jidda governorate run by Prince Khalid al-Faisal calling him to explain, Mr. Farhan said. Despite the snail’s pace of change, women on Sunday were optimistic that the right to vote and run would give them leverage to change the measures, big and small, that hem them in. “It is a good sign, and we have to take advantage of it,” said Maha al-Qahtani, one of the women who defied the ban on driving this year, said of the king’s announcement. “But we still need more rights.” Women require the permission of a male sponsor, or “mahram,” to travel or undertake much of the commercial activity needed to run a business. They inhabit separate and often inferior spaces in restaurants, banks and health clubs, when they are allowed in at all. Women were granted the right to their own national identification cards in 2001, the last major step that many hoped would lead to greater public freedom, but it failed to materialize. The Saudi judiciary, a conservative bastion, has yet to allow female lawyers, a new phenomenon, to argue in court. And a royal decree issued earlier this year that women should be allowed to work in public to sell lingerie has not been enacted — leaving Saudi women to buy their bras from male clerks, who mostly hail from South Asia. Social media, heavily used in Saudi Arabia to start with, lit up with the announcement, with supporters endorsing it as “a great leap forward,” as one Twitter post put it. Some conservatives inveighed against it. “Muslim scholars believe it is un-Islamic to allow women to participate in the Shura council,” wrote Mohammad al-Habdan, one such scholar. In March, King Abdullah announced $130 billion in public spending over the next decade on measures like affordable housing, hoping for social peace after the first governments in the region were toppled. But uprisings have continued to challenge Arab governments. Around the Persian Gulf, many citizens of the wealthy monarchies jealously track the rights and largess granted in neighboring states. On Saturday, 19 men and one woman were elected to a legislative body in the United Arab Emirates. Last summer, Qatar granted a notable 60 percent pay raise to all state employees. Such regional and domestic pressures weighed on the Saudi monarchy to make some type of gesture. The one King Abdullah chose was less sweeping than

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many political activists had wanted, but one they hoped was a sign of more to come. “It is not something that will change the life of most women,” said Fawaziah Bakr, an education professor in Riyadh, noting that she had just held a monthly dinner for professional women who were buzzing with excitement about the change. “We are now looking for even more,” Mrs. Bakr said. “The Arab spring means that things are changing, that the political power has to listen to the people. The spring gave us a clear voice.” Nada Bakri contributed reporting from Beirut, Lebanon. Http://Www.Nytimes.Com/2011/09/26/World/Middleeast/Women-To-Vote-In- Saudi-Arabia-King-Says.Html?Nl=Todaysheadlines&Emc=Tha2

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09/24/2011 12:10 PM A Plea for the Palestinian Cause Abbas Appeals to the World's Conscience By Ulrike Putz At the UN on Friday, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas appealed for recognition of an independent Palestinian state in a statesmanlike speech. His appearance may have won Palestinians sympathy abroad -- but it does little to advance their cause. He kept the most dramatic statement for the end. "We have one goal," he said. "To be. And we will be." With these prophetic words, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas ended a 35-minute speech which will probably be seen as the highlight of his political career. Then, amid thundering applause from the delegates of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, he held up a copy of the application for recognition of an independent Palestinian state and for full membership of the United Nations which he had submitted to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon earlier. "I hope we shall not have to wait too long," said Abbas. It is time, he said, that the Palestinian people attained their freedom and independence: "Enough, enough, enough." Earlier, Abbas had said that the "moment of truth" had come. "My people are waiting to hear the answer of the world." Reaping Applause Abbas' display of emotion ended a speech that had been sober in tone but clear in its intentions. Abbas had presented his view of the Middle East conflict to the world's representatives in New York in calm words and without overblown rhetoric. He described in detail the suffering of the Palestinians and the injustice they experienced because of the "colonial military occupation," especially the Israeli government's settlement policy. He explained how the Palestinian hopes for peace had been "shattered on the rock of the Israeli settlement expansion project." Above all, however, Abbas stressed that the Palestinians' desire for self-determination was just and lawful. He concluded by saying that anyone who had "a shred of conscience" could no longer reject the Palestinians' bid for recognition of their state. Abbas did nothing less than appeal to the world's conscience. In return, he reaped great applause, with a majority of the delegates present giving him a standing ovation. But despite all the acclaim, Abbas' successful speech will do little to advance the Palestinians' cause. It seems certain that the Security Council, which has to approve the Palestinians' membership application, will postpone its vote for months, if not years. Earlier this week, the news leaked out that this may even happen with the Palestinians' consent. They would give the Security Council time to deal with the application, a representative of President Abbas' Fatah party said on Wednesday in New York. The application is opposed by Israel and by the US, which holds a veto as a permanent Security Council member.

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According to diplomats, the calculated delay could allow Israelis and Palestinians time to carry out negotiations on a peaceful solution again, without losing face. On Thursday, French President Nicolas Sarkozy revealed that there are already concrete plans for such negotiations under the auspices of the Mideast Quartet, which consists of the European Union, the UN, the US and Russia. The plan foresees the resumption of negotiations within a month, Sarkozy said. An agreement on borders and security should be reached within six months, with a final settlement being reached within a year. In a statement released on Friday, the Quartet urged the two sides to resume direct negotiations without delay. "Within a month, there will be a preparatory meeting between the parties to agree an agenda and method of proceeding in the negotiation," the Quartet proposed. A New Tactic But achieving peace within a year seems an ambitious goal. Then-US President George W. Bush tried the same thing with the so-called Annapolis process -- without success. The disappointment about all the fruitless negotiations drove the Palestinians to go it alone and inspired Abbas to appear before the UN plenary session. The initiative marks the transition to a new tactic. The Palestinians are attempting to beat the Israelis at their own game, by seeking to win the struggle for public opinion through skillful PR work. A team of young Palestinians who grew up abroad have been working in Ramallah for weeks on the project "Palestine 194" (a reference to the fact that a Palestinian state would be the 194th member of the United Nations) and preparing Abbas' performance in New York. Appearances before the plenary session of the United Nations are all about one thing: public perception. Not wanting to leave the stage to Abbas alone, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had announced in advance that he wanted to respond to the Palestinian leader's statement. The stage was set for a rhetorical duel which would do little to advance the peace process but would earn points for the winner. In the end, Abbas was the clear winner of the hotly anticipated showdown. The Palestinian leader avoided rhetorical tricks and made a convincing impression as an honest representative of a just cause. In contrast, Netanyahu came across as arrogant and aggressive. Right at the beginning of his speech, the Israeli prime minister called the UN General Assembly a "theater of the absurd" that "for too long has been a place of darkness for my country." Netanyahu compared the United Nations to a "house of many lies." He also made strong remarks aimed at Abbas and the Palestinians, claiming they had rejected or failed to respond to Israeli offers of peace. Netanyahu attacked Abbas' words about the "hopes and dreams" of the Palestinians, satirically recasting them as: "hopes, dreams and 10,000 missiles and Grad rockets supplied by Iran." Flimsy Offer Former US Assistant Secretary of State Jamie Rubin told the news station CNN that Netanyahu would have been better off giving his speech to an Israeli "debating society." Indeed, Netanyahu did not shy away from transparent maneuvers for the sake of his audience back home. He submitted an offer of talks to Abbas that can only be described as flimsy. "Let's meet here today in the United Nations," he told Abbas. It's obvious that peace talks cannot be conducted in such a fashion, but the supposed offer gives 193

Netanyahu ammunition. Next time, he can claim once again that he offered Abbas talks and he did not even deign to reply. Whether the Palestinian initiative at the UN will give new impetus to the peace process is unclear. It is equally uncertain whether future negotiations will be successful in the end. But what is already clear is that Abbas has proved himself through a statesmanlike appearance that few would have thought him capable of. His team of young strategists has raised the Palestinians' game in terms of their political PR. They staged a showdown on the East River and laid a trap for Netanyahu that he promptly walked into. In his speech, he came across as stubborn and pigheaded -- and hurt Israel's image abroad.

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,788154,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: Palestinians Celebrate UN Application http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-73241.html • Poker With UN Votes: Europe Divided on Palestinian Question (09/22/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787889,00.html • Palestinian Statehood?: A Litany of Diplomatic Failures in US and Europe (09/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787078,00.html • SPIEGEL Interview with Palestinian Prime Minister: 'An Independent Palestine Will Be Inevitable' (09/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787165,00.html

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Nuevas elecciones en el golfo Pérsico a la sombra de la primavera árabe

Los comicios de hoy en Bahréin y Emiratos Árabes Unidos ponen al descubierto las carencias democráticas que aún arrastran ambos países ÁNGELES ESPINOSA | Dubái 24/09/2011 Hoy ha sido día de elecciones en Bahréin y en Emiratos Árabes Unidos. A pesar del entusiasmo oficial, el ejercicio de participación ciudadana ha puesto al descubierto las carencias democráticas que aún arrastran ambos países. Por distintos motivos, ni las parciales para cubrir los 18 escaños vacantes en el Parlamento bahreiní, ni el experimento con grandes electores de la federación emiratí, satisfacen los requisitos mínimos o las ansias democráticas de sus respectivas poblaciones. En el caso del reino de Bahréin, el boicoteo del principal grupo de la oposición, el chií Wefaq, y la escasa participación de los 187.000 votantes registrados evidencian un problema de credibilidad en el sistema que quiso ser pionero en la transición a la democracia entre las monarquías petroleras. La desilusión de los bahreiníes con la democracia controlada inaugurada por el rey Hamad tras su llegada al poder en 1999 estalló a principios de año bajo el impulso de las revueltas árabes. Una población mayoritariamente chií salió a la calle para expresar su descontento con el monopolio de poder de la dinastía suní que les gobierna y el nepotismo y corrupción que ello alienta. La represión dejó una treintena de muertos, centenares de heridos y un millar de detenidos. Lo que es más grave, abrió una enorme brecha de desconfianza entre las dos comunidades religiosas, que se agranda además por la rivalidad entre las dos potencias regionales Irán (chií) y Arabia Saudí (suní). Los 18 diputados del Wefaq abandonaron el Parlamento (de 40 miembros) forzando la convocatoria de las parciales de hoy. Entre medias, el rey Hamad ha tratado de devolver las aguas a su cauce convocando un Diálogo Nacional que no sólo no ha convencido a los opositores, sino que les ha llevado a boicotear la cita. Incluso esa actitud resulta parca para los sectores más radicales que intentan resucitar las movilizaciones. Un nuevo intento de marchar hasta la desaparecida plaza de la Perla (demolida tras las protestas de marzo) ha encontrado esta noche la misma respuesta policial que el día anterior: balas de goma y bombas de sonido, según Reuters. Aún así, 59 candidatos se han presentado para los 18 escaños y 4 de ellos ni siquiera han tenido que ser votados porque no afrontaban competencia. En los siete emiratos que componen la federación de Emiratos Árabes Unidos el clima es mucho más tranquilo. Sin fisuras étnicas o religiosas, sus apenas un millón de nacionales gozan de un nivel de vida que otros árabes consideran envidiable y el mayor reto para las siete familias gobernantes es repartir la riqueza de forma que nadie se sienta excluido. Aún así, el mensaje de cambio de la llamada primavera árabe no ha pasado desapercibido.

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En un esfuerzo por involucrar a un mayor número de emiratíes en la gestión pública, los responsables han ampliado de 6.595 a 129.274 el número de miembros del colegio electoral que cada cinco años desde 2006 elige a la mitad del Consejo Federal Nacional. En total, 469 candidatos aspiran ocupar uno de los 20 escaños en liza en esa cámara sin poderes legislativos ni responsabilidades claras. Pero la gran pregunta que se hacen muchos de quienes no han sido designados para votar es ¿por qué no pueden hacerlo todos los emiratíes? Haber pedido elecciones directas y poderes legislativos para el Consejo Federal Nacional ha llevado a la cárcel a cinco blogueros (Ahmad Mansour Al Shehi, Nasser Ahmad Khalfan Bin Gaith, Fahd Salem Mohammad Salem Dalk, Hassan Ali Al Khamis y Ahmad Abdul Khaleq Ahmad) acusados de "amenazar la seguridad del Estado, alterar el orden público, oponerse al sistema de Gobierno e insultar a los dirigentes". Los cinco, que bajo el artículo 176 del Código Penal pueden ser condenados hasta con cinco años de cárcel, vuelven a comparecer ante el juez el próximo lunes después de que su juicio se interrumpiera el pasado 25 de julio. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Nuevas/elecciones/golfo/Persico/sombra/p rimavera/arabe/elpepuint/20110924elpepuint_6/Tes

Aisha Gadafi rompe el silencio pactado con las autoridades de Argel La hija del líder libio, refugiada en Argelia, ensalza a su padre y arremete contra las nuevas autoridades de su país IGNACIO CEMBRERO | Madrid 24/09/2011 Tenía sus primeras contracciones de parto, se disponía a cruzar la frontera de Argelia para exiliarse, pero no se aguantó e hizo allí mismo, en pleno desierto, una última declaración: "Que los occidentales y sus mercenarios tomen nota: Aisha Gadafi no se doblegará nunca ante su conspiración del mal". Acaba ahora de cumplir su promesa poniendo en aprietos al país anfitrión. Tras hacerles esperar 12 horas en el puesto fronterizo de Tinalkoum, bajo un sol de plomo, el propio presidente Abdelaziz Buteflika dio, el 29 de agosto, el visto bueno para que entrasen en Argelia Aisha, de 35 años, otros dos hijos de Gadafi, Hanibal y Mohamed, y Safia, la segunda esposa de Gadafi. En total eran unas treinta personas entre las que figuraban numerosos niños. Habían llegado hasta aquel remoto lugar del desierto en un autobús y un vehículo Mercedes. Ese mismo día Aisha dio a luz a una hija que nació allí, en la frontera, "sin asistencia médica", según informó el embajador de Argelia ante la ONU, Mourad Benmehidi, en una carta enviada al Consejo de Seguridad. Era el cuarto hijo de Aisha aunque uno de ellos falleció en Trípoli, durante la guerra, donde también murió su marido y primo, el coronel Ahmad Gadafi. Poco después del parto madre e hija fueron trasladadas al hospital de Djanet, en el sur de Argelia, para someterse a una revisión médica. Todos los Gadafi refugiados siguen 196

aún en esa ciudad sahariana, a 2.200 kilómetros al sur de Argel, alojados en una residencia de una gran empresa pública argelina. Aquel recibimiento sentó mal a las nuevas autoridades de Libia, el Consejo Nacional de Transición. "(...) todos los países deben comprender que salvar a la familia Gadafi no es una iniciativa que vayamos a celebrar", declaró su portavoz, Mahmoud Chamman. "Es muy imprudente". "Queremos que esas personas vuelvan aquí", concluyó. El Gobierno argelino dio todo tipo de explicaciones públicas. "Es un caso humanitario y se la ha dado un trato similar al de otros casos humanitarios", señaló el primer ministro argelino Ahmed Ouyahia. De paso Argel dejó claro que en ningún caso aceptaría a Moamar el Gadafi como refugiado. Aunque Trípoli ya estaba en manos de los rebeldes libios, Argelia se resistía entonces a reconocer al CNT como la nueva autoridad legítima. Lo hizo, por fin, de una manera un tanto alambicada, el pasado jueves al publicar un comunicado manifestando su deseo de trabajar "estrechamente" con la nueva Libia. Dos días después de este reconocimiento de facto, Aisha ha roto el pacto suscrito con sus anfitriones: no inmiscuirse en la vida política Libia. Cuando los rebeles están a punto de tomar Sirte y Bani Walid, los dos últimos bastiones de Gadafi, la hija hizo, en la noche del viernes al sábado, una arenga a través de Al-Rai, la televisión vía satélite siria, el canal de comunicación que también utilizan su padre y su hermano Saif. "¡Estad tranquilos!", les dice a los libios. "Vuestro gran líder está bien, sigue armado y lucha en diversos frentes". A continuación llama al "pueblo a resistir" y arremete contra los dirigentes árabes, empezando por los de Qatar, y contra tres de los máximos responsables del CNT a los que llama "traidores" por "haber roto su juramento de lealtad" al régimen de Gadafi. Sus palabras no habían suscitado reacción alguna de las autoridades argelinas. Aisha Gadafi tiene una doble formación. Es abogada, fue incluso defensora del dictador iraquí Sadam Husein, y militar. Alcanzó el rango de teniente coronel del Ejército libio. Fue también nombrada embajadora de buena voluntad por el Programa de Desarrollo Humano de la ONU que le retiró el título en febrero pasado. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Aisha/Gadafi/rompe/silencio/pactado/auto ridades/Argel/elpepuint/20110924elpepuint_7/Tes

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Abbas desafía ante la ONU a Netanyahu y a EE UU El presidente palestino pide ante la Asamblea General un Estado de pleno derecho.- El primer ministro israelí advierte que la paz no puede lograrse solo con resoluciones de Naciones Unidas ANTONIO CAÑO | Nueva York 23/09/2011 Apelando a la conciencia mundial y a la justicia de una causa defendida democrática y pacíficamente, Mahmud Abbas ha solicitado este viernes la admisión de Palestina como Estado de pleno de derecho de Naciones Unidas, un paso histórico que arrincona diplomáticamente a Israel y a su principal valedor, Estados Unidos, y que abre un futuro con menos esperanzas que incertidumbres y riesgos en Oriente Próximo. "Esta es la hora de la verdad, ha llegado el momento de la independencia para el pueblo palestino", ha dicho Abbas entre los aplausos atronadores de una Asamblea General que ha dejado claro de la manera más efusiva de qué lado está. Pero la Asamblea General no tendrá que votar por el momento. La petición palestina será tramitada primero en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, el único órgano con autoridad para admitir a un nuevo miembro y donde EE UU ha anunciado que hará uso de su derecho al veto para rechazarla en el que caso de que ésta obtuviese los nueve votos que se requieren para su aprobación, lo que no es seguro. La actuación de Abbas en la ONU, apasionada y comedida a la vez, tiene varias dimensiones y puede provocar distintas consecuencias. Desde el punto de vista simbólico y emotivo, su éxito fue clamoroso. Eso, en sí mismo, puede servir enormemente para potenciar una causa que languidecía y para obligar a las otras partes a romper el actual impasse. La paralización de los últimos años sólo ha servido para que Israel, que ha seguido construyendo asentamientos, se fortalezca y se extienda. Pero desde el punto de vista práctico, político y diplomático, esta petición de un Estado seguramente se va a estrellar con una realidad muy difícil de modificar: la complejidad de la negociación con Israel, que siente en peligro su supervivencia como Estado, y el apoyo inevitable de EE UU a su aliado judío, incluso con un presidente, como Barack Obama, que hizo un intento de ser neutral. También desde este aspecto, el de la viabilidad, Abbas estuvo prudente y conciliador en su discurso ante la Asamblea General. "No queremos aislar a Israel ni deslegitimarlo, sólo queremos legitimar al pueblo palestino", ha dicho. "Tiendo la mano a Israel para que aproveche esta ocasión... Estamos dispuestos a regresar inmediatamente a la mesa de negaciones", ha añadido. Ha descrito el futuro Estado palestino con algunas características que el actual Gobierno de Benjamin Netanyahu rechaza, como su soberanía dentro de las fronteras de 1967 -lo que incluye la actual Cisjordania, Gaza y el Este de Jerusalén- y el establecimiento de la capital en esa ciudad santa. Ha exigido también la paralización de los asentamientos como condición para establecer un diálogo auténtico. Pero ha mostrado flexibilidad para discutir todos esos asuntos, y otros como el del regreso de los refugiados palestinos, si Israel admite la existencia de Palestina como Estado.

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Criticas de Netanyahu a la propuesta palestina Netanyahu ha tratado igualmente de ser moderado en su intervención ante la Asamblea General, a continuación de la de Abbas. Y también ha obtenido aplausos, aunque mucho más tímidos, cuando se ha ofrecido a negociar con los palestinos los términos de "una paz justa y duradera" y propuso hacerlo ayer, aprovechando que los dos están en Nueva York. Ambos líderes han hecho un recuento de las calamidades sufridas por sus pueblos desde que en 1948 la ONU decidió la división de la antigua Palestina bajo ocupación británica en dos Estados, uno árabe y el otro judío. Abbas ha recordado las expulsiones, persecuciones y represión de que han sido objeto los palestinos en estos "63 años de sufrimiento". Netanyahu ha citado las agresiones árabes y las amenazas de exterminio, algunas tan recientes como las que el presidente de Irán, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, pronunció ayer en este mismo foro. Los dos han recorrido también las vicisitudes de varios años de negociación para concluir que fue el otro quien impidió un acuerdo. Los palestinos aceptaron el derecho a la existencia de Israel y renunciaron a su territorio anterior a 1967, sin que eso sirviera de nada. Los israelíes reconocieron a la Organización para la Liberación de Palestina y se retiraron de Gaza y de gran parte de Cisjordania, sin que eso sirviera para nada. Hoy el conflicto es tan inabordable políticamente como lo ha sido siempre y tan explosivo como lo ha sido siempre. Si se llega al momento en que EE UU tenga que vetar el sueño palestino, la ola de irritación y quizá de violencia en el mundo árabe está garantizada. Ni qué decir del prestigio de Obama en una región con la que intentó hacer las paces desde el primer día de su presidencia. Algunas cosas pueden, sin embargo, cambiar como resultado de la jornada que este pasado viernes se ha vivido en la ONU. Uno de los méritos de Abbas ha sido el de exponer con nitidez que este no es un asunto en el que haya que tener en cuenta derechos humanos, terrorismo o democracia. Abbas ha dejado clara la renuncia de su pueblo a la violencia y ha asegurado que "el Estado que queremos es un Estado donde regirá el imperio de la ley, la democracia, la libertad y la transparencia". Para Netanyahu, para Obama y para muchos israelíes debía de ser fácil deducir de esas palabras que esta es quizá la última oportunidad de que Israel haga la paz con un Estado palestino democrático y pacífico. La generación que suceda a Abbas en el liderazgo palestino, la generación que tenga que gobernar la frustración que pueda dejar un fracaso en la ONU, no va a volver a la Asamblea General con una rama de olivo en la mano. El primer ministro de Israel ha insistido en su discurso en que "los palestinos tendrán que hacer la paz con Israel si quieren tener un Estado". También Abbas ha hablado de paz, pero mientras en la paz israelí prima la seguridad, en la paz palestina prima el territorio. Abbas ha preguntado al mundo si va a permitir "que Israel nos ocupe para siempre". La representación del mundo, si así entendemos a esta Asamblea General, le ha dicho que no. Pero no es al mundo a quien tiene que preguntarle, sino a Israel. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Abbas/desafia/ONU/Netanyahu/EE/UU/el pepuint/20110923elpepuint_7/Tes • Abbas reclamará a la ONU que reconozca a Palestina como Estado • Abbas persiste en la ONU en su plan para Palestina pese a las presiones • Israel se siente bajo asedio • Las potencias intentan enfriar el afán palestino de ser un Estado de la ONU • La rebelión de Abbas en su ocaso 199

• EE UU y la UE muestran su oposición a que Palestina pida a la ONU su reconocimiento • El Cuarteto analiza los efectos de la petición palestina de adhesión a la ONU • Abbas insta a Israel a "no perder la oportunidad para la paz" • Abbas rechaza reabrir el diálogo con Netanyahu mientras no cumpla sus condiciones • Obama afirma que solo las negociaciones pueden llevar al Estado palestino • Los líderes mundiales presionan a Netanyahu y Abbas para que negocien • Miles de palestinos vitorean a Abbas en Ramala tras su discurso en la ONU • Las grandes potencias intentan que las partes se sienten a negociar • Congresistas de EE UU piden a 31 países que rechacen la petición de Palestina ante la ONU

Published 20:22 23.09.11 Latest update 20:22 23.09.11 Full transcript of Abbas speech at UN General Assembly Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas addresses UN General Assembly after submitting application for recognition to UN Chief Ban Ki-moon.

Mr. President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Mr. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, At the outset, I wish to extend my congratulations to H.E. Mr. Nassir Abdulaziz Al- Nasser on his assumption of the Presidency of the Assembly for this session, and wish him all success. I reaffirm today my sincere congratulations, on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian people, to the government and people of South Sudan for its deserved admission as a full member of the United Nations, wishing them progress and prosperity. I also congratulate the Secretary-General, H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, on his election for a new term at the helm of the United Nations. This renewal of confidence reflects the world’s appreciation for his efforts, which have strengthened the role of the United Nations. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, The Question Palestine is intricately linked with the United Nations via the resolutions adopted by its various organs and agencies and via the essential and lauded role of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East - UNRWA - which embodies the international responsibility towards the plight of Palestine refugees, who are the victims of Al-Nakba (Catastrophe) that occurred in 1948. We aspire for and seek a greater and more effective role for the United Nations in working to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in our region that ensures the inalienable, legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people as defined by the resolutions of international legitimacy of the United Nations.

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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, A year ago, at this same time, distinguished leaders in this hall addressed the stalled peace efforts in our region. Everyone had high hopes for a new round of final status negotiations, which had begun in early September in Washington under the direct auspices of President Barack Obama and with participation of the Quartet, and with Egyptian and Jordanian participation, to reach a peace agreement within one year. We entered those negotiations with open hearts and attentive ears and sincere intentions, and we were ready with our documents, papers and proposals. But the negotiations broke down just weeks after their launch. After this, we did not give up and did not cease our efforts for initiatives and contacts. Over the past year we did not leave a door to be knocked or channel to be tested or path to be taken and we did not ignore any formal or informal party of influence and stature to be addressed. We positively considered the various ideas and proposals and initiatives presented from many countries and parties. But all of these sincere efforts and endeavors undertaken by international parties were repeatedly wrecked by the positions of the Israeli government, which quickly dashed the hopes raised by the launch of negotiations last September. The core issue here is that the Israeli government refuses to commit to terms of reference for the negotiations that are based on international law and United Nations resolutions, and that it frantically continues to intensify building of settlements on the territory of the State of Palestine. Settlement activities embody the core of the policy of colonial military occupation of the land of the Palestinian people and all of the brutality of aggression and racial discrimination against our people that this policy entails. This policy, which constitutes a breach of international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions, is the primary cause for the failure of the peace process, the collapse of dozens of opportunities, and the burial of the great hopes that arose from the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel to achieve a just peace that would begin a new era for our region. The reports of United Nations missions as well as by several Israeli institutions and civil societies convey a horrific picture about the size of the settlement campaign, which the Israeli government does not hesitate to boast about and which it continues to execute through the systematic confiscation of the Palestinian lands and the construction of thousands of new settlement units in various areas of the West Bank, particularly in East Jerusalem, and accelerated construction of the annexation Wall that is eating up large tracts of our land, dividing it into separate and isolated islands and cantons, destroying family life and communities and the livelihoods of tens of thousands of families. The occupying Power also continues to refuse permits for our people to build in Occupied East Jerusalem, at the same time that it intensifies its decades-long campaign of demolition and confiscation of homes, displacing Palestinian owners and residents under a multi-pronged policy of ethnic cleansing aimed at pushing them away from their ancestral homeland. In addition, orders have been issued to deport elected representatives from the city of Jerusalem. The occupying Power also continues to undertake excavations that threaten our holy places, and its military checkpoints prevent our citizens from getting access to their mosques and churches, and it continues to

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besiege the Holy City with a ring of settlements imposed to separate the Holy City from the rest of the Palestinian cities. The occupation is racing against time to redraw the borders on our land according to what it wants and to impose a fait accompli on the ground that changes the realities and that is undermining the realistic potential for the existence of the State of Palestine. At the same time, the occupying Power continues to impose its blockade on the Gaza Strip and to target Palestinian civilians by assassinations, air strikes and artillery shelling, persisting with its war of aggression of three years ago on Gaza, which resulted in massive destruction of homes, schools, hospitals, and mosques, and the thousands of martyrs and wounded. The occupying Power also continues its incursions in areas of the Palestinian National Authority through raids, arrests and killings at the checkpoints. In recent years, the criminal actions of armed settler militias, who enjoy the special protection of the occupation army, has intensified with the perpetration of frequent attacks against our people, targeting their homes, schools, universities, mosques, fields, crops and trees. Despite our repeated warnings, the occupying Power has not acted to curb these attacks and we hold them fully responsible for the crimes of the settlers. These are just a few examples of the policy of the Israeli colonial settlement occupation, and this policy is responsible for the continued failure of the successive international attempts to salvage the peace process. This policy will destroy the chances of achieving a two-State solution upon which there is an international consensus, and here I caution aloud: This settlement policy threatens to also undermine the structure of the Palestinian National Authority and even end its existence. In addition, we now face the imposition new conditions not previously raised, conditions that will transform the raging conflict in our inflamed region into a religious conflict and a threat to the future of a million and a half Christian and Muslim Palestinians, citizens of Israel, a matter which we reject and which is impossible for us to accept being dragged into. All of these actions taken by Israel in our country are unilateral actions and are not based on any earlier agreements. Indeed, what we witness is a selective application of the agreements aimed at perpetuating the occupation. Israel reoccupied the cities of the West Bank by a unilateral action, and reestablished the civil and military occupation by a unilateral action, and it is the one that determines whether or not a Palestinian citizen has the right to reside in any part of the Palestinian Territory. And it is confiscating our land and our water and obstructing our movement as well as the movement of goods. And it is the one obstructing our whole destiny. All of this is unilateral. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, In 1974, our deceased leader Yasser Arafat came to this hall and assured the Members of the General Assembly of our affirmative pursuit for peace, urging the United Nations to realize the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, stating: “Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand”.

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In 1988, President Arafat again addressed the General Assembly, which convened in Geneva to hear him, where he submitted the Palestinian peace program adopted by the Palestine National Council at its session held that year in Algeria. When we adopted this program, we were taking a painful and very difficult step for all of us, especially those, including myself, who were forced to leave their homes and their towns and villages, carrying only some of our belongings and our grief and our memories and the keys of our homes to the camps of exile and the Diaspora in the 1948 Al-Nakba, one of the worst operations of uprooting, destruction and removal of a vibrant and cohesive society that had been contributing in a pioneering and leading way in the cultural, educational and economic renaissance of the Arab Middle East. Yet, because we believe in peace and because of our conviction in international legitimacy, and because we had the courage to make difficult decisions for our people, and in the absence of absolute justice, we decided to adopt the path of relative justice - justice that is possible and could correct part of the grave historical injustice committed against our people. Thus, we agreed to establish the State of Palestine on only 22% of the territory of historical Palestine - on all the Palestinian Territory occupied by Israel in 1967. We, by taking that historic step, which was welcomed by the States of the world, made a major concession in order to achieve a historic compromise that would allow peace to be made in the land of peace. In the years that followed - from the Madrid Conference and the Washington negotiations leading to the Oslo agreement, which was signed 18 years ago in the garden of the White House and was linked with the letters of mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel, we persevered and dealt positively and responsibly with all efforts aimed at the achievement of a lasting peace agreement. Yet, as we said earlier, every initiative and every conference and every new round of negotiations and every movement was shattered on the rock of the Israeli settlement expansion project. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I confirm, on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, which will remain so until the end of the conflict in all its aspects and until the resolution of all final status issues, the following: 1. The goal of the Palestinian people is the realization of their inalienable national rights in their independent State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, on all the land of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, which Israel occupied in the June 1967 war, in conformity with the resolutions of international legitimacy and with the achievement of a just and agreed upon solution to the Palestine refugee issue in accordance with resolution 194, as stipulated in the Arab Peace Initiative which presented the consensus Arab vision to resolve the core the Arab-Israeli conflict and to achieve a just and comprehensive peace. To this we adhere and this is what we are working to achieve. Achieving this desired peace also requires the release of political prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons without delay. 2. The PLO and the Palestinian people adhere to the renouncement of violence and rejection and condemning of terrorism in all its forms, especially State terrorism, and

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adhere to all agreements signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel. 3. We adhere to the option of negotiating a lasting solution to the conflict in accordance with resolutions of international legitimacy. Here, I declare that the Palestine Liberation Organization is ready to return immediately to the negotiating table on the basis of the adopted terms of reference based on international legitimacy and a complete cessation of settlement activities. 4. Our people will continue their popular peaceful resistance to the Israeli occupation and its settlement and apartheid policies and its construction of the racist annexation Wall, and they receive support for their resistance, which is consistent with international humanitarian law and international conventions and has the support of peace activists from Israel and around the world, reflecting an impressive, inspiring and courageous example of the strength of this defenseless people, armed only with their dreams, courage, hope and slogans in the face of bullets, tanks, tear gas and bulldozers. 5. When we bring our plight and our case to this international podium, it is a confirmation of our reliance on the political and diplomatic option and is a confirmation that we do not undertake unilateral steps. Our efforts are not aimed at isolating Israel or de-legitimizing it; rather we want to gain legitimacy for the cause of the people of Palestine. We only aim to de-legitimize the settlement activities and the occupation and apartheid and the logic of ruthless force, and we believe that all the countries of the world stand with us in this regard. I am here to say on behalf of the Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization: We extend our hands to the Israeli government and the Israeli people for peace-making. I say to them: Let us urgently build together a future for our children where they can enjoy freedom, security and prosperity. Let us build the bridges of dialogue instead of checkpoints and walls of separation, and build cooperative relations based on parity and equity between two neighboring States - Palestine and Israel - instead of policies of occupation, settlement, war and eliminating the other. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Despite the unquestionable right of our people to self-determination and to the independence of our State as stipulated in international resolutions, we have accepted in the past few years to engage in what appeared to be a test of our worthiness, entitlement and eligibility. During the last two years our national authority has implemented a program to build our State institutions. Despite the extraordinary situation and the Israeli obstacles imposed, a serious extensive project was launched that has included the implementation of plans to enhance and advance the judiciary and the apparatus for maintenance of order and security, to develop the administrative, financial, and oversight systems, to upgrade the performance of institutions, and to enhance self- reliance to reduce the need for foreign aid. With the thankful support of Arab countries and donors from friendly countries, a number of large infrastructure projects have been implemented, focused on various aspects of service, with special attention to rural and marginalized areas. In the midst of this massive national project, we have been strengthening what we seeking to be the features of our State: from the preservation of security for the citizen and public order; to the promotion of judicial authority and rule of law; to strengthening 204

the role of women via legislation, laws and participation; to ensuring the protection of public freedoms and strengthening the role of civil society institutions; to institutionalizing rules and regulations for ensuring accountability and transparency in the work of our Ministries and departments; to entrenching the pillars of democracy as the basis for the Palestinian political life. When division struck the unity of our homeland, people and institutions, we were determined to adopt dialogue for restoration of our unity. We succeeded months ago in achieving national reconciliation and we hope that its implementation will be accelerated in the coming weeks. The core pillar of this reconciliation was to turn to the people through legislative and presidential elections within a year, because the State we want will be a State characterized by the rule of law, democratic exercise and protection of the freedoms and equality of all citizens without any discrimination and the transfer of power through the ballot box. The reports issued recently by the United Nations, the World Bank, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) and the International Monetary Fund confirm and laud what has been accomplished, considering it a remarkable and unprecedented model. The consensus conclusion by the AHLC a few days ago here described what has been accomplished as a “remarkable international success story” and confirmed the readiness of the Palestinian people and their institutions for the immediate independence of the State of Palestine. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is no longer possible to redress the issue of the blockage of the horizon of the peace talks with the same means and methods that have been repeatedly tried and proven unsuccessful over the past years. The crisis is far too deep to be neglected, and what is more dangerous are attempts to simply circumvent it or postpone its explosion. It is neither possible, nor practical, nor acceptable to return to conducting business as usual, as if everything is fine. It is futile to go into negotiations without clear parameters and in the absence of credibility and a specific timetable. Negotiations will be meaningless as long as the occupation army on the ground continues to entrench its occupation, instead of rolling it back, and continues to change the demography of our country in order to create a new basis on which to alter the borders. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a moment of truth and my people are waiting to hear the answer of the world. Will it allow Israel to continue its occupation, the only occupation in the world? Will it allow Israel to remain a State above the law and accountability? Will it allow Israel to continue rejecting the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice and the positions of the overwhelming majority of countries in the world? Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I come before you today from the Holy Land, the land of Palestine, the land of divine messages, ascension of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the birthplace 205

of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him), to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people in the homeland and in the the Diaspora, to say, after 63 years of suffering of the ongoing Nakba: Enough. It is time for the Palestinian people to gain their freedom and independence. The time has come to end the suffering and the plight of millions of Palestine refugees in the homeland and the Diaspora, to end their displacement and to realize their rights, some of them forced to take refuge more than once in different places of the world. At a time when the Arab peoples affirm their quest for democracy - the Arab Spring - the time is now for the Palestinian Spring, the time for independence. The time has come for our men, women and children to live normal lives, for them to be able to sleep without waiting for the worst that the next day will bring; for mothers to be assured that their children will return home without fear of suffering killing, arrest or humiliation; for students to be able to go to their schools and universities without checkpoints obstructing them. The time has come for sick people to be able to reach hospitals normally, and for our farmers to be able to take care of their good land without fear of the occupation seizing the land and its water, which the wall prevents access to, or fear of the settlers, for whom settlements are being built on our land and who are uprooting and burning the olive trees that have existed for hundreds of years. The time has come for the thousands of prisoners to be released from the prisons to return to their families and their children to become a part of building their homeland, for the freedom of which they have sacrificed. My people desire to exercise their right to enjoy a normal life like the rest of humanity. They believe what the great poet Mahmoud Darwish said: Standing here, staying here, permanent here, eternal here, and we have one goal, one, one: to be. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, We profoundly appreciate and value the positions of all States that have supported our struggle and our rights and recognized the State of Palestine following the Declaration of Independence in 1988, as well as the countries that have recently recognized the State of Palestine and those that have upgraded the level of Palestine’s representation in their capitals. I also salute the Secretary-General, who said a few days ago that the Palestinian State should have been established years ago. Be assured that this support for our people is more valuable to them than you can imagine, for it makes them feel that someone is listening to their narrative and that their tragedy and the horrors of Al-Nakba and the occupation, from which they have so suffered, are not being ignored. And, it reinforces their hope that stems from the belief that justice is possible in this in this world. The loss of hope is the most ferocious enemy of peace and despair is the strongest ally of extremism. I say: The time has come for my courageous and proud people, after decades of displacement and colonial occupation and ceaseless suffering, to live like other peoples of the earth, free in a sovereign and independent homeland. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

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I would like to inform you that, before delivering this statement, I submitted, in my capacity as the President of the State of Palestine and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, an application for the admission of Palestine on the basis of the 4 June 1967 borders, with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital, as a full member of the United Nations. I call upon Mr. Secretary-General to expedite transmittal of our request to the Security Council, and I call upon the distinguished members of the Security Council to vote in favor of our full membership. I also call upon the States that did not recognized the State of Palestine as yet to do so. Excellencies,Ladies and Gentlemen, The support of the countries of the world for our endeavor is a victory for truth,freedom, justice, law and international legitimacy, and it provides tremendous support for the peace option and enhances the chances of success of the negotiations. Excellencies,Ladies and Gentlemen, Your support for the establishment of the State of Palestine and for its admission to the United Nations as a full member is the greatest contribution to peacemaking in the Holy Land. I thank you. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/full-transcript-of-abbas-speech-at-un- general-assembly-1.386385

Las grandes potencias intentan que las partes se sienten a negociar Abbas: "Somos el último pueblo en estar ocupado" Netanyahu: "La verdad es que los palestinos quieren un Estado sin paz" 'El mundo tiene la palabra', análisis de JAVIER VALENZUELA Israelíes y palestinos, el corazón de un conflicto

Las grandes potencias intentan que las partes se sienten a negociar Israelíes y palestinos deben reanudar el diálogo antes de un mes, según la UE EL PAÍS - Madrid - 23/09/2011 Tras el discurso del presidente de la Autoridad Palestina, Mahmud Abbas, el Cuarteto para Oriente Próximo, formado por la Unión Europea, Rusia, Naciones Unidas y Estados Unidos, consiguió un acuerdo para reclamar a israelíes y palestinos que reanuden las negociaciones antes de un mes y durante el plazo de un año, según ha anunciado esta noche la jefa de la diplomacia europea, Catherine Ashton: "Esperamos que ambas partes reaccionen positivamente [a la propuesta]".

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El Cuarteto también ha expresado su deseo de que se alcanzaran, en el plazo de tres meses, avances concretos en temas de seguridad y territorios, así como progresos sustanciales sobre estas materias al final de seis meses. El objetivo final del Cuarteto sería alcanzar un acuerdo de paz antes del fin de 2012, según la declaración difundida tras la reunión celebrada entre el secretario general de la ONU, Ban ki-Moon; la alta representante de la ONU; la secretaria de Estado de EE UU, Hillary Clinton, y el ministro ruso de Exteriores, Sergei Lavrov. El presidente francés, Nicolas Sarkozy, propuso esta semana que los palestinos sean admitidos como Estado observador en la Asamblea General de la ONU y que se establezca un plazo de un mes para la reanudación de las negociaciones bilaterales, seis meses para la obtención de un compromiso sobre seguridad y fronteras y un año para la firma de un acuerdo definitivo. Los palestinos se niegan a volver a la mesa de diálogo si Israel no paraliza antes los asentamientos y reconoce las fronteras de 1967, a lo que el Gobierno judío se niega. Por su parte, Israel rechaza los plazos. La posición española fue avanzada esta semana por la ministra de Exteriores, Trinidad Jiménez, quien intervendrá hoy en la Asamblea. Para España, Palestina debe constituirse como Estado, pero eso debe ir precedido de negociaciones para que el reconocimiento tenga efectos prácticos, informa Sandro Pozzi. El Gobierno español defiende la iniciativa de Abbas y espera que a partir de ahí se abra un proceso en el que los plazos no son importantes. España considera que la propuesta de Francia es razonable y constructiva, pero cree que por el momento hay que esperar a que se vote la iniciativa en el Consejo de Seguridad. En cualquier caso, esta semana ha quedado claro, según lo expuesto por varios países, especialmente Estados Unidos, que la creación de un Estado palestino surgirá en una votación de la ONU, sino como consecuencia de negociaciones entre israelíes y palestinos. Por ahora toda la atención está volcada en si el Cuarteto para Oriente Próximo consigue llevar a israelíes y palestinos a la mesa de negociaciones. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/grandes/potencias/intentan/partes/sienten/ negociar/elpepuint/20110923elpepuint_14/Tes

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El mundo tiene la palabra JAVIER VALENZUELA 23/09/2011 El mundo tiene ahora la palabra, no solo Israel y Estados Unidos, todo el mundo. En Nueva York, dirigiéndose a la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas, Mahmud Abbas acaba de pedir que todos y cada uno de los países se pronuncien sobre si creen que los palestinos tienen derecho a disponer de un Estado propio en el 22% de lo que fue su hogar durante siglos, en los territorios ocupados por Israel en 1967: Cisjordania, Gaza y Jerusalén oriental, que sería la capital. "Esta es la hora de la verdad, nuestro pueblo está esperando oír la voz del mundo", ha dicho Abbas. Esta demanda de aceptación de Palestina como miembro de pleno derecho de la ONU, ha señalado Abbas, no impediría una posible reanudación de las negociaciones con el gobierno de Israel. ¿Por qué habría de hacerlo? Basta, ha dicho Abbas, con que los israelíes cesen en seguir colonizando Cisjordania y Jerusalén Este para que las partes puedan volver a hablar directamente. Es una petición razonable: uno no negocia con alguien que sigue robándole la cartera. En este mismo escenario, Arafat pronunció en 1974 sus famosas palabras "He venido aquí con una rama de olivo y el fusil de quien lucha por la libertad. No permitan que la rama de olivo caiga de mi mano". Hoy Abbas ya no ha hablado de ningún fusil, hace lustros que la OLP renunció a las armas; el sucesor de Arafat solo ha esgrimido una "mano tendida" a Israel para negociar la paz en base a la existencia de dos Estados en las fronteras de 1967, y una petición al conjunto de la comunidad internacional para que rompa el bloqueo en la solución del tumor primario de Oriente Próximo. En las últimas semanas algunos propagandistas han intentado ningunear la posibilidad de que la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas reconozca, aunque sea como observador, al Estado palestino. Es curioso que intenten hacer olvidar al mundo que Israel basa su legalidad y legitimidad internacionales en una resolución de ese mismo organismo, la 181, que en 1947 decidió la partición en dos Estados del entonces Mandato Británico en Palestina. A los judíos se les adjudicó entonces el 56% del territorio, a los árabes el 43% y Jerusalén fue declarada una entidad especial administrada por la ONU. En Oh, Jerusalén, Dominique Lapierre y Larry Collíns contaron la ansiedad con que Ben Gurion y 650.000 judíos de Tierra Santa -la gran mayoría recién emigrados- vivieron el desarrollo de las votaciones de 1947 en Flushing Meadows, en las afueras Nueva York, y el júbilo con que terminaron celebrando la decisión de la Asamblea General. Escribieron Lapierre y Collins: "Toda la Jerusalén judía estaba despierta y manifestaba su alegría. Las sinagogas abrieron sus puertas a las tres de la madrugada y fueron invadidas por multitudes agradecidas. Hasta los judíos más agnósticos tenían aquella noche la impresión de sentir sobre ellos la mano de Dios (...). A través de toda Palestina, los judíos compartían el mismo regocijo. Tel Aviv, la primera ciudad judía del mundo, parecía una capital latina en una noche de carnaval. En cada kibutz la comunidad entera bailaba y rezaba". Las decisiones de la Asamblea General tenían entonces mucha importancia. ¿Hoy ya no? Los hijos, nietos y biznietos de aquellos pioneros israelíes que bailaron cuando la 209

Asamblea General aprobó la partición de Tierra Santa, rechazan ahora que ese mismo organismo reconozca, con más de seis décadas de retraso, el Estado palestino en un territorio mucho más pequeño que el que les asignaba la partición de 1947. Cierto es que los palestinos, y el resto de los árabes, se opusieron entonces a la división de Palestina (no entendían por qué judíos venidos del exterior debían adueñarse de la mayor parte de una tierra habitada por árabes -cristianos y musulmanes- durante siglos; no aceptaban que fueran ellos los que tuvieran que pagar los platos rotos del antisemitismo occidental, de las inquisiciones, los pogromos y el Holocausto), y cierto es que durante lustros negaron el derecho a la existencia de Israel. Pero en 1967 el Israel surgido de la guerra de 1947-48 ocupó militarmente el resto de Tierra Santa, o sea, Jerusalén Este, Cisjordania y Gaza, y desde entonces los palestinos no tienen en su propio hogar histórico ni una sola pulgada independiente y soberana. Los subsiguientes fracasos de los métodos violentos de lucha llevaron ya hace tiempo a buena parte del pueblo palestino a aceptar resignadamente que Israel es indestructible y a comprender que sólo la acción pacífica puede darles alguna victoria. Ya no sirven los viejos argumentos. El pretexto israelí de que los palestinos y los árabes querían "arrojar los judíos al mar" es obsoleto, hoy ya solo puede utilizarse tomando a una parte extremista por el todo. En su cumbre en Argel de 1988, la OLP aceptó la idea de la partición de Tierra Santa y, en consecuencia, la existencia de Israel, como acaba de recordar Abbas. En los acuerdos de Oslo de 1993, rubricados en la Casa Blanca de Clinton, esto se hizo absolutamente oficial. Países árabes como Egipto y Jordania tienen relaciones con Israel y la mismísima Liga Árabe, en el plan de paz que aprobó en Beirut en 2002, aceptó la idea de los dos Estados. Solo falta, pues, falta materializar la segunda parte de la decisión de Naciones Unidas de 1947: construir el Estado palestino en los territorios ocupados desde 1967. Y esto es lo que ha pedido Abbas en nombre de unos palestinos más que hartos de los pretextos israelíes para prolongar las negociaciones y continuar con la colonización -han pasado 20 años desde el comienzo del "proceso de paz" en la conferencia de Madrid de 1991- y de la falta de neutralidad de Estados Unidos. Es una jugada valiente e inteligente que pretende romper el inmovilismo político y diplomático en este conflicto. El mundo tiene ahora la palabra. Todos y cada uno tienen que retratarse. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/mundo/tiene/palabra/elpepuint/20110923e lpepuint_10/Tes

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El presidente Saleh vuelve a Yemen en pleno conflicto civil EE UU exige al mandatario que abandone el poder ÁNGELES ESPINOSA | Dubái 23/09/2011 El inesperado regreso este viernes a Yemen de su presidente añadió nuevas dosis de incertidumbre sobre el futuro de ese país. Alí Abdalá Saleh, que desde el 4 de junio se recuperaba de un atentado en Arabia Saudí, ha cogido por sorpresa tanto a sus opositores como a los diplomáticos que desde hace meses tratan de convencerle de que abandone el poder para evitar una guerra civil. La televisión estatal no ha difundido imágenes de su llegada, pero su llamamiento a una tregua en los enfrentamientos que se reiniciaron el jueves parece haber surtido efecto. "Estamos confundidos", reconoce desde Saná un embajador europeo que ha seguido la crisis desde el pasado febrero. "Todo está pendiente de un hilo. Nadie sabe qué va a hacer", añade en conversación telefónica. Como los yemeníes, los diplomáticos esperan ansiosos el discurso que el presidente va a pronunciar, el próximo lunes, con motivo del 49º aniversario de la revolución del Veintiséis de Septiembre y la proclamación de la República. De momento, Saleh ha logrado presentarse como el hombre que controla la situación y que ha parado los combates. "Desde las 11 de la mañana han cesado los cañonazos", asegura a este diario un residente en la capital yemení. Durante la madrugada, varios obuses causaron dos muertos entre los manifestantes que piden su cese en la plaza de la Universidad (rebautizada del Cambio) y otros cuatro entre las tropas anti-Saleh en el barrio de Hasaba. Aunque pasadas una horas, la web opositora Al Sahwa ha elevado a 18 los muertos por la caída del obús de mortero. Con ellos y la docena de víctimas del día anterior se supera ya el centenar de fallecidos en los enfrentamientos desde el pasado domingo. "El presidente pide un alto el fuego a todos los partidos políticos y militares. Solo el diálogo y las negociaciones pueden detener el derramamiento de sangre y conducir a un acuerdo", señala el comunicado difundido por la agencia oficial Saba tras la llegada de Saleh. No está claro qué papel está jugando Arabia Saudí, el poderoso vecino de Yemen que hasta ahora parecía apoyar los esfuerzos de Washington para que Saleh entregara el poder de forma pacífica. Resulta improbable que haya salido del país sin autorización. Sea como fuere, Washington aún espera que abandone el poder a cambio de inmunidad. "Exhortamos al presidente Saleh a transferir el poder y organizar elecciones presidenciales antes de fin de año", ha declarado el portavoz de la presidencia estadounidense, Jay Carney, citado por la agencia France Presse. Pero Saleh ha aceptado varias veces esa propuesta para rechazar firmarla en el último minuto. Altos funcionarios yemeníes atribuyen su actitud al temor a que su familia quede desprotegida del mismo modo que las de otros mandatarios árabes derrocados en los últimos meses. EE UU exige a Saleh que abandone el poder 211

La Casa Blanca ha exigido hoy al presidente yemení, Ali Abdulá Saleh, que firme el acuerdo propuesto por el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG) y abandone el poder. El portavoz de la Casa Blanca, Jay Carney, ha condenado el uso de la violencia en Yemen y ha lanzado un llamamiento a Saleh para que abandone el poder y permita que el país árabe "pase página". También el Departamento de Estado norteamericano ha instado a Saleh, a firmar el acuerdo con CCG y abandonar el poder. "Queremos ver a Yemen avanzar sobre la base de la propuesta del CCG, esté el presidente Saleh dentro o fuera del país ", ha dicho el portavoz del Departamento de Estado, Victoria Nuland. "Él puede hacer que eso suceda mediante la firma de este acuerdo, renunciando al poder y permitiendo a su país seguir adelante ", ha dicho. Menos contundente se ha mostrado la jefa de la diplomacia europea, Catherine Ashton, que pedido a todos los yemeníes a que mantengan calma y se abstengan de cualquier acto de violencia, y les ha instado a avanzar en el acuerdo político propuesto por los otros países del Golfo. "Tras el regreso del presidente Saleh a Yemen hoy, la alta representante insta al mandatario y a todas las partes en Yemen a mantener la calma y la compostura, abstenerse de cualquier acto de violencia y a mantener el curso hacia un rápido acuerdo político acorde a la iniciativa del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG)", han señalado los portavoces de Ashton. • EE UU exige a Saleh que abandone el poder • Una violenta jornada de represión en Yemen se salda con al menos 27 muertos • La policía mata a más de 20 manifestantes en Yemen • Dos muertos en Yemen unas horas después de la tregua • La escalada de violencia en Yemen amenaza con http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/presidente/Saleh/vuelve/Yemen/pleno/con flicto/civil/elpepuint/20110923elpepuint_1/Tes

JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA Hartos de trampas JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA 23/09/2011 Durante décadas, Israel fue el puesto avanzado de Occidente y sus valores en una región donde la democracia no estaba ni en el mapa ni en el vocabulario. Gracias a sus innegables logros, los israelíes aseguraron su prosperidad y seguridad en un contexto regional sumamente adverso. Con aquellos a los que temían o necesitaban, como Egipto o Jordania, alcanzaron la paz. Con otros, como Siria, sustituyeron las confrontaciones directas por otros conflictos de menor nivel asumidos por actores o peones interpuestos, en los territorios ocupados o Líbano. El resultado es que Israel ha disfrutado de un periodo de paz y seguridad mucho más prolongado de lo que la retórica antiisraelí dominante en el mundo árabe y musulmán habría hecho esperar. El mérito, sin embargo, ha de ser atribuido a Estados Unidos, no a la diplomacia israelí. La tarea de Washington ha sido doble. Por un lado, ha puesto al servicio de Israel su excelente red de relaciones bilaterales. Desde Rabat hasta Ankara, pasando por Riad y las capitales europeas, Estados Unidos ha logrado mantener como artículo de fe el principio de que la solución al conflicto solo podría venir de un acuerdo entre las partes alcanzado libremente y sin presiones externas, relegando con ello el papel de la

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comunidad internacional a la facilitación de las conversaciones y, eventualmente, a la oferta a las partes de garantías externas (económicas y/o de seguridad) si finalmente se alcanzara un acuerdo. Paralelamente, Estados Unidos ha venido bloqueando sistemáticamente cualquier intento de internacionalizar la solución del conflicto, es decir, de imponer a unas partes incapaces de ponerse de acuerdo una solución justa y duradera basada en los principios de derecho internacional más comúnmente aceptados. Así pues, cada vez que la solución al conflicto palestino ha amenazado con desbordar el marco bilateral y llegar al ámbito internacional, Estados Unidos ha acudido al rescate de Israel. Las cifras son elocuentes: entre 1972 y 2011, Estados Unidos ha tenido que ejercer su derecho de veto en nada menos que 31 ocasiones con el fin de que una resolución sobre Palestina que gozaba del apoyo mayoritario del Consejo de Seguridad no llegara a buen puerto. La ecuación resultante es bastante evidente. Por un lado, tenemos una increíble asimetría entre el poder negociador de israelíes y palestinos (pues unos lo tienen prácticamente todo y los otros prácticamente nada). Aunque demográficamente el tiempo juegue a favor de los palestinos, política y económicamente Israel es cada día más fuerte y sus asentamientos más numerosos y asfixiantes para los palestinos. Por otro lado, la comunidad internacional hace bastante trampas en su mediación: mientras que a los israelíes se les intenta persuadir con buenas formas y sin levantar la voz, a los palestinos se les presiona y exige sin disimulo alguno. Si a todo ello añadimos las dos magníficas muletas diplomáticas (regional e internacional) proporcionadas por Estados Unidos, el resultado final (un proceso de paz estancado) adquiere bastante sentido. No cabe extrañarse de que los palestinos se hayan cansado de jugar a un juego donde todas las cartas están marcadas de antemano y se hayan dirigido a Naciones Unidas a que les proporcione una baraja de cartas nueva. El gran revuelo desatado por la petición de Abbas de que Palestina sea reconocida como miembro de pleno derecho no es sino la prueba que confirma la hipocresía de Estados Unidos y de gran parte de los miembros de la Unión Europea, otra vez patéticamente divididos en un asunto clave para su relevancia internacional. Cuando más de 122 miembros de Naciones Unidas ya reconocen bilateralmente al Estado palestino, las presiones europeas sobre Abbas para que se eche atrás en su petición de lograr un estatuto de pleno derecho y se conforme a cambio con un estatuto de no miembro, amputado, entre otras cosas, de la capacidad de litigar ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia, resultan un sarcasmo. Por un lado, se hace el trabajo sucio a Estados Unidos para que Obama no tenga que desprestigiarse vetando una resolución mayoritaria del Consejo de Seguridad. Por otro, se hace el trabajo sucio a Israel impidiendo que los palestinos acudan a la justicia internacional (no vaya a darles la razón). A cambio, se espera, Netanyahu congelará los asentamientos, volverá a la mesa de negociaciones, tratará a los palestinos de igual a igual y aceptará la solución de dos Estados en menos de un año. Todo ello, por las buenas, sin presión estadounidense y en un año electoral para Obama. No parece que Abbas tenga tanto sentido del humor. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/hartos/trampas/elpepiint/20110923elpepiin t_4/tes CONOMIA/GRECIA/BARAJA/POSIBILIDAD/QUIEBRA/ORDENADA/QUITAS/E LPEPIECO/20110924ELPEPIECO_7/TES

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World

September 23, 2011 Palestinians Formally Request U.N. Membership By NEIL MacFARQUHAR UNITED NATIONS — Resisting American pressure, President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority formally requested full United Nations membership on Friday as a path toward statehood, rejecting arguments by the United States and Israel that it was not a substitute for direct negotiations for peace in the Middle East. Mr. Abbas handed a letter requesting the membership to Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Secretary General, before delivering his speech at the annual General Assembly. Mr. Ban was submitting the request to the Security Council. Speaking to Palestinian Americans who came to his hotel Thursday night, Mr. Abbas said the United States had aggressively sought to deter him from the move but that he had insisted on proceeding. “There are small countries in the world that have gained their freedom and independence but we still haven’t got ours,” Mr. Abbas told his guests. “So we are going to demand this right.” The request for Palestinian statehood on land occupied by Israel has become the dominant issue at this year’s General Assembly, refocusing global attention on one of the world’s most intractable conflicts. The Security Council will likely take up the issue in earnest next week, diplomats said, when the question becomes whether the United States and its allies can stall it. Washington is also working to prevent the Palestinians from gathering the nine votes needed for it to pass in the full council and thus avoid further wrecking the image of the United States in the Middle East by casting yet another veto against something Arabs want. The final vote is not expected to take place for more than a month. Among the 15 members, some are expected to stay solidly in the Palestinian camp including Russia, China, Lebanon, South Africa, India and Brazil. The United States is a solid vote against, and the five European members—Britain, France, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Portugal and Germany—are all question marks. The positions of Colombia, Nigeria and Gabon are also not entirely clear. The African Union supports membership, but it is not entirely clear if Gabon and Nigeria will go along. President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria did not mention the issue in his speech to the General Assembly, unlike many leaders from the developing world who support Palestine, and the statement by President Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon, was somewhat enigmatic. He said he hoped to soon see a Palestinian state, but noted that both the Palestinians and the people of Israel are friends of Gabon.

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In Latin America, Colombia is the only nation that does not have diplomatic relations with the Palestinians, and it is an American ally. In his General Assembly speech, President Juan Calderon seemed to echo the line from Washington, saying “progress can be made if consistent dialogue and effective mediation are favored.” In Europe, Germany tends to lean against, its relations with Israel always overshadowed by the legacy of World War II. France leans the other way, while Britain sits on the fence. Portugal and Bosnia have been close to the Palestinians and the Arab world in the past, but their support is not assured this time around. In theory, United Nations procedures demand that the special 15-member committee — one from each state — that studies the membership issue report back in 35 days, but nothing is more flexible than a deadline at the United Nations. Security Council members can stall things for weeks and weeks by requesting more information or by saying they are waiting for instructions from their capitals. Behind them, though, looms the policy enunciated by President Nicholas Sarkozy of France, who said that the Palestinians should get enhanced membership in the General Assembly, moving from an observer entity to a non-member observer state. Alain Juppe, the French foreign minister, said it would wait to see what happens in the Security Council before moving forward. By tradition, the General Assembly does not take up an issue when the Security Council is studying it and vice versa, but it is not impossible. The historic day of speeches engendered a sense that the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had come full circle. The Palestinians call their membership application a desperate attempt to preserve the two-state solution despite encroaching Israeli settlements, as well as an attempt to shake up the negotiations that they feel have achieved little after 20 years of American oversight. The question is whether trying to bring the intractable problem back to its international roots will somehow provide the needed jolt to get negotiations moving again. The general point of view of the Israeli government and its supporters is that the Palestinians and their Arab allies gave up the right to the United Nations resolutions detailing a two state solution by rejecting that original plan and waging war against Israel for six decades. But after every war, the United Nations resolutions and indeed the peace treaties with other Arab states have all reaffirmed the resolutions that outline the two-state compromise, starting with General Assembly resolution 181 in 1947. In the annex of their membership application submitted to Mr. Ban today, the Palestinians listed every United Nations resolution that envisioned a two-state solution that has not been implemented, they said. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/world/palestinians-submit-statehood-bid-at- un.html?_r=1&emc=na

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Yemen president's return could inflame violence, opponents warn Ali Abdullah Saleh was wounded in an assassination attempt in June and fled to Saudi Arabia for treatment Associated Press guardian.co.uk, Friday 23 September 2011 08.32 BST

An anti-government fighter in Sana'a where the Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is reported to have returned from Saudi Arabia. Photograph: Wadia Mohammed/EPA President Ali Abdullah Saleh has returned to the Yemeni capital after more than three months of medical treatment in Saudi Arabia in a surprise move that could further inflame violence between loyalist troops and forces backing his opponents.

Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Yemeni president. Photograph: EPA Saleh left Yemen for Saudi Arabia in June after he was seriously injured in an attack on his presidential compound in the capital, Sana'a. During his absence, the country slipped further into chaos after the protests that erupted in February demanding an end to his 33-year old rule. Sana'a has been gripped by street battles and exchanges of shelling between the elite Republican Guards, led by Saleh's son, and tribesmen opposing Saleh, as well as military units who had defected.

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Nearly 100 people have been killed in the violence since Sunday. Heavy clashes and thuds of mortars were heard throughout the night in Sana'a and into Friday morning. One person was killed overnight after mortars hit the square in central Sana'a where protesters demanding Saleh's resignation have been camped for months, a medical official said. Fifteen people were killed in several separate clashes on Thursday. The Yemeni public did not see Saleh's return on state television, which was running songs praising the president and broadcasting video footage of his many public appearances in the past. The programme said Saleh was in good health. Officials in his office said he had returned on a private plane. For the protest leaders, Saleh's return bodes ill for the already explosive situation. "His return means more divisions, more escalation and confrontations," said Abdel-Hadi al-Azizi, a protest leader. "We are on a very critical escalation." The anti-Saleh protesters have called for more rallies after Friday prayers. HTTP://WWW.GUARDIAN.CO.UK/WORLD/2011/SEP/23/SALEH-RETURNS- YEMEN-TELEVISION-REPORT?CMP=EMCGT_230911&

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09/22/2011 06:05 PM Poker With UN Votes Europe Divided on Palestinian Question By Carsten Volkery in New York He's the first European Council President to speak before the United Nations General Assembly -- but he'll be allowed to say precious little. Herman van Rompuy will avoid controversial commitments, serving only to highlight European discord over the Palestinian question. It's a historic premiere: For the first time, a European Council President will appear before the United Nations General Assembly. But protocol will allow Herman van Rompuy to make only a statement, instead of a proper speech, because he is not a head of state. Still, it's symbolic step in the path to a collective European foreign policy. Van Rompuy will speak after British Prime Minister David Cameron, and before Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The moment will highlight the top EU representative's dilemma, since there is no unified European position on the General Assembly's most important question -- whether to allow UN membership for Palestinians. On this matter van Rompuy can only speak with restraint. He will not surge ahead with his own suggestions for a new start to the Middle East peace process, unlike French President Nicolas Sarkozy. He also won't warn the Palestinians to avoid a showdown with the US in the UN Security Council. Both positions would be too controversial. The Belgian will name only the fundamental elements of a peace settlement (a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, Israel's special need for security). And he will recommend a renewal of talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Much Depends on Palestinian Approach The empty statement will show that van Rompuy wishes to avoid a specific foreign policy profile for fear of resentment among EU members. But it also shows how at odds the Europeans remain on the Palestinian question. The potential vote in the UN Security Council and in the UN General Assembly will expose these differences. "I don't believe that we will see a unified position of all 27 EU countries," says Nick Witney of the European Council of Foreign Relations. One important variable is which proposal the Palestinians submit on Friday. Will they insist on full membership, which would have to be discussed in the Security Council? Or will they be content with an improved observer status, which can be decided upon by the General Assembly? President Mahmoud Abbas is expected to submit a request for full membership after his UN speech on Friday in order to not disappoint his constituents back home. But Abbas does seem willing to submit to pressure from US President Barack Obama and most of Europe to accept a delay on the vote. This would give diplomats time to negotiate a new peace plan between Israel and the Palestinians, after which they could settle the question of UN membership.

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European Votes Remain Secret Which way European representatives might vote is likely to remain as protected as a state secret until the end. The 27 EU foreign ministers have all agreed not to make premature decisions in public. But past statements help construct a likely scenario: On an immediate vote on the Security Council, the German government would vote with the US in rejecting the Abbas plan. Following accusations of unreliable foreign-policy decisions in recent months, Berlin has a strong interest in staying by America's side. France and Great Britain will likely abstain from voting, with a view toward the US, though they're inclined to favorable decisions on Palestine. But everyone in New York is working feverishly to make sure this scenario doesn't come to pass. Should the Palestinians allow a delay on the vote in the Security Council, then the "Vatican option" could be an alternative. They could apply to have their status enhanced from "observer" to "observing non-member state." This status, also held by the Vatican, would let them enter into international agreements. This option would almost certainly pass the General Assembly, and the Security Council would have no veto. Berlin's Stance Unclear But even for the Vatican option, they would lack full European backing. About 20 of the 27 EU member states would probably vote for it. But a handful -- including the Czech Republic, Italy and the Netherlands -- would likely oppose any such status enhancement. Berlin's position remains unclear. Witney suggests that an overwhelming vote in favor of admitting the Palestinians would actually be useful for the Americans. "The US government would hate being isolated," the foreign policy expert says. "But it would give them more control over Israel again." If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saw the Europeans side with the Palestinians, Witney added, he would be forced to give greater consideration to his most important allies.

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787889,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Shrinking Influence: Germany's Woeful Security Council Record (09/21/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787322,00.html • SPIEGEL Interview with Palestinian Prime Minister: 'An Independent Palestine Will Be Inevitable' (09/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,787165,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Lip Service Is No Longer Sufficient for the Palestinians' (09/16/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,786684,00.html • Arab League Head Nabil Elaraby: 'What's Wrong with the Palestinians Appealing to the UN?' (09/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,784815,00.html 219

Pakistan backed attacks on American targets, U.S. says By Karen DeYoung, Updated: Friday, September 23, 7:55 AM The Obama administration for the first time Thursday openly asserted that Pakistan was indirectly responsible for specific attacks against U.S. troops and installations in Afghanistan, calling a leading Afghan insurgent group “a veritable arm” of the Pakistani intelligence service. Last week’s attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and a Sept. 10 truck bombing that killed five Afghans and wounded 77 NATO troops were “planned and conducted” by the Pakistan-based Haqqani network “with ISI support,” said Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The ISI is the Pakistani military’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency. “The government of Pakistan and most especially the Pakistani army and ISI” have chosen “to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy” to maintain leverage over Afghanistan’s future, Mullen testified during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta also testified. Mullen’s statement represented a sharp break with a long-standing administration policy of publicly playing down Pakistan’s official support for Taliban insurgents who operate from havens within its borders. U.S. officials have typically described Pakistan as a troublesome but valuable partner in the struggle against terrorism. The testimony capped a week of increasingly critical administration statements in the wake of the recent attacks and reflected a rising conviction that a new strategy is needed. Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar condemned Mullen’s allegations and issued what sounded like a veiled counter-threat, warning that the United States could ill afford to risk its relationship with Pakistan. “If they are choosing to do so, it will be at their own cost,” Khar told the Pakistani television network Geo on Thursday from New York City, where she is attending a U.N. General Assembly meeting. “Anything which is said about an ally, about a partner publicly to recriminate it, to humiliate it is not acceptable,” she said. Even as they denounced Pakistan, Mullen and Panetta insisted that the recent attacks, among the most brazen of the 10-year-old war, were an indication of increasing Taliban desperation as U.S. military pressure has diminished the insurgents’ ability to conduct all-out offensives. On Tuesday, a suicide bomber with explosives concealed in his turban killed former Afghan president and leading peace negotiator Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul.

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Rabbani’s killing is under investigation, said a U.S. official with access to intelligence from Afghanistan. He said he is “not aware” of any information linking the Haqqani group to that attack. Mullen and Panetta deflected lawmakers’ questions about what actions the administration is prepared to take to stop Pakistan’s support for insurgents. “We’ve made clear that we are going to do everything we have to do to defend our forces,” Panetta said. “I don’t think it would be helpful to describe what those options would look like and what operational steps we may or may not take.” “I think the first order of business right now is to, frankly, put as much pressure on Pakistan as we can to deal with this issue from their side,” Panetta added. The administration has said that “credible intelligence” shows that the Sept. 13 embassy attack, the truck bombing in nearby Wardak province and a June 28 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul were conducted by the group led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, based in the Pakistani tribal region of North Waziristan. U.S. military officials have said that the group, part of a number of Taliban affiliates with havens in Pakistan, poses the greatest threat to American troops in Afghanistan. In meetings over the past week with Pakistan’s military and intelligence chiefs, and with the country’s foreign minister, President Obama’s top national security officials have warned that U.S. tolerance has reached the breaking point. The statement Thursday was especially significant because it came from Mullen, who has been the administration’s point man for building relations with the Pakistani military and has met dozens of times in recent years with the Pakistani army’s chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. “I’ve done this because I believe that a flawed and difficult relationship is better than no relationship at all,” Mullen said. “Some might say I’ve wasted my time, that Pakistan is no closer to us than before and may now have drifted even further away.” Mullen said he disagreed with such critics, and he noted that “with Pakistan’s help, we have disrupted al-Qaeda and its senior leadership in the border regions.” But Pakistan’s use of insurgent groups as “proxies” for leveraging influence in Afghanistan, he said, has “eroded their internal security and their position in the region.” Pakistan’s public reaction to the warnings has been relatively subdued. Interior Minister Rehman Malik categorically denied ISI involvement in the embassy attack. “We have no such policy to attack or aid attacks through Pakistani forces or through any Pakistani assistance,” Malik told the Reuters news agency. A Pakistani intelligence officer said in an interview Thursday in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, before Mullen’s testimony that the recent allegations had “dealt a severe blow” to U.S.-Pakistan relations, which had only recently begun to thaw after the unilateral U.S. military raid in May that killed Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. The officer, who was not authorized to publicly present the official government position, said that “so far, U.S. authorities have not provided us with any tangible or specific evidence proving links between the ISI and the Haqqani network.” “This is very frustrating for Pakistani security circles, and it is creating an impression that a case is being prepared against Islamabad in Washington,” the officer said. 221

U.S. officials — and some Pakistani officials — countered that the administration has repeatedly provided Pakistan with evidence of the whereabouts of the Haqqani leadership in Miranshah, North Waziristan’s largest city, including surveillance photographs of their headquarters in a former school and evidence of meetings with ISI officials. CIA Director David H. Petraeus provided the ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, with specific evidence of Haqqani involvement in the embassy attack when they met at agency headquarters Tuesday, according to a second official who was not authorized to discuss intelligence matters. No U.S. citizens were harmed in the attack, in which seven Afghans were killed. The preferred administration option for dealing with Haqqani is for the Pakistanis to capture or kill the network’s top leadership or mount a joint operation with U.S. assistance, administration officials said. Second would be to provide intelligence to assist a U.S. ground operation or act to draw Haqqani leaders into unpopulated areas where drone strikes could target them. Pakistan remains unsure whether the administration “has decided to take its words to their logical conclusion” and strike on its own, either with drones or ground forces, one senior Pakistani official said. Some civilians inside Pakistan’s government have pushed for a reevaluation of policy toward the Afghan insurgents, the official said, but the power structure remains divided and “there are people arguing for business as usual.” Similar divides remain within the Obama administration, where stability in Pakistan is widely viewed as a key component of regional peace, although decreasing numbers appear to be advocating more patience. Although some lawmakers noted the sacrifices Pakistan has made in battling domestic insurgents and in capturing and assisting with drone targeting of al-Qaeda leaders, others warned of cuts in and conditions on U.S. military and economic assistance. “As far as I’m concerned,” Panetta said of conditional aid, “anything that makes clear to them that we cannot tolerate their providing this kind of safe haven to the Haqqanis and that they have to take action — any signal we can send to them, I think — would be important to do.” Correspondent Karin Brulliard in Islamabad contributed to this report. © The Washington Post Company http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pakistan-backed-attacks-on- american-targets-us-says/2011/09/22/giqaf0q6ok_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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At United Nations, a last-minute push for Mideast talks By Joby Warrick, Friday, September 23, 2:26 AM UNITED NATIONS — Diplomats struggled Thursday evening to devise a way to restart Middle East peace talks, apparently without success, as Palestinian leaders prepared the formal launch of their emotionally charged campaign for membership to the United Nations. With the U.N. bid just hours away, U.S., European and Middle Eastern officials huddled in hotel rooms to try resolve differences about how to limit the discord over the membership quest — and perhaps even leverage the crisis to force Israel and the Palestinians back to the bargaining table after nearly a year apart. The diplomatic wrangling occurred against a backdrop of pageantry and speechmaking at the U.N. General Assembly, including an incendiary address by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Iranian leader triggered a mass exodus from the U.N. chamber after he suggested that larger conspiracies were behind the Nazi Holocaust and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The search for a breakthrough on Middle East peace talks came on the eve of a scheduled speech by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, in which he is expected to petition the U.N. Security Council to grant membership to a Palestinian state. The move is opposed by Israel and by the Obama administration, which has argued that a statehood bid could hinder the resumption of direct negotiations to resolve the conflict. Obama administration officials, acknowledging fading hopes for stopping Abbas from proceeding with the membership bid, said the chief concern now is to prevent the Palestinian initiative from driving the two sides further part — and perhaps crushing any hopes for a peace deal in the foreseeable future. “Regardless of what happens tomorrow in the United Nations, we remain focused on the day after,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told reporters during a news conference with Tunisian Foreign Minister Mouldi Kefi. Clinton, who met separately with Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu late Wednesday, said both leaders expressed a commitment to resuming direct negotiations to resolve the conflict’s most vexing issues, including final borders, the right claimed by Palestinian refugees and their descendants to return to what is now Israel, and the status of Jerusalem. Yet it remained unclear whether the two sides could overcome the deep distrust that has stalled negotiations for more than a year and reach agreement on a Palestinian request that Israel cease building settlements in the occupied West Bank. Netanyahu imposed a temporary moratorium on settlements last year at some political risk, but when it was not extended, negotiations collapsed. 223

“They both recognize that there has to be a resolution of the outstanding issues to produce a functioning Palestinian state,” Clinton said. She added: “We will leave no effort or stone unturned in our commitment to achieving that.” Talks among members of the Quartet of Mideast peace mediators — the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations — ended late Thursday, but there was sufficient progress that a new round of discussions was scheduled for early Friday, just ahead of Abbas’s speech, a senior administration official told reporters. In his Wednesday address to the General Assembly, President Obama emphasized his “unshakable” support for Israel and rejected the Palestinians’ bid to have the United Nations recognize the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem as their state. The speech drew strong support from Netanyahu, who called Obama’s opposition to the Palestinian diplomatic effort a “badge of honor.” But some traditional allies, including France, proposed elevating the Palestinians’ status in the United Nations as a way of trying to break decades of stalemate, a move Obama and Israel oppose. In his remarks Thursday to the General Assembly, Ahmadinejad swiped at Israel and its supporters, who he said imposed “60 years of war, homelessness, terror and mass murder on the Palestinian people.” It was one of many incendiary lines in a 30-minute speech that blamed the West for slavery, two world wars and the global economic crisis. And he also told the Associated Press that the planes by themselves couldn’t have brought down the World Trade Center towers on Sept. 11, 2001. The Iranian leader, known for his bomb-throwing rhetoric, criticized the Obama administration for killing Osama bin Laden, suggesting that the al-Qaeda leader could have been the star witness at a trial that would reveal the true culprits behind the attacks. “Instead of assigning a fact-finding team, they killed the main perpetrator and threw his body into the sea,” Ahmadinejad said. Meanwhile, those who raised questions about Sept. 11 or the Holocaust, he said, were “threatened with sanctions and military action.” His words sent diplomats streaming for the exits, starting with the U.S. delegation and followed by dozens of Europeans and others. More than a third of the General Assembly seats were empty by the time Ahmadinejad finished speaking, to polite applause. The Iranian president had recently made conciliatory gestures to the West, including his support for a decision to free Americans Shane Bauer and Josh Fattal, who were arrested in 2009 after apparently straying into Iranian territory during a hike along Iraq’s border. But no olive branches were in evidence during his sharply worded speech, which was accompanied by finger-wagging and dramatic hand gestures. “Do these arrogant powers really have the competence and ability to run or govern the world?” he asked, referring to the United States and the former colonial powers of Europe. In an apparent reference to the Western-led military intervention in Libya, he added: “Can the flower of democracy blossom from NATO’s missiles, bombs and guns?” Staff writer Scott Wilson contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/at-united-nations-a-last- minute-push-for-mideast-talks/2011/09/22/giqallzvok_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Palestinians ready to put statehood on backburner in favour of peace talks Obama causes anger with veto pledge and staunch backing of Israel but Abbas continues to hold out olive branch

• Read the day's developments as they happened • Julian Borger: Obama plays it (electorally) safe Chris McGreal in New York and Harriet Sherwood in Ramallah guardian.co.uk, Thursday 22 September 2011 02.21 BST

The Palestinian leadership remains prepared to put statehood on the backburner at the UN security council in order to leave room for the revival of peace talks, according to senior Palestinian sources. The Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is said to have told Barack Obama at a meeting on Wednesday evening that he would agree to delaying a security council vote by several weeks, although the Palestinians are maintaining the line in public that any delays will be "procedural not political". The Palestinian offer comes despite Obama angering them by defending the US threat to veto the bid for statehood while praising revolutions in other parts of the Arab world. Obama told the opening of the UN general assembly in New York that negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians, not a security council resolution, was the way to ensure a lasting peace. But he was challenged by the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who said US leadership on the issue had failed and called for a new initiative involving Europe and Arab states to create a Palestinian state within a year. Sarkozy's intervention fits with a plan being mapped out by the Quartet of the UN, US, EU and Russia to restart negotiations and avoid a showdown in the security council. The French president said there should be talks without preconditions. But the Quartet plan faces a major obstacle from a Palestinian insistence that it require Israel to halt all settlement construction during talks. Obama said "the Palestinian people deserve a state of their own" and that vision had been delayed for too long. But he offered no new initiatives and, tellingly, did not repeat earlier calls – for which he has come under fire – for negotiations to be based on the borders at the time of the 1967 war, with agreed land swaps. He also made no mention of settlements. Obama went from his speech to a meeting with the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu. The US president was dismissive of Abbas's plan to ask the security council to recognise Palestine as a state. "Peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the UN – if it were that easy it would have been accomplished by now. Ultimately it is Israelis and Palestinians who must live side by side. Ultimately it is Israelis and Palestinians – not us – who must

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reach agreement on the issues that divide them: on borders and security, on refugees and Jerusalem," he said as Abbas shook his head. The Palestinians responded by saying they would not be deterred from pursuing their request to the security council for full membership of the UN, and that if he US used its veto they would seek a vote in the general assembly, which has the power to grant observer status. However, the Palestinians appeared to be pulling back from an immediate confrontation, having come under intense pressure from the Europeans as well as the Americans. Although Sarkozy staked out a position sympathetic to the Palestinian cause in his UN speech, he has advised Abbas to hold off from the security council move. Another senior Palestinian official, Nabil Shaath, said the Palestinians had an assurance from the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, that a vote in the security council would not be delayed for political reasons, but only by procedure. He said that if there was no request for the vote, or the US exercised its veto, then the Palestinians would go to the general assembly. But he declined to put a timescale on such a move. In a speech that was widely seen as his most supportive of Israel as president, Obama spoke about the US's "unshakeable" commitment to the Jewish state's security, and said that any lasting peace must recognise Israel's "very real security concerns". He spoke at length about Israeli suffering, but to the consternation of the Palestinians made no mention of the difficulties of life under occupation or the impact of expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Obama said: "Let's be honest: Israel is surrounded by neighbours that have waged repeated wars against it. Israel's citizens have been killed by rockets fired at their houses and suicide bombs on their buses. Israel's children come of age knowing that throughout the region, other children are taught to hate them. "Israel, a small country of less than 8 million people, looks out at a world where leaders of much larger nations threaten to wipe it off of the map. The Jewish people carry the burden of centuries of exile, persecution and the fresh memory of knowing that six million people were killed simply because of who they were. "Friends of the Palestinians do them no favours by ignoring this truth, just as friends of Israel must recognise the need to pursue a two-state solution with a secure Israel next to an independent Palestine." Obama's failure to offer any new hope of progress toward a Palestinian state stood in sharp contrast to his praise of the quest for freedom in parts of the Arab world and beyond. "Something is happening in our world. The way things have been is not the way they will be. The humiliating grip of corruption and tyranny is being pried open," he said. Sarkozy said the "miracle" of the Arab spring was a reminder of the moral and political obligation to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But without naming the US, he implied that its oversight of years of failed negotiations meant a new approach was required. "We can wait no longer. The method is no longer working? Change the method. Cease believing that a single country or a small group of countries can solve a problem of such complexity." Sarkozy called for a fresh set of negotiations, with wider involvement of European and Arab nations, based on a timetable that would see the borders of a Palestinian state 226

agreed within six months and a final deal within a year. "We should not look for the perfect solution. Choose the path of compromise," he said. But Sarkozy also said the Palestinians were mistaken to seek full recognition as a state at the security council. He warned there could be violence if the bid went ahead and was vetoed by the US. The French president said the Palestinians should instead ask to be admitted as an observer state to the general assembly, which would give them hope. Shaath criticised Obama's speech for failing to address what he said was the primary obstacle to peace negotiations: the continued construction of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. "The serious gap in the speech had to do with the absolute minimum for the peace process ... settlement policies, de-Arabisation of Jerusalem, the siege of Gaza," he said. Hanan Ashrawi, the Palestinian former negotiator who is part of Abbas's delegation to the UN, told the Israeli newspaper Haaretz she was angered by Obama's speech. "I did not believe what I heard, it sounded as if the Palestinians were occupying Israel. There was no empathy for the Palestinians, he only spoke of the Israeli problems," she said. "He told us that it isn't easy to achieve peace – thanks, we know this. He spoke about universal rights – good, those same rights apply to Palestinians. "[The Americans] are applying enormous pressure on everybody at the UN, they are using threats and coercion. I wish they would invest the same energy in an attempt to promote peace, not threats." Obama's speech was greeted with despair in the West Bank. Mustafa Barghouti, an independent politician and former Palestinian presidential candidate, said he was disappointed. "It clearly shows the double standards of the US when it comes to the Palestinian issue. Obama spoke about freedom, human rights, justice in South Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt – but not for the Palestinians," he said. "His version of reality is wrong. He claims that Israel is the victim in this conflict and that's not true. He doesn't see that this is not a struggle between two equal sides, but between an oppressor and the oppressed, and occupier and the occupied." A Ramallah shop owner, Marwan Jubeh, said: "Israel and the US are one and the same: the US is Israel, and Israel is the US. Israel doesn't want to give the Palestinians anything and Obama can't do anything without Israel because Congress is pro-Israel." In contrast, Netanyahu praised Obama when the two met after the US president's speech. The Israeli prime minister described Obama's pledge to block the Palestinian move at the UN security council as a "badge of honour". Netanyahu said he was ready for talks with the Palestinians but was sceptical about what they could achieve. "I think the Palestinians want to achieve a state but they're not prepared yet to make peace with Israel," he said. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/21/barack-obama-israel-palestinian- negotiations?cmp=emcgt_220911 &

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Global Business September 21, 2011 Western Finance Bodies Face Challenges in Funding Arab Spring Countries By MATTHEW SALTMARSH LONDON — As Arab Spring turns into autumn, Western lending institutions face highly sensitive issues in their quest to support economic and social development in countries struggling to emerge from decades of stagnation. Governments and institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the European Investment Bank have been quick to offer financial help to Egypt, Tunisia and the other Middle Eastern countries making tentative steps toward democracy. But whatever the motive behind the offers — benevolence, wanting to bolster Western- style governance or help Western businesses expand — the traditional model used by multilateral lenders looks increasingly unsuitable for the region and difficult to implement, analysts say. “There is a potential contradiction in that the economic model that these countries need, and that is on offer, has been discredited,” said Mark Malloch Brown, former deputy United Nations secretary general. “The liberal economic programs that these countries tended to adopt in recent years were compromised by the regimes, which enriched themselves and their friends.” Finding an economic model to replace crony capitalism is critical to addressing the region’s other pressing problems, which include high unemployment, budget shortfalls, high inflation, and a lack of investment. The I.M.F. estimates that Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia all have unemployment rates of about 11 percent, barely changed over the past two decades. Youth unemployment on average exceeds 40 percent. Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia and Syria are likely to experience recession this year as economic activity contracts following the uprisings, the Institute of International Finance said recently. An I.M.F report in May said the external financing needs of oil-importing Middle East and North African countries would exceed $160 billion over the next three years. This month leaders of the Group of 8 industrialized nations pledged $38 billion in new aid to help underpin the transition to democracy amid complaints that little of a $20 billion aid package promised in May had materialized. Cash-rich Arab states like Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have also offered billions, as well as increasing their own spending to try to head off domestic unrest. In a research report this month, Jean-Michel Saliba of Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimated that the oil-rich Gulf nations would spend $150 billion to accommodate domestic social pressures and in intra-regional fiscal transfers.

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The I.M.F. has said it could provide $35 billion in loans to the region, and the World Bank in May announced plans to lend $6 billion over two years to Egypt and Tunisia. Alongside the Gulf States, Europe may have a central role: It accounts for more than three-quarters of Tunisia’s exports of goods, tourism receipts, workers’ remittances and investment. One tool of support would be the European Investment Bank, which has a mission to support stability and nation-building in the Union’s partner countries. At the start of the summer, Union members agreed that the E.I.B. could increase lending to the Middle East in a process expected to be ratified soon. That would give the bank nearly €6 billion in financing available for the region until 2013. Over the summer, the E.I.B signed a €163 million loan to support road upgrades in Tunisia and a €140 million loan to help the Tunisian Chemicals Group, a major phosphates producer, build a fertilizer plant. Egypt is to receive about half of its funds for the region, followed by Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. The European Union is also offering Libya access to E.I.B. loans, should a new government seek assistance. Another vehicle will be the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, established in 1991 to help countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union make the transition to market economies and multi-party rule following the collapse of communism. In July, its board approved expanding into the Middle East, part of a process that could see it lend €2.5 billion in the region annually. An initial fund could start lending to Egypt next spring, focusing on agriculture, manufacturing, municipal services, urban transport and banks. The aim would be to draw in private investors to share risk. In a similar way, the World Bank’s private-sector investment arm, the International Financial Corp., is also mobilizing. It has worked in the region since the 1960s. Lars H. Thunell, its chief executive, estimates the I.F.C. will invest about $7 billion in the region over the next three years. But despite these efforts, the response from the region has been mixed. Much like South Africa in the aftermath of apartheid, Egypt appears wary of the motives behind the offers. “Egypt has been allocated $17.5 billion by different pledges and commitments,” said Gouda Adbel-Khalek, the Egyptian minister for solidarity and social justice. “Very little has materialized and lots of it is propaganda. Everyone is jockeying for position and trying to promote their own interests.” Part of the issue appears to be fear of being associated with lenders or policies linked to the West or the previous regimes. In Tunisia, for example, as late as September 2010, the I.M.F. was still lauding “sound macroeconomic management and structural reforms” of the regime of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. And the fund called for unpopular policies of containing public spending on wages, food and fuel subsidies. In June, Egypt’s transitional rulers on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces canceled plans to borrow $3 billion from the I.M.F. as well as fresh loans from the World Bank, arguing that the government had already trimmed its budget deficit. The

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council indicated that the loan conditions would have violated sovereignty, and it may have feared an outcry against the potentially restrictive terms. There is also a fear of handing yet more debt to the next generation. Europeans in particular will have to tread carefully with the new governments, having signed partnership deals with and courted the former dictators. Europe is also constrained by its fiscal crisis and is unwilling to win trust by opening its borders to North African immigrants. And unlike in the case of Eastern Europe, Brussels is unwilling to offer the Arab Spring countries the carrot of Union membership. That leaves little to offer but soft loans and market access. Meanwhile, pressure groups have been warning about the potential negative side effects of multilateral lenders expanding in the region. CEE BankWatch Network, a non-governmental organization that monitors international institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, argues that it is premature for the E.B.R.D. to finance North Africa “when it is by no means clear what kind of governments will follow the recently overthrown regimes.” In July, it warned that the E.I.B. and E.B.R.D. “operate on vague political mandates” from the European Union, and that “E.U. political institutions exercise limited control over the actual banking activities.” It has also criticized past E.I.B. investments in the region for being narrow, for example focusing on fossil fuels. In June, two other nongovernmental organizations, Counter Balance and Network for Development, raised concerns about the damage that Western aid could do to democratic transition. They argued that the outside institutions have been promoting the same unjust economic models against which the protests emerged. Philippe de Fontaine Vive, E.I.B. vice president for the southern Mediterranean, said his bank’s commitments would be based on “solid foundations” and its “40 years of experience of working in the region, as well as the efforts we have made to meet and discuss with the governments concerned.” “Our objective is to support more inclusive growth, notably small job-creating companies, transport links with less developed regions, social housing and urban development,” he said. The E.B.R.D. said in a statement that its investments “would take into account political and economic reform steps undertaken.” Sultan al-Qassemi, a fellow at the Dubai School of Government and prominent blogger based in the United Arab Emirates, said the money should be channeled into the region by a new Arab bank for development. “Without this a lot of the money will be lost” due to lack of corporate governance. Others argue that other institutions could take on this role, or that the recipient countries alone should monitor the funds. Anoush Ehteshami, professor of international relations at Durham University, said foreign investment would be essential to creating jobs and lifting growth but a new approach would be required. “Just carrying on with the old I.M.F.-type model is unlikely to be productive in the post- revolutionary environment, especially with the inherent need for state intervention,” he said. “The key for the West will be to work in partnership with these countries and other regional players like the Gulf states.”

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The countries would be best served, he added, by a variant of the model employed successfully in other emerging economies like China or Russia, whereby multilateral support is combined with subsidies to inefficient state industries until they are able to compete. Mr. Malloch Brown, now chairman of global affairs at F.T.I. Consulting, said similar transitions to democracy and market economies have typically taken a decade. “There will almost certainly be some messy bits en route,” he said. “But with the generational shift, and after the events in places like Tahrir Square, I’m sure they’ll get there.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/business/global/western-finance-bodies-face- challenges-in-funding-arab-spring-countries.html?src=recg

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Estados Unidos coordina con Turquía la transición en Siria Obama se reunirá hoy por separado con Abbas y con Netanyahu para intentar reanudar el diálogo bilateral. -Obama y Karzai afirman que seguirá la estrategia de diálogo en Afganistán ANTONIO CAÑO | Nueva York 21/09/2011 La Administración norteamericana trata de coordinar con Turquía una transición ordenada en Siria ante la evidencia de que el presidente Bachar el Asad será incapaz de mantenerse al frente pese a la represión desatada por su Gobierno contra las fuerzas opositoras que desde hace meses han tomado las calles como protesta. Ese fue el asunto principal que Barack Obama trató anoche con el primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, entre los contactos bilaterales que el presidente de Estados Unidos sostiene en la Asamblea General de la ONU, en Nueva York. "Los dos líderes han coincidido en la necesidad de incrementar la presión sobre el Gobierno de Damasco hasta satisfacer las aspiraciones del pueblo sirio", declaró un portavoz norteamericano tras la reunión. "Se puede decir que se ha llegado a un punto en que [tanto Obama como Erdogan] han perdido la paciencia con Asad", añadió. Aunque EE UU ha tratado hasta ahora de ser cuidadoso con la evolución de los acontecimientos en Siria, ante las consecuencias que estos pueden tener en Líbano, Israel, Jordania y otros países de la región, el deterioro de la situación ha llegado a tal punto en el que el riesgo de una guerra civil entre comunidades religiosas se ha hecho inminente. Washington no quiere actuar por separado para no dar argumentos a la demagogia antiimperialista de El Asad y considera que Turquía, un país musulmán con creciente influencia en Oriente Próximo, es el aliado idóneo para elaborar una estrategia conjunta. Turquía, un aliado de Siria en el pasado, rompió ya lazos con El Asad ante el grado de la violencia ejercida por su Gobierno y está interesado ahora en encontrar fórmulas que eviten una guerra civil en ese país o un clima de desestabilización crónica. Además, para Erdogan, el hecho de que Obama reclame su participación en la solución de esta crisis representa un éxito personal y una prueba más del poder que su Gobierno está adquiriendo como puente en las relaciones entre Occidente y el mundo árabe. Cada año por estas fechas, las citas de Obama en Nueva York son un indicador de los conflictos más acuciantes y de los países que más relevancia adquieren. Ayer, el presidente norteamericano se entrevistó con el presidente de Afganistán, Hamid Karzai, con Erdogan y con la presidenta de Brasil, Dilma Rousseff, además del nuevo líder libio y de los jefes de Gobierno que forman parte del Grupo de Contacto sobre Libia. Rousseff, quien con su discurso de hoy será la primera mujer en la historia que inaugure una Asamblea General de la ONU, se ha convertido ya en un interlocutor imprescindible de los grandes asuntos internacionales, acorde con el papel protagonista que Brasil ha adquirido.

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La entrevista entre Obama y Karzai estuvo dedicada fundamentalmente a ratificar la estrategia de buscar contactos con la oposición afgana y procurar una solución negociada al conflicto militar, a pesar del asesinato del hombre que hasta ahora estaba encargado del diálogo con los talibanes, el expresidente Burhanuddin Rabbani. "Esto no nos impedirá seguir creando un camino para que los afganos puedan vivir en libertad, seguridad y prosperidad", declaró Obama. Karzai admitió, por su parte, que el vacío que deja Rabbani va a ser muy difícil de llenar, por la personalidad excepcional del expresidente, pero insistió en que "continuaremos por la vía emprendida y triunfaremos". Obama entrará hoy ya plenamente a abordar la crisis desatada por la intención de la Autoridad Palestina de reclamar su reconocimiento como Estado, el tema principal de esta Asamblea General. El presidente se reunirá por separado con el presidente de la Autoridad Palestina, Mahmud Abbas, y con el primer ministro israelí, Benjamín Netanyahu, en lo que puede ser la última oportunidad de disuadir a los palestinos de que renuncien a su propósito y de que palestinos e israelíes reanuden el diálogo bilateral. HTTP://WWW.ELPAIS.COM/ARTICULO/INTERNACIONAL/ESTADOS/UNIDOS/ COORDINA/TURQUIA/TRANSICION/SIRIA/ELPEPUINT/20110921ELPEPUINT_ 2/TES

Obama pide garantías de que la transición libia impedirá el extremismo religioso "Seremos un estado vibrante que protegerá los derechos humanos", afirma el presidente del Consejo Nacional de Transición ANTONIO CAÑO | Nueva York 20/09/2011 • Los rebeldes arrinconan a la última resistencia gadafista • La 'sharía', según Libia • Erdogan, ante los libios: "El tiempo de regímenes dictatoriales ha terminado" • El líder del Gobierno rebelde promete un islam moderado y mayor cuota para las mujeres • Las tropas de Gadafi resisten una ofensiva coordinada de los rebeldes en dos bastiones • El Gobierno de Níger prohíbe salir del país a Saadi Gadafi • Los gadafistas resisten hasta la última bala • A la caza del gadafista • La revolución pendiente de Libia • Los mandatarios de Libia acuden a la asamblea de la ONU sin formar Gobierno • La división de los rebeldes enturbia la formación del nuevo Gobierno libio Barack Obama prometió el martes su apoyo para que las nuevas autoridades de Libia puedan estabilizar el país y reconstruir la economía, pero pidió a cambio garantías de que el régimen que se instaure sea democrático, respete los derechos humanos y no tolere el extremismo religioso. La posición del presidente norteamericano ha sido respaldada en una reunión del Grupo de Contacto sobre Libia celebrada en el marco de

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una Asamblea General de la ONU que ha dado formalmente la bienvenida a los triunfadores del levantamiento contra Muamar Gadafi. La bandera de la nueva Libia ha sido izada hoy en el mismo foro en el que hace dos años Gadafi pronunció un famoso y larguísimo discurso en el que recurrió reiteradamente a sus viejas soflamas contra Occidente e hizo exhibición de toda la extravagancia dialéctica y gestual que caracterizó siempre al depuesto líder. Ha sido una de esas jornadas que dan sentido a la ONU y que sirven para que esta organización encuentre compensación por tantos y tan frecuentes fracasos. Libia, como ha dicho Obama en su discurso ante el Grupo de Contacto, "es un ejemplo de cómo debe de actuar la comunidad internacional en el siglo XXI, con más naciones compartiendo la responsabilidad y los costes de los desafíos internacionales". Pero también ha sido una jornada en la que se han dejado claras las incertidumbres y preocupaciones que la situación libia aún despierta, no solo porque Gadafi sigue escondido y con capacidad potencial de tomarse revancha, sino porque Libia está aún amenazada por otras fuerzas internas que hacen el futuro incierto. El principal de los riesgos es que el nuevo régimen derive en el extremismo religioso o la venganza, como ha ocurrido con la persecución de los inmigrantes africanos que presuntamente trabajaron para Gadafi. Preocupación por las armas dejadas por los gadafistas "Mientras los libios encuentran fortaleza en su fe, una religión enraizada en la paz y la tolerancia, es necesario rechazar el extremismo religioso, que no ofrece más que muerte y destrucción", ha advertido Obama. El presidente ha expresado esa condición de forma muy clara en su reunión bilateral con el presidente del Consejo Nacional de Transición de Libia, Mustafá Abdel Yalil, y ha obtenido, según fuentes de la Casa Blanca, "una respuesta muy favorable". "Seremos un Estado vibrante que protegerá los derechos humanos", ha asegurado Jalil tras esa conversación. El líder provisional de Libia ha respondido también positivamente, según la versión norteamericana, a las otras demandas que Obama había hecho públicas ante el Grupo de Contacto: organizar una transición que "incluya a todos los sectores", garantizar "los derechos de las mujeres", aprobar una Constitución, imponer un estado de derecho y celebrar "elecciones libres y democráticas". EE UU quiere ver pruebas de la buena voluntad de las nuevas autoridades libias lo antes posible, y no solo en el terreno político. La Administración norteamericana está preocupada también por el arsenal de armas convencionales y químicas que Gadafi adquirió y que heredará el nuevo gobierno. Un portavoz de la Casa Blanca ha informado que se está trabajando, en colaboración con la ONU, para tener acceso a ese arsenal y eliminar las armas que sean consideradas de destrucción masiva. Con todas estas reservas, el Grupo de Contacto se ha ratificado hoy en su apoyo a Libia y en el mantenimiento de la ayuda militar de la OTAN mientras el peligro que representa Gadafi no desaparezca por completo. "Así como el mundo estuvo a su lado en la lucha por la libertad, seguiremos junto a ustedes en su lucha por conseguir la prosperidad", ha dicho Obama, quien ha anunciado, como muestra de ese compromiso, el regreso a Trípoli del embajador norteamericano. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/obama/pide/garantias/transicion/libia/impe dira/extremismo/religioso/elpepuint/20110920elpepuint_15/tes 234

Las tropas de Saleh golpean con fuerza el epicentro de la protesta Más de 70 personas han muerto en los últimos dos días en Saná ÁNGELES ESPINOSA | Madrid 20/09/2011 • La policía mata a más de 20 manifestantes en Yemen • La 'primavera árabe' cobra ímpetu • Una nueva jornada de enfrentamientos en Yemen se salda con al menos 20 muertos • Una violenta jornada de represión en Yemen se salda con al menos 27 muertos Fuerzas gubernamentales y de la oposición yemení mantienen una precaria tregua después de una jornada que ha dejado al menos una decena de muertos en Saná. "Están utilizando tanques para reprimir a los manifestantes pacíficos", ha declarado por teléfono Jaled, un residente en la capital yemení. Las víctimas de hoy elevan a cerca de 70 los fallecidos desde el domingo en los combates, en los que por primera vez se han implicado fuerzas leales al general disidente Ali Mohsen. La violencia ha vuelto a estallar ese día después de que los activistas por el cambio que desde hace ocho meses ocupan la plaza de la Universidad decidieran tomar la conocida localmente como glorieta Kentucky. El lugar, donde se halla el hospital Republicano, el principal de Yemen, estaba considerado una línea roja por las fuerzas leales al presidente Ali Abdalá Saleh, que han disparado sin contemplaciones contra los manifestantes y han causado la primera treintena de muertos. "Se trata de un lugar estratégico porque quien controla ese cruce controla tanto los movimientos Norte-Sur como Este-Oeste, pero lo que pudo ponerles nerviosos es que la casa de Ali Ahmed se encuentra a menos de 500 metros", explica un analista yemení que pide el anonimato. Ali Ahmed es el hijo mayor del presidente Saleh y quien está al frente de las fuerzas armadas desde que su padre fuera trasladado a Arabia Saudí a raíz del atentado que sufrió el pasado junio. Desde entonces, los yemeníes esperan una solución al estancamiento político a que ha llevado el rechazo de Saleh a ceder el poder, tal como le vienen exigiendo tanto los opositores de su país como una coalición de aliados internacionales que incluye a EEUU, la UE y el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo. "Cada vez estamos más molestos con Arabia Saudí porque su actitud está bloqueando el desenlace de la crisis", asegura Jaled recogiendo una opinión muy extendida. Para los opositores, la hospitalidad saudí constituye un endoso de Saleh. Sin embargo, un alto funcionario próximo al presidente discrepa. "Es mera solidaridad tribal", interpreta. Sea como fuere, la televisión oficial yemení utiliza esas imágenes para demostrar que Saleh sigue al frente y activo. En la última grabación, el lunes, se veía al mandatario yemení con la cara completamente pelada, fruto de la muda de piel tras las graves quemaduras que sufrió en el atentado. Pero aunque él se esté recuperando, su país se encuentra más dividido cada día.

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El papel de los militares Al propio Saleh no le pasó desapercibido que tras el Ramadán, el suyo no fue el único discurso a la nación que recibieron los yemeníes. El general Ali Mohsen, antiguo aliado y ahora rival, también compareció ante las cámaras de Suhail, la cadena de televisión que controla el clan opositor de los Al Ahmar. El hecho de que el militar hubiera sustituido la guerrera por traje y corbata enviaba un poderoso mensaje sobre sus ambiciones. Sin embargo, hasta ahora Ali Mohsen, que en una circunstancia sólo posible en Yemen sigue cobrando del Estado, había mantenido a sus hombres al margen de los combates. La situación cambió el domingo. Cuando las fuerzas oficialistas dispararon sobre los manifestantes, los soldados de la Primera División Acorazada (que se pasaron a la oposición con su comandante) respondieron. De ahí que los enfrentamientos hayan superado en intensidad los vividos en los meses anteriores. Pero tal como explicaba un observador occidental desde Saná, "los hijos de Saleh tienen mayor capacidad de fuego". Según su relato, destruyeron la casa de Ali Mohsen, varios de sus carros de combate y una de las residencias del jeque Al Ahmar. Aún así, la brutalidad de su respuesta (internet se llenó de imágenes de cuerpos destrozados por los lanzagranadas y el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja denunció choques armados en el propio hospital Republicano) les hacía perdedores ante la opinión pública. De ahí que Saleh autorizara al vicepresidente Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi, formalmente al frente del país, a negociar la tregua que se ha alcanzado hoy con la ayuda de varios embajadores extranjeros. HTTP://WWW.ELPAIS.COM/ARTICULO/INTERNACIONAL/TROPAS/SALEH/G OLPEAN/FUERZA/EPICENTRO/PROTESTA/ELPEPUINT/20110920ELPEPUINT_ 3/TES

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Americas September 19, 2011 U.S. Is Quietly Getting Ready for Syria Without Assad By HELENE COOPER WASHINGTON — Increasingly convinced that President Bashar al-Assad of Syria will not be able to remain in power, the Obama administration has begun to make plans for American policy in the region after he exits. In coordination with Turkey, the United States has been exploring how to deal with the possibility of a civil war among Syria’s Alawite, Druse, Christian and Sunni sects, a conflict that could quickly ignite other tensions in an already volatile region. While other countries have withdrawn their ambassadors from Damascus, Obama administration officials say they are leaving in place the American ambassador, Robert S. Ford, despite the risks, so he can maintain contact with opposition leaders and the leaders of the country’s myriad sects and religious groups. Officials at the State Department have also been pressing Syria’s opposition leaders to unite as they work to bring down the Assad government, and to build a new government. The Obama administration is determined to avoid a repeat of the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq. Though the United States did not stint in its effort to oust Saddam Hussein, many foreign policy experts now say that the undertaking came at the expense of detailed planning about how to manage Iraq’s warring factions after his removal. Syria is sure to be discussed when President Obama meets Tuesday with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on the periphery of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York, administration officials say. A senior administration official said the abandonment of Mr. Assad by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and European nations would increase his isolation, particularly as his military became more exhausted by the lengthening crackdown. Another Obama administration official said that with 90 percent of Syria’s oil exports going to Europe, shutting the European market to Damascus could have a crippling effect on the Syrian economy and could put additional pressure on Mr. Assad’s government. “Back in the 1990s, if Syria wanted credit and trade and loans that they couldn’t get from the United States, they went to the Europeans,” said Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Obama administration official. Now, Mr. Takeyh said, Europe has 237

joined the United States in imposing sanctions on Syrian exports, including its critical oil sector. Aside from Iran, he said, Syria has few allies to turn to. “The Chinese recognize their economic development is more contingent on their relationship with us and Europe than on whether Assad or Qaddafi survives,” he said, referring to the deposed Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. Eight months ago, the thought of Syria without a member of the Assad family at the helm seemed about as far-fetched as the thought of Egypt without Hosni Mubarak or Libya without Colonel Qaddafi. But intelligence officials and diplomats in the Middle East, Europe and the United States increasingly believe that Mr. Assad may not be able to beat back the gathering storm at the gates of Damascus. Mr. Obama’s call last month for Mr. Assad to step down came after months of internal debate, which included lengthy discussions about whether a Syria without Mr. Assad would lead to the kind of bloody civil war that consumed Iraq after the fall of Mr. Hussein. The shift moved the administration from discussing whether to call for Mr. Assad’s ouster to discussing how to help bring it about, and what to do after that. “There’s a real consensus that he’s beyond the pale and over the edge,” the senior Obama administration official said. “Intelligence services say he’s not coming back.” To be sure, Mr. Assad may yet prove as immovable as his father, Hafez al-Assad, was before him. Many foreign policy analysts say that the longer Mr. Assad remains in power, the more violent the country will become. And that violence, they say, could unintentionally serve Mr. Assad’s interests by allowing him to use it to justify a continuing crackdown. Many factors may make his exit more difficult than the departures of Mr. Mubarak in Egypt and President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. For one thing, both the United States and Europe have become more distracted in recent weeks by their economic crises. Furthermore, while Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and even Yemen all imploded, those eruptions were largely internal, with their most significant ramifications limited to the examples they set in the Arab world. A collapse in Syria, on the other hand, could lead to an external explosion that would affect Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and even Iraq, foreign policy experts say, particularly if it dissolves into an Iraq-style civil war. “The Sunnis are increasingly arming, and the situation is polarizing,” said Vali Nasr, a former Obama administration official in the State Department and the author of “The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future.”

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“Iran and Hezbollah are backing the regime,” Mr. Nasr said. “There’s a lot of awareness across the regime that this is going to be pretty ugly.” That awareness is fueling the desire to plan for a post-Assad era, Obama administration officials say. “Nobody wants another Iraq,” one administration official said on Saturday, speaking on the condition of anonymity. At the same time, the administration does not want to look as if the United States is trying to orchestrate the outcome in Syria, for fear that the image of American intervention might do the Syrian opposition more harm than good. In particular, administration officials say that they do not want to give the Iranian government — which has huge interests in the Syrian government and is Mr. Assad’s biggest supporter — an excuse to intervene. But one administration official pointed to the remarkable call earlier this month by Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for Mr. Assad to ease up on his crackdown as a sign that even Iran’s leaders are worried about the Syrian president’s prospects. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/world/americas/us-is-quietly-getting-ready-for-a- syria-without-an-assad.html?hp

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Middle East September 17, 2011 Tumult of Arab Spring Prompts Worries in Washington By STEVEN LEE MYERS WASHINGTON — While the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring created new opportunities for American diplomacy, the tumult has also presented the United States with challenges — and worst-case scenarios — that would have once been almost unimaginable. What if the Palestinians’ quest for recognition of a state at the United Nations, despite American pleas otherwise, lands Israel in the International Criminal Court, fuels deeper resentment of the United States, or touches off a new convulsion of violence in the West Bank and Gaza? Or if Egypt, emerging from decades of autocratic rule under President Hosni Mubarak, responds to anti-Israeli sentiments on the street and abrogates the Camp David peace treaty, a bulwark of Arab-Israeli stability for three decades? “We’re facing an Arab awakening that nobody could have imagined and few predicted just a few years ago,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a recent interview with reporters and editors of The New York Times. “And it’s sweeping aside a lot of the old preconceptions.” It may also sweep aside, or at least diminish, American influence in the region. The bold vow on Friday by the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, to seek full membership at the United Nations amounted to a public rebuff of weeks of feverish American diplomacy. His vow came on top of a rapid and worrisome deterioration of relations between Egypt and Israel and between Israel and Turkey, the three countries that have been the strongest American allies in the region. Diplomacy has never been easy in the Middle East, but the recent events have so roiled the region that the United States fears being forced to take sides in diplomatic or, worse, military disputes among its friends. Hypothetical outcomes seem chillingly present. What would happen if Turkey, a NATO ally that the United States is bound by treaty to defend, sent warships to escort ships to Gaza in defiance of Israel’s blockade, as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has threatened to do? Crises like the expulsion of Israel’s ambassador in Turkey, the storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo and protests outside the one in Amman, Jordan, have compounded a sense of urgency and forced the Obama administration to reassess some of this country’s fundamental assumptions, and to do so on the fly. “The region has come unglued,” said Robert Malley, a senior analyst in Washington for the International Crisis Group. “And all the tools the United States has marshaled in the past are no longer as effective.” The United States, as a global power and permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, still has significant ability to shape events in the region. This was

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underscored by the flurry of telephone calls that President Obama, Mrs. Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta made to their Egyptian and Israeli counterparts to diffuse tensions after the siege of Israeli Embassy in Cairo this month. At the same time, the toppling of leaders who preserved a stable, if strained, status quo for decades — Mr. Mubarak, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia — has unleashed powerful and still unpredictable forces that the United States has only begun to grapple with and is likely to be doing so for years. In the process, diplomats worry, the actions of the United States could even nudge the Arab Spring toward radicalism by angering newly enfranchised citizens of democratic nations. In the case of Egypt, the administration has promised millions of dollars in aid to support a democratic transition, only to see the military council ruling the country object to how and where it is spent, according to two administration officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss diplomatic matters. The objection echoed similar ones that came from Mr. Mubarak’s government. The government and the political parties vying for support before new elections there have also intensified anti-American talk. The officials privately warned of the emergence of an outwardly hostile government, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and remnants of Mr. Mubarak’s party. The upheaval in Egypt has even raised the prospect that it might break its Camp David peace treaty with Israel, with Egypt’s prime minister, Essam Sharaf, telling a Turkish television channel last week that the deal was “not a sacred thing and is always open to discussion.” The administration, especially Mrs. Clinton, also spent months trying to mediate between Turkey and Israel over the response to the Israeli military operation last year that killed nine passengers aboard a ship trying to deliver aid to Gaza despite an Israeli embargo — only to see both sides harden their views after a United Nations report on the episode became public. Unflinching support for Israel has, of course, been a constant of American foreign policy for years, often at the cost of political and diplomatic support elsewhere in the region, but the Obama administration has also sought to improve ties with Turkey after the chill that followed the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Turkey, which aspires to broaden its own influence in the region, has been a crucial if imperfect partner, from the administration’s point of view, in the international response to the fighting in Libya and the diplomatic efforts to isolate Syria’s president, Bashar al- Assad. The administration deferred to Turkey’s request last month to delay new sanctions on Mr. Assad’s government to give diplomacy another chance. This month, only days before expelling Israel’s ambassador, Turkey agreed to install an American radar system that is part of a new NATO missile defense system, underscoring its importance to a policy goal of the last two administrations. Mrs. Clinton, in the interview, expressed hope that the United States would be able to support the democratic aspirations of the Arab uprisings. She also acknowledged the constraints that the administration faced at home, given the country’s budget crisis and

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Republican calls in Congress to cut foreign aid, especially to the Palestinians and others seen as hostile to Israel. “It’s a great opportunity for the United States, but we are constrained by budget and to some extent constrained by political obstacles,” she said. “I’m determined that we’re going to do as much as we can within those constraints to deal with the opportunities that I see from Tunisia to Libya and Egypt and beyond.” The administration has faced criticism from all quarters — that it has not done enough to support Israel or has done too much, that it has supported some Arab uprisings, while remaining silent on the repression in Bahrain. That in itself illustrates how tumultuous the region has become and how the United States has had to scramble to keep up with events that are still unfolding. “Things are so fluid,” said Robert Danin, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “They’re not driving the train. They’re reacting to the train, and no one knows where the train is going.” HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2011/09/18/WORLD/MIDDLEEAST/TUMULT-OF- ARAB-SPRING-PROMPTS-WORRIES-IN- WASHINGTON.HTML?_R=1&NL=TODAYSHEADLINES&EMC=THA2

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ft.com Comment blogs The World America and the Palestine vote September 14, 2011 10:15 pm by Gideon Rachman It is safe to say that the US government is dreading the prospect of a UN Security Council vote on Palestine’s bid for statehood later this month. At present the Americans reckon they could well lose such a vote 14-1, which would be a humiliation. It is possible that Britain, France and Germany (in particular) might abstain – but the Americans aren’t counting on it. US officials say that, if it comes to it, they will take the odium of being the sole pro- Israeli vote. Why? Well, there are official and unofficial arguments. Officially, the Americans say that, although they are in favour of a two-state solution, it has to be the product of negotiation between the two parties. They also worry aloud that the statehood bid could provoke a second intifada. And they worry – although not as much as the Israelis – that Palestinian statehood could be used as part of the drive to “delegitimise” Israel, through international legal action. Set against that, however, is the damage that such a vote would do to President Obama’s multi-year effort to repair relations with the Muslim world. The Palestinians have artfully constructed their resolution so that it incorporates lots of ideas and language that the US has already endorsed. A vote against such a resolution would mean that all the favourable images from Obama’s Cairo speech – and from the US support for the Libyan and Egyptian revolutions – would be badly tarnished. So why take the risk? Domestic politics obviously comes into it. This is a presidential election year. The power of the Jewish vote is, in some ways, surprising. The Jewish population in the US is only about 6.5m, or just over 2% of the population. Not all Jews are hardline supporters of the Netanyahu government, and they tend to vote Democratic anyway – which might suggest that President Obama could take a risk on the UN vote. On the other hand, in a country where half the population fails to vote, Jewish voters tend to turn out at the polls - and they are important in key swing states like Florida, Pennsylvania and California. If the US did not “stand by Israel” at the UN, the Republican Party would have a field day. The mood of Republicans in Congress can be gauged by the fact that Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has just proposed a bill that would slash funding to the UN - if the Palestine vote goes through. But while the Americans will vote with Israel if it comes to it, they are not happy to be put in the situation they find themselves in. Some US diplomats complain that because the Israeli government assumes (correctly) that the US will always come to its rescue, it has little incentive to try to break out of its diplomatic isolation – an isolation that is only growing with the changes in Egypt and Turkey. If the US endures a diplomatic disaster because of its support for Israel, that will inevitably place a strain on the two countries’ “special relationship.” Israel is always at pains to refute any suggestion that the US pays a price for its support for Israel – but a UN debacle will make that argument harder to make, with a straight face. Still, the Americans hope that they might yet to be able to head off humiliation. The game underway is to persuade the Palestinians to satisfy themselves with a vote at the

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UN General Assembly, and not to take the issue to the UN Security Council. That effort may succeed – but don’t count on it. http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2011/09/america- and-the-palestine-vote/ ft.com Comment Columnists September 15, 2011 8:14 pm Israel should back a Palestinian state By Philip Stephens

The Palestinians are seeking affirmation of statehood at the UN. Good friends of Israel will support them in the endeavour. The Middle East has been upended by the Arab spring. Israel cannot pretend nothing has changed. If it wants to safeguard its security it has to adjust. The prospect of a vote on Palestinian statehood at this month’s meeting of the UN General Assembly has thrown western governments into something of a panic. A procession of US officials has been despatched to Ramallah to persuade Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian leader, to take a step back. They have been joined in recent days by Tony Blair, the representative of the so-called Quartet of the UN, US, European Union and Russia. More ON THIS STORY Netanyahu set for UN diplomatic showdown Ashton leads Middle East shuttle diplomacy Palestinians sceptical about UN move In depth Arab- Israel conflict World Bank warns on Palestinian fiscal crisis European governments are sympathetic, albeit to slightly varying degrees, with the frustrations of Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority. Build the institutions of statehood, the Palestinian leadership was told by the international community a couple of years back. It has been doing just that. The trouble is – and you hear this said from London to Berlin to Washington and all points in between – Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu has frustrated at every turn the US-led effort to revive a peace process.

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That said, the Europeans fear a UN vote on statehood would test their unity – not something they want to contemplate after the scars left by intervention in Libya. Some worry about a rupture with the US. Washington is ready to wield its veto if the Palestinian bid reaches the UN Security Council. Important as such considerations seem to US and European diplomats, it is hard to see why Palestinians should be overly impressed by political machinations in the west. The vast majority of UN members are ready to swing behind the claim to statehood. Everyone knows that Barack Obama’s threatened veto has more to do with a hostile Congress and with the president’s re-election campaign than with considerations of justice or statecraft. Mr Blair has told Mr Abbas that if the Palestinians settle for a statement of principles from the Quartet in place of a UN vote, Mr Netanyahu will open serious negotiations. Given the Israeli prime minister’s record in these matters, and his aggressive expansion of illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the Palestinians cannot take such promises seriously. The Arab uprisings may be redrawing the geopolitical map of the region, but Mr Netanyahu has kept his head firmly in the sand. He has launched a ferocious – I have heard one European foreign minister call it “menacing” – campaign against Mr Abbas’s diplomatic gambit. The Israeli government is combining the threat of economic sanctions against West Bank Palestinians with warnings of violent unrest if Mr Abbas wins the UN argument. Mr Netanyahu must know he is playing with fire: in this part of the world incendiary language has a habit of becoming self-fulfilling. In any event, the Palestinians’ carefully-crafted case for statehood asks for essentially what has been long promised by the international community and, incidentally, by past Israeli governments: a two-state solution based around 1967 borders and a shared capital in Jerusalem. Unless I am mistaken, this is the long-held stance of the Quartet, as well as of the European Union and of Mr Obama’s administration. Israel, of course, has fundamental concerns – notably about security and about the status of Palestinian refugees. Any declaration of Palestine statehood must be framed in the context of absolute guarantees of Israel’s future. The irony is that such legitimate worries are lost to the anger and frustration generated by Mr Netanyahu’s intransigence. For all its prime minister’s bombast, Israel has rarely looked so beleaguered. Mr Netanyahu’s premiership has drained Israel of what the American scholar Joseph Nye has called “soft power”. Israel has lost its capacity to carry its argument by persuasion and example. Its prime minister has seemed to relish his isolation. The Arab uprisings have toppled important pillars of Israel’s strategic security. As last weekend’s violent attacks on its embassy in Cairo attested, Israel can no longer depend on Egypt. The turmoil in Syria threatens instability to the north. just as Hamas in Gaza stirs violence in the south. Mr Netanyahu, of course, has no control over upheavals in the Arab world, but this is surely not the time to make enemies of friends. In Europe, he has broken the patience even of Germany’s Angela Merkel. William Hague, a lifelong friend of Israel and Britain’s foreign secretary, does little to hide his exasperation. Mr Netanyahu’s relationship with Mr Obama runs along a spectrum from sour to abysmal. 245

This week’s visit to Cairo of Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke to Mr Netanyahu’s reckless disregard of old alliances. Not so long ago, Turkey was counted a reliable friend. Bilateral co-operation spanned economics, diplomacy and defence. Since Israel’s attack on the Gaza flotilla, relations have gone from chill to freeze. Mr Erdogan is not an innocent in this. He has played politics with the issue to assert Turkish leadership in the Middle East. His latest comments were ill-judged in place and timing. Mr Netanyahu has, however, spurned US efforts to broker a rapprochement. It was too much, it seems, to issue even a mild expression of Israeli regret at the death of Turkish citizens in the flotilla. Israel’s isolation will be on uncomfortable display at the UN General Assembly. The diplomatic compromise now under discussion is one that would see the Palestinians admitted as an observer state, with a status comparable to that of the Vatican. There is no reason for Mr Abbas to accept anything less. Ehud Olmert, Mr Netanyahu’s predecessor, was no soft touch. But he reached the intelligent conclusion that winning wars against Israel’s neighbours was not enough. Real security demanded peace with the Palestinians; and peace demanded a Palestinian state. Mr Olmert’s offer came too late in his premiership. The only thing to have changed since is that the imperative of peace has become more urgent. The pro-Israel position is Palestinian statehood. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/02874128-dedd-11e0-9130- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1y1jdcihe

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Africa September 14, 2011 Islamists’ Growing Sway Raises Questions for Libya By ROD NORDLAND and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK TRIPOLI, Libya — In the emerging post-Qaddafi Libya, the most influential politician may well be Ali Sallabi, who has no formal title but commands broad respect as an Islamic scholar and populist orator who was instrumental in leading the mass uprising. The most powerful military leader is now Abdel Hakim Belhaj, the former leader of a hard-line group once believed to be aligned with Al Qaeda.

Moises Saman for The New York Times

Libyans in Martyrs' Square in Tripoli on Aug. 31 to celebrate the end of Ramadan and the liberation of the city. Most Libyans practice a moderate Islam in which individual liberties are respected The growing influence of Islamists in Libya raises hard questions about the ultimate character of the government and society that will rise in place of Col. Muammar el- Qaddafi’s autocracy. The United States and Libya’s new leaders say the Islamists, a well-organized group in a mostly moderate country, are sending signals that they are dedicated to democratic pluralism. They say there is no reason to doubt the Islamists’ sincerity. But as in Egypt and Tunisia, the latest upheaval of the Arab Spring deposed a dictator who had suppressed hard-core Islamists, and there are some worrisome signs about what kind of government will follow. It is far from clear where Libya will end up on a spectrum of possibilities that range from the Turkish model of democratic pluralism to the muddle of Egypt to, in the worst case, the theocracy of Shiite Iran or Sunni models like the Taliban or even Al Qaeda. Islamist militias in Libya receive weapons and financing directly from foreign benefactors like Qatar; a Muslim Brotherhood figure, Abel al-Rajazk Abu Hajar, leads 247

the Tripoli Municipal Governing Council, where Islamists are reportedly in the majority; in eastern Libya, there has been no resolution of the assassination in July of the leader of the rebel military, Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, suspected by some to be the work of Islamists. Mr. Belhaj has become so much an insider lately that he is seeking to unseat Mahmoud Jibril, the American-trained economist who is the nominal prime minister of the interim government, after Mr. Jibril obliquely criticized the Islamists. For an uprising that presented a liberal, Westernized face to the world, the growing sway of Islamists — activists with fundamentalist Islamic views, who want a society governed by Islamic principles — is being followed closely by the United States and its NATO allies. “I think it’s something that everybody is watching,” said Jeffrey D. Feltman, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, visiting here on Wednesday. “First of all the Libyan people themselves are talking about this.” The highest-ranking American official to visit Libya since Colonel Qaddafi’s fall, Mr. Feltman was optimistic that Libya would take a moderate path. “Based on our discussions with Libyans so far,” he said, “we aren’t concerned that one group is going to be able to dominate the aftermath of what has been a shared struggle by the Libyan people.” Mr. Sallabi, in an interview, made it clear that he and his followers wanted to build a political party based on Islamic principles that would come to power through democratic elections. But if the party failed to attract widespread support, he said, so be it. “It is the people’s revolution, and all the people are Muslims, Islamists,” Mr. Sallabi said. Secularists “are our brothers and they are Libyans.” “They have the right to offer their proposals and programs,” he said, “and if the Libyan people choose them I have no problem. We believe in democracy and the peaceful exchange of power.” Many Libyans say they are not worried. “The Islamists are organized so they seem more influential than their real weight,” said Usama Endar, a management consultant who was among the wealthy Tripolitans who helped finance the revolution. “They don’t have wide support, and when the dust settles, only those with large-scale appeal, without the tunnel vision of the Islamists, will win.” Yet an anti-Islamist, anti-Sallabi rally in Martyrs’ Square on Wednesday drew only a few dozen demonstrators. Many, like Aref Nayed, coordinator of the Transitional National Council’s stabilization team and a prominent religious scholar, say that the revolution had proved that Libyans would not accept anything but a democratic society, and that the Islamists would have to adapt to that. “There will be attempts by people to take over, but none of them will succeed because the young people will go out on the streets and bring them down,” Mr. Nayed said. Some are concerned that the Islamists are already wielding too much power, particularly in relation to their support in Libyan society, where most people, while devout, practice a moderate form of Islam in which individual liberties are respected. 248

Mr. Sallabi dismissed those fears, saying Islamists would not impose their traditionalist views on others. “If people choose a woman to lead, as president, we have no problem with that. Women can dress the way they like; they are free.” Adel al-Hadi al-Mishrogi, a prominent businessman who began raising money for the anti-Qaddafi insurgents early in the revolution, is not convinced by the Islamists’ declarations of fealty to democratic principles. He pointed to a well-organized Islamist umbrella group, Etilaf, which he said had pushed aside more secular groupings. “Most Libyans are not strongly Islamic, but the Islamists are strongly organized, and that’s the problem,” Mr. Mishrogi said. “Our meetings go on for hours without decisions. Their meetings are disciplined and right to the point. They’re not very popular, but they’re organized.” He complains that Etilaf and Mr. Sallabi are the ones who are really running things in Libya now. Others say the picture is much more diverse and chaotic than Mr. Mishrogi suggests, although it is true that Etilaf, with no fixed address and still apparently operating underground, continues to issue decrees of all sorts as if it were some sort of revolutionary guide. “All offices here must make sure that they are headed by an acceptable person within seven days of this notice,” read a leaflet pasted to the doors of offices throughout Tripoli Central Hospital, dated Sept. 3 and signed, simply, Etilaf. “They are behind everything,” Mr. Mishrogi said. Youssef M. Sherif, a prominent Libyan writer and intellectual, said: “Every day the Islamists grow stronger. When there is a parliament, the Islamists will get the majority.” “Abdel Hakim Belhaj is in effect the governor of Tripoli just because he was elected by an Islamist militia,” Mr. Sherif said. Echoing debates in Egypt, Mr. Sherif argued for a longer transition to elections than the planned eight months, to give liberals a better chance to organize. The growing influence of the Islamists is reflected in their increased willingness to play a political role. Until recently the Islamists have kept a low profile, and even many secular Libyan officials have expressed a reluctance to criticize them, saying they should focus instead on the common enemy while Colonel Qaddafi remains on the loose. That seems to be changing. After the interim government’s acting prime minister, Mr. Jibril, appeared recently in Tripoli and indirectly criticized politicking by the Islamists as premature with a war still in progress, Mr. Belhaj and Mr. Sallabi began agitating for his replacement. “Jibril will be gone soon,” one aide to Mr. Belhaj said. And Mr. Sallabi said that Mr. Jibril, along with the American-educated finance and oil minister, Ali Tarhouni, were ushering in a “new era of tyranny and dictatorship,” Al Jazeera reported. During the 42 years of Colonel Qaddafi’s rule, underground organizations like Mr. Belhaj’s Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Muslim Brotherhood were the only opposition. Although outlawed and persecuted, they had a network through mosques that secular opponents of the government could not match.

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That has also given them a head start in political organizing now, and they appear to be wasting no time. “There will be attempts by some parties to take over; it’s only natural,” said one prominent official with the Transitional National Council, who spoke anonymously so as not to alienate Islamists. “And definitely Etilaf is trying to increase its influence. And we’re hearing much more from the Islamists in the media because they are more organized and they are more articulate.” Mr. Nayed conceded that might be true, but was unconcerned. “My answer to anyone who complains about that: You must be as articulate as they are and as organized as they are,” he said. “And I think we’re starting to see that among various youth groups.” Fathi Ben Issa, a former Etilaf member who became an early representative on the Tripoli council, said he quit his position after learning that the Muslim Brotherhood members who dominate that body wanted to ban theater, cinema and arts like sculpture of the human form. “They were like the Taliban,” he said. “We didn’t get rid of Qaddafi to replace him with such people.” The final straw, he said, came when Etilaf began circulating a proposed fatwa, or decree, to bar women from driving. Most Libyans are quick to bristle at suggestions that their own Islamists might one day go the way of Iran, where after the fall of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini stomped out a short-lived liberal government by denouncing democracy as un-Islamic. Mr. Sallabi said he hoped Libyans could find a leader on the model of George Washington, whom he had been reading about lately. “After his struggle he went back to his farm even though the American people wanted him to be president,” Mr. Sallabi said. “He is a great man.” Referring to Mr. Sallabi, Mr. Ben Issa, who said he has received death threats since breaking with the Islamists, retorted: “He is just hiding his intentions. He says one thing to the BBC and another to Al Jazeera. If you believe him, then you don’t know the Muslim Brothers.” This article has been revised to reflect the following correction: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/africa/in-libya-islamists-growing-sway- raises-questions.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2

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La 'sharía', según Libia Los nuevos responsables del ministerio de Justicia aseguran que aunque se aplique la ley islámica, el país nunca será como Arabia Saudí FRANCISCO PEREGIL | ENVIADO ESPECIAL, Trípoli 15/09/2011 Ministras libias, embajadoras, consejeras delegadas de empresas... El antiguo ministro de Justicia y ahora presidente interino, Mustafá Abdel Yalil, quiere que las mujeres se incorporen al poder. Así lo expresó el lunes antes diez mil personas en Trípoli. Pero en el mismo discurso anunció que la fuente jurídica iba a ser la sharía, es decir, el Corán. Los nuevos jueces que han tomado el mando en el Ministerio de Justicia no ven ninguna contradicción entre una cosa y la otra. "Nosotros no somos ni vamos a ser nunca Arabia Saudí. Aquí conducen las mujeres y hay juezas en los tribunales", señala el magistrado Milad al Gali. El código no obligará a nadie a llevar el velo, aunque parece algo innecesario porque en Libia casi todas las mujeres acostumbran a ponérselo en la calle. "La sharía no obliga a nadie a decir cómo se tiene que vestir. Pero somos un país musulmán, y aquí no podemos abrir bares donde se venda alcohol, ni prostíbulos", añade Milad al Gali. "Es una ley que sirve para unir a todas las tribus del país", señala el viceministro de Justicia, Jalif al Gehmy. "Y que en el caso de los crímenes más graves contempla la posibilidad del perdón", añade. No obstante, la norma milenaria permitiría cortarles una mano a los ladrones o matar a cualquier homicida. "Eso es cierto", admite el juez Jamal Bennour, integrante del gabinete jurídico de Bengasi y desplazado a Trípoli estos días. "Pero en la práctica casi nunca se llega a ese extremo. Porque en esos casos, el criminal tiene que confesar cuatro veces su culpa. Es una opción espiritual. El culpable, en esos casos, elige ser castigado en este mundo para presentarse limpio por dentro al otro mundo. Además, tienen que declarar en su contra al menos cuatro testigos. Cuando no se encuentran suficientes pruebas se aplica el código común. Y eso es lo que se hará en la mayoría de los casos. Casi nunca se llegará a aplicar la pena de dar cien latigazos a nadie". Las mujeres no podrán viajar sin hombres El viceministro Al Gehmy señala que el borrador de la Constitución por la que se regirá el país establece que todos los "hombres y mujeres" son iguales ante la ley independientemente de su religión, su lengua, su tribu y su sexo. "Y así seguirá siendo", asegura. Sin embargo, se obligará a las mujeres a no emprender ningún viaje de larga distancia sin la compañía de un hombre. "Eso se hace para protegerlas, porque son la parte más importante de nuestra sociedad", alega el juez Bennour. Bennour cree que las palabras del presidente Yamil el otro día tenían como objetivo tranquilizar al pueblo y que a la hora de la verdad, en la vida social no supondrá un gran cambio, salvo que quedará abolida para siempre la norma que instauró Gadafi en 1978 por la que el Estado podía controlar la propiedad privada de la gente. Mohamed Jalifa Al Bur, uno de los abogados más prestigiosos del país, experto en derecho internacional, coincide plenamente con el magistrado y pone de ejemplo el caso de Arabia Saudí para mostrar la eficacia de la sharía. "Cuando se implantó esta ley en

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1940 hubo que aplicarla en unos 14 ó 15 casos extremos. Y en 1970, ya no hubo que cortar ninguna mano". Alaa Murabit, de 22 años, y Sofia Harezi, de 25, fundadores de La Voz De Las Mujeres Libias estaban presentes cuando Yalil declaró que habría ministras y embajadoras libias y cuando mencionó la sharía. Y no encuentran ninguna contradicción al respecto. "Si se aplica correctamente servirá para potenciar los derechos de la mujer. Este código no permite que la mujer pida el divorcio, salvo tres importantísimas excepciones que casi nunca se aplican: si se dañan tus creencias religiosas, a tus hijos, o si te maltratan, cosas que nunca se mencionan. Y no se aplican porque en Libia la religión siempre ha sido manipulada desde el poder. Ahora, nosotras nos encargaremos de ir a las mezquitas a explicarles a las mujeres sus derechos. Espero que las palabras de Yalil no sean huecas, como las que hemos recibido siempre de Gadafi", concluye Sofia Harezi. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/sharia/Libia/elpepuint/20110915elpepuint _3/Tes

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"Recordadme cuando caiga el régimen" Un joven dirigente de la oposición siria dejó escrito su testamento político antes de morir torturado IGNACIO CEMBRERO - Madrid - 15/09/2011 "Si os apenáis con la noticia de mi muerte, sabed que ahora yo he obtenido de una sola vez la felicidad y la libertad (...)". "Recordadme cuando festejéis el derrocamiento del régimen y una patria libre de opresores". Ghiath Matar, de 26 años, escribió estas líneas con la intención de que se dieran a conocer si la represión del régimen sirio acababa con su vida. Y así fue. Matar fue secuestrado el 6 de septiembre y murió la semana pasada. No se sabe el día exacto, aunque su cuerpo fue entregado el sábado pasado a su familia en la barriada damascena de Darayya. En el pecho tenía equimosis y heridas en la cara que confirmaban que fue torturado, según informó la ONG Human Rights Watch (HRW) tras contactar en Damasco con militantes de la oposición. Pese a su juventud era, desde marzo, uno de los organizadores de las protestas contra el presidente Bachar el Asad. Como todos los líderes opositores sirios dejó a sus amigos y familiares un testamento político. "Es para que os reafirméis en el mismo principio por el que salimos a la calle, para que trabajéis por todo aquello que demandamos con nuestros gritos (...)", reza el texto póstumo. "No dejéis que os cambien, no desperdiciéis mi sangre y la de los otros mártires que dieron sus almas por una Siria libre". "Sed pacientes, pues la victoria llegará". Además de coordinar manifestaciones, Matar "era un pacifista", recuerda Nawal Sibai, escritora siria exiliada en Madrid. "Aunque nos maten a todos no hay que recurrir a las armas para defenderse, como decía Matar", añade. Se desmarcaba así de aquellos opositores que se inclinan por la insurrección armada. "Por eso su muerte es aún más dolorosa", concluye. Casado y a punto de ser padre (su esposa dará a luz en diciembre), Matar cayó en una trampa hace nueve días, según HRW. Estaba con su amigo Yahya Charbaji, un periodista que trabaja en la clandestinidad, cuando este recibió una llamada de su hermano -amenazado a punta de pistola por agentes de la policía secreta- aconsejándole que se desplazara, por razones de seguridad, al barrio de Sahnaya. Allí les apresaron tras una persecución en coche. Las familias recibieron después sendas llamadas de un funcionario informándoles de que habían sido capturados. Nunca hasta ahora la muerte de un activista sirio había suscitado tanta reprobación como la de Matar. Tanto la UE como otros Gobiernos occidentales condenaron su muerte y el martes los embajadores en Damasco de EE UU, Robert Ford; y de Francia, Eric Chevallier, acudieron a una vigilia fúnebre con sus familiares. Después se les unieron otros seis embajadores, pero no el español.

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Cientos de jóvenes asistieron a la ceremonia. En cuanto se alejaron los diplomáticos los antidisturbios llanzaron granadas lacrimógenas y dispararon al aire para disolverles, pero en esta ocasión no apuntaron a matar. Desde que empezaron las protestas en marzo han fallecido 2.600 activistas, según reveló el lunes Nani Pillay, Alta Comisionada de la ONU para los Derechos Humanos. Justo cuando el cuerpo de Matar era entregado el sábado a su familia, desaparecía en el aeropuerto de Damasco Rafah Nached, de 66 años, la primera psiquiatra siria, fundadora de la Escuela de Psicoanálisis de Damasco. Tenía un billete para volar a París, pero nunca embarcó. En estos tiempos convulsos se dedicaba a impartir clases para ayudar a sus compatriotas a superar el miedo. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Recordadme/caiga/regimen/elpepiint/2011 0915elpepiint_8/Tes

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Syrian activist Ghiyath Matar’s death spurs grief, debate By Liz Sly, Thursday, September 15, 3:29 AM BEIRUT — To the extent that the still-leaderless Syrian uprising can be said to have any leaders at all, Ghiyath Matar, a tailor with a fondness for flowers, was one of them. His name was little known outside the Damascus suburb of Darayya, where he lived and worked and soon was to become a father. But there he was regarded as a hero, an inspirational organizer of anti-government rallies whose passionate commitment to nonviolence earned him the nickname “Little Gandhi.” When his brutalized body was delivered to his parents’ home Saturday, four days after Syrian authorities detained him and a month shy of his 25th birthday, the shock waves rippled far beyond. A man who had encapsulated the youthful idealism of Syria’s grass-roots protest movement, pioneering the tactic of handing out roses and water to the troops sent to shoot demonstrators, had died in custody. And with him, a little piece of the Syrian revolution also seemed to die. Activists across the country shuddered with outrage — and with fear. U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford showed up at Matar’s wake, as did other Western envoys, to express support for his pacifism at a time when many frustrated protesters are clamoring for arms. Twitter exploded with tributes, many of them quoting the testimony he delivered to his activist friends in anticipation of his death. “Remember me when you celebrate the fall of the regime and . . . remember that I gave my soul and my blood for that moment,” he wrote. “May God guide you on the road of peaceful struggle and grant you victory.” Whether his wish will be heeded seems in grave doubt, however. Matar is by no means the first protest organizer to die in detention since the revolt against President Bashar al- Assad’s rule began in March. But his death comes at a critical moment for the uprising, which is entering its seventh month amid few signs that Assad’s government is in danger of falling. The mass protests that drew hundreds of thousands of people in cities such as Hama and Deir al-Zour earlier in the year have been crushed by highly publicized tank assaults, in which hundreds died. Demonstrations continue on a daily basis nationwide, but so do the killings — 54 have died since Matar was buried Saturday, human rights groups report. And out of the spotlight, a systematic sweep of activists in the Damascus area has netted dozens of key players in recent weeks, including Matar, chilling the protest movement there and casting into doubt prospects that the capital will one day be able to muster the

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momentum needed to seriously challenge the Assad regime in the one place where it really matters. The momentum is “dying” in Damascus, said Alexander Page, an activist based in the capital who uses a pseudonym to protect his identity. He said he knew Matar and has seen nearly 20 other colleagues disappear into detention. “A lot of people have gone into hiding, and a lot of people are not taking part in protests,” he said. Many activists suspect that informants have penetrated their ranks. Some believe captured protesters have divulged names under torture. Increasingly, the security forces seem to know in advance when a protest is planned and are on hand to round up the participants. Other activists have been caught in sting operations similar to the one that snared Matar, who had been in hiding for months after his prominent role leading demonstrators in chants of “peaceful, peaceful” drew the attention of authorities. On Sept. 6, security forces raided the hideout of another activist, who was apparently forced to make a call to his brother, Yahya Sherbaji, a veteran activist, in which he said he had been shot and appealed for help, according to witnesses and relatives. Colleagues suspected a trap, but Sherbaji and Matar insisted that they had to go to see whether they could help. They did not return. Exactly how Matar died isn’t clear. A video of his body shows what relatives suspect are burn marks caused by electric shocks. There appeared to be bruising around his throat. There were also two bullet wounds to his abdomen, and some witnesses reported a car chase and shooting as the men were captured. Official Syrian media reported that the men had been killed by “armed gangs,” the phrase usually used by the government to describe protesters. No one who knew Matar believes that. But as word of Matar’s death spread, despair deepened among some activists that peaceful protests alone won’t be enough to bring down the government, Page said. And calls for the protest movement to acquire weapons have grown, he said. “We know how peaceful this guy was, and he was tortured to death, and it shows that if we continue like this, we’ll be treated like anyone who had a gun and was a terrorist,” he said. “Everyone’s really, really angry.” Ford and seven other envoys to Damascus attended Matar’s wake because they hope that his death will instead serve to reinforce the commitment to peace that has finally earned the Syrian protest movement a measure of international support in recent weeks, according to a Western diplomat in the capital. “There’s a growing frustration in the streets that a lot of people are being killed and wounded and that they should take up arms,” said the diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive subjects. “This young man understood the importance of the protest movement staying peaceful, even as he was confronting a lot of violence.” Minutes after the ambassadors departed, security forces attacked the tent in which the wake was held, firing live ammunition and tear gas and shouting curses against Ford and the other envoys, according to a witness, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Matar’s relatives and friends pledged to uphold the pacifism he preached. His wife, who is seven months pregnant with their first child, has been receiving condolences at her

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home dressed in white, not the traditional black. Mourners handed out flowers at the wake, in honor of Matar’s chief legacy — the practice of distributing roses to soldiers. “There are many views, and one of them is to take up arms,” said a close friend of Matar’s who asked that his name not be used because he fears for his safety. “But for me, and for his friends, and for his family, peaceful resistance is the only option.” “His death is a grave loss for us,” he added. “But there are many people who have been killed before, and there are many more deaths yet to come. The revolution is still there, and it cannot be shut down.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/syrian-activist-ghiyath-matars- death-spurs-grief-debate/2011/09/14/gIQArgq8SK_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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09/14/2011 01:01 PM Erdogan's 'Dangerous Macho Posturing' EU Politicians Slam Turkey's Anti-Israel Course By Annett Meiritz Turkey's prime minister is keen to position himself as a leader in efforts to rebuild the Arab world. At the same time, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has grown aggressive in his verbal attacks on Israel. European Union politicians are now criticizing the Turkish leader, calling for a more moderate tone. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is not only using his tour of several Arab states for self-promotion, but for verbal attacks against Israel as well. "No one can play with Turkey or Turkish honor," Erdogan said in Cairo on Tuesday. Israel lost Turkey as a strategic partner after the Israeli military attack on the humanitarian aid flotilla to the Gaza Strip in May 2010. During the Arab Spring, Erdogan has presented himself as a new power, a model leader and a "rising star" with "near pop-star status" in the region, as the New York Times has described the Turkish leader. His multi-day trip to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya is meant to strengthen his role in the region. However, Erdogan has also linked his solidarity with the Arab world to a strident anti- Israel foreign policy. Indeed, the political battle lines between Turkey and Israel have been intensifying in recent weeks: • Erdogan expelled senior Israeli diplomats in early September. If the tension between the two countries wasn't thick enough already, this step only served to escalate the dispute between them. • Ankara halted its military cooperation with Israel and announced an increased Turkish military presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. All trade ties with Israel are currently frozen and Erdogan is threatening "further sanctions." • At the same time, Erdogan is presenting himself more and more as an advocate for the Palestinians. More than once, he has vociferously considered visiting the Gaza Strip, a move Israel would regard as an affront. • Erdogan doesn't shy away from verbal attacks, either. On Monday, he said Israel had behaved like a "spoiled child" and accused Israel of supporting "state terror." He described Israel's military action against last year's flotilla to Gaza as a "cause for war." The conflict could also put Ankara's relationship with the European Union to the test. The dispute over the deadly military raid on the Gaza flotilla, which left nine Turkish activists dead, could grow into a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and the EU. Indeed, among high-profile politicians in the European Parliament, criticism of Erdogan is growing.

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'Anti-Western Sentiment' Elmar Brok, the foreign policy spokesman for the parliamentary group of the conservative Christian Democrats in the European Parliament, said he is skeptical of Turkey's efforts to establish itself as a regional power within the Arab world. He said Erdogan is seeking to transform it into a regional power similar to the status it held "earlier with the Ottoman Empire." He said Ankara isn't pursuing the goal of EU membership and that "it is using the conflict with Israel in order to gain credibility in the region," Brok told SPIEGEL ONLINE. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, a member of the European Parliament with the business- friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP) said he also viewed the shift in foreign policy course by the Turkish government as a sign that Ankara's EU ambitions are waning. Turkey, as a secular democracy, may be a role model for the countries currently undergoing a phase of transformation, the FDP party group leader in Brussels told SPIEGEL ONLINE, "but Ankara can in no way be allowed to link the reorientation of its foreign policy with anti-Western sentiment." Lamsbdorff has accused the Erdogan government of using "gunboat rhetoric" in its statements about Israel. The Turkish government's aggressive policy course against Israel, he said, shows that the country currently has "no interest" in pushing forward EU accession talks. "With a strident anti-Israel course, it isn't making any friends in Europe" right now, Lambsdorff said. With his pro-Palestinian course, Erdogan is in fact risking a conflict with the West. The Turkish prime minister plans to support the Palestinian initiative at the United Nations General Assembly to announce unilateral independence, a move both the United States and Germany have said they would oppose. On Tuesday, US President Barack Obama said his government would veto any Palestinian petition for full membership submitted to the Security Council. During his visit to Cairo on Tuesday, Erdogan said the international recognition of a Palestinian state is "not an option but an obligation." 'Deeply Injured' At present, there is no common EU foreign policy position on the Palestinian initiative in the UN Security Council. Fundamental supporters of Turkey's EU membership are still standing behind Erdogan. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the chair of the Green Party group in the European Parliament and a well-known Franco-German politician, warned against casting sole blame for the Turkish-Israeli conflict on Ankara. "That is only the partial truth," he said. The "macho posturing" by the Turkish prime minister, he said, may be "intolerable and politically dangerous," but it is also justifiable in light of what he described as Israel's intransigence. "Erdogan is deeply injured," Cohn-Bendit said. The European politician added that Turkey currently no longer has any prospects of joining the EU. Otherwise, he said, "Merkel and Sarkozy would have done everything they could to ensure that Turkey could accede in a timely manner." Europe, he said, has long refused to allow Turkey to integrate into its structures, and now Erdogan has little choice but to play the card of becoming a regional power.

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URL: Annett Meiritz Erdogan's 'Dangerous Macho Posturing'. EU Politicians Slam Turkey's Anti-Israel Course09/14/2011 01:01 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,786204,00.html

Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links:

• Softening Stance After Setbacks: Israel Fears Complete Isolation (09/12/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785845,00.html • The AKP's Disappointing Victory: Erdogan Falls Short of Goal in Turkish Elections (06/13/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,768175,00.html • SPIEGEL Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister: 'Turkey and Europe Need Each Other' (06/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767432,00.html • The Anatolian Tiger: How the West Is Losing Turkey (06/15/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,700626,00.html • Diplomatic Maneuvering: Palestinians Plan Application for UN Membership (08/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,778128,00.html • Rage after the Raid: Israel's Voyage into Isolation (06/07/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,699065,00.html • From the Archive: Gaza Raid Spells End of Turkish-Israeli Alliance (06/01/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,698115,00.html • From the Archive: Nostalgia for the Ottomans (11/12/2009) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,660635,00.html

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ft.com Comment Columnists

September 14, 2011 7:37 pm When the Singapore sling meets the Arab spring By David Pilling By the standard of uprisings in the Arab world, the political changes unfolding in Singapore are hardly earth-shattering. The wealthy, orderly city state is better known for its cocktails than for its revolutions. But Singapore, too, has had its spring. It started in May when the ever-ruling People’s Action party was treated to its worst election result since independence in 1965. True, it won 60 per cent of the vote. Barack Obama would settle for that. But Singapore’s political system has hitherto not afforded the opposition even the slimmest foot in the door. If there was doubt about the meaning of the result, Lee Kuan Yew, the “minister mentor” who steered Singapore to first-world status, underlined it by resigning. Last month, the normally placid election for president was closely fought, evidence of the newly competitive landscape. “Singapore has entered a new political era in the last three months,” says Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. The inroads made by the opposition are small. It won six seats in the 87-seat parliament. But that is three times more than it held previously. Opposition parties face substantial constraints. Although they can campaign freely at election time, fiercer critics of the PAP leadership have sometimes faced court actions for defamation. Outside election periods, public speeches are not allowed without a permit. The gains are more remarkable still given the economic background. Even the government’s sternest critics concede the country has been well run. Singapore’s standard of living caught up with the west a decade ago. With a gross domestic product per capita of more than $43,000, according to World Bank data, Singaporeans are better off than people in Britain or France. After being jolted by the financial crisis the country has bounced back. Last year, the economy grew 14.5 per cent. There is little social tension, a low crime rate and full employment. It has beautifully manicured streets. Even its low-income housing is mostly cheerful. If Singapore is such a paradise, why should there be any discontent at all? One answer comes from Goh Chok Tong, the prime minister from 1990-2004, who also quit politics in May. “The electorate has changed, it has matured,” he told a small conference last week. People, he said, were better educated with more aspirations than before. They could not so easily be satisfied with basic housing or decent jobs. Rather endearingly, Mr Goh admitted he did not quite know what people wanted. That is why he and Mr Lee, who turns 88 this week, had stepped aside, he said – so that a new generation could work it out.

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Another explanation is immigration policy, a hot-button issue in May’s election. According to Sylvia Lim, chairman of the opposition Workers’ party, the population has swelled from 4m to 5m in the past decade, with roughly 3.2m citizens, 1.2m foreign workers and half a million permanent residents. Ms Lim says Singaporeans recognise the value of openness. But the process has gone too fast. “We feel like we are strangers in our own place,” she says. Middle class Singaporeans cannot compete for jobs with foreign workers willing to work 14-hour shifts for lower wages. Cherian George, a political commentator, says the younger generation no longer supports the frantic dash for progress. “For many Singaporeans, we thought we’d kind of arrived 10 years ago. We think: ‘Why can’t we enjoy it instead of continuing to be on this growth treadmill’,” he says. Indeed, the government appears to have changed tack: it is making plans to cut immigration quotas even at the cost of lower growth, now expected to slow to an annual 3-5 per cent. The ruling PAP has responded to the desire for a more open society in other ways. Singapore was once criticised for being boring. Now it has swanky night clubs, Formula One motor racing, two brand-new casinos and the Singapore Flyer, a full 30 metres taller than the London Eye. This too has backfired. According to Prof George, local residents do not see this new, slick Singapore as being aimed at them. Rather it is seen as a lure for rich bankers and tourists. The Singapore spring, then, is partly a conservative backlash against a government seen as putting too much faith in free-market liberalism. The change of tone has been aided by an upheaval in the once tightly controlled media. Now newspapers, such as The Straits Times, have to be more even-handed – dare I say interesting – if they are to compete with the online world of blogs and instant news. Still, the opposition has modest goals. Ms Lim says she hopes that at the next general election in 2016, her party will be able to field quality candidates in half the constituencies. She cannot yet imagine a Singapore that is not run by the PAP. In the meantime, the ruling party – for decades unchallenged and unquestioned – is going through a period of introspection. Even some of its lifetime supporters acknowledge that is no bad thing. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/da37315e-debb-11e0-a228- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1YNw2AvpU

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September 11, 2011 Veto a State, Lose an Ally By TURKI AL-FAISAL Jidda, Saudi Arabia The United States must support the Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations this month or risk losing the little credibility it has in the Arab world. If it does not, American influence will decline further, Israeli security will be undermined and Iran will be empowered, increasing the chances of another war in the region. Moreover, Saudi Arabia would no longer be able to cooperate with America in the same way it historically has. With most of the Arab world in upheaval, the “special relationship” between Saudi Arabia and the United States would increasingly be seen as toxic by the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, who demand justice for the Palestinian people. Saudi leaders would be forced by domestic and regional pressures to adopt a far more independent and assertive foreign policy. Like our recent military support for Bahrain’s monarchy, which America opposed, Saudi Arabia would pursue other policies at odds with those of the United States, including opposing the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq and refusing to open an embassy there despite American pressure to do so. The Saudi government might part ways with Washington in Afghanistan and Yemen as well. The Palestinian people deserve statehood and all that it entails: official recognition, endorsement by international organizations, the ability to deal with Israel on more equal footing and the opportunity to live in peace and security. Israel should see the Palestinian bid for statehood not as a threat, but as a chance to return to the negotiating table and prevent further conflict. Recent polls show that up to 70 percent of Palestinians say they believe there will be a new intifada if the deadlock is not broken shortly; this should encourage Israel to seek peace with the moderate Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas. The Obama administration has had ample opportunities to lead Israelis and Palestinians into bilateral peace talks, but American policy makers have unfortunately been more preoccupied with a deteriorating domestic economy and a paralyzed political scene than with finding a workable solution to this epic injustice. Because Washington has offered no viable new proposals, the least it can do is step aside and not hinder Saudi, European and moderate Arab efforts to advance Palestinian rights at the United Nations. Even Israeli officials have recently admitted privately to their European counterparts that only Saudi Arabia will be able to give the Palestinians the required religious, political and financial legitimacy they need to complete a deal with Israel. Saudi Arabia had earmarked over $2.5 billion in aid to the Palestinian Authority since June 2009, making it by far the largest single supporter of the Palestinian cause. But this money will not do much good until Palestinians are granted their fundamental rights.

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The 2002 Arab Peace Plan must be the starting point for negotiations; a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders is the only realistic foundation on which to restart talks, seeing as how the Oslo Peace Process has proved fruitless. The Palestinian statehood initiative is a chance to replace Oslo with a new paradigm based on state-to-state negotiations — a win-win proposition that makes the conflict more manageable and lays the groundwork for a lasting solution. The only losers in this scenario would be Syria and Iran, pariah states that have worked tirelessly — through their support of Hamas and Hezbollah — to undermine the peace process. Saudi Arabia recently played a leading role in isolating Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal government by demanding an end to the killing of protesters and recalling the Saudi ambassador from Damascus. The impending fall of Mr. Assad’s barbarous regime provides a rare strategic opportunity to weaken Iran. Without this vital ally, Tehran will find it more difficult to foment discord in the Arab world. Today, there is a chance for the United States and Saudi Arabia to contain Iran and prevent it from destabilizing the region. But this opportunity will be squandered if the Obama administration’s actions at the United Nations force a deepening split between our two countries. Although Saudi Arabia is willing and able to chart a new and divergent course if America fails to act justly with regard to Palestine, the Middle East would be far better served by continuing cooperation and good will between these longstanding allies. American support for Palestinian statehood is therefore crucial, and a veto will have profound negative consequences. In addition to causing substantial damage to American-Saudi relations and provoking uproar among Muslims worldwide, the United States would further undermine its relations with the Muslim world, empower Iran and threaten regional stability. Let us hope that the United States chooses the path of justice and peace. Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former director of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence services and a former Saudi ambassador to the United States, is chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/12/opinion/veto-a-state-lose-an- ally.html?gwh=692e785d7dcfe6cdfe46dae995d14bef&ref=opinion&pagewanted=print

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Wealthy nations, global lenders pledge $58 billion to Arab countries to encourage democracy By Associated Press, Published: September 10 MARSEILLE, France — Wealthy countries and international lenders promised more money Saturday to encourage democratic reforms in Arab nations, promising at least $58 billion. After Tunisia and Egypt ousted their authoritarian regimes earlier this year, eight of the world’s most developed economies along with rich Arab countries and a raft of development banks had pledged in May to give $40 billion in support to their nascent democracies and hopefully keep them on the path to open government. Those uprisings set off a cascade of revolts across the Middle East, and the Group of Eight and others are now increasing their pledges and expanding the recipients to include Morocco and Jordan. So far, at least $58 billion has been promised to the four countries — $38 billion from development banks through 2013 and more than $20 billion from the G-8 and the wealthy Arab countries. Saturday’s meeting was notable for its inclusion of Libya, where rebel forces recently took control of most of the country and are working to create a government to replace Moammar Gadhafi’s brutal regime. Libya is not yet officially part of the program but could soon receive funding, according to Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flaherty. Libya’s vast oil wealth means it is unlikely to need substantial aid over the long term, but its oil exports slowed to a trickle during recent fighting, and the country is still waiting for funds that were frozen under Gadhafi to be handed over to them. Flaherty indicated that the program could bridge the gap. “We did not discuss quantum, but we discussed, yes, the reality that the Libyans may require some assistance in the short term,” Flaherty said. Earlier in the day, British Treasury chief George Osborne said officials would also commit to lifting sanctions on Libya, unfreezing its assets, and also “significantly get oil production going as quickly as possible.” Libya’s new ambassador to France Mansour Seyf al-Nasr called the meeting “a success.” Tunisia’s finance minister, Jelloul Ayed, also praised the meeting. “A very successful meeting. The financial commitment that we obtained today is a general commitment,” he said, noting that it would be determined later how much each of the Arab countries gets.

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In another step for Libya’s Transitional National Council, it won recognition Saturday from the International Monetary Fund, according to the organization’s chief, Christine Lagarde. She said she would dispatch teams to Libya to help with technical assistance and policy advice as soon as it was safe. The money is intended to help support “transparent, accountable government” and “sustainable and inclusive growth” in North Africa and the Middle East, according to a statement from the nine international and regional lenders who pledged the $38 billion. The plan was hatched in May by the G-8 nations — Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the U.S. — as they sought to support the revolts and reforms inspired by the Arab Spring. They hope the money will reward — and encourage — reform. The Syrian government, which is involved in a bloody crackdown on dissent, was pointedly not invited. But there has been criticism that the funds have been slow in coming. French Finance Minister Francois Baroin said Saturday that everyone was working to hand over the money as quickly as possible. Of the lenders, the World Bank is providing the largest share of financing, with $10.7 billion. The African Development Bank has pledged $7.6 billion, the Islamic Development Bank $4.5 billion, with the rest coming from regional development bodies such as the Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It wasn’t immediately clear how much the G-8 countries were now offering, though Baroin said the commitments had “increased strongly.” But he only specified France’s new pledge, which has more than doubled to $2.7 billion. The IMF also has another $35 billion available for lending to the region, with the focus to be on oil-importing countries suffering from rising food and fuel prices. Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/industries/g7-finance-officials-to-speed-aid- to-arab-democracies-kickstart-libyan-oil- production/2011/09/10/gIQAPdqxGK_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Middle East September 10, 2011 Beyond Cairo, Israel Sensing a Wider Siege By ETHAN BRONNER JERUSALEM — With its Cairo embassy ransacked, its ambassador to Turkey expelled and the Palestinians seeking statehood recognition at the United Nations, Israel found itself on Saturday increasingly isolated and grappling with a radically transformed Middle East where it believes its options are limited and poor. The diplomatic crisis, in which winds unleashed by the Arab Spring are now casting a chill over the region, was crystallized by the scene of Israeli military jets sweeping into Cairo at dawn on Saturday to evacuate diplomats after the Israeli Embassy had been besieged by thousands of protesters. It was an image that reminded some Israelis of Iran in 1979, when Israel evacuated its embassy in Tehran after the revolution there replaced an ally with an implacable foe. “Seven months after the downfall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, Egyptian protesters tore to shreds the Israeli flag, a symbol of peace between Egypt and its eastern neighbor, after 31 years,” Aluf Benn, the editor in chief of the left-leaning Israeli newspaper Haaretz, wrote Saturday. “It seems that the flag will not return to the flagstaff anytime soon.” Egypt and Israel both issued statements on Saturday reaffirming their commitments to their peace treaty, but in a televised address on Saturday night, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel warned that Egypt “cannot ignore the heavy damage done to the fabric of peace.” Facing crises in relations with Egypt and Turkey, its two most important regional allies, Israel turned to the United States. Throughout the night on Friday, desperate Israeli officials called their American counterparts seeking help to pressure the Egyptians to protect the embassy. President Obama “expressed his great concern” in a telephone call with Mr. Netanyahu, the White House said in a statement, and he called on Egypt “to honor its international obligations to safeguard the security of the Israeli Embassy.” Washington — for whom Israel, Turkey and Egypt are all critical allies — has watched tensions along the eastern Mediterranean with growing unease and increasing alarm. And though the diplomatic breaches were not entirely unexpected, they prompted a flurry of diplomatic activity in Washington. The mayhem in Cairo also exacted consequences for Egypt, raising questions about whether its military-led transitional government would be able to maintain law and order and meet its international obligations. The failure to prevent an invasion of a foreign embassy raised security concerns at other embassies as well. The Egyptian government responded to those questions Saturday night, pledging a new crackdown on disruptive protests and reactivating the emergency law allowing indefinite detentions without trial, one of the most reviled measures enacted under former President Hosni Mubarak. 267

Since the start of the Arab uprisings, internal critics and foreign friends, including the United States, have urged Israel to take bold conciliatory steps toward the Palestinians, and after confrontations in which Israeli forces killed Egyptian and Turkish citizens, to reach accommodations with both countries. Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador a week ago over Israel’s refusal to apologize for a deadly raid last year on a Turkish ship bound for Gaza in which nine Turks were killed. The storming of the embassy in Cairo on Saturday was precipitated by the killing of three Egyptian soldiers along the border by Israeli military forces pursuing terrorism suspects. Israel has expressed regret for the deaths in both cases, but has not apologized for actions that it considers defensive. The overriding assessment of the government of Mr. Netanyahu is that such steps will only make matters worse because what is shaking the region is not about Israel, even if Israel is increasingly its target, and Israel can do almost nothing to affect it. “Egypt is not going toward democracy but toward Islamicization,” said Eli Shaked, a former Israeli ambassador to Cairo who reflected the government’s view. “It is the same in Turkey and in Gaza. It is just like what happened in Iran in 1979.” A senior official said Israel had few options other than to pursue what he called a “porcupine policy” to defend itself against aggression. Another official, asked about Turkey, said, “There is little that we can do.” Critics of the government take a very different view. Mr. Benn, the Haaretz editor, acknowledged that Mr. Netanyahu could not be faulted for the events in Egypt, the rise of an Islamic-inspired party in Turkey or Iran’s nuclear program. But echoing criticism by the Obama administration, he said that Mr. Netanyahu “has not done a thing to mitigate the fallout from the aforementioned developments.” Daniel Ben-Simon, a member of Parliament from the left-leaning Labor Party, said the Netanyahu government was on a path “not just to diplomatic isolation but to actually putting Israelis in danger,” he said. “It all comes down to his obsession against a Palestinian state, his total paralysis toward the Palestinian issue. We are facing an international tide at the United Nations. If he joined the vote for a Palestinian state instead of fighting it, that would be the best thing he could do for us in the Arab world.” The Palestinians have given up on talks with Israel, and within the next two weeks they plan to ask the United Nations to grant them membership and statehood recognition within the 1967 lines, including East Jerusalem as a capital. Potential side effects of the diplomatic disputes have already emerged. The growing hostility from Egypt could require a radical rethinking of Israel’s defense doctrine which, for the past three decades, counted on peace on its southern border. As chaos in the Sinai has increased and anti-Israel sentiment in Egypt has grown, military strategists here are examining how to beef up protection of the south, including by the building of an anti-infiltration wall in the Sinai. A threat by Turkey last week to challenge Israel’s plans for gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean could threaten Israel’s agreement with Cyprus on gas drilling and could worsen tensions with Lebanon on drilling rights. 268

Initial Israeli fears about the Arab Spring uprisings have begun to materialize in concrete ways. When the uprisings began in Tunisia and Egypt at the start of the year, little attention was directed toward Israel because so much focus was on throwing off dictatorial rule and creating a new political order. Traditionally, many Arab leaders have used Israel as a convenient scapegoat, turning public wrath against it and blaming it for their problems. The faint hope here was that a freer Middle East might move away from such anti-Israel hostility because the overthrow of dictators would open up debate. But as the months of Arab Spring have turned autumnal, Israel has increasingly become a target of public outrage. Some here say Israel is again being made a scapegoat, this time for unfulfilled revolutionary promises. But there is another interpretation, and it is the predominant one abroad — Muslims, Arabs and indeed many around the globe believe Israel is unjustly occupying Palestinian territories, and they are furious at Israel for it. And although some Israelis pointed fingers at Islamicization as the cause of the violence, Egyptians noted Saturday that Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, distanced themselves from Friday’s protests and did not attend, while legions of secular-minded soccer fans were at the forefront of the embassy attacks. “The world is tired of this conflict and angry at us because we are viewed as conquerors, ruling over another people,” said Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, a Labor Party member of Parliament and a former defense minister. “If I were Bibi Netanyahu, I would recognize a Palestinian state. We would then negotiate borders and security. Instead nothing is happening. We are left with one ally, America, and that relationship is strained, too.” David D. Kirkpatrick contributed reporting from Cairo, and Steven Lee Myers from Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/world/middleeast/11israel.html?_r=1&nl=todaysh eadlines&emc=tha2

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09/09/2011 06:01 PM Bush's Tragic Legacy How 9/11 Triggered America's Decline A Commentary by Gregor Peter Schmitz in Washington The events of Sept. 11, 2001 led to a wave of solidarity with the US. But the superpower has lost that goodwill over the course of the wars it subsequently waged. Now America is mainly seen not as the victim of terrorism, but as a perpetrator of violence itself. The smoke was still rising from the rubble of the World Trade Center when Richard Armitage, at the time the US deputy secretary of state, spoke in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. "History begins today," he said. In the coming decade, Armitage would turn out to be right -- except the politician could not have foreseen how tragic the history would be following the epochal event. It is the history of the decline of the USA as a superpower. Immediately before the attacks, this country was in full bloom -- like Rome at its peak, as TV host Joe Scarborough recalls today. The Republican President George W. Bush had inherited a fat budget surplus from the Democrat Bill Clinton. In Kosovo, the US, which Madeleine Albright dubbed "the indispensable nation," had just shown the Europeans how it could resolve conflicts, even in their own backyard. Bill Gates and Microsoft were still cool. Then came the planes, piloted by the followers of Osama bin Laden -- and for a brief moment, the superpower seemed even more powerful than ever. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had himself photographed donating blood for the victims. Even the French all suddenly wanted to be Americans. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised "unlimited solidarity." What followed was an unlimited mistake. Bin Laden had hoped to entangle the Americans in bloody wars. How well he would succeed in doing this, he probably could not have imagined himself. Bush's Tragic Legacy America was trapped in Iraq for years, where a victory was a long time coming and was never a real one. It is currently trapped in Afghanistan, where victory no longer even seems possible. And it is trapped in an embrace with its ally Pakistan, which it does not trust and yet cannot release. These are costly defeats for America and the rest of the world. According to a conservative estimate by Brown University, there have been almost 140,000 civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. The massive retaliation cost more than $3 trillion (€2.2 trillion) -- dollars that would have been better used in America's schools or in the wallets of US citizens. For a short time after the attacks, the country seemed united. Americans embraced each other. Even the cold city of New York suddenly seemed warm. But instead of cultivating public spirit, President Bush sought to find a pretext -- any pretext -- to invade Afghanistan and Iraq. This is his most tragic legacy, the fact that America can no 270

longer even mourn its victims properly -- because Americans have long been not just victims, but also perpetrators. But the decade of terror did in fact traumatize Americans and turn them into victims -- even those who only experienced the attacks on television. A Country at War with Itself Today, following all the Bush-era tax cuts, the US is a deeply divided country in social terms. The gap between rich and poor is almost as great as it was in the days of oil barons and steel magnates in the last century. Five percent of Americans buy almost 40 percent of all consumer goods sold in the country. The country is at war with itself. It has a Congress where there is perpetual conflict between the right and the left -- and where they don't even want to talk to each other when the threat of a national bankruptcy looms. Like no other country, the US became great because of its openness. Now, it has become distrustful, fearful and defensive -- against Muslims, against foreigners, against anyone who is different. Citizen militias hunt down illegal immigrants, and many people can still not accept having a black president in the White House. "American exceptionalism" was always the US's trump card. The new candidates for the White House still refer to it in the election campaign, but it sounds like a hollow mantra -- one of those election promises that shouldn't be examined too closely. Because if it was, then people might realize that many things in America are only exceptional because they are exceptionally bad. The country has lousy health statistics despite having one of the most expensive health care systems in the world. Then there are the billions wasted in the education system, not to mention the armaments madness - - the US spends almost as much on defense as the rest of the world put together. And then there is the fixation on a financial system that rewards gamblers, where the country's most talented young people no longer work on developing new patents, but devote themselves to financial wizardry. Meanwhile, China and other emerging economies can happily concentrate on their own ascent. Estranged from the Rest of the World Where has that one-of-a-kind America gone? New York Magazine sums it up: "Ten years later, America now looks a bit more like other countries do -- our embrace of capitalism has grown more complicated, our class mobility less certain, our immigrants and our diversity less unique." Even in foreign policy, the world power is no longer seen as the world's role model. "Leading from behind" is the maxim of the current president, Barack Obama. He says it out of necessity, because stateside a strange alliance has formed, between those on the fringes of mainstream politics both on the left and on the right. They want to turn America into a tight-fisted world power. They only want one thing: US troops should come home, and then other countries should see how they fare. After all, the isolationists argue, these other countries don't understand America anyway. The US has become estranged from the rest of the world. It is partly its own fault, but the rest of the world also shares some of the blame -- because many only see America as a perpetrator, and no longer regard it as a victim.

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This was most evident on the day that bin Laden was killed. Americans cheered spontaneously on the streets when they heard the news. But many people in other parts of the world did not want to celebrate with them. They reacted with agitation to the openly flaunted joy over the terrorist's death. The alienation of the others often sounded patronizing and self-satisfied. But it underlined the fact that the victims of the attacks were no longer in the foreground. Instead, the sins of the original victim were brought into focus -- America's sins. The superpower, to a large extent, only has itself to blame. But that is still sad nonetheless.

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785405,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Opinion: Ten Lost Years (09/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785280,00.html • 'Who's Afraid of the Big, Bad Buildings?': How New Yorkers Tried to Stop the World Trade Center (09/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785206,00.html • Photo Gallery: Protests Against the World Trade Center Construction http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-72634.html • Questioning 9/11: The Politician Turned Conspiracy Theorist (09/06/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,784673,00.html • Photo Gallery: What Became of the Hamburg Cell http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-72209.html • On the Trail of Said Bahaji: 9/11 Conspirator Reported to Be Living in Pakistan (08/29/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,783097,00.html • President Barack Obama's Speech: 'Justice Has Been Done' (05/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,760065,00.html • Photo Gallery: America Celebrates Bin Laden's Death http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-67463.html

09/09/2011 10:53 AM Opinion Ten Lost Years By Jakob Augstein Ten years have passed since Sept. 11, 2001, and today only losers remain. Islam has been taken hostage by blinded ideologues. The West has betrayed its values in its struggle against terror, and we are now burdened with Islamophobes. Without 9/11, the crimes of Anders Behring Breivik and the rise of right-wing populists in Europe would be inconceivable. What remains etched in our minds, 10 years after the fact? Two images tell the entire story. One is of the burning Twin Towers and the other of a prisoner being tortured in 272

Abu Ghraib. This is the iconography of human insanity: the horrific crime in New York and the horrific crime of the war against terror. Violence was fought with violence, only to generate even more violence. Anyone who believed that people had learned something from the wars of the 20th century was promptly disabused of that notion at the beginning of the new millennium. In fact, we have learned nothing. We are still all too willing to exterminate each other, even with our bare hands. And we always have good reasons to do so. We are always in the right. What remains, 10 years later? The realization that those who pursue the law of revenge are condemning themselves. And that a record of horror never adds up. The policy of the United States after 9/11 wasn't merely immoral. It actually damaged the country. The roughly 3,000 people who died on Sept. 11 were followed by more than 6,000 dead American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq, countless civilian victims, 5 million refugees and costs currently estimated at more than $3 trillion (€2.13 trillion). What should the West have done after the attacks on America? The "War on Terror" should have ended when al-Qaida was driven out of Afghanistan. Instead, the United States turned it into an ideological world war. It expended so many of it resources in this struggle, beyond all reasonable measure, that it led to shifts in the global tectonics of power. The rise of China, which may have been unstoppable already, was accelerated. The United States overestimated its abilities, and the neocons' fantasies of omnipotence failed as a result. Democracy -- if it ever was the objective -- cannot be bombed into existence by some outside force. It has to grow from within. A Perilous and Pointless Division of the World What remains, 10 years later? What remains is that many Muslims and Westerners consider each other to be fanatical and dangerous (the Muslims also consider people in the West to be corrupt and greedy). What remains is a division of the world into Muslims and Westerners that is as perilous as it is pointless, a division that goes deeper and seems more irreparable than anyone could have imagined before the concept of the clash of cultures was invented. It is a division that separates nations and continents, but that is also tearing apart Western societies from within. The pathological Islamophobia spreading through large parts of Europe and contributing to the rise in the popularity of right-wing populist parties and movements is inconceivable without 9/11. And the crimes of mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik are inconceivable without 9/11. When we look at what remains, 10 years later, it no longer matters whether Osama bin Laden, that revolutionary of evil, achieved his actual objective. His giant caliphate uniting all Muslims was not achieved. On the contrary, as a result of his attack on the Americans, the al-Qaida leader brought ruin to Afghanistan, the only country in which his ideas had already been largely put into practice -- from a ban on tape-recorders to acid attacks on schoolgirls to the destruction of ancient statues. Bin Laden failed as a revolutionary. But as a terrorist he was successful beyond compare. Ten years later, is all of this merely cause for despair? No. It is correct that not even the great flood managed to wash away all evil from the earth. In the end, God said with resignation, as it is written in the First Book of Moses: "I will henceforth curse the ground no more for man's cause, for the imagination of man's heart is evil, even from 273

his youth." But what Franz Kafka describes in "The Trial" as the most horrible thing of all, namely that "the lie has become the order of the world," will not prevail in the long run. Osama bin Laden lies dead on the ocean floor, George W. Bush has retired to some farm in Texas, and the Arab Spring has begun in North Africa. That's a start, at least. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,785280,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • On the Trail of Said Bahaji: 9/11 Conspirator Reported to Be Living in Pakistan (08/29/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,783097,00.html • Charisma Deficit: Loss of Bin Laden Threatens Al-Qaida 'Brand' (09/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,783655,00.html • A Unique Perspective on Sept. 11: The Last Sunrise Between the Twin Towers (09/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,784089,00.html

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September 9, 2011

A New Start for Libya After 42 years of erratic dictatorship, it would be unrealistic to expect a smooth transition in the early days of Libya’s post-Qaddafi era. There have been water and fuel shortages, episodes of vigilante justice, and power struggles among the victorious rebel forces. There are also signs of progress on military, diplomatic, economic and political fronts. The last bastions of the regime are under assault, while Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi remains unaccounted for. Foreign governments have begun releasing billions of dollars of Libyan assets that were frozen during the fighting. Plans have been drafted for electing a constitutional assembly by early next year. Technicians are assessing damage to the oil wells and pipelines that account for 98 percent of the country’s annual revenues, though full production may not be restored for months or even longer. Considering the situation six months ago, there is reason to be encouraged. Nonetheless, the new regime faces many challenges. Among the most troubling developments is the brutal treatment of dark-skinned Africans rounded up by vigilantes and the regime’s security forces. The overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan Africans in Libya are migrant workers. Two and a half million worked there before the rebellion. Roughly two million remain. Colonel Qaddafi is thought to have hired several thousand Africans to fight for him in February. How many stuck with him to the end is unclear. But Western journalists saw no evidence of mercenaries in Tripoli when the city fell. What they have seen is Africans being rounded up and treated differently from Libyans who fought for the dictator, many of whom have already been set free. Some Africans accused of being mercenaries were lynched after the rebels captured Benghazi in February. To maintain its international credibility, the transitional government must release innocent Africans and make sure that those who fought for Colonel Qaddafi are treated fairly. Much hard work remains in other areas as well. Vigilantes must be disarmed or placed under firm government control. Tribes, factions representing different regions and rival rebel leaders must be reconciled and represented in the transitional government. Other countries should help with technical assistance and cash until Libyan assets are fully unfrozen and oil revenues flow again. Qatar and Kuwait have been generous so far, as have the United States, Britain and France. Promises of support are also flowing in from countries like Germany and Turkey, which refused to take part in NATO’s protective airstrikes against Colonel Qaddafi’s forces. Libya’s new leaders may be tempted to skew future Libyan oil contracts and other economic rewards toward nations that helped most in the fight against the Qaddafi regime. But they should resist that temptation. Bidding for contracts should be open and transparent to ensure the best returns for the Libyan people. Colonel Qaddafi was a master at using Libya’s oil wealth to forge his international alliances. That is a tactic his successors should not emulate. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/opinion/a-new-start-for-libya.html?hp

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HUMAN RIGHTS Los amigos occidentales de Gadafi Arnold Cassola 2011-09-08

LA VALETA (MALTA) – Con el régimen del coronel Muamar El Gadafi en ruinas y el propio Gadafi fugado, ha llegado el momento de examinar exactamente por qué sobrevivió en el poder durante tanto tiempo. Parece que la avidez de mercados y dinero acabó con la supuesta preocupación de Occidente por los derechos humanos básicos. Los países occidentales más importantes transigieron con Libia durante decenios. Al fin y al cabo, Gadafi sobrevivió a la incursión punitiva con la que el Presidente Ronald Reagan bombardeó en 1986 su residencia sólo porque el ex Primer Ministro italiano Bettino Craxi y el ex Primer Ministro maltés Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici lo previnieron. Naturalmente, Craxi pudo acogerse más adelante a la protección de otro dictador árabe recientemente caído, Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali, cuando huyó de Italia para escapar a la cárcel en 1992. Por su parte, Bonnici siguió consolidando sus lazos con el dictador libio hasta el final, mediante su participación en el –¡agárrense!– Premio Gadafi de Derechos Humanos, También la “rehabilitación” internacional de Gadafi en los años inmediatamente anteriores a la “primavera árabe” rebosó de sordidez moral. Según muchos observadores, el papel del Primer Ministro británico Tony Blair en el lanzamiento de ese proceso en 2004 estuvo motivado, casi desde el principio, por el deseo de hacer negocios con su régimen. Y no era sólo petróleo lo que estaba en juego. Según una crónica de la Associated Press, en la que se citan estadísticas del Foreign Office, Libia compró al Reino Unido “equipo militar y paramilitar por valor de unos 40 millones de libras (55 millones de dólares) en el año acabado el 30 de septiembre de 2010”. En la lista de la compra de Gadafi figuraban “fusiles con mira telescópìca, vehículos blindados, munición para el control de multitudes y gas lacrimógeno”. No cabe duda de que ese armamento ha resultado muy útil en los seis últimos meses. Según la misma crónica de la AP, “el gobierno de Bush aprobó la venta a Libia de material por valor de tres millones de dólares en 2006 y de 5,3 millones de dólares en 2007. En 2008, se permitió a Libia importar armamento de los Estados Unidos por valor de 46 millones de dólares. Entre las mercancías aprobadas figuraban casi 400 276

cargamentos de material explosivo e incendiario, 25.000 piezas de repuesto para aviones, 56.000 componentes electrónicos militares y casi 1.000 artículos de equipo óptico y otras clases de equipo de dirección para armas”. Tampoco Alemania fue inmune a la tentación. En 2004, el entonces Canciller Gerhard Schroeder inauguró un pozo petrolífero gestionado por la empresa alemana Winterstall en el Magreb libio. Para no ser menos, el Presidente francés, Nicolas Sarkozy, se apresuró a visitar Libia en 2008 para vender a Gadafi tecnología nuclear. Italia importa el 60 por ciento de su petróleo y el 40 por ciento de su gas natural de Libia y, poco después de que el Primer Ministro Silvio Berlusconi fuera reelegido en 2008, prometió pagar al régimen de Gadafi 250 millones de euros anuales durante veinte años a cambio de la aceptación por parte de Libia de todos los refugiados norteafricanos que buscaran asilo político en Italia. Parece que el nombre de Berlusconi nunca deja de aparecer cuando de lucrativas transacciones comerciales con Libia se trata. De hecho, Berlusconi y Gadafi han compartido intereses comerciales personales desde 2009, cuando Lafitrade, una empresa familiar de Gadafi, tomó una participación del diez por ciento en Quinta Communications, productora cinematográfica de la que la enpresa Fininvest de Berlusconi posee el 22 por ciento de las acciones. El caso de la pequeña Malta, a unos doscientos kilómetros de las costas de Libia, podría ser simplemente la punta de un iceberg de complicidad mucho mayor. El Gobierno maltés acaba de revelar que ha congelado activos del Gobierno de Libia por valor de 377 millones de euros, de los cuales 86 pertenecían a la familia de Gadafi o a entidades en la que ésta tiene una participación mayoritaria. ¿Dónde se ha invertido todo ese dinero? ¿Sólo en bancos malteses o hay algunos intereses comerciales también involucrados? ¿Y quiénes son los socios malteses? ¿Hay políticos involucrados? Esas preguntas tienen importancia porque las entidades libias en Malta solían ofrecer “ayuda” a políticos malteses a cambio de que promocionaran la imagen de Gadafi. El pasado 28 de agosto, el periódico procristianodemócrata Il-Mument reveló documentación de la CIA sobre la financiación directa por parte del régimen de Gadafi de actividades organizadas por el Partido Laborista de Malta durante la cumbre Bush- Gorbachev celebrada en Malta en 1989. El ex tesorero del Partido Laborista Joe Sammut es quien aparece citado con más frecuencia por su conexión con Gadafi. Según The New York Post, Sammut manejó centenares de miles de dólares en nombre de Mutassim Gadafi, hijo del coronel y ex jefe de seguridad. Se dice que Sammut intervino en la organización de fiestas en las que participaron Snoop Dog, Nelly Furtado y Enrique Iglesias, entre otros, para diversión de los hijos de Gadafi. Y no son sólo políticos del Partido Laborista de Malta los que han tenido supuestamente conexiones con el clan Gadafi. El actual Comisario maltés de la Unión Europea, John Dalli, ex diputado cristianodemócrata y ministro del Gobierno, ha reconocido francamente que había “establecido una potente red en los niveles político y ejecutivo” de Libia. Gadafi y su familia han estado repartiendo dinero por toda Europa durante años, comprando influencia y logrando que los gobiernos hicieran la vista gorda ante las 277

violaciones de los derechos humanos por parte del régimen. Es de esperar que algún día el Tribunal Penal Internacional de La Haya juzgue a Gadafi, su familia y sus subordinados, pero también habríamos de esperar que el nuevo gobierno de Libia revelara los vínculos entre políticos occidentales y el régimen de Gadafi. En ese momento el tribunal de la opinión pública, como mínimo, podrá emitir sentencia sobre sus acciones. Arnold Cassola fue Secretario General del Partido Verde Europeo y diputado al Parlamento de Italia. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cassola5/Spanish

September 7, 2011 Finding Hope in Libya By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF When I was entering Libya last week from Tunisia, a rebel soldier named Ayman objected that I didn’t have a visa. I pointed out that his force had overthrown the government that issued visas. But, in this kind of a stalemate, the guy with the gun wins. And that was Ayman. Eventually, he came up with a solution. I would give him a ride to his hometown, Zawarah, and the visa requirement would disappear. I gritted my teeth and told him to jump in. That incident points to a fear that many Americans have of the Libyan rebels. Are they just goons who will create their own tyranny or chaos? Particularly after we embraced Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, only to see him engulfed by corruption, it’s fair to ask whether the Libyan rebels will do any better. The uncertainties are real. But, after my recent visit to Libya, I’m guardedly optimistic. What’s particularly impressive is the paucity of revenge killings and looting in Tripoli, the capital. There have been a few incidents in which rebel soldiers apparently executed prisoners, and black Africans have been treated abysmally (they are accused of being mercenaries for Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi). But the Libyans who served in that hated regime mostly have not been molested. I saw many Libyans fleeing for Tunisia, and, presumably, many of them were Qaddafi loyalists. But rebels did not hinder them at checkpoints or pilfer their belongings. And, as far as I could tell, the homes and luxury vehicles the loyalists left behind have been mostly untouched by neighbors and rebels alike. In addition, I went through dozens of armed rebel checkpoints and was never once asked for a “baksheesh,” meaning bribe or gift. What we know of the top rebel leadership is also reasonably encouraging. Mahmoud Jibril, the acting prime minister of the rebels’ Transitional National Council, earned his doctorate from the University of Pittsburgh and taught there, too. As for Mustafa Abdel- Jalil, the acting chairman of the council, he is a former justice minister who challenged 278

Colonel Qaddafi by calling for the release of political prisoners. Ali Tarhouni, the finance minister, is a former economist at the University of Washington. Some Americans have fretted that Islamic extremists will take over Libya, but very few of the rebel leaders have been associated with Islamic fundamentalism. One exception is Abdel Hakim Belhaj, a military commander in Tripoli, who says he was tortured by the C.I.A. in 2004. Yet he told my Times colleague Rod Nordland that all is forgiven and that he appreciates the American role in the Libyan revolution. Frankly, any representative Libyan government needs to include fundamentalists like Mr. Belhaj, who were particularly brave in standing up to the Qaddafi regime. The mood in Libya is both pro-Islam and pro-Western. Occasionally, I ran into Libyan-Americans who traveled to Libya to join the revolution; I called one rebel outside my hotel “Texas,” because that’s where he learned his drawl. Then there’s Dr. Rida Mazagri, a neurosurgeon from West Virginia who returned to his native Libya to care for patients in rebel-held areas. Dr. Mazagri was seized by Qaddafi forces, and nothing was heard of him for five months. Many of us assumed that he was dead, but then rebels freed him from a prison in Tripoli and he has just returned to a hero’s welcome in West Virginia. The mood in Tripoli seems largely tolerant and forgiving, and exuberant about the prospect of democracy. “We are free now,” an engineer named Belgassim Ali told me. “Make a newspaper to support Qaddafi; I don’t mind. But no dictatorship!” It’s true that the rebels are atomized in small armed groups, and some roll their eyes at the rebel council. Most have little experience in governing, and they squabble among themselves. Then again, the rebels have coordinated disparate fighting units and have tried to arrange the surrender of holdout towns like Surt, Colonel Qaddafi’s hometown, rather than just marching in with guns blazing. Libya’s new government will also have the advantage of access to tens of billions of dollars in frozen funds and to the oil that makes Libya one of the richest countries in the region. I’m a believer in humanitarian intervention to avert genocide or mass atrocities — when the stars align, as I believe they did in Libya — so maybe I’m deluding myself to justify our bombing campaign. Yet it seems to me that the NATO military intervention prevented a massacre in Benghazi, saved countless Libyan lives and has put the country on a track of hope. Countries like the United States, France, Britain and Qatar did something historic in supporting a military operation that was largely about preserving lives, not national interests. While plenty can still go wrong, my sense is that Libya is muddling along toward a future far better than its oppressive past. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/opinion/finding-hope-in- libya.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

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THE WORLD IN WORDS Entre el 11-S y la primavera árabe Omar Ashour 2011-09-07

EL CAIRO – El contexto en el que actúa Al Qaeda en la actualidad es muy diferente de cuando lanzó su operación más conocida, los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre. En mayo de este año, miembros del grupo de élite SEAL de la marina estadounidense mataron a Osama Bin Laden, fundador y líder carismático de Al Qaeda, en Pakistán; también durante este año, se produjo en el Cercano Oriente el derrocamiento de tres dictaduras brutales, dos de ellas por medio de tácticas de resistencia civil sin uso de armas y la otra a manos de una rebelión armada con apoyo de la OTAN. Además, muchos de los comandantes de Al Qaeda más experimentados murieron en ataques con aviones no tripulados (el caso más reciente fue el de Atiyah Abd al Rahman). ¿Significa esto el fracaso del yihadismo militante, y que por consiguiente la supervivencia de Al Qaeda es incierta? El yihadismo es una ideología revolucionaria moderna que sostiene que la violencia política es un modo de producir cambios sociopolíticos que es legítimo desde el punto de vista teológico y eficaz desde el punto de vista táctico. En las acciones armadas de muchos de los grupos que suscriben esta visión del mundo (incluida, por supuesto, Al Qaeda), el terrorismo ha ocupado un lugar preponderante. Pero aunque después del 11-S Al Qaeda mantuvo su ideología, su modo de organización cambió en forma radical. De ser una organización centralizada y jerárquica pasó a adoptar una estructura sumamente descentralizada, en la que el protagonismo se trasladó a las ramas regionales. A fines de 2002 apareció en Arabia Saudita el subgrupo Al Qaeda de la Península Arábiga (AQPA), que en 2003 organizó un ataque espectacular en Riad. En 2004 se produjo el nacimiento de Al Qaeda de Irak (AQI). Para el año 2007 había aparecido también una rama llamada Al Qaeda del Magreb Islámico (AQMI). El “modelo de franquicia” estaba firmemente establecido. Pero diez años después del 11-S, estas franquicias no están en expansión, sino contenidas. 280

A la par del modelo de “franquicia”, Al Qaeda adoptó también un sistema de “telaraña”, donde se evita la estructura organizada y se favorece en cambio el uso de agentes entrenados que forman células pequeñas para llevar a cabo ataques específicos y luego se desbandan. Ejemplos de este modelo son los grupos que perpetraron los ataques en Madrid y Londres. Existe también un modelo de “frente ideológico”, propuesto en un primer momento por un famoso estratega yihadista, Abu Musab al Suri. Este modelo, lo mismo que el de la telaraña, se basa en la premisa de que la forma más segura de organización es no tener ninguna organización. En un manual paramilitar de 1.600 páginas, Llamada a la resistencia islámica global, escribió: “Esto frustra cualquier medida de seguridad”. El funcionamiento del modelo se basa en propagar una narrativa que describe la gravedad de las injusticias y humillaciones sufridas por los musulmanes, promover una ideología que identifica los medios para reparar esos agravios y luego esperar a que los simpatizantes se unan espontáneamente a Al Qaeda o inicien sus propias operaciones. Fue el modelo aplicado en el caso del mayor del ejército de los EE. UU. Nidal Hasan, quien en 2009 mató a 13 camaradas en Fort Hood, Texas, y en el de Roshonara Choudhary, quien en 2010 apuñaló al parlamentario británico Stephen Timms. Además de los cambios en la estructura de Al Qaeda, su ideología es objeto constante de cuestionamientos que salen de los lugares más inesperados. Después del 11-S, diversos movimientos, facciones, líderes yihadistas y simples militantes expresaron duras críticas al accionar de Al Qaeda y comenzaron a tomar partido por la no violencia, lo que significó para Al Qaeda la pérdida de decenas de miles de seguidores. Esto condujo a la transformación de organizaciones enteras en Egipto, Libia y Argelia, y de una cantidad considerable de militantes en Arabia Saudita, Yemen, Irak, Afganistán, Malasia, Singapur, Indonesia y otros países. En Egipto, la organización Al Gama’a al Islamiyya, o Grupo Islámico (GI), un ex aliado de Al Qaeda que participó en el asesinato del presidente Anwar Sadat en 1981, renunció a la violencia política y la deslegitimó. Entre 1992 y 1997 este grupo había liderado una insurgencia en el Alto Egipto y en 1993 estuvo implicado en el atentado al World Trade Center de Nueva York, pero en 1997 comenzó a repudiar el uso de tácticas armadas, cambio que reafirmó con la publicación de unos 25 volúmenes de argumentos teológicos y racionales en apoyo de su nueva ideología. Después de la caída de Hosni Mubarak, ocurrida a principios de este año en Egipto, el GI, en vez de acumular arsenales y reconstruir su brazo armado, optó por celebrar elecciones internas; pidió a sus miembros que rellenaran fichas de afiliación, organizó manifestaciones contra la violencia sectaria, emitió comunicados conjuntos con la Iglesia Copta Ortodoxa de Assiut a favor de la coexistencia pacífica y fundó un partido político (Construcción y Desarrollo) para presentarse en las elecciones. La organización egipcia Yihad Islámica, de la que salió Ayman al Zawahiri, actual líder supremo de Al Qaeda, también inició un proceso de transformación, parcialmente exitoso. Aunque varias de sus facciones todavía defienden las tácticas armadas, incluido el terrorismo, otras son sumamente críticas de Al Qaeda y están intentando crear partidos políticos convencionales en Egipto. El Grupo de Combate Islámico Libio (GCIL), otro ex aliado de Al Qaeda, abandonó la ideología entre 2005 y 2010; luego se unió a la revolución contra la dictadura del coronel Muamar el Gadafi. El líder del GCIL, Abdul Hakim Belhaj (alias Abu Abdullah 281

al Sadiq) es el actual comandante del Consejo Militar de Trípoli y encabezó el ataque al complejo Bab al Aziziya de Gadafi. Tras la victoria, Belhaj hizo un llamamiento a reforzar la seguridad, proteger las propiedades, detener las venganzas y construir una nueva Libia. En general, este tono moderado se corresponde con lo que la mayoría de los líderes del GCIL venían diciendo en los últimos seis meses, tanto en el este como en el oeste de Libia. En términos generales, la primavera árabe propinó un fuerte golpe al yihadismo y menoscabó en gran medida su tesis principal (que la militancia armada es el medio más eficaz y más legítimo para lograr el cambio). De hecho, la acción combinada de las operaciones de inteligencia, los ataques con aviones no tripulados, las transformaciones dentro de las filas yihadistas y la primavera árabe dejó muy disminuido el poder de la “Central de Al Qaeda”. Dados el modelo de franquicias y las innovaciones ideológicas, es probable que algunos fragmentos de Al Qaeda sobrevivan, ya que hay localidades donde están más enraizados. Pero en cuanto amenaza global, Al Qaeda está seriamente debilitada. Omar Ashour es director del programa de estudios de posgrado sobre Oriente Próximo en el Instituto de Estudios Árabes e Islámicos de la Universidad de Exeter (Reino Unido) y profesor visitante en el Brookings Doha Center. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ashour6/Spanish

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09/07/2011 09:06 AM Arab League Head Nabil Elaraby 'What's Wrong with the Palestinians Appealing to the UN?' Pro-democracy uprisings are continuing in the Middle East and the Palestinians could soon declare statehood. SPIEGEL spoke with Arab League General Secretary Nabil Elaraby about the Syrian regime's use of violence against protesters and how the US has failed to force Israel to negotiate in good faith. SPIEGEL: Libya has been liberated from Moammar Gadhafi's autocratic rule. Tensions in Syria, meanwhile, have already claimed more civilian lives than the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia combined, and yet the Arab League is holding back. Why are you going easy on the Syrian regime? Elaraby: Syria isn't Libya. Libya has always been largely isolated. What happened there had little effect on neighboring countries. It's a completely different situation with Syria. The country holds a key position in the region. What happens there has a direct impact on Lebanon and Iraq. In addition, Gadhafi used heavy weapons from the start, but Assad hasn't. SPIEGEL: Yet tanks have been deployed in Hama, Homs and Latakia for some time. Elaraby: When I flew to Syria 10 days after taking office, they also tried to tell me that there had been no riots in Aleppo or Damascus. I was told that gun battles had only occurred in a few towns near the border, because rebels had fired on security forces there. SPIEGEL: That, of course, is far from the truth. Elaraby: I delivered a clear and unambiguous message to (Syrian President) Bashar Assad. I called on him to institute reforms, stop the violence and facilitate a peaceful transition into a new era. SPIEGEL: We're hearing that for the first time. Elaraby: It was a sensitive issue that I couldn't make public at the time. Assad promised me that he would introduce changes. But now almost two months have passed, and I don't see any reforms. SPIEGEL: What are you asking for? Regime change? Elaraby: That's something for the Syrian people to decide for themselves. No one can dictate to a sovereign nation how it should change. SPIEGEL: What would have to happen for the League to take a stronger position against the Syrian regime, as it did in Libya? Elaraby: Things are still in flux. Only the United Nations has the right to make decisions on the use of force. Even the Arab League has no mandate to bring about change by force in a member state.

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SPIEGEL: Still, the Arab League has been militarily active in the past. In 1961, for example, it sent a special force to Kuwait to protect it from an imminent Iraqi invasion. Don't you need this kind of a strike force, not unlike the UN peacekeeping force? Elaraby: Given the majorities within the League, I don't think that's realistic. But I do insist on compliance with human rights. The people, the citizens, have to be protected, and not just in Syria. SPIEGEL: Many Arabs now feel that your institution is not very efficient. Elaraby: The historic moment of change has gripped the entire region, and sooner or later it will change all Arab countries. The League will certainly need to adjust to that. We must be capable of reacting quickly to unexpected developments. SPIEGEL: Surely there are a few member states, most notably Saudi Arabia, which will hardly support such changes. Elaraby: I too have my doubts there. Nevertheless, we still have to try, and we have to take seriously the human rights established by the UN, which all countries in the League have recognized. SPIEGEL: How does Saudi Arabia's foreign minister explain that his country supports the Syrian opposition, on the one hand, while at the same time sending troops to Bahrain? Elaraby: I don't ask him these questions. That's your job. You're the journalists. SPIEGEL: Do you support the Palestinian Autonomous Authority in its aspiration to have the UN General Assembly give its blessing in September to the establishment of a State of Palestine? Elaraby: UN Resolution 181, adopted in 1947, is the birth certificate for two nations, Israel and Palestine. What's wrong with the Palestinians appealing directly to the UN after 20 years of negotiations with Israel? They could spend another 20 years negotiating without results, because the Israeli government doesn't even want to put an end to the conflict. The Israelis are only serious about gaining more land and expanding the settlements. SPIEGEL: So you support the Palestinian initiative? Elaraby: Support? We are doing everything in our power to back it. SPIEGEL: The Americans have threatened tough consequences… Elaraby: That's an unacceptable position for us! The strongest and richest country in the world is incapable of making a commitment. Instead, someone from Tel Aviv or Jerusalem is telling them what to do. SPIEGEL: Won't this stance lead to tensions between the Arab League and the United States? Elaraby: I hope it doesn't come to that. If the Americans had fulfilled the promises they made many years ago and had forced the Israelis to engage in serious negotiations, the problem would have been solved already. SPIEGEL: The German government has also announced that it will not support the Palestinians' plan.

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Elaraby: I heard what (German Chancellor) Angela Merkel said. She cited the Germans' unique responsibility to the Jews. But the Germans also have a responsibility to the Palestinians. SPIEGEL: The radical Islamic group Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, also doesn't recognize Israel. Elaraby: Has Israel recognized Hamas? That sort of thing is based on reciprocity. SPIEGEL: But the Islamists in the Gaza Strip are the ones firing rockets at Israeli cities. Elaraby: That shouldn't be happening. It's wrong, and we do say that to them. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas constantly implores them to stop condoning the firing of rockets. The fact is that there are extremists on both sides. SPIEGEL: Will there ever be another war between an Arab country and Israel over Palestine? Elaraby: Completely out of the question. SPIEGEL: You took the position of secretary-general two months ago, during a turbulent time. Do you think it's possible that you will resign if the pressure becomes unbearable? Elaraby: Yes, absolutely. It's in my nature. Indeed, I'm not sure that I can stand it much longer. Interview conducted by Christoph Sydow and Volkhard Windfuhr Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,784815,00.html

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Libyan leaders fear Gaddafi may flee south across the border into Niger Niger's foreign minister warns that the country does not have the means to close the border Lizzy Davies Wednesday 7 September 2011 20.24 BST

A Libyan rebel soldier fires a machine gun into the air at the last outpost before Bani Walid from the Northern road towards Misrata. Photograph: Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images Libya's new leaders were urgently trying to stop Muammar Gaddafi fleeing south as neighbouring Niger said it would be impossible to close its border, and evidence emerged suggesting the fugitive dictator was last seen in the very southern-most part of Libya. As the National Transitional Council (NTC) announced it had sent a delegation to Niamey to discuss how to stop "any kind of infiltration" by Gaddafi or his family, Niger's foreign minister said the former ruler had neither crossed nor asked to cross the border. However, a day after it emerged that Gaddafi's personal security chief had been admitted to the country, Niger's foreign minister Mohamed Bazoum told the BBC that it had not decided whether it would accept Gaddafi himself or hand him over to the International Criminal Court (ICC). "We have no means to close the border ... It is too big and we have very, very small means for that," he said. Fathi Baja, the head of political affairs for the NTC, said the group was determined to try to prevent the dictator fleeing to Niger or Algeria. "I think he's near one of these borders … and he's looking for a chance to leave. We're asking every country not to accept him. We want these people for justice," Baja told Reuters. The leader of the interim government's manhunt, who said late on Tuesday that Gaddafi had last been seen three days before near the village of Ghwat, around 200 miles from

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the border with Niger. Hisham Buhagiar told Reuters: "We have it from many sources that he's trying to go further south, towards Chad or Niger." It was not possible to confirm whether this supported another claim made on Wednesdayby a spokesman for Tripoli's new military council, according to which Libyan fighters had located Gaddafi at an undisclosed location in Libya and had surrounded him on all sides. Anis Sharif said authorities were waiting to decide whether to capture or kill him. "He can't get out," Sharif told the Associated Press, without giving any more detail of the presumed location. "We are just playing games with him." In a signal of just how mired in contradiction and confusion the manhunt is, Libya's new deputy defence minister Mohammad Tanaz said the NTC did not know where Gaddafi was. Finding him, he added, was not a "priority". As fresh detail emerged of the convoys reported to have crossed the Niger-Libya border in recent days, the government in capital Niamey acknowledged that Gaddafi's former aide Mansour Dhao had been allowed in to the country "for humanitarian reasons". Bazoum said that at least three convoys had come in to Niger containing, he claimed, several pro-Gaddafi businessmen, as well as Agaly ag Alambo, a Tuareg rebel leader. There were fewer than 20 of them, he added, and they would be free to stay in Niger. The US said it believed senior Gaddafi regime figures had also crossed over the border, but not Gaddafi himself. In Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, president Blaise Compaoré denied reports it had offered asylum to the former Libyan despot. As the search for Gaddafi continued, lead rebel negotiator Abdullah Kanshil said his son Saif al-Islam had been spotted in the town of Bani Walid on Monday and was probably still there. "Saif was sighted two days ago," he said on Wednesday in Boshtata, about 50km from the town. "He's coming in and out." Kanshil said that Bani Walid was made up of 52 villages, three of which were still occupied by pro-Gaddafi gunmen. It was also possible that Saif could be hiding in its numerous caves. Another "big fish" might also be in the town, Kanshil added. Pressed for details, he replied: "Another of the sons. The ugly one." Peace talks appeared to break down on Tuesday. But Kanshil insisted: "There is a lot of progress today in the conference with the clan leaders in Bani Walid. They are safe and sound. A few people waved their guns and cursed at them [after talks yesterday] but the people of Bani Walid made they got home to their families." Asked if would be necessary to take Bani Walid by force, Kanshil said: "No, we hope not. The people of Bani Walid are with the revolution. But there are 80 snipers there, that's our worry. Some in caves, some on roofs of buildings, some walking in places." Any decision on an attack rested with the National Transitional Council, he said. "They are the leadership." http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/07/libyan-leaders-fear-gaddafi-flee- niger/print

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ft.com Comment Opinion September 6, 2011 9:53 pm After 9/11, getting beyond us-and-them By Wendell Steavenson Last week I met for coffee with a friend of mine, Ibrahim Hodaiby, in a place off Tahrir Square in Cairo. Outside were scores of black-uniformed state security police, to prevent attempts by protesters to restage a sit-in. Mr Hodaiby is young, fiercely intelligent, excruciatingly articulate and is simultaneously doing two master’s degrees, one in political science at the American University of Cairo, the other in Islamic sharia at the High Institute of Islamic Studies. I told him I was trying to write something about the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, and that despite having spent much of the intervening decade in the region from which the hijackers came, and on which America’s response to their attack was visited – Kabul, Tehran, Kurdistan, Baghdad, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo – I was finding it hard to fashion a narrative arc or argument. “Actually there’s not much to say,” he concurred. “The revolutions have killed all the ideology of violence that underpinned the jihadi movements.” More ON THIS STORY Analysis America after 9/11 – United we scan Analysis 9/11: The end of American hegemony Philip Stephens No, 9/11 did not change the world The remains of that day Slideshow The remains of that day Ibrahim’s grandfather was supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Ibrahim himself was a member, but has now broken with the organisation. He is a very modern Islamist, “a foot in both camps”, he says of his academic career and his ability to move between Islamic and liberal groups, advocating a system that for him would encompass the rights of western democracy but would be underpinned by the principles of social justice and community to be found in sharia. I am half-American, half-English, born in New York, grew up in London. I was not in America on 9/11; prosaically, I was in a shoe shop in Notting Hill when the first plane flew into the World Trade Center. My impetus in writing since then has been not to understand what had happened on 9/11 to Americans – the trauma seemed obvious enough – but to try to get to know the people on the other side of the supposed new Manichean world order of us-and-them. For a long time, especially in Iraq during the appalling violence after the 2003 invasion, the conversations were blunt and characterised by finger jabs at the Americans. One such, in the winter of 2003 with a young, serious Sunni called Ali in Baghdad, I remember in particular. “So what did you think about September 11th?” I asked him. He blinked his long Bambi eyelashes. “Yes, it was jihad,” he smiled, “I was very happy.” “But why jihad against America?” “As long as it is attacking any Muslim country, there can be jihad against America.” His words were clad in a smooth implacable armour of justification. 288

“But what Muslim country was America attacking in 2001?” I interrupted. “Many different countries,” he insisted, pressing the tips of his elegant fingers together to delineate certainty. “But especially in Bosnia, they slaughtered most of them.” A year later Ali was boasting to me about blowing up a police station in his neighbourhood; according to some of my sources he later joined al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. At the time I thought these kinds of arguments were false because they were based on wrong facts and on the sticky gobbets of propaganda that were flung out by autocrats and sheikhs and stirred into conspiracy theories. But later I came to think the contentions did not matter really. It was the actions that manifested, clear as blossoming fireballs on a September morning, an enraged sense of injustice. The west was seen as the enemy of the people of the Middle East because they had suffered its foreign policies for decades: in Palestine; through its support for repressive rulers; in its self- serving oil politics. This is perhaps why, when I talked to Egyptians this May after Osama bin Laden was killed, many said things like: “Of course we’re upset, because he’s a Muslim, and one of our brothers,” or “Every so often they kill someone – I am not saying Saddam and bin Laden were right – but it’s the way Americans treat Arabs and Muslims, this is what upsets me.” I had hoped to break through the rhetoric of the clash-of-civilisations divide. For a while I did it by adopting my own outrage at what my governments had done, especially in Iraq, where the violence of a mismanaged post-invasion was so horrifying. But I realised too, that my own cultural context had inexorably shaped me just as it had shaped the perceptions of my interlocutors. As much as I respected the religion, I could never get to grips with Islam as a political argument. The conviction of fundamental belief seemed to cut off the possibility of things I held dear: dissent, complaint, debate. I had a long argument one hot spring afternoon in 2004 about the efficacy of violent resistance with an insurgent in Baghdad. His name, by coincidence, was Osama. “Our religion says that we must resist,” he told me. “The way to protect Islam is through jihad.” Our conversation went in circles. “The difference is our religion,” Osama explained finally, exasperated. “It’s not about having different opinions, it’s about believing in something.” In 2006 the furore over the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet as a terrorist erupted. I had a discussion with a friend, a Syrian dissident activist. He was a liberal. He supported the idea of pluralistic democracy, but he did not think the Danish newspaper should have published the cartoons. I remained adamant in defending freedom of speech. I told him about the day a few weeks earlier when Sunni fundamentalists had invaded Christian East Beirut, where I was then living, a running mob, beards and guns in the street, and that I had felt disquiet at understanding what it felt to be threatened, and in that instant, to know instinctively, what side I was on. My friend listened and sighed. “Yes I know. And I am on the other side.” “But we think the same, you and I,” I said then. “We are the middle ground, but there’s no middle ground any more.” This summer I saw him again in Damascus. He was exhausted from the corrosion of fear and stress of these past months of uprising and crackdown. “It will end,” I told him, trying to evince a little cheer and hope. “Everything eventually ends.” 289

The decade that 9/11 ushered, the decade of Bush and bin Laden, has ended. I too have been swept up in the flag waving. We used to deride George W’s references to “freedom”; now I think maybe it’s the one universal. Ibrahim and I talked through the welter of current Egyptian politics. I complained I thought the protesters were getting distracted by emotional issues like Palestine. He shook his head. “It’s all one cause,” he said. “There’s a misconception that these revolutions mean a new era of friendly relations with the United States. We all in the region disagreed overwhelmingly with the attacks and targeting innocent civilians, but we were strongly opposed to the US foreign policies and this is still the case.” Democracy, if that’s what emerges in some form, in the Middle East will not suddenly remove all our differences. A relationship skewed by superiority and inferiority complexes has manifestly changed. But we should not overlook the deep animosity that remains towards the US in the region. Who knows what ironies of unintended consequence we will be discussing in 10 years. As Egyptian friends say, “the revolution is only just beginning”. The writer’s latest book is ‘The Weight of the Mustard Seed’ http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/449b27ba-d874-11e0-8f0a- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz1XY1QtAI8

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Libyan army convoys flee across Sahara carrying looted cash and gold Muammar Gaddafi's location still unknown despite rumours of asylum in Burkina Faso David Smith in Boshtata, Libya guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 6 September 2011 20.39 BST

Anti-Gaddafi fighters at the last checkpoint outside Bani Walid, one of only three major cities still in the control of the Libyan army. Photograph: Youssef Boudlal/Reuters The hunt for Muammar Gaddafi has widened across Africa after Libyan army convoys crossed hundreds of miles of desert into neighbouring Niger, rumoured to be bound for Burkina Faso. Tantalising clues of a possible escape route for Gaddafi filled the void created by the disappearance of the ousted leader whose face was ubiquitous in Libya for more than 40 years. Reports of multiple convoys fleeing to Niger with looted gold and cash also suggested that the will of regime loyalists was failing and their last pockets of resistance in Libya could be near collapse. Details of the size of the convoys, and who was in them, were scarce as they made their way across the vast swath of Sahara with more than 1,000 miles between any populated areas on the two sides of the border. But military sources from France and Niger told Reuters that a convoy of between 200 and 250 vehicles from Libya was escorted to the northern city of Agadez by the Nigerien army. Amid speculation about a possible South African-brokered deal to allow Gaddafi to go free, there were rumours he might join the convoy en route to neighbouring Burkina Faso, which has offered him asylum. Guma el-Gamaty, the London representative of the National Transitional Council (NTC), said that Gaddafi could already be in Niger but admitted there was no certainty about his whereabouts. US and British officials said they were sceptical about claims the deposed leader had already left Libya. In London, Foreign Office sources described difficulties in 291

communications – Britain does not have embassies in either Niger or Burkina Faso – amid swirling rumours about events in the remote Sahel borderlands. Gaddafi has courted poor African nations in recent years and used Libya's oil wealth to buy influence at the African Union. He is believed to have financed the Tuareg rebellion in the north of Niger and remains popular in towns such as Agadez, where a majority of the population is Tuareg. Burkina Faso, a former recipient of large amounts of Libyan aid, offered Gaddafi sanctuary about two weeks ago even though it has signed the international criminal court treaty requiring it to hand suspects to The Hague. France, Niger and Burkina Faso, along with the NTC and Nato, all denied knowing where he was or of any deal to let him go abroad or find refuge. Niger's foreign minister, Bazoum Mohamed, was quoted by al-Arabiya television saying that Gaddafi was not in the convoy which arrived late on Monday. An aide to the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, said: "We have no specific information that would indicate that Gaddafi is there." But those comments did not contradict a French military source who claimed the 69- year-old fugitive and his son and heir Saif al-Islam might join the convoy later to head for Burkina Faso. The unnamed source told Reuters he had been informed that the commander of Libya's southern forces, General Ali Khana, may also be in Niger, not far from the Libyan border. He said he had been told Gaddafi and his son, Saif al-Islam, would join Khana and catch up with the convoy should they choose to accept the offer of exile. The source said the convoy, probably including officers from army units based in the south of Libya, may have looped through Algeria rather than crossing the Libya-Niger frontier directly. Algeria last week took in Gaddafi's wife, daughter and two other sons, angering the NTC. A spokesman for the NTC described a convoy carrying gold and cash, including banknotes from the Central Bank of Libya branch in Sirte, Gaddafi's birthplace that remains loyal to him. An NTC official, Fathis Baja, told Reuters: "Late last night 10 vehicles carrying gold, euros and dollars crossed from Jufra into Niger with the help of Tuaregs from the Niger tribe." Tuareg nomads who inhabit the Sahara across frontiers say those fleeing Libya include many black Africans, some of whom may have been fighters for Gaddafi and now fear anger and reprisals. Officials in Niger have said the head of Gaddafi's security brigades, Mansour Dhao, along with more than 10 other Libyans, crossed the border on Sunday. Meanwhile, Abdoulaye Harouna, owner of the Agadez Info newspaper, told the Associated Press several dozen pick-up trucks had arrived on Monday, led by the Tuareg rebel leader Rissa ag Boula, a native of Niger who sought refuge in Libya and was believed to be fighting for Gaddafi. Gamaty warned that Niger would be penalised if it was found to have helped Gaddafi escape. "Niger is a neighbour of Libya from the south and should be considering the future relationship with Libya," he told the BBC. This – if confirmed – will very much antagonise any future relationship between Libya and Niger."

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Nato appeared to deny suggestions that it had deliberately refrained from attacking a large convoy or convoys reported to have crossed the border. "Nato continuously receives reports from various sources regarding weapons, vehicles and even convoys of vehicles moving throughout Libya," said spokeswoman Oana Lungescu. "We do not discuss the intelligence and surveillance information we collect, but we do publicly announce actions we take when we act on threats to the civilian population. Our mission is to protect civilians, the civilian population in Libya, not to track and target thousands of fleeing former regime leaders, mercenaries, military commanders and internally displaced people." Gaddafi has broadcast defiance since being forced into hiding but only three major Libyan cities remain under his control – Bani Walid, Sirte and Sabha. His fugitive spokesman Moussa Ibrahim said by phone on Monday: "Muammar Gaddafi is in excellent health and in very, very high spirits … he is in a place that will not be reached by those fractious groups, and he is in Libya." Both Gaddafi and Saif al-Islam have previously been said to be in the tribal stronghold of Bani Walid, 90 miles south of Tripoli. But that belief has evaporated after days of blockade of the town. NTC negotiators continued to press on Tuesday for a peaceful surrender in Bani Walid to avoid further bloodshed. They met four local clan leaders at a televised parley in a mosque in Boshtata, 30 miles from the town. The clan leaders said the majority of Bani Walid's population were ready to surrender but the rest feared reprisals, in particular against 63 Gaddafi loyalists named on a wanted list. They told the meeting of rumours circulating in Bani Walid that the rebels were going to rape the women of the town and kill people. The rebels offered a temporary amnesty to loyalists and ordered that a local radio station, accused of spreading alarmist propaganda, be shut down. Mahmoud Jibril, prime minister of the NTC, joined the talks by telephone on loudspeaker, promising to restore food, water and power supplies while protecting civilians. "This is a real chance for Bani Walid to show its real face to the world, to enter the history of Libya," he said. As the participants emerged, rebels sang and fired into the air in celebration. Moftha Bagol, a mediator from Bani Walid, said: "Around 90% of the people there are against Gaddafi. A few are still refusing because they have been involved in killing and bloodshed and are scared something will happen to them later. "But we are determined to persuade them. With god's help we hope to convince them that we are all brothers." Hours later, sources in Boshtata suggested that the attempt had not been a success and the stalemate continued. Near Sirte there was the first sign of heavy fighting for some days. Combatants reported exchanges of shell fire and rockets to the east. Soumaya Ghannoushi, page 30 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/06/libya-army-convoys-looted-gold/print

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ft.com comment blogs The World Israel, Turkey and Greece September 4, 2011 7:01 pm by Gideon Rachman The news that Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, is considering visiting the Gaza Strip raises the possibility of a sharp escalation in Turkey’s dispute with Israel. The two countries dispute dates back to 2010 and Israel’s storming of the Mavi Marmara, a ship that was trying to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza – some eight Turkish citizens were killed during the Israeli attack. The Turks have demanded an apology and compensation. The Israelis have refused to apologise. The latest twist in the dispute has been provoked by a UN report on the incident which looks like a classic effort to split the difference. The report, issued a few days ago, suggested that Israel should indeed pay compensation and express regret. But it also found that the Israeli naval blockade is legal (since Gaza has been the base for attacks launched on Israel). This finding appears to have infuriated the Turks, who have declared the report “null and void”. Erdogan’s appearance in the Gaza Strip could have dangerous consequences for Israel, given the volatility of the situation there – and the fact that it will precede the Palestinian effort to gain recognition as a state at the United Nations. But it is also carries risks for Erdogan himself. The Turkish prime minister is riding high. He has recently won a smashing electoral victory at home, the Turkish economy is booming and his strongly anti-Israeli foreign policy has made him popular in the Arab world and at home. Turkey, however, also has its vulnerabilities. Its economy is clearly over-heating. Turkish foreign policy is also going through a troubled phase. While Mr Erdogan is clearly keen to position himself as a champion of Palestinian rights, his government has been pretty feeble about standing up for the rights of the Syrians, who are being massacred in large numbers just across the border. The Turkish government was also distinctly ambivalent about the Libyan uprising. It was France, Britain and the US that made the running within Nato, in assisting the Libyans to overthrow a vicious dictatorship. And while joining in the condemnation of any Israeli bombardment of Gaza, the Turks have continued energetically to bomb the bases of Kurdish insurgents. Mr Erdogan’s energetic championing of the Palestinian cause has also profoundly changed the image of Turkey in Washington. The Turks used to be extremely popular on Capitol Hill and in the State Department. But all that has changed. Riding high at home and in the region – and with a booming economy behind him – Mr Erdogan presumably feels he can afford to stick it to the Israelis and their friends in Congress – at least for now. But damaging Turkey’s traditionally warm relationship with Western governments in favour of popularity on the Arab street, is not an obviously brilliant move. Turkish confidence is, of course, only matched by Greek desperation. But, when they can turn their minds away from the unfolding economic disaster at home, senior

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officials in Greece see a diplomatic opportunity in the deterioration in the relationship between Turkey and Israel. Traditionally, Greece has been a champion of the Palestinian cause. Andreas Papandreou, the father of the current prime minister, George, cultivated contacts with the PLO when that was still a highly controversial thing to do. Given this pro- Palestinian legacy and its popularity with the Greek left, switching to a more pro-Israeli stance would be a potentially sensitive move. But the signs of such a switch are already emerging. Greece quietly squished plans to launch another “Gaza flotilla” from Greek waters earlier this summer. Emissaries from the Greek government have also travelled to Israel for talks with Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior figures in the government. When I was in Athens recently, one Greek involved in the talks said that they were perfectly compatible with keeping faith with the old PLO-link. As the Greeks see it, Turkey is cultivating Gaza which is run by Hamas. The Greek government is keeping lines open to the West Bank, which is run by Hamas’s enemies, Fatah. Israel, of course, will take any friends it can get – even if they are a bit hard up at the moment. For the Greeks, a warmer relationship with Israel has several potential benefits. It goes down well in Washington and it also has potentially positive economic spin-offs. Large amounts of natural gas have been found off the coast of both Israel and Cyprus. The Greeks see their country as the natural route for a pipeline taking Israeli natural gas to the European mainland. http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2011/09/israel-turkey-and-greece/#axzz1x4dttj9n

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"La gente ha despertado en Israel" Stav Shaffir, líder de los indignados israelíes, cree que su país debe resolver sus problemas internos para poder solucionar el conflicto con los palestinos ANA GARRALDA | Tel Aviv 04/09/2011 Llega montada en bicicleta con su larga melena pelirroja, rizada, bajo un sombrero de ala del que no se separa; el sol de Tel Aviv abrasa en verano. Sin embargo, bajo su apariencia frágil subyace una personalidad fuerte, un discurso sólido, bien estructurado, sorprendente para una joven de 26 años. "Hace dos meses recibí la llamada de un amigo, me habló de una chica a la que habían desahuciado de su casa porque no podía pagar el alquiler", explica Stav Shaffir, una de las líderes más visibles de los indignados israelíes. Una semana después, a mediados de julio, ella y diez personas más decidieron unirse y salir a la calle para protestar por un problema silenciado por las clases privilegiadas, pero en boca de muchos israelíes: los desorbitados precios de la vivienda y la falta de perspectivas de futuro en una sociedad con una brecha creciente entre ricos y pobres a pesar de albergar una economía saneada que crece a un ritmo del 6% anual. "Trabajaba como periodista a tiempo completo en una revista, me pagaba un máster a plazos, pero no podía pagar un alquiler aunque compartiera piso con varias personas", añade. A la semana de montar la primera tienda en el exclusivo bulevar Rothschild de Tel Aviv, funcionarios del ayuntamiento intentaron desalojarles. "Eso nos hizo enfadar, nos dio fuerza, nos quejamos aún más alto y a nuestra llamada se fue uniendo rápidamente más gente hasta hoy", comenta. Este primer sábado de septiembre, en la protesta social más importante de las últimas décadas, casi medio millón de personas se echaron a la calle para unir su voz a la de Stav y a la de otros indignados precoces. "La gente ha despertado. En los últimos años lo han privatizado todo, la sanidad, la educación, la vivienda, siempre nos han dicho que la seguridad era lo más importante", dice enérgica Saphir, mientras unos religiosos rezan muy cerca los tradicionales mitxvá (dicen que para infundir fuerza espiritual y claridad de pensamiento a los acampados). "Por primera vez, hemos visto cómo la gente ha despertado, cómo no se han quedado en los refugios a pesar de ver los cohetes sobrevolando sus cabezas", continúa Stav, en referencia al intercambio de ataques entre la franja de Gaza y el sur de Israel en agosto, tras el ataque a un autobús donde fallecieron varias personas. "Siempre se habla de Israel, de la cuestión palestina, pero ¿cómo vamos a solucionar eso si no arreglamos los problemas internos de nuestra sociedad? Hay una conexión clara", apostilla. Su agenda es ajetreada, tanto que hace semanas que no ve a su familia. "Me queda media hora para la entrevista", dice distraída mientras recibe un mensaje en su teléfono inteligente de última generación. Mientras, unos curiosos la paran en medio del paseo para hacerse fotos. "Tenemos que apoyarles, esta generación va a cambiar el país", comenta un israelí que curiosea en los alrededores junto a un amigo turista recién llegado de Nueva York y que, por inercia, también posa para la instantánea. Segundos después, otro israelí se acerca y le empieza a contar sus problemas en un chorro incontrolable: "Mi mujer y yo trabajamos, tenemos dos hijos pero no podemos

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comprar una casa; todo sube, la electricidad, ¡el agua tres veces este año!, ¡díselo a los del Gobierno!", le espeta.

Stav Shaffir posa entre las tiendas de los indignados acampados en Tel Aviv.-

Sin duda, esa es una de sus ocupaciones: escuchar a los indignados acampados en el centenar de ciudades que se han unido a la protesta por todo el país, además de asistir a las constantes asambleas donde se discuten las acciones a emprender. "Después tenemos que hablar con nuestro comité (de expertos) para que consideren todas estas quejas cuando hagan sus recomendaciones al Gobierno de Netanyahu", aclara Stav. El Ejecutivo israelí creó hace unas semanas la conocida comisión Trachtenberg, formada por varios ministros y expertos, con el objetivo de aportar soluciones concretas al incómodo movimiento de los indignados. "Queremos que nos digan que van a hacer esto o lo otro en un plazo concreto, de seis meses, de ocho, lo que sea, pero hasta el momento solo hablan y hablan sin aportar soluciones", dice. Después de la manifestación del fin de semana, el primer ministro ha dicho este domingo que los miembros de esta comisión trabajarán "a fondo" para ofrecer soluciones específicas en el plazo de dos semanas. "Si hacen lo que necesitamos, entonces nos calmaremos. Si no, aumentaremos la presión. Esto es un tren en marcha que no va a parar", advierte esta pelirroja de armas tomar. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/gente/ha/despertado/Israel/elpepuint/2011 0904elpepuint_4/Tes

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Rusia rechaza el embargo petrolero de la UE a Siria Los Veintisiete no descartan nuevas sanciones si continúa la represión MIGUEL GONZÁLEZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Sopot - 04/09/2011 Con el conflicto de Libia encarrilado, Europa y Estados Unidos vuelven sus ojos hacia Siria, pero no parece fácil que logren el aval de la ONU para una intervención militar como la que ha puesto en fuga a Gadafi y ni siquiera para un paquete de sanciones como las que ya aplican contra Damasco con carácter unilateral. El ministro de Asuntos Exteriores ruso, Sergéi Lavrov, cargó ayer con dureza contra la decisión europea de vetar las compras de petróleo sirio. En Dushanbé (Tayikistán), donde participaba en una cumbre de repúblicas exsoviéticas, Lavrov advirtió: "Siempre hemos dicho que las sanciones unilaterales no llevan a ninguna parte. Esto arruina cualquier tipo de aproximación conjunta a una crisis". Damasco es el principal aliado de Moscú en Oriente Próximo y el puerto sirio de Tartus alberga la mayor base rusa fuera de la antigua URSS. El embargo aprobado por los Veintisiete afecta a la compra, importación y transporte del crudo sirio, así como a la financiación y aseguramiento de estas operaciones. El 95% de las exportaciones sirias de productos petrolíferos se dirigen a la UE -Alemania, Francia, Italia, Holanda, Austria y España-, y de estas ventas obtiene Damasco una cuarta parte de sus ingresos. Por petición de Italia, hasta el 15 de noviembre se podrán seguir ejecutando los contratos firmados antes del pasado viernes, cuando se aprobó el embargo. La Unión aún no ha prohibido las inversiones en Siria, como Washington, pero ni la alta representante para la Política Exterior, Catherine Ashton, ni los jefes de la diplomacia francesa, alemana y británica descartaron la adopción de nuevas sanciones. La UE ha prohibido ya la entrada en su territorio y ha bloqueado los fondos de medio centenar de personas y una decena de empresas vinculados al régimen de El Asad. Al término de una reunión informal de ministros de Exteriores de la UE en Sopot (Polonia), Ashton evitó responder a las críticas de Lavrov y se limitó a subrayar que la UE está tomando "las medidas más eficaces" para detener el baño de sangre en Siria y espera que la comunidad internacional asuma también su responsabilidad. Más explícita, la española Trinidad Jiménez reclamó al Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU una resolución de condena "lo bastante firme" como para reflejar la voluntad de "poner fin al régimen" sirio, cuya represión de las protestas ha ido más allá de lo tolerable. Jiménez dijo que la UE apoya a la oposición siria para que se convierta en una alternativa creíble, como ha sido el Consejo Nacional de Transición en Libia. Pese a la caída de Trípoli en manos de los rebeldes, Asthon se mostró preocupada por la proliferación de armas en manos de la población y el descontrol de las fronteras del país, pero subordinó el eventual despliegue de la gendarmería europea al aval de la ONU. "Aún no se está discutiendo la posibilidad de enviar efectivos", zanjó. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Rusia/rechaza/embargo/petrolero/UE/Siria /elpepuint/20110904elpepiint_3/Tes

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La 'sharia' aflora en la transición libia El Consejo Nacional anuncia una Constitución democrática, con garantías de corte liberal, pero con la ley islámica como fuente principal de la legislación JUAN MIGUEL MUÑOZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Trípoli - 04/09/2011

Miles de personas rezan en la céntrica plaza de los Mártires (antes plaza Verde), el pasado viernes en Trípoli.- ANIS MILI (REUTERS) Las dictaduras tunecina y egipcia toleraban cierto margen de maniobra a partidos opositores, por testimonial que fuera su presencia en la vida parlamentaria. Libia es un erial institucional. Dedicados durante seis meses a derrocar a Muamar el Gadafi y a persuadir a los dirigentes occidentales para que se devuelvan los capitales incautados al tirano, los líderes de la sublevación han iniciado la andadura política. La transición comienza con un calendario encaminado a establecer un sistema democrático en un plazo de 18 o 20 meses, tras la ratificación popular de la nueva Constitución. Una tarea complicada para una sociedad habituada a la fuerza bruta y carente de cultura política. El presidente del Consejo Nacional de Transición (CNT, el Gobierno de los sublevados), Mustafá Abdel Yalil, anunció ayer que la semana entrante viajará a la capital desde Bengasi. "Libia una, y Trípoli nuestra capital", rezaban los lemas de los insurgentes desde el primer día de la revuelta, en febrero. Es hora de ponerse manos a la obra en la política. El proceso arrancará con una Declaración de Liberación que exige la captura o muerte del déspota, todavía fugitivo y amenazante. A partir de esa declaración, y del establecimiento en Trípoli de un Gobierno interino, los libios elegirán en el plazo de ocho meses una Conferencia Nacional con la misión de redactar una Constitución, que será sometida a referéndum, y de nombrar un Gobierno interino. El CNT se disolverá entonces y comenzará el desarme de los rebeldes. Una vez aprobada la nueva Ley Fundamental por mayoría de dos tercios, en un término máximo de cuatro meses, la Conferencia Nacional emitirá la legislación electoral y seis meses después se celebrarán

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elecciones generales que contarán con la presencia de observadores de Naciones Unidas. Punto final a la transición. Aunque todo está por decidir, el programa esbozado por el CNT establece que Libia es un Estado con el islam como religión oficial y la sharia como fuente principal de la legislación. Un aspecto que no provoca ningún rechazo en una sociedad profundamente conservadora y donde los sentimientos religiosos -durante cuatro décadas de dictadura- han aflorado con enorme vigor. Por lo demás, el plan describe un Estado homologable a las democracias europeas. Se garantizarán la igualdad ante la ley, las libertades de expresión, de manifestación y de formación de partidos y organizaciones; se protegerán los derechos de las minorías, y se prohibirá la discriminación por razones ideológicas, étnicas, religiosas y de género o filiación tribal. Abdulrazak Mujtar, miembro del Consejo, comentaba a este diario que "la Conferencia Nacional Pública será elegida por el pueblo". Pero más allá de esta precisión, todo son interrogantes. "No sabemos si el sistema será presidencialista o parlamentario. Eso ha de decidirse cuando se redacte la Constitución", añadía el dirigente. También se ignora qué partidos concurrirán a los comicios. En Túnez fue ilegalizado el Reagrupamiento Constitucional Democrático, el partido del autócrata Ben Ali, pero había grupos activos y En Nahda, el partido islamista clandestino reprimido con dureza, pero de indudable implantación. En Egipto, el Consejo Supremo Militar manda, pero otras formaciones tienen tradición, y los Hermanos Musulmanes son también muy influyentes. En Libia hay que fundar los partidos. Con certeza nacerá alguno islamista, y muchos de otras tendencias. Pero hasta la fecha son políticos liberales quienes encabezan la transición y disfrutan del apoyo del mundo. El primer ministro, Mahmud Yibril, diseñó reformas liberales en los últimos años del régimen gadafista hasta que abandonó hastiado; el titular de Finanzas y Petróleo, Ali Tarhuni, ha enseñado Economía durante décadas en EE UU; el responsable de Infraestructuras, Ahmed Yehani, ha servido 30 años en el Banco Mundial... A la política, sin embargo, preceden urgencias inaplazables que afronta Trípoli. Cientos de hombres y mujeres -en filas separadas- hacían cola a las puertas de los bancos para cobrar salarios devengados desde hace medio año. Ante la penuria de dinero en metálico, y a la espera de que las remesas de billetes lleguen desde Londres, donde fueron impresos, el CNT ha decidido limitar los fondos que cada ciudadano puede retirar: 250 dinares, equivalentes a 147 euros. El desabastecimiento es notorio. Ni un solo restaurante ha reabierto sus puertas; los camiones cisterna circulan por Trípoli distribuyendo agua; los trabajadores de las instalaciones petroleras se esmeran para iniciar en 10 días la producción de crudo. Al mismo tiempo, muchos comercios vuelven a atender, el tráfico se normaliza y la actividad política ha despegado. La CIA y el MI6 británico colaboraron con Gadafi Los jefes del espionaje libio no quemaron los archivos. Y una vez hallados un montón de documentos por la ONG Human Rights Watch , las revelaciones son esclarecedoras. La CIA y el MI6 británico colaboraron estrechamente con los servicios de espionaje libios, entregaron a presuntos islamistas al Gobierno de Muamar el Gadafi e incluso facilitaron información al dictador sobre disidentes libios. "No es solo que se entregara a la inteligencia libia a secuestrados sospechosos de militancia islamista. La CIA envió las preguntas que deseaban hacer y de los archivos se desprende que algunos de sus 300

agentes estaban presentes en los interrogatorios", declaró Peter Bouckaert, miembro de esta organización de derechos humanos que analiza los papeles en Trípoli, y que acusó a ambos servicios secretos de dar su aprobación a métodos abyectos: "Se trataba de que pudieran torturarlos en Libia para obtener la información que deseaban". La cooperación entre los servicios libios, la CIA y el MI6 tuvo lugar entre 2002 y 2007, durante los años en que Gadafi trataba de recomponer las relaciones con Occidente; una vez ofrecidas compensaciones monetarias a las víctimas de Lockerbie (Escocia), donde fallecieron más de 270 personas en un atentado contra una avión comercial en diciembre de 1988. En la segunda mitad de la primera década del siglo, el déspota libio -después de admitir en 2004 a los inspectores internacionales que certificaron el desmantelamiento de los programas de armas químicas y biológicas- era recibido en las capitales europeas y recibía en su jaima a Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi y José María Aznar, entre otros. Hubo al menos ocho entregas de supuestos terroristas vinculados a Al Qaeda, pero se ignora cuántas personas fueron puestas en manos de los espías libios. Entre ellos se encontraba Andel Hakim Belhadj, quien fue encarcelado durante seis años en la prisión tripolitana de Abu Salim y que comandó una de las brigadas de milicianos que conquistó Trípoli hace 10 días. Han sido hallados también estos días expedientes sobre la infiltración de gadafistas en el Consejo Nacional rebelde. También sobre una reunión de un ex alto cargo del Departamento de Estado, David Welch, con altos funcionarios de Gadafi en El Cairo, en fecha tan reciente como el pasado 2 de agosto. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/sharia/aflora/transicion/libia/elpepiint/201 10904elpepiint_4/Tes

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Trípoli, seis meses después En un viaje desde Misrata, el autor describe la situación en los barrios de la capital de Libia, liberada el 20 de julio por las columnas del ejército insurgente BERNARD-HENRI LEVY 04/09/2011 Ziten, Kaam... Exbastiones gadafistas que el general Zarmuh juró tomar en pocas horas si tenía las armas apropiadas Abu Salim es el único barrio, junto con Machrur, en el que nos desaconsejan entrar: allí todavía hay combates Podía entrar por Túnez y tomar la carretera de la costa. Podía regresar a Zintan y volver a bajar el Djebel Nefusa por Gharyan. O podía volar de Bengasi a Misrata y seguir la vía abierta el sábado anterior por las columnas insurgentes que asestaron el golpe final que el general Ramadan Zarmuh anunciaría a Sarkozy el pasado 20 de julio. Escogí la tercera solución. En Misrata, me encuentro con el general Zarmuh, que pone a nuestra disposición dos de esos acorazados rodantes que vi fabricar en los talleres clandestinos de la ciudad durante el asedio. Dejamos atrás Ziten, Kaam y Khoms, esos antiguos bastiones gadafistas cuyos nombres nos apuntó en París, en un pedazo del mantel de papel, mientras juraba que, si recibía las armas apropiadas, los tomaría sin dificultad en unas pocas horas. Al principio, hay que pasar algunas barreras: construidas con arena solidificada y contenedores volcados, son las mismas que marcaban la reconquista de Tripoli Street por los rebeldes en el interior de la ciudad mártir. Después, la carretera se hace más fluida; apenas algunos puestos de control en los que ondea la bandera libia de la antigua monarquía y, a menudo, la bandera de la República Francesa. En menos de dos horas, llegamos a una cornisa cubierta por un sinfín de palmeras que bordean una costa magnífica: a la derecha, un puerto comercial desierto; luego, un puerto militar abandonado y, a lo lejos, en la rada, unos navíos que parecen barcos fantasma; a la izquierda, los esqueletos de unas construcciones faraónicas que debían ser el orgullo del régimen, pero han sido interrumpidas de golpe y solo quedan unas grúas; y luego, de repente, aparece una plaza delante de mí, la plaza Verde, ese símbolo del régimen, la Heidenplatz del tirano derrocado, el foro en el que convocaba y arengaba a sus partidarios. Lo primero que llama la atención es el tamaño de esta plaza, más pequeña que en las fotos y en mi imaginación. Seguramente a causa del Ramadán, está sorprendentemente vacía, casi desierta; apenas unas docenas de hombres, no más, que se acercan y disparan ráfagas de alegría. Pero, ya sea porque el rumor de la llegada de unos extranjeros se ha extendido o porque la excitación de los chebabs [jóvenes combatientes] de nuestra escolta, que también han 302

empezado a disparar salvas de honor, llama la atención, el caso es que la gente empieza a afluir, cada vez más numerosa y, blandiendo sus armas hacia el cielo, se suman a la diversión. Yo improviso algunas palabras: "Gran día... belleza de una ciudad que se libera... imágenes de la liberación de París... Libia libre entre vuestras manos... nada de excesos ni venganza". Los jóvenes gritan: "Alá Akbar", yo contesto "Lybia Hora". Ellos aclaman a Francia y yo, a la primavera libia. Al cabo de unos veinte minutos, como el ruido de las ráfagas impide que nos entendamos y, además, parece que algunos terminan por reconocer a un francés cuya imagen lleva meses apareciendo en la televisión de Gadafi, que lo sataniza continuamente, y se ponen a filmarlo con los teléfonos móviles, nuestros amigos libios nos invitan a marcharnos. Llegamos a las inmediaciones de Bab el Azizia, el antiguo cuartel general del Guía, donde reina otra forma de efervescencia: parece que han detenido a un francotirador. Volvemos a partir hacia el sur, al barrio de Abu Salim, que es el único, junto con el vecino barrio de Machrur, en el que nos desaconsejan entrar: parece que allí todavía hay combates. Buscamos la Embajada de Francia. "¿La antigua o la nueva?", pregunta un quincuagenario vestido de traje. Evidentemente, nosotros no tenemos ni idea y él nos guía por el barrio de Al Andalus, a través de unas calles desiertas pero libres, hasta un pequeño edificio blanco, banal, con unos balcones cúbicos, aparentemente vandalizado. Muy cerca de allí, nos encontramos con un hombre, lanzacohetes en ristre, que dice habernos visto el mes pasado en Zintan y quiere llevarnos a un centro de detención secreto en el que los gadafistas, en plena desbandada, habrían procedido a ejecutar a decenas de prisioneros. Más lejos, en el barrio de Qarqash, en una arteria bordeada por edificios de estilo colonial que recuerdan al barrio italiano de Tánger, nos enseñan el emplazamiento de un antiguo centro de entrenamiento para mujeres soldado. Y por fin Tajura, ese suburbio al que las brigadas de élite del ejército de Misrata llegaron durante la noche del sábado al domingo y donde Mohamed Chaboun, un joven comandante que se apoya en unas muletas, nos cuenta la operación: él estaba con el general Zarmuh en la primera unidad que, al alba, pisó la arena de las proximidades de Trípoli; nada más llegar fue alcanzado por una bala, pero insistió en permanecer a la cabeza de su comando -dos de sus hombres cargan con él- mientras avanzaba hacia la ciudad vieja. Son las 19.30. Es la hora de la ruptura del ayuno: vasos de leche y dátiles servidos sobre los capós de las camionetas. ¿Aceptamos la hospitalidad de Chaboun, que nos propone pasar la noche aquí, en el paseo marítimo? ¿O volvemos a Misrata, mi ciudad, que, como me recuerda uno de los chebabs de la escolta, me nombró ciudadano de honor, y me espera? Opto por Misrata. Pero me hace muy feliz estar aquí, haber cerrado el círculo y haber puesto un epílogo, provisional, a seis meses de lucha y esperanza. - http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Tripoli/meses/despues/elpepusocdgm/20110904 elpdmgpan_1/Tes 303

Middle East

September 3, 2011 U.S. Is Appealing to Palestinians to Stall U.N. Vote By STEVEN LEE MYERS and MARK LANDLER WASHINGTON — The Obama administration has initiated a last-ditch diplomatic campaign to avert a confrontation this month over a plan by Palestinians to seek recognition as a state at the United Nations, but it may already be too late, according to senior American officials and foreign diplomats. The administration has circulated a proposal for renewed peace talks with the Israelis in the hopes of persuading the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, to abandon the bid for recognition at the annual gathering of world leaders at the United Nations General Assembly beginning Sept. 20. The administration has made it clear to Mr. Abbas that it will veto any request presented to the United Nations Security Council to make a Palestinian state a new member outright. But the United States does not have enough support to block a vote by the General Assembly to elevate the status of the Palestinians’ nonvoting observer “entity” to that of a nonvoting observer state. The change would pave the way for the Palestinians to join dozens of United Nations bodies and conventions, and it could strengthen their ability to pursue cases against Israel at the International Criminal Court. Senior officials said the administration wanted to avoid not only a veto but also the more symbolic and potent General Assembly vote that would leave the United States and only a handful of other nations in the opposition. The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss diplomatic maneuverings, said they feared that in either case a wave of anger could sweep the Palestinian territories and the wider Arab world at a time when the region is already in tumult. President Obama would be put in the position of threatening to veto recognition of the aspirations of most Palestinians or risk alienating Israel and its political supporters in the United States. “If you put the alternative out there, then you’ve suddenly just changed the circumstances and changed the dynamic,” a senior administration official involved in the flurry of diplomacy said Thursday. “And that’s what we’re trying very much to do.” Efforts to head off the Palestinian diplomatic drive have percolated all summer but have taken on urgency as the vote looms in the coming weeks. “It’s not clear to me how it can be avoided at the moment,” said Ghaith al-Omari, a former Palestinian negotiator who is now executive director of the American Task Force on Palestine in Washington. “An American veto could inflame emotions and bring anti-American sentiment to the forefront across the region.” While some officials remain optimistic that a compromise can be found, the administration has simultaneously begun planning to limit the fallout of a statehood vote. A primary focus is to ensure the Israelis and Palestinians continue to cooperate on

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security matters in the West Bank and along Israel’s borders, administration officials said. “We’re still focused on Plan A,” another senior administration official said, referring to the diplomatic efforts by the administration’s new special envoy, David M. Hale, and the president’s Middle East adviser on the National Security Council, Dennis B. Ross. Mr. Hale replaced the more prominent George J. Mitchell Jr., who resigned in May after two years of frustrated efforts to make progress on a peace deal. The State Department late last month issued a formal diplomatic message to more than 70 countries urging them to oppose any unilateral moves by the Palestinians at the United Nations. The message, delivered by American ambassadors to their diplomatic counterparts in those countries, argued that a vote would destabilize the region and undermine peace efforts, though those are, at least for now, moribund. Two administration officials said that the intent of the message was to narrow the majority the Palestinians are expected to have in the General Assembly. They said that and the new peace proposal — to be issued in a statement by the Quartet, the diplomatic group focused on the Middle East comprising the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations — could persuade potential supporters to step back from a vote on recognition, and thus force Mr. Abbas to have second thoughts. “The fact is there are countries who would choose not to do that vote if there was an alternative,” the first senior administration official said. In essence, the administration is trying to translate the broad principles Mr. Obama outlined in May into a concrete road map for talks that would succeed where past efforts have failed: satisfy Israel, give the Palestinians an alternative to going to the United Nations and win the endorsement of the Europeans. Diplomats are laboring to formulate language that would bridge stubborn differences over how to treat Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and over Israel’s demand for recognition of its status as a Jewish state. A statement by the Quartet would be more than a symbolic gesture. It would outline a series of meetings and actions to resume talks to create a Palestinian state. The Quartet’s members are divided over the proposal’s terms and continue to negotiate them among themselves, and with the Palestinians and Israelis. Among the issues still on the table are how explicitly to account for the growing settlements in the West Bank. The question of Israel’s status is also opposed by Russia and viewed warily by some European countries. The Palestinians have never acceded to a formal recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, in deference at least in part to the Palestinians who live in Israel. The Quartet’s envoy, Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, visited Jerusalem on Tuesday to negotiate the terms of the proposal with the Israelis. He is expected to discuss it with the Palestinians soon. The Israelis have so far responded positively to the draft, but the Palestinian position remains unclear. Two administration officials said that Mr. Abbas had recently indicated that he would forgo a United Nations vote in favor of real talks. But a senior Palestinian official, Nabil

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Shaath, angrily dismissed the American proposal as inadequate and said a vote would go ahead regardless. “Whoever wrote this thought we are so weak that we cannot even wiggle or that we are stupid,” he said in a telephone interview from Ramallah in the West Bank. He added, “Whatever is to be offered, it is too late.” Within the administration, there are different views of the situation’s urgency. Some officials believe that the United States can weather a veto diplomatically, as it has before, and politically at home because of the strong support for Israel in Congress. But others view the Palestinian push for recognition as deeply alarming, raising the specter of new instability and violence in the West Bank and Gaza. “The most powerful argument is that this will provoke a Palestinian awakening, that there will be a new violence and that we’ll be blamed,” said Martin S. Indyk, a former American ambassador to Israel. Ethan Bronner and Isabel Kershner contributed reporting from Jerusalem, and Neil MacFarquhar from the United Nations. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/world/middleeast/04mideast.html?_r=1&nl=today sheadlines&emc=tha2

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September 3, 2011 A Libyan Prisoner Lives to Tell His Story By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF TAJOURA, Libya HE was my confidential source in the Libyan military this spring, an officer who passed on secret information about disaffection in the ranks of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. And then as the Libyan revolution spread, he made bombs and smuggled weapons into Tripoli to help overthrow the Qaddafi government. But then Salem al-Madhoun, 47, was arrested three weeks ago, captured after the Qaddafi forces detected his Thuraya satellite telephone transmissions. I received an urgent message about his capture, and I assumed that by now he must have been tortured and executed. On arriving here in Libya, I set out to comfort his widow. That proved unnecessary. When rebels liberated the Abu Salim prison in Tripoli, they found Madhoun: skeletal and tortured, but alive. Now he is the hero of Tajoura, the suburb outside the capital where he lives, and in long conversations in his office and home he recounted the full story of how he came to help overthrow the government. Madhoun studied electrical engineering in France, and as an engineer he rose in the ranks of the navy. When the Libyan revolution began in February, his ship was ordered to attack Benghazi, but he, instead, plotted to defect and sail his ship to Malta. Through an intermediary at that time, he asked me whether he could get American protection while the ship was at sea. I’m not in the business of providing air cover, but I wrote a blog post then urging the Obama administration to create a safety corridor to protect Libyan ships seeking to defect. Then Madhoun heard from fellow officers that he was about to be arrested, and he changed plans. He recorded a video on board his ship, announcing his defection and calling on other military officers to join his mutiny. I was in Cairo then covering the revolution at Tahrir Square and received a frantic call: Would I put the video online? I agreed to do so but asked about Madhoun’s family. He was in hiding, but what if the government took revenge on his pregnant wife and three children? I didn’t want that on my conscience, and I suggested that Madhoun think it through carefully. He consulted with his wife, Samah, who was outraged at the way he was placing his family at risk. “I told him it’s a big mistake,” she recalled to me. “ ‘Why don’t you think before you do this?’ ” Somewhat sheepishly, Madhoun sent word that I shouldn’t mention his name after all, and we dropped the idea of showing the video. He disappeared into hiding, along with his family, and began to help organize the underground resistance in the Tripoli area.

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Working with a force that he says consisted of around 1,200 underground rebels, he smuggled weapons in by boat and bombed security offices. He sent targeting data to French government contacts so that NATO could bomb military sites. Libyan women have received little attention in the uprising, but, behind the scenes, they played a significant role. Even Madhoun’s daughters, ages 11 and 14, volunteered to sew rebel flags, which other family members then hung from mosques and schools to spread the message of resistance. “This is the time to fight Qaddafi,” Madhoun’s 18-year-old niece, Rehab, remembers telling him, and she pleaded for any assignment in the underground. An engineering student who speaks excellent English, Rehab also began painting dramatic anti-Qaddafi graffiti around Tripoli — sometimes in English so that foreigners would know that the opposition was alive. She also used her engineering skills to tap into the Internet, which the government had blocked, to send messages to the outside world. In May, Madhoun was picked up in a routine police sweep, but he lied about his identity and claimed to be a simple vegetable seller. After four hours and a beating, he was released. But then, on Aug. 10, police found Madhoun’s hide-out, and his world collapsed. “When they arrested me, I knew I was going to be killed,” he recounted. He says he was subjected to horrific electric shocks in interrogations overseen by Seif al-Islam el- Qaddafi, one of Muammar’s sons. “What helped me endure torture was reciting the Koran,” he said, adding that he never gave up names. After less than two weeks, rebels stormed the prison and named Madhoun the military commander of the newly liberated Tajoura area. He now has an escort of bodyguards as he strolls through the neighborhood — rapturously greeted by neighbors. Americans are wondering and worried about who Libya’s new leaders are, and whether they can knit the country together. In truth, these new leaders include all kinds, but I’m reassured and inspired when I meet those like Madhoun. It’s impossible to know what lies ahead for Libya, but Madhoun’s story is a window into the grit and vision that made the entire Arab Spring possible, from Tunisia to Syria. Yes, the movement was facilitated by Facebook and Twitter, but so many people lost lives or limbs. This was no armchair revolution. Madhoun acknowledges that the hard work is only just beginning. Yet he is guardedly optimistic that Libya can build a modern multiparty democracy — and he hopes that President Obama will soon come to Tripoli so that the Libyan people can thank him and all Americans for their support. “My death was inevitable,” he said, “but I am alive thanks to God and NATO.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/opinion/sunday/kristof-a-libyan-prisoner-lives-to- tell-his-story.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

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EUROPE & THE WORLD DIPLOMACY EU to embargo Syrian oil 2 September 2011

De Volkskrant, 2 September 2011

Even before the meeting of European Ministers of Foreign Affairs on September 2 and 3, De Volkskrant is reporting that “the EU will declare a boycott of Syrian oil today in response to the bloody crack-down on the opposition.” The Amsterdam daily carries the statements of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uri Rosenthal, made in a television interview September 1. “Unless a member country raises last-minute objections, the decision could be announced officially,” the newspaper writes. According to Rosenthal, the embargo would impose a double blow. On one hand, the ban on crude oil exports will “hit the regime in the solar plexus” as “their foreign currency reserves run out”; and on the other hand, it will bring in sanctions related to the financing and insurance of any companies that transport the oil. “This second measure will also affect countries like Russia and China that are adamantly opposed to sanctions,” De Volkskrant adds. The paper highlights the slow pace of decision-making by the EU, which imports 95 percent of Syria’s oil, and singles out Italy as the country dragging its feet. HTTP://WWW.PRESSEUROP.EU/EN/CONTENT/NEWS-BRIEF-COVER/907581- EU-EMBARGO-SYRIAN-OIL

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MI5 former chief decries 'war on terror' Lady Eliza Manningham-Buller uses BBC lecture to criticise 'unhelpful' term, attack Iraq invasion and suggest al-Qaida talks Richard Norton-Taylor The Guardian, Friday 2 September 2011

MI5's former director general Lady Eliza Manningham-Buller during her 2011 BBC Reith lecture. Photograph: Jeff Overs/BBC/PA Lady Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5, delivered a withering attack on the invasion of Iraq, decried the term "war on terror", and held out the prospect of talks with al-Qaida. Recording her first BBC Reith lecture on the theme, Securing Freedom, she made clear she believed the UK and US governments had not sufficiently understood the resentment that had been building up among Arab people, which was only compounded by the war against Iraq. Before an audience which included Theresa May, the home secretary, she also said the 9/11 attacks were "a crime, not an act of war". "So I never felt it helpful to refer to a war on terror". Young Arabs, she said, had no opportunity to choose their own rulers. "For them an external enemy was a unifying way to address some of their frustrations."They were also united by the plight of Palestinians, a view that the west was exploiting their oil and supporting dictators. "It was wrong to say all terrorists belonged to al-Qaida," added Manningham-Buller. Pursuing a theme which some in the audience may have been astounded to hear from a former boss of MI5, she said terrorist campaigns – she mentioned Northern Ireland as an example – could not be solved militarily. She described the invasion of Iraq as a "distraction in the pursuit of al-Qaida". She added: "Saddam Hussein was a ruthless

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dictator but neither he nor his regime had anything to do with 9/11." The invasion, she said, "provided an arena for jihad", spurring on UK citizens to resort to terror. September 11 was a "monstrous crime" but it needed a considered response, an appreciation of the causes and roots of terrorism, she said later in answers to questions. She said she hoped there were those – she implied in western governments – who were considering having "talks with al-Qaida". Some way must be found of approaching them, she suggested, though she said she did not know how, at the moment, that could be done. Manningham-Buller, who retired in 2007, attacked the invasion of Iraq in an interview with the Guardian in 2009. However, she has never before expressed such antipathy towards the prevailing policies and rhetoric of the government which she had to endure when she was in office. The lecture is to be broadcast on Radio 4 on 6 September, and entitled Terror. Richard Norton-Taylor MI5 former chief decries 'war on terror'2 September 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/02/mi5-war-on-terror-criticism/print

ft.com comment Columnists

September 1, 2011 8:25 pm No, 9/11 did not change the world By Philip Stephens

Just about everything has changed since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC 10 years ago. The contours of the geopolitical and economic landscapes have been redrawn. The curious thing is how little the changes owe to 9/11.

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This sounds counterintuitive after the tumult of the past decade. The US waged war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Violent Islamism transformed America’s view of the world, and the world’s view of America. Everything stood still for George W. Bush’s “war on terror” – or so it seemed. Al-Qaeda is still with us; so is Guantánamo.

More ON THIS STORY Philip Stephens Testing times for the west’s odd couple More from Philip Stephens Philip Stephens Spasm or spiral? The west’s choice Philip Stephens Working out what China wants Philip Stephens Rivalries among the rising rest During a visit to Washington in the spring of 2003, I heard a senior US official explain how the invasion of Iraq would establish the new rules of the international game. Forget all that mush about multilateralism, this official told an audience of (mostly mushy) Europeans. This was the age of the single superpower. With or without allies, the US would avenge the felling of the twin towers. We were present, I wrote then, at the destruction of the multilateral order. Yet for all the upheaval, it now turns out that the geopolitical forces shaping the present century will bear only slight connection to 9/11. Osama bin Laden grabbed a decade’s worth of headlines, but the future was being written in Beijing, Delhi, Rio and beyond. Two assumptions underpinned reactions to the first serious attack on the US mainland since the British sacked the White House in 1814. The first was that the US would assert the global primacy bestowed by victory in the cold war; the second, that the west’s security would be defined by a generation-long war against Islamist jihadis. Mr Bush’s administration soon added a third: the Middle East would be remade in the image of western liberal democracy. Washington’s approach was codified in the National Security Strategy published in 2002. This promised permanent US hegemony, promulgated a doctrine of preventive war and cast aside the constraints of multilateralism. Never mind what anyone else thought. The US could act unilaterally. The White House was far from alone in its assessment of US power. Shock and awe saw the media cast the US as a 21st century Rome. Commentators counted the carrier groups, stealth bombers and cruise missiles and declared America invincible – happily ignoring the vulnerability that had been exposed by al-Qaeda. Muammer Gaddafi was moved to surrender his weapons of mass destruction. Iran’s mullahs considered abandoning their nuclear ambitions and suing for peace. The unipolar moment soon passed. Bin Laden is dead, and the US is leaving Iraq. Afghanistan is to be returned to the Afghans. The always curious notion of a “war on terror” has been quietly dropped. Islamist extremism is indisputably a serious threat – witness Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. This is not, though, the Manichean struggle imagined by the likes of Britain’s Tony Blair. The Middle East has indeed proved ripe for democracy, but not at the point of a cruise missile. Arabs are reclaiming their own future, careless of the views of US neoconservatives and of al-Qaeda alike. Americans have tired of unilateralism and of preventive war. Barack Obama’s decision to lead from behind in the military campaign to oust Muammer Gaddafi fitted his country’s mood. When Republicans were recently offered a choice between preserving tax cuts and maintaining defence spending, they opted for the tax cuts.

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American power is contested to a degree unimaginable after the fall of Baghdad. By any measure, the US remains the sole superpower, but few imagine it can any longer set the direction of global events on its own. The world has indeed been turned upside down, but Afghanistan, Iraq and the badlands of Waziristan have been a smokescreen, obscuring the bigger story of the past decade. The changes that have mattered have been in the rising states of Asia and Latin America. Ten years on, the strategic challenge to the US comes from the rapid reallocation of power. The global order no longer belongs to the west. The rise of the rest was long predicted. But no one thought it would happen so fast. Around the opening of the present century, the expectation was that China’s economy would match the US by, say, 2050. Now the expectation is that it will overtake it before 2020. The challenge to the multilateral system established by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman comes not from a unilateralist president in the White House, but from new great powers unwilling to accept an order designed by the west. This shifting balance owes something to perception – and anticipation – as well to hard realities. China may have just launched an aircraft carrier, but the US already has a dozen fleets patrolling the world’s oceans. For all that, the direction of travel counts: China is splashing out on its military just as the US retrenches. The other big change, of course, flowed from the global financial crash of 2008. This was as much a geopolitical as an economic moment. The failure of the western banking system and the sovereign debt crises that stripped Europe of its remaining pretensions and the US of its triple A rating have shown us a world in which the west is no longer the master of globalisation. The Washington consensus once set the rules for everyone else. Its liberal market capitalism was buried in the rubble of Lehman Brothers. China is America’s largest creditor. The rising states have their own economic models. Mr Bush’s response to 9/11 reinforced these underlying trends. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost the US more than a $1,000bn in cash and just as much in global prestige. They have ended up showing the limits, rather than the reach, of military might. Cruise missiles do not work against improvised explosive devices. What we are left with is a world betwixt and between. The sweep of history will record the past decade as a parenthesis – separating a brief period of unparalleled US might from a new, and chaotic, multipolar world. Al-Qaeda had to be defeated. But for all the horror he inflicted on 9/11, Bin Laden did not really change very much at all. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b6c10c8e-d332-11e0-9ba8- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1whcwjo9h

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Africa September 1, 2011 In Libya, Former Enemy Is Recast in Role of Ally By ROD NORDLAND TRIPOLI, Libya — Abdel Hakim Belhaj had a wry smile about the oddity of his situation. Yes, he said, he was detained by Malaysian officials in 2004 on arrival at the Kuala Lumpur airport, where he was subjected to extraordinary rendition on behalf of the United States, and sent to Thailand. His pregnant wife, traveling with him, was taken away, and his child would be 6 before he saw him. In Bangkok, Mr. Belhaj said, he was tortured for a few days by two people he said were C.I.A. agents, and then, worse, they repatriated him to Libya, where he was thrown into solitary confinement for six years, three of them without a shower, one without a glimpse of the sun. Now this man is in charge of the military committee responsible for keeping order in Tripoli, and, he says, is a grateful ally of the United States and NATO. And while Mr. Belhaj concedes that he was the emir of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which was deemed by the United States to be a terrorist group allied with Al Qaeda, he says he has no Islamic agenda. He says he will disband the fighters under his command, merging them into the formal military or police, once the Libyan revolution is over. He says there are no hard feelings over his past treatment by the United States. “Definitely it was very hard, very difficult,” he said. “Now we are in Libya, and we want to look forward to a peaceful future. I do not want revenge.” As the United States and other Western powers embrace and help finance the new government taking shape in Libya, they could face a particularly awkward relationship with Islamists like Mr. Belhaj. Once considered enemies in the war on terror, they suddenly have been thrust into positions of authority — with American and NATO blessing. In Washington, the Central Intelligence Agency declined to comment on Mr. Belhaj or his new role. A State Department official said the Obama administration was aware of Islamist backgrounds among the rebel fighters in Libya and had expressed concern to the Transitional National Council, the new rebel government, and that it had received assurances. “The last few months, we’ve had the T.N.C. saying all the right things, and making the right moves,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the matter’s delicacy. Mr. Belhaj, 45, a short and serious man with a close-cropped beard, burst onto the scene in the mountains west of Tripoli only in the last few weeks before the fall of the capital, as the leader of a brigade of rebel fighters. 314

“He wasn’t even in the military council in the western mountains,” said Othman Ben Sassi, a member of the Transitional National Council from Zuwarah in the west. “He was nothing, nothing. He arrived at the last moment, organized some people but was not responsible for the military council in the mountains.” Then came the push on Tripoli, which fell with unexpected speed, and Mr. Belhaj and his fighters focused on the fortified Bab al-Aziziya compound of Col. Muammar el- Qaddafi, where they distinguished themselves as relatively disciplined fighters. A veteran of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets, Mr. Belhaj has what most rebel fighters have lacked — actual military experience. Yet he has still not adopted a military rank (unlike many rebels who quickly became self-appointed colonels and generals), which he said should go only to members of the army. Dressed in new military fatigues, with a pistol strapped backward to his belt, Mr. Belhaj was interviewed at his offices in the Mitiga Military Airbase in Tripoli, the site of what had been the United States Air Force’s Wheelus Air Base until 1970. Last weekend, Mr. Belhaj was voted commander of the Tripoli Military Council, a grouping of several brigades of rebels involved in taking the capital, by the other brigades, a move that aroused some criticism among liberal members of the council. However, his appointment was strongly supported by Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, the chairman of the council, who said that as Colonel Qaddafi’s former minister of justice he got to know Mr. Belhaj well during negotiations leading to his release from prison in 2010. Mr. Belhaj and other Islamist radicals made a historic compromise with the Qaddafi government, one that was brokered by Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi, the Qaddafi son seen then as a moderating influence. The Islamists agreed to disband the Islamic Fighting Group, replacing it with the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change, and renounced violent struggle. “We kept that promise,” Mr. Belhaj said. “The revolution started peacefully, but the regime’s crackdown forced it to become violent.” Mr. Belhaj conceded that Islamists had no role in creating the revolution against Colonel Qaddafi’s rule; it was instead a popular uprising. “The February 17th revolution is the Libyan people’s revolution and no one can claim it, neither secularists nor Islamists,” he said. “The Libyan people have different views, and all those views have to be involved and respected.” Forty-two years of Qaddafi rule in Libya had, he said, taught him an important lesson: “No one can make Libya suffer any more under any one ideology or any one regime.” His pledge to disband fighters under his command once Libya has a new government was repeated to NATO officials at a meeting in Qatar this week. Some council members said privately that allowing Mr. Belhaj to become chairman of the military council in Tripoli was done partly to take advantage of his military expertise, but also to make sure the rebels’ political leaders had him under their direct control. Many also say that Mr. Belhaj’s history as an Islamist is understandable because until this year, Islamist groups were the only ones able to struggle against Colonel Qaddafi’s particularly repressive rule.

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After Mr. Belhaj and a small group of Libyan comrades returned from the jihad against the Soviets, they formed the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and had a secret base in the Green Mountain area of eastern Libya, until it was discovered and bombed, and many of its followers rounded up. Mr. Belhaj escaped Libya in the late 1990s and, like many antigovernment exiles, was forced to move frequently as Libya used its oil resources as a way to pressure host countries. “We focused on Libya and Libya only,” he said. “Our goal was to help our people. We didn’t participate in or support any action outside of Libya. We never had any link with Al Qaeda, and that could never be. We had a different agenda; global fighting was not our goal.” He said that America’s reaction to the Sept. 11 attacks led to his group’s classification as terrorist. In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the rapprochement between Libya and Western countries led to the apprehension of several anti-Qaddafi activists, who were returned to Libya by the United States. While Mr. Belhaj insisted that he was not interested in revenge, it is not a period of his life that he has altogether forgotten. “If one day there is a legal way, I would like to see my torturers brought to court,” he said. Steven Lee Myers and Scott Shane contributed reporting from Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/africa/02islamist.html?src=recg&pagewante d=print

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09/01/2011 04:26 PM Parallel Justice Islamic 'Arbitrators' Shadow German Law By Maximilian Popp In mosques or tearooms, Muslim elders dispense verdicts that keep their communities in line. They mediate between aggrieved immigrants, sometimes at the expense of German justice. Some say the arbitrations ease caseloads in court, but others see the creeping advance of Sharia law. The men ambushed Fuat S. on the street, then locked him in a basement and tortured him. Fuat was later admitted to the hospital in Berlin's Neukölln district with gaping wounds, contusions and broken bones. Police took his statement concerning the attack the same night. Fuat S., a gambler and a recipient of "Hartz IV" -- Germany's social welfare benefits for the long-term unemployed -- gave a detailed statement. He'd conned an acquaintance, Mustafa O., out of €150,000 ($217,000) and the man was taking his revenge, Fuat said, together with his three brothers. They hit his hands, arms and knees with a hammer and threatened to shoot him. The public prosecutor's office in Berlin initiated proceedings against Mustafa O., a Palestinian man who had come to their attention repeatedly for violent acts. Police had investigated him in a number of cases, and now prosecutors saw an opportunity to convict a dangerous repeat offender. But when the case began, Fuat S., the principle witness, unexpectedly withdrew his testimony. It was not Mustafa who had tortured him, he said, but an Albanian man he didn't know. Mustafa, he said, wasn't even in the basement at the time. This was clearly a lie, as police analysis of telephone data showed, but the judge was forced to acquit the defendant due to lack of evidence. The decision, in fact, was reached by a different judge. According to police, the victim's and the perpetrator's families had met at a restaurant in the presence of an Islamic "justice of the peace," an arbitrator who mediates conflicts between Muslims. The two families had reached a compromise: Fuat would drop the charges, and in exchange be relieved of part of his debt. According to Bernhard Mix, the public prosecutor in charge of the case, Fuat's false testimony was part of a deal between the families. "It's difficult to establish the truth using legal means, when the perpetrator and the victim reach an agreement," he says. Judges Without Laws Politicians and social workers tend to focus on forced marriages and honor killings, but the baleful influence of these Islamic arbitrators has gone largely unnoticed by the public. Joachim Wagner, an author and television journalist of many years, has taken a closer look at the phenomenon in his book "Richter ohne Gesetz" ("Judges without Laws"). Reconstructing Mustafa O.'s case, he reaches the conclusion that "the Islamic parallel justice system is becoming a threat to the constitutional legal system." These justices of the peace don't wear robes. Their courtrooms are mosques or teahouses. They draw their authority not from the law, but from their standing within the community. Most of them are senior members of their families, or imams, and some 317

even fly in from Turkey or Lebanon to resolve disputes. Muslims seek them out when families argue, when daughters take up with nonbelievers or when clans clash. They often trust these arbitrators more than they trust the state. The late juvenile court judge Kirsten Heisig drew attention to this problem a year ago: "The law is slipping out of our hands. It's moving to the streets, or into a parallel system where an imam or another representative of the Koran determines what must be done." In Wagner's book, judges and prosecutors tell of threats toward public officials and systematic interference with witnesses. "We know we're being given a performance, but the courts are powerless," says Stephan Kuperion, a juvenile court judge in Berlin. Federal public prosecutor Jörn Hauschild warns, "It would be a terrible development if serious criminal offences in these circles could no longer be resolved. The legal system would be reduced to collecting victims." So who are these men who make the decisions about justice and love, lives and monetary compensation? 'They Trust Me' Hassan Allouche sits behind the wheel of his station wagon, steering the vehicle through Berlin's rush hour traffic with one hand, talking on his cell phone. Two Arabs have called on him for help in a rent dispute. He lights a cigarette and says, "People are afraid of the authorities. They trust me." Allouche came to Germany from Lebanon 37 years ago. He acts as a religious arbitrator, just as his great-grandfather did before him. People greet him on the streets of Berlin, shaking his hand or bowing. "He's kept us from a great deal of harm," one Turkish businessman says. Allouche's brother was shot while trying to resolve a conflict, and since then he always wears a bulletproof vest when doing his work. He says he mediates 200 cases a year, often offers his own services and doesn't ask any payment, although he accepts gifts. "I do this for Germany and for Allah," he says. Wagner, the journalist, believes that getting rich plays only a minor role for most of these arbitrators. Far more important, he says, are power and prestige, as they increase their influence within the community with each successful mediation. Although the mediators generally work in secret, "it's common practice," Wagner says, repeating what Ralf Menkhorst, detective superintendent for the city of Essen, has told him. "Any beginner realizes after three cases that this phenomenon exists." Police in Bremen, for example, know of four or five arbitrators by name. They operate in a gray area between conflict resolution and obstruction of justice. Allouche, for example, claims to work closely with authorities, but investigators suspect him of preventing witnesses from giving statements to the police. So far they've never been able to prove an obstruction of justice. This culture of arbitration predates Islam, since earlier Arab tribes also solved conflicts with verdicts passed by senior family members. In countries such as Lebanon or in southeastern Turkey, these lay judges still take the place of governmental institutions. In Germany, they find followers wherever the local population includes many Muslims who haven't integrated into German culture.

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Ursula Spuler-Stegemann, an Islamic studies professor in Marburg, believes this distance between immigrants and the German state explains the success of religious arbitration. Many immigrants, she says, mistrust police and the legal system. Criminal prosecutors are concerned about extended Muslim families and strict religious groups. "They disdain the rule of law. They haven't integrated, and don't intend to. The family is above the law," Bremen's police write in a working paper. Munich-based imam and arbitrator Sheik Abu Adam says he considers it a religious duty to mediate among the faithful. He invites both parties to visit him at the mosque, listens to both sides, and ultimately has them sign a peace treaty. The important thing, he says, is not who's right and wrong, and evidence is no particular help -- the important thing is to find a compromise. In nine out of 10 cases, the people respect his decision, he says. "My judgment is fairer than the government's," he says. A Problem of Integration Abu Adam teaches a reactionary kind of Islam. He lives with three women, doesn't believe in separating religion from the state, and rejects moderate branches of his religion. "I tell my people, don't go to the police," the sheikh says unabashedly. "We'll take care of this conflict among ourselves." He dismisses accusations of running a shadow justice system, saying, "I'm making less work for the police." Investigators do cooperate with Islamic arbitrators in a few exceptional cases. In Essen, for example, police and an imam work together to mediate disputes within Muslim families. If these arbitrators would limit themselves to containing conflicts, there would be no reason to object, says legal and Islamic studies expert Mathias Rohe in the Bavarian city of Erlangen. German law, after all, allows for arbitration. What Rohe finds unacceptable is the exertion of influence over criminal proceedings. "Criminal prosecution is a privilege of the state," he says. The state justice system, though, is having a hard time shaking off the shadow system. Klaus-Dieter Schromek, a judge in Bremen, criticizes his colleagues for not taking the phenomenon seriously enough. "If conflict mediators manage to force the justice system out of homicides and other serious violent crimes," he told Wagner for the book, "it will mean more conflicts settled using these methods." Legal steps alone can't prevent a parallel Islamic justice system, not with so many immigrants from Muslim countries who insist on following values retained for centuries -- such as the primacy of men and the unconditional struggle for one's own honor and that of the family. One problem is that they pass on these clichés to their children, so even third-generation members of immigrant families mistrust the German legal system. "We need to promote our constitutional legal state starting in school," says Rohe, the Islamic studies expert. If German integration were in better shape, he believes, Islamic arbitrators would have been out of work long ago. URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,783361,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Lenient Courts: German Justice Slammed in Honor Killing Study (08/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,777997,00.html • Muslims as a Mirror: Germany's Unhealthy Obsession with Islam (08/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,781577,00.html 319

• Allah's Elite: Why the 9/11 Mosque Was Closed (08/16/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,711977,00.html • Islam's Spiritual 'Dear Abby': The Voice of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (02/15/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,745526,00.html

09/01/2011 04:31 PM Islamic Justice in Europe. 'It's Often a Dictate of Power' Using Sharia law to settle disputes can be innocent, but it can also undermine Western ideas of fairness. Journalist Joachim Wagner, author of a new book on parallel justice, discusses the influence of Islamic arbitrators on Germany's legal system. SPIEGEL: Mr. Wagner, you spent nine months researching the Islamic shadow justice system. What kind of a world is it? Wagner: Very foreign, and for a German lawyer, completely incomprehensible at first. It follows its own rules. The Islamic arbitrators aren't interested in evidence when they deliver a judgment, and unlike in German criminal law, the question of who is at fault doesn't play much of a role. SPIEGEL: What laws do the arbitrators follow? Wagner: First, they get an idea of the facts. They talk with the perpetrator's family, who are generally the ones to have called the arbitrator, and with the victim's family. They ask: Why did this happen? How bad is the damage? How serious is the injury? But for them, a solution to the conflict, a compromise, is the most important thing. Who's right and wrong, guilt and atonement, these aren't particularly relevant. SPIEGEL: What's wrong with two parties attempting to resolve a dispute between themselves? Wagner: Nothing, initially. The problem starts when the arbitrators force the justice system out of the picture, especially in the case of criminal offenses. At that point they undermine the state monopoly on violence. Islamic conflict resolution in particular, as I've experienced it, is often achieved through violence and threats. It's often a dictate of power on the part of the stronger family. SPIEGEL: How prevalent is the phenomenon? Wagner: As far as I know, very prevalent. There are no reliable statistics, since these mediations take place almost exclusively in secret. But criminal investigators who specialize in organized crime and violence within Muslim immigrant families have confirmed for me that in nearly every conflict in this milieu, the first attempt is to find a solution outside the German justice system. SPIEGEL: You write that Islamic arbitration poses a threat to the constitutional legal system. Why? Wagner: These arbitrators try to resolve conflicts according to Islamic law and to sideline German criminal law. We see witness testimony withdrawn (from German courts) and accusations trivialized to the point where an entire case runs aground. The

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justice system is "powerless," partly because it hasn't tackled the problem vigorously enough. SPIEGEL: Some reports from judges and public prosecutors in your book sound like a cry for help. Wagner: They're overwhelmed, because they don't know how to react. They're in the middle of a legal case, and suddenly there's no evidence. Eighty-seven percent of the cases I researched either were dismissed or ended with an acquittal when Islamic arbitrators were involved. SPIEGEL: How can we combat this shadow justice system? Wagner: Prosecutors need to investigate Islamic arbitrators more intensively. If they had done so sooner, the arbitrators would have been convicted of obstruction of justice long ago. And certain lawyers need to stop behaving as if they were mere servants to a parallel justice system. They allow themselves to be directed by their clients' desires, regardless of truth and justice. And finally, my plea would be for judges to hear witnesses earlier, which would reduce the arbitrators' influence.

URL: Islamic Justice in Europe. 'It's Often a Dictate of Power'09/01/2011 04:31 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,783843,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Parallel Justice: Islamic 'Arbitrators' Shadow German Law (09/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,783361,00.html • Lenient Courts: German Justice Slammed in Honor Killing Study (08/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,777997,00.html • Muslims as a Mirror: Germany's Unhealthy Obsession with Islam (08/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,781577,00.html • Islam's Spiritual 'Dear Abby': The Voice of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (02/15/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,745526,00.html • Allah's Elite: Why the 9/11 Mosque Was Closed (08/16/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,711977,00.html

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Tripoli’s sudden fall revealed rotten heart of Gaddafi’s regime By Simon Denyer and Leila Fadel, Thursday, September 1, 1:13 AM TRIPOLI, Libya — They were elite, professionally trained troops guarding a critical source of the regime’s power: the headquarters of Libya’s propaganda-spewing state television. But when unarmed protesters took to the streets, the feared guards, members of brigades known as Katibas, simply took off their uniforms, lay down their weapons and ran. “Underneath their uniforms, they had civilian clothes, jeans and T-shirts, as though they were expecting this,” said Badr Ben Jered, a 25-year-old employee in Nokia’s marketing division, patrolling his neighborhood with a Kalashnikov rifle. “Then people started screaming, ‘The Katiba are running! The Katiba are running!’ We were so shocked, and still so scared of them, no one even went after them.” The guns have been collected, but abandoned uniforms still litter the ground around the television station and elsewhere in Tripoli, evidence of a gigantic loss of nerve, the sudden crumbling of a regime built on brutality and fear. Its rapid disintegration Aug. 20 and 21 suggests that support for Moammar Gaddafi was far more shallow than the government had portrayed over the course of the six-month uprising. But the way many of Gaddafi’s supporters just melted away into the night also prompts concern about whether some die-hard loyalists are simply lying low, waiting for the day they can regroup and launch their own insurgency. Elements of the former government have already signaled their continued defiance. Gaddafi’s most influential son, Saif al-Islam, issued a statement to a Syrian-owned satellite television channel Wednesday in which he urged followers to fight to the death against the Transitional National Council, the new de facto government of Libya. “We assure people we are here, ready and in good shape. Resistance is continuing, and victory is near,” he said. He boasted that 20,000 fighters loyal to his father — who is still at large — remain in the Gaddafi stronghold of Sirte. And yet, when it came time to battle the rebels for control of Tripoli, the Gaddafi government did not put up much of a fight. Since February, when the uprising began, there was a gradual hollowing out of the regime from within that seems to have finally precipitated its collapse. For months, many state employees had not been turning up for work — some because the government had ceased to function properly, but many because they were simply boycotting the regime.

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One of the key defections was that of Mohammed al-Barani Eshkal, who commanded the brigade guarding the television station and was charged with protecting Gaddafi in his main Bab al-Aziziya compound. Eshkal had played a finely nuanced game, working for the Libyan leader while simultaneously assuring the rebels that if their fighters arrived at the gates of the capital, he would instruct his men to lay down their weapons. That is exactly what happened, according to rebel officials in Benghazi. Operation Mermaid Dawn Rebel commanders — working in conjunction with NATO — had long been plotting an uprising of Tripoli residents to coincide with an opposition advance into the capital. The start of Operation Mermaid Dawn was set for Aug. 20, the six-month mark of the uprising in Tripoli and the 20th day of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The day is symbolic among Muslims because it marks the anniversary of the prophet Muhammad’s entrance into Mecca to retake his home town. “The day was studied carefully based on the deterioration of Gaddafi’s power in Tripoli, and as we got closer to the capital, we chose the day for its symbolism,” said Mustafa Sagazly, the deputy interior minister for the rebel government. Outside Tripoli, the military tide had turned sharply against Gaddafi in mid-August with the fall of the eastern city of Zlitan and the garrison mountain town of Gharyan. But the critical rebel victory came about in the gateway city of Zawiyah, which cost Gaddafi his last oil refinery and his coastal lifeline to Tunisia. Attempts by Gaddafi’s forces to reinforce Zawiyah and Gharyan from Tripoli were spotted by NATO and quashed with airstrikes, said a NATO official, who was not authorized to speak on the record. Then government checkpoints on the way to the capital also were struck. “We knew we had to come from the east, west and south,” said Fathi Baja, the head of political affairs for the rebel council. “We designed the plan in connection with NATO so they could start the operation by hitting the checkpoints.” News of Zawiyah’s fall turned the mood in Tripoli, as residents who had endured 42 years of Gaddafi rule realized that his defeat was within reach. Rebel officials in Benghazi said underground dissidents, as well as lawyers, journalists, doctors and drivers, were primed to bring people out on the streets, with armed sleeper cells ready to do the fighting. On the afternoon of Aug. 20, a Friday, young men took over the microphone at a Tripoli mosque to broadcast a message to Gaddafi’s troops. “Raise the white flag and nobody will touch you,” one young man proclaimed, according to residents who heard the announcement. “Lay down your arms, and I promise you we will break our fast together this evening. We are all Libyans. We don’t want to kill you, we don’t want to hurt you. How many are you going to kill? 10? 20? 30? You can’t kill us all.” A homemade video shows young men cautiously making their way onto the streets in the capital’s Zawiyat al-Dahmani district. Machine-gun fire crackles, and they briefly retreat, but soon they are advancing again.

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Gradually the streets start to fill, and the red, black and green rebel flag emerges from people’s homes. When rebels streamed into the capital Aug. 21 and 22 from Misurata to the east and Zawiyah to the west, they found many districts “liberated,” even if there was still fierce fighting ahead to overtake the Bab al-Aziziya compound and loyalist neighborhoods such as Abu Salim. “I thought most of us would die,” said Mohammed Fallah, 23, a rebel fighter. “We thought there would be a lot of blood in Tripoli, but we were very surprised, very happy at what happened here.” Fallah said Gaddafi’s troops had put up a far less potent fight than he had expected. “I thought, ‘Is that all Gaddafi can do?’ He was the bogeyman, but once the people of Tripoli got over their fear, they found themselves free.” Hard-core government loyalists were surprised, too, at how quickly the city fell. In the Rixos hotel, Moussa Ibrahim, a Gaddafi spokesman, left with his entourage Aug. 21. Today, in what was once his room, an open suitcase and his infant son’s toys lie scattered on the ground, evidence that his wife did not even have time to pack as she ran out of the hotel, her son in her arms. ‘Please forgive me’ More than a week after Tripoli fell, the bulk of Gaddafi’s remaining forces appear to have regrouped in his home town and tribal stronghold of Sirte. But they are also in Tripoli. Some, no doubt, are preparing for battles to come; others have begun to curry favor with the very people they once subjugated. Hamza Mhani, a prisoner under Gaddafi, recalled watching on the night of Aug. 20 as prison guards shed their uniforms, stashed weapons in the trunks of their vehicles and drove away before they could be vanquished by the rebels. One guard, whom Mhani describes as the most conspicuously loyal to Gaddafi, stopped to free the prisoners. “He was crying and saying, ‘Please forgive me,’ ” Mhani said. As the guard unlocked the cells, Mhani said, he repeated again and again: “I am now doing what was always in my head to do.” Fadel reported from Benghazi. Correspondent Michael Birnbaum in Cairo contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tripolis-sudden-fall-revealed-rotten-heart-of- gaddafis-regime/2011/08/27/giqabpgssj_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines

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Russia recognizes Libyan rebels as country’s leaders ahead of world conference on Libya By Associated Press, Published: August 31 | Updated: Thursday, September 1, 11:13 AM PARIS — Russia recognized the Libyan rebel movement as the country’s acting leadership Thursday, a key endorsement hours ahead of an international conference seeking to map Libya’s future. The summit in Paris of 60 world leaders and top envoys is also looking to free up billions in frozen Libyan assets worldwide to help the opposition, and reconcile diplomatic differences over the NATO-led airstrike campaign that helped oust iron- fisted leader Moammar Gadhafi. The meeting is the first international gathering for the rebel-backed National Transitional Council now that it has taken Tripoli and controls most of Libya, and a test of its readiness to run a country ravaged by months of civil war and decades of dictatorship. The council is expected to present a detailed list of requests at the conference, which comes 42 years to the day after Gadhafi seized power in a coup. It may seek short-term loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, U.S. officials said. While they do not want international peacekeepers, the rebels may seek a civilian U.N. police presence, the officials said. While the United States and many European countries abandoned Gadhafi and recognized the rebel months ago, Russia was among those sharply critical of NATO’s military campaign in Libya. The Russian envoy to the Paris conference said he is coming to defend Russia’s economic interests in Libya, an oil-rich North African nation. A short statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry on Thursday said it recognized the National Transitional Council. Pressure will fall Thursday on other countries to follow suit — especially China and Algeria. China, a big investor in Libya, agreed at the last minute to send an envoy to the Paris conference, and stressed that the United Nations should take a leading role in Libya’s future. When asked about Thursday recognizing the rebels, Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said only that China respects the choice of the Libyan people and attaches importance to the “role played by the National Transitional Council in the settlement of the Libyan issue.” Algeria offered safe haven to Gadhafi’s wife and three of his children on Monday, drawing ire from the Libyan rebels. Algerian newspaper El Watan reported that Gadhafi himself also sought refuge across the border but the Algerian president refused to take his phone calls. 325

With Gadhafi’s whereabouts unknown, Algeria’s foreign minister insisted Thursday that he’s not in Algeria. Asked on Europe-1 radio if Gadhafi could be given asylum, Mourad Medelci said, “I don’t believe so.” Instead of aid for Libya, the financial focus at Thursday’s conference will be on unfreezing assets linked to Gadhafi in banks worldwide. The money was blocked by a U.N. resolution earlier this year aimed at persuading Gadhafi to stop his violent crackdown on anti-government protests. French officials say at least $50 billion linked to Gadhafi is believed to be squirreled away across the world. British officials have put the figure as high as $110 billion. “France has just received authorization to transfer €1.5 billion which belongs to the Libyans,” French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said Thursday. “We have to aid the transitional council because the country is devastated. The humanitarian situation is difficult. They lack water, gas, electricity,” he said. Late Wednesday, Britain’s Royal Air Force delivered about 280 million Libyan dinars to the country’s Central Bank in Benghazi, following a U.N. agreement to lift sanctions on about $1.6 billion of the $20 billion assets held in the U.K. The notes were printed in Britain but seized in March under asset freezes. Britain will deliver a total of 1.86 billion Libyan dinars over the coming days. “The bank notes will be used to pay the wages of Libyan public sector employees, including nurses, doctors, teachers and police officers,” said British Foreign Secretary William Hague. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, coming to the Paris conference, hopes to announce that $1.5 billion in Gadhafi regime assets frozen in the United States have been distributed on behalf of the rebels, U.S. officials said. That money is about half the liquid assets of the more than $30 billion in frozen Libyan assets in the United States. Years of insurgent violence in Iraq are a warning to leaders at Thursday’s conference of the potential for postwar bloodshed. Algeria’s Medelci warned that terrorists could take advantage of the transition period in Libya and said some Libyan weapons have already fallen into the hands of al-Qaida’s North African offshoot. Summit hosts French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain, two of the most vocal backers of the rebels, are eager for the Libyans themselves to be seen as taking the lead, instead of outside powers. The transition process “is Libyan-led, this is Libyan-owned, this is not Iraq,” Hague said on BBC Radio Thursday. The fall of Gadhafi, who remains at large but whose regime has all but collapsed under the onslaught of NATO-led air power and rebel fighters, has fanned talk of parallels with the U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 — notably among Iraqis, who warn that Libya’s postwar aftermath could devolve into similar chaos. Libya faces a tricky alchemy in the weeks ahead: Many rebels have different tribal loyalties, the country is awash in weapons — some seized from bombed-out or pillaged army barracks — and Gadhafi loyalists could be a wild card. The Libyan council must

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also restore electricity, battle food and water shortages, reopen schools — and, a key priority, pay salaries. British officials have stressed that Libya’s interim new government must use Thursday’s summit to offer assurances over the timetable toward elections. But Hague indicated there could be flexibility over the National Transitional Council’s commitment to hold elections within 8 months. “We will want them to stick to their deadline, but of course it is a deadline that they have set themselves,” he told BBC radio. Council leaders Mustafa Abdul-Jalil and Mahmoud Jibril are expected to be among 13 heads of state and 19 prime ministers at the conference, along with U.N. Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon and leaders of NATO, the European Union, African Union, the Arab League, and the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation. _____ Matthew Lee in Washington, Jim Heintz in Moscow, David Stringer in London, Scott McDonald in Beijing and Greg Keller in Paris contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libyas-rebels-on-world-stage-in- paris-eyeing-democratic-transition-after-fall-of- gadhafi/2011/08/31/giqa133wsj_story.html?wpisrc=nl_headlines : • F

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• UENTESECIALES EUROPA EN EL MUNDO REVISTA DE PRENSA Libia: tras la guerra, los negocios 1 septiembre 2011 PRESSEUROP

" Libia: fin de las operaciones aéreas". Herrmann Tras el acuerdo conseguido por los participantes en la conferencia de París sobre la “nueva Libia” se esconde la guerra encubierta entre Francia, Italia y Reino Unido para tener acceso a la explotación de los recursos del país, tal y como recogen los periódicos franceses, italianos y británicos. Tras seis meses de hostilidades contra el régimen de Muamar el Gadafi, Nicolas Sarkozy y David Cameron convocaron en París a los representantes de unos sesenta países y ONG, así como a los miembros del Consejo Nacional de Transición libio, con el objetivo de poner fin a las operaciones militares y de esbozar la transición política y la reconstrucción de la “nueva Libia”. Como telón de fondo, la codicia por el maná petrolero libio. Libération habla de una “prueba de fuego de la que se sale victorioso en Libia, la que vuelve a poner a Francia en su sitio y en consonancia con un nuevo mundo árabe”, y de una “Blitzkrieg [guerra relámpago] diplomática acompañada de una audaz apuesta militar”. Una apuesta de la que “las empresas petroleras francesas podrían obtener copiosos beneficios”, según recoge el diario. “Eso es al menos lo que queda reflejado por escrito en el documento al que Libération ha tenido acceso. Un texto firmado por el Consejo Nacional de Transición (CNT), autoridad de transición creada por los rebeldes libios. Desde luego, era de conocimiento público que, cuando llegase el momento, el CNT tendría en mejor consideración a los países que más se habían comprometido con los insurgentes, concretamente respecto al número de contratos contantes y sonantes en el sector 328

petrolero. Pero ese documento muestra claramente que los compromisos secretos se concedieron hace ya muchos meses”. De hecho, explica el diario, el 3 de abril, es decir, diecisiete días después de la adopción de la resolución 1973 por parte del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, el CNT firmó un carta dirigida al emir de Catar, que ha desempeñado el papel de intermediario entre Francia y el CNT, en la que se precisaba que el acuerdo sobre el petróleo cerrado con Francia, a cambio del reconocimiento del CNT como representante legítimo libio, atribuye el 35% del total del petróleo bruto a los franceses. "Que Italia corteje ahora al CNT" El éxito diplomático francés y su corolario energético preocupan en gran medida a Italia. Ésta entró a formar parte de la coalición gestionada por París y Londres a regañadientes, y la antigua potencia colonial teme ahora quedarse al margen del reparto del “pastel” libio. ¿Que pasará con Italia, “que era el primer socio económico de Libia y que estaba vinculada por un tratado de amistad firmado a costa de una mala alianza?” plantea La Stampa. Que será de “esta Italia que ocupa hoy en día un segundo plano, de la ENI [la concesión administrativa estatal de hidrocarburos] que tendrá que pelearse en el futuro con los franceses y los ingleses los nuevos contratos por la energía”. Bueno, que Italia “corteje al CNT para salvar sus contratos”, señala el diario. “Fundamentalmente han sido París, seguida de Londres, quienes han querido esta ‘guerra falsa’ en Libia. Nicolas Sarkozy tratará de recoger los frutos de su compromiso, al dirigir la reconstrucción económica. La presencia de Italia en Libia se verá reducida”, aprecia Marta Dassù también desde las páginas de La Stampa. La politóloga italiana evoca la hostilidad histórica de los habitantes de Cirenaica – la región en la que se originó la rebelión – hacia los italianos, lo que limita el alcance de sus iniciativas diplomáticas. “Italia tenía mucho que perder en esta ‘guerra falsa’ en Libia. Sin embargo, no lo ha perdido. La [reciente] visita del jefe de ENI a Bengasi confirma que todavía puede salvaguardar sus propios acuerdos energéticos”. Respecto a los europeos, “después de haber tenido posturas enfrentadas con relación a la guerra, tienen interés en promover un acuerdo entre los sucesores de Gadafi. La ilusión de una cotitularidad franco- británica del Mediterráneo ya ha fracasado en el pasado. Y los europeos fracasarán de nuevo si se limitan a pelearse por el ‘pastel’ de Libia. Su interés común, y de los libios, es no tener que echar de menos los tiempos de Gadafi. Después, quienes tengan capacidad podrán hacer negocios. Ésa es la única competencia aceptable entre las democracias del Viejo Continente”. "Que los libios se gobiernen a sí mismos" En el bando británico, tampoco se engañan sobre lo que está en juego en la posguerra. Tal y como subraya The Independent, ”los participantes están ahí para ver qué beneficios puede sacar”. ¿Quién va a “asegurar los contratos de la retirada de basuras, de abastecimiento de agua y de los conductos de petróleo hasta los puertos de este rico país en hidrocarburos? Para los occidentales, las oportunidades para involucrarse son numerosas, motivo por el cual tanto los libios como los árabes se muestran escépticos sobre sus intenciones humanitarias”. Por ello, y para evitar que ”una precaria situación política desemboque en una lucha por el enriquecimiento personal”, el Financial Times sugiere “un sistema de contra-poderes

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creíble en el sector energético”, y “un amplio consenso constitucional, para permitir que los libios se gobiernen a sí mismos, como un pueblo libre”.

ALEMANIA Visión desde la barrera El éxito de las operaciones militares en Libia pone a Alemania, que no las ha apoyado, en un apuro, puesto que ahora es el momento de discutir cómo se va a realizar la reconstrucción y los contratos que suscitará. En concreto, el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Guido Westerwelle está en el candelero, según informa el Süddeutsche Zeitung. Tras el triunfo militar de la OTAN, atribuyó la caída del régimen de Gadafi al embargo internacional sobre Trípoli, que contaba con el apoyo de Alemania, más que a la insurrección armada. Westerwelle ha reconocido en público su error, a instancias de la canciller Angela Merkel, pero, según señala el diario bávaro, “todos los políticos, fuese cual fuese su opinión sobre la intervención de la OTAN en Libia, le han criticado. Una vez que Gadafi ha sido derrocado, el panorama ha cambiado completamente: todo el mundo manifiesta su respeto por la OTAN. El alivio por la caída de Gadafi favorece el apoyo a una guerra que nunca tuvo como objetivo la salida del dictador”. http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/905401-libia-tras-la-guerra-los-negocios

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Journal of Classical Sociology August 2011 (11.3) Table of Contents Special Issue: Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt Edited by: Bryan S. Turner and Simon Susen Editorial Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner Introduction to the Special Issue on Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt (pp. 229-239) A sociological odyssey: The comparative voyage of S.N. Eisenstadt Edward A. Tiryakian Duke University, USA, [email protected] Abstract This essay proposes that the comparative research of Eisenstadt made room for ‘tradition’ as a creative feature of modernity, rather than as dysfunctional, as in either the liberal or leftist model. He recognized that conflict — often a conflict of generations—is a feature of modernity, and that trust is also a problematic aspect of change. An ultimate concern of Eisenstadt was to build on classical themes of sociology and theories of social change to develop, with colleagues, an adequate sociological understanding of an evolving civilization of modernity. Eisenstadt based his writings on comparative historical research, his far-flung travels, as well as continuous observations of the dynamics of his own Israeli society. doi: 10.1177/1468795X11406007 Journal of Classical Sociology August 2011 vol. 11 no. 3 241-250 Connected histories, power and meaning: Transnational forces in the construction of collective identities Luis Roniger Wake Forest University, USA, [email protected] Abstract The construction of collective identities is central to Shmuel N.Eisenstadt’s comparative research program, as reflected in his studies of civilizations and multiple modernities. This article suggests the theoretical relevance of bridging comparative and transnational studies, calling attention to the impact of connected histories in processes of crystallization of collective identities. Focusing on Central America, this analysis shows that, following independence, the societies of this region found it hard to articulate distinct identities; they came to such issues belatedly, almost by default; and were unable to completely disengage from transnational forces that pulled them together time and again. It thus indicates how societies often lead a Janus-faced dynamics in constructing their visions of collective membership, which can only be followed by taking into account transnational undercurrents at work long before the onset of recent cycles of globalization. doi: 10.1177/1468795X11406005 Journal of Classical Sociology August 2011 vol. 11 no. 3 251-268

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Deciphering transcendence and the open code of modernity: S.N. Eisenstadt’s comparative hermeneutics of civilizations Ilana F. Silber Bar-Ilan University, Israel, [email protected] Abstract This paper highlights the key position and polysemy of the idea of transcendence in Eisenstadt’s comparative historical sociology. Eisenstadt’s deployment of the idea of transcendence as a tool of systematic comparative analysis applicable to both past and present civilizations stands in clear continuity with directions of inquiry opened up by Weber and later inflected by conceptions of the ‘Axial Age’ as first developed by Jaspers and others. But it was also nourished by his time of study with Buber, self-critical revision of his early affinities with structural-functionalism, and dialogical absorption of competing theoretical influences. Transcendence, in the process, develops into a polysemic idea of flexible analytical scope, which can combine with but does not overlap with those of the search for salvation, charisma, or the sacred. The result is a comparative hermeneutics of civilizations that strives to decipher the manifold and contradictory expressions of transcendence in the history of human conceptions and institutions. It is also a cultural hermeneutics that posits the paradoxical operation of generative cultural structures able to both close and open, encode or dissolve, as well as construct and reconstruct collective boundaries and arenas of trust and commitment. doi: 10.1177/1468795X11409990 Journal of Classical Sociology August 2011 vol. 11 no. 3 269-280 An appraisal of Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt’s global historical sociology Willfried Spohn University of Wrocław, Poland, [email protected] Abstract Shmuel N. Eisenstadt was one of the great sociologists of the second half of the twentieth century and a major visionary for the sociological challenges of the twenty-first century. As I claim, his overall work should be understood as a life-long critical conversation with the classical modernization paradigm from a heterodox and peripheral point of view — reflecting the Holocaust experience of European modernity as well as the precarious construction of a modern society in Israel. As such, his oeuvre can be viewed as an alternative, neo-Weberian synthesis of classical sociology to mainstream sociology. To demonstrate this claim, I firstly reconstruct Eisenstadt’s heterodox theory of modernity, emphasizing the tensions, contradictions and paradoxes of global modernity. Secondly, I highlight the contours of his comparative-civilizational, multiple modernities approach that has materialized in numerous path-breaking analyses of several civilizations — not only of Western but particularly of non- Western civilizational complexes. Thirdly, I emphasize the innovative research direction of his civilizational analysis for the new field of world history. Fourthly, I show also his innovative research direction in the recently growing area of the sociology of globalization and world society. Taken together, I see Shmuel Eisenstadt’s oeuvre as one of the great inspirations for a global historical sociology of the twenty-first century. doi: 10.1177/1468795X11406025 Journal of Classical Sociology August 2011 vol. 11 no. 3 281-301

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S.N. Eisenstadt: A sociological giant Roland Robertson University of Durham, UK, [email protected] Abstract This paper considers the work of Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt mainly in the perspective of the author’s specific encounters with his work, in the course of which Eisenstadt’s work is compared with that of Talcott Parsons. There are several aspects of this programme. First, brief attention is given to the biographies of Eisenstadt and Parsons; second, their styles and approaches to sociological analysis are compared and contrasted; third, the subject of their somewhat different approaches to what I will call globality is raised, against the background of Eisenstadt’s great reliance on the later work of Karl Jaspers and the somewhat problematic issue of civilization(s). The discussion of Eisenstadt’s deployment of Jaspers’ insights is explored with particular reference to the former’s Japanese Civilization. Often regarded as the graveyard of comparative sociology, Eisenstadt’s attempt to place Japan in a comparative context is, in a number of respects, the consummation of his life’s work, though he had many years yet to live. The paper concludes with a question concerning whether global consciousness has superseded, or transcended, the contrast between differential modernization and global civilization. doi: 10.1177/1468795X11406029 Journal of Classical Sociology August 2011 vol. 11 no. 3 303-311 The dialogue of civilizations: An Eisenstadt legacy Donald N. Levine University of Chicago, USA, [email protected] Abstract The thesis of a ‘clash of civilizations,’ famously voiced by Samuel Huntington in 1993, draws support from selected social science generalizations and the fact that all historical civilizations organized around core beliefs and values condemned outsiders. This thesis can be challenged by showing that civilizations are internally complex, including elements that also develop nonexclusionary themes; and by specifying a human need for ‘dialogue’ driven by compresent needs for attachment and differentiation. The historic emergence of those inclusionary sub-traditions can be documented by looking at the cases of Gandhi in India, Ueshiba in Japan, and a number of historic and contemporary figures in the Abrahamic civilizations of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. doi: 10.1177/1468795X11406028 Journal of Classical Sociology August 2011 vol. 11 no. 3 313-325 Axial civilizations, multiple modernities, and Islam Saïd Amir Arjomand State University of New York at Stony Brook, USA, [email protected] Abstract Departing from the modernization theory, S.N. Eisenstadt proposed the idea of ‘post-traditional societies’ in the early 1970s, and proceeded to formulate the concepts of ‘axial civilizations’ and ‘multiple modernities’ in the following decades. In the 1980s, Eisenstadt sketched a model of constant tension between an Islamic primordial utopia — the ideal of the Golden Age of pristine Islam— and the historical reality of patrimonial Sultanism, coexisting with an autonomous public sphere protected by Islamic law and dominated by the religious elite, the ulema. The main feature of this model was the oscillation between military regimes with limited pluralism and puritanical fundamentalism. Eisenstadt further emphasized the degree of autonomy of the religious elite as the carriers of Islam in relation to the ruler and political power as a determinant of the strength of their civilizational impact. Islam remained confined to the religious sphere in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, where the religious elite lacked autonomy, but had a much broader civilizational impact in the Middle East and North Africa, where the ulema developed greater autonomy. The article shows Eisenstadt’s subsequent influence by discussion of the application by other sociologists of civilizational analysis to Islam in a comparative perspective, and of multiple modernities to contemporary Islam. doi: 10.1177/1468795X11406032 Journal of Classical Sociology August 2011 vol. 11 no. 3 327-335 333