POLICY PAPER —№8— JANUARY 2017

RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR – DOMESTIC DRIVERS AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

HANNA NOTTE N.B: The article only reflects the opinion of its author. RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR – DOMESTIC DRIVERS AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS INTRODUCTION Over the past year, Russia has catch observers by surprise become an increasingly pivotal and have perpetuated the player in the Syrian war and, idea that Russian actions are by extension, in the broader unpredictable at best, and Middle East. Its military irrational at worst. Yet, while intervention since September Russian foreign policy analysis 2015, its recent assistance of is bedeviled by a real lack of the Assad regime in retaking transparency into the who Aleppo and its subsequent and how of specific decision- forging of a Syria-wide making, arguably, Russia’s ceasefire with Ankara have fundamental interests in made significant impacts on Syria have been remarkably the ground and marginalized consistent over the past six the US’ role in the conflict. years. Its policies, in turn, Russia’s close cooperation have been logical in light of with Iran and rapprochement these interests. Understanding with Turkey and Egypt will these requires analytically continue to redraw the lines of embedding Russia’s Syria influence, not just in Syria but policy in a broader context, the region writ large. assessing it through the prisms of Russia’s perspective Amidst the noise Russia’s on the post-‘Arab Spring’ impact in Syria has caused, Middle East, its own historical the underlying drivers of experience in the Chechen its strategy – domestic, Wars, its fears about so- security and ideological – called ‘color revolutions’ in remain too often ignored. As post-Soviet countries, and its a result, Russian decisions relationship with the West. regarding Syria routinely

Page 1 POLICY PAPER

This article examines the key RUSSIA AND STATE ORDER: underlying drivers of Russia’s IDEOLOGICAL, HISTORICAL Syria policy, distinguishing AND REGIME SURVIVAL between Russian interests CONSIDERATIONS and perspectives as they relate to (1) state order and Ideology: Russia and (2) geopolitics, in order to ‘Sovereign Democracy’ explain why Russia has been steadfast in its support for First, a concern with state the Assad regime, stepped order, or regime stability, is up its involvement at various essential to Russia’s view on points throughout the war and the Syrian conflict. As things sought to carefully calibrate are seen from Moscow, none of a path between military the outside actors propagating escalation and diplomacy. what they call a “political Implications of its Syria transition” in Syria have a strategy for Russia’s position credible plan for ensuring the in the broader Middle East, as orderly survival of existing well as the prospects for Syria state structures after Assad’s diplomacy in 2017 will also be departure. Russia fears that discussed. the collapse of institutions and concomitant spread of chaos will nurture instability and allow radical Islamist factions to expand their influence. An apprehension of this causal chain – the removal of strong leaders leads to state collapse, which facilitates the rise of Islamists – has more broadly characterized Russia’s reaction to the ‘Arab Spring’ since 2011. While Moscow’s official response to initial events RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR in Egypt and Tunisia was Western intentions to support relatively low-key, Russian democratic aspirations in experts and diplomats voiced Syria are judged as either cautious concerns early on.1 deeply misguided or, worse, seen as a cover for ulterior The regional fallout from motives, such as to weaken the 2003 US invasion of Russia’s own position in the Iraq gradually nurtured a Middle East by undermining conviction among Russian its allies. officials, which was then dramatically solidified by Turning to the ideological the 2011 intervention in underpinnings of this Libya and the overthrow Russian outlook, there is of Muammar Gaddafi, that the belief that stability and Western policies of social- the material wellbeing of a political engineering in the society should be acceded region are both naïve and priority over a concern with utterly irresponsible. Certainly human rights and the degree in private, Russian diplomats of freedom enjoyed by its now share the view that citizens. In recent years, the Iraqi and Libyan people the Kremlin has promoted fared relatively better under its own understanding of the oppressive Saddam and democratization, which places Gaddafi regimes, respectively, primacy on gradual, stability- than they do in their war-torn prioritizing and state-led societies today. Given the change at the expense of the Iraqi and Libyan precedents, more pluralist role played by civil society inherent in the 1 The Russian narrative stands in liberal democratic model.2 stark contrast to Western scholarly accounts of the Arab Spring, which 2 Roland Dannreuther, “Russia view authoritarian regimes in the and the Arab Spring: Supporting Middle East as the primary cause for the Counter-Revolution”, Journal of Islamist radicalization. For examples, European Integration, Vol. 37, No. see the work by Francois Burgat or 1 (2015), p. 79. The prioritization John Esposito. of stability is not only advocated

Page 3 POLICY PAPER

That understanding has been ensuring that the resulting nurtured by the Russian societal transformation leadership’s deep antipathy does not lead to disorder to the idea of linking internal and conflict but preserves regime legitimacy to validation social stability and economic by external actors or a specific reform”.4 The Russian democratic process prescribed approach is thus one that from within.3 The concept values “order” over “justice” of “sovereign democracy”, and regime security over which was first promulgated human security. by Putin’s Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov The Russian government in 2006 in response to formulates its Syria policy George W. Bush’s “Freedom through the prism of Agenda”, entails the idea sovereign democracy. It that “the form of democracy argues that there are different appropriate to Russian society, paths to, and incarnations and by extension to other of democracy, and that the modernizing societies, is Russian model is better one where the state has the suited for Syria and other primary role in managing post-Arab Spring countries, the transition to democracy, given their complex ethnic and confessional fabric top-down by the Russian govern- that mandates stability- ment, but sociological work shows prioritizing policies. In a long it is also supported by the Russian 2012 interview discussing population, see Andrei Kolesnikov, “Do Russians Want War?”, Carnegie Russia’s view on the Arab Moscow Center (October 2016). Spring generally, and events in Egypt and Syria specifically, 3 Roy Allison, “Russia and the post-2014 international order: revisionism, Realpolitik and regime 4 Vladislav Surkov, “Sovereignty: change”, Public Lecture, Russian and it is a political synonym for com- Eastern European Studies, School of petitiveness”, in: N. Garadzha (ed.), Interdisciplinary Area Studies, Uni- Suverenitet (2006), quoted in: Dan- versity of Oxford (January 16, 2017). nreuther (2015), pp. 89-90. RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR

Foreign Minister Sergey these concerns most plainly Lavrov warned that “any in an interview in 2000, attempts to ‘transplant’ one’s warning that“the essence own models of state structure of the situation in the North and development, to export Caucasus and in Chechnya one’s own values onto the soil ... is the continuation of the of other countries, ignoring collapse of the USSR. If we their traditions and culture, did not quickly do something as a general rule cannot to stop it, Russia as a state be successful. Russia is in its current form would convinced that both the pace cease to exist.... we would be and form of democratization facing… the Yugoslavization should be defined from within of Russia.”6 He believed that societies themselves”.5 it was the false promise of Western-style democracy, History: The Chechen Wars which was promoted in the 1990s – including in Russia Further, Moscow’s concern – and which encouraged less with state order in Syria has its control for a strong center, that roots in Russia’s own historical led to chaos and civil war in experience: After the Cold War, the North Caucasus given an unrest among the indigenous emerging power vacuum in Muslim populations in the Moscow. The extent to which North Caucasus raised fears these personal perceptions in in the Kremlin that Chechen ascending to power during the separatism could spill over tumultuous late 1990s would to other Russian regions and determine President Putin’s precipitate state disintegration. outlook on the situation in President Putin expressed Syria a decade later can hardly 5 “Lavrov: o transformatsiiakh be overstated. v arabskom mire”, Interview with Egyptian Newspaper Al-Ahram 6 Quoted in: Natalya Gevork- (November 9, 2012), Russian ver- yan, NatalyaTimakova and Andrei sion available at: http://inosmi.ru/ Kolesnikov, Ot pervogo litsa (2000), world/20121109/201973659.html. pp.133-135.

Page 5 POLICY PAPER

Just like the sovereign labelled the armed opposition democracy prism, the as foreign mercenaries Chechnya prism has shaped supported by external players, Russia’s Syria policy. who try to use the conflict Moscow’s insistence that in Syria to further their own transnational Islamist nefarious goals.8 Its discourse terrorism threatens the very has portrayed the Syrian integrity of the Syrian state conflict as a binary struggle echoes similar claims the between the Assad regime Kremlin made regarding and “terrorists”. As was the Chechnya in the early 2000s.7 case with Chechnya, Russia Further, the Second Chechen has rejected any distinction War was exclusively framed between good and bad armed as a conflict fuelled by outside opponents of the Syrian state forces. Following the terrorist and has criticized the US attacks of 9/11 and the throughout last year, when October 2001 US invasion of Moscow and Washington were Afghanistan, the Kremlin held trying to install a stable cease- weekly press conferences to fire, for failing to provide support claims that Chechens satisfying intelligence on the had links to the Taliban whereabouts of “moderate” and provided the largest rebels. Finally, both in contingent of Al-Qaeda’s Chechnya and Syria, Russia foreign legion in Afghanistan. has also claimed it is fighting Equally, in Syria, Russia has a terrorist threat of not just regional, but transnational 7 For a comparison of Russia’s perspective on the Second Chechen 8 For one exemplary Russian ac- War and the Syrian civil war, see: count which, in line with the official Fiona Hill, “The Real Reason Putin view, argues that the Syrian crisis Supports Assad,” Foreign Affairs has been predominantly fuelled by (March 25, 2013); Hanna Notte, external actors, see: Boris Dolgov, “Russia in Chechnya and Syria: Pur- “The Syrian Conflict: Russian and suit of Strategic Goals”, Middle East GCC Perspectives”, Russian Interna- Policy Council, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring tional Affairs Council (November 19, 2016). 2015). RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR proportions, leaving Moscow broader Middle East as having at the forefront of defying violated international law, what is no less than a while stressing that Russia’s civilizational challenge.9 own military involvement in the Syrian conflict was Regime Survival: Fearing requested by the legitimate ‘Color Revolutions’ government of the country and thus constituted another Finally, Russia’s concern “intervention by invitation”.10 with state order in Syria Grievances over Western betrays fears about Western- democracy promotion efforts supported ‘color revolutions’, have been a consistent theme not only in the Middle East in Moscow’s outlook since but also in Russia’s own 9/11 and the beginning of the neighborhood. In providing US military campaigns in steadfast support to the Afghanistan and Iraq, but they Assad regime since the have notably intensified over outbreak of the Syrian time. crisis in 2011, Moscow has argued it is thwarting yet Viewing the Taliban as a another Western attempt to threat to its own national impose standards of political security, Russia supported legitimacy on a sovereign the October 2001 US-led state. Russian official rhetoric campaign in Afghanistan, but on Syria has made constant as Washington progressively references to past Western- adopted a narrative of state- backed interventions in the building in the country, Russia became more critical.11 It 9 Some authors have also drawn a parallel between Russian mili- 10 Allison, Lecture at University of tary tactics used in the bombing of Oxford (January 16, 2017). Grozny in 2000 and those in Aleppo in recent months, see: Mark Galeotti, 11 For a detailed analysis of Rus- “Putin is playing by Grozny rules in sian objections to perceived West- Aleppo”, Foreign Policy (September ern-orchestrated regime change and 2016). democracy promotion objectives, in

Page 7 POLICY PAPER was then staunchly opposed US regime change intentions to military action against against Damascus had been Iraq. When claims about expressed already long before the presence of weapons of the outbreak of the Syrian mass destruction (WMDs) crisis in 2011. Whether it inside Iraq proved unfounded was the Bush administration and the language of regime grouping Syria with the change started to figure infamous “axis of evil” in May more prominently in the 2002,13 or the US stepping US’ discourse on the war, up its threats against the Russia’s apprehensions Assad regime following the became yet more acute. assassination of Rafik Hariri Further, having abstained in Beirut in February 2005 – from the UN Security Council Russia always made clear that vote on Resolution 1973 on it would not tolerate externally Libya, in what was partially a orchestrated regime change in gesture of goodwill to the US, Syria. the Kremlin observed with complete incredulity how the While Moscow’s current 2011 intervention eventually support for Damascus resulted in regime change. needs to be understood in President Putin called the this historical perspective, elimination of Gaddafi not just a “medieval”, but outright changing world” (text in Russian), “primitive apotheosis” of the Rossiiskaya Gazeta (February West’s meddling in regional 27, 2012), available at: https://rg. ru/2012/02/27/putin-politika.html. affairs, warning that Russia would not allow the Libya 13 In his original State of the Union scenario to be reproduced in Address in 2002, US president George W. Bush designated only 12 Syria. Worries about possible Iran, Iraq and North Korea as belong- ing to the “axis of evil”. However, Un- Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond, see: dersecretary of StateJohn R. Bolton Roy Allison, Russia, the West, and a few months later added Syria to Military Intervention (2013). this axis in his “Beyond the Axis of 12 Vladimir Putin, “Russia in a Evil” speech. RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR it is a fear of contagion of to the popular uprisings in democracy promotion efforts Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 beyond the Middle East that and 2004, which the Kremlin really lies at the core of its staunchly alleged had been misgivings. Already during staged by the West, were the Libya crisis, Sergey an early case in point. By Lavrov argued that sowing February 2011, then President a belief among people that Dmitri Medvedev warned “foreigners [helping] us” that the scenario unfolding overthrow the regime may in the Arab world had been be “contagious”, and could prepared for Russia by certain “spread to protesters in other script-writers, too, while countries of the region” Army General Nikolai Makarov hoping for assistance from argued following Gaddafi’s fall the international community, that the technique of “color and that this would be “an revolutions”, used by “leaders invitation to a whole array of some countries” to “remove of civil wars”.14 Fears about undesirable political regimes”, a Western-backed regime might later be applied to change dynamic spreading Russia and its allies.15 After like a virus ultimately betrays Libya, Syria became the the Russian regime’s paranoia Russian litmus test for how about so-called “color the West would be allowed to revolutions” in the post-Soviet respond to internal conflicts in space, which Russia sees the future. Until today, Syria as its legitimate sphere of remains Russia’s red line, influence. Moscow’s reaction Russia’s “never again” to US- backed regime change. 14 “Sergey Lavrov at a press con- ference in Tskhinvali (April 26, 2011)”, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: It is important to note that the Former Soviet Union; quoted in: Roy 2011 events in Libya coincided Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining not only with the start of the Alignment With A Regime In Crisis”, Syrian crisis, but also with International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4 (2013). 15 Allison (2013), p. 817.

Page 9 POLICY PAPER internal turmoil surrounding The Kremlin’s increasingly parliamentary and presidential anti-Western outlook, elections in Russia itself. The which has been crystallizing Kremlin’s announcement since 2011, underpinning in 2011 that Vladimir Putin Russia’s illiberal conception would assume the Presidency of sovereign democracy, for a third term sparked and assisting Putin’s efforts unprecedented protests on to remain in control after Moscow’s streets. The tense returning to the Presidency, internal political situation has shaped Russia’s rhetoric forced Putin to further on the Syrian war. First, consolidate his power against the Russian narrative has the opposition. He also blamed promulgated a broader clash the protests on nefarious of values between Western foreign influences, demonizing corruption and moral decay the US and attacking on the one hand, and Russian Secretary of State Hillary protection of tradition and Clinton and US Ambassador conservative values on the Michael McFaul personally other. This rhetoric has for their alleged involvement.16 been fed and fuelled by the Adopting an uncompromising Russian Orthodox Church, an stance on the unfolding Syrian increasingly powerful lobby crisis became part and parcel supporting the Kremlin’s of this anti-Western policy of foreign policy. In his most power consolidation, which recent press conference became increasingly driven by held on January 17, Sergey Russia’s idée fixe of thwarting Lavrov devoted some time further color revolutions, and to elaborate on and criticize whose ideological building the West’s “post-Christian” blocks had been installed values, which he argued with Surkov’s “sovereign were not the values “the democracy” five years earlier. Europeans’ grandfathers and great-grandfathers adhered 16 Angela Stent, The Limits of to”, but rather “something Partnership (2014), p. 246. RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR new, something that has been joined such a coalition. subject to ‘modernization’, something all-permissive”.17 Secondly, the Russian In the Syrian theater, Russia discourse has securitized has consequently portrayed the Syrian crisis as a fight itself as a bulwark of stability of existential importance. and guarantor of national As argued in the preceding identities and state order, as section, the conflict in Syria well as the only major power has been essentially reduced truly serious about fighting to a struggle between the threat posed by ISIL. In Assad and the terrorists, the his September 2015 remarks civilized and the barbarians to the UN General Assembly, of ISIL, Jabhat Fateh Al- President Putin proposed an Sham (formerly Jabhat Al- “anti-Hitler”-type coalition to Nusra) and affiliated groups. fight ISIL.18 Russian officials In perpetually producing keep referencing this speech narratives of external to this day, in order to express existential threats that Russia their disappointment that needs to stand up against Western states have not yet – the fascists in Ukraine, international terrorism in Syria 17 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lav- rov’s remarks and answers to media – the Kremlin has diverted questions at a news conference on the public’s attention from the results of Russian diplomacy in pressing economic problems.19 2016, Moscow”, (January 17, 2017), translation from Russian by the au- Looking at Syria through thor, available at: http://www.mid.ru/en/for- the prism of much-dreaded eign_policy/news/-/asset_pub- “color revolutions”, Russia lisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ has offered an anti-Western, id/2599609. moralizing and existential 18 Vladimir Putin, “Address to threat securitizing account the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly” (September 28, 2015), 19 Andrey Kolesnikov, “A Back- available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/ ground War”, Vedomosti (October events/president/news/50385. 22, 2015).

Page 11 POLICY PAPER of the conflict, one that is strikes launched from the designed to fuel patriotism, Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, while simultaenously carry a or of Syrian civilians baking clear message to the Russian bread with Russian flour after people: popular uprisings do months of starvation imposed not pay off. In this context, by the armed opposition.21 since the Ukrainian threat By imbuing Russia’s Syria narrative had to some extent campaign with the importance run its course by mid-2015 of a higher moral order, the and the war there was seen official media narrative has as protracting without given the domestic populace significant results, some a sense of pride and urgency, analysts argued that the start intended to fuel patriotism. of Russian airstrikes in Syria The appeal of Russia’s war also conveniently served to abroad, as it is presented ensure continued popular by the media, is partially mobilization.20 driven by the absence of significant losses on the Russia’s media campaign Russian side, but also by on the Syrian operation the fact that it is framed as has indeed been savvy and just, defensive, triumphant provided a highly skewed and preventive, offering picture of Russian motivations symbolic compensation and actions – recently for economic stagnation at featuring extensive coverage of the Russian-supported “liberation” of Eastern Aleppo’s 21 For examples of such official civilians held hostage by Russian media coverage, see: “Po “terrorists”, of surgical missile IGIL b’iut rossiiskie korabli”, Vesti (November 15, 2016), available at: http://www.vesti.ru/videos/show/ 20 For instance, Jeffrey Mankoff, vid/697907/cid/9/; “Zhiteli Aleppo “A Syrian Sleight of Hand — To vypekut hleb iz rossiiskoi muki”, Deescalate in Donbass, Putin Moves Vesti (November 26, 2016), available to the Mediterranean”, Foreign Af- at: http://www.vesti.ru/doc.htm- fairs (October 13, 2015). l?id=2826053. RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR home.22 Importantly, that However, despite its skilled media narrative has been state-led media offensive, it pushed in the context of a appears that Russia’s Syria growing vacuum of alternative campaign has been less sources of information on the crucial to regime consolidation one hand, and broader public purposes than the annexation apathy regarding Russian of Crimea or the conflict actions abroad on the other.23 in Eastern Ukraine were previously. In early October 22 Kolesnikov (2016). 2015, when Russians were 23 The most recent high profile polled regarding their support case in a government crackdown on for Russia’s military campaign small news outlets in past years has in Syria, only 47% voiced clear involved top editors at RBC, a wide- approval, while 33% expressed ly-read independent publication, 24 leaving their positions in May. 2016. reservations. At the end The independent Levada pollster, of the day, Syria is not part the human rights group Memorial, as of Putin’s Russkiy Mir.25 And well as the non-governmental SOVA the involvement in a Middle Center think-tank were declared Eastern country evoked fears foreign agents over the past year. In 2016, the Russian government of a “second Afghanistan” allocated almost 1 billion USD to among almost half of the supporting the media, making the respondents polled just after state the largest donor in the coun- try’s media market. And according to Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Net” scores, Russia moved from billion-dollars-on-the-media-this- “partially free” (until 2014) to “not year. free” (from 2015). “Freedom of the 24 “Levada Center survey” (Oc- Net”, Freedom House, available at: tober 2-5, 2015) (“Do you support https://freedomhouse.org/report/ the Federation Council’s decision freedom-net/2016/russia; “The to allow the use of Russian troops Russian government is spending abroad?”), available at: http://www. almost a billion dollars on the media levada.ru/eng/russian-participa- this year”, Meduza (August 3, 2016), tion-syrian-conflict. available at: https://meduza.io/en/ news/2016/08/03/the-russian- 25 “Russkiy mir” is Russian for government-is-spending-almost-a- “Russian world”.

Page 13 POLICY PAPER airstrikes began.26 Mediterranean on November 14, as did one of its SU-33 Today, according to official jets attempting to land on the numbers, Russian casualties Kuznetsov aircraft carrier on in Syria remain limited, December 5. In light of such especially if compared to mounting calamities, the Iranian, Turkish or Hezbollah reported recent deployment losses.27 But the deaths of of Chechen fighters to Syria two Russian nurses serving has been interpreted in some in Aleppo province in early circles as partially driven December, which caused by the Kremlin’s calculation somewhat greater public that potential Chechen resonance, were followed deaths in Syria would cause by the dramatic crash of less alarm among Russia’s a Defense Ministry plane overall population.28 Polls on transporting Russian domestic attitudes towards musicians and journalists the military operation in Syria to Hmeymim airbase on have not changed much over Christmas Day. In addition, the past year, with support a Russian MiG-29 jet still hovering at around 50 fighter crashed into the 26 “Levada Center survey” 28 In early December, Russian TV (October 23-25, 2015) (“In your station “Dozhd” published a vid- opinion, is it possible that Russian eo purportedly showing Chechen military involvement in the Syr- troops preparing for deployment to ian conflict could escalate into a Syria. “Chechenskih kontraktnikov “New Afghanistan” for Russia?), otpravili v Siriiu”, Dozhd (December available at: http://www.levada.ru/ 7, 2016), available at: https://tvrain. en/2015/11/06/russian-participa- ru/news/chechnya-422827/?utm_ tion-in-the-syrian-military-conflict/. campaign=breaking&utm_source=- 27 “Spisok pogibshih rossi- push&utm_medium=422827&utm_ ian s nachala kampanii VKS v term=2016-12-07. See also Pavel Sirii”, RBC (December 5, 2016), Felgenhauer, “Chechen Special Bat- available at: http://www.rbc.ru/ talions Sent to Syria as Reinforce- politics/05/12/2016/58457c589a- ments”, The Jamestown Foundation 79473fa152c4a2?from=newsfeed. (December 8, 2016). RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR percent.29 While approval foreign fighters. A driving ratings for President Putin concern, so the argument, is spiked after Russia’s military that the collapse of Syrian moves on Crimea and have state order could facilitate a remained stable since,30 it terrorist “spillover” beyond thus seems questionable the country’s borders. Such whether these are supported a scenario would pose a real specifically by the Syria security threat to the Russian campaign. Going forward, Federation itself if extremists popular mobilization over move to the North Caucasus, Russia’s war in Syria will most other Russian regions or likely remain limited and the Central Asia. Sergey Lavrov Kremlin is well aware of these warned as early as March constraints. 2011 that “the more the Middle East gets unstable, Preempting Spillover from the higher the risk of people Collapsing State Order: with malicious purposes Is Russia’s Campaign causing us trouble.”31 And two ‘Counterterrorist’? weeks before the Russian military commenced airstrikes Since September 2015, in Syria in September 2015, Russian media and officials President Putin argued at the have claimed that a key aim of CSTO meeting in Dushanbe Moscow’s military campaign that “militants undergoing in Syria has been to destroy ideological indoctrination and military training by ISIS 29 “Siriiiskii Konflikt”, Levada Center Poll (October 31, 2016), come from many nations available at: http://www.levada. around the world, including,… ru/2016/10/31/sirijskij-konflikt/. the Russian Federation, 30 “Dve treti rossiian zahote- and many former Soviet li ostavit’ Putina prezidentom”, Kommersant (November 16, 2016), 31 “Sergey Lavrov in an interview available at: https://lenta.ru/ to Ekho Moskvy” (March 2011), avail- news/2016/11/16/ostavaysya_s_ able at: https://www.rt.com/politics/ nami/; Kolesnikov (2016). russia-arab-unrest-caucasus/.

Page 15 POLICY PAPER republics. And, of course, we Russian soil, or forming and are concerned by their possible supporting regional extremist return to our territories.”32 organizations, is routinely brought up by Russian officials According to the latest and the media. Moscow has official numbers, 3200 indeed been worried about the Russian citizens have joined security situation, especially a terrorist formation in Syria in Dagestan and Kabardino- or Iraq.33 An additional 2000 Balkaria, where people to 3000 people from Central pledging allegiance to ISIL Asia have been estimated have claimed responsibility amongst the ranks of various for a number of strikes, more groups in the Syrian jihad.34 recently also in Moscow and The possibility of foreign Nizhny Novgorod.35 The fighters returning and Federal Security Service conducting terrorist attacks on (FSB) has reportedly thwarted a number of ISIL-inspired 32 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at CSTO attacks over the past months, Collective Security Council session both in Moscow and St. in Dushanbe” (September 15, 2015), available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ Petersburg, but also outside 36 president/news/50291. large urban centers. In 33 “Bolee 3,2 tysiachi rossiian 35 “Islamskoe gosudarstvo vzialo v’ehali v Siriiu i Irak, chtoby voevat’ na sebia otvetstvennost’ za napad- za boevikov”, Ria Novosti (November enie v Nizhnem Novgorode”, Kom- 21, 2016), available at: https://ria. mersant (October 26, 2016), avail- ru/incidents/20161121/1481772465. able at: http://www.kommersant.ru/ html. doc/3126516. 34 See, for instance: The Soufan 36 “V FSB zaiavili o predotvrash- Group, “Foreign Fighters: An Updat- henii teraktov v Ingushetii i Moskve”, ed Assessment of the Flow of For- Kavkaz Uzel (November 15, 2016), eign Fighters into Syria and Iraq” (De- available at: http://www.kavkaz-uzel. cember 2015); Noah Tucker, “Central eu/articles/292654/?utm_ Asian Involvement in the Conflict in source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twit- Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Respons- ter; “Rossiiskie specsluzhby v 2016 es”, Report prepared for USAID (May godu predotvratili 42 terakta”, 2015). Ria Novosti (December 13, 2016), RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR light of the perceived threat, years, Russia has continuously military and counterterrorism pledged help to Tajikistan’s exercises remain a frequent military to counter terrorism, occurrence in the North for instance, by reinforcing Caucasus, especially Dagestan. Dushanbe’s military base with armored personnel carriers The Kremlin’s worries about and battle tanks.39 Only in the nexus between the Syrian early January, Moscow’s war and domestic-oriented Ambassador to Dushanbe radical Islamism extend suggested that Russia was beyond the North Caucasus. It seeking to further expand has also long been concerned its military presence in about an ISIL infiltration Tajikistan by renting the Ayni across the Afghan-Tajik border.37 A recent trilateral id/2581141?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_ meeting between Russia, D2wHaWMCU6Od&_101_IN- STANCE_D2wHaWMCU6Od_lan- Pakistan and China was guageId=en_GB#11 partially intended to address these apprehensions.38 In past 39 Some Western experts on Central Asia have criticized Moscow available at: https://ria.ru/inci- for using the ISIL threat narrative in dents/20161213/1483445190.html. Central Asia to increase its leverage over the republics and justify why 37 For a recent statement, see they need to militarily and politi- Zamir Kabulov, Russia’s special rep- cally work closely with Russia, for resentative for Afghanistan: ‘Zamir instance: Noah Tucker, “Islamic State Kabulov: Situaciia v Afganistane na- messaging to Central Asians Migrant kaliaet obstanovku v Tadzhikistane’, Workers in Russia”, CERIA Brief, news.tj (September 13, 2016), avail- No. 6 (March 2015). More recently, able at: http://news.tj/ru/news/ta- US military figures have criticized jikistan/security/20160913/230788. Russia for using its allegedly acute 38 “Briefing by Foreign Ministry concern over ISIL’s Khorasan Prov- Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, ince as a pretext for lending legiti- Moscow” (December 27, 2016), macy to the Taliban and undermine available at: http://www.mid.ru/ NATO policy towards Afghanistan, ru/press_service/spokesman/ see: Ahmed Rashid, “Moscow moves briefings/-/asset_publisher/ into the Afghanistan vacuum”, The D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/ Exchange (January 13, 2017).

Page 17 POLICY PAPER airbase.40 Warnings about communities are difficult ISIL’s intention to build and to study empirically, but consolidate its “Khorasan there is evidence that people Province”, which includes are approached on work Central Asia, have been voiced sites, in gyms and unofficial not only by the Russian mosques, which are often leadership, but also other attended by migrants. In regional heads, for instance Moscow, for instance, even Kyrgyzstan’s Almazbek the much celebrated opening Atambaev.41 of the Cathedral Mosque in September 2015 was unlikely Then, there is the daunting to mitigate the shortage of challenge of managing a official places for worship. big Central Asian migrant Without local imams who population at home, in speak their native language Russia’s industrial cities, such to turn to for guidance, many as Moscow, Vladivostok or migrants participate in online Tyumen. Most Central Asians devotional communities, are radicalized and lured into where they often end up the Syrian jihad while working being targeted by extremist in Russia, rather than in their recruiters. home countries.42 Recruitment processes amongst these Yet, as important as it is to acknowledge these various 40 “Russia Announces Intent to Establish Air Base in Tajikistan”, security concerns, fears of Eurasianet (January 2, 2017), an “Islamist spillover” have available at: http://www.eurasianet. never been the primary org/node/81826?utm_source=dlvr. driver of Moscow’s strategy it&utm_medium=twitter. in the Syrian war. While it is 41 “Ne grozi iuzhnomu frontu: Kak conceivable that the Russian Rossiia namerena borot’sia s IG es- military, following the recent hhe i v Srednei Azii”, Lenta (October 20, 2015), available at: https://lenta. fall of Aleppo, might step ru/articles/2015/10/20/khorasan/. up anti-ISIL airstrikes in Syria to some extent, its 42 Tucker (2015). RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR core objective remains the have been able to leave for preservation of the Assad Syria in high numbers and regime.43 For one, its military largely unhindered since campaign has arguably the beginning of the 2011 heightened the terrorist threat uprising, especially until the to Russia. While a group of 2014 Sochi Olympics, because Saudi Wahhabi clerics called authorities hoped to export for jihad against Russia the domestic jihad.45 Yet, following the deployment Russia did not see the need for of its troops to Syria, ISIL “counterterrorism” airstrikes released a Russian-language until September 2015. And video shortly thereafter, then, it did not even primarily warning that Russian “blood target ISIL on the ground. will spill like an ocean”.44 But Instead, Moscow’s decision more importantly, extremists to escalate its involvement from the North Caucasus in Syria was prompted by the successes in early 2015 43 In late December, Russian jets 45 “The North Caucasus Insurgen- reportedly for the first time provid- cy and Syria: An Exported Jihad?”, ed air support for Turkey’s “Shield International Crisis Group (March of Euphrates” operation, bombing 2016). The report shows that, up un- the city of Al-Bab, one of ISIL’s til the Sochi Olympics in early 2014, remaining strongholds in Syria. With Russian officials did little to prevent Palmyra having recently fallen back radicalized Islamists from leaving under ISIL control, some analysts for Syria. Instead, the overarching also expect Russia to step up its concern at that time was to keep the efforts there. North Caucasus secure for the Sochi 44 “Saudi opposition clerics make Games. The FSB only became wor- sectarian call to jihad in Syria”, Re- ried about the outflow (and possible uters (October 5, 2015), available return) of extremists from mid- at: http://www.reuters.com/arti- 2014, tightening border and airport cle/us-mideast-crisis-saudi-cler- controls. Elena Milashina, “Halifat? ics-idUSKCN0RZ1IW20151005; “ISIS Primanka dlia durakov!”, Novaya threatens Russia in new video”, CNN Gazeta (July 29, 2015), available at: (November 12, 2015), available at: https://www.novayagazeta.ru/arti- http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/12/ cles/2015/07/29/65056-171-hali- middleeast/isis-russia-threat/. fat-primanka-dlya-durakov-187.

Page 19 POLICY PAPER of those armed opposition Sunni Muslim community has groups, which threatened been mostly loyal to the state Russia’s core objective of when it comes to the Syria Syrian regime survival. While campaign, rather than taking Russian officials have certainly any action or protesting in tended to classify any armed significant numbers.47 That opposition as “terrorist”, they being said, Russian experts on have also argued that the Islam and the North Caucasus foreign fighter threat directed monitor the situation closely, at the Russian Federation warning that the current calm itself emanates mostly from could give way to another ISIL and Al-Qaeda affiliated explosion of radical activity, groups. Unlike saving the with Russian actions in Syria Assad regime, fighting ISIL serving not as the exclusive, to preempt a “spillover” has but as an additional igniting never been Russia’s main factor.48 Some, for instance, objective in Syria, but saying have interpreted the recent so has resonated well with the attacks on security forces in domestic audience. Chechnya’s capital Grozny, which left eleven militants Further, ISIL’s influence on dead, as a reaction of a Russia’s umma has been more part of Chechen society to limited than official rhetoric Russian military support for suggests, with returning Damascus.49 foreign fighters behaving largely passively and regional kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/275548/. extremist organizations, such 47 Alexei Malashenko, “Voina v as the Caucasus Emirate, Sirii glazami rossiiskih musul’man”, remaining essentially Carnegie Moscow Center (June 23, 2016). disbanded.46 Russia’s large 48 Alexei Malashenko, “Preserving the Calm in Russia’s Muslim Com- 46 “Eksperty sviazali zaiavlenie munity”, Carnegie Moscow Center Shebzuhova s oslableniem ‘Imarata (September 9, 2016). Kavkaz’”, Caucasian Uzel (January 6, 2016), available at: http://www. 49 Elena Milashina, “Napadenie RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR

RUSSIA AND in the region. Russia’s armed GEOPOLITICS: FROM forces have launched attacks HOPES OF COMPELLING on targets in Syria from the US COOPERATION TO Caspian Sea, submarines, the Iranian Hamadan REGIONAL REALPOLITIK base, its Black Sea Fleet Moscow’s Syria Policy: The and most recently its only Message to Washington aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. Substantial Leaving aside Russia’s military hardware has been state order concerns which, deployed to Syria, including as argued, have been the S-400 and S-300, an underpinned by historical oscillating number of fighter experience and reflected aircraft, tanks, submarines, fears of color revolutions in destroyers and surveillance 50 post-Soviet countries (and and reconnaissance aircraft. of Islamist spillover from the After it was passed by the Middle East to a lesser extent), State Duma, President there are also Moscow’s Putin signed a federal law more sober geopolitical confirming Russia’s indefinite interests at stake in Syria. deployment of forces at Its alliance with the Assad 50 For a detailed overview of regime represents the core Russia’s military deployment to of its post-Soviet presence in Syria until mid-2016, see: “The the Middle East and Russia’s Syrian Frontier” (available only in actions in recent months have Russian), Centre for Analysis of betrayed its desire to expand Strategies and Technologies (2016), available at: http://cast.ru/upload/ power-projection capabilities iblock/686/6864bf9d4485b9cd- 83cc3614575e646a.pdf. Following na Groznyi. Chto eto bylo?”, Novaya the latest Russia-Turkey negotiated Gazeta (December 20, 2016), avai- ceasefire in Syria, Moscow an- lable at: https://www.novayagazeta. nounced in early January 2017 its ru/articles/2016/12/20/70958- intent to withdraw its aircraft carrier napadenie-na-groznyy-chto-eto- from Syria and scale down its mili- -bylo?utm_source=push. tary presence.

Page 21 POLICY PAPER

Hmeymim airbase and has never been in its interest. authorized investments in its The idea that Russia would use modernization, as well as that airstrikes in Syria towards that of the Tartus port. end might sound outlandish to Western observers, but it Russia’s desire to project was frequently articulated hard power in Syria must be within the Moscow expert understood in the context of community at the time. its evolving relationship with Whether the Kremlin hoped the United States. While its for more concrete benefits – initial military escalation was a settlement of the Ukraine undoubtedly prompted by crisis on terms acceptable the perceived need to prop to Russia, or the lifting of up an Assad regime losing sanctions – is a matter of significant territory by mid- speculation. But Moscow’s 2015, an additional motivation relentless demands for was likely to change facts on cooperation with Washington the ground in Syria in a way on Syria have shown just that would force the US to re- how valuable the perception engage Russia more actively of an equal partnership in diplomacy. The Russian remains to the Kremlin. While government, it appears, Russian expectations for any believed the Syrian crisis joint action on Syria have could be instrumentalized to ebbed during the recent US create conditions for a “thaw” presidential transition, with in relations between Russia President Obama considered and the West, following the as a “lame duck” on Syria and severe fallout over Crimea and amidst more bilateral tension the war in Eastern Ukraine. following the fall of Aleppo Moscow defined this in itself as and the US’ decision to expel a desirable objective – despite Russian diplomats, there is its often anti-Western rhetoric modest hope for cooperation discussed above – because a with the incoming Trump sustained crisis with the West administration. RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR

Moscow’s Growing Regional while also cementing regional Clout: Increasingly an End in access by conducting joint Itself? military drills with select players. At the same time, Its growing military Russia’s Foreign Ministry has involvement in Syria has renewed modest attempts to created opportunities for re-start an Israeli-Palestinian Moscow to build more robust peace process and signalled its commercial and diplomatic interest in playing a mediating relationships with other role in the Libyan crisis.52 The Middle Eastern players, at a time when its gambit of com/article/us-russia-iran-arms- idUSKBN1390UM; “Russia-Turkey forcing Washington into Commission to Discuss S-400 Air cooperation appeared to Defense Systems Deliveries Soon”, not be paying off. Since Sputnik (November 19, 2016), avail- September 2015, Russia’s able at: https://sputniknews.com/ military-industrial complex military/201611191047614849-rus- sia-turkey-s-400/; “Livanskii has led discussions on ministr rasskazal o krupnom proekte weapons deals with actors postavok vooruzhenii iz Rossii”, Ria including Algeria, Iran, Novosti (January 7, 2017), available Bahrain, Turkey and Lebanon,51 at: https://ria.ru/defense_safe- ty/20170107/1485232040.html. 51 “Algeria Increases Order of 52 General Khalifa Haftar, the Russian-made Mi-28 Helos to 42”, commander of Libya’s armed forces DefenseNews (April 7, 2016), avail- loyal to the country’s Tobruk-based able at: http://www.defensenews. government, visited Moscow sev- com/story/defense/2016/04/07/ eral times last year for high-level algeria-increases-order-rus- consultations. At the end of De- sian-made-mi-28-helicop- cember, Russian Deputy Foreign ters-42/82747976/; “Rossiia s Minister Gatilov said in an interview “Triumfom” zahodit v Bahrein”, Kom- with Tass that Haftar should be- mersant (September 9, 2016), avail- come part of Libya’s leadership and able at: http://www.kommersant. that the UN remains ineffective in ru/doc/3083667 ; “Russia and Iran diffusing the Libyan crisis. Libyan in talks over $10 billion arms deal: national unity government Depu- RIA”, Reuters (November 14, 2016), ty Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq available at: http://www.reuters. went on to state on January 4 that

Page 23 POLICY PAPER cumulative effect of this string of Moscow “upping the ante” of Russian initiatives, some in the region. As Russian- more serious than others, has US relations were sliding been an emerging perception towards yet another low point, any possible initiatives by Russia following both sides’ last-ditch to arrange the political dialogue in effort to preserve a Syrian the country would be welcomed. ceasfire in September 2016, And following its withdrawal from Moscow’s investment in the Syria on January 5, Russia’s Ad- Syrian frontier and shrewd miral Kuznetsov arrived in Libyan territorial waters on January 10 cultivation of ties with pivotal for joint drills with Haftar’s forces, players (especially Turkey) had while Russia’s Chief of General Staff by then put the Kremlin in a reportedly travelled to Tobruk for a position from which it has been meeting with Haftar. “Gatilov: RF bez increasingly able to dictate entuziazma otnositsia k idee sniatiia oruzheinogo embargo s Livii”, Tass the terms of Syria diplomacy. (December 27, 2016), available at: While its initial military http://tass.ru/politika/3909283; escalation was partially about “Libya Ready To Welcome Russia’s forcing Washington into a Initiatives For Political Dialogue”, lukewarm friendship, that Sputnik (January 4, 2017), avail- able at: https://sputniknews.com/ goal has for now receded into politics/201701041049260071-lib- the background, due to both ya-russia-political-dialogue/; persistent disappointments “Russian warships doing military with the US and a self- drills in the Libyan water coordi- awareness of Russia’s growing nated with Haftar’s forces”, Libyan Express (January 10, 2017), avail- clout in the Middle East. Unlike able at: http://www.libyanexpress. protecting the Assad regime com/russian-warships-doing-mili- and preserving Syrian state tary-drills-in-the-libyan-water-co- order, gaining such clout was ordinated-with-haftars-forces/; not initially a key driver of “Russian Chief of General Staff arrives in Tobruk to meet Khalifa Russia’s Syria strategy. But it Haftar”, Libyan Express (January has become one over time, as 11, 2017), available at: http://www. the Syrian war turned into a libyanexpress.com/russian-chief-of- derivative of the broader US- general-staff-arrives-in-tobruk-to- Russian confrontation. meet-khalifa-haftar/. RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR

Russia and Iran: A Marriage of far more vital to the self- Convenience in Syria perceived Iranian “besieged fortress”, than it has been to An important element of this Moscow. broader regional resurgence has been Russia’s evolving Russian-Iranian cooperation relationship with Iran. Prior on Syria has certainly been to the outbreak of the Syrian extensive, with Tehran crisis, Russian-Iranian even temporarily allowing relations had been souring for the Russian military to fly a number of years, for instance airstrikes from its Hamadan because President Medvedev base last summer. However, had supported UN sanctions lingering mutual mistrust against Iran in 2010 and and diverging goals in signed a ban on the Russian Syria have consistently delivery of the S-300 missile presented obstacles towards defense system to Tehran. the development of a full- Following the outbreak of the fledged alliance. Moscow Syrian crisis in 2011, Russia has never wanted Tehran to and Iran cooperated towards develop a nuclear weapons saving the Assad regime, capability and has been ready though for different reasons. to take actions in the past to While Moscow has been thwart any such ambitions. concerned with defending the Differences in style between principle of state order and both actors played out regime inviolability in Syria, starkly during Russia’s usage Iran’s support for Damascus of Hamadan, which ended has been driven by its desire rather abruptly with Iran’s to retain its regional influence Defense Ministry criticizing and access to its chain of Russia for publicizing the defense comprising Lebanon, raids and displaying a “show- Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Making off” attitude.53 Further, Iran sure the ruling Assad dynasty stays in power has been 53 “Iran Says Russia’s Use of Air Base Has Ended For Now”, Gandha-

Page 25 POLICY PAPER has been more comfortable latest stark reminder of the deploying proxies in the two sides’ diverging priorities Syrian war, an approach in Syria.55 that does not gel so neatly with the Russian modus From Moscow’s perspective, operandi. Since grievances beyond Syria, there are over state collapse in Libya additional reasons why the and Iraq feature prominently Russian-Iranian relationship in the Kremlin’s thinking, it is best characterized as a wants to avoid a situation in “marriage of covenience”, Syria where non-state actors rather than a full-fledged dominate on the ground.54 alliance.56 First, while having Finally, following the latest been greatly at odds with Russia-Turkey brokered Syria- the Arab Gulf states in its wide ceasefire, Iranian-backed approach to the Syrian offensives in the Wadi Barada crisis, Moscow has still been region near Damascus, though 55 Since the Russia-Turkey not officially criticized by brokered ceasefire was announced Moscow, have served as the on December 29, pro-Assad forces have continued their offensive on ra Radio Free Europe/Radio Liber- Wadi Barada, reportedly backed by ty (August 22, 2016), available at: Hezbollah and Iranian headquarters, http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/iran-rus- arguing that Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham sia-syria-air-base/27938420.html. fighters (excluded from the truce) are present in the area. While Turkey 54 Hanna Notte, “New ‘Axis of has warned that the offensive will Resistance’? – Why Russia Avoids derail plans for upcoming political Full Identification with the Syri- talks between the Assad regime and an-Iranian Alliance”, Russian Inter- the opposition in Astana, Kazakh- national Affairs Council (December stan, Russia has remained relatively 15, 2016). That being said, there silent on the issue. is some evidence that Russia has developed a pragmatic relationship 56 Clement Therme, “The with Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict, Iran-Russia Entente: Marriage of see Alexander Corbeil, “Russia Is Convenience or Strategic Partner- Learning About Hezbollah”, Carnegie ship?”, in: Paolo Magri and Annalisa Endowment For International Peace Perteghella (eds.): Iran After The (January 11, 2017). Deal: The Road Ahead, ISPI (2015). RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR keen to foster diplomatic the GCC, continuing its multi- and commercial relations vector diplomacy of forging with the GCC members and relations with actors across has been clearly reluctant the Middle East that has been to be perceived as sitting so characteristic of Russian too firmly within an Iranian foreign policy towards the pro-Shia camp. Admittedly, region since the early 2000s. following the announcement And Russia’s pragmatism of the latest Syria ceasefire pays off: Qatar’s sovereign on December 29, Sergey investment fund only recently Lavrov suggested that Saudi announced its intent to pay 5 Arabia and Qatar would not billion USD in hard cash for a be invited to the first round stake in Rosneft, heralding one of Syria talks in Astana,57 in of the largest deals Russia has what was yet another sign ever struck with a GCC state.59 that Russia is forging a new coalition comprising Iran, Second, while pursuing its Turkey and Egypt, one that strategic goals in Syria, Russia is able to impose the terms wants to avoid the risk of of Syria diplomacy not only seriously alienating Israel, on the US, but also on the let alone associate with the Arab Gulf states.58 But that militant anti-Israel rhetoric being said, Moscow remains characteristic of the Iranian interested in dialogue with leadership. Russian-Israeli relations have evolved under 57 “Lavrov says Egypt could join Putin’s presidency, lingering Syria talks in Astana”, TASS (Decem- ber 29, 2016), available at: http:// frictions over Moscow’s tass.com/politics/923242. cooperation with Iran and Syria and engagement of 58 Emile Hokayem, “How Syria Defeated the Sunni Powers”, The 59 “Glencore and Qatar take 19.5% New York Times (December 30, stake in Rosneft”, Financial Times 2016), available at: https://www. (December 10, 2016), available nytimes.com/2016/12/30/opinion/ at: https://www.ft.com/content/ how-syria-defeated-the-sunni-pow- d3923b08-bf09-11e6-9bca- ers.html. 2b93a6856354.

Page 27 POLICY PAPER

Hamas notwithstanding. Since Russia lost its superpower the start of Russian airstrikes status at the end of the Cold in Syria, Russia and Israel have War, successive Russian elites been careful to coordinate refused to accept that their their military activities along country had therefore become the Syrian-Israeli border in a lesser power. order to prevent accidents. Differing views on the legal In escalating its role in the status of the Caspian Sea, Syrian war in a carefully as well as the relatively calibrated way, Russia has modest level of economic forced the US and other cooperation, remain additional players to accept it as an impediments towards a indispensable mediator of the more robust Russian-Iranian conflict, and as a force to be alliance. reckoned with in the wider region. The Russian play has Russia and the Quest for clearly served its quest for Great Power Status status recognition, especially since it has allowed the The Russian desire to play Kremlin to showcase Russia’s a key role in mediating latest military prowess and the Syrian war on equal thus win new clients. If one terms with Washington has adds Russia’s grandstanding highlighted a final driver of rhetoric about “carrying the its strategy: the importance torch in the fight against it attaches to international international terrorism” to “status”. While even Realists the picture, it seems clear admit that all states care that Russia’s involvement about status (Robert Gilpin in Syria has betrayed the once called prestige the desire to project a certain “everyday currency of image, domestically and international politics”), post- internationally. Few episodes Soviet Russia seems to do so illustrated this as vividly disproportionately. Though as the Kremlin’s staging RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR of a triumphal concert in sarcasm has missed the Palmyra earlier this year, after point that even Russia’s Russian-backed forces had undermodernized military recaptured the site from ISIL. has brought to bear enough As one prominent Russian airpower to break the rebellion commentator put it, the Middle in Aleppo, catapulting East has become an arena Russia into the position of “to showcase that the period chief mediator in the Syrian of Russia’s absence from the crisis. Even those mocking international scene as a first- Russia have to admit it has rate state has ended.”60 gained international status through its involvement Over recent months, Western in Syria – status not commentators and the Twitter necessarily as what the community have often been ‘West’ would characterize as quick to ridicule Russian a responsible actor assuming calamities in Syria, belittling a constructive role, but as a its “ageing rust bucket of an shrewd player deploying hard aircraft carrier” deployed power consistently, largely towards the Mediterranean, or competently, its eyes always calling the crash of a Russian on the prize. Su-33 jet attempting to land on the Admiral Kuznetsov “embarrassing”.61 But such

60 Fyodor Lukyanov, quoted in: Yaroslav Trofimov, ‘Russia’s Long at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ Road To The Middle East’, The news/2016/10/25/vladimir-putins- Wall Street Journal (May 27, 2016), aggression-means-we-must-speed- available at: http://www.wsj.com/ up-the-rebuilding/; “Embarrassing: articles/russias-long-road-to-the- Second Russian warplane crashes middle-east-1464361067. into Mediterranean off aircraft car- 61 “Don’t laugh at Vladimir Putin’s rier”, Express (December 5, 2016), rusty navy – at least the Russians available at: http://www.express. have an aircraft carrier”, The Tele- co.uk/news/world/739906/Rus- graph (October 25, 2016), available sia-warplane-crash-Mediterranean.

Page 29 POLICY PAPER

ADDENDUM: WHO MAKES Orthodox Church have RUSSIA’S SYRIA POLICY? represented important lobbies influencing Russia’s Middle Embedding Russia’s Syria East policy, and while the policy in a broader context, historically pro-Arab leaning assessing it through the Foreign Ministry arguably prisms of Russia’s perspective plays its role in executing on the post-‘Arab Spring’ diplomacy, it has become Middle East, its historical consensus among Russia experience in the Chechen analysts in recent years that Wars, its fears about so- foreign policy decisions are called ‘color revolutions’ in the final instance taken and its relationship with by a small circle, including the West, this article has the President and his key argued that it is possible to advisors.62 identify Russia’s fundamental interests in the Syria war, While the decisive which have remained largely deliberations occur within consistent over the past six Putin’s inner circle, the years and driven policy. That President’s willingness to being said, getting behind heed the advice of different the who and how of concrete lobbies seems to oscillate over Russian actions is much more time. For instance, following challenging. Transparency the failed September 2016 into final decision-making ceasefire, which Russia had processes on foreign policy, while constrained in any 62 Nikolas Gvosdev and Christo- political system, is especially pher Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy: limited in the Russian Interests, Vectors, and Sectors (2014); Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Federation. Even though a Foreign Policy: The Return to Great number of domestic actors, Power Politics (2009); Fiona Hill, most notably the military- “Putin: The one-man show the West industrial complex, the oil doesn’t understand”, in: Bulletin of industry and the Russian the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 3 (2016). RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR brokered with the US, the quickly forge a ceasefire position of Russia’s Defense and jump-start renewed Ministry appeared to have political talks. It might also be been elevated within the no coincidence that, on the power circle, driven both by same day the ceasefire was the perceived success of the announced, Deputy Defense military campaign and by the Minister Anatolii Antonov failure of diplomacy. Russia’s – who has great diplomatic subsequent support for the experience negotiating Assad regime’s operation to with the US government retake Aleppo from the armed – was re-appointed to the opposition was a natural Foreign Ministry, where he result of that shift. But the will “coordinate military and Russian military’s ability to political security issues”.63 At impose its preferences is not the end of the day, Moscow cast in stone. At other times, needs a political solution diplomatic considerations (on its terms) towards the have been prioritized over the Syrian crisis, in order to military-industrial complex’ extricate itself from the war, interests, for instance when claim the status of successful the Russian government “peacemaker” and drive its banned the S-300 sale to Iran policy of preserving Syrian in the summer of 2010, in state order to its full what was partially a gesture conclusion. of goodwill to the United States. Instead, events in CONCLUSION recent weeks suggest that Considering the key drivers diplomatic and military of Russia’s Syria policy, what concerns remain carefully informed guesses can be made calibrated in Russia’s Syria strategy and that no single 63 “Takoi chelovek polezen dlia lobby enjoys the President’s MID”, Gazeta (December 29, 2016), attention. Following Aleppo’s available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/ fall, Russia was eager to politics/2016/12/29_a_10456451. shtml.

Page 31 POLICY PAPER about developments in 2017 the time being. While Russia’s and what are the important military has played a key role questions analysts should in putting Moscow into this be asking going forward? To position of relative strength, this insecure Russian regime, ultimately, Russia needs a which increasingly sees itself political process. Increasingly as a “besieged fortress” that at liberty to dictate its terms, has been denied its deserved Moscow will still show some status by the United States, measure of flexibility in order the protection of Syrian state to give diplomacy a chance. order will remain the central The list of groups Moscow concern. If one reflects on the included in the latest ceasefire range of actions Russia has featured both Ahrar Al- taken throughout the Syrian Sham and Jaysh Al-Islam – war – from working with previously labelled “terrorist”, the US on Syrian chemical now counted among the weapons demilitarization, to “moderates” – in a sign that launching airstrikes in Syria, the Kremlin saw merit in to recently getting Turkey adjusting its position as a to acquiesce to Russia’s gesture to Turkey.64 Further, approach via exploiting its Russia’s pro-regime agenda weaknesses – Moscow has will remain calibrated to been diplomatically savvy and pursue limited goals. While militarily shrewd in pursuit it is vital that Assad does not of its goal. There is nothing succumb to external pressure, to suggest that Russian Moscow is not committed ingenuity has reached its to enable him to retake all limits. of Syria’s territory. Instead,

64 “List of armed formations, which Forging a new alliance with joined the ceasefire in the Syrian Arab Turkey, Iran, and to some Republic on December 30, 2016”, extent Egypt, Russia has Ministry of Defense of the Russian successfully marginalized the Federation, available at: http://eng. US in the Syrian conflict for mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more. htm?id=12107227@egNews. RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE SYRIAN WAR it has wanted Assad to be whenever it sees them as just about flexible enough conducive towards its goals.65 for a diplomatic process to remain alive. As long as there I have argued that we might is a political track, Russia will well be entering a period in be central to it and Russia which the Middle East ceases will be talked about. This to serve as a bargaining chip is indispensable to Russia in Russia’s relationship with reclaiming status in the Middle the US, but is acquiring a East and the international qualitatively new level of community more broadly. strategic significance in itself for Moscow. Yet, whether With these considerations in Russia has an independent mind, it is also conceivable “vision” for a regional security that the Kremlin will be ready order, one that has more to to seek closer cooperation it than mere anti-Western on Syria with the incoming revisionism, remains doubtful. Trump administration. Yet, In his appearance at the that it will not cede initiative latest Valdai Club meeting or escalation dominance in October, President Putin to the US government has called for a “kind of Marshall been made clear over recent Plan” for the Middle East as months, when Russia pushed an “effort in which Russia is ahead in enabling Assad to 65 “Foreign Policy Concept of retake Aleppo, rather than the Russian Federation (approved sitting out the US presidential by President of the Russian Fed- transition and waiting for eration Vladimir Putin on Novem- Donald Trump’s arrival at the ber 30, 2016)”, Ministry of Foreign White House. Instead, as laid Affairs of the Russian Federation, available at: http://www.mid.ru/ out in its latest foreign policy foreign_policy/news/-/asset_pub- strategy published at the lisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/ end of last year, Moscow will id/2542248?p_p_id=101_IN- continue to forge ad hoc intra- STANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_IN- and cross-regional alliances STANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_lan- guageId=en_GB.

Page 33 POLICY PAPER certainly willing to join.”66 And force, rather than the appeal representatives of Moscow’s of its soft power. Others will expert community harbor instead admire Russia for hopes that Russia could one appearing to resist American day play a mediating role influence, representing between the GCC and Iran. conservative values and Whether such intentions protecting Christian minorities are sheer hubris or actually in the region. The history of realistic possibilities depends whether Russia’s image will on a number of factors that benefit or suffer from its role will take some time to play in the Syrian war, and how out: the extent of regional its broader posture in the players’ readiness for Russia Middle East will be affected, to fill the vacuum left by is therefore one that still has recent US retrenchment, to be written. What seems President Trump’s policies certain, for now, is that towards the Middle East, as Moscow’s Syria policy will well as the trajectory of social remain firmly in pursuit of and economic stability in the protecting what is Russia’s Russian Federation itself. understanding of state order At this point, some Middle in the Middle East and beyond. Eastern interlocutors will say that greater respect for Russia in the region is sustained by Hanna Notte angst not admiration, by its Hanna Notte is PhD candidate readiness to deploy brute in International Relations at 66 “Vladimir Putin Meets With the University of Oxford. She Members of the Valdai Discussion has been a visiting researcher Club. Transcript of the Plenary both at IISS Middle East in Session of the 13th Annual Meeting” Manama and the Carnegie (October 27, 2016), available at: Moscow Center. She has http://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/ articles/vladimir-putin-took-part- published widely on Russia’s in-the-valdai-discussion-club-s- role in the Middle East. plenary-session/.