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Introduction from Sergey Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of The RUSSIA he forthcoming visit of British for the benefit of the two countries and that Prime Minister David Cameron of the rest of the world. to Moscow this autumn is a The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the good opportunity to review Foreign Office are following the guidelines theT current state of our political dialogue set by the two leaders. The dialogue aimed and areas of practical cooperation. We at achieving common goals is held at value multidimensional interaction between various levels. We have exchanged quite Russia and Great Britain in the UN Security productive visits with Secretary Hague, and Council, G8, G20 and other multilateral our respective departments and experts have fora. This interaction is indispensable for developed useful working contacts. international stability, including Euro- An important component of our bilateral Atlantic region where the need for an open relationship is the interparliamentary cooperative architecture of indivisible dialogue which became livelier. The Russian security without dividing lines becomes more Federal Assembly and the British Parliament and more obvious. are in touch with each other on a range of Within the context of an evolving, issues in different formats. Apart from the multipolar, more democratic and fair world interaction in the multilateral bodies, such as system, based on the rule of international law, Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Introduction from we cannot afford to be guided by politicised Europe and OSCE, there are regular bilateral and stereotyped approaches inherited from a meetings, including between the relevant Sergey Lavrov, different era. parliamentary committees. The Chairman of Minister for Foreign The visit of Prime Minister Cameron the upper Chamber of the Russian parliament comes at an opportune time. More and more visited Great Britain last March, and further Affairs of the people, including politicians, understand parliamentary exchanges between London that ideological obsessions must give way and Moscow are being planned. Russian Federation to pragmatism and the search for balance of The cooperation between various interests, both internationally and in bilateral departments of the two governments relations of states, in spite of the fact that further enriches the fabric of the bilateral governments might differ on certain matters. agenda. The Ministries of Education work Key national interests of Russia and Britain hard on an intergovernmental agreement are not contradictory. This is why we believe on adoption. The Federal Drug Control that the Moscow summit will provide further Service of Russia and the Britain’s SOCA impetus to the mutual efforts to take our have conducted several joint operations relationship to a new level. against drug trafficking. The interaction This expectation is based on the results we between Ministries of Justice is also evolving managed to achieve lately in restoring the in a constructive fashion. Those are just a atmosphere of mutual trust and respect. few examples. We are witnessing a dynamic development Most importantly, our relations have a firm of political dialogue based upon willingness and solid economic foundation. In fact, trade to listen to and hear each other that underlie and economic cooperation between Russia the relations between President Medvedev and the UK has been progressing over many and Prime Minister Cameron. During their years irrespective of political currents and meetings in the margins of G8 and G20 differences in some other areas. Our bilateral Summits in Canada, Republic of Korea and trade in the first half of the year more than France they could understand each other doubled and almost caught up with the level perfectly well and agreed to work together preceding the global recession. The UK is 6 to strengthen the Russo-British relationship also one our top investment partners. FIRST Prime Minister Cameron will bring with that deserve special attention and support. him to Moscow an impressive group of Britain’s Those are energy and energy efficiency, The key national business leaders. Many of them already have financial services, including plans for the entered the Russian market or intend to do so Moscow Financial Centre, high-tech and interests of to take advantage of its huge demand, as well as nanotechnologies, small and medium human and natural resources. businesses, overall business environment Russia and There are plenty of opportunities. Russia and Olympic legacy. is working hard on diversifying its economy, When speaking about our ties, I cannot Britain are not introducing innovative approaches to growth help mentioning that Russian culture is based on modernisation and high-tech popular in Britain and the same can be said contradictory industries, and creating better conditions about British literature, drama, music and for mutually beneficial investments. Our film in Russia. We hope that a series of priorities are very much like those of high profile cultural events planned for the Britain as regards meeting the challenges coming year would meet keen interest of Foreign Secretary William of the current difficult situation on the the sophisticated British public and foster Hague meeting Russian global markets. The two governments have mutual understanding between our peoples Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov identified six areas of bilateral cooperation and nations. F in London, 15 February 2011 Photo: FCO Photo: 7 FIRST .
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